# Amicus Curiae Brief — Grumman Aerospace Corp. v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1991
- **Citation:** 502 U.S. 919

## Text

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
CP JUN 2 1 yegt
No. 90-1800 | QEFICE OF THE CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

GRUMMAN AEROSPACE CORPORATION,
Petitioner,

if

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To
The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Federal Circuit

SHIPBUILDERS COUNCIL OF AMERICA
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
PETITIONER, GRUMMAN AEROSPACE CORPORATION

JOHN G. DEGOOYER
Counsel of Record

RONALD A. UITz

HopKINS & SUTTER

888 Sixteenth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 835-8000

Counsel for Amicus Curiae
Shipbuilders Council of America

PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS, WASHINGTON, D.C. (202) 347-8203

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
THE AMICUS AND ITS INTERESTS ..................0000. 1
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ........... 4

I.

il.

IMPORTANT POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES OF

THE CONTRACT DISPUTES ACT ARE FRUS-
TRATED BY THE DECISION OF THE COURT

OT ia scoacatcneainathecadmicibbneiguie atiaetansamnttnecaneie 6

THIS COURT SHOULD EXERCISE ITS SUPER-
VISORY JURISDICTION TO CORRECT THE UN-
PRECEDENTED AND PATENTLY ERRONEOUS
READING GIVEN THE_CONTRACT DISPUTES
ACT AND THE FAR CERTIFICATION REGULA-
SEE ES EMRE CAFURE BAIA cocsecescssesteseresnveies 13

PETIT snnisevehseseneeshsdgetinntannesiniantennbediiteseapwaonin 18

il
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES: Page

Alaska Lumber and Pulp Co., Inc., AGBCA No. 82-
107-1, 1990 Westlaw 34704 (March 20,

SUED séninsdinicnctseisdemanneuaie madame ee 12
Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 182 (1982) woo... eee. 13
Chemical Manufacturers Ass’n v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116 (1985) .... 13
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) occ ceeeeee 13
Columbia Mfg. Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 715 F.2d 1409

rN a nA 17
Crandon v. United States, 110 S.Ct. 997 (1990) ... 14

Federal Election Commission v. Democratic Sena-
torial Campaign Committee, 454 U.S. 27

SINE D cetbiecndecevdesbnnbasaeducsusdasiadmmeenese ae aene 13
Linn Timber, Inc., AGBCA No. 89-194-1, 90-1 BCA

YE CD vesscnccevecnexsseteccunnaieee 17
Little River Lumber v. United States, 21 Cl.Ct. 527

RUUD | Scccsnctenscesamanuaticerctisssanekdsata ee ae 12,17
Sullivan v. United States, 4 Cl.Ct. 70 (1983), aff'd,

742 F.2d 628 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (per curiam) ... 17
United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864 (1977) ... 17
United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941) ... 17
STATUTES:

Contract Disputes Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-563,
92 Stat. 2383 (41 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq.) .... 4,passim

Sec. 2(4), 41 U.S.C. § 601(4) .0.............cccccceee. 15
Sec. 6(cX1), 41 U.S.C. § 605(cX(1) oo. 4,15
Sec. 8(aX1), 41 U.S.C. § 607(aY1) 0... 7
Sec. Od), 41 UBC. § GOT) ..cccicccccscscccessccces: 7

Sec. 8(h), 41 U.S.C. § GOT(h) ...c0....ccccscsccscesee. 14

ill

Table of Authorities Continued

Page
RS, OP MEED cscccsesesssesesessncecssseccces ll
Sec. 14(i), 92 Stat. 2391, amending 28 U.S.C.
ES 7
eee CP, © GOL GOCE) ............2..000005. 15
Act of November 26, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-129, 83
Nee scl ileseravassissnensosescsseccccserses 6
OFPP Act, Pub. L. No. 93-400, 88 Stat. 796
arr snissssavasscscssnsowanconsscosccosseeceees 17
Neen ees. tecbvsveonssascessccesssccscecoseoess 3,11

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS:

S. Rep. No. 93-692, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
NE IIE cescrsnssvescrnepsccee Ness siddsrbrsasssonnce 17

S. Rep. No. 95-1118, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.

Neen To | eerncnsesccsnseccssocs 7,9,15
H.R. Rep. No. 95-1556, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (Sep-
Nees rcasasnsnnsscvscrccsvssesece 9

124 Cong. Rec. S18636 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1978) .. 14
124 Cong. Rec. $18640 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1978) .. 15

See. GEG, BOEGO (1DTS) ..................0000.cceerreeee 15

REGULATIONS:

Federal Acquisition Regulation
0 A SD S|) eens 11
TE ES ee 12
PAR 35.201, 48 C.F.R. § 33.201 ..................... 11

FAR 33.207(c\2), 48 C.F.R. § 33.207(c\2) .... 4,15,16

Department of Defense FAR Supplement, 48 C.F.R.
TE tphateicanscenacccancssnsssvrcssenessesceesseeses 12

iv

Table of Authorities Continued

Department of Health and Human Services Acqui-
sition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. Chapter 3 ..........

Department of Agriculture Acquisition Regulation,
ee Re i I 8 a iiccad cs ieteassudenctudecennosate

General Services Administration Acquisition Regu-
lation, 48 C.F.R. Chapter 5 ........cccsocssscccoosseees

Department of State Acquisition Regulation, 48
Ra is aI RE ceca rcclebenigsaa cihestShoveionseds

Agency for International Development Acquisition
Regulation, 48 C.F.R. Chapter 7.0.0.0...

Department of Veterans Affairs Acquisition Regu-
mntion, 46 C.F BR. Chetet & oon cccnescccnsccssssesesss

Department of Energy Acquisition Regulation, 48
Rei ee MIMI WF The FAR certification requirement has already produced the
anomaly tnat CDA claims submitted under contracts subject to
the FAR are judged by the FAR’s restrictive standard of who
must certify claims on behalf of non-individual contractors, while
CDA claims submitted under contracts not subject to the FAR
are judged by the rational standard that a certifier authorized
to bind the ‘‘contractor’’ satisfies the will of Congress in the
CDA. See Little River Lumber v. United States, 21 Cl.Ct. 527,
533-34 (1990); Alaska Lumber and Pulp Co., Inc., AGBCA No.
82-107-1, 1990 Westlaw 34704 (March 20, 1990).

13

II. THIS COURT SHOULD EXERCISE ITS SUPERVISORY
JURISDICTION TO CORRECT THE UNPRECEDENTED
AND PATENTLY ERRONEOUS READING GIVEN THE
CONTRACT DISPUTES ACT AND THE FAR CERTI-
FICATION REGULATION BY THE COURT BELOW

In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 887 (1984), this Court
articulated the principles governing judicial review of
interpretations by administrative agencies of the stat-
utes they are entrusted by Congress with the duty
to administer. Before applying this Court’s Chevron
principles of deference to agency action, however, a
reviewing court. must first determine whether Con-
gress has delegated to the agency a duty to admin-
ister the statute in question or, to put it differently,
whether Congress has empowered the agency to regu-
late in the first place.® In this case, the court below

® See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842, 844 (EPA accorded de-
ference since it was entrusted to administer statutory scheme
of Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91
Stat. 685); Chemical Manufacturers Ass’n v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 118 & n.2, 125 (1985) (EPA
accorded deference since it was entrusted to administer Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.); Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S.
132, 139-140 & n.8, 141-142 (1982) (Secretary of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare accorded deference since he was charged
with administering federal funding for emergency assistance pro-
grams under Title IV-A of Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 603(a\5)); and Federal Election Commission v. Democratic Sen-
atorial Campaign Committee, 454 U.S. 27, 45 (1981) (Commis-
sion accorded deference because Congress vested it with primary
and substantial responsibility for enforcing Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. 44 431 et seg., and provided
the agency with extensive rulemaking and adjudicative powers).
By contrast, regulatory interpretations of a statute made by an
agency that has not been delegated specific responsibility to

14

made no such inquiry and made no such determina-
tion. Instead, the court improperly invoked Chevron
and thereby erroneously concluded that it was re-
quired to defer to the agency’s judgment and to its
regulation. App. 4a-7a. Had the court not ignored the
critical, indispensable first step of a proper Chevron
analysis, it would have quickly discerned that the FAR
certification regulation is entitled to no deference at
all and cannot, therefore, have the force and effect
of law.

The only authority that Congress granted to OFPP
in the CDA statutory scheme was the specific and
strictly limited authority to “issue guidelines with re-
spect to criteria for the establishment, functions, and
procedure of the agency boards.’”’ CDA § &(h), 41
U.S.C. § 607(h). Congress did not empower OFPP to
administer the CDA, or to promulgate any regulation
whatsoever, much less a binding legislative regulation
defining the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts
and contract appeals boards to adjudicate contract
disputes. The language of the CDA could not be
clearer, but even even if resort to the legislative his-
tory of the CDA were appropriate, it too affirms that
the authority granted to OFPP was strictly limited.’

administer that statute are not entitled to deference under the
Chevron principles. See Crandon v. United States, 110 S.Ct. 997,
1011 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).

‘ Originally, the bill reported out of committee in the Senate,
directed OFPP to “issue rules and regulations with respect to”’
the establishment, functions, and procedures of the agency
boards. 124 Cong. Rec. S18636 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1978) (em-
phasis added). Even at that, OFPP’s role was unmistakably lim-
ited, almost clerical in nature, 1.e., ‘developing ... workload
study formats; being the central clearing point for collection of

15

The specific claim certification provision of the CDA
at issue in this case, CDA §6(c\1), 41 U.S.C.
§ 605(c\(1), has no legislative history. The provision is
not discussed in the committee reports because it was
added by amendment on the Senate floor—without
explanation or discussion—on the day the Senate
passed the legislation and the day before the House
passed it. See 124 Cong. Rec. 36266, 37074-76 (1978).
The only guidance as to the meaning and intent of
this provision insofar as this case is concerned, there-
fore, is the statute’s plain language that claims in
excess of $50,000 shall be certified by the ‘‘contrac-
tor’’ and the statute’s definition of ‘“‘contractor’’ for
these purposes as “‘a party to a Government contract
other than the Government.’ CDA §§ 6(c)(1) & 2(4),
41 U.S.C. §§ 605(c)1) & 601(4).

It is against this legislative backdrop that OFPP
promulgated the claim certification regulation that lies
at the heart of this case and which is now found at
FAR 33.207(c)(2), 48 C.F.R. § 33.207(c)(2). Section 16
of the CDA provides that the ‘Act shall apply to
contracts entered into one hundred twenty days after
the date of enactment.’’ See 41 U.S.C. § 601 (note).
On at least three separate occasions, OF PP relied on
this provision as its authority to issue proposed rules,
stating that the proposed contract and regulatory cov-
erage was necessary because the CDA required cer-

...agency’s workload studies; and acting in concert with the
agency head in the establishment of each board.”’ S. Rep. No.
95-1118 at 27. Later, on the Senate floor the words ‘rules and
regulations with respect to” in the bill were eliminated and
replaced by the words ‘“‘guidelines with respect to the criteria
for.” 124 Cong. Rec. $18640 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1978) (emphasis
added).

16

tain changes to clauses and procurement regulations
of the procuring agencies by March 1, 1979 (one
hundred twenty days after the CDA was signed into
law on November 1, 1978). See Proposed Rules, 44
Fed. Reg. 5,219 (Jan. 25, 1979); Interim Final Rules,
44 Fed. Reg. 12,519 (March 7, 1979); Final Rules and
Proposed Contract Disputes Clause, 44 Fed. Reg.
34,228 (June 14, 1979).

The interim final rules set forth an interim disputes
clause, including a requirement that contractors cer-
tify claims. 44 Fed. Reg. at 12,524. When it published
the final rules, OFPP modified the interim disputes
clause and invited comments. 44 Fed. Reg. at 34,229.
Up to and including this point, however, both the
proposed rules and interim disputes clauses required
‘the contractor’’ to certify claims, in exactly the same
language as Congress had specified in the CDA.

Then, on May 9, 1980, OF PP issued what it termed
a “‘policy directive’ (OFPP Policy Letter 80-3), again
based on Section 16 of the CDA, which completely
rescinded the previous “‘final’’ regulations, and set
forth new final regulations and a final disputes clause.
Final Contract Disputes Regulatory Coverage and
Contract Disputes Clause, 45 Fed. Reg. 31,035 (May
9, 1980). For the first time, the regulation included
the restriction now found at FAR 33.207(c\2), which
purports to describe who must certify a claim on be-
half of a non-individual contractor. OFPP described
the restriction as a ‘‘technical’”’ change ‘‘made to bet-
ter reflect the intent of the Contract Disputes Act.”
Id. OF PP provided no opportunity for notice and com-
ment on this change.*

* This alone prevents the regulation from having the force and

17
«

It is clear from the foregoing that the assignment
given to OFPP by Congress was narrow and specific
and did not authorize OFPP’s unfettered excursion
into any other areas, and certainly not into subject
matter jurisdiction of the contract appeals boards or
the Claims Court. Moreover, it is equally clear from

effect of law, since OFPP is required to follow notice and com-
ment procedures. See OFPP Act, Pub. L. No. 93-400, 88 Stat.
796, 797 § 6(dX2) (1974) and S. Rep. No. 93-692, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. at 1 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 4589, 4601-02. But even if OFPP had been authorized to
promulgate the regulation and had done so properly, the reg-
ulation conflicts with the legislation it purports to implement,
and thus cannot have force or effect. See United States v. Lar-
tonoff, 431 U.S. 864, 873 (1977) (‘‘regulations, in order to be
valid, must be consistent with the statute under which they are
promulgated’); Sullivan v. United States, 4 Cl.Ct. 70, 73 (1983)
(‘‘a regulation which is clearly incompatible with the statute
under which it was ostensibly promulgated must give way’’),
affd, 742 F.2d 628 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (per curiam). There can be
no doubt that the regulation conflicts with the CDA when the
same certification can simultaneously be “‘ciearly’’ invalid under
the regulation yet clearly valid under the plain language of the
CDA. See Little River, 21 Cl.Ci. at 534 (not reaching the issue
of whether the certification regulation is valid or material to
the court’s jurisdiction because the contracts involved were not
subject to the FAR). Under the CDA, Congress intentionally
conferred statutory jurisdiction to the Boards so that no agency
regulation or dispute clause requirement could alter their juris-
diction. See, e.g., United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590
(1941) (a rule that purports to alter jurisdiction conferred by
Congress is invalid); Columtia Mfg. Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 715 F.2d
1409, 1410 (9th Cir. 1983) (same). Cf Linn Timber, Inc., AGBCA
No. 89-194-1, 90-1 BCA 4 22,625 at-113,482 (1990) (refusing to
enforce contract disputes clause requirement for-certification of
claims for less than $50,000 since ‘‘such an act is obviously the
sole province of Congress’’). Yet according to the decision below,
whether or not a contract is subject to the FAR is a potentially
dispositive jurisdictional inquiry.

18

the regulation’s language and the context in which it
was promulgated that OFPP itself intended merely
to provide an interpretation of the CDA’s dispute
procedures for inclusion in agency contracts and
rules—not to define the subject matter jurisdiction of
the claims tribunals.

In these circumstances, the court below should not
have deferred to the assumed judgment and expertise
of the agency, but instead should have determined
whether the limiting language of the FAR certifica-
tion regulation could be squared with the statutory
grant of subject matter jurisdiction to the contract
appeals boards and the Court of Claims to adjudicate
claims certified by the “‘contractor.”” Had the court
done Sa, it never could have rendered the decision it
did. This Court should, therefore, review and reverse
that erroneous decision.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the petition for a writ of
certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN G. DEGOOYER
Counsel of Record

RONALD A. UITz

HopkKINs & SUTTER

888 Sixteenth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 835-8000

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

June 1991 Shipbuilders Council of America

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_2126%3A4. Public record. Not legal advice.
