# Opposition Brief — Work v. Tyson Foods, Inc.

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_2098%3A4

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1991
- **Citation:** 502 U.S. 956

## Text

Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1991

LEWIS STEPHEN WORK, ET AL., PETITIONERS
OP

TYSON Foops, INC., ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

KENNETH W. STARR
Solicitor General

BARRY M. HARTMAN
Acting Assistant Attorney General

JOHN A. BRYSON
WILLIAM B. LAZARUS
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 514-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the resolution of an enforcement action
brought by the government under Section 309(b)
and (d) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1319(b)
and (d), precludes citizens from prosecuting the
same violations against the same polluter in a sepa-
rate citizen suit that had been initiated under Sec-
tion 505(a)(1) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. 1365(a) (1),
prior to commencement of the government’s action.

(1)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

a ssintesniecmonocsongionsmess 1
i ceeuetnnmnepameneoescmacs 1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:

Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 933 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1991) ............. 9
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. American Re-
covery Co., 769 F.2d 207 (4th Cir. 1985) —.......... 8
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay
Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987) 22.0000... 6, 7-8
Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 110 S. Ct. 304
EE 7

Statutes, regulation and rule:
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.:

SS ee
§ 301, 88 U.S.C. 18111 .................... t= hires oO
I SS CT)
oe cneemnecenene
EE ST)
§ 309 (d), 33 U.S.C. 1819(d) ...................-..-..---...
TT ccsesnasemmmmecs
SEE BREE s ROPE) 2.2 -ncccecccnenecocccse
cc eeemeees
§ 505 (a) (1), 33 U.S.C. 1365 (a) (1) ae es i
§ 505 (a) (2), 33 U.S.C. 1865 (a) (2) _................
§ 506 (b) , 88 U.S.C. 1865 (b) .........................-....
§ 505(b) (1) (A), 33 U.S.C. 1365(b) (1) (A) ...
§ 505(b) (1) (B), 33 U.S.C. 1365 (b) (1) (B) _...
§ 505 (b) (2), 33 U.S.C. 1865 (b) (2) 0...
§ 506(c), 88 U.S.C. 1865(c) ................................
ES Ee EPs BOE nnn ccccccccccccnccceee

Nee a ssauiunscevuensenes Sao
I cc cnscsmemeceoeses Reise

$9 Ad

FDO WWWWONNNNWWWWD W DY

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1991

No. 90-1768
LEWIS STEPHEN WORK, ET AL., PETITIONERS

Vv.
TYSON Foops, INC., ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App.
1-40) is reported at 921 F.2d 1394. The memoran-
dum opinion of the district court (Pet. App. 44-60)
is reported at 720 F. Supp. 132.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals (Pet. App.
41) was entered on December 18, 1990. The order
of the court of appeals denying rehearing was en-
tered on February 14, 1991. Pet. App. 81. The peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari was filed on May 15,
1991. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under
28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

(1)

2

STATEMENT

1. The Clean Water Act creates a comprehensive
program “to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s
waters.” 33 U.S.C. 1251(a). As part of that pro-
gram, Section 301(a) of the Act prohibits all dis-
charges of pollutants into navigable waters except
those made in compliance with other sections of the
Act, including Section 402, 33 U.S.C. 1342, which
establishes the National Pollutant Discharge Elimi-
nation System (NPDES). See 33 U.S.C. 1311(a).

Section 402(a) provides that the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) shall issue NPDES per-
mits authorizing effluent discharges in strict compli-
ance with conditions specified in the permit. 33
U.S.C. 1342(a). Section 309 of the Act authorizes
the United States to enforce the terms of a permit
through a variety of administrative, civil, and crimi-
nal mechanisms. See 33 U.S.C. 1319. In addition,
Section 505(a)(1) of the Act permits private citi-
zens to commence a civil action in certain situations
against anyone “who is alleged to be in violation of
* * * an effluent standard or limitation under this
chapter,” 33 U.S.C. 1365(a) (1), including the terms
of a permit, 33 U.S.C. 1365(f). Section 505 author-
izes the district courts to enforce the permit require-
ments and impose civil penalties, which are payable
solely to the United States treasury. A citizen suit
may also be brought against the Administrator alleg-
ing failure to perform a nondiscretionary duty under
the Act. 33 U.S.C. 1365(a) (2).

The commencement of a citizen suit under Section
505 is, however, subject to certain limitations. Citi-
zen suits against alleged violators may not be com-
menced either (1) prior to 60 days after giving

3

notice of an alleged violation to the Administrator of
EPA, the State, and any alleged violator, 33 U.S.C.
1365(b)(1)(A)'; or (2) “if the Administrator or
State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a
civil or criminal action * * * to require compliance
** *” 33 U.S.C. 1865(b)(1)(B). When a citizen
suit is barred because the United States has com-
menced and is diligently prosecuting an enforcement
action, Section 505(b)(1)(B) further provides that
“any citizen may intervene as a matter of right” in
any such action in a federal court. 33 U.S.C.
1365(b) (1) (B).

2. In March 1987, after giving the requisite no-
tice, petitioners Lewis Stephen Work and others filed
a complaint pursuant to the Clean Water Act’s citi-
zen suit provision against Tyson Food, Inc. (Tyson),
the City of Green Forest, Arkansas, and the Admin-
istrator of EPA, among others, concerning pollution
allegedly caused by discharges from the City of Green
Forest’s wastewater treatment plant. The United
States subsequently brought a Clean Water Act en-
forcement action in September 1987 under Sections
309(b) and (d). The government’s suit, like the
citizen suit, sought civil penalties and injunctive re-
lief against the City of Green Forest for its discharge
of pollutants in violation of (1) Section 301 of the
Act, 33 U.S.C. 1311, (2) certain terms and condi-
tions of an NPDES permit issued to the City pursu-
ant to Section 402 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. 1342, and
(3) various Administrative Orders issued to the City
under Section 309 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. 1319. The
government’s complaint alleged that the City had dis-

1 Similarly, no citizen suit may be commenced against the
Administrator prior to 60 days after giving notice of such
action to the Administrator. 33 U.S.C. 1365(b) (2).

4

charged pollutants from the City’s wastewater treat-
ment works in excess of the limits established by the
NPDES permit, and sought an order requiring the
City to comply with the Act, the NPDES permit, and
the Administrative Orders by adhering to the per-
mit’s effluent limitations and submitting required
reports.

Nearly two months after the government filed its
enforcement action, the citizens filed two motions in
the government’s action, one seeking intervention in
the government’s action and the other seeking con-
solidation of the two cases. The district court re-
jected the motion to intervene as untimely, and re-
jected the motion to consolidate on account of the
complications that consolidation would cause.? The
citizens did not file a notice of appeal from the court’s
denial of the intervention motion within the 60-day
period allowed by Fed. R. App. P. 4(a).

The United States and the City subsequently en-
gaged in extensive settlement negotiations in the gov-
ernment’s enforcement action, resulting in a proposed
consent decree and an opportunity for public com-
ment. In March 1989, the citizens filed a second mo-
tion to intervene, based on the lodging of the proposed
consent decree. The district court denied the citizens’
second intervention motion, explaining that interven-
tion was not appropriate and that the prospective in-
tervenors had an opportunity to, and did, file their
objections to the proposed consent decree during the
available public comment period. See 28 C.F.R. 50.7.
The consent decree was entered by the district court
shortly after it denied the citizens’ second motion to

2 The district court also denied another motion, filed by the
citizens in their citizen suit, to consolidate the citizen suit with
the government’s enforcement action.

5

intervene. Pet. App. 78. The decree (1) required the
City to pay a penalty of $15,000 for past violations
and to maintain compliance with the NPDES permit
and the Act, effective immediately, and (2) provided
for stipulated penalties in the event of future
violations.

Following the entry of the consent decree in the
government’s enforcement action, the district court
dismissed the citizens’ Clean Water Act claims against
the City. The court explained that “[b]ecause issues
raised against the City under the Clean Water Act
have been resolved, plaintiffs are barred from raising
the same issues here.” Pet. App. 79. The citizens
subsequently appealed from the district court’s de-
nials of their two intervention motions. That appeal
was held in abeyance pending completion of the citizen
suit at the citizens’ request.

After a trial, a jury found in favor of the citizens
as against Tyson Foods, and awarded $244,412 in
damages on state law claims. The jury found in favor
of the City on the citizens’ claims against it that had
not been dismissed. The district court entered judg-
ment on the verdict and assessed Tyscn $43,000 in
civil penalties for the company’s Clean Water Act
violations. Tyson and the citizens both appealed, and
their appeals were consolidated with the citizens’ ap-
peals from the denial of their intervention motion at
the citizens’ request.

3. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s
dismissal of the citizens’ Clean Water Act claims
against the City. Pet. App. 16-21.° The court noted

3 The court also determined that it lacked jurisdiction to
consider the citizens’ appeal from the denial of their first
motion to intervene in the government’s enforcement action
because that appeal was untimely. Pet. App. 11-12. The court

6

that the citizens “concede[] that the CWA claims
made in the citizens’ suit were the same as those made
by the EPA.” /d. at 17. It stated that “there may be
some cas¢s in which it would be appropriate to let a
citizens’ action go forward in the wake of a subse-
quently-filed government enforcement action,” id. at
19-20, but found that “this is not such a case” due
to the entry of the consent decree, id. at 20:

In view of the preeminent role that must be
afforded the EPA in enforcing CWA act viola-
tions—a role contemplated by the legislative his-
tory and recognized by the Supreme Court in
Gwaltney [of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay
Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987) ]—we
hold that it was proper for the district court to
dismiss [petitioners’] CWA claims against Green
Forest after the latter had entered into a con-
sent decree with the EPA. The EPA is charged
with enforcing the CWA on behalf of all citizens.
Since citizens suing under the CWA are cast in
the role of private attorneys general, as a prac-
tical matter there was little left to be done after
the EPA. stepped in and negotiated a consent
decree.

Ibid.

4. Following the denial by the court of appeals of
requests for reconsideration, Pet. App. 81, the parties
filed cross petitions for writs of certiorari. Because
the issues identified in the two petitions all arose in

the citizen suit, the United States waived its right to
respond to those petitions. The Court subsequently

determined that the district court had erred by denying the
citizens’ second motion to intervene, id. at 13, but determined
that this error was “largely harmless,” id. at 14; it remanded
for the purpose of allowing the citizens an opportunity to
recover attorneys’ fees, id. at 15.

7

requested that the United States respond to question
1 in the citizens’ petition, which concerns the pro-
priety of the court of appeals’ affirmance of the dis-
trict court’s dismissal of the citizens’ Clean Water
Act claims against the City.‘

ARGUMENT

The decision of the court of appeals is correct and
is not in conflict with any decision of this Court or
any other court of appeals. Accordingly, further re-
view is not warranted.

1. Petitioners contend that the court of appeals
“erroneously concluded that the entry of a consent
decree in an enforcement action commenced subse-
quent to the filing of a citizens’ suit pursuant to Sec-
tion 505(a) of the CWA * * * precluded the prose-
cution of a previously filed citizen suit.” Pet. 12.
But there is no good reason why petitioners should
have been permitted to pursue the very same claims
resolved by the consent decree simply because the
government’s enforcement action was commenced sub-
sequent to the filing of their suit. Indeed, as peti-
tioners admit, “Congress intended for the EPA to
have the primary role in enforcing the Act.” Pet. 13,
citing Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay
Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987); see also Hall-
strom vy. Tillamook County, 110 S. Ct. 304, 310 (1989)
(EPA’s enforcement efforts may obviate the need for
citizen suits). In Gwaltney, the Court held that “the

* Petitioners also complain that “the appellate court erred
in holding the district court’s failure to allow intervention
harmless.” Pet. 17 n.4. However, they add that “this error is
overshadowed by the greater error herein addressed,” ibid.,
and they did not include any challenge to the court of appeals’
rulings on intervention in their list of questions presented to
the Court.

8

citizen suit is meant to supplement rather than to
supplant governmental action.” 484 U.S. at 60. Ac-
cordingly, where EPA has entered into a consent de-
cree, citizens should not be permitted to pursue an
action based on the claims resolved by the consent
decree.

Contrary to petitioners’ suggestions, Pet. 12-15,
nothing in the Act supports their position. Neither
the requirements of Section 505(b), which governs
commencement of a citizen suit, nor the provisions of
Section 505(c), which authorizes EPA to intervene
in citizen suits and to review and comment on pro-
posed consent decrees in citizens suits, show that
Congress intended EPA’s role as enforcer to diminish
based simply upon the timing of commencement of
an enforcement action by the government. Indeed,
far from showing a congressional intent that EPA
yields its role as primary enforcer of the Act if it
waits to commence an enforcement action until after
the filing of a citizen suit, the provisions petitioners
cite reveal Congress’s intent that EPA play a central
role in enforcement actions even where the agency
chooses not to file its own enforcement action.

Contrary to petitioners’ assertion (Pet. 12), no
other court of appeals has ruled differently than the
court of appeals below. Petitioners wrongly cite the
decision of the Fourth Circuit in Chesapeake Bay
Foundation, Inc. v. American Recovery Co., 769 F.2d
207 (4th Cir. 1985), to support their theory that
they should have been permitted to pursue their claims
against the City despite the fact that those very
claims had been settled in the government’s enforce-
ment action. In fact, that court made no such ruling
in that case, having found that the appeal was moot
due to the negotiation of a consent decree. Jd. at 209.

In addition, petitioners incorrectly state that “there
is no authority under any case that has dealt with this

9

issue for the holding below.” Pet. 17. To the con-
trary, only one other court of appeals has faced
similar circumstances, and that court’s decision is
fully consistent with the decision of the court of
appeals in this case. In Atlantic States Legal Founda-
tion, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 933 F.2d 124 (1991),
the Second Circuit upheld the propriety of dismissing
a citizen suit based on the entry of a consent decree
in a subsequently commenced government enforce-
ment action. In Atlantic States, the State of New
York commenced an enforcement action under the
Clean Water Act after the Atlantic States Legal
Foundation had initiated a citizen suit, and the dis-
trict court dismissed the citizen suit based on entry of
a consent decree between the State and the polluter
in the State’s enforcement action. On appeal, the Sec-
ond Circuit held that “[i]f the state enforcement pro-
ceeding has caused the violations alleged in the citi-
zen suit to cease without any likelihood of recurrence
—has eliminated the basis for the citizen suit—we
believe that the citizen action must be dismissed.”
933 F.2d at 127. The court explained:

The purpose of the citizen suit is to stop viola-
tions of the Clean Water Act that are not chal-
lenged by appropriate state and federal author-
ities. However, we do not belie e the Clean
Water Act can or should be read to discourage
a governmental enforcement action once a citizen
suit has been commenced nor to prevent state or
local authorities from achieving a settlement as
to conduct that is the subject of a citizen com-
plaint. To hold otherwise would likely lead to
underenforcement of the Clean Water Act.

Ibid. That same reasoning applies here.

Significantly, this is not a case where claims made
by the citizens in their suit have been left unresolved

10

by the combined entry of a consent decree in the gov-
ernment’s enforcement action and the dismissal of
their Clean Water Act claims in their citizen suit.
The district court determined that the consent decree
had “resolved” the “issues raised against the City
under the Clean Water Act,” Pet. App. 79, and peti-
tioners conceded in the court of appeals that their
Clean Water Act claims against the City “were the
same as those made by the EPA,” id. at 17. In those
circumstances, the court of appeals correctly affirmed
the district court’s dismissal of the citizens’ Clean
Water Act claims against the City. Furthermore, pe-
titioners commented on the proposed decree, and the
district court took their comments into account in
reaching its decision. Pet. App. 14. Allowing the
citizens now to pursue the same claims resolved by the
consent decree, where the relief available to the citi-
zens—injunctive relief and penalties—is identical to
that available to the government, would undermine
the district court’s judgment that the consent decree
provides an adequate remedy for the violations.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
denied.

Respectfully submitted.

KENNETH W. STARR
Solicitor General

BARRY M. HARTMAN
Acting Assistant Attorney General

JOHN A. BRYSON
WILLIAM B. LAZARUS

Attorneys
OCTOBER 1991

% ©. 6. Covennucer reimtine orrice; 1991 312324 45115

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_2098%3A4. Public record. Not legal advice.
