# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Savic v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1991
- **Citation:** 502 U.S. 813

## Text

90-1790)

IN THE

Supreme Court, U.S.

MAY 15 1991

SUPREME COURT OF THRE UNITED S’
October Term, 1990

TOMISLAV SAVIC,
Petitioner,

v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

Owins OF THE CLERK

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Bogdan Martinovich
Of Counsel
RAY & GLICK, LTD.
611 South Milwaukee Avenue
Libertyville, Illinois 60048
(708)680-9600
Attorneys for Petitioners

i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.

Is Seventh Circuit’s reversal of the judgment of
the District Court in direct conflict with the decisions
of the Illinois Supreme Court in its interpretation of
the Illinois Structural Work Act, Illinois Revised
Statutes Chapter 48, paragraphs 60-68.

Il.

Did the Seventh Circuit engage in impermissible
fact finding when it redetermined credibility and
weight of testimony in ruling that the District
Court’s fact finding was clearly erroneous.

il
LIST OF PARTIES
The parties to the proceedings below were
petitioners, the respondents and a third party defend-
ant not the subject matter of this petition:
The petitioner is Tomislav Savic.

The respondent is the United States of America.

The third party defendant is Kovilic Construction
Company, Inc., an Illinois corporation.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PF jee 8! 9) | ere il

RIT MIIOW oo... c ce nccnccacscccccccce l
NI secu a seuccccccccsccecccss 9
STATUTES INVOLVED ...........00eeeeeee: 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE...........0000+ 2

THE REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.7

I.

Il.

CONCLUSION

REVIEW IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT

THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT FROM
IGNORING ILLINOIS LAW AS IT RELATES
TO THE ILLINOIS STRUCTURAL WORK ACT
AND PREVENT THE APPLICATION OF THE
ACT IN FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS CASES
WHICH ARE IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH
THE DECISIONS OF THE ILLINOIS
oo 9 7

THE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPREHEND-
ED AND MISAPPLIED THE CLEARLY ERRON-
EOUS STANDARD OF FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE 52(a), 28 USCA...... 1]

APPENDIX

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Anderson v. City of Bessemer City,
105 S.Ct. 1504 (1985)

Cannon v. United States, 328 Fed.2d
768,(7th Cir. 1964) cccccccccccccsccccese ll

Chance v. City of Collinsville,
112 Ill.App.3d 6, 11, 445 N.E.2d
SD, 42 (USGS)... crcccccccnccccccecccces 10

Emberton v. State Farm Mutual Auto
Insurance Company, 71 [ll.2d 111,
117, 373 N.E.2d 1384, 1350 (1978)....... 9, 10

Hollis v. R. Latora Construction,
Inc., (1985) 108 IIl.2d 401, 410,
92 Ill.Dec. 494, 485 N.E.2d 4............ 18

Johnson vs. Commonwealth Edison
Company, 88 IIl.Dec. 449,
453 N.E.2d 1057 (1st Dist.1985).......... 10

Kochan v. Commonwealth Edison
Company, 123 Ill.App.3d 844, 848,
79 Ill.Dec. 367, 463 N.E.2d 921.......... 16

Larson v. Commonwealth Edison
Company (1965), 33 Ill.2d 316,
Dee, BEE Peel BET, GOks ve cccccssecs 7, 8

Miller v. DeWitt, 37 Ill.2d 273,
966 N.E.2d 630, 39 (1967)......eeceeees 10, 11

Vv.

Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537

Fn SPO se cna vag sadensuascenensens 16

People v. Gould, 345 Ill. 288, 323,

ROW PUR. TOD, BOD ccccccscevccccscceses 8

Phillips v. United States,

792 F.2d 639, 645 (7th Cir. 1986)........ 7

Savic v. United States of America,

702 F.Supp. 695 (N.D.III.1988) .......... 2

Savic v. United States of America,

918 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1990)

TETTTTTITITITT TTT 1, 9,
10, 11,
14, 15,
19

Simmons v. Union Electric Company,

104 Ill.2d 444, 85 Ill.Dec. 347,

473 N.E.2d 946, 949 (1984)............. 9, 18

Smith v. Georgia Pacific, 86 Ill.App.3d

PER GOP PME BOE No ccdcccsescseceees 18

United States v. Aluminum Company of America,

148 F.2d 416, 433
CCAS BGR) ides ccncwcssesivccscesceses 16

Zenith Radio Corporation v. Hazeitine
Research, Inc. 395 U.S. 100, 123

89 S.Ct. 1562, 1576 L.Ed.2d 129

CODD) ccc rccscccevccvesessesssesevceuss 14

Vi.

STATUTES
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 52(a), 28 U.S.CA........6-- 12
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
Sections 2671-2680 .....--eeeeees 9 6
Illinois Revised Statute, Chapter 48
paragraphs 60-68 .........eeeee+: 2, 6
BS UBC. Sec. 1BSE1). .cccececces 2
Me Uses OE. LOOOUD. ccccccccees 6
29 C.F.R. Sec. 1926 450 (7)(1981)
ee ee ee ee thee eens 5
29 C.F.R. Sec. 1926 450 (9)(1981)
ERSTE POT TTT TTT TET TTT Te UL 5

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1990

TOMISLAV SAVIC,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner prays for a writ of certiorari to issue to
review a judgment and opinion of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit entered on
November 19, 1990.

OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit is reported at 918 F.2d 696 and is
reprinted in the Appendix, p. lc, infra.

The trial of this cause was bifurcated with the
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois

(Duff, D.J.) ruling from the bench after the trial on
liability. That portion of the official record is re-
printed in Appendix, p. la, infra.

The memorandum decision of the District Court
at the close of the case is reported at 702 F.Supp
695 (Northern District, Illinois 1988) and is reprinted
in Appendix, p. 1b, infra.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit was entered on November 19, 1990.
On December 5, 1990 Plaintiff timely petitioned the
Seventh Circuit for Rehearing or for Rehearing En
Banc. On January 14, 1991 the Seventh Circuit
denied the petition for rehearing. Appendix, p. ld,
infra. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
under 28 U.S.C. Section 1254(1).

STATUTES INVOLVED

This case involves the Illinois Structural Work
Act, Illinois Revised Statute, Chapter 48 paragraphs
60-68 and the Federal Tort Claims Act 28 U.S.C.
Sections 2671-2680. The Illinois Act is reprinted in
the Appendix, p. le, infra.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Tomislav Savic had been employed as a roofing
laborer for Kovilic Construction Company, Inc.
(Kovilic) when he fell from a roof attempting to
descend on a ladder and sustained severe injuries to

2

his arm, ribs, kidney and hip. Kovilic had contracted
with the United States to strip and re-roof canopies
covering loading docks on three warehouses at the
Great Lakes Navel Training Station in Great Lakes,
Illinois.

The United States Government construction
contract that was used provided that the work would
be performed under the general direction of the
contracting officer, who would designate a represent-
ative of the government and under the direction of
the contracting officer have complete charge of the
work and exercise full supervision and _ general
direction of the work so far as it affords the interest
of the government. The contract further provided
among other things that the government may at any
time make any change in their work including but
not limited to changes in the specifications, the
method or manner of the performance of the work,
equipment, services, or direct acceleration in the
performance of the work. The contract further
provided that the government may order the con-
tractor to suspend or delay all or any part of the
work for such time as he may determine to be
appropriate for the convenience of the government’.
The Department of the Navy maintained on the
premises an officer whose title was "Resident Officer
in Charge of Construction" who actually administered
all of the construction contracts at Great Lakes,
Illinois.

'See Appendix If

The government employed two construction
inspectors, Skonie and Syska, whose responsibilities
included general over sight responsibilities of
Kovilic’s performance; to act as safety inspectors to
assure compliance with Army Corp of Engineers and
OSHA Safety Standards; to instruct the individual
worker, for Kovilic to cease doing anything that may
endanger his safety and the welfare of those around
him; to stop a project if they saw anything unsafe
and generally conduct inspection for quality of work
and for unsafe work practices. They had the author-
ity to stop the work until corrective action was taken
in either the quality of the work or safety practices.
They had the ultimate authority to promote safety.’
They each visited the worksite three to four times a
day.* Their supervisor was Mr. Barnett, the project
manager.

On the portion of the roof work where Savic was
injured, Kovilic’s workers climbed the roof with the
use of an aluminum extension ladder. There was
substantial evidence that the top of the ladder had
been attempted to be secured by the use of nails
along the side of the ladder, however, one of the
government inspectors recalled the ladder being tied
with a wire. Marko Letica, a co-worker of Savic,
testified that nothing was used to secure the ladder

*See excerpts of testimony of Barnett, Skonie and
Syska, Appendix 1h, li and II

*See excerpts of Kovilic’s testimony, Appendix 1k

from time to time prior to the time of Savic’s injury
and that the government inspectors were present
when this occurred. There was uncontroverted
evidence that the ladder was not secured at its base
as required by OSHA’, that the ladder exceeded a
maximum 4 to 1 pitch required by OSHA%, and
there was uncontroverted evidence that the ladder
was too short in that it did not protrude three feet
above the working surface as required by OSHA’.

Piainuff's expert, Charles Schultz, former govern-
ment safetv inspector, testified that all four of the
aforementioned defects violated OSHA and safety
practices of the construction industry and were the
cause of Savic’s fall. The ladder was climbed in this
condition by the government inspectors during their
daily inspections.

On the morning of August 10, 1981 Savic des-
cended the ladder in a crouched position in order to
grab the top of the ladder which extended only
below his knees. Upon stepping on the ladder, it
moved causing Savic to fall off the roof onto the
ground some 18 feet below.

‘See excerpts of Letica testimony, Appendix lg
°29 CFR Section 1926 450 (10) 1981
629 CFR Section 1926 450 (7) 1981

729 CFR Section 1926 450 (9) 1981

This case arose under the Federal Tort Claims
Act 28 U.S.C. Section 2671-2680 (FTCA). The law
which is to be applied is the law of the State of
Illinois, "the law of the place where act or omission
occurred", 28 U.S.C. Section 1346(b). The trial court
in applying Illinois law found that the United States
was liable pursuant to the Illinois Structural Work
Act, Illinois Revised Statutes Chapter 48, paragraphs
60-69.°

The government appealed the District Court’s
judgment to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
In preparing the Record on Appeal the government
did not include the exhibits that were introduced at
trial. Accordingly the Appellate Court did not have
before it any of the numerous photographs of
physical evidence including the site and ladder in
question, as well as others of varying lengths showing
their relationship to the site of the work performed.

The Appellate Court, after reviewing only a
partial record, found that based on its view of what
weight should have been afforded to what it felt was
credible testimony as opposed to what the District
Court believed, that the District Court’s judgment
was clearly erroneous and was therefore reversed.

*For entire text see Appendix le

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I.

REVIEW IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT
THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT FROM
IGNORING ILLINOIS LAW AS IT RELATES
TO THE ILLINOIS STRUCTURAL WORK
ACT AND PREVENT THE APPLICATION
OF THE ACT IN FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS
CASES WHICH ARE IN DIRECT CON-
FLICT WITH THE DECISIONS OF THE
ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT.

The Appellate Court’s decision that the District
Court was clearly erroneous in finding that the
Government did not "have charge of" the work as
required under the Illinois Structural Work Act
("Act") is in direct conflict with the decisions of the
Illinois Supreme Court.

Whether one has charge of work under the Act
is a question of fact, a finding which can be over-
turned on review only if it is clearly erroneous

ma 792 F2d 639, 645 (7th Cir.
1986).

The Illinois Supreme Court in Larson vs.
w (1965), 33 Ill.2d
316, 321-22, 211 N.E.2d 247, 451, stated:

"While it may be conceded that some of the
decisions in this jurisdiction involving the
Scaffold Act appear to have equated ‘having

charge’ with; supervision and control; in
varying degrees, it is our opinion the language
of the statute, and the legislative intent it re-
flects, do not permit the conclusion that the
terms are the inflexible and unbending legal
equivalent of the other. The term ‘having
charge of is a generic term of broad import,
and although it may include supervision and
control, it is not confined to it. As was said of
the word ’charge’ in People vs. Gould, 345
111.288, 323, 178 N.E. 133, 148; "The word
does not necessarily include custody, control or
restraint, and its meaning must be determined
by the associations and circumstances sur-
rounding its use. "To have charge of" does
not necessarily imply more than to care for or
to have the care of.’* * *. [Consistent with its
beneficent purpose of preventing injury to
person employed in the extra-hazardous
occupation of structural work, the thrust of the
statute is not confined to those who perform,
or supervise, or control, or who retain the
right to supervise and control, the actual work
from which the injury arises, but, to insure
maximum protection, is made to extend to
owners and others who have charge of the
erection of alteration of any building or
structure.]' (Emphasis added.)

The Court went on to hold that the mere right
to stop the work done in a dangerous manner makes
those persons "having charge" within the meaning of
the Act whether the right is exercised or not Larson
at 252.

The Illinois Supreme Court in Miller vs. DeWitt,
37 Ill.2d 273, 266 N.E.2d 630, 639 (1967) reaffirmed

its ruling in Larson supra.

The Illinois Supreme Court in Emberton vs. State
a a 71

Ill.2d 111, 373 N.E.2d 1348 (1978) held that both
the owner of the property as well as the architect
"had charge" of the work being done by a contractor.
The owner was held liable even though it did not
exercise control over the manner in which the work
was done or concerned itself with the assembly and
construction of scaffolds. Liability was merely pred-
icated on frequent job inspections and issuances of
change orders. The architect was held liable because
he had the authority to stop work whenever such
stoppage may be necessary to insure the proper
execution of the contract. Emberton at 669.

The Illinois Supreme Court in Simmons_vs.
J 104 Ill.2d 444, 85 Ill.Dec.

347, 473 N.E.2d 946, upheld a finding of an owner
to "have charge" where the work performed by the
contractor was "subject to inspection and final accept-
ance" and the contractors only entered the premises
upon the request of the owner.

The Appellate Court in reversing the District
Court’s factual finding of "having charge of" ignored
and refused to follow the dictates of the Illinois
Supreme Court. Instead it has held that 10 factors
must be considered in determining whether a de-
fendant "has charge of' work. 918 F.2d 69. The

Appellate Court then goes on to recite those ely
which are cited in Vv
112 Ill.App.3d 6, 445 N.E.2d 39, 42 (1983). Those
factors constitute a summary of factors taken into
account from time to time in various appellate
decisions as probative on "having charge of" they are
not exclusive.

88 Ill.Dec. 449, 453 N.E.2d 1057 (1st Dist.
1985). The Appellate Court treated the 10 factors as
if they constituted prima facie requirement for
"having charge of" then simply arithmetically con-
cluded that the factors "weigh" in favor of the Gov-
ernment 7 to 3 and therefore the District Court's
finding was erroneous.

The Appellate Court went on to hold that be-
cause in its view the evidence did not demonstrate
control of the day to day work, or continued and
constant supervision that the District Court was
clearly erroneous in finding the Government "having
charge of". 918 F.2d 703.

This ruling is not a finding of clearly erroneous
fact rather it is a statement of law, one that is in
direct conflict with the decisions of the. Illinois
Supreme Court as set forth in Larson, Miller, and
Emberton supra. The mere right, whether exercised
or not, to stop the work if it is done in a dangerous
manner or inconsistent with the contract can make
a person "have charge of".

No where is it more evident that the Appellate
Court is attempting to make new law in direct

10

conflict with the decisions of the Illinois Supreme
Court then when it stated;

"We decline to hold that the mere Govern-
ment inspection of work being performed by
an independent contractor to assure that the
independent contractor is following the neces-
sary safety precautions, is by itself, enough to
shift the responsibility for taking safety pre-
cautions to the Government." 918 F.2d at
703.

Not only is this policy making on the part of the
Appellate Court, but also demonstrates a fa'lure to
recognize that Illinois courts have determined that
more than one entity can "have charge of" a project,
even though the Court acknowledges this fact in its
opinion. 918 F.2d at 700. Accordingly, there is no
necessity for a "shifting of responsibility" in order for
the Government to be "in charge of".

It should be noted that the Appellate Court relies
on an earlier Seventh District opinion to buttress its
conclusion. Cannon vs. United States, 328 Fed.2d
763 (7th Cir. 1964). However, that decision was
rendered one year before the standards announced
by the Illinois Supreme Court in Larson supra.

Il.
THE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPRE-

HENDED AND MISAPPLIED THE CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS STANDARD OF FEDERAL

1]

RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 52(a), 28
“ISCA.

The issues on which the Appellate Court reversed
the District Court’s judgment were specifically;

l. That the Government did not "have charge
of" the job.

2. That three of the four defects of the ladder
in question upon which evidence was
presented were not proximate causes of the
injury to Savic.

3. That the Government did not willfully
violate the Illinois Structural Work Act.

All three of the findings by the District Court that
were reversed were findings of fact. The standard
governing Appellate review of the District Court’s
finding of fact is that set forth in Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 52(a):

"Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be
given to the opportunity of the Trial Court to
judge the credibility of the witnesses."

A careful reading of the decision by the Appellate
Court in this case demonstrates that it reversed the
finding of the trier of facts simply because it was
convinced that it would have decided the case dif-
ferently. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals
misapprehended and misapplied the erroneous

12

standard and must be reversed. Anderson vs. City of
Bessemer City, N.C., 105 S.Ct.1504 470 U.S. 562, 84
L.Ed.2d 518.

If the District Court’s account of the evidence is
plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety,
the Court of Appeals may not reverse it even though
convinced that had it been sitting as a trier of fact it
would have weighed the evidence differently. This
is true even when the District Court’s findings do
not rest on credibility determinations, but are based
on the physical or documentary evidence or infer-
ences from other facts. Anderson supra 105 S.Ct. at
1507. In the instant case, the Appellate Court did
not even have the entire record in front of it from
the standpoint of photographic and physical evidence
to determine what inferences the District Court drew
from same. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals
failed to give due regard to the District Court’s
ability to interpret and discern the credibility of oral
tesiumony. Indeed the Appellate Court chastised the
District Court for determining the credibility, analyz-
ing facts and drawing inferences from the facts based
on the Trial Court’s own experiences in life rather
then having viewed the evidence as the Appellate
Court would have. This criticism is curious in light
of the fact that under Illinois law jurors are instruct-
ed that in considering the evidence in a case they
are not required to set aside their own observations
and experiences in the affairs of life but they have a
right to consider all the evidence in the light of their

13

own observations and experiences in the affairs of
life. Clearly the District Court cannot be required
to do otherwise.

The Appellate Court failed to follow the principal
that their function is not to decide factual issues de
novo. orati Vv
Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 89 S.Ct. 1562,
1576 23L.Ed.2d 129 (1969). The Appellate Court’s
decision is replete with examples of de novo fact
finding. Not only does the Appellate Court criticize
the District Court’s reliance on his experience in life
in deciding the credibility, weight and application of
the facts in arriving at his judgment; but it berates
the Court for giving credence to Plaintiffs expert
testimony because his opinion was based on a dis-
puted ladder, 918 F.2d at 705 Foot Note 11. The
District Court is attacked for its credibility finding as
to whether the ladder that Kovilic testified that he
gave to his insurance company a few months after
the accident was in fact the ladder involved in the
fall. Kovilic firmly believed it was the ladder at the
time he gave the ladder to his insurance company,
and did not believe the ladder might not be the lad-
der in question until after the Plaintiffs expert in-

*Ill.Rev.Stats. 1987 ch. 110a, sec. 239 (a); Ill.Patern
Jury Instr. - Civil (IPI) 3d Ed. ch. 1-60 (1990)

14

spected and measured same while Kovilic was still a
third party Defendant.'® The Court as a trier of fact
was in a position to determine the credibility of
Kovilic, his bias and interest, and had the opportun-
ity to view photographs of the ladder and its rela-
tionship to the work site and to draw inferences
therefrom in conjunction with other testimony
presented at trial. The Appellate Court did not have
such opportunity.

The Appellate Court also made a de novo finding
of fact relative to Letica’s testimony that the ladder
had not always been previously attached when
persons were climbing on it, and independently
found that Letica’s testimony was questionable for
what the Appellate Court deemed was impeachment
or bias; and therefore the District Court had no
business relying on this testimony to determine that
the Government knew of the dangerous condition
and simply decided to do nothing about it. Such a
conclusion by the Appellate Court fails to give due
deference to the Trial Court. The Appellate Court
went on to say in its view the "overwhelming weight
of credible evidence" shows that the Government had
no knowledge that the nail had previously been
detached when the ladder was in use, 918 F.2d 706.
This statement by the Appellate Court clearly dem-
onstrates that it is engaging in de novo fact finding.

See excerpts of Kovilic’s testimony, Appendix 1k

15

The Appellate Court disagreed with the District
Court as to the finding that three defects existed and
held that in any event, in its view, those defects were
irrelevant and the District Court was clearly erron-
eous in finding that three of the four defects were
the proximate cause of Savic’s injuries. The question
of proximate cause under the Act is a question of
law only when facts are not disputed and where
there can be no difference in the judgment of
reasonable men. Kochan vs. Commonwealth Edison
7 123 Ill.App.3d 844, 848, 79 IIll.Dec. 367,
463 N.E.2d 921. However the Appellate Court went
on to substitute its own judgment of what evidence
should be believed. It held that in its judgment
Plaintiffs expert Schultz’ opinion as to causation was
discounted on cross-examination because in its view
Schultz said that if the nails had been in place the
ladder would not have fallen. Such testimony by
Schultz was not internally inconsistent in that Savic’s
fall and not the fall of the ladder was in issue.,
Furthermore the District Court was in a position to
determine the adequate basis, foundation and weight
to be given to any cross-examination on the basis of
all of the evidence before it as well as the photo-
graphs of the physical evidence. Thus Schultz’
tesumony that all four defects were the cause of
Savic’s fall rather then the ladder’s falling was not
contradicted by extrinsic evidence and not internally
inconsistent. Raney ten there can be no clear
error.

America, 148 F.2d 416, 433 (CA 2 1945), Orvis vs.
Higgins, 180 F.2d 537 (CA 2 1950).

16

There was more than sufficient evidence for the
District Court to conclude that the pitch of the
ladder in excess of a 4 to | ratio caused the plaintiff
to step out far over the edge of the canopy thereby
contributing to his loss of balance when the ladder
shifted. Furthermore, there was sufficient evidence
to support the finding that the inadequate length of
the ladder caused the Plaintiff to crouch in order to
attempt to grab the ladder which was extending only
12 to 15 inches over the roof, thereby causing him
to have his weight and center of gravity in a pre-
carious position, contributing to his fall when the
ladder shifted. Taking into account these factors
coupled with the general instability of the ladder
because of lack of proper fastening, the Appellate
Court could hardly conclude that the District Court’s
finding that all four factors were contributing causes
to Savic’s fall was clearly erroneous.

The Appellate Court’s conclusion that there was
only one proximate cause, that of the lack of nails
near the top of the ladder, and that the Government
could not have been responsible therefore because
such a condition never existed before it happened on
the day of Savic’s fall, is not only improper de novo
fact finding for the reasons set forth above, but
would necessitate a credibility finding that Letica was
lying when he said the condition existed from time
to time before the fall with the Government in-
spectors present. This credibility finding was not
made by the District Court and cannot now be made
by the Appellate Court.

17

The Appellate Court was also critical of the
District Court’s finding that there was no reliable
evidence that Savic descended the ladder improperly.
The Appellate Court was critical of the District Court
because in its view there was no evidence to support
such a finding since the only direct testimony on the
subject was Savic’s who said he did not descend the
ladder improperly.'' However, the fact that the
Appellate Court even raises this issue is puzzling
since comparative negligence is not applied to
actions under the Act. The only inquiry is in assess-
ment of the Defendant’s culpability and not the
Fibagge conduct. Hollis vs. R. Latora Construction,

Inc., (1985) 108 Ill.2d 401, 410, 92 Ill.Dec. 494, 485
N.E.2d 4; Simmons_vs. Union Electric Company,
(1984) 104 IIl.2d 444, 459-60, 85 Ill.Dec. 347, 473
N.E.2d 946. Furthermore even if Savic’s negligence
was the primary cause of his fall, a concurrent
violation of OSHA that contributed to the fall re-
mains a question of fact for the fact finder. See

v ific, 86 Iil.App.3d 570, 408
N.E.2d 117. However the District Court in this case
found that there was no negligence, primary or
otherwise, with respect to Mr. Savic’s conduct. For
the Appellate Court to suggest otherwise it would not
only have to engage in de novo fact finding, but in
fact engage in sheer speculation.

To fully comprehend the extent to which the
Appellate Court engaged in de novo fact finding, the
entire record would have to be reviewed. Not only
did it redetermine weight and credibility, but it

"See Appendix lj

18

Pi

ignored or misapprehended evidence; e.g. the Appel-
late Court in its opinion relative to the "having
charge of" issue stated that the Government only
inspected the job twice a day, 918 F.2d 701, when
the record shows as many as six to eight inspections
per day."

The Appellate Court in its decision has cited in
part this Court’s standard of review as set forth in
Anderson supra, however, it has wholly failed to
follow its dictates and sorely misapplied and mis-
apprehended its meaning.

CONCLUSION

This is the only Court to which the decision of
the Seventh Circuit can be appealled. Accordingly,
for all the foregoing reasons it is submitted that the
Petitioner for a Writ of Certiorari should be granted.

See Appendix lk
Respectfully Submitted,

RAY & GLICK, LTD.

Bogdan Martinovich
Bogdan Martinovich
RAY & GLICK, LTD.
P.O. Box 400
Libertyville, Illinois 60048-0400
(708) 680-9600

19

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1990

TOMISLAV SAVIC,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

APPENDIX

Bogdan Martinovich
Of Counsel
RAY & GLICK, LTD.
611 South Milwaukee Avenue
Libertyville, Illinois 60048
(708)680-9600
Attorneys for Petitioners

A-i

APPENDIX
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

Appendix A: District Court’s Ruling
from Bench at close of
liability portion of
WR i bab aeaneadeesncssscccens la

Appendix B: | Memorandum Opinion and
Order of the District Court
December 29, 1988.........00- lb

Appendix C: Opinion of the Court of
Appeals November 19,
1990 ..ccccccccccccccccccccces lc

Appendix D: Order of Court of Appeals,
denying Petition for
Rehearing en banc
January 14, 1991............-.. ld

Appendix E: Relevant Statutory
PLOVISIONS ...ccccccccccccccees le

I. Illinois Revised
Statutes, Chapter 48
paragraphs 60-68........ le

II. 29 CFR Sec. 1926
450 (7) (1981)........06- De

29 CFR Sec. 1926
Soe Ce CAO i cee ccxccccs Qe

Appendix F:

Appendix G:

Appendix H:

Appendix I:

Appendix J:

Appendix K:

Appendix L:

A-il

29 CFR Sec. 1926

450 (10) (1981)......

Construction Contract......

Excerpts of Letica’s

BOMBERORY soc ccccccvccccces

Excerpts of Syska’s

Pi aaas neces icenes

Excerpts of Sconie’s

re eo eTTeTTT ee

Excerpts of Savic’s
Testimony

Excerpts of Kovilic’s

TORI. wn cccccesecccecs

Excerpts of Barnett’s

SR oo cas cadcsewesces

—

APPENDIX A

District Court’s Ruling from Bench at
Close of Liability Portion of Trial

————e

DISTRICT COURTS RULING FROM
BENCH AT CLOSE OF LIABILITY
PORTION OF TRIAL
Pages 432 through 443

THE COURT: Okay. Well, first of all, let me
tell you that -- and I’m quite sincere -- that some-
times my job gets very difficult and sometimes it’s
irksome, nettlesome, or boring, and with you three
lawyers -- four lawyers it has not been any of the
above. In fact, I am quite sincere, it’s been a
pleasure to have you in my courtroom. You worked
hard, you have maintained your sense of humor, you
have worked intelligently and responsibly, and I am
more than happy to have had you with us this week.

I say that first because the loser doesn’t even
know afterwards what I’m saying, so I have to say it
first. But it’s not hard for me to rule on this case.

Having listened to all the evidence, having
observed the witnesses and determined my sense of
their credibility, applying my own knowledge of the
law, my experiences in life, as I would instruct any
jury, my sense of the facts, my consideration of the
totality of the evidence, it is my opinion that on
Count | the Government loses and on Count 2 the
plaintiff loses, that is to say, on the Structural Work
Act the plaintiff wins and on the negligence the
Government wins. There is two counts, right? Yes.

Now, more specifically, for citations, some of the
ones that you have actually given to me you can
refer to. You have already mentioned Phillips. You

could add Emberton v. State Farm, which has been
referred to earlier, Gannon v_ Chicago Milwaukee
has been referred to earlier. That would relate to
the Structural Work Act essentially.

Now, I would say that the Untied States for the
purposes of the Act had charge of the project, not
alone, but in the context of the Act had charge,
because it had some direct connection with the work
above mere ownership or employment of an inde-
pendent contractor, which is what Phillips would
refer to along with the Illinois cases it cited.

The United States inspected the work, they
oversaw the work, in the opinion of the Court, they
had a right to control the work. Whether or not
that right was exercised constantly or in the fullest
sense of the word, I believe they did.

In particular, there were two Government in-
spectors, each with slightly different roles, who
investigated as much as seven times a day on loca-
tion, they could have stopped the work for compli-
ance with the safety regulations. The contract
reflects their responsibility in that respect.

It is more than just their property, but it was
their property. They were in total control of the
circumstances of the base. They had a safety officer
in control of the whole base and the construction
came within the purview of the people who owned
and ran the base, as did every project under it and
specifically and directly this one.

I think that the social relationship may have had
something to do with the situation. I think the
Government was lazy or slack in their application of
their control over the safety aspects of the Act.

Now, the Structural Work Act, as you will know,
is a strict liability and it’s to be applied for the
purposes for which it was intended to the extent that
it can be. I don’t think that the Government relin-
quished any immunities in this respect. If at some
future point in time the Government would like to
give me some kind of a brief on some specific aspect
I haven’t dealt with adequately in their opinion in
terms of sovereignty, I’ll listen to that, but I don’t
see any here right now which would fit this set of
facts.

I also believe that the dangerous condition was
one which the United States knew of the existence of
which. It was a -- or by the exercise of reasonable
care could have discovered the existence of that
condition, and I would refer you to Kohutko v. Four
Columsn, Ltd., 148 Ill.App.3d, 181 at 187, a 1986
case, and Mathiew v. Venture Stores, Inc., 144
Ill.App.3d 783 at 795, also a 1986 case, and I think
the government in particular -- to be more parti-
cular, but not to in any way denigrate from what I
have already said, I would find as facts that the
project was ongoing with the ladders being moved
not only daily, but many times within each day for
the purposes of allowing the workers to move along
the platform of the ceiling or of the roof in terms of
applying the asphalt.

They had to move the ladder, they had to move
the buckets, they had to move the workers, and
many workers were going up and down the ladder
all day, and as far as I can see, the only consistent
attempt -- well, it wasn’t consistent, the general
attempt to secure the ladder in my opinion was to
use sixteenpenny nails.

There is no indication anywhere in the record
that there were ever more than two used per side on
either end of the ladder. There is some indication
that there was one used, there is some indication
that they were used fairly often, there is no indica-
tion that they were used constantly.

The inspectors actually went up the ladders and
down. They knew the circumstances of the ladder.
The ladder was, according to at least one witness,
and I believe it, propped up against the outside
track. Some say it was sometimes in the middle. I
think that’s possible.

There is no indication that these 2 x 4s or 4 x 6s
were used constantly or regularly, since it’s also
apparent that sometimes one was used and some-
times the other and it’s not certain that they were
ever all used, and if they were, they were nailed to
the ties so that the lower end of the ladder could
rest against them.

There is no indication that they were always used
or always moved when the ladder was moved. I
don’t believe they were from the general tenor of

what I have heard from all the witnesses in terms of
the circumstances of the working place.

I believe that the ladder was lower than it should
have been in its projection above the roof and |
believe that the plainuff put his left foot over onto
the ladder, and before he had an opportunity to take
a hold of the ladder with his right hand, the ladder
moved and he fell.

Now, that suggests to me and I will find, that he
did not try to go down the ladder forward. He is a
laborer, a man of, it would appear to me, some
intelligence some experience. He is a physically
competent human being from what I observed of
him physically and his expressions of himself and the
experience to which he has referred, and I do not
believe that he would try to go down a ladder
backwards, but more than that, I think the testimony
doesn’t prove it in any way, shape, or form except
some self-serving comments made by an insurance
claims investigator who spoke to unnamed persons at
the scene of the accident who didn’t speak his
language, were excited and upset, and if seeing him
fall forward, which indeed he easily could have been,
and I would tell you frankly that were I in his
circumstances I would have made an effort to fall in
the same fashion and I would have been successful.

I do not think that any human being with any
reasonable agility would find it difficult to, if starting
to fall backwards from a ladder 18 feet in the air or
a roof 18 feet in the air, would have any difficulty
turning enough to fall forward on his hands. In

fact, I think it would be even a rational attempt.
There is really no direct evidence anywhere that he
came down the ladder the wrong way.

I also find that the word "secured" is not met,
and my ruling, finding of fact is that the ladder was
not adequately secured by one or two sixteenpenny
nails driven into a board one and a half or two
inches deep with a projection of only an inch and a
half above on a ladder which is clearly three times
that length in its own elevation, also heavy, heavy
enough to go 22 to 24 feet in the air -- excuse me,
20 to 24 feet in the air depending upon utilization,
heavy enough to bear the weight of a 230 pound
man. With that weight plus that ladder those nails
could hardly be considered to be sufficient to secure
the ladder from any extraordinary stress, leverage or
pressure, and if the ladder weren’t high enough and
if the angle were too wide, then the extra _ stress,
leverage or pressure might easily fall against those
nails, which would be inadequate to serve the
purpose.

I don’t think that those nails were put in regular-
ly and, I think the inspectors had an obligation to
know they were not put in regularly and did know
or should have known because of the frequency of
their visits over the number of days. The custom
and usage didn’t stop during those days or change in
any fashion.

The question of "in charge of," I think that the

Government had a sufficient degree of supervision
and control. They had retained the right to super-

6

—

vise and control. They could have stopped the work
at any time. They weren’t constantly on location,
but they were on location several times a day every
day for a number of days.

The contract suggested they had a right, they did
have in my opinion a meeting that could be con-
sidered to be adequate to include the concept of
safety, there was safety discussed, according to the
Government and its own witnesses. They had
responsibility for monitoring the compliance with the
contract. The contract included safety requirements.
They could have changed the work circumstance. As
the man said, you know, he could have told them to,
and when I asked him, "Could you stop them from
using that asphalt bucket? Certainly could."

Well, if you can stop them from using an asphalt
bucket, you can certainly stop them from inadequate-
ly supporting a ladder.

Now, the authority to issue change orders isn’t
important in this situation. The right to stop work,

they did, they said they did, I would find they did
under any circumstances.

The ownership of equipment is not relevant to
this instance. They were surely and clearly familiar
with construction customs and practices of this job
and of every other job since they spoke of the large
number of times that they were involved in letting
construction contracts on the base, and I think the
difference between the word "assure" and "insure" is
important.

They didn’t have to insure workers’ safety be-
cause they weren’t an insurance company, but they
did indeed have the ability to assure workers’ safety
by simply speaking to the issue to the contractor in
many, many ways, not only under the contract itself,
but under the fact that they gave out the contract
and could give out more contracts and had given out
contracts in the past, as well as to assure simply by
pointing out the lack of compliance and the necessity
of complying.

But in addition to that, the other rights and
powers that they had, which were more than merely
property owners, gave them the ability to assure
workers’ safety and very conveniently, by the wey,
without any great stress.

I think they were lax and lazy, and I think that
under the circumstances it all constitutes a willful --
under the statute -- as we know, "willful" under the
Statute doesn’t require the same kind of willfulness
that an intentional tort under the common law
would require.

I think the plainufPs expert witness lacked some-
thing, to be sure. Too bad you can’t pay him
afterwards instead of before. But by the same token,
he did include in his testimony some of the things
that he was called upon to do, references to the
statutes and references to the rules, and I did pay
attention to his testimony, I didn’t give it any greater
credibility than it deserved, but I will tell you as you

inquired in fact, yes, I have had a great deal of
experience on ladders, as a matter of fact.

I have been a laborer in my life on more than
one occasion, and as I say, even a homeowner gets
a certain amount of experience with ladders. But I
used ladders in the navy, I used ladders when I was
a worker on the highways in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts many years ago, I washed trucks and
moved things around for Rouan Motor Transport
out in Iowa years ago, and I painted fences with
creosote and buildings with creosote on ladders
when I was a healthy young lad.

I know without any difficulty at all the actions
that his laborer was going through when he was
attempting to get off that roof and on to that ladder.

I am sure, and I find, that the ladder was not
high enough above the leverage of the building, and
it was insecure, that it was -- now, as far as the
negligence is concerned, I don’t think that under the
common law rules of negligence I can find the
Government negligent. I think there is a clear
distinction, and so I rule against the plaintiff on
negligence. That means the issue of contributory
negligence is not an element that I need to deal
with.

Now, I think I have covered everything. It took
me more than five minutes.

Now, we need to deal with the issue, since this is
a bifurcated trial, of damages. I would suggest that

9

what I would first ask you to do is talk to each other
about that. If you need to have it resolved by me
on a trial, we can set a date and time for that. You
can do it by stipulation if you wish.

You can have the plaintiff come back and talk
about his pain and suffering if you want. You can
have me take the testimony that I have already
heard if you want. You can settle it if you want.
You can tell how long you think it will take me to

try it.

And if you want, I think -- I’m not sure of this,
but I maybe we could refer it to a magistrate if you
wanted too, but I’m not sure. The liability having
been found, I think the damages could be done that
way.

So I’m happy to do whatever you four discuss
with each other and decide.

MR. MARTINOVICH: Can we have a short
status date? That will give us an opportunity to get
together.

THE COURT: Yes. Let’s have Mrs. Brotherson
call and pick a date. It will be early next week.

MR. MARTINOVICH: You will be on vacation,
though.

THE COURT: My staff is not going to be

around. I’m not going on vacation as soon as they
are, but that means I won’t be on the bench, and

10

that won’t -- but I won’t lose all of my support
systems until the 18th. So we can do it early next
week.

MR. MARTINOVICH: Thank you, Judge.

MR. FLESSNER: Thank you.

MS. GINSBERG: Thank you.

1]

APPENDIX B

Memorandum Opinion and Order of the
District Court
December 19, 1988

(Filed December 29, 1988)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
702 F.Supp. 695 (N.D.III. 1988)

Tomislav Savic and Kristina
Savic, Plaintiffs,

VS.

Civ. No. 83 C 5388
The United States of America
and S.W. Barnett, Defendants.

The United States of America,
Third Party Plaintiff,

Vs.

Kovilic Construction Co., Inc.,
Third Party Defendant

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

BRIAN BARNETT DUFF, District Judge

Plaintiff Tomislav Savic has sued the United States
of America under the Federal Claims Act ("the
FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2671 et seq. for violations of
the Illinois Structural Work Act, IIl.Rev.Stat. ch. 48,
sec. 69, resulting in his fall from the roof of a
building at the Great Lakes Naval Base while work-

]

ing for Kovilic Construction Co., Inc. The case came
before the court as a bifurcated trial beginning in
August, 1988. On August 7, this court ruled, for the
reasons stated in open court, that the United States
was liable to the plaintiff his injuries because it was
in charge of the construction project for the purposes
of the Structural Work Act, 689 F.Supp. 854. This
court now makes the following findings of fact and
conclusions law with regard to the damages phase of
the trial.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Plaintiff was born on March 27, 1954 in
Yugoslavia, and attained an eighth grade education
in that country.

2. Plaintiff worked primarily as a farmer in
Yugoslavia but also did work as a roofer on an
informal basis there.

3. Plaintiff came to the United States in 1980
and, through mid-1981, worked as a greenskeeper at
the Owentsia Country Club in Lake Forest, Illinois.

4. Plaintiff is married and presently has two
children, aged 2 and 11.

5. Plainuffs wife works as a janitor at Lake
Forest College in Illinois.

6. In late July, 1981, plaintiff was employed as a
laborer by Kovilic Construction Co. ("Kovilic").

7. Plaintiff worked as a roofer for Kovilic at a
roofing job at the Great Lakes Naval Base in Great
Lakes, Illinois for the two weeks prior to August 10,
1981.

8. At the time, plaintiff was earning $11.87 per
hour; experienced roofers were earning $16.50.

9. On August 10, plaintiff fell off the roof of a
building on which he was doing work for Kovilic,
injuring his left elbow, his left kidney, and his left

leg.

10. The United States was in charge of the
project.

11. The injury to his elbow required three
separate hospitalizations for surgery.

12. Plaintiffs medical expenses incurred as a

result of the injuries caused by the fall came to
$18,523.35.

13. Plainuff will eventually need surgery on his
elbow to relieve the pain caused by further deteriora-
tion, costing approximately $10,000.

14. Plaintiff speaks English at a third grade level
and, despite his efforts to learn the language, cannot
and will never master it sufficiently to gain employ-
ment requiring fluency in the language.

15. Plaintiffs mathematical skills are at a sixth
grade level and, due to his below-average intelli-

3

gence, will not improve much beyond this level
irrespective his efforts.

16. The injury to his elbow has prevented and
will continue to prevent plaintiff regularly lifting
more than 20 pounds (although under some cir-
cumstances he may occasionally do so) and, together
with his inability to speak English, has prevented and
will prevent him from doing anything but menial
labor at a wage of approximately $5.50 per hour at
present wage levels.

17. Plaintiff is a responsible individual devoted to
supporting his family, has done whatever he reason-
ably could to mitigate his damages from the fall,
including taking on available work that he was
capable of doing in the years following his injury
(with the exception of one period during which he
remained home with his newborn child when babysit-
ters’ fees approximated his wages but not his
wife’s.).

18. As a result of his injuries, plaintiff lost the
following amount of wages from the date of his
injuries through the date of trial (based on a wage
of $11.87 per hour at 40 hours per week for 50
weeks a year and subtracting out the amounts he
either earned or would have earned had he taken an
available job he could handle):

a. 1981 -$ 9,400
b. 1982 - $ 19,200
c. 1983 - $ 23,700
d. 1984 - $ 20,700

e. 1985 - $ 20,700
f. 1986 - $ 20,700

. 1987 - $ 13,700
h. 1988 - $ 13,700
Total $141,800

19. Had plaintiff not sustained the injuries he
did in 1981, he would today be working as a roofer
at a rate of approximately $16.50 per hour.

20. Because of his injures, plaintiff will only be
able to earn $5.50 per hour in the future.

21. From now through the time he reaches 65
years of age, at which point he would have stopped
working as a roofer, plaintiff will lose $11.00 per
hour for 40 hours a week for 50 weeks a year, or
$22,000 a year, for 31 years, as a result of his
injuries.

22. Based on the seasonal and risky nature of
work as a roofer, there is a 60% probability that
plainuff would have remained employed as a roofer
full-time through the age of 65 had he not been
injured.

23. The fall caused plaintiff to experience pain
and suffering from his left arm, kidney and leg, but
plainuff failed to establish that the fall caused the
lower back pain he now suffers.

24. Plainuffs past pain and suffering quantifiable
in an amount of $45,000.

25. Plaintiff will experience pain and suffering in
the amount of $5,000 in the future provided that he
has the $10,000 operation to relieve the pain caused
by further deterioration of his left elbow.

26. In the absence of such an operation, plaintiff
would experience an additional $10,000 in future
pain and suffering. .

27. Plaintiff recovered $100,000 in a settlement
with Kovilic for injuries resulting from the fall.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. This court has jurisdiction pursuant the
FTCA, 28 U.S.C. sec. 1346(b). Venue is net con-
tested.

2. Illinois substantive law governs this case.

3. Plaintiffs injuries to his left arm, kidney and
left leg, were proximately caused by the August 10,
1981 fall.

[1] 4. The United States is liable under the
Structural Work Act, IIl.Rev.Stat. ch. 48, sec. 69, for
these injuries and resultant damages.

[2-5] 5. Plaintiff is entitled to recover for (a) his
past medical expenses, (b)future medical expenses, (c)
his lost past wages, (d) his lost future wages, (e) his
past pain and suffering, and (f) his future pain and
suffering.

(a) Plaintiff has sustained $18,500 in past medical
expenses.

(b) Plaintiff will sustain an additional $10,000
(present dollars) in future medical expenses.

(c) Plaintiff lost a total of $141,800 in past wages.

(d)(1) Plaintiffs damages for loss of future
earnings must be calculated at their present-day cash
value. Fenolio v. Smith, 802 F.2d 256, 258 (7th
Cir.1986). At $22,000 a year for the next 31 years,
plaintiffs lost earnings have a present-day cash value
(at a discount rate of 2%, see O’Shea vs. Riverway

677 F.2d 1194, 1199 (7th Cir.1982) of

$504,630.

(d)(2) This amount must be reduced by 40%, to
$302,778 to account for the seasonal and risky
nature of plaintiffs work. See O’Shea v. Riverway

Towing Co., 677 F.2d at 1200.

(d)(3) The United States argues that this amount
must be further reduced to account for the income
taxes plaintiff would have had to pay had he received
the money as income over the next 31 years, since
the damages award will not be taxed. Although
Harden v. United States, 688 F.2d 1025 (5th
Cir.1982), involved a wrongful death claim, the
United States cites it for the proposition that Norfolk
& Western R. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 100 S.Ct.
755, 62 L.Ed.2d 689 (1980), mandates a deduction
for income taxes under the FTCA even where, as
here, state law does not allow for a deduction of

income taxes from personal injury awards, see
Vv -W.

115 Ill.App.3d 702, 705-08, 71 Ill.Dec. 432, 450
N.E.2d 1311 (1983); see also Klawonn v. Mitchell,
105 Ill.2d 450, 454-58, 86 Ill.Dec. 478, 475 N.E.2d
857 (1985) (rejecting Liepelt for state law causes of
rinieg Compare Vv

453 U.S. 473, 486-87, 101 S.Ct. 2870, 2879-
30, 69 L.Ed.2d 784 (1981) (Liepelt established a
federal common law rule for all federal causes of
action).

Although the rule set forth in Harden might
require the deduction of federal income taxes here,
but see In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, IIl.,
701 F.2d 1189, 1195-96 (7th Cir. 1985) (distinguishing
wrongful death from personal injury claims), this
court disagrees with the Fifth Circuit that Liepelt
mandates the deduction of income taxes in all actions
under the FTCA. "Damages under the Federal Tort
Claims Act are assessed according to state law."
Jastremski v. United States, 737 F.2d 666, 672 (7th
Cir.1984). Harden held that an income tax deduc-
tion was required by the FTCA’s prohibition against
punitive damages, 688 F.2d 1029; see 28 U.S.C. sec.
2674; Felder v. United States 543 F.2d 657, 665-66
(9th Cir.1976), but that holding is inconsistent with
the Illinois nondeductibility rule.

Under Illinois law, as in many states, federal tax
liability is excluded from consideration of compensa-
tory damage awards not to punish the government
but instead to ensure full compensation for the
victim. ann _v. Lisle-W ldge rotec

District, 115 Ill.App.3d at 706-07, 71 Ill.Dec. 432, 450
N.E.2d 1311. As the Eighth Circuit held in Manko

vs. United States, 830 F.2d 831 (8th Cir.1987):

Whether to deduct income taxes is simply
one of many issues courts face in deciding what
is fair compensation for the injury. Other such
issues are whether to apply the collateral-source
rule, whether or award pre-judgment interest,
how certain a forecast of future earnings must be,
how to value pain and suffering, and so forth.
Different jurisdictions resolve these issues in
different ways, but they have nothing to do with
"punitive damages" as that term is traditionally
used in the law. They do not depend on a
finding of wanton or malicious conduct, they are
not imposed to punish a defendant, and they have
nothing to do with a defendant's net worth-all
questions that customarily arise when punitive
damages are awarded. We conclude that Con-
gress did not mean to outlaw all variations from
some ideal norm of compensation when it forbade
"punitive damages." It was referring only to the
concept in its traditional sense.

Id. at 836. Accordingly, this court rules that the
United States is not entitled to a deduction in
plainuffs ward for income taxes. )foreover, even
were this court to rule otherwise, the United States
has presented no evidence as to the amount plain-
tiffs award would have to be reduced and, in the
absence of such evidence, this court would not at-
tempt a purely speculative calculation as to the
proper amount to deduct.

9

ieee

(e) Plaintiff is entitled to recover $45,000 for past
pain and suffering.

(f) Plaintiff is entitled to $5,000 for future pain
and suffering. (Had this court agreed with the
government that plaintiff did not prove that he will
need $10,000 in future medical expenses to relieve
the pain from the deterioration of his left elbow, the
court would have awarded him an additional $10,000
for future pain and suffering).

6. Plaintiffs total damages come to $523,078.

7. The United States is entitled to a credit of
$100,000 by reason of plaintiffs settlement with
Kovilic, Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 70, sec. 302(c); O’Connor v.
Pinto Trucking Service, Inc., 149 Ill.App.3d 911, 103
Ill.Dec. 242, 501 N.E.2d 263 (1986), bringing the
liability of the United States to $423,078.

[6] 8. The United States argues that this amount
should be further reduced to reflect only its relative
culpability in the incident. Although it recognizes
that under Illinois law, indeed under well-settled
principles of common law throughout this country,
apportionment among joint tortfeasors of their lia-
bility to the injured does not exist, the United States
grounds its argument on the FTCA. According to
the United States, because the FTCA only permits
recovery against the government for its negligent or
wrongful acts, Loque v. United States, 412 U.S. 521,
93 S.Ct. 2215, 37 L.Ed.2d 121 (1973), it is entitled to

10

a credit for Kovilic’s share of culpability in the
incident as a matter of federal law.

This argument is essentially one for a federal
-common law rule of apportionment among tort-
feasors. Recognizing that such a rule is unsupported
by any FTCA caselaw, the United States attempts to
distinguish this case from the ordinary joint tort-
feasor situation based on the Structural Work Act’s
imposition of liability on persons "having charge of"
work, a theory of liability distinct from ordinary
common law negligence. Yet, for purposes of the
FTCA, this is a distinction without a difference.

The Seventh Circuit has held that under statutes
imposing liability against an owner “in charge of"
work, the United States can be held liable under the
FTCA, since such statutes are predicated on the
owner's wrongful conduct. Fentress v. United States,
431 F.2d 824 (7th Cir.1970); also see Phillips v
United States, 792 F.2d 639 (7th Cir.1986). And
under the Structural Work Act, liability is joint and
several. Dinschel v. United States Gypsum Co., 83
Ill.App.2d 466, 476-77, 228 N.E.2d 106 (1976).
Thus, a Structural Work Act case against the govern-
ment is no different than any joint tortfeasor situa-
tion, and in the absence of a contrary federal statute,
the United States is entitled to apportionment only
to the extent that applicable state law allows it. See

of W. Wa v. United States, 669
F.Supp. 234, 236 (N.D.III.1987). Illinois law does
not. See Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 70, sec. 302(c)

1}

CONCLUSION

Judgment is entered for the plaintiff and against
the United States in the amount of $423,078.

12

APPENDIX C

Opinion of the Court of Appeals
November 19, 1990

In the

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit

No. 89-1399
TOMISLAV SAVIC,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant and Third Party
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
KOVILIC CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
INCORPORATED,
Third Party Defendant-Appellee.

,

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 83 C 5388—Brian Barnett Duff, Judge.

ARGUED FEBRUARY 18, 1990—DECIDED NOVEMBER 19, 1990

Before Woop, JR., CoFFEY, Circuit Judges, and
ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge.

CoFFEY, Circuit Judge. The United States appeals the
district court’s finding of liability and the award of dam-
ages following a bench trial pursuant to the Illinois Struc-
tural Work Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, Pars. 60-68, and
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 in
favor of Tomislav Savic. We reverse.

Cited as Savic vs. United States of America,
918 F. 2d 696 (7th Cir. 1990)

2 No. 89-1399

I.
FACTS
Tomislav Savic had been employed as a roofing laborer
for Kovilic Construction Co., Inc. (“Kovilic’’) for approx-
imately two weeks prior to his fall from a ladder, in which
he sustained injuries to his arm, ribs, kidney and hip.
Kovilic had contracted with the United States to strip and
re-roof the canopies covering loading docks on three ware-

houses at the Great Lakes Naval Training Station in Great
Lakes, Illinois.

The standard United States Government construction
contract was used on this project and placed the respon-
sibility for proper safety and health precautions on the
contractor. Kovilic, the contractor, was required to sub-
mit a safety plan for the project, and the parties stipu-
lated that a pre-construction conference was held at which
the government, among other things, discussed Kovilic’s
responsibility for the safety of his employees and the ad-
ministration of the contract, as well as the applicable labor
standards.

The government retained the authority under the con-
tract for general oversight of the project, such as the abil-
ity to stop work for any safety violations observed and
the authority to change the construction ifications dur-
ing the performance of the work. In the Accident Preven-
tion section of the contract, the “Contractor” (Kovilic) was
required to take actions necessary to ensure a safe work-
place, but the Government only had the responsibility to
“notify the Contractor of any noncompliance with the fore-
going provisions and the action to be taken. The Contrac-
tor shall, after receipt of such notice, immediately take
corrective action.” At a later point in that section, the
contract provided: “If the Contractor fails or refuses to
comply promptly, the Contracting Officer may issue an
order stopping all or part of the work until satisfactory
corrective action has been taken.” ;

The government employed two experienced construction
inspectors whose responsibilities included general oversee-

No. 89-1399 3

ing responsibilities of Kovilic’s performance and ensuring
quality control during the term of the contract. One of
the inspectors, Mr. James Skonie, was a government em-
ployee, and the other, Mr. Joseph Szyszka, was an em-
ployee of an independent contractor.

On the particular portion of the roofing job where Savic
was injured, Kovilic’s workers climbed to the roof via an
aluminum extension ladder. Even though there was a con-
flict in testimony between the government’s construction
representative and other witnesses dealing with the method
of how the ladder was secured, the judge failed to state
why he chose to believe that the ladder was attached by
nails, rather than wire in spite of the fact that James
Skonie, one of the government’s construction representa-
tives, testified that he recalled the ladder being tied and
secured at the top with wire. There was also conflicting
testimony at trial on the question of whether attaching
the top of the ladder with nails was the safest method,
but the two construction representatives and the plain-
tiffs ladder expert did agree that this method would have
prevented the ladder from moving sideways and thus would
have prevented the accident. At trial Savic testified that
at the beginning of the work day on the morning of Au-
gust 10, 1981 he climbed the ladder, and that the ladder
was attached to the roof, as it had been in the past, and
further, that he and one of his co-workers moved a tar
pipe! immediately prior to his accident. Moving the tar
pipe necessitated the detachment of the ladder from the
roof momentarily in order that the pipe might be passed
behind it. Although it is unclear from the evidence whether
Savic or his co-worker detached the ladder, it is clear that
it was not reattached to the roof after the pipe had been
moved. Immediately after moving the pipe, Savic was
summoned by his supervisor (Nic Kovilic) to help him
move some insulation on the ground. As Savic stepped

1 The tar pipe is a pipe which is used in pumping hot tar from
ground level to the roof.

4 No. 89-1399

on the ladder to descend, the ladder moved sideways,
catapulting Savic to the ground, some eighteen feet.?

As a result of the fall, Savic injured his left elbow, frac-
tured four ribs, damaged his left kidney as well as his
left hip. After being awarded worker’s compensation for
his claim against Kovilic, Savic filed suit against the
United States claiming violations of the Illinois Structural
Work Act and common law negligence. The United States
filed a third- complaint against Kovilic Construction,
on the grounds of common law indemnity, and later amended
the third party complaint to include a claim under the
Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, Ill. Rev. Stat.
ch. 70, pars. 301-305. Over four years after the filing of
the original third-party complaint, the trial judge refused
to allow a further amendment by the United States, a
claim against Kovilic for contractual indemnity, because
of the lapse in time. Kovilic was dismissed from the ac-
tion prior to trial after settling directly with Savic. Savic
v. United States, 689 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ill. 1988).

The court trial was bifurcated as to the issues of liability
and damages. In the liability phase of the trial, the tria!
judge found the United States to be liable under the IlIli-
nois Structural Work Act but did not find common law
negligence on the part of the United States. In its oral
decision, the court found that the United States “had
charge of” the project on which Kovilic was working, ac-

2 There was testimony at trial that Savic may have attempted to
descend the ladder improperly, facing away from the building in
descending it similar to a staircase. This evidence was based upon
information which Nic Kovilic testified to hearing from Savic’s co-
workers after the accident, as well as the testimony of Emilio
a who witnessed the final eight to ten feet of Savic’s
fall, and testified that he was falling face-forward. The judge found
that there was no reliable evidence that Savic descended in this
manner and found this evidence not to be credible. In his opinion,
the trial judge stated that Savic would naturally have turned his
body in mid-air in order to be facing downward as he fell, but
there was no evidence of this in the record.

No. 89-1399 5

cording to the Illinois Structural Work Act, because the
government participated in the work beyond merely own-
ing the property or employing an independent contractor,
citing Phillips v. United States, 792 F.2d 689 (7th Cir.
1986). The court further found that the method of attach-
ing the ladder with nails to the building was an improper
method of securing the ladder, was inadequate, and this
was the proximate cause of Savic’s injuries. The court also
reasoned that the United States had willfully violated the
Act, as the term “willful” is used under the Illinois Struc-
tural Work Act, in allowing this method of ladder attach-
ment. Although the government inspectors’ testimony con-
flicted on the question of whether the ladder was secured
with nails or wire, both inspectors nonetheless agreed that
attaching the ladder with nails would have complied with
safety requirements. Despite extensive testimony in the
record regarding the adequacy of the method of attach-
ment using nails, the judge discounted the testimony of
the government’s expert witnesses, who testified concern-
ing the attachment of the ladder and instead cited his
“great deal of experience on ladders” as the basis for his
findings.*®

After having found liability on the part of the United
States, the judge received evidence regarding Savic’s dam-
ages, finding that Savic had sustained damages in the

3 Specifically, the trial judge stated in his oral findings:

“T have been a laborer in my life on more than one occa-
sion, and as I say, even a 4" (~ a certain amount
of experience with ladders. But I ladders in the navy,
I used ladders when I was a worker on the highways in the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts many years , I washed
trucks and moved things around for Rouan [sic] Motor Trans-
port out in Iowa years ago, and I painted fences with creosote
and buildings with creosote on ladders when I was a healthy
young lad.

I know without any difficulty at ali the actions that this
laborer was going through when he was attempting to get off
that roof and on to that ladder.”

6 No. 89-1399

amount of $523,087.00.* After subtracting the $100,000.00
which Savic received as a result of the settlement with
Kovilic, judgment was entered = the United States
in the amount $423,087.00. The United States appealed.

II.
DISCUSSION

This case arises under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (“FTCA”). The law which is to be
— is the law of the State of Illinois, “the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1346(b).

The trial judge found that the United States was li-
able pursuant to the Illinois Structural Work Act, Ill. Rev.
Stat. ch. 48, pars. 60-69.5 In order to find liability under

4 The judge’s damage award calculation contains many assump-
tions unsupported in the record. Savic had been a “laborer” prior
to his accident, and was omg laborer’s wages at $11.87 per hour,
but the judge found that his future —— would be $16.50 per hour,
stating that is what “experienced roofers” were ing. The rec-
ord fails to set forth his basis for finding where the $16.50 per
hour came from (the evidence showed experienced roofers made
$16.82 per hour) nor how Savic could be classified as an ‘“‘experi-
enced roofer.” In calculating Savic’s earning abilit~ xfter the in-
jury, the judge projected his future i at $0... per hour,
an in we are unaware of the source of this figure. On the
other Kovilic testified that he paid Savic $10 to $12 per hour
for approximately fifteen weeks in 1982, the year following the
accident. Kovilic stated that Savic worked as a laborer and that
Savie did not have any problems doing the tasks assigned to him.
At the end of fifteen weeks, Savic was laid off because the winter
season prevented outdoor construction work. Savic did not return

to work the following spring.

5 Section 1 of the Structural Work Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 48,

par. 60, provides, -in pertinent part:
“All scaffolds, hoists, cranes, stays, ladders, supports, or other
mechanical contrivances, erected or constructed by any per-
son, firm or corporation in this state for the use in the erec-

(Footnote continued on following page)

No. 89-1399 7

the Structural Work Act, the plaintiff must prove all of
the following:

“(1) The plaintiff was engaged in or was passing un-
der or by a structural activity; (2) the activity was
being performed with reference to a structure; (3) a
scaffold or other mechanical device was being used;
(4) a defect existed in the construction or use of the
device; (5) the defect proximately caused the plain-
tiffs injuries; (6) the defendant had charge of the

5 continued

tion, repairing, alteration, removal or painting of any house,
building, mie viaduct, or other structure, shall be erected
or constructed, in a safe, suitable and proper manner, and shall
be so erected and constructed, placed and operated as to give
proper and adequate protection to the life and limb of any per-
son or ns employed or engaged thereon, or passing under
or by the same, and in such manner as to prevent the falling
of any material that may be used or deposited thereon.”

A private cause of action arises under Section 9 of the Struc-
tural Work Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, par. 69, which provides in
part:

“Any owner, contractor, sub-contractor, foreman or other
person having charge of the erection, construction, repairing,
alteration, removal or painting of any building, bridge, viaduct
or other structure within the provisions of this act, shall com-
ply with all the terms thereof, and any such owner, contrac-
tor, sub-contractor, foreman or other person violating any of
the provisions of this act shall be guilty of a Class A
misdemeanor.

*_ * *

For any injury to person or pro , occasioned by an
wilful violations of this Act, or rvilfal failure to comply wi
any of its provisions, a right of action shall accrue to party
injured, for any direct damages sustained thereby; and in case
Ce ee ee ee ee ee
ure as aforesaid a right of action shall accrue to the survivi
of the person so killed, the lineal heirs or adopted chil-
n of such person, or to any other person or persons who
were, before such loss of life, a for support on the
person or persons so killed, for a like recovery o s for
the injuries sustained by reason of such loss of life or lives.”

8 No. 89-1399

work being performed; and (7) the defendant willfully
violated the Act’s safety standard.”

Fisher v. Crippen, 144 Ill. App. 3d 239, 493 N.E.2d 1204,
1206 (1986) (citations omitted). On appeai, the United States
disputes the district court’s findings regarding whether
it was “in charge of” the construction activities under the
act, the defect in use which proximately caused the acci-
dent, and the government’s willfulness in allowing the
defective use to exist.

Findings of fact pursuant to FTCA and the Illinois Struc-
tural Work Act must be affirmed unless they are clearly
erroneous. Phillips v. United States, 792 F.2d 639, 644
(7th Cir. 1986). A finding is clearly erroneous when, al-
though there may be some evidence to support it, “‘the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been com-
mitted.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564,
573 (1985) ree United States v. United States Gyp-
sum Co., U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). “We may have such a
conviction if the trial judge’s interpretation of the facts is
implausible, illogical, internally inconsistent or contradicted
by documentary or other extrinsic evidence.” E.E.0.C.
v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 309 (7th Cir. 1988)
(citations omitted).

The lack of written findings by the district court makes
review difficult. See Jones v. Jones Brothers Construc-
tion Corp., 879 F.2d 295 (7th Cir. 1989). In Jones, this
court remanded because it felt that “the district court’s
opinion makes review difficult because the limited number
of specific findings do not sufficiently identify the evidence
or credibility determinations upon which they were based
and reflect certain inconsistencies.” Jones, 879 F.2d at 297.
In the present case, however, the transcript of the court’s
oral opinion does reflect a sufficient amount of informa-
tion for us to glean the basis for the court’s relevant find-
ings in order that this court might make a valid deter-
mination of the propriety of those findings.

No. 89-1399 9

A

Whether the United States
“had charge of’ the Project

Whether the United States “had charge of” Kovilic’s
roofing operation, which is the sixth element under Fisher,
is a question of fact, to be reviewed under the totality
of circumstances standard. Gentile v. Kehe, 165 Ill. App.
3d 802, 520 N.E.2d 827, 829 (1987). Illinois courts have
determined that more than one entity can “have charge
of’ a project, Fruzyna v. Walter C. Carlson Associates,
Inc., 78 Ill. App. 3d 1050, 398 N.E.2d 60, 63 (1977), but
a number of factors (10) must be considered in determin-
ing whether or not a particular defendant “has charge of”’
(responsibility for) the project under the parameters of
the Structural Work Act.

“These factors are: (1) supervision and control of the
work; (2) retention of the right to supervise and con-
trol the work; (3) constant participation in ongoing
activities at the construction site; (4) supervision and
coordination of subcontractors; (5) responsibility for
taking safety precautions at the job site; (6) author-
ity to issue change orders; . . . (7) the right to stop
the work; . . . (8) ownership of the equipment used
on the job site; (9) defendant’s familiarity with con-
struction customs and practices; and (10) whether
defendant was in a position to assure worker safety
or alleviate equipment deficiencies or improper work
habits.”

Chance v. City of Collinsville, 112 Ill. App. 3d 6, 445
N.E.2d 39, 42 (1983) (citations omitted); Gentile, 520
N.E.2d at 829. The government would be found to be
“in charge of’ Kovilic’s project if the totality of these
factors weighs in favor of such a finding. As with the de-
fendant landowner in Gentile, the government should not
be held liable for “merely requiring compliance with the
contract and insuring the quality of the work.” Jd. at 530.
In Fruzyna, an architect was not found to be “in charge
of’ the contractor’s work even though he was familiar

iii

10 No. 89-1399

with the type of work being performed and had the right
to Po work for inferior quality. Fruzyna, 398 N.E.2d
at °

Supervision and control of Kovilic’s work would require
day-to-day control of the workers and the details of the
work, as in Emberton v. State Farm Insurance, 71 Ill.
2d 111, 373 N.E.2d 1348 (1978), where the numerous daily
change orders by the architect amounted to day-to-day
control. Retention of this right is also significant, even
if it is not exercised. Constant participation would require
an ongoing presence and involvement in the day-to-day
work. The very language of the contract as well as Kovi-
lic’s understanding of the situation establishes that respon-
ng: for safety precautions rest clearly upon Kovilic and
not the United States.

The government did meet the sixth and seventh ele-
ments, retaining authority to change specifications and
stop work if necessary. Ownership of equipment, however,
was clearly not a factor in favor of a finding that the
government was in charge, because Kovilic owned and his
employees operated the equipment used at the site. The
government representatives were familiar with construc-
tion practices, the ninth element. However, based upon
the record, it is at best highly questionable and nigh unto
impossible for the government to be in a position to as-
sure worker safety or alleviate equipment deficiencies or
improper work habits (the tenth element), given that the
government inspectors visited the construction site only
once or twice during an ordinary work day.

The district court did make reference to some of the
appropriate factors for determining whether the United
States had charge of the geen referring to Mathieu v.
Venture Stores, Inc., 144 Ill. APP. 3d 783, 494 N.E.2d 806
(1986) and Kohutko v. Four Columns, Ltd., 148 Ill. App.
3d 181, 498 N.E.2d 522 (1986). Specifically, the district
court said “that the government a sufficient degree
of supervision and control,” because “the United States
inspected the work, they oversaw the work, and in the

No. 89-1399 11

opinion of the court, they had a right to control the work.
Whether or not that right was exercised constantly in the
fullest sense of the word, I believe they did.” However,
the judge did not provide an analysis nor examples of
what he relied upon in yr of this statement. Addi-
tionally, the district court found that the government “re-
tains the right to supervise and control,” and that the
government was not “constantly on location, but they
were on location several times a day every day for a
number of days.” Even though he found that the govern-
ment was not on location constantly, the judge found that
the United States was “in total control of the circum-
stances of the base,” citing the United States’ ownership
and general supervision of the property.* The testimony
demonstrated that the government inspectors climbed the
ladders but one or two times per day, when they wished
to inspect the installation of roofing material as well as
the quality of the same pursuant to the terms of the con-
tract; and at these times they testified they took notice
that the ladders were attached to the roof.

Regarding safety, the district judge cited the pre-con-
struction conference at which safety, along with numerous
other administrative details, was discussed by represen-
tatives of the government and the contractor. The govern-
ment was responsible for monitoring compliance with the
contract which included the ability to stop work for qual-
ity control problems; however, section 45 of the contract
between the government and Kovilic placed responsibility’

® Using such reasoning, one could easily envision a situation where
the government would be found to be “in charge of” work being
performed by an employee of a private security system firm who
was injured during the installation of the security system in a
government building simply because of the United States’ owner-
ship and supervision of the property.
7 The relevant portion of section 45 states:
“(a) In order to provide safety controls for protection to the
life and health of employees and other persons . . . the Con-
tractor [Kovilic] shall comply with all pertinent provisions of
Corps of Engineers Manual . . . and will also take or cause to
be taken such additional measures as the Contracting Officer
may determine to be reasonably necessary for the purpose.”

oltre

12 No. 89-1399

for accident prevention upon Kovilic. In demonstrating
that the government had a right to control the work, the
judge cited testimony by Sherman Barnett, the Navy’s
project manager for this and all other construction proj-
ects at Great Lakes Naval Training Station, that he could
make Kovilic change the asphalt bucket, although no evi-
dence established that ing the asphalt bucket would
be a safety precaution, rather than an aspect of quality
control.* From this unexplained evidence, the judge came
to the conclusion that “if you can stop them from using
an asphalt bucket, you can certainly stop them from in-
adequately supporting a ladder.” The district court found
that the government could have stopped the work at any
time, that the government was “surely and clearly famil-
iar with construction customs and practices” related to
this job because the inspectors were highly experienced
in the construction industry, and that the government “did
indeed have the ability to assure workers’ safety” because
of the inspectors’ ability to “point out the lack of com-
pliance and the necessity of complying,” as provided in
the contract.

The factors regarding whether a party “has charge of’
a project under the Illinois Structural Work Act are aimed
at determining whether a particular defendant has a depth
of involvement in the project beyond mere ownership of
the property or employment of the contractor, which was
the case in Phillips. Being “in charge of” a project consists
of a “continuing and substantial involvement with the
work, or authority over, or responsibility for, and knowl-
edge of the conditions which caused the injury.” Phillips,
792 F.2d at 645. “Mere ownership, without more, is in-
sufficient to establish liability under the Structural Work
Act.” Norton v. Wilbur Waggoner Equipment Rental, 76
Ill. 2d 481, 394 N.E.2d 408, 406 (1979). The owners in Em-

8 Indeed, the record reveals that Barnett testified that the ~
ernment inspectors could order the asphalt bucket changed to
make a “correction on it.”

No. 89-1399 13

berton were found to have charge of the work where they
were at the work site every day, sometimes all day, at-
tended the contractor’s weekly progress meetings with
subcontractors, and issued over a hundred change orders
on all aspects of the project, acting over and above mere
ownership or the employment of a contractor.? Ember-
ton, 373 N.E.2d at 1852-53. In Phillips, the United States
was not “in charge of’ work on its own property when
it had no idea of the progress of the work when the ac-
cident occurred or the particular methods being used in
that work. Phillips, 792 F.2d at 645.

The United States argues, and we agree, that only three
of the ten factors from Chance would support a finding
that it was “in charge of’ the work being performed by
Kovilic: the authority to issue change orders, the right
to stop work (only when it does not comply with contract
specifications), and familiarity with construction customs
and practices; the other seven factors applied to Kovilic.
Thus, under the totality of the factors from Chance, we
firmly believe that the United States was not “‘in charge
fl ged roofing project, for purposes of the Structural

ork Act.

As to the first two factors, the judge found that the
United States had “a sufficient degree of supervision and
control” for him to find that the United States “‘had charge
of’ the work, although he failed to delineate or explain his
reasoning, much less the difference between “sufficient”
and “insufficient.” However, Mr. Barnett, the Navy’s proj-
ect manager, and Nic Kovilic both testified to the fact
that the government did not have a right to control the
work of the contractor, except when the quality of the
work did not comply with the contract’s specifications. The
main duty of the inspectors was to ensure not only the
quality of the material used but also compliance with the
contract specifications as to installation. Although the con-

® In contrast, there was no testimony in this case of the govern-
ment inspectors’ ever submitting even a single change order.

ell

14 No. 89-1399

tract mentioned safety, it clearly assigned the duty for
maintaining a safe operation to the contractor Kovilic: “In
order to provide safety controls . . . the Contractor shall
comply with all pertinent provisions of [the] Corps of En-
gineers Manual .. . entitled ‘General Safety Require-
ments.’ ” The United States’ i rs testified that they
would only become involved with the work of the individ-
ual laborers when and if they observed immediate danger
to “life and limb, where someone could get hurt,” but that
this situation never became necessary during Kovilic’s
roofing project. Otherwise, section 45 of the contract re-
quired any comments or requests for changes in the con-
tract provisions to be channeled through the contractor’s
supervisor on the site. The contract required Kovilic “to
have on the work ({site] a competent superintendent”’ at
all times, with authority to act for the contractor. The
evidence regarding the United States’ authority to enforce
safety regulations and control the work, except as to qual-
ity control, established that the government did not have
or retain the right to supervise and control the day-to-
day work of Kovilic, and neither Savic nor the court have
cited any evidence to contradict that conclusion, thus fail-
ing to support the trial court’s finding as to supervision
and control, as well as retention of that right, the first
two factors under Chance.

Regarding the third factor, “constant participation in
ongoing activities at the construction site,” the trial judge
stated “they weren’t constantly on location, but they were
on location several times a day every day for a number
of days.” The judge made no finding, however, and the -
evidence fails to demonstrate that the government’s lim-
ited presence at the site amounted to “participation” in
the work. The government’s periodic inspections fail to
fall within the parameters of continual supervision. Kovilic
testified that the inspectors usually just “came up and
talked to you... and asked you questions” about the
activity, and that after the start of the project “they kind
of slack off.” In finding that the government was constant-
ly participating in the ongoing activities at the site, the

No. 89-1399 15

judge reached out beyond the contractually stated respon-
sibilities and the evidence presented. This factor cannot
weigh in favor of the government being in charge of the
ap for the government did not participate ‘“constant-
y.” Moreover, this court has previously held that govern-
ment inspection of work being performed by an indepen-
dent contractor is not enough to place the government
“in charge of’ the work. Cannon v. United States, 328
F.2d 763, 765 (7th Cir. 1964). The fact that the govern-
ment had retained two inspectors who, from time to time,
inspected the work being performed by Kovilic’s employ-
ees did not place the government “in charge of” the work.
This is especially so, given that the government inspec-
tors were also responsible for making inspections of as
many as twenty other work sites each day.

The terms of the contract established that the respon-
sibility for ensuring safety precautions at the job site was
upon Kovilic, the fifth of the Chance factors. That respon-
sibility for safety was affirmed at the pre-construction con-
ference. Nic Kovilic, at trial, was asked “you assumed
responsibility for the safety of your employees, did you
not?” Kovilic answered ‘‘yes.”” When asked whether the
“government [had] responsibility for taking safety precau-
tions at the job site,’ Mr. Barnett, the Navy’s project
manager, replied ‘‘no.” When asked whether the inspec-
tors had the authority to stop the project, Mr. Barnett
replied that “The only way they could stop a phase of the
project would be if they saw some thing unsafe [such as]
in the case of endangerment of life or limb or property.”’
Both government inspectors made similar statements. The
government was not in the position to assure workers’
safety because, under the terms of the contract it had
delegated this responsibility to the contractor. Further-
more, we decline to hold that mere government inspection
of work being performed by an independent contractor
to assure that the independent contractor is following
necessary safety precautions is, by itself, enough to shift
the responsibility for taking safety precautions to the gov-
ernment. To do so would create a disincentive for the

so lhtthiteeienenll

16 No. 89-1399

government to ever become involved in ensuring that
work by an independent contractor is performed in a safe
manner.

Regarding Chance’s eighth factor, Kovilic owned, main-
tained and operated the equipment used at the job site,
including the portable ladder upon which Savic was stand-
ing when he suffered his injuries.

Because seven of the ten Chance factors mandate our
holding that Kovilic had complete safety responsibility on
the roofing project, we reverse the district court’s finding
that the government “‘had charge of’’ the project. While the
government maintained some responsibility regarding the
authority to issue change orders concerning installation
and quality of the material and was familiar with the con-
struction activities as an owner, in our opinion the con-
tract entered into between the government and Kovilic,
as well as the practice on the job site, clearly placed the
responsibility of safety on the contractor, Kovilic Construc-
tion Co. When asked whether he agreed with the state-
ment “the Government would turn over the plans and
specifications to you and then you were responsible for
performing the work,” Nic Kovilic responded “‘yes.”’ Al-
though the district court judge found some of the factors
to weigh in favor of the government being “in charge of’
the project (like familiarity with construction practices
and the ability to issue change orders), our review of the
record considered in its totality reveals that the judge
erroneously found liability on the government, based upon
what he referred to as his “experience on ladders.” Be-
cause the evidence fails to support the trial judge’s find-
ing that the government above and beyond the role
of a mere property owner or the hiring of a contractor,
we hold that the trial judge’s finding that the government
“had charge of” the project for purposes of establishing
liability under the Illinois Structural Work Act was erro-

neous.

| No. 89-1399 17

B.
Defect in Use of the Ladder

Our hoiding that the United States was not “in charge
of” the roofing project when Mr. Savic was injured would
itself preclude a finding of liability against the United
States under the Structural Work Act, but we feel that
we are obligated to discuss the other grounds which com-
pel this reviewing court to reverse the district court’s
finding of liability against the United States under the
Act. The trial court found that the manner of securing
the ladder to the roof was the defective use of the lad-
der which proximately caused Savic’s injuries, and that
the United States willfully allowed the existence of that
defect. The trial court failed to recognize the defect in
the use of the ladder which clearly caused Savic’s injuries:
The ladder was not attached to the roof when Savic stepped
upon it and feil because either Savic or his co-worker had
detached it immediately prior to Savic stepping upon it
and falling. Based upon the record before us we fail to
understand how the United States could be found to have
willfully allowed that defect to exist.

The district court referred to three different defects in
the use of the particular ladder which it felt caused the
accident. First, the court felt that the method by which
Kovilic secured the ladder at the top was inadequate to
support the weight of the ladder and the people climb-
ing it. Second, the court found that the ladder was not
consistently secured at the bottom. Third, the court found
that the ladder was too short, not extending high enough
over the rm of the roof. As will be shown later, all three
of these defects are immaterial (even if we agreed with
the findings, which we do not) because the proximate
cause of the accident was that the ladder was not attached
to the roof when Savic fell. The court also found that since
the United States “had charge of’ the project and
“willfully” allowed these conditions to exist, as that term
is defined in cases under the Illinois Structural Work Act,
all the necessary elements for liability under the Act were
satisfied.

1 eeeerl

18 No. 89-1399

There is evidence regarding the three defects which the
court found (the improper attachment at the top, improper
attachment at the bottom, and insufficient projection above
the roof), but the findings as to whether these defects
existed is irrelevant because the record clearly illustrates
that none of these factors caused Savic’s accident. The
evidence in the record establishes that Savic’s accident
occurred because the ladder had been detached from its
moorings immediately prior to the accident and not re-
attached to the roof before Savic attempted to descend.
This detachment of the ladder was the defect in use which
was the proximate cause of Savic’s accident. Savic had
been working on the roof for over two weeks, having
climbed the ladder “hundreds of times” during that pe-
riod, and his own testimony reveals that the ladder had
never previously been detached from the roof without be-
ing immediately re-attached. Savic or his co-worker pulled
the ladder from the nails which secured it to the roof in
order to move the tar pipe, and failed to re-attach it. The
detachment of the ladder was a defect in use, but under
no circumstances can the United States be found to have
willfully allowed this defect to exist because it had no
knowledge of the momentary detachment and lack of re-
attachment of the ladder. How the government can be
faulted for an accident of this nature we are at a loss to
understand.

The district court “‘believe{d] that the ladder was lower
than it should have been in its projection above the roof,”
and found that this was a contributing cause of the acci-
dent. The parties stipulated that the roof was 18 feet, 8%
inches above the ground, and that the ladder in the pos-
session of Kovilic’s insurance company was 20 feet, 1 inch
in its usable length (the maximum usable length is based
upon a full extension of the ladder with a safe overlap
of the two sections). The plaintiff's expert based his
testimony on these stipulated facts, including the measure-
ment of the ladder, to conclude that the ladder was too

- No. 89-1399 19

short to safely reach the height of the roof,!° which ac-
tually may not have been the ladder used at the time of
the accident.!1 Upon cross-examination, however, the ex-
pert stated that the purpose of the three-foot projection
requirement was to provide a hand hold at the top of the
ladder for persons getting on or off the ladder. He fur-
ther testified that a violation of the regulation would not
have caused the ladder to fall as Savic described it as
falling because grasping a falling ladder upon which he
was standing would not have prevented the fall. The trial
judge relied upon the testimony of the plaintiff's expert
as to the safety of the ladder as to its height in relation
to the height of the roof (which had been discounted on
cross-examination by a showing that the three-foot pro-
jection would not have prevented the accident), and again
relying upon his own personal experience as a laborer in
deciding that the violation of the three-foot projection re-
quirement, combined with the nail method of securing the
ladder, were the proximate causes of Savic’s accident.

The competent testimony regarding the proximate cause
of Savic’s accident set forth that Savic fell because the
ladder was not secured to the roof at the time when Savic
stepped upon it to descend. The plaintiff Savic was the
only eye-witness to the beginning of the fall, and in his
testimony at trial he stated that the ladder was not at-
tached to the roof when he started down. He further tes-
tified that he had climbed the ladder perhaps twenty to
thirty times per day for two weeks and had never seen

10 OSHA standards require the side rails of a ladder to “extend not
less than 36 inches above the landing.” 29 C.F.R. § 1926.450(aX9).

11 Kovilic testified that he was not certain that the ladder which
he had provided to the insurance company a few months after the
accident was in fact the ladder that was used by Savic at the time
: of the accident. Because the plaintiff's expert witness based his
testimony on his i ion of a ladder that may not have been
the ladder used at the time of the accident, we find it hard to
understand how the trial judge gave credence to the plaintiff's ex-
pert’s testimony.

steel

20 No. 89-1399

it detached from the roof before. The plaintiff's expert,
Charles Schulz, cited as one of three reasons for the cause
of the fall, along with the projection of the ladder above
the roof and the improper pitch of the ladder (both of which
according to the transcript were discounted as causes on
cross-examination) was the fact that the ladder was not
attached at the time when the plaintiff stepped upon it
to descend. Nic Kovilic, who was Savic’s supervisor on
the job and had asked Savic to descend to help him, tes-
tified that he saw the ladder detached by Savic or one of
his co-workers when they moved the tar pipe, but that he
paid no attention to whether the ladder was re-attached.
He assumed that the person who detached the ladder
would re-attach it.

The fact that the ladder was detached when Savic stepped
upon it to descend it was the proximate cause of the ac-
cident. The trial court’s finding that the method of at-
tachment (whether adequate or not), or the height of the
ladder’s projection above the roof caused the accident is
unsupported in the record and thus clearly erroneous.

C.
Willfulness of the United States

Since there was a defective use of the ladder, and that
defective use was the proximate cause of the accident,
our analysis requires a discussion of whether the viola-
tion of the Act’s safety standard was a willful violation
by the United States.12 Under the Illinois Structural
Work Act, “a willful violation occurs when one having
charge of the work knows that a dangerous condition ex-

12 As we mentioned pe our holding that the United States

charge j
finding of liability against the United States under the
Work Act. However, we feel it necessary to discuss the other
grounds which compel a reversal of the district court’s finding of
liability against the United States.

| No. 89-1399 21

ists on the [ladder] or, by the exercise of reasonable care,
could have discovered the existence of the dangerous con-

dition.” Simmons v. Union Electric Co., 104 Ill. 2d 444, 473
N.E.2d 946, 950 (1984); Dickman v. Midwest Interstate

Electric Construction Co., 143 Ill. App. 3d 494, 493 N.E.2d
33, 36 (1986); Moore v. Clearing Industrial District, Inc.,
64 Ill. App. 3d 391, 380 NE 2d 1063 (1978). The trial
judge based his finding of willfulness on the fact that the
government had knowledge of the method of attachment
and the height of the ladder, defects which we hold not
causal of the accident.

The government inspectors, Skonie and Szyska, as well
as Savic, Kovilic, and Emilio Spasojevic all testified that
previously the ladder had always been attached when per-
sons were climbing upon it. The only testimony at trial
that the ladder may not have been attached at any time
previously was the deposition testimony of Marko Letica.
However, the credibility of Letica’s testimony was ques-
tionable because he contradicted himself regarding whether
he quit or was fired from his employment with Kovilic
and the length of time he had been planning the trip
which prevented him from being present at the trial. Ob-
viously, the trial judge did not rely upon his testimony,
for he made no mention of Letica’s deposition testimony
in his findings, but rather again relied upon his own per-
sonal experience. The judge stated, “I think they [the
government inspectors] were lax and lazy, and I think that
under the Se ak oe it bee rma arte . ion ng age
tion, apparently implying that the Uni tates knew 0
dangerous conditions, was responsible for changing them
and simply decided to do nothing about them. A willful
violation of the Illinois Structural Work Act requires that
the party “in charge of” the tre know of the defec-
tive condition: iy owner is liable where the dangerous
condition is known to him or when, in the exercise of rea-
sonable care, the existence of the dangerous condition
could have been known to him.” Phillips v. United States,
792 F.2d 639, 646 (7th Cir. 1986). We disagree with the

tll

22 No. 89-1399

trial judge’s finding that the government willfully violated
the Act because, on the overwhelming weight of
the credible evidence, it is clear that the United States,
through its agents, had no knowledge that the ladder had
previously been detached from the nails when in use.

The United States did not know, nor could its agents
reasonably have anticipated, that the ladder would be
unattached and thus used improperly. Furthermore, Kovilic
Construction was “in charge of” the project, and their
actions did not depend upon the government’s presence
at the site: (1) Kovilic furnished the ladders, (2) Kovilic
a secured the ladders, (3) Kovilic employees de-
tached the ladder, and (4) Kovilic employees failed to re-
attach the ladder. The periodic inspections of the United
States’ agents for quality and contract compliance cannot
be expected to detect every momentary change in condi-
tions at the work site, including each of the 20 to 30 daily
ascents and descents of the ladders by Kovilic’s 10 to 20
employees.

The United States did not know, and there was no rea-
son that the United States should have known, of the mo-
mentarily defective condition in the detachment of the lad-
der. When there is no notice of unsafe activities, there
can be no finding of liability under the Illinois Structural
Work Act. See Phillips, supra. The district court’s find-
ing that the United States willfully allowed the defective
condition which caused the accident to occur is clearly er-
roneous because it does not ply to the defect in use
which caused Savic’s accident. From our review of the
record, we are unable to ascertain any willfulness on the
part of the United States in allowing the existence of the
defective condition which caused Savic’s injury. No act
or omission of the United States was a proximate cause
of Tomislav Savic’s injuries, but clearly, the proximate
cause of the accident was the detachment of the ladder
by Savic himself, or his co-worker, with the government’s
inspectors nowhere near the scene.

& No. 89-1399 23

III.
CONCLUSION

“This is [another] one of those relatively rare cases in
which we are left with a ‘definite and firm conviction’. . .
that the district judge erred in a yn 3 of fact.” Louis
Vuitton S.A. v. Lee, 875 F.2d 584, 589 (7th Cir. 1989) (cita-
tions omitted). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although
there may be some evidence to support it, “the review-
ing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573
(1985) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum
Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). The district court judge,
rather than relying upon the evidence in the trial record,
relied on his own personal experience regarding the course
of events which ied to Tomislav Savic’s fall and his subse-
quent injuries. We are of the opinion that the trial judge’s
interpretation of the evidence at trial fails to support the
judge’s findings dealing with the cause of the accident,
while the true proximate cause of the accident was abun-
dantly clear from the trial record. We hold that the United
States is not liable under the Illinois Structural Work Act
for the injuries Tomislav Savic received as a result of the
fall from the ladder at Great Lakes Naval Base. The judg-
ment against the United States is

REVERSED.
A true Copy:
Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

USCA 79004—Midwest Law Printing Co., Inc., Chicago—11-19-90—500

0

en es re

APPENDIX D

Order of Court of Appeals, denying
Petition for Rehearing en Banc
January 14, 1991

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604

January 14, 1991

_Before

Hon. Harlington Wood, Jr., Circuit Judge
Hon. John L. Coffey, Circuit Judge

Hon. Jesse E. Eschbach,
Senior Circuit Judge

Tomislav Savic, ] Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellee, ] United States
] District Court
No. 89-1399 v. ] for the
] Northern

United States of America _] District of
Defendant and Third ] Illinois,

Party, ] Eastern
Plaintiff-Appellant, ] Division.
]
v. ] No. 83 C 5388
] Brian B. Duff,
Kovilic Construction ] Judge
Company, Incorporated, ]
Third Party ]
Defendant-Appellee ]

ORDER

On consideration of the petition for rehearing
with suggestion for rehearing en banc filed herein by
the plaintiff-appellee, no judge in active service has
requested a vote thereon, and all of the judges on
the original panel have voted to deny a rehearing.
Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the aforesaid petition for
rehearing be, and the same is hereby, DENIED.

APPENDIX E

Relevant Statutory Provisions

| eee owe

ILLINOIS STRUCTURAL WORK ACT
Illinois Revised Statutes, Chapter 48
paragraphs 60-68

60. Scaffoids, cranes, ladders, etc. - Erection and
construction

Sec. 1. All scaffolds, hoists, cranes, stays, ladders,
supports, or other mechanical contrivances, erected
or constructed by any person, firm or corporation in
this State of the use in the erection, repairing,
alteration, removal of painting of any house, build-
ing, bridge, viaduct, or other structure, shall be
erected and constructed, in a safe, suitable and
proper manner, and shall be so erected and con-
structed, placed and operated as to give proper and
adequate protection to the life and limb of any
person or persons employed or engaged thereon, or
passing under or by the same, and in such manner
as to prevent the falling of any material that may be
used or deposited thereon.

Section 9 of the Structural Work Act, IIl.Rev.Stat. ch.
48, par. 69, provides in pertinent part:

"Any owner, contractor, sub-contractor,
foreman or other person having charge of the
erection, construction, repairing, alteration,
removal or painting of any building, bridge,
viaduct or other structure within the provisions of
this act, shall comply with all the terms thereof,
and any such owner, contractor, sub-contractor,
foreman or other person violating any of the

]

SEL

provisions of this act shall be guilty of a Class A
misdemeanor.

* & * * /” *

For any injury to person or property,
occasioned by and wilful violations of this Act, or
wilful failure to comply with any of its provisions,
2 right of action shall accrue to the party injured,
for any direct damages sustained thereby; and in
case of loss of life by reason of such wilful viola-
tion or wilful failure as aforesaid a right of action
shall accrue to the surviving spouse of the person
so killed, the lineal heirs or adopted children of
such person, or to any other person or persons
who were, before such loss of life, dependent for
support on the person or persons so killed, for a
like recovery of damages for the injuries sustained
by reason of such loss of life or lives."

29 CFR Sec. 1926 (7) (1981):

Portable ladders shall be used at such a pitch that
the horizontal distance from the top support of
the foot of the ladder is about one-quarter of the
working length of the ladder (the length along
the ladder between the foot and the top support).
Ladders shall not be used in a horizontal position
as platforms, runways, or scaffolds.

29 CFR Sec. 1926 (9) (1981):

The side rails shall extend not less than 36 inches
above the landing. When this is not practical,

2

grab rails which provide a secure grip for an
) employee moving to or from the point of access,
shall be installed.

29 CFR Sec. 1926 (10) (1981):

Portable ladders in use shall be tied, blocked, or
otherwise secured to prevent their being dis-
placed. .

Wrasse 3 Ores, oe ow

APPENDIX F

Construction Contract

CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT
General Provisions

1. DEFINITIONS

(a) The term "head of the agency" or "Secretary"
as used herein means the Secretary, Under Sec-
retary, any Assistant Secretary, or any other head or
assistant head of the executive or _ military
department or other Federal agency; and the term
"has duly authorized representative "means any
person or persons or board (other than the Contract-
ing Officer) authorized to act for the head of the
agency or the Secretary.

(b) The term "Contracting Officer" as used
herein means the person executing this contract on
behalf of the Government and includes a duly
appointed successor or authorized representative.
(DAR 7-602.1).

3. CHANGES

(a) The Contracting Officer may, at any time,
without notice to the sureties, by written order —
designated or indicated to be a change order, make
any change in the work within the general scope of
the contract, including but not limited to changes:

(1) In the specifications (including drawings and
designs);

(ii) In the method or manner of performance of
the work;

(iit) In the Government-furnished facilities,
equipment, materials, services, or site, or

(iv) Directing acceleration in the performance of
the work.

9. MATERIAL AND WORKMANSHIP

(a) Unless otherwise specifically provided in this
contract, all equipment, material, and articles incor-
porated in the work covered by this contract are to
be new and of the most suitable grade for the
purpose intended. Unless otherwise specifically
provided in this contract, reference to any equip-
ment, material, article, or patented process, by trade
name, make or catalog number, shall be regarded as
establishing a standard of quality and shall not be
construed as limiting competition, and the Contractor
may at his option, use any equipment, material,
article or process which, in the judgment of the
Contracting Officer, is equal to the named. The
Contractor shall furnish to the Contracting Officer
for his approval the name of the manufacturer, the
model number, and other identifying data and
information respecting the performance, capacity,
nature and rating of the machinery and mechanical
and other equipment which the Contractor con-
templates incorporating in the work. When required
by this contract or when called for by the Contract-
ing Officer, the Contractor shall furnish the Con-
tracting officer for approval full information concern-
ing the material or article which he contemplates
incorporating in the work...

(b) All work under the contract shall be per-
formed in a skillful and workmanlike manner. The
Contracting Officer may, in writing, require the
Contractor to remove from the work any employee
the Contracting Officer deems incompetent, careless,
or otherwise objectionable. (DAR 7-602.9)

10. INSPECTION AND ACCEPTANCE (1976 OCT)

(a) All work (which term includes but is not
restricted to materials, workmanship and manufacture
and fabrication of components) shall be subject to
inspection and test by the Government at all reason-
able times and at all places prior to acceptance. Any
such inspection and test is for the sole benefit of the
Government and shall not relieve the Contractor of
the responsibility of providing quality control meas-
ures to assure ... No inspection or test by the
Government be construed as constituting or implying
acceptance. Inspection or test shall not relieve the
Contractor of responsibility for damage to or loss of
the material prior to acceptance nor in any way
affect the continuing rights of the Government after
acceptance of the completed work under the terms
of paragraph (f) of this clause, except as hereinabove
provided.

(b) The Contractor shall without charge, replace
any material or correct any workmanship found by
the Government not to conform to the contract
requirements, unless in the public interest the
Government consents to accept such material or
workmanship with an appropriate adjustment in

contract price. The Contractor shall promptly
segregate and remove rejected material from the
premises.

(c) If the Contractor does not promptly replace
rejected material or correct rejected workmanship
the Government (1) may, by contract or otherwise
replace such material or correct such workmanship
and charge the cost thereof to the Contractor, or (2)
may terminate the Contractor’s right to proceed in
accordance with the clause of this contract entitled
"Termination for Default - Damages For Delay -
Time Extensions."

17. SUSPENSION OF WORK (1968 FEB)

(a) The Contracting Officer may order the
Contractor in writing to suspend, delay, or interrupt
all or any part of the work for such period of time
as he may determine to be appropriate for the
convenience of the Government.

18. TERMINATION FOR CONVENIENCE OF
THE GOVERNMENT (1974 APR)

(a) The performance of work under this contract
may be terminated by the Government in accordance
with this clause in whole, or from time to time in
part, whenever the Contracting Officer shall deter-
mine that such termination is in the best interest of
the Government. Any such termination shall be
effected by delivery to the Contractor of a Notice of
Termination specifying the extent to which perform-
ance of work under the contract is terminated, and

the date upon which such termination becomes
effective.

44. ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS (1965 JAN)

(a) Wherever in the specifications or upon the
drawings the words "directed", "required", "ordered",
"designated", "prescribed", or words of like import are
used, it shall be understood that the "direction",
"requirement", "order", "designation", or "prescription"
of the Contracting Officer is intended and similarly
words "approved", "acceptable", "satisfactory", or words
of like import shall mean "approved by" or "accept-
able to" or "satisfactory to" the Contracting Officer,

unless otherwise expressly stated.

(b) Where "as shown", "as indicated", "as detail-
ed", or words of similar import are used, it shall be
understood that the reference is made to the draw-
ings accompanying this contract unless stated
otherwise. The word "provided" as used herein shall
be understood to mean "provided complete in place,"
that is "furnished and installed." (DAR 7-602.41)

45. ACCIDENT PREVENTION (1977 JAN)

(a) In order to provide safety controls for protec-
tion to the life and health of employees and other
persons; for prevention of damage to property,
materials, supplies and equipment, and for avoidance
of work interruptions in the performance of this
contract, the Contractor shall comply with all perti-
nent provisions of Corps of Engineers Manual, EM
3M5 1-1, dated 1 June 1977 entitled "General Safety

5

Requirements", as amended, and will also take or
cause to be taken such additional measures as the
Contracting Officer may determine to be reasonably
necessary for the purpose.

(b) The Contractor will maintain as accurate
record of, and shall report to the Contracting Officer
in the manner and on the forms prescribed by the
Contracting Officer, exposure data and all accidents
resulting in death, traumatic injuries, occupational
disease, and damage to property, materials, supplies
and equipment incident to work performed under
this contract.

(c) The Contracting Officer shall notify the
Contractor of any noncompliance with the foregoing
provisions and the action to be taken. The Con-
tractor shall, after receipt of such notice, immediately
take corrective action. Such notice, when delivered
to the Contractor or his representative at the site of
the work, shall be deemed sufficient for the purpose.
If the Contractor fails or refuses to comply promptly,
the Contracting Officer may issue an order stopping
all or part of work until satisfactory corrective action
has been taken. No part of the time lost due to any
such stop orders shall be made the subject of claim
for extension of time or for excess costs or damages
by the Contractor.

(d) Compliance with the provision of this article
by subcontractors will be the responsibility of the
Contractor.

If the contract involves more than 6 months work
or is described as hazardous character in the invita-
tion for Bids, Schedule, or Specifications, the
following paragraph (e) will apply.

(e) Prior to commencement of the work the
Contractor will

(1) submit in writing his proposals for effectuat-
ing this provision for accident prevention.

(2) meet in conference with representatives of
the Contracting Officer to discuss and develop
mutual understandings relative to administration of
the overall safety program. (DAR 7-602.42)

46. GOVERNMENT INSPECTORS (1965 JAN)

The work will be conducted under the general
direction of the Contracting Officer and is subject to
inspection by his appointed inspectors to insure strict
compliance with the terms of the contract. No
inspector is authorized to change any provision of
the specifications without written authorization of the
Contracting Officer, nor shall the presence or ab-
sence of an inspector relieve the Contractor from
any requirements of the contract. (DAR 7-602.43)

69. GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES (6-72)
(a) The work will be under the general direction
of the Contracting Officer, the Commander, Naval

Facilities Engineering Commander, who shall des-
ignate an officer of the Civil Engineer Corps, United

7

States Navy, or other officer or representative of
the Government, as Officer in Charge of Construc-
tion, hereinafter referred to as the "OICC", who
except in connection with the "Disputes" clause shall
be the authorized representative of the Contracting
Officer and under the direction of the Contracting
Officer have complete charge of the work, and shall
exercise full supervision and general direction of the
work, so far as it affects the interest of the Govern-
ment. For the purposes of the "Dispute" clause the
Contracting Officer shall mean the Commander,
Naval Facilities Engineering Commander; the Acting
Commander, their successors, or their representatives
specially designated for this purpose.

(b) The provisions in this clause or elsewhere in
this contract regarding supervision, approval or
direction by the Contracting Officer or the OICC or
action taken pursuant thereto are not intended to
and shall not relieve the Contractor of responsibility
for the accomplishment of the work either as regards
sufficiency or the time of performance, except as
expressly otherwise provided herein.

94. WORK OUTSIDE REGULAR HOURS (6-72)

If the Contractor desires to carry on work outside
regular hours or on Saturdays, Sundays, or holidays,
he shall submit application to the Officer in Charge
of Construction, but shall allow ample time to enable
satisfactory arrangements to be made by the Govern-
ment for inspecting the work in progress. At night,
he shall light the different parts of the work in an
approved manner. All utility cutovers shall be made

after normal working hours or on_ weekends.
Anticipated costs shall be included in the bid.

APPENDIX G

Excerpts of Letica’s Testimony

Excerpts of Letica’s Testimony

Q. Okay. Now the ladder t

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_2117%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
