# Amicus Curiae Brief — North Carolina v. Smith > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_2044%3A3 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief - **Published:** January 1, 1991 - **Citation:** 502 U.S. 956 ## Text @ | Bupreme Court, U.S, | be FILED No. 90-1712 OCT 3 129} OFFICE OF THE CLERK In the Supreme Court of the Unite OCTOBER TERM, 1991 STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, PETITIONER Vv. CARLTON J. SMITH ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE KENNETH W. STARR Solicitor General ROBERT S. MUELLER, III Assistant Attorney General WILLIAM C. BRYSON Deputy Solicitor General EDWIN S. KNEEDLER Assistant to the Solicitor General KATHLEEN A. FELTON Attorney Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20530 (202) 514-2217 ZZ QUESTION PRESENTED Whether the State of North Carolina has jurisdiction to prosecute respondent as an adult for crimes he alleg- edly committed when he was a juvenile at Camp Lejeune, a federal military installation over which the United States has exclusive legislative jurisdiction. (1) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ns Re ee ee 1 EEE SRLS a A 7 EE RLS GE AS EOC 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Ableman Vv. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859)... 14 Battle v. Johnson, 209 U.S. 36 (1908) ....0000000. % Benson V. United States, 146 U.S. 325 (1892)... 5 Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956) .. 15 Board of Freeholders v. McCorkle, 98 N.J. Super. 451, 237 A.2d 640 (1968) _......... Mt See 11 Bowen V. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19 (1939) 000i BB California vy. Rooney, 483 U.S. 307 (1987) ........... a 15 Cobb vy. Cobb, 406 Mass. 21, 545 N.E.2d 1161 Ne cniiasinoenbdbeneianine 11 D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) ............ Ss nes OER TE 14-15 Evans vy. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970) 0.0... 11 Goodyear Atomic Corp. Vv. Miller, 486 U.S. 174 on ciuliaeondennanen 12 Howard vy. Commissioners, 344 ‘US. 624 (1953). 12 James B. Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94 ES Re Ee a 12 Martin Vv. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 ss nitineninenees 14 People of Puerto Rico v. Koedel, 927 F.2d 662 (1st rr casanamenennoens 8 Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). 15 Solem Vv. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984) 0.00000. 14 State in Interest of D.B.S., 137 N.J. Super. 371, aS I 11 State v. DeBerry, 224 N.C. 834, 32 S.E.2d 617 EEE a a ee 5, 7,15 State v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 352 S.E.2d 653 (1987). 5 Stedman, In re, 305 N.C. 92, 286 S.E.2d 527 i Ee eee 5 IV Cases—Continued : Page Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647 (1930)... 8 Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990) 2.00. 14, 15 Terry Y, In re, 101 Cal. App. 3d 178, 161 Cal. Ss: a a easlllaahe 11 United States v. C.G., 736 F.2d 1474 (11th Cir. IIIT sisecsi-cicteidaith cinching tecdtaduuaaaioantiogbintiatidatiotaiesnididcniaisiioid 13 United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978) ............ 8 United States v. Juvenile Male, 819 F.2d 468 (4th I II cnisiinicsicicencdssib scien canscebaaapeeiniictiiiascaatienmiaaiitininneie 4 United States v. Juvenile Male, 939 F.2d 321 (6th a ei a 10 United States v. Smith, 675 F. Supp. 307 (E.D.N.C. 1987), rev’d, 851 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1988)... 3,4 United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U.S. 138 (1930)........ 5,8 United States v. Vancier, 515 F.2d 1378 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 857 (1975) 0.00... at cas 13 Washington v. Washington State Commercial Pas- senger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658 i es 14 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Chiles, 214 U.S. 274 en Saale 8 Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711 (1946)... 8 Constitution, statutes and regulation: U.S. Const. : ne oe HF Art. I, § 9, Cl. 3 (Ex Post Facto Clause) .......... 4,16 Amend XIV (Equal Protection Clause) ......... 11 Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Tit. II, § 1201 (b) (2), 98 Stat. 2150 200. penieanaed 4 Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.13 0.000000. 12 Be se ls I vncnccccexscnisccencectscsnsnnsosesens 12 Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. 5031 et seq.: Ia eacnalle 4 Be I MII ctccsnninnerinsictebnnccense LAR TM 3, 4, 6, 10, 13 Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 1153 20000. : x nT a cadcaudnionmdones 11 I I oocsaaisistis chicas ccttemenasaccnanbiaaiesacncmanenaniogiien 11 V Statutes and regulation—Continued : Page 488 Fp er Dred bannicniaicausadusden aime “ Ua esnslnascica scnmceaianisneealiiaaabamsa 12 N.C. Gen. Stat. (1989) : oa denneaenebbenion Cina 5 TTR ER CRs eRe 5 Be I iccoeninroecenene AE eco ote 5 aS eseinoensnacnliio 2,6,7 Army Reg. 608-18, The Army Family Advocacy Program (Sept. 18, 1987) .........2.022-.-cccccceceeeeeseeee- 11 Miscellaneous: Department of the Army, Administrative and Civil Law Handbook (Pamphlet 27-21, Sept. 18, SRILA IE SAINTS Ph Re cee eR tered ie eae 11 Interdepartmental Committee for the Study of Jurisdiction Over Federal Areas Within the States, Jurisdiction Over Federal Areas Within ff kA seme Te) In the Suprenwe Court of the Wuited States OCTOBER TERM, 1991 No. 90-1712 STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, PETITIONER Vv. CARLTON J. SMITH ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE This brief is submitted in response to the Court’s in- vitation to the Solicitor General to file a brief expressing the views of the United States. STATEMENT 1. On the morning of August 24, 1981, on the United States Marine Corps Base at Camp Lejeune, North Caro- lina, the bodies of respondent’s aunt, cousin, and sister were found in the house where respondent lived. All three had been murdered. Respondent, who was 15 years old at the time, became a suspect. Pet. App. Al, A12, A40, A41-A42. The portion of Camp Lejeune where the murders were committed, known as Area C, was acquired by the United States in 1941. Pet. App. A35-A36, A39; Pet. 5. In that year, Acting Secretary of the Navy Forrestal ac- cepted jurisdiction over the area on behalf of the United States “in the manner and form provided by an Act of (1) tae tere 2 1907, Ch. 25, N.C. Code 1927, Sec. 8059.” Pet. App. A1, A38. The cited state statute, now codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 104-7 (1985) (see Pet. 4-5), provides that the consent of the State is given, in accordance with Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the United States Constitution,’ to the acquisition by the United States of any land in the State required for courthouses, post offices, arsenals, or any other purposes of the government, and that “[e]xclu- sive jurisdiction in and over any land so acquired by the United States shall be and the same is hereby ceded to the United States for all purposes,” except service of civil or criminal process of the state courts. On the day the murders occurred, the U.S. Attorney’s office contacted the state district attorney’s office to deter- mine its position on the question of federal or state jurisdiction. In a letter of the same date, an assistant district attorney informed the U.S. Attorney’s office that it had always been his understanding that criminal of- fenses occurring on Camp Lejeune “fall exclusively within the federal jurisdiction,” but that “[e]ven assum- ing concurrent jurisdiction exists,” the district attorney’s office would defer to federal authorities in the case. Pet. App. A40. The Naval Investigative Service (NIS) was unable to obtain sufficient evidence to bring charges against re- spondent in 1981. Respondent and his family left Camp Lejeune some time later, and they ultimately moved to 1 Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution provides that the Congress shall have power: To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock- Yards, and other needful Buildings. 3 Oregon. In 1986 respondent attempted to enlist in the Oregon National Guard. A background investigation dis- closed that the murder investigation was still pending. As a result, respondent was not allowed to join the National Guard. Respondent’s mother then contacted offi- cials at Camp Lejeune and requested that they close the investigation. NIS agents thereafter conducted several interviews with respondent and members of his family. During one such interview, respondent made an incrimi- nating statement. He was immediately arrested. See United States v. Smith, 675 F. Supp. 307, 308-309 (E.D. N.C. 1987), rev’d, 851 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1988). 2. On July 8, 1986, federal authorities filed a juvenile information in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina charging respondent with three counts of premeditated murder. Pet. App. A41-A42. Pursvant to the Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. 5032,? the United States filed with the informa- tion a certification that “no juvenile court or other ap- propriate court of any state, including the General Court of Justice of the State of North Carolina, has jurisdic- tion over said juvenile with respect to the acts of juvenile delinquency alleged in this case, such acts having oc- 2 Section 5032 provides in relevant part: A juvenile alleged to have committed an act of juvenile delinquency, other than a violation of law committed within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States for which the maximum authorized term of imprison- ment does not exceed six months, shall not be proceeded against in any court of the United States unless the Attorney General, after investigation, certifies to the appropriate district court of the United States that (1) the juvenile court or other appro- priate court of a State does not have jurisdiction or refuses to assume jurisdiction over said juvenile with respect to such act of juvenile delinquency, (2) the State does not have available programs and services adequate for the needs of juveniles, or (3) the offense charged is a crime of violence that is a felony [or one of certain enumerated offenses! and that there is a substantial Federal interest in the case or the offense to warrant the exercise of Federal jurisdiction. 4 curred on Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, a military reservation acquired for the use of the United States and under exclusive jurisdiction thereof.” Pet. App. A43. The district court subsequently granted the govern- ment’s motion under 18 U.S.C. 5032 to have respondent stand trial as an adult. Pet. App. A20. The court of ap- peals, however, reversed. It held that the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution (Art. I, §9, Cl. 3) barred application to respondent of the 1984 amendment to 18 U.S.C. 5032 that permits trial as an adult for a juvenile charged with committing an offense after his fifteenth birthday.* United States v. Juvenile Male, 819 F.2d 468, 470-472 (4th Cir. 1987). Respondent turned 21 while his appeal was pending. Accordingly, on July 6, 1987, after the Fourth Circuit rendered its decision, the government sought and was granted leave to dismiss the juvenile information. Pet. App. A21. On July 8, 1987, a federal grand jury re- turned an indictment charging respondent, as an adult, with three counts of first-degree murder. Respondent moved to dismiss the murder counts on the ground that he could not be prosecuted as an adult after having been proceeded against as a juvenile under the Juvenile De- linquency Act. The district court denied the motion. /d. at A22; United States v. Smith, 675 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. N.C. 1987). The court of appeals reversed, holding that under 18 U.S.C. 5032, the filing of juvenile proceedings acted as a bar to the subsequent institution of criminal charges against respondent, even after he turned 21. United States v. Smith, 851 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1988). 3. On December 13, 1988, after the Fourth Circuit’s decision ordering dismissal of the federal murder prose- cution, a state grand jury in Onslow County, North Carolina, returned an indictment charging respondent * Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Tit. II, § 1201(b)(2), 98 Stat. 2150. Prior to the amendment, the minimum age for transfer for trial as an adult was 16. 18 U.S.C. 5032 (1982). 5 with three counts of murder under state law based on the events of August 24, 1981. The Superior Court de- nied respondent’s motion to dismiss the indictment. It held that the United States did not acquire exclusive jurisdiction over juvenile delinquency matters at Camp Lejeune and that the State retained jurisdiction over such matters. Pet. App. A25-A31. The court further ruled, on the basis of In re Stedman, 305 N.C. 92, 105, 286 S.E.2d 527, 534-535 (1982), that the state courts no longer had juvenile jurisdiction over respondent, be- cause such jurisdiction terminates when the individual reaches his eighteenth birthday (see N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7A-517(20), 7A-524 (1989)) and respondent was by then more than 22 years of age, but that the Superior Court did have jurisdiction to try respondent as an adult. Pet. App. A30.* 4. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, hold- ing that the United States has exclusive jurisdiction over Camp Lejeune and that the state court therefore lacked jurisdiction to prosecute respondent. Pet. App. A1l-A11. The North Carolina Supreme Court pointed out that it, as well as this Court, had previously concluded that when the United States acquires exclusive jurisdiction over an area pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution, the State does not have jurisdiction to prosecute a criminal offense occurring on the enclave. Pet. App. A6-A7.° 4 Respondent would have been tried as an adult under state law even if the state court had obtained jurisdiction over him prior to his eighteenth birthday. Under North Carolina law, the juvenile court may transfer jurisdiction over a juvenile 14 years of age or older to the superior court if the juvenile was 14 or older when he allegedly committed an offense that would be a felony if committed by an adult, and the court must transfer jurisdiction if the alleged felony is a capital offense. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-608 (1989); see State v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 12, 352 S.E.2d 653, 659 (1987). 5 The Court cited United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U.S. 138 (1930): Bowen Vv. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19 (1939); Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325 (1892); and State v. DeBerry, 224 N.C. 834, 32 S.E.2d 617 (1945). 6 The State conceded that it normally would not have jurisdiction over criminal matters on Camp Lejeune. Pet. App. A8. But the State contended that it has jurisdiction in this case because a juvenile delinquency proceeding is civil in nature and because state civil laws in existence at the time of cession are deemed to con- tinue in effect until abrogated by federal authority. Jd. at A7. The State further contended that the federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. 5032, embodies a specific congressional determination that the States are better able to deal with juvenile delinquency problems than federal] authorities. The North Carolina Supreme Court found the State’s reliance on 18 U.S.C. 5032 misplaced, because Section 5032 does not require deference to state procedures where the Attorney General certifies that state courts do not have jurisdiction, and here the U.S. Attorney made such a certification to the federal district court. Pet. App. A8- A9. The court also rejected the State’s contention that the federal government never accepted jurisdiction over juvenile delinquency matters on Camp Lejeune. Jd. at A7, A9-A10. It explained that Acting Secretary of the Navy Forrestal expressly accepted jurisdiction in 1941 in the manner provided by the 1907 North Carolina statute, now codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 104-7 (1985), which cedes “|e]xclusive jurisdiction” to the United States “for all purposes” except service of process. Pet. App. A10. The court was unpersuaded by the State’s suggestion that Acting Secretary Forrestal could not have anticipated “the many complexities of jurisdictional law that would arise in the future.” bid. In its view, the Acting Secre- tary had “accepted exclusive jurisdiction as completely as he could,” and it noted that both the state and federal governments had laws applicable to juvenile delinquency at the time of the 1941 cession. [bid. Finally, the North Carolina Supreme Court rejected the State’s contention that federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over this case on the rationale that 7 a juvenile delinquency hearing is a civil matter in both the federal and state court systems. The court concluded that it was not necessary to decide whether state juvenile delinquency proceedings are civil or criminal for these purposes, because “|i]n this case the proceedings against [respondent] in the Superior Court, Onslow County are criminal! proceedings. His case was transferred to supe- rior court on three charges of murder.” Pet. App. A111. Since this case is an ordinary criminal prosecution, not a juvenile delinquency proceeding, the court held that the jurisdiction of the United States is exclusive. To hold otherwise, the court concluded, would require it to over- rule its prior decision in State v. DeBerry, 224 N.C. 834, 32 S.E.2d 617 (1945), which held that the State may not prosecute an offense occurring on a federal enclave as to which the State has ceded exclusive jurisdiction. Pet. App. AT, A11. DISCUSSION The North Carolina Supreme Court was correct in holding that the State does not have jurisdiction to prose- cute respondent for the murders he allegedly committed on Camp Lejeune. That decision does not conflict with the decision of any other court and presents no question of general importance warranting review by this Court. Accordingly, although we are reluctant to conclude that serious charges of this nature must be dismissed with- out a trial on the merits in either federal or state court, we believe that the petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied. 1. a. The United States acquired jurisdiction over the portion of the Camp at issue here in 1941, in accordance with a North Carolina statute that ceded “/{e]xclusive jurisdiction” to the United States “for all purposes,” except service of process. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 104-7 (1985). The State does not dispute that, as a result, Camp Lejeune is an exclusive federal enclave within the meaning of Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Consti- 8 tution and that established principles governing such enclaves are applicable here. See Pet. 11. It is firmly established that the United States alone has jurisdiction to prosecute criminal offenses commit- ted on an exclusive federal enclave. Whatever may be the interrelationship between state and federal law on such enclaves in other contexts, exclusive federal criminal jurisdiction has long been at the very core of their unique status. United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U.S. 138 (1930) ; Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 29-80 (1939); see also Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 652-655 (1930) ; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Chiles, 214 U.S. 274, 278 (1909); Battle v. Johnson, 209 U.S. 36, 37 (1908) ; . People of Puerto Rico v. Koedel, 927 F.2d 662, 664-667 (1st Cir. 1991);* see generally Interdepartmental Com- mittee for the Study of Jurisdiction Over Federal Areas Within the States, Jurisdiction Over Federal Areas Within the States Pt. 2, at 105-109 (1957). It follows that the State of North Carolina does not have jurisdic- tion to prosecute respondent for murders committed on Camp Lejeune. The State acknowledges (Pet. 11) that “an otherwise plenary cession of jurisdiction to the federal government does not implicitly reserve state criminal jurisdiction,” because the purpose of Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution is to enable Congress “to exercise di- rect and plenary sovereignty” over federal enclaves and because “the enforcement of the criminal law is one of the highest attributes of sovereignty.” The State there- fore “does not question the general rule upheld in cases such as Bowen and Unzeuta” that the United States alone has criminal jurisdiction over such enclaves. Pet. *Cf. United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 651 (19728) (federal jurisdiction over prosecution of Indian under Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 1153, is exclusive of state jurisdiction); Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711, 714 (1946) (federal courts have ex- clusive jurisdiction under what is now 18 U.S.C. 1152 over crime committed by non-Indian against Indian in Indian country). ~_ FS |e ltt 9 11-12; see also Pet. 15. The State does contend (Pet. 12-15), however, that it has jurisdiction to conduct juve- nile delinquency proceedings with respect to acts com- mitted on Camp Lejeune because such proceedings are “civil” in nature and because, in its view, North Carolina laws on the subject remained in effect after the cession to the United States. That issue is not presented here, because the State is not proceeding against respondent as a juvenile. The Superior Court held (Pet. App. A30), and the State does not dispute, that the state courts do not have juvenile jurisdiction over respondent even as a matter of state law, because he is now more than 25 years old. Rather, the State is proceeding against respondent as an adult, invoking its ordinary criminal jurisdiction to prosecute him for murder, which is a capital offense under state law. See note 4, supra. Such a prosecution is not civil in nature. Nor can state jurisdiction be justified on the rationale that the State’s jurisdiction over respondent “has its origin in juvenile law” and that “[o]nce jurisdiction attaches, as it did in 1981, it continues to exist notwithstanding the fact that the respondent is no longer a juvenile.” Pet. 15. We may assume, arguendo, that while respondent re- mained a juvenile within the meaning of state law, the State would have had jurisdiction to adjudicate him a delinquent and to make a non-criminal disposition of his case, on the State’s theory that such a “civil” proceeding is not barred by the United States’ acquisition of exclu- sive jurisdiction over Camp Lejeune. But the State would not have had jurisdiction to bring an ordinary criminal prosecution against respondent even while he was a juve- nile, since the prosecution would not have been a “civil” case over which the State had, by hypothesis, retained jurisdiction.” It follows a fortiori that the State may not 7 We do not agree with the State’s apparent contention (Pet. 15) that the federal Juvenile Delinquency Act’s policy of deferral to - States carves out an implied exception to the rule of exclusive 10 bring a criminal prosecution against respondent now that he is no longer subject to state juvenile jurisdiction. b. The State does not cite any other case involving the exercise of state criminal jurisdiction over an offense committed by a juvenile on an exclusive federal enclave, and we are aware of none. Moreover, the decision below does not, in our view, introduce problems of law enforce- ment on federal enclaves. When a person has allegedly committed a serious crime of violence as a juvenile and an ordinary criminal prosecution is warranted and per- mitted by federal law, the matter falls within the normal responsibilities of the U.S. Attorney and the jurisdiction of the federal criminal justice system. In fact, the fed- eral Juvenile Delinquency Act, as amended in 1984, does not require deferral to state authority even outside an exclusive enclave when the Attorney General certifies that the offense is a crime of violence and that there is a substantial federal interest in the case or offense war- ranting the exercise of federal jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C. 5032. Thus, the decision below does not disrupt estab- lished jurisdictional arrangements. federal jurisdiction over ordinary criminal prosecutions arising on a federal enclave. The policy of deferral to state courts focuses on (and is triggered by) the existence and suitability of state juvenile jurisdiction and programs. That is evident from the provision in 18 U.S.C, 5032 that a juvenile alleged to have committed an act of juvenile delinquency may be proceeded against in federal court if the Attorney General certifies that “the juvenile court or other appropriate court of a State does not have jurisdiction or refuses to assume jurisdiction over said juvenile with respect to such act of juvenile delinquency,” or that “the State does not have available programs and services adequate for the needs of juveniles.” Moreover, because the first portion of 18 U.S.C. 5032 quoted above expressly contemplates that there will be situations in which a State does not have juvenile jurisdiction, the Juvenile Delinquency Act does not by its terms furnish a basis for recognizing the right of a State to exercise even juvenile jurisdiction on an exclusive enclave. See United States v. Juvenile Male, 939 F.2d 321, 323-324 (6th Cir. 1991). But the Act of course does not foreclose any other available sources of state jurisdiction. 11 We have been informed in our consultations with de- partments having jurisdiction over exclusive federal en- claves that in many instances the responsible military commanders and civilian officials would prefer to have state courts and agencies exercise authority over routine juvenile delinquency problems (and domestic relations and similar matters) that arise on or concern residents of the enclave. The State typically has established insti- tutions and experienced personnel to address those issues on a comprehensive basis, and there often is no compar- able federal capability. For that reason, the federal gov- ernment often would be prepared to retrocede jurisdiction to the States if necessary to facilitate state cooperation on these matters (see, ¢.g., 10 U.S.C. 2683; 16 U.S.C. la-3) and has in the past supported the exercise of such state authority in certain circumstances even in the ab- sence of a formal retrocession.* But in this case the North Carolina Supreme Court expressly declined to * See, e.g., State in Interest of D.B.S., 137 N.J. Super. 371, 349 A.2d 105 (1975) (sustaining state juvenile jurisdiction over resident of Fort Dix where base authorities filed petition in state court) ; In re Terry Y, 101 Cal. App. 3d 178, 161 Cal. Rptr. 452 (1980) (state court exercises jurisdiction, at request of base authorities, over abused child residing at Fort Ord); Cobb v. Cobb, 406 Mass. 21, 545 N.E.2d 1161 (1989) (holding, supported by United States as amicus curiae, that state court may issue spousal abuse preven- tion order at request of enclave resident); Board of Freeholders v. McCorkle, 98 N.J. Super. 451, 237 A.2d 640 (1968) (holding, sup- ported by United States as amicus curiae, that state laws relating to welfare services for children and commitment of mentally ill persons apply to enclave residents). Moreover, residents of exclu- sive federal enclaves frequently resort to state courts for divorce, probate, or other purposes (see Jurisdiction Over Federal Areas supra, Pt. 2, at 8, 215-238) and receive state welfare, education and other benefits. See, ¢e.g., Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970) (Equal Protection Clause prevents State from denying enclave resi- dents right to vote); see generally Department of the Army, Ad- ministrative and Civil Law Handbook 24-37 (Pamphlet 27-21, Sept. 18, 1990); Army Reg. 608-18, The Army Family Advocacy Program (Sept. 18, 1987), Apps. B, C. 12 reach any broader questions concerning a State’s exercise of traditional juvenile jurisdiction on an exclusive federal enclave. Pet. App. All. There accordingly is no occasion for this Court to consider those questions.’ 2. The State asks this Court to consider whether the state courts were bound by the U.S. Attorney’s certifica- tion to the federal district court under the federal Juve- nile Delinquency Act that the state courts did not have juvenile jurisdiction over respondent’s conduct. See Pet. 16-17. That issue does not warrant review. *We do note, however, that this Court’s cases to date do not establish that a State may exercise juvenile jurisdiction on an exclusive federal enclave. In Howard vy. Commissioners, 344 U.S. 624, 626-627 (1953), cited by the State (Pet. 12), the Court held that a city was not barred from annexing an area located within an enclave. That holding did not resolve any questions concerning what jurisdiction the city could exercise over the area as a result, or suggest that the only inquiry in any case involving state civil juris- diction is whether it interferes with federal authority; such a test would accord no significance to the exclusive nature of the enclave. In fact, the Court in Howard sustained application of the challenged city tax on the enclave only because it was authorized by the Buck Act, 4 U.S.C. 105-110. 244 U.S. at 627-629. The State also relies (Pet. 12) on the proposition that state civil laws in effect at the time of cession remain in effect on the enclave until displaced by federal legislation. But it appears that state civil law is carried forward as federal law in the enclave. See James B. Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 100 (1940) (this principle “assimilate[s] the laws of the federal territory, where the Congress has not legislated otherwise, to the laws of the surrounding state”); Jurisdiction Over Federal Areas, supra, Pt. 2, at 158 (“The rule serves to federalize not only the statutory but the common law of a State.”); compare 18 U.S.C. 13 (Assimilative Crimes Act). Moreover, state laws that are implemented through a state administrative agency have generally been thought to be inapplicable on the enclave (Jurisdiction Over Federal Areas, supra, Pt. 2, at 161-162, 183-184; Stewart & Co., 309 U.S. at 102), in the absence of a retrocession to the State, as in the case of state workers’ compensation laws permitted by 40 U.S.C. 290. See Jurisdiction Over Federal Areas, supra, Pt. 2, at 207-210; Goodyear Atomic Corp. Vv. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 182-184 & n.4 (1988); id. at 193-194 (White, J., dissenting). Na 13 a. As the North Carolina Supreme Court pointed out, the Second Circuit held in United States v. Vancier, 515 F.2d 1378, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 857 (1975), that at least in the absence of bad faith, the federal courts are bound by the U.S. Attorney’s certification that the state court does not have or will not exercise jurisdiction. See also United States v. C.G., 736 F.2d 1474, 1477-1478 (llth Cir. 1984); compare United States v. Juvenile Male, 923 F.2d 614, 616-618 (8th Cir. 1991). We agree with the State that the state courts are not similarly bound by such a certification. But the North Carolina Supreme Court did not hold otherwise. It discussed the U.S. Attorney’s certification only in response to the State’s argument that the States are better able to deal with juvenile delinquency problems and that Section 5032 reflects a congressional intent to defer to state jurisdic- tion. Pet. App. A9. To be sure, it is not entirely clear what the state court meant when it wrote: “If we must accept the United States Attorney’s certification as final that the courts of this state do not have jurisdiction, then 18 U.S.C. § 5032 is not helpful to the State.” Ibid. But the court did not say that it actually was required to aecept the certification. Moreover, the court independ- ently examined the governing jurisdictional principles (id. at A6-A7, A9-A11) and held that the state courts do not have jurisdiction here for the distinct reason that the State is proceeding against respondent as an adult, in an ordinary criminal prosecution. /d. at All. The decision below therefore does not rest on any issue con- cerning the U.S. Attorney’s certification. The question of the effect of the certification on subse- quent proceedings in state court is not in any event one of general importance warranting review by this Court. We are aware of no other cases raising the issue, and in light of the fact that such a certification is ordinarily filed only after consultation with state authorities, the issue is unlikely to arise frequently. 14 b. In a related vein, the State objects (Pet. 18-19) to one sentence in the last paragraph of the opinion below, which states: “Bound as we are by the federal court’s interpretation of this federal question, we must hold that the Superior Court, Onslow County does not have juris- diction to try the defendant.” Pet. App. All. The State apparently reads this sentence as an indication that the North Carolina Supreme Court believed that it was bound by the Second Circuit’s holding in Vancier that the U.S. Attorney’s certification is binding. See Pet. 18-19. But the North Carolina Supreme Court did not identify Vancier as the “interpretation” by a “federal court” to which it was referring. In any event, we would not readily infer that the North Carolina Supreme Court believed that it was obligated to follow a single federal court of appeals for a circuit that does not even embrace North Carolina, and Vancier did not address the qustion of whether a state court is bound by the U.S. Attorney’s certification. We of course agree with the State (Pet. 19 n.7) that a state court is not ordinarily bound in any formal! sense by the interpretation given to a federal law by an inferior federal court. The Constitution and relevant statutes contemplate that state courts may exercise independent judgment in interpreting federal laws, subject to review by this Court where Congress has provided, and that conflicts among state and federal courts on questions of federal law may and will arise. See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 341-348 (1816) ; Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 517-520 (1859) ; Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 464-467 (1990)." Because the decisions of state courts may not be reviewed by inferior federal courts, D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 10 See, e.g., Washington Vv. Washington State Commercial Passen- ger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 672 n.19 (1979); Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S, 463, 466 (1984). 15 U.S. 462, 476 (1988); Rooker vy. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 418, 415-416 (1923), it would make no sense for state courts to be obligated to follow their decisions. However, it is entirely proper for a state court to be guided by and defer to the decisions of the lower federal courts if it finds them persuasive. See 7T'afflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. at 465. That may be all the North Carolina Supreme Court meant to say. Alternatively, the North Carolina Supreme Court may have meant to refer to the decisions of this Court. State courts properly regard themselves as bound by this Court’s interpretations of federal law. In this re- gard, the opinion below discusses a number of this Court’s decisions holding that state courts have no criminal juris- diction over offenses arising in an exclusive federal en- clave. Pet. App. A6-A7. Because the sentence in the opinion quoted above follows immediately after the court’s holding that the North Carolina courts do not have juris- diction to entertain an ordinary criminal prosecution against respondent, id. at All, it may be that the North Carolina Supreme Court meant to refer to an “interpre- tation” of federal law announced by this Court. Whatever the import of the ambiguous sentence in the opinion’s closing paragraph, however, it presents no ques- tion of general importance that warrants certiorari. This Court reviews judgments, not statements in opinions. Black yv. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292, 297 (1956); see California v. Rooney, 483 U.S. 307, 311 (1987). It is clear that the judgment below is correct, and the por- tion of the opinion in question was not necessary to that judgment; the North Carolina Supreme Court pointed out that if it were to hold that the State could bring an ordinary criminal] prosecution against respondent, it would have to overrule its own prior decision in State v. De- Berry, supra. Accordingly, dismissal of the state charges was required by the North Carolina Supreme Court’s own precedent, irrespective of whatever a lower federal court 16 might once have said about federal questions that might have some relevance to this case. 3. Needless to say, we profoundly regret that the charges of murder at issue here must be dismissed with- out a trial on the merits in either federal or state court. In the federal system, that result was the product of prosecutorial and litigating decisions made at various stages of the case; the judgment by Congress as of 1981 not to permit trial of a juvenile as an adult for crimes he committed at age 15; and the interpretations of the Ex Post Facto Clause and the federal Juvenile Delin- quency Act in the two Fourth Circuit rulings that effec- tively foreclosed a federal prosecution. In the state sys- tem, the dismissal of the charges was required by the allocation of jurisdiction that was made when the exclu- sive federal enclave was established in the State, with its consent, pursuant to the Constitution and statutes of the United States and North Carolina. Unless that jurisdic- tional regime is altered by Congress or by a retrocession of jurisdiction to the State under existing statutory au- thority, the creation of exclusive enclaves to further what the Framers, Congress, and responsible Executive Branch officials deemed to be important federal interests will, on occasion, lead to a result such as the one the North Carolina Supreme Court was required to reach here. 17 CONCLUSION The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied. Respectfully submitted. KENNETH W. STARR : Solicitor General ROBERT S. MUELLER, III Assistant Attorney General WILLIAM C. BRYSON Deputy Solicitor General EDWIN S. KNEEDLER Assistant to the Solicitor General KATHLEEN A. FELTON Attorney OCTOBER 1991 Te ate ee ee ee ey EM INS Ce WY ou. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING orrice; 1991 28206! 45096 --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_2044%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.