# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — In re Cournoyer

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_2193%3A1

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1991
- **Citation:** 502 U.S. 805

## Text

~ ~e Supreme Court, U.S.
90-1874) OT ED
. JUN 4 9

{
No. orn oF me cum |

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1990

IN RE: ARTHUR COURNOYER,

Petitioner,

PETITION FOR
AN EXTRAORDINARY WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND

ROBERT D. POWELL
LAW OFFICES OF
ROBERT D. POWELL, P.C.
2033 M Street, N.W.
Suite 703
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 223-5140

Attorney for Petitioner.

June 4, 1991

bi 2]

(t)

QUESTION PRESENTED

DID THE SUPERIOR COURT OF RHODE ISLAND VIO-
LATE PETITIONER’S RIGHTS UNDER THE 14 TH
AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES BY ORDERING THE DESTRUCTION OF NON-
OFFENDING FIXTURES AND PERSONAL PROPERTY
LAWFULLY PLACED ON HIS REALTY AS A METHOD
OF ENFORCING A CONTEMPT DECREE, WITHOUT
HOLDING A HEARING SPECIFICALLY FOCUSED ON
THE VALIDITY OF THOSE ITEMS BEING ON PETI-
TIONER’S PROPERTY?

(it)
TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED. .........-00000000

TABLE OF CONTENTS, 0.00 cc cccccccsccccvsnes

JURISDICTION 2... ccc ccc crc ceneeeeennncvens
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED.......
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .... 0... ese eeeecees

REASONS FOR ALLOWING THIS REQUEST FOR

ISSUANCE OF EXTRAORDINARY WRIT.........
CONCLUSION 0.0 ccc ccc cer cc ees e sce nnesees

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Avery v. Midland County, Texas, 390 U.S. 474, 20

L.Ed.2d 45, 86 S.Ct. 1114 (1968) ............6.-

Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust and Savings v. Hill, 281 U.S.

673, 74 L.Ed. 1107, 50 S.Ct. 451 (1930)..........

Deauville Associates, Inc., v. Eristave Tchitcherine, 173
Fae Fae Gee Ge BOUND 622s 60k 6 ane eRe as 6S

De Beers Consol. Mines v. U.S., 325 U.S. 212, 89 L.Ed.
om Fe Re | ere ee ee

Ex Parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 91 L.Ed. 2041, 67 S.Ct.

tS pre cere ie CCN Tres

Far East Conf. v. U.S., 342 U.S. 570, 96 L.Ed. 576, 72

FoR gi Pre errr ee ee
Herbert v. State of Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 47 S.Ct. 103

House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 89 L.Ed. 739, 65 S.Ct. 517
| Pe er are ree sa on eer

~ ei

(itt)

Cases, continued: Page
Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U.S. 407, 42 L.Ed. 215, 17 S.Ct.
DCCL Chh CASS SES ae na 6ceesecceoserecs 7
In re 620 Church St. Bldg., 299 U.S. 24, 81 L.Ed. 16,
DCR E CLS Sow eeéccessesececcsvess 6
Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy v. NRC, 479 U.S.
1312, 93 L.Ed.2d 692, 107 S.Ct. 682 (1986) ........... 5
Statutory Provisions, and the Constitution
of the United States:
1. Section 1, Amendment 14 to the Constitution of the
sees ck eben ee 6 bas sks esesece 2
EL SRcS Ga Rhee bce sc ceaecereserces 1
APPENDICES:
Appendix A — Order of the Honorable Justice Giannini,
PS) ) re Loti eakeweeues cee hae: ae
Appendix B — Order of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island,
March 28, 1991,...... yee e na ewe es bee ebeenees: 3a
Appendix C — Order of the Honorable Justice Giannini,
ae ee Pewee e686 eben e sees 4a
Appendix D - Supplemental Order, Honorable Justice
ae ) ee ee a 7a
Appendix E — Order of the Honorable Justice Giannini,
February 20, 1991............ cea es i eeeeeees . 9a
Appendix F — Order of the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island, November 16, 1990........ Leh ekGik bcs ss 808
Appendix G — Decree of the Honorable Justice Giannini,
February 22, 1990.......... Pek See es be be esos. 13a
Appendix H ~ Decree of the Honorable Justice Giannini,
l6a

February 21, 1990,........ : cece beeveaesteeer

w/attached transcript pages from honing of

POwrwaty ZI, 1GDG, 2. ccc cc cence sccvces .. 17a-19a

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1990

IN RE: ARTHUR COURNOYER,

Petitioner,

PETITION FOR
AN EXTRAORDINARY WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND

JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction of the Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
1651 (a). This Petition seeks the issuance of the extra-
ordinary writ of certiorari under said section, directed
to the orders of the Superior Court of Rhode Island,
dated February 20, 1991, and March 11, 1991, which
order, in part, the demolition of Petitioner’s garage, and
demolition or removal and sale of his house trailer, and
the removal and sale of his duly registered vehicles,
directing that review of said matters be brought directly
before this Court.

i aaa

2
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED

Petitioner relies on a portion of Section 1 of the 14th
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, to
wit:

No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States; nor shall any state de-
prive any person of life, liberty or property with-
out due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner’s history with the Town of Lincoln, Rhode
Island, extends back to 1958, and marches through a
massive amount of litigation. See Cournoyer v. ZBR of
Lincoln, 92 R.I. 42, 166 A.2d 128 (1960); Town of Lin-
coln v. Cournoyer, 95 R.I. 20, 186 A.2d 728 (1962);
Town of Lincoln v. Cournoyer, 102 R.I. 512, 232 A.2d
124 (1967); Cournoyer v. Sharkey, 107 R.I. 373, 267
A.2d 722 (1970); Town of Lincoln v. Cournoyer, R.I.
290 A.2d 600 (R.I. 1976); Town of Lincoln v. Courno-
yer, —R.L-, 375 A.2d 410 (R.I. 1977); Town of Lin-
coln v, Cournoyer, —R.I.— (Appeal #90-145A, sum-
marily dismissed November 16, 1990). All this litigation
stems from a Town Zoning Ordinance placing Petition-
er’s land in a residential zone, after it had been used for
many years in a commercial enterprise, a junk yard for
truck parts. Petitioner, in response to the Town’s initial
attempt to enforce its newly enacted ordinance, claimed
“grandfather” rights. Somehow, these rights were waived,
and a consent decree was passed in which Petitioner was

wel

3

alleged to have agreed to conform his use of his property
to the ordinance.

Throughout this litigation, Petitioner has claimed that
he had never authorized the original consent decree of
1958, which consented to his waiver of his “grandfather
rights” under the Town of Lincoln’s zoning ordinance
so assiduously enforced since 1958. He has never had a
hearing on that claim, and all parties involved at the time
in 1958, are deceased, save Petitioner.

Petitioner was incarcerated at least five times for con-
tempt of court for failing to clear junked trucks and parts
from his property. These parts have repeatedly been
cleared off the land, and sold, the proceeds going to pay
for administrative expenses. After the fifth imprisonment,
the property was entirely cleared of all property in con-
formance with the Town’s Zoning Ordinance. It is
cleared as of this day.

As part of the Superior Court’s order of February 22,
1990, for the stated purpose of depriving Petitioner of
ever again being able to defy a Court order regarding his
non-conforming use of his property (See Appendix H),
Petitioner was ordered to remove from his property his
house trailer, his garage, and several lawfully registered
vehicles. The garage was built on Petitioner’s property
pursuant to a lawful building permit. Petitioner attempt-
ed to introduce the permit into evidence, but no hearing
was conducted concerning its validity. Neither the Town
of Lincoln nor any of the Petitioner’s neighbors had com-
plained about the garage. Petitioner’s house trailer was
upon his property and served as his home prior to any
ordinance precluding it. He obtained and sought to
introduce affidavits to that effect, but no hearing was
ever held concerning this alleged pre-existing usage. No
one had ever complained about the house trailer.

[a

4

Finally, Petitioner maintains four registered vehicles
on his property, that may not be classified as “junk” or
“scrap,” and these have not been complained of by the
Town or his neighbors, yet the order requires their re-
moval and sale.

It should also be noted that Petitioner was sentenced
to serve six months at the Adult Correctional Institute
of Rhode Island for Contempt of Court on February 22,
1990, sentence suspended. The suspension was vacated
on March 11, 1991, and he began serving that sentence
on that date. He was released on his own recognizance
on May 9, 1991. An application for a writ of Habeas
Corpus, filed in the U.S. District Court for Rhode Island,
was denied on May 30, 1991, the stated grounds being
that petitioner had not yet exhausted all of his state
court remedies, as the appeal referenced below is pend-
ding. The District Court did not reach the merits of the
case.

Petitioner sought a stay of the Superior Court’s Order,
as it pertained to these items of property referred to
above, seeking a hearing on his rights under Section 1,
Amendment 14 to the U.S. Constitution. The Superior
Court refused to stay its order, but authorized that the
subject be briefed. Petitioner and counsel for the Town
of Lincoln submitted briefs. Petitioner sought only a
hearing to provide him with an opportunity to be heard
on the validity of the placement of his garage, house
trailer, and vehicles. The Court denied additional hear-
ings, ruling the matter res judicata, although no specific
hearing on the subject had ever been held. An applica-
tion for an interlocutory stay was made to the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island. Its ruling was that a stay would
not issue, as the matter was res judicata. ie

5

Petitioner has appealed the Superior Court’s Orders of
February 20, 1991, and March 11, 1991, to the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island. In addition to his Section 1, 14th
Amendment rights, Petitioner will assert in that court
rights under the 4th and 9th Amendments to the Consti-
tution, Given its ruling on Petitioner’s stay request, there
is no doubt that the Supreme Court of Rhode Island will
dismiss Petitioner’s appeal.

Petitioner presented an application for injunctive
relief to Justice Souter, on May 17, 1991, Case No.
A-869, which application was denied on May 18, 1991.

REASONS FOR ALLOWING THIS REQUEST FOR
ISSUANCE OF AN EXTRAORDINARY WRIT

With Justice Scalia’s decision and caution in Ohio Citt-
zens for Responsible Energy, Inc., v. NRC, 479 U.S.
1312, 93 L.Ed.2d 692, 107 S.Ct. 682 (1986), squarely
in mind, as well as Rule 20 of this Court’s Rules, it is sub-
mitted that absent the issuance of a writ of certiorari
herein, Petitioner’s lawful residence will be destroyed or
sold; his garage, a lawful fixture on his property, will be
destroyed, and his lawfully registered vehicles, used by
him in his business, will be sold. The res that would be
the basis for review by this Court of the what would
no doubt be the ultimate and negative decision of the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island, would no longer exist.
Should this Court ultimately find the state actions below
unconstitutional, the decision would be of little solace to
the Petitioner. He would be left with an invitation
toward further litigation, and little more, and confront a
hardship in awaiting the finalization of the appeal pro-
cess. United States Alkali Export Association v. U.S.,
325 U.S. 196, 89 L.Ed. 1554, 65 S.Ct. 1120 (1945).

This Court clearly has authority to resort to the com-
mon law wnt of certiorari, in aid of its jurisdiction,

pei

ny

Cnited States halt Export cdyss'n. supra: Far East Con-
Jerence & ULS., 342 U.S. 370, Yo Lied. 576, 72 S.Ct.
#92 (1952); House ve, Mayu, 324 U.S. 42, 89 L.Ed. 739,
65 S.Ct. 317 (1945); dn re 620 Church St. Bldg, 299
U.S. 24, 81 L.Ed. 16, 57 S.Ct. 88 (1936), especially when
Petitioner will suffer great harm awaiting the appeal pro-
cess to be fulfilled. .tlkali Export .iss'n., supra, More-
over, at this juncture, given the ruling of the Supreme
Court of Rnode Island on Petitioner’s request for a stay,
it is safe to say that the sole appellate relief available to
Petitioner on the important constitutional issues raised
herein will be in this Court. Under these extraordinary
circumstances, where an appeal in a state court is mani-
fesdy inadequate, the extraordinary relief herein re-
quested is warranted Ex Parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258,
91 L.Ed. 2041, 67 S.Ct. 1558 (19+7).

Section | of the 14th Amendment clearly applies to
the issues at hand, including actions of the Rhode Island
judiciary. Brinkerhosf-Faris Trust and Savings v. Hill,
281 U.S. 673, 74 L.Ed. 1107, 50 S.Ct. 45: (1930); Steel
Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 93 L.Ed. 1544, 69 S.Ct.
1291 (1949); very v. Midland County, Texas, 390 U.S.
+74, 20 L.Ed.2d 45, 86 S.Ct 1114 (1968).

In the instant case, Petitioner submitted to the Rhode
Island courts that all offending property had been cleared
from his realty prior to the Superior Court's orders of
February 20 and March 11, 1991. An order had been
passed one year pnor, on February 22, 1990, dealing
with his house trailer, garage and vehicles, which he be-
lieved were not covered by orders of years passed, and
which dealt with property not offensive to anyone. The
stated purpose for including the garage, trailer, and vehi-
cles Was to insure that Petitioner did no turther business

“3

on his property (See Appendix H). But they were luw-
fully on his property, and have uses other than business
uses. He asked to be heard on this specific issue, as
recently as March 1991, Luc found the courthouse doors
closed to him. In effect, his property is being taken
from him, destroyed, or will be sold, as part of the con-
tempt process, without specific hearing or process, in
direct violation of this Court’s holding, limited to its
facts, of Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U.S. 409, 42 L.Ed. 215,
17 S.Ct. 841 (1897). Also see Brinkerhoss-Fans Trust
and Savings v. Hill, wherein Justice Brandeis, speaking
for the Court, said

whether acting through its judiciary or through its

legislature, a state may not deprive a person of all

existing remedies for the enforcement of a right,
which the state has no power to destroy, unless
there is, or was, afforded to him some real oppor-

tunity to protect it. (281 U.S. 673, at 682).

A court should not prescribe, as a means to enforce its
orders, that its doors be closed to one in contempt in de-
fense of either his liberty or property. Deauville Assoct-
ates, Inc., v. Eristave Tchitcherine, 173 F.2d 745 (5th
Cir. 1949).

The enforcement of the Rhode Island Court’s Order
wouild fall squarely within this caveat, and the Hovey
pronibitions. In the instant case, without regard to Peti-
tioner’s constitutional rights, the Superior Court sought
to enforce its orders by means other than fines or im-
prisonment, without proper process. This was inappro-
priate and beyond the Court’s judicial power, Deauville
.issuciates, supra. When a court so acts bevond its judi-
clal power, its actions exemplify not mere error, but a
usurpation of power. I[t is this sort of a situation that

calis for the application of section 1651. De Beers

Consol. Mines v. U.S., 325 U.S. 212, 89 L.Ed. S06, 65

S.Ct. 1130 (1945).
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not take up the statutes of the several
states and make them the test of what it requires,
nor does it enable this court to reverse the decisions
of the State Courts on questions of state law. What
it does require is that state action, whether through
one agency or another, shall be consistent with the
fundamental principles of liberty and justice, which
lie at the base of all our civil and political institu-
tions. Herbert v. State of Louisiana, 272 U.S.
312 (1926), at p. 316.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner asks for the issuance of an extraordinary
writ of certiorari bringing the issue of the Superior Court
of Rhode Island’s actions with respect to his constitu-
tional rights directly before this Court. In effect, Peti-
tioner asks only for due process of law.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT D. PowELL
.lttomey sor Arthur Cournoyer

June +, 1991

eT rete a

la

APPENDIX A

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
PROVIDENCE, SC.

EQUITY NO. 26210

SUPERIOR COURT

TOWN OF LINCOLN
VS

JOSEPH A. COURNOYER

ORDER

This matter came to be heard before the Court, the
Honorable Justice Giannini presiding, upon respondent's
hearing concerning constitutional issues. The issues were
submitted on memorandum by the respondent and peti-
tioner replied. The memoranda were supplemented by
oral argument on April 29, 1991. After hearing thereon
and consideration thereof, it is hereby

ORDERED as follows:

1. Respondents’ request to present memoranda of law
conceming constitutional issues having been granted and
heard shall further be treated as a motion to reconsider
and amend the Court’s order dated February 20, 1990.

2. As such, respondent’s motion to reconsider and
amend is denied.

3. In doing so, the Court finds that the Supreme Court
Order dated November 16, 1990 rendered final ull issues

relative to the arguments presently argued.

2a

+. Had said arguments been presented to the Superior
Court prior to the Court's order dated February 20, 1990
the Superior Court would have found Mr. Cournoyer’s
constitutional rights not to have been violated by the pro-

cess followed in this case.

BY ORDER

ENTER

Justice of the Superior Court

PRESENTED BY:

/s/ James P. Marusak
James P. Marusak
GIDLEY, LOVEGREEN & SARLI

70 Westminster Street
Providence, Rhode Island 02903

3a
APPENDIX B
SUPREME COURT OF RHODE ISLAND
No, 91-132-A.
Town of Lincoln

v.
Joseph Coumoyer.

ORDER

The defendant’s motion to stay the order of the Su-
perior Court entered in this matter on March 11, 1991 is
denied. The Special Master’s motion to remand the
Papers in this matter to the Superior Court for hearing
scheduled for April 2, 1991 is granted. Following said
hearing the papers shall be returned to this court forth-

with,
Mrs. Justice Murray did not participate.

Entered as an Order of this Court this 28th day of
March 1991.

By Order,

/s/ Beverly A. Clark per

Matthew J. Smith
Clerk

tu

APPENDIX C

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
PROVIDENCE, SC. SUPERIOR COURT

Equity + 26210
TOWN OF LINCOLN
VS.

JOSEPH A. COURNOYER, ET AL.

ORDER

This matter came to be heard before the Superior
Court, Mr. Justice Gianinni presiding, on March 11, 1991,
upon continuation of the Status Hearing of February 15,
1991.

After hearing thereon and consideration thereof it 1s
hereby

ORDERED, as follows:

1. The suspension of the six month sentence imposed
on February 15, 1991 is hereby vacated; the Respondent
having failed to remove the violating vehicles, structures
and materials as ordered.

2. The Respondent is ordered to serve six months in
the Adult Correctional Institution.

3. At the request of the Respondent's counsel the
hearing on the Special Masters request for payment of his
fees from funds on deposit in the Registry of the Court is
hereby continued to Apni 1, 1991 at 10 a.m.

CC OSSGDSS ST

5a

+. The Special Master is ordered to make arrangements
for the demolition of the garage; the sale of all materials
and vehicles in the garage; the sale of all vehicles and
plows now on the premises with the exception of the
Respondent’s passenger vehicle and the removal or demvu-
lition of the house trailer present on the premises.

5. The Respondent is assessed, and shal] remain re-
sponsible to pay for, all costs and fees incurred in the
prosecution of this Order and all other prior Orders of
the Court.

6. In order to obtain the services to be engaged and
the goods to be sold at appropriate values, the Special
Master is directed to seek said services and sales by com-
petitive bidding where feasible.

7. The Special Master is directed to advertise for a
contract or contracts for services for the demolition and/
or removal of the garage and trailer and to advertise for
the sale of the contents of the garage and all other vehi-
cles and items noted above. The Special Master shall en-
deavor to solicit at least three (3) competitive bids for the
items of service and sale which bids shall be opened and
awarded in open Court on a date certain to be selected
by the Special Master. The Master shall retain the right to
reject all bids and to go onto the open market with the
approval of the court for good cause shown.

8. To effectuate prompt payment for any and all ser-
vices and fees incurred pursuant hereto, the proceeds of
any sale of goods and the amounts now on deposit with
the Registry of the Court shall first be applied. If the
costs and fees exceed said amount recovered and on de-
posit, then the excess shall be paid by the Town of Lin-
coln. Any amounts so expended by the Town shall be
added to the amounts constituting a continuing lien upon
the Respondent’s property. All sums due to the Town of

————

a a < Nee

a — ———

6a

Lincoln may ultimately be recouped pursuant to fore:
closure and sale of the Respondent’s property alter fur-

ther hearing by the Court.

9. The Respondent's request to present Memorand’ of
Law concerning constitutional issues is granted. Respénd-
ent shall present any such memorandum on or before
March 22, 1991 and the Petitioner shall submit its reply
on or before April 10, 1991.

10. The Respondent's request for a stay of implemen-
tation of this Order is denied.

BY ORDER

/s/ Shirley A. Connelly, Asst. Clerk

ENTER

/s/ Giannini, P.J./Rel.)
Justice of the Superior Court

Dated: March 15, 1991

Presented by

/s/ James P. Marusak

James P. Marusak

GIDLEY, LOVEGREEN & SARLI
170 Westminster Street
Providence, RI 02903

ee 2

7a
APPENDIX D

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND

PROVIDENCE, SC. SUPERIOR COURT

Equity # 26210
TOWN OF LINCOLN
VS.

JOSEPH A. COURNOYER, ET AL.

SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER

This matter came to be heard before the Superior
Court, Mr. Justice Gianinni presiding, on March 11, 1991,
upon Respondent’s Motion to clarify paragraph ++ of the
Order submitted by the Special Master and dated Febru-
ary 20, 1991.

After hearing thereon and consideration thereof it is

hereby

ORDERED, as follows:

That paragraph #4 of the Order submitted by the Spe-
cial Master on or about February 20, 1991 is hereby sup-
plemented to reflect the clear intent of the Bench deci-
sion issued on February 15, 1991 which intent was
plainly made known to all parties at that time.

As further detailed in said Bench Decision, by directing

the Respondent “to clean up his property’? the Court
required Mr. Cournoyer to remove all vehicles from his

8a

premises other than his personal passenger vehicle, as well
as all other structures and materials delineated in the

Order.
BY ORDER

/s/ Shirley A. Connelly, Asst. Clerk

ENTER

/s/ Giannini, P. J. (Ret.)
Justice of the Superior Court

Dated: March 15, 1991

Presented by:

/s/ James P. Marusak

James P. Marusak

GIDLEY, LOVEGREEN & SARLI
170 Westminster Street
Providence, RI 02903

| 9a

i APPENDIX E

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
PROVIDENCE, SC. SUPERIOR COURT

EQUITY NO. 26210
TOWN OF LINCOLN
VS.

JOSEPH A. COURNOYER, et al.

ORDER

This matter came on to be heard before Judge Gian-
nini, Presiding Justice of this Court, on February 15,
1991, upon status hearing and upon the Special Master's
request for payment of his fees from the funds on de-
posit in the Registry of the Court; and after hearing
1 thereon and consideration thereof, it is hereby

ee aga eta tie "ie

ORDERED

1. That Respondent is adjudged to be in civil con-
tempt of the Orders of the Superior Court.

2. Respondent is hereby sentenced to serve a term of
six months at the Adult Correctional Institution.

3. The purpose for the sentence is to get the Respond-
ent to clean up his property.

+. Respondent is directed to clean up his property,
to tear down the garage, and to remove the house trailer.
If these are done by March 8, 1991, Respondent will not

go to jail.

eee

10a

5. The sentence of six months for civil contempt is
hereby suspended to see what the Respondent does about
this matter by March 8, 1991.

6. This matter is continued to March 8, 1991, at
10:00 a.m. for a status hearing.

7. The request for payment of fees by the Special
Master shall be considered by the Court at the continua-
tion of this hearing on March 8, 1991, at 10:00 a.m.

By order,

/s/ Ilegible

Deputy Clerk 2-20-91
ENTER:
/s/ Giannini, P. J.

Presiding Justice of the
Superior Court

DATED: February 20, 1991

PRESENTED BY:

/s/ Joseph T. Little

JOSEPH T. LITTLE, ESQUIRE 7
Special Master 2
225 Waterman Avenue
P.O. Box 14198

East Providence, RI 02914
434-3800

lla

APPENDIX F

SUPREME COURT OF RHODE ISLAND

No. 90-145-Appeal.

Town of Lincoln
ve

Joseph A. Cournoyer, et al.

ORDER

~ 4s8 Case came before this court for oral argument on
",ovember 5, 1990. Both parties had been ordered to
show cause why the issues raised by this appeal should
not be summarily decided. Defendant is appealing his
contempt conviction. The conviction arises out of the
defendant’s failure to comply with a court decree order-
ing him to clean up his property. Defendant alleges that
the Superior Court judge exceeded his authority in order-
ing defendant to remove his trailer home and garage
from his property, and in enjoining defendant from keep-
ing more than one registered vehicle on the property.

After careful consideration of the arguments and
memoranda submitted by the parties, this court finds
that cause has not been shown. Accordingly, we sum-
marily decide that the trial judge did not exceed his
authority in entering the above order.

Therefore, defendants’ appeal is denied and dismissed.
The decision of the Superior Court is hereby affirmed.

es

12a

Entered as an Order of this Court this 16th day of
November 1990.

By Order,

/s/ Beverly A. Clark

Matthew J. Smith
Clerk

Mr. Chief Justice Fay did not participate.

ae hae ee ae ee ee ee ee ee eee ee ee ee ee oe ail aes

l3a

APPENDIX G
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
PROVIDENCE, SC. SUPERIOR COURT

EQUITY NO. 26210

TOWN OF LINCOLN
VS

ARTHUR COURNOYER

DECREE

This matter came on for hearing on February 22, 1990,
before Presiding Justice Giannini for the imposition of
sanctions to be imposed upon the Defendant, Arthur
Cournoyer, based upon the Bench Decision of February
21, 1990; and after hearing arguments of counsel, it is
hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED:

1. Defendant is sentenced to the A.C.I. for a period of
six (6) months.

2. Said sentence is suspended upon the following con-
ditions:

A. Defendant is required to clear from that land all
vehicles, all parts of vehicles, all tires, all lumber, and all
debris. Defendant does not have to clear those trees
which might be uprooted and in a natural state.

B. Defendant is to remove anything that is inside
the garage.

l4a

C. The garage must be removed from the land
either by removal of the garage from the land or by the
demolition of same with the rubbish and rubble from
said demolition removed from the land.

D. Defendant is permitted to retain and drive on
the land one vehicle, a 1979 Ford automobile with the
present registration number WW 162. No other vehicles
are allowed on the land.

E. In the event that it is necessary for Defendant
to bring additional vehicles on the land to effectuate the
cleanup of the land, the Defendant is directed to call the
Special Master, Mr. Little, or his attorney, Charles Rogers,
to obtain permission from Presiding Justice Giannini to
bring any other vehicles onto the property.

F. The Defendant has until April 30, 1990 to clear
the land, demolish or remove the garage and clear every-
thing that is in the garage.

G. The house trailer on the premises must also be
removed from the premises by April 30, 1990.

3. This case is continued for further hearing on Thurs-
day, March 1, 1990, provided a Motion is filed by the
Defendant prior to that time.

4. The Lincoln Police Department is hereby advised
that the only vehicle allowed on the Cobble Hill Road
property is a 1979 Ford with registration of WW 162.
The Police Department is hereby advised that after March
1, 1990, there are to be periodic and random inspections
of that real estate on a daily basis, one of which inspec-
tions must be between midnight and 5:00 a.m. The pur-
pose of the inspections is to insure that no vehicles are
on the premises other than the 1979 Ford with the regis-
tration of WW 162.

15a

5. Mr. Little, Special Master, is directed to arrange to
video tape the entire premises including the interior of
the garage prior to February 28, 1990. In addition, the
entire 30 odd acres must be video taped.

6. The Special Master is directed to go on the land on
May lst and no later than May 5th to video tape the
garage, the contents of same and the entire 30 acres of
the premises.

7. The Special Master, is hereby directed to arrange
for both video tapes to be viewed by the Court on Mon-
day, May 7, 1990.

8. This matter is continued for further hearing on
Monday, May 7, 1990, at 10:00 a.m.

9. Nothing contained herein will prevent the Town
from moving that the suspension of the 6-months sen-
tence be removed if the Town is of the opinion that this
Order has been violated. The Town may present a Motion
to have the Defendant adjudged in contempt.

ENTERED as a Decree of this Court this day of
February, A.D. 1990.

By Order,

Clerk

ENTER:

JUDGE

l6a

APPENDIX H
SUPERIOR COURT OF RHODE ISLAND

EQUITY NO. 26210

TOWN OF LINCOLN
VS

ARTHUR COURNOYER

DECREE

This matter came on for hearing on February 21. 1990,
before Presiding Justice Giannini on the Motion filed by
the Plaintiff, Town of Lincoln, who adjudged the Defend-
ant in Contempt. On the basis of the findings of fact con-
tained in the Bench Decision of February 21, 1990, it is
hereby

ORDERED, AD]UDGED and DECREED:

1. That the Defendant has violated the zoning ordi-
nance of the Town of Lincoln and is in contempt of the
Decree of this Court entered on February 18, 1958.

ENTERED as a Decree of this Court this day of
February, A.D. 1990.

By order,

ENTER: Clerk

JUDGE

l7a

[Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings of
February 21, 1990]

[12] THE COURT: I’m going to discuss this proposal,
but before I do, I want to make some comments on state-
ments made by Mr. Ragers on behalf of this respondent.
The first statement is that what I heard this morning is in
large measure just a rehash of everything I heard in the
courtroom. The same arguments have been made. I heard
him say that Mr. Little isn’t doing anything. It’s not for
him to judge. That’s for me to judge. I have heard him
talk about his trailer and where he has to live. I have
made a ruling on that. I made a ruling with regard to the
garage. I see the garage as the means by which he is able
to conduct an illegal business in a residential zone. Now,
whether that ruling is correct or not in light of the pur-
ported building permit for that garage is another matter.
Supreme Court has that. There was evidence in the record
that there was no building permit issued, and there is no
contradictory evidence to that.

Now, there are a couple of things that were said by Mr.
Rogers that I think ought to be said, even though largely
it’s merely a rehash. This business about the tar-filled
trailer and it being the source of a large amount of the
$25,000 estimate given to Mr. Little by Metals Recycling,
as to that, it doesn’t seem to the Court to mean anything
that no one has ever moved it. It’s Mr. Cournoyer’s re-
sponsibility to move it. And whether the Town had
moved it, and probably spent a large amount of money
in doing so, and charged it to Mr. Cournoyer, or if Mr.
Couroyer is responsible to move it and pays a lot of
money to do it, or if Mr. Little gets Metals Recycling to
do it for a lot of money, it’s all going to come out of
Mr. Cournoyer’s pocket. The fact that it hasn’t been
moved before doesn’t change anything. It’s got to be

18a

moved. And whether it was moved in Judge Pettine’s
order and the costs charged to Mr. Cournoyer, or
whether Mr. Cournoyer is required to move it now, it
all comes out to the same thing, Mr. Cournoyer is
going to pay for it.

With respect to Mr. Cournoyer’s inability to clean
that place up now because he’s in prison, that man was
given better than two months to clear it up, and he
defied the Superior Court. And now he’s claiming that
he can’t comply because he’s incarcerated. That’s trying
to have it both ways. It’s up to him to figrue out a way.
The way Mr. Little was able to get hold of Metals Recy-
cling, Mr. Cournoyer can do the same thing. If he’s able
to use the telephone to talk to reporters, he’s able to call
Metals Recycling and probably some established junk
dealers to find out how to go about doing it. I don’t
accept the argument that his incarceration prevents him
from dealing with people on the outside. I would have
to have John Moran, Director of Corrections, tell me
that. I would have to have John Moran tell me that
people who are incarcerated cannot do business on the
outside, if that’s a legal business. Unfortunately, there
are people who are incarcerated who have no trouble
conducting illegal business on the outside.

With regard to this question that it’s unreasonable to
expect Mr. Cournoyer to clean this area without the use
of a couple of trucks, flies absolutely in the face of what
the Court said on the record in the courtroom. The Court
recognized in entering this order that in addition to the
use of that garage, the other means by which Mr. Cour-
noyer was able to conduct this illegal business was to be
able to use a pick-up and a tow truck.

* * *

19a

[22] Now, the cleanup must include everything that is in
that garage. That garage is the source of Mr. Cournoyer’s
violation of this zoning ordinance. If that garage is elimi-
nated, he’s not going to have any place to work. But if
the Supreme Court says that my ruling in that regard is
improper, then at least the material in that garage must
be removed, because there is no [23] question in my
mind that whatever is in that garage is used to further this
illegal conduct of the business.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_2193%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
