# Appendix — Georgiou v. Gauthier

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_1983%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1991
- **Citation:** 500 U.S. 954

## Text

80- 1648 } FILED |
MAR % 1981
7 @F THE CLERK
IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

D. Georgiou,
Petitioner,

V.

George A. Gauthier,
Respondent.

APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS,

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Dimitrios C. Georgiou, M.D.
2642 Prairie Avenue
Evanston, IL 60201

(708) 869-8189

Pro se Petitioner

1A

APPERDISA

THIRD DIVISION May 27, 1990

(Seal:) NOTICE The text of this order
may be changed or corrected prior to the
time for filing of a Petition for Rehear-
ing or the disposition of the same.

No. 1-89-3013

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

GEORGE A. GAUTHIER Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, Cook County.

Vv. No. 88 M2 1681
DR. D. GEORGIOU, Honorable

Joseph H. Romano,
Defendant-Appellant.Judge Presiding.

ORDER

Plaintiff, George Gauthier, initi-
ated this forcible entry and detainer
action in the circuit court against
defendant, Dr. Dimitrios C. Georgiou,
for the possession of residential pre-

mises. The parties subsequently entered

2A
an agreed order which the defendant
moved to vacate. Following a hearing,
the trial court denied the motion.
Defendant now appeals, contending that:
1) the denial of the motion was improper
because the trial court failed to "read"
or appropriately consider the motion and
a related memorandum; and 2) plaintiff
failed to protect the leased premises
from wrongful entry during defendant's
absence.

On September 5, 1989, piaintiff, as
landlord of premises located at 2642
Prairie Avenue in Evanston, Illinois,
filed a forcible entry and detainer
action against drfendant, a tenant who
resided in Apartment 2-F. The action
sought only possession of the premises.

On the scheduled trial date of Octo-
ber 23, 1989, defendant appeared without

counsel and was allowed a continuance

é

3A
until October 30, 1989, to obtain counsel.
The order stated that the October 30,
1989, hearing would be "final."

On the morning of October 30, 1989,
just prior to the trial, defendant met
with his attorney for the first time.

This attorney was the second attorney
hired by defendant. It was defendant's
impression that his second attorney de-

fonstrated a “strong bias" ayainst
psychiatrists and psychiatry, defendant's
chosen profession. For the next three
hours, defendant, his attorney, and
plaintiff's attorney wrangled over the
terms and defendant's understanding of

a proposed agreed order. Defendant

claims to have been ina "State of
confusion with regard to the particulars
of the agreed order". Defendant asked

his attorney how defendant could dismiss

him and enlist the services of a third

4h
attorney. According to defendant, the
attorney did not reply. Defendant fur-
ther claims that at that time he was
under the impression that he was cbhii-
gated to be represented and proceed to
trial that same day. He also says that
he did not know that a Chicago Bar As-
sociation attorney was assigned to the
particular court where the parties were
to appear.

Apparentiy, at some point during
the lengthy discussion, defendant had
’

a brief conversation with the trial
judge regarding defendant's concern
that "all of his rights were preserved"

The trial judge advised defendant to

Ww

continue discussing the matter with hi

attorney which defendant did. During
the subsequent discussion, defendant's

= hie wi pherm ¢ ,
attorney told him that his rights wer

iv

protected by the agreed order. Accordins

5A
to the defendant, he then agreed to ini-
tial the order with the caveat that he
could not "read" the order and therefore
could not give "informed consent", but
that he would rely upon his attorney's
advice.

The agreed order provided that: 1)
an order of possession was entered, but
stayed until November 30, 1989: 2) defen-
dant would provide access to the apart-
ment on November 1, 1989, for plaintiff
to decorate and renovate from 9 a.m. to
5 p.m.; 3) if access was not provided,
plaintiff might move to vacate the stay
of possession and seek immediate posses-
Sion; and 4) defendant would pay use and
occupancy at a rate of $345 per month
from September 1, 1989, until posses-
sion was finally relinguished.

During the afternoon of October 30,

1983, defendant claims to have contacted

.

6A
additional attorneys who advised him
that he had been improperly counseled by
his secona attorney. Defendant immediate-
ly dismissed his second counsel by certi-
fied letter dated October 30, 1989,
claiming that the attorney had impro-
perly explained the specifics of the
agreed order, so that defendant remain-
ed confused.

On the next day, October 31, 1989,
defendant and plaintiff both signed a
"memorandum" which referred to the
agreed order of October 30, 1989, and
which provided additional specifics
regarding the provision of access to the
apartment, including that the date of
access would be changed from November
1 to November 4, 1989.

On November 3, 1983, defendant filed
a notice of motion and a motion to va-

cate the agreed order entered on Octo-

-

7A

ber 30, 1989. The notice of motion made
reference only to the filing of the mo-
tion to vacate the agreed order. The mo-
tion was lengthy and recited that defend-
ant had been confused about the terms
of the agreed order as he was improperly
counseled hy his attorney. The motion
essentially presented the same arguments
defendant raises on this appeal concern-
ing the circumstances surrounding the
execution of the agreed order.

On November 6, 1989, plaintiff filed
a "Motion for Immediate Hearing of Mo-
tion and Immediate Possession." This mo-
tion aiso requested that defendant be
ordered to pay use and occupancy as due
in accordance with the agreed order.

On November 8, i989, the trial court
heard both defendant's motion to vacate
the agreed order and plaintiff's moti-

on for immediate possession. Although

8A

Although defendant has not provided a
transcript of proceedings or any bystand-
er's report of this hearing, defendant
maintains that the trial court "read"
plaintiff's motion and additional materi-
als in their “entirety," but did not
consider or "read" defendant's motion
or a related “memorandum" dated November
4, 1989. Defendant claims that the only
material read by the trial court was
defendant's letter dismissing his second
attorney because that letter was located
"on the top" of all the documents.

At the conclusion of the hearing,
the trial court granted plaintiff im-
mediate possession as of that date, No-
vember 8, 1989; and the court denied
defendant's motion to vacate the agreed
order. The trial court did not rule on
plaintiff's request for use and occupan-

cy payments. Subsequent to the filing

9A

of the notice of appeal, the order of
possession was stayed pending an outcome.

As a threshold matter, we decline to
dismiss this appeal as requested by
plaintiff on the basis that defendant
has violated Supreme Court Rules in the
filing of his appeilate brief. (i107 ill.

2d R. 341 et. seg. ) Piaintiff raised

this issue by motion before this court
on March 13, 1990, and we denied it on
March 28, 1990. We fail to find that
this pro se defendant has since violated
Supreme Court Rules so flagrantiy as to

require dismissal. See Menicocci v.

Archer Nat'l Bank of Chicago, (1978),

67 Ill. App. 3d 388, 390, 385 N.E.2d 63;

In re J.M. v. William McCarron (1988),

170 Ill. App. 3d 552, 556, 524 N.E.2d

Similarly, we also decline to dismiss

the appeal on the basis that it is now

LOA
moot. That defendant concedes that his
leasehold rights terminated as of April
1990, as asserted by plaintiff, is
nowhere reflected by the record before
us. Furthermore, even if the record re-
flected such a concession, it still
does not provide us with sufficient
information to discern the legal basis
for any such concession. Accordingly,
we now consider defendant's first
contention.

Defendant argues that the denial
of his motion to vacate the agreed
order of October 10, 1989, was improper
because the trial court did not consider
or “read" that motion and a reiated
"memorandum" dated November 4, 1989.
The record, however, fails to reflect
the inclusion of this memorandun. A
reviewing court will not consider any-

thing which is not contained in the

LILA

record. (International Amphitheater v.
Vanguard Underwriters Insurance Company
(1988), 177 Till. App. 3d 555, 564, %32
N.E. 2d 493.) Indeed, defendant attempt-
ed to have this memorandum included in
the record by way of an appendix to his
appellate brief. However, we denied de-
fendant leave to file such an appendix
on April 4, 1990, so that the memo-
randum is not now before us.

Since defendant has not supplied a
transcript or a bystander's report sf

the November 8, 1989, hearing in ac-

i.’
‘

cordance with Supreme Court Pule 32
(107 Ill. 2d R. 323(¢c)), we have n6
choice but to indulge in every rea-
sonable presumption favorable to the
judgment order or ruling from which an

appeai is taken. See Alta

4

neat elena,

a

ca

—y a a —

12A

1032; and Dell’ Armi Builders, Inc. v.

Johnston (1988), 172 Ill . App. 3d 144,

149, 526 N.E. 2d 409.

Even assuming that the trial court
"read plaintiff's brief in its entirety”
either silently or out loud, or that
defendant could discern what in fact the
trial court was reading at any given
point, this does not demonstrate that
the trial court did not consider or
read defendant's motion filed some five
days previously. Indeed the trial court's
order reflects a consideration of de-
fendant's motion because it specifical-
ly stated that it concerned a hearing

on that motion, that the court was

“advised in the premises,” specifically
recognizing that defendant was appearing
"personally", and yet it denied the mo-

tion. Particularly where no report of

proceedings is supplied and the judgment

——

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ie

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a Se a ie ee, eer

13A
order utilizes the operative language
that it is "fully advised in the pre-
mises," a reviewing court will indulge
in every reasonable presumption favor-
able to the order and must presume that
the matters heard by the trial court
were sufficient to support the judgment
absent any contrary indication in the

record. Altaf v. Hanover Square Condomi-

nium Assoc., No. 1, 188 Ill. App. 3d at

539; Dell' Armi Builders, Inc. v. Johns-

ton, 172 Ill. App. 3d at 149; In re

Marriage of Macaluso (1982), 110 Ill.

App. 3d 838, 846, 443 N.E.2d l.
Accordingly, we believe any argu-
ment that the trial court did not
consider or "read" defendant's motion
to vacate the agreed order is totally

insupportable. See Foutch v. O'Bryant

(1984), 99 Ill. 2d 389, 459 N.E.2d 958.

However, even though not explicitly

14A
Stated, defendant seems to argue that
denial was improper because there were
legal and factual bases to support va-
catur of the agreed order.
"Such an order can be set aside
only by agreement of the parties
upon a showing that it resulted

from fraudulent misrepresentation,

coercion, incompetence of one of the

parties, gross disparity in the

parties' bargaining positions, or

newly discovered evidence." (Empha-

Sis added.) (Kandalepas v. Economou
(1989), 191 Ill. App. 3d 51, 54, 547

N.E.2d 496; Berymon v. Henderson (1935),

135 Ill. App. 3d 852, 865, 482 N.E. 2d

391.) None of these bases exist in tli

oy

case.
Certainly defendant was not incom-
petent at the time he initialed the

agreed order, nor was he "coerced" into

15A
entering the agreement. Being advised
that one must sign or proceed to triai
that same day, going with the legal re-
presentation at hand, is not coercion.

(See First Sec. Bank of Glendale Heights

v. Bawoll (1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 787,

456 N.E.2d 193.) Neither can defendant
claim that a gross disparity in the
parties' bargaining positions existed
given defendant's professional status,
articuiateness, and the tenacity which
he has demonstrated throughout this
matter. Furthermore, the strongest argu-
ment defendant makes that the terms of
the agreement were fraudulentiy mis-
represented is that he later learned
that a reference to a third party with
whom he might have to negotiate was not
incorporated into the final agreed order,
although the attorneys inciuded such a

reference when repetitiously "“reading"

16A
the proposed order to him. Indeed the
best that can be said is that defendant
did not understand the agreement, his
counsel's explanations did not clarify
it to him, and, nevertheless, he signed
in reliance upon counsel. Such a scenario,
unfortunately, does not rise to the
level of fraud, coercion or unfair ad-
vantage. A party to a written contract
is under a duty to learn or know the
contents of that contract before he
Signs it and is under a duty to determi-
ne the obligations which he undertakes
by the creation of a written agreement.

(Leon v. Max L£. Miller & Son, Inc. (1974),

23 Ill. App. 3d 694, 699-70, 320 N.E.2d
256). Mature adults have a duty to be
fully advised as to the nature of the
contents of a binding agreement. See

Great American Federal Savings and Loan

Association v. Grivas (1985), 137 Ill.

17A
App. 3d 267, 484 N.E.2d 429.

Defendant does contend that during
the afternoon of the day he initialed
the agreement he "realized" after con-
tacting "other attorneys" that he had
been “improperly counseled" by his
second attorney. What information was
provided to defendant by these attorneys
that caused him to "realize" anything
is not even suggested. Hence, we do not
find that newly Sieouaret evidence
has been presented warranting vacatur
of the agreed order.

Of significance also is that defend-
ant entered into and signed a supplement-
ary agreement ( memorandum dated Octo-
ber 31, 1989,), which further parti-
cularized the terms of the agreed order
the day after he signed the agreed order

and allegedly "realized" that he had been

“improperly counseled". Sureiy, defend-

18A

dant cannot honestly claim that he was
coerced, or unfairly disadvantaged when
he signed the agreed order since he sub-
sequently freely entered into the sup-
plementary agreement. Accordingly, we
find no error by the denial of defend-
ant's motion to vacate the agreed order.

Defendant's secona contention is that
Since 1985, plaintiff has failed to
protect the leased premises during de-
fendant's absences. He contends that
in 1985, plaintiff left the apartment
door unlocked, so that the apartment
was burglarized. Since that time,
defendant has noticed that valuable
personal items are being removed and
foreign objects, including "insects"
are appearing in the apartment.

This issue,however, is not properly
before us at this time. The point was

nowhere raised below at the trial court,

ee

19A
so that we cannot take cognizance of it
now. It is axiomatic that questions not
raised in the trial court are deemed
waived and may not be raised for the

first time upon appeal. Western Casualty

& Surety Company v. Brochu (1985), 105

Ill. 2d 486, 500-1, 475 N.E.2d 872.

Finally plaintiff requests that we
grant him costs, attorney fees, and any
use and occupancy payments allegedly
due him. The trial court,however, never
ruled on plaintiff's request for use
and occupancy payments, although plain-
tiff requested that relief in his motion
for immediate possession. Accordingly,
we would remand to the trial court for
a consideration of any amounts owed
because of use and occupancy in ac-
cordance with the agreed order.

The judgment of the circuit court

denying defendant's motion to

————————

2 Gikaw :

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a

ne te

20A

vacate the agreed order is affirmed.
We remand the cause to the trial court
for a consideration of any use and cc-
cupancy payments in accordance with
the terms of the agreed order.

Affirmed and remanded.

WHITE, J., with CERDA, P.J. and

FREEMAN, J., concurring.

20A-Add
IN THE APPELLATE COURT, STATE OF ILL.
FIRST DISTRICT
GEORGE A. GAUTHIER, Plaintiff- Appellee,
v. Dr. D. GEORGICU, Defendant- Appellant
NO. 1-89-3013
ORDER

THIS CAUSE COMING ON TO BE HEARD
upon the Motion of Defendant-Appellant
For Leave To File A Response To The
Objections Of Plaintiff-Appellee To De-
fendant-Appellant's Motion To File Reply
Brief In Excess Of Page Limitation
Instanter, due Notice having been given
and the Court being advised in the pre-
mises, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Mo-
tion To File A Response is granted.
(Seal:) ORDER ENTERED May 29 90
(signature:) David Cerda Justice
Dr.D.GEORGICU,Appellant,2642 Prairie Ave.
Evanston, IL 60201, Tel:708/869-8189

GILBERT S. MARCHMAN,CLERK APP.CT.FIRST DIS.

21A
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY,ILL.

George A. Gauthier
Vv. NO. 89 M2-16€81
Dr. D. Georgiou (Petitioner's
Note: Text
Agreed ORDER handwritten
by plaintiff's
attorney,
not legible)
This matter coming on for hearing in date
set, plaintiff appear(ing?) (...?) with
his attorney; Defendant appearing and
with his attorn(ey) (...?) parties having
agreed in a settlement and the Court
being adv(...?) (..?) the premises; it
is hereby ordered. 1. An order of pos-
session for Apt 2F 2642 Prairie, Evanston
(..?) (..)ntered and stayed to November
30, 1989. 2. Defendant shall give Plain-
tiff access to the apartment for (decor)-
ation and renovation. Plaintiff shali
work around Derend(ant's) (posse?)ssions
to the extent possible and practicable.

If not, Plaintiff (...)11 move posses-

sions (Petitioner's Note: Different

CO

(Agreed ORDER, continued) 22A
handwriting here, not legible) to a safe
place (Petitioner's Note:Different hand-
writing here, legible in part, reading
approximately:)/only in the presence of
and following approval by defendant
(initials)/,and return them after (decor)
ation and renovation is finished. Access
shall be provided on 11/1/89 at 9 am.De-
fendant shall give plaintiff access to
the (ap)artment,work shall take place
from 9 am to 5 pm. 3. If Defendant
does not cooperate in the access, Plain-
“tiff (...?) have right to move for va-
cating stay of possession (...?) obtain
immediate possession. 4. Defendant shall
pay use and occupancy at rate of $345 per
month from 9/1/89 to date possession is
delivered or obtained.

(Plaintiff's signature, Defendant's ini-

(Seal:) ENTERED 10/30/1989 Jtiais.)
AURELIA PUCINSKI, CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT
(continued)

itll

(Agreed CRDER, continued) 23A
COURT. (Notes, not legible)

Atty No. 50373 Name Charles R. Goerth
Attorney for plaintiff,Address 1200
Central ,City Wilmette IL 60091
Telephone 256-7102

(Record on Appeal number, seal:)

C000012
AURELIA PUCINSKI, CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT

COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS

24A
MEMORANDUM
To: Mr. George A. Gauthier
From: Dr. D GEORGIOU (initialed)
Subj}: Your demand to have access to
my apartment

Date: November 4, 89 (Saturday)

I do not understand why you came
this morning to my apartment, despite
the fact that I have personally served

you on November 3, 89 (yesterday) a

copy of my Motion to vacate “agreed order’

You have been knecking thunderously
and you were shouting and demanding for
me to give you access, mentioning that
you were in possession of an "agreed
order"

I told you(behind my docr, being

inside my apartment} that I am not

waiving my above Motion to vacate

“agreed order", by opening the door

and giving you access.

a

25A

You insisted demanding for me to open

the door and to give you access. Then

I told you to wait for a few minutes in
order for me to get dressed. Then I
opened the door, I saw you in the stairs,
I said: "I opened the door because you
are or were demanding it" and I also
told you that I was sick because of

your alarming behavior.

Then you came to the door, you stop-
pea after vou entered in part. I said
nothing, I did nothing. I was not phy-
Sically preventing you. Then you said:
"This is not access, I will go to court
to evict you". I said:"I did what you
were asking me to do."Ycou repeated:
"This is not access", you turned your
back to me and you left without greeting
me, stating: “" I will take you to court
to evict you because you did not

give me access". I said:

OO

26A

"Without waiving my Motion to vacate
"agreed order", I gave you access;

to my surprise you are turning your
back to me and you are leaving ".

END OF MEMORANDUM.

(Signature:) D.C.Georgiou

27A
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY,ILL.
Gauthier
Vv. NO. 89 M2 1681
Georgiou

ORDER

This matter coming on to be heard on
motion of plaintiff to hear defendant's
motion to vacate an agreec order; and
plaintiff's motion for immediate pos-
session, plaintiff appearing and with
his attorney; Defendant appearing
personally; and the court being advised
in the premises, it is ordered:
1. Defendant's motion to vacate agreed
order is denied. 2. Plaintiff's motion
for immediate possession is granted.
3. Plaintiff shall have possession this
date, Nov 8,1989.
(Seal:) ENTERED 11/8/1989
Atty No.50373 Name Cnaries Goerth, Atty
for plaintiff,120C Central Av.,Wilmette IL

tel:256-7102. Record on AppealNo:C0C0026

S|

APPENODUIA

ORDER
IN THE APPELLATE COURT, STATE OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
GEORGE A. GAUTHIER,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
¥. NO. 1-89-3013
DR. D. GEORGIOU,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER
Upon consideration of petition for
rehearing filed by Defendant-Appellant
on June 20, 1990,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that said
petition for rehearing is DENIED.
(Seal:) ORDER ENTERED JUL 12 90
/s/ David Cerda Justice
/s/ William S. White Justice
/s/ Charles E Freeman Justice
GILBERT S. MARCHMAN, CLERK OF THE

APPELLATE COURT, FIRST DISTRICT

OO

29A
70670 ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT
JULEANN HORNYAK, CLERK
SUPREME COURT BUILDING
SPRINGFIELD, ILL 62706
(217) 782-2035
October 3, 1990
Dr. So eageetou
2642 Prairie Ave.
Evanston, IL 60201
No. 70670 - George A. Gauthier, respond-
ent, v. Dr. D. Georgiou, petitioner.
Leave to appeal, Appellate Court,
First District.

The Supreme Court today DENIED the
petition for leave to appeal in the
above entitled cause.

The mandate of this Court will issue
' to the Appellate Court on October 25,

1990.

30A
SEAL OF THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF ILLINOIS, SUPREME COURT CLERK
SUPREME COURT BUILDING,SPRINGFIELD 62706
JULEANN HORNYAK CLERK OF THE COURT
(217) 782-2035
FIRST DISTRICT OFFICE , ROOM 30-129
RICHARD J. DALEY CENTER, CHICAGO €0602
(322) 793-1332
October 16,1990
Dr. D.C.Georgiou,
2642 Prairie Avenue, Evanston, IL 60201
THE COURT HAS TODAY ENTERED THE FOLLOWING
ORDER IN THE CASE OF:
No. 7067C - George A. Gauthier, respond-
ent, v. Dr. D. Georgiou, petitioner.
The motion by petitioner to stay the
Mandate pending the filing and dispositi-
on of writ of certiorari in the United
States Supreme Court is allowed.
A copy of the order is enclosed.

/Goerth
JH:kp Encl. cc:George A.Gauthier,Charles

CC

31A
(Seal:) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, U.S.A.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ARMED FORCES EXAMINING AND ENTRANCE

STATION, 65 EAST 9TH STREET

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60605
MEFPCC-CHI 12 April 1979
SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation
Dimitrios C. Georgiou, MD
Chief Medical Officer
Consultant in Psychiatry and Neurology
AFEES - Chicago
65 E. 9th Street, Chicago, IL 60605
Dear Dr. Georgiou:
It is with great pieasure that I wish to
express my appreciation with regard to
the extremely competent service you have
offered to the Department of Defense as
Chief Medical Officer and Consultant in
Psychiatry and Neurology at AFEES~Chicago,
Since January 31, 1977 when you were

appointed. (continued)

»

asi + t As (_o— 5 om
Se Se. Sete
-4

i:
eee a oateed

32A
(DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Letter of
Appreciation of 12 April 1979, continued).
Your proper handling of the complex medi-
cal, psychiatric and administrative is-
sues, arising frequently, has demonstrated
an extensive theoretical background as
well as abilities and skills which are

more than ordinary.

The MEPCOM Surgeon, Dr. Joseph W. McNaney,
MD Colonel, MC was also glad tc share with
me his positive comments on several oc-

casions.

A copy of this correspondence will be

placed in your official personnel file.

(Signature) GEORGE CRONIN
LTC, FA

Commanding

eo lll ite i eet ™ '
o eos © 7 oT eee as a ee ee aa Are (a7 -
a Sons ee es
. -

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I ern

—_—

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Ratna
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33A
(Seal:) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, U.S.A.
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
WASHINGTON DC 20310 1813 (Seal)
24 AUG 1988
SFMR-RBE
Ms. Dolores L. Rozzi, Director
Office of Review and Appeals
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
5203 Leesburg Pike, Suite 900
Falis Chusch, Virginia 22041
RE: Complaint of Dimitrios C. Georgiou
and John O. Marsh, Jr., Secretary
of the Army. Docket No: 01.88.3042
Agency No: 81-06-519
Dear Ms. Rozzi:

Thank you for your letter of July 12,
1988, that requested the case file on Mr.
Dimitrios C. Georgiou. The final Army
decision issued to Mr. Georgiou was not

in compliance with governing EEO policies

_ 34A

DEPT. OF THE ARMY, OFFICE OF THE AS-
SISTANT SECRETARY, Letter 24 AUG 88,Cont'd
and procedures. The complaint is being
remanded for procedural compliance and
the final decision shall be rescinded.
Therefore, the complaint is inappro-
priate for review and appeal.

Sincerely,

(Signature)

Stanley L. Kelley, Jr.

Deputy Director,

Egual Employment Opportunity

Compliance and Complaints Review

Agency.

35A
(Seal:)}) EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMN.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Review and Appeals
5203 Leesburg Pike, Suite 900
Falls Church, Virginia 22041
OCT 6 1988
Dr. Dimitrios C. Georgiou
2642 Prairie Avenue, Evansyon, Illinois
ORA Docket No. 01.88.3042

Dear Dr. Georgiou:
Our records indicate that we have alrea-
dy forwarded a copy of the enclosed let-
ter from the Department of the Army to
you. However, in response to your re-
quest a second copy herewith is
forwarded.
Sincerely,
(Signature) C. Lloyd Buddoo

Supervisory General Attorney

Research and Analysis Unit

Enclosure

36A
CERTIFIED P-468-158-955 RETURN REC.REQD.
MEMCRANODUM
To: Ms. Dolores L. Rozzi, Director, Of-
fice of Review and Appeals, EEO COMMISN.
5203 Leesburg Pike, Suite 900, Falls
Church, Virginia 22041
From: Dimitrios C. Georgiou, M.D.,2642
Prairie Ave., Evanston, IL 60201
Date: December 28, 1990

This is to remind you, once more, that

the enclosed two documents (one from
EEOC, dated Oct.6, 1988, and signed
C. Lloyd Buddoo and the other, at-
tached together, from the Department of
the Army, Office of the Assistant
Secretary, dated 24 August 1988, signed
Stanley Kelley, Jr., Deputy Director,
EEO Compliance and Compiaints Review A-

gency) are the ones I have received last

from your Agency. Meanwhile,as I have in-
office DG
formed youyperiodically,discrimination
/continues. (Signed)

37A

IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT No.

GEORGE A. GAUTHIER, Plaintiff-Respondent
v. DR. D. GEORGIOU, Defendant-Petitioner
NOTICE OF FILING AND PROOF OF SERVICE

To: Mr. Charles R. Goerth, Attorney At
Law, 1200 Central Av., Wilmette, IL 60091
You are hereby notified that pursuant to
the provisions of the Rules-of Court, we
have on this date filed with the Clerk of
the Court the Petition for Writ of Certio-
-ari, and Appendix, including, but not li-
mited to, extension of the period within
which the mandate is stayed, until dis-

position of the Petition by the U.S.

Supreme Court, with the proper number of
copies. Date: March 1,1991. /s/D.C.Georgiou
| I, Dr. D. GEORGIOU, Defendant-Peti-
tioner, on oath state that on March 1,91,

I served the proper number of copies of

the above document on the party mentioned

' above, by mailing to his office address

ee

=i
= ~
Led 7 a
: i ; _ hy
——
i =
a rm i Sons —_ a Spa a

ee i ie ee ee a ae

Pd
eit — ie. iy aa 7 _ bs nein, i

38A
(NOTICE OF FILING AND PROOF OF SERVICE,
continuation page)
mentioned above the above mentioned
copies, by enclosing them in a postmarked,
prepaid, sealed envelope, postage pre-
paid and depositing same at the post-
office on Dearborn St. and Adams in

Chicago. (Signature): D C Georgiou

Subscribed and sworn to before me
this lst day of March 1991

(Signature)
(Seal:) OFFICIAL SEAL FREEDA I. KOSIEK
Notary Public, State of Illinois

My Commission Expires 8-31-92

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_1983%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.