# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Goodacre v. New York

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1991
- **Citation:** 499 U.S. 976

## Text

_

Suprene Cuurt, U.S
60-1359 FILED
= FEB 27 199)
Qia&
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1990

CHARLES GOODACRE and PETER GRIM,
Petitioners,
against
NEW YORK,
Respondent
On Perition FoR A Writ OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME

Court oF New York, APPELLATE Division, First
DEPARTMENT

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

RICHARD A. DIENST
Dienst & SERRINS
Counsel for Petitioners

225 Broadway
New York, NY 10007
(212) 406-1700
Of Counsel:
Harry GREENBERG

RAYMOND KERNO

February 25, 1991
Tee Reroeres Company, Inc. 30 Weary SR. New York. NY 10007.199)
wvC Dep )o2-o978 Westchester 914-68). 1922 Long istend $16-222-022!

($942—LC2-923)

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the state can satisfy its heavy
burden of proving legitimate independent
sources for its evidence where the
departmental investigators compelled
petitioners’ testimony pursuant to a grant
of immunity while they simultaneously
conducted the criminal investigation for
the state and there was both evidentiary
and nonevidentiary use of this immunized
testimony in violation of petitioners’
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.

Page
QUESTION PRESENTED .......... i
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........4... ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......... iv
OPINIONS BELOW. .........4...1i1
JURISDICTION... 2... 21.2.2. ee ee 2
STATUTES INVOLVED ...........2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ......... 4
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT... . . 24

I. BY FAILING TO CONSIDER THE STATE’*S
NONEVIDENTIARY USE OF IMMUNIZED
TESTIMONY, THE STATE COURTS

HOLDING IN
AND THE HOLDINGS OF SEVERAL COURTS
OF APPEALS .......2.+2+4e60. 24

II. AS THE STATE FAILED TO SEGREGATE THE

DISMISSAL OF THE INDICTMENT... 24

ai

CONCLUS ION . *. . . * . * . . * . . .

APPENDIX:

A. OPINION OF THE NEW YORK SUPREME
COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST
DEPARTMENT. . © © + © © © © #

B. KASTIGAR HEARING. . « «+ «+ «+ «© «

C. SENTENCING MINUTES. ..-.++ «+ «

iii

42

“TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page

United States v. Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524
(llth Cir. 1985) . . . 26, 27, 28, 32, 36

United States v. Crowson, 828 F.2d 1427
(9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S.

wae CGeeeep we eee ewe tee 26, 27, 36

, 359 F.Supp.
684 (S.D.N.¥. 1973), ?
grounds, 491 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1974) . 26

, 775 F.2d 1479
(llth Cir. 1985)... . ... . . passim
406 U.S. 441 (1972)... .... passim

, $34 F.2d 511
(2d Cir. 1976) . . . . . . . . . > . . 40
United States v. McDaniel,
482 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1973) . . . passin
, 851 F.2d 595

(2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1011 (1989)... ... . 26, 28

United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843,

modified, reh’q denied, in part, en banc,
» 920 F.2d 940

(D.C. Cir. 1990) ......,..., passim

489 U.S. 248 (1963)... 2... 00

iv

United States v. Schwimmer,
662 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1989) ...... 38

United States v. Semkiw, 712 F.2d 891
(3d Cir. 1983) . ....+ + «+ «+ « « passin

» 870 F.2d 1
(ist Cir. 1969) . . «© « «© « «© 26, 27, 36

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1990

CHARLES GOODACRE and PETER GRIM,
Petitioners,

Vv.

NEW YORK,

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE
DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT

The petiticners Charles Goodacre and
Peter Grim respectfully pray that a writ
of certiorari issue to review the judgment
and opinion of the Supreme Court of New
York, Appellate Division, First
Department, entered in People of the State
of New York v. Peter Grim and People of
the State of New York v. Charles Goodacre
on October 16, 1990.

OPINIONS BELOW

The unreported opinions of the Supreme
Court of New York, Appellate Division,
First Department, affirming the decision
and order of the Supreme Court, New York
County, can be found in the Appendix.

JURISDICTION

The order of the Court of Appeals of
New York, denying leave to appeal, was
entered on November 29, 1990. The
jurisdiction of this Court to review the
judgment of the New York Supreme Court,
Appellate D:vision, First Department,
entered October 16, 1990, is invoked under
28 U.S.C. §1257(a).

STATUTES INVOLVED
U.S. Const. V Amendment

No person shall .. . be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against
Himself... .

City of New York, Police Department,
Patrol Guide 1186-9:

If a member of the service (uniformed or
Civilian) is under arrest or is the
subject of a criminal investigation or
there is a likelihood that criminal
charges may result from the investigation,
the following warnings shall be given to
the member concerned prior to commencement
of the interogation:

"I wish to advise you that you are being

2

questioned as part of an official
investigation by the Police Department.
You will be asked questions specifically
directed and narrowly related to the
performance of your duties. You are
entitled to all the rights and privileges
guaranteed by the laws of the State of
New York, the Constitution of this state
and the Constitution of the United States,
including the right not to be compelled to
incriminate yourself and the right to have
legal counsel present at each and every
stage of this investigation.

I further wish to advise you that if you
refuse to testify or to answer questions
relating to the performance of yeur
official duties, you will be subject to
departmental charges which could result in
your dismissal from the Police Department.
If you do answer, neither your statements
nor any information or evidence which is
gained by reason of such statements can be
used against you in any subsequent
criminal proceedings. However, these
statement [sic) may be used against you in
relation to subsequent departmental
charges".

The questions and answers resulting from
the interogation conducted pursuant to
this procedure are confidential. They are
not to be revealed nor released to any
person or agency outside the department
without prior written approval of the
Deputy Commissioner-Legal Matters. If a
subpoena duces tecum is received for any
such questions and answers, the Legal
Bureau should be contacted immediately.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Course of proceedings in the case now
before this Court.

On June 28, 1989, the petitioners
were found guilty, after a jury trial
before the Supreme Court, New York County,
of assault in the second degree (New York
Penal Law §120.05(1)).

On October 16, 1990, the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court of the State
of New York affirmed the petitioners’
conviction.

On November 29, 1990, petitioners’
timely application for leave to appeal to
the State of New York Court of Appeals was
denied.

B. How the Federal Question Was
Presented.

The federal question was first

presented in a pre-trial motion to dismiss

the indictments, dated July 12, 1988, on

the grounds that immunity had been

conferred upon the petitioners pursuant to
Police Department Patrol Guide Section
118-9. The motion to dismiss was denied,
however, a hearing on the issue was
directed pursuant to an order dated

October 18, 1988. A hearing was commenced

on April 24, 1989, pursuant to Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) to

determine whether any of the petitioners’
immunized testimony was used by the
prosecution in violation of their rights
under the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. (Trial Record at 1.)

Petitioners appealed the court’s
ruling on the federal question to the
Supreme Court of New York, Appellate
Division, First Department, which affirmed
the decision of the trial court. (Appendix
A)

Cc. Introduction

Around midnight of February 20, 1988,
Touissant Vogelsang was the victim of an
assault allegedly committed by several off
duty police officers.

On the date of the assault,
petitioners Sergeant CHARLES GOODACRE and
Officer PETER GRIM were New York City
police officers assigned to the Midtown
South Precinct. On the evening of
February 20, 1988, they attended a
basketball game at Madison Square Garden
in Manhattan with four other police
officers, Sergeant JAMES DEAN, Sergeant
ANTHONY DIRENZO, Officer GREG LEONE and
Officer STEVEN GOLDEN. After the game,
all of the officers went to a nearby bar.
The People claimed that after the officers
left the bar, they encountered complainant
Vogelsang, a racial slur was directed at
Vogelsang and that petitioner Grin punched

Vogelsang. Vogelsang apparently left the

6

area, but returned and was again attacked

by a group of men.

Following the incident, an
investigation was immediately commenced by
the Internal Affairs Division ("IAD").

Within the first three days of the
investigation, both of the petitioners
were compelled to testify pursuant to
General Order 15 ("G.0O. 15"). This
provision is now Patrol Guide 118-9 of the
Rules and Regulations of the New York City
Police Department, which have the force
and effect of law. Patrol Guide 118-9
requires an officer to testify under
threat of job forfeiture. Information
obtained pursuant to this provision can be
used administratively by the police
department, but cannot be used against the
officer in a subsequent criminal
proceeding. It was common practice for

the IAD to obtain approval from the

district attorney’s office before
commencing questioning pursuant to G.O. 15
(484).?

Following the IAD _ investigation,
after having been compelled to answer
questions, petitioners GOODACRE and GRIM
were indicted and charged with assault in
the second degree.

On April 24, 1989, a pre-trial
Kastigar hearing was commenced to
determine whether petitioners’ immunized
testimony had been used by the prosecution
in violation of their Fifth Amendment
priviledge against self incrimination.

D. The evidence at the Kastigar Hearing.

In the early morning of February 21,

1988, Lieutenant CHARLES MONAHAN, was

All page references are to the
actual page in the Trial Record

containing the Kastigar hearing
decision which is located at
Appendix 5.

summoned by his commanding officer,
Captain Stone, to the Midtown South
Precinct to investigate police involvement
in the assault of Vogelsang. Both Monahan
and Stone were members of the IAD. When
Monahan arrived at the precinct at 8:00
a.m., Stone (deceased at the time of
trial) informed him that an assault had
taken place on 7th Avenue and 34th Street.

Within one hour, the assistant
district attorney who prosecuted the
petitioners’ case, Susan Braver ("ADA
Braver"), arrived at the precinct (10).
Following a conversation between Captain

Stone and ADA Braver, Stone declared that

“(wie are going to G.0O. 15 the whole
place” (13-14). At this time, both the
departmental and the criminal

investigations began.
At the time the investigation began,

there was no written or “hard and fast"

policy mandating the IAD to use separate
units to conduct the criminal
investigation and the departmental
interrogations of targets. In this case,
both the departmental and criminal
investigations were conducted by the same
unit - Unit 2 (180) .? In fact, Lieutenant
JOHN KID testified that Unit 2 conducted
the investigation for the District
Attorney’s office and no outside
investigators were ever used (102-103).
Unit 2 consisted of Monahan, Kid,
Detective THOMAS ENG, Officer STEPHANIE
RICH, Detective ANDREA SORRENTINO,
Sergeants Robert Castellano and Villada,

and Detective Aubrey Weeks. It was

While there was testimony which
indicated that it was generally
IAD policy to separate
investigatory functions in
situations such as this one, no
explanation was given as to why
this was not done here (98,105).

10

before this unit that the petitioners
testified under a grant of immunity
pursuant to G.O. 15.

As of February 22, 1988, when
petitioner Grim testified pursuant to G.O.
15, there was no direct evidence
implicating the petitioners in the
assault.? Officer STEVEN GOLDEN and
Sergeant JAMES DEAN, who were interviewed
the day before, both stated that on
February 20, 1988 they had gone to a
basketball game with the petitioners and
several other officers and that following
the game the entire group went to McAnn’s,

a nearby bar. Golden stated that he and

Although the trial court refers
to a photo identification of
petitioners on February 21,
1988, this appears to be a
simple mistake, as it points
out later in its opinion that
the first photo compilation and
identification took place on
February 22, 1988 (485-486).

il

Leone left the bar at approximately 11:45
p.m.; walked a few blocks, and encountered
the assault upon Vogelsang; they attempted
to intervene; and during the course of the
events Leone was struck in the face by a
man wielding a "2 x 4." Neither Golden
nor Leone implicated the petitioners in
the assault. Further, neither officer
provided a description of the petitioners
or the time that the petitioners left the
bar.

Similarly, neither of the two
civilian witnesses implicated the
petitioners. While each recounted the
events regarding the assault, only one
witness, Rodney Grant, provided any type
of description of the assailants. Grant,
who was arrested for striking Leone,
stated that there were several white males
involved in the assault upon Vogelsang.

Monahan also testified that before he

12

obtained the petitioners’ G.0. 15s, he had
a description of one of the men who
assaulted Vogelsang. This description was
limited, however, to the fact that the
assailant was wearing a green army jacket.

When petitioner Grim testified
pursuant to G.0O.15 on February 22, 1988,
he was already a target of the
investigation. In fact, the trial court
found that Grim was a target as early as
the morning of February 21, 1988. IAD
asked Grim to describe his clothing. Grim
also told the IAD that he was at the
basketball game and that afterwards he
went to McAnn’s bar with the other
officers. At the bar, he met two friends,
CHRISTOPHER WALDRON and Christine Murphy.
Grim stated that he and petitioner
Goodacre left the bar after about one hour
and walked directly to Goodacre’s car

without encountering complainant

13

Vogelsang, and then drove home. (27-29,
353).

On the same day of Grim’s G.O. 15,
Officer Rich interviewed Waldron, whose
identity was discovered only because of
Grim’s G.O. 15 (471). Rich testified that
Waldron placed Grim at the bar from 11:30
p.m. to about 12:20 a.m. Waldron stated
that Grim invited him to a party at the
Hyatt Hotel, but that when he arrived at
the hotel, Grim was not there (434-435).
Prior to the matter being presented to the
Grand Jury, Waldron’s statement was
summarized and placed in the IAD folder
which was given to ADA Braver (383).

ADA Braver later summoned Waldron to
testify before the grand jury which
indicted the petitioners. Waldron’s grand
jury testimony revealed petitioner’s alibi
defense prior to trial. With this

knowledge, ADA Braver used Waldron’s grand

14

———Sw

jury testimony at least five times during
the petitioners’ trial for the purpose of
impeaching Waldron. Waldron testified at
trial as an alibi witness for the defense.
On the evening of February 22, 1988,
after Grim’s immunized statements had been
obtained, Detective Sorrentino conducted a
canvess of the area where the incident
occurred. Sorrentino brought a photo
array with her which included pictures of
the petitioners. She interviewed Greg
Nelson, who told her that he had witnessed
the incident and then picked petitioner
Grim out of a photo array. (204-209).
The following day, February 23,1988
petitioner Goodacre testified pursuant to
G.O. 15. Like Grim, he also stated that
he was at the basketball game and had gone
to McAnn’s bar. Goodacre stated that he

was at the bar for forty-five minutes to

one hour when he left with petitioner

Grim, who drove him home because he was
not feeling well. (47-48). Goodacre also
provided Monahan with a description of
what he was wearing the night of the
incident.

After Goodacre testified, Detective
Sorrentino compared his immunized
testimony with Grim’s. She testified that
she did this because every piece of
information had to be considered and
analyzed. Moreover, Sorrentino admitted
that the comparison was made for the
purposes of furthering the investigation
(246).

Monahan also made investigatory use
of Goodacre’s immunized testimony
attempting to verify the time _ that
Goodacre stated he had left the bar.
Monahan did this by questioning two
bartenders who were working on the night

of incident. The bartenders statements

16

—— SS!

were then summarized, placed in the IAD
file and delivered to ADA Braver prior to
presentment to the Grand Jury (384-385).
The same day Goodacre testified,
Officer Rich and ADA Braver, along with
Lieutenant Kid, interviewed complainant
Vogelsang (423-424). Rich reported that

Vogelsang identified the petitioners from

a photo array (418, 422). Rich aiso
testified that she reviewed each
petitioner’s G.O. 15 (423). Although it

is not clear whether Rich read _ the
petitioners’ immunized statements prior to
interviewing Vogelsang, Detective
Sorrentino testified that briefings were
held with unit members on a daily basis
(185). Detective Eng testified that a
G.O. 15 is considered something new and
that whenever “there was a new development

in the case, whoever was involved in the

case would know about it.” (124).

,
>

On February 25, 1988, Monahan
directed Sorrentino to interview Christine
Murphy, who Grim had named as an alibi
witness at his G.O. 15. According to
Sorrentino, Monahan told her that "Grim
had mentioned that he had been with
certain people that night and that it was
our responsibility to check that." (164).
A summary of Murphy’s statement was placed
in the IAD file and delivered to ADA
Braver prior to the presentment of the
matter to the Grand Jury (471).

Based on information provided by
Murphy, Monahan checked the Long Island
Railroad departure times (355-356). This
appears to have been a critical inquiry,
as Monahan stated that time was an
essential element of the investigation
(374).

Four days after the IAD obtained

Goodacre’s immunized testimony, Monahan

18

and Sorrentino interviewed Rodney Johnson.
Johnson selected Goodacre from a photo
array as one of the men involved in the
assault upon Vogelsang. Although Johnson
also thought he recognized petitioner
Grim, he did not positively identify him.

On April 5, 1988, Monahan delivered
most of the IAD file to ADA Braver. While
it was not clear whether all of the
contents of the file were delivered at
this time, the trial court found that the
file had been delivered in its entirety
during the month of April, 1988 prior to
the grand jury proceedings (480). The
only items removed from the file were the
summaries of the petitioners’ G.0O. 15’s
(385, 471). The summarized statements of
Christopher Waldron, Christine Murphy, and
the two bartenders, however, were not
removed.

In May 1988, grand jury proceedings

19

were commenced. Christopher Waldron was
compelled to appear as a witnesses before
the grand jury. Officer Rich, who had
read petitioners’ immunized statements and
had gathered evidence for the grand jury,
also testified. At the close of the
proceedings, the petitioners were each
indicted for the crime of assault in the
second degree.

E. The Trial Court’s Kastigar Ruling and
the Appellate Division’s Decision on
Appeal.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the
trial court rendered its decision.
(Appendix "B"). The trial court concluded
that the petitioners had met their initial
burden of demonstrating that they made
statements pursuant to a grant of immunity
and that those statements were related to
the prosecution (490). The court

determined, however, that the prosecution

20

had proven an independent source for all
the evidence introduced by a preponderance
of the evidence (495-496) .*

In reaching its decision, the court
stated that there were only two possible
sources of taint, the testimony of
Detective Rich and Christopner Waldron’s
compelled appearance before the grand
jury. The court, however, found that
Rich’s testimony was not a valid source of
taint (491). With respect to Waldron, who
testified that petitioner Grim had planned
to meet him at a party which Grim failed
to attend, the court concluded that Grim’s
failure to meet Waidron as planned did not
substantiate the charges in any
significant way (493). The court went on

to conclude that “harmless error is

The court cited Byrd, which

appears to be a reference to
, 765

F.2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1985).

21

applicable if, even without the immunized
testimony, the People would have acted
exactly as they dia."* (495).

On appeal, the Appellate Division of
the Supreme Court of the State of New
York, First Department, affirmed the
judgment of the trial court (App. A). In
its affirmance, the court directed only
one paragraph to the Kastigar issue and
stated that "(t)he operative facts
relative to the incident and the parties
involved in the altercation were known
prior to the time the Internal Affairs
Division interviewed defendants, at least
one of whom had previously been identified

from a photo array." (Id. ) The court

The court cited Gallo, which
may be a reference to either

United States v. Gallo, 859
F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1988) or

United States v. Gallo, 863
F.2d 185 (2d Cir.), cert.

denied, 489 U.S. 1083 (1988).
22

VTi

remand,

sentenced to a

between

ot

one and

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I.
BY FAILING TO CONSIDER THE STATE’S
NONEVIDENTIARY USE OF IMMUNIZED
TESTIMONY, THE STATE COURTS PERMITTED
THE VIOLATION OF PETITIONERS’ FIFTH
AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION IN CONTRADICTION TO
THIS COURT’S HOLDING IN KASTIGAR V.
UNITED STATES AND THE HOLDINGS OF

SEVERAL COURTS OF APPEALS.

In Kastigar v. United States, 406
U.S. 441 (1972), this Court upheld the
constitutionality of the federal
testimonial immunity statute because,
although it compelled testimony, the

statute conveyed immunity from the use and

derivative use of compelled testimony. ®

The immunity statute, 18 U.S.C.
§6002, provides in relevant

part that “no testimony or other
information compelled under the
order (or any information
directly or indirectly derived
from such testimony or other
information) may be used

against the witness in any

criminal case." Kastigar,
406 U.S. at 460.

24

This Court held that such immunity was
coextensive with the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination and
that in any subsequent prosecution of the
witness, the government must meet a heavy
burden to show a legitimate independent
source for its evidence. Id. at 460-461.

Since Kastigar, the courts of appeals
have sharply divided on the issue of
whether nonevidentiary use of compelled
testimony violates the Fifth Amendment
privilege. United States v. North, 910
F.2d 843, 857, modified, reh’g denied, in
part, en banc, United States v. North, 920

F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990). In this case,
both the trial court and the appellate
court finding that the state satisfied its

heavy burden under Kastigar, without

having considered the state’s
nonevidentiary use of petitioners’
immunized statements, is contrary to

25

specific holdings of the Third, Eighth and
Eleventh Circuits. United States v.
Hampton, 775 F.2d 1479, 1490-91 (11th Cir.
1985); United States v. Semkiw, 712 F.2d
891, 895 (3rd Cir. 1983); United States v.
McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305, 311 (8th Cir.
1973); see also United States v. Dornau,
359 F.Supp. 684, 687 (S.D.N.¥. 1973),
rev'd on other grounds, 491 F.2d 47 (2d
Cir. 1974). Compare United States v.
Serrano, 870 F.2d 1, 16 (list Cir. 1989);
United States v. Mariani, 851 F.2d 595,
600-01 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490

U.S. 1011 (1989); United States v.
Crowson, 828 F.2d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir.

1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1427 (1988);
United States v. Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524 (11th
Cir. 1985) (all holding nonevidentiary use

to be either permissible or permissible if

26

no evidentiary use).’ Recently, the D.C.
Circuit expressed uncertainty as _ to
whether Kastigar prohibits nonevidentiary
use and assumed without deciding that such
use is impermissible. North, 910 F.2d at
858-860. The uncertainty regarding the
constitutionality of nonevidentiary use,
evidenced by the division of the circuits,
has left the district and state courts
unclear as to whether nonevidentiary use
must be considered in determining whether

the government has met its burden under

Kastigar.®

Therefore, it 1s apparent that

whether Kastigar or the Fifth Amendment

The different holdings of Byrd
and Hampton also evidences a
split within the Eleventh
Circuit.

Even the courts of appeals
which have not prohibited
nonevidentiary use of compelled
testimony have stated that it
is a difficult question.

Serrano, 870 F.2d at 16;
Crowson, 828 F.2d at 1430.

2?

prohibits nonevidentiary use is a question
which warrants resolution by this Court.
Here, the state appellate court
incorrectly affirmed the trial court’s
Kastigar hearing decision because the
trial court found only two possible
sources of taint. The courts failed to
consider the significant nonevidentiary
use which resulted from the state’s
extensive exposure and access to the
immunized statements during all phases of
the criminal investigation.
Nonevidentiary use has been defined
to include use of the compelled testimony
in “focusing the investigation, deciding
to initiate prosecution, refusing to plea
bargain, interpreting evidence, planning
cross-examination and otherwise generally
planning trial strategy." McDaniel, 482
F.2d at 311; see also Mariani, 851 F.2d

at 600; Crowson, 828 F.2d at 1430; Byrd,

28

—

765 F.2d at 1530; Semkiw, 712 F.2d at 895.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit has defined nonevidentiary
use to include instances where

{[p)rosecutorial knowledge of the

immunized testimony may help
explicate evidence theretofore
unintelligible, and it may expose as
significant facts once thought
irrelevant (or vice versa).

Compelled testimony could indicate

which witnesses to call, and in what

order. Compelled testimony may be
helpful in developing opening and
closing arguments.

North, 910 F.2d at 858-9.

The definitions of nonevidentiary use
provided by McDaniel and North encompass
the use that the state made of the
petitioners’ immunized testimony in this
case. Through their team of
investigators, the state heard the
petitioners’ immunized testimony, analyzed
them for consistency, attempted to verify

information contained therein, and

discovered the identities of petitioners’

29

alibi witnesses before trial.
Furthermore, the prosecutor was regularly
briefed on the progress of the
investigation and learned the substance of
petitioners’ alibi defense by calling one
of the alibi witnesses to testify before
the grand jury.’ In fact, one investigator
admitted that the petitioners’ imaunized
testimony was used for the purposes of
furthering the investigation.

Such nonevidentiary use is prohibited

under Kastigar, because this Court has

The uses delineated may also
constitute derivative
evidentiary use as the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
has stated that "[o)ne
forbidden use of the immunized
testimony is the identification
of a witness, but other uses of
a citizen’s immunized testimony
“as by presenting the testimony
of grand jury or trial
witnesses that has been derived
from or irfluenced by the
immunized testimony-are equally

forbidden." North, 910 F.2d at
865.

30

|

held that any grant of immunity in
exchange for compelled testimony must be
coextensive with the Fifth Amendment
privilege against seilf-incrimination.
Pillsbury v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 254
(1983). In Kastigar, this Court explained
that the federal testimonial immunity
statute affords the same protection as the
Fifth Amendment privilege as it provides a
"sweeping prohibition of any use, direct
Or indirect, of the compelled testimony
and any information derived therefron,"
and "assur (es) that the compelled
testimony can in no way lead to the
infliction of criminal penalties on the
witness." Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460, 461

(emphasis added).

"
®

While declining to requ

transactional immunity to satisfy the

tne argument that the immunity statute

does not guard against “the subtle ways in

which the compelled testimony may

disadvantage a witness" by stating that
total prohibition on use provides a
comprehensive safeguard, barring the
use of compelled testimony as an
“investigatory lead," and also
barring the use of any evidence
obtained by focusing investigation on
a witness as a result of his
compelled disclosures.

Id. at 460.7° this Court further stated

that a person who is prosecuted after
giving testimony pursuant to a grant of
immunity “is not dependent for the
preservation of his rights upon. the
integrity and good faith of the
prosecuting authorities." Id. Thus, the
nonevidentiary use of compelled testimony,

either subtle or overt, constitutes use in

” The Court of Appeals for the

Eleventh Circuit appears to
ignore this language and has
held that it is premature to
bar nonevidentiary use because
there is not yet an evidentiary
use. Byrd, 765 F.2d at 1531-32.

32

violation of the petitioners’ Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. McDaniel, 482 F.2d at 311
(forbidding all prosecutorial use of
immunized testimony, not merely that which
results in the presentation of evidence
before the jury); Semkiw, 712 F.2d at 895.

Consequently, the failure of the
trial court to consider nonevidentiary use
in determining whether the state satisfied
its heavy burden under Kastigar,
over looked the state’s significant
nonevidentiary use of the petitioners’
immunized statements and allowed the state
to violate the peti. ioners’ Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. As such, the appellate
court erred in affirming the trial court’s
holding because it failed to address or
recognize the impermissible nature of

nonevidentiary use. The appellate court’s

33

silence on the issue, insofar as it may
suggest that the nonevidentiary use which
occurred was insignificant, also
constitutes error because the trial court
did not make a specific finding and
appellate courts may not construe facts in
the government’s favor where it has the
burden of proof. North, 910 F.2d at 855.
Therefore, the petition for a writ of

certiorari should be granted.

It.

AS THE STATE FAILED TO SEGREGATE THE
IMMUNIZED STATEMENTS, THE STATE
COURTS INCORRECTLY HELD THAT THE
STATE HAD MET ITS HEAVY BURDEN UNDER
KASTIGAR BECAUSE SEVERAL COURTS OF
APPEALS HAVE HELD THAT EXTENSIVE
EXPOSURE AND ACCESS CREATES AN
INSURMOUNTABLE BURDEN REQUIRING
DISMISSAL OF THE INDICTMENT.

In interpreting Kastigar, several
courts of appeal have held that such
exposure and access creates an

insurmountable burden of proof for the

34

government. See e.g., Hampton, supra;

SemKkiw, supra; McDaniel, supra.
Therefore, in view of the state’s
significant exposure and access, the

decisions of trial court and the appellate
court are erroneous as the state could not
have satisfied its heavy burden under
Kastigar.

Where the state fails to segregate
the immunized statements, thereby leading
to extensive exposure and access, the
state’s burden of proof is greater because
"the possibility that the government
compromised the defendant’s immunity is
heightened." Semkiw, 712 F.2d at 895; see
also, Hampton, 775 F.2d at 1490; McDaniel,
482 F.2d at 311. The exposure resulting
from the failure to segregate the
immunized testimony causes "an
immeasurable subjective effect" such that

the government’s burden of proof becomes

35

insurmountable. McDaniel, 482 F.2d at
311-312; Hampton, 775 F.2d at 1490. In
the present case there was no such
segregation, nor was it ever attempted,
Since the departmental investigation and
the criminal investigation were
simultaneously conducted by the same unit.
Consequently, dismissal of the indictment
is warranted as a remand would be futile.
Hampton, 775 F.2d at 1491 n.54; McDaniel,
482 F.2d at 312.

Prohibiting nonevidentiary use where
the government compels testimony does not
create transactional immunity, as _ some
courts of appeals have suggested, 11 because
Kastigar specifically allows the
government to prosecute so long as it uses

evidence from legitimate independent

ss Serrano, 870 F.2d at 16;

Crowson, 828 F.2d at 1429;
Byrd, 765 F.2d at 1530.

36

sources. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 461. This
Court has stated that where an individual
is compelled to testify, the immunity
conveyed must be coextensive with the
Fifth Amendment privilege leaving "the
witness and the prosecutorial authorities
in substantially the same position as if
the witness had claimed the Fifth
Amendment privilege." Id. at 462.

In the present case, neither
petitioners nor the prosecution was left
in substantially the same position, as the
state was able to use petitioners
immunized statements both for evidentiary
and nonevidentiary purposes, in violation
of the petitioners Fifth Amendment
privilege. The state had significant
exposure to petitioners’ immunized
testimony by virtue of the fact that the
individuals who conducted the criminal

investigation simultaneously acted as the

37

departmental investigators who compelled
petitioners’ testimony.

The Second and Third Circuits have
stated that the government can easily
protect the witness’ immunized statements
by taking measures to segregate the
statements from the prosecution. Semkiw,
712 F.2d at 895 (suggesting reassignment
of the case); United States v. Schwimmer,
882 F.2d 22, 26 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating
that it may be necessary to construct a
"Chinese Wall" to adequately guard against
the use of immunized statements’. in
violation of the fifth amendment). These
measures may take the form of segregation
and in the present case, the government
need only have created a separate criminal
investigative unit. Requiring protective
procedures imposes no new burden on the
government, because where the government

decides to compel testimony pursuant to a

38

grant of immunity, it decides that it
values the testimony more than

prosecution. North, 910 F.2d 862. In so

deciding, the government "must understand
that the Fifth Amendment and Kastigar mean
that it is taking a great chance that the
witness cannot constitutionally be
indicted or prosecuted." Id. In the case
at bar, the state attempted to preserve
both its interest as an employer and as a
prosecutor. This it cannot do within the

constraints of Kastigar or the Fifth

Amendment. Therefore, because the state
utilized the petitioners’ immunized
statements, the decisions of the trial
court and the —_ court cannot
stand.

Furthermore, dismissal of the
indictment may be warranted because it may
be the only remedy as it is the use of

immunized testimony that is_ prohibited

39

under the Fifth Amendment and Kastigar.
See North, 910 F.2d at 869; see also

United States v. Kurzer, 534 F.2d 511, 516
(2d Cir. 1976) (Fifth Amendment is by its
terms an exclusionary rule). There is no
independent violation that can be remedied
by the exclusionary rule and "the
indictment becomes indistinguishable from
the constitutional and statutory
transgression." Id. at 869. Under these
circumstances, the state’s prosecution of
the petitioners violated Kastigar and the
petitioners’ Fifth Amendment privilege.
In the present case, the state courts

failed to recognized the significant of

the fact that the petitioners’ immunized

12 Mere denials that it did not

use the statements are
insufficient to satisfy the
burden that it had legitimate
independent sources. Hampton,

775 F.2d at 1489; McDaniel,
482 F.2d at 312.

40

testimony would not have been available to
the prosecution if the departmental
investigators who compelled the testimony
had not acted as the criminal
investigators. Thus, the state was faced
with an insurmountable burden of proof
such that, even if the trial court had
considered the state’s nonevidentiary use,
the state could not have satisfied its
heavy burden under Kastigar and the
indictment should have been dismissed.

Therefore, because the state prosecuted
the petitioners without proving an
independent legitimate source for its
evidence, in violation of petitioners’
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, the petition for a writ of

certiorari should be granted.

41

Conclusion
For the reasons’ stated, it is
respectfully requested that the Court
grant the petition for a writ of

certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

Richard A. Dienst
Dienst & Serrins

225 Broadway

New York, N.Y. 10007
(212) 406-1700

Dated: New York, New York
February 25, 1991

APPENODI X

New York Supreme Court

Appellate Division, First Department
Entered October 16, 1990

Kupferman, J.P., Ellerin, Wallach, Smith,
Rubin, JJ.

40857 The People of the State of New
York,
Respondent,
-against-

Peter Grin,
Defendant-Appellant.

40858 The People of the State of New
York,
Respondent,
-against-

Charles Goodacre,
Defendant-Appellant.

Judgments of the Supreme Court, New
York County (Harold Rothwax, J.), both
rendered June 28, 1989, convicting
defendants, after jury trial, of assault
in the second degree, and sentencing each
of them to indeterminate terms of
imprisonment of from 1 to 3 years,

unanimously affirmed. The case is remitted

to the Supreme Court, New York County, for

A-1

further proceedings pursuant to CPL
460.50(5).

Defendants' claim that the prosecution
made derivative use of their immunized

statements is without merit. The evidence

adduced at the Kastigar hearing (Kastigar
v. United States, 406 US 441) established
that the prosecution's evidence was derived
from a legitimate independent’ § source
(Kastigar v. United States, supra; United
States v. North, _— F2d _, 1990 US App
Lexis 12106). The operative facts relative
to the incident and the parties involved in
the altercation were known prior to the
time the Internal Affairs Division
interviewed defendants, at least one of
whom had previously been identified from a
photo array.

The guilt of the defendants herein was

proven beyond a reasonable doubt. At

trial, Grim was identified by the victim

A-2

a

and two eyewitnesses, all of whom had
previously identified him at a lineup.

Nor did the trial court err when it
gave the jury instructions on accessorial
liability. While the single count
indictment did not contain the words
"acting in concert", both defendants were
charged with committing the same assault,
on the same victim, at the same time.
Defendants were convicted for the same
crime for which they were indicted (People
v. Iannone, 45 NY2d 589, 594), and the
court's instructions did not change the
theory of the case as it was presented and
tried.

We also find no merit to the claims
that the trial prosecutor should have been
recused and that the trial court unduly
interjected itself into the proceedings.
Although there was concern at the hearing

that the prosecutor might be a necessary

A-3

witness, defense counsel indicated that she
would not be called, and no showing has
been made that her testimony would have
been relevant to any issue at trial (People
Vv. Paperno, 54 NY2d 294, 302).

While the court indicated some
impatience with the lack of Clarity of
questions addressed to the witnesses and
with the slow pace of the proceedings, its
Criticism was directed at both the
prosecution and the defense, as
appropriate. The questions put to
witnesses by the court constituted largely
reformations of questions put by counsel,
restated to provide greater precision as
to the information sought to be elicited,
with particular attention to the sequence
of events. Without the court's assistance,
the jury could have easily become confused
about which of several similar occurrences

was being discussed. Moreover, no

A-4

—eSESE—t—<“=_=_OSSCS

specific, meaningful objection was raised

during trial (People v. Yut Wai Tom, 53

NY¥2d 44, 56).

Finally, the contention raised by
defendant Grim that the court should have
charged the jury on the defense of
justification is without merit. While the
inconsistency of the asserted alibi defense
does not preclude the right to a

justification charge (People v. Padgett,

60 NY2d 142; People v. Steele, 26 NY2d

526), in view of the severity of the
beating sustained by the complaining
witness, there is no reasonable view of the
evidence, construed most favorably to the
accused, upon which the jury could have
concluded that the defendants' conduct was

justified (Penal Law §35.30(1]); People v.

McManus, 67 NY2d 541, 549). Nor could the
jury have found that the defendants, off

duty police officers at the time of the

A-5

incident, employed force in the course of
making an arrest as no arrest was ever
effected. Indeed, when pressed by the
court, defense counsel could state no
theory which would warrant an instruction
to the jury on the defense of
justification.

We have considered defendants'
remaining claims and find them to be
without merit.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND
ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE
DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

ENTER:
ENTERED OCT 16 1990

FRANCIS X. GALDI

Clerk

—

:

SUPREME COURT ; NEW YORK COUNTY

CRIMINAL TERM PART 56

The People of the State of New York
~against-

Peter Grim and Charles Goodacre

Defendants

Wade Hearing/Kastigar Hearing

Decided May 1, 1988

Trial Record:
The Court: All right, the Court will make
the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law:

The Court finds that on February 21,

1988, that Lieutenant Charles Monahan of

B-1

the Internal Affairs Division of the Police
Department, arrived at the Midtown South
Precinct at about eight o'clock in the
morning.

He had been advised or was advised
when he [469] arrived that there had been
an assault the previous night on February
20, 1988, at Seventh Avenue and 34th
Street, and that off-duty police officers
may have been involved in that assault.

At the precinct with him either at the
time he arrived or shortly after was
Captain Stone, now deceased, Sergeant
Castellano, Police Officer now Detective
Rich, and tective Weeks; Assistant
District Attorney Braver arrived at the
station house at about nine a.m. and
conferred with Captain Stone.

A complainant in the assault was at
the hospital. There was also a witness

from the assault, one Lafayette Bridget.

B-2

Thereafter, Lieutenant Monahan was
advised that they were going to G.O. 15 the
first platoon.

Let me state, for the purpose of this
hearing, that G.O. 15 and P.G. 118-9 have
been utilized interchangeably throughout
this hearing. For the present purpose I
conclude that they have the same legal
force and effect. Apparently G.O. 15 refers
to a General Order 15, subsequently
replaced by what is known presently as
Patrol Guide 118-9.

In that kind of ae situation a
defendant -- withdrawn. [469].

A police officer who is_ being
investigated is advised that if he answers
questions, neither his statement nor any
information or evidence gained by reason
of such statement can be used against him
in any subsequent criminal proceeding.

However, those statements can be used

B-3

against him in relation to subsequent
departmental charges and the Court accepts
for the present purpose of having been
given advisory warnings under 188-9, if the
officer refused to respond he would be
subjected to either suspension or dismissal
from the force.

As I indicated, these two defendants,
Grim and Goodacre quickly became targets,
and they were targets as of the morning of
February 21, 1988.

Lieutenant Monahan had been advised
that they were going to G.O. 15 the first
platoon. The first platoon had been a
platoon that went on duty about eleven-
twenty-five p.m. on February 20th and off
duty at about eight a.m. on February 21st.

Neither Goodacre nor Grim were members
of that first platoon. I accept that, that
whole platoon was G.O. 15'd.

Lieutenant Monahan subsequently spoke

B-4

to Police (471) Officer Grim at Health
Services in Queens on February 22, 1988,
between 12:15 p.m. and 12;45 p.m.

I have a recording of that interview
which is Defense Exhibit C in evidence.
Present at that interview were Captain
Stone and the officer's attorney, one Mr
Macuire. No Miranda warnings were given
to the witnesses at that time.

It is clear that as of the time that
officer Grim was interviewed the police did
not know of Christopher Waldren or Miss
Murphy, and that later on they were
interviewed by police officials, and those
interviews were turned over to the district
attorney at a subsequent time.

The summary of Officer Grim's
statement at that interview was found at
page 16 of the I.A.D. file. It should be
clear that prior to the time when Golden

-- prior to that time when Grim was

B-5

interviewed on February 22nd, that Police
Officer Golden and Sergeant Dean had
already ‘been interviewed and tape
recordings, now People's 7 and 8 in
evidence, were obtained.

They were also interviewed pursuant
to 188-9. Golden and Dean indicated prior
to the interview and thereafter with
Goodacre, that Grim and [(472] Goodacre had
taken lost time at about eight thirty in
the evening of February 20th; that all six
officers, that is, Golden, Dean, Direnzo,
Leone, Grim, and Goodacre, had gone to a
basketball game and after the basketball
game had gone to McAnn's Bar.

In any event, police records were also
-- have indicated that the officers signed
out at about eight thirty in the evening in
order to go to a basketball game, although

those records do not indicate where they

went thereafter.

I find that approximately twelve G.O.
15s were prepared prior to the time that
Officer Grim was interviewed; that nineteen
police officers were interviewed pursuant
to G.O. 15 after Police Officer Grim.

I find that the officers learned
nothing of any substantial use through the
investigation from Officer Grim that they
would not otherwise have learned except for
the possible involvement -- except for the
possible presence of witnesses Waldron and
Murphy at McAnn's Bar, to which I will
address myself later.

Officer Grim basically indicated what
the police officers already knew, that he
had been doing [473] a four-to twelve tour,
that he stopped at eight thirty and took
lost time to go to a basketball game; that
he sat with Golden, that all six thereafter
went to McAnn's Bar.

Thereafter, Officer Grim, on his own

B-7

said that he was at the bar for about an
hour, that he met a friend from Queens,
with his fiance, that he left McAnn's Bar
with Goodacre at about -- withdrawn ==
that he left with Goodacre after about an
hour to go to 36th Street and Ninth Avenue
to get Goodacre's car. That he observed
nothing at 34th Stree* and Seventh Avenue.
And that he denied any involvement in the
altercation that had taken place, which
I.A.D. was investigating.

Sergeant Goodacre was likewise
interviewed, his tape is in evidence as
Defendant's Exhibit A, pursuant to G.O. 15
on February 23, 1988, between three and
three twenty in the afternoon.

I find that both Grim and Goodacre
made their statements under the provisions
of P.G. 118-9, and that they made their
statements understanding that those

statements could not be used against them

in any criminal investigation and that
criminal proceedings -- and that they had
both use and derivative [474] use immunity.

When Serge.int Goodacre was interviewed
-- I believe Sergeant Goodacre's interview
was Defendant's Exhibit D. The Defendant's
Exhibit A is the G.O. 15 which is in
evidence, Defendant's Exhibit B is the tape
recording of Sergeant Goodacre, and he was
accompanied by his attorney, Mr. Fallek at
the time of the interview.

His remarks are found at Page 31 os
{sic} the I.A.D. file.

Like Officer Grim, he indicated that
he had been doing a four-to-twelve tour and
that he stopped at about eight thirty for
a basketball game. That he went with five
others thereafter to McAnn's Bar. That he
stayed at the bar for forty five minutes to
an hour, that he left with officer Grin,

and basically he indicated what Officer

B-9

Grim had said before him, that they went to
36th Street and Ninth Avenue, that Grim
drove Goodacre's car because Goodacre was
not feeling well, and he also denied
involvement in the altercation.

Lieutenant MOnahan [sic] indicated
that he was aware prior to the interview
of both Grim and Goodacre that pictures of
these officers had been identified [474]
by the people on the corner at the time of
the incident, and by people in the
emergency room at St. Vincent's Hospital,
who were there with regard to Officer
Leone.

The tape which had been interrupted
at about 322, resumed at that time, shortly
thereafter, and went on until 325 and
Sergeant Goodacre continued to deny any
involvement in the incident.

Lieutenant Monahan knew before the

interviews with these defendants that all

B-10

six of these officers had gone to the
busketball game and had taken off early.

They knew that a witness had said that
Golden may have been involved in the
assault on the complainant, and they had
information regarding what the assailants
were wearing at the time of the assault on
Mr. Vogelsang.

They knew the complainant had reported
that he had been involved with an
altercation with six to eight male whites,
that he threw a bottle and ran. The bottle
struck an individual, that he was then
[476] thrown down and beaten.

They knew chat -- they knew of Rodney
Grant. The complainant, Mr. Vogelsang, had
asked Mr. Grant to give him a hand, and
Rodney Grant had picked up a two-by-four
and hit one of the white men involved in
the assault upon Mr. Vogelsang.

Officer Golden and Sergeant Dean were

B-11

present in the precinct at eight a.m. on
February 2ist. I have listened to the
tapes of their conversation with the
Lieutenant. They are in evidence as
People's 7 and 8.

Additionally, Lieutenant Monahan had
checked the log book, checked roll call,
checked the record of the station house,
which showed that all six were granted lost
time, four hours of lost time, they got off
about eight thirty p.m. Dean and Golden,
as I have indicated, basically indicated
about the lost time and going to the
basketball game, and then to McAnn's Bar.

Sergeant Dean indicated that at the
bar he had met a friend named Ray Durand.

Dean indicated that there came a time
when he saw the complainant in a cab at the
location of the assault, saw Golden with
the arrested person, heard [476a]} Leone had

been injured, and he returned to the

B-12

<<

precinct with Golden.

Rodney Grant was at the precinct under
arrest for the assault on Leone, and
Lafayette Bridgett was also in the
precinct.([477].

Grant would have been arrested on --

for the assault on Leone, was interviewed
on February 21st shortly before noontime at
the precinct where he indicated that he had
seen the complainant being beaten by three
“to four, or four to five, persons, white
males, and believed that Golden, his
arresting officer, was one of then.

He recounted the events leading up to
ths assault upon the complainant and his
obtaining a two-by-four with which he hit
Police Officer Leone and his arrest by
Golden.

Assistant District Attorney Braver did
the questioning of Mr. Grant. Bridgett was

also interviewed on February 21st at 10:25

B-13

SS

a.m. in the precinct and he was interviewed
by Sgt. Chartier and Capt. Kincaid, and he
also recounted the events leading up to the
assault by Grant on Officer Leone.

There was also a George Hewitt at the
station house that morning. George Hewitt
was a cab driver who spoke to Sgt. Chartier
and Capt. Kincaid regarding observing the
beating and that one of the persons had
said he was a cop. [478]

He was a male white, in plain clothes,
with a green army jacket, and the cab
driver assisted Mr. Vogelsang.

Capt. Kincaid also spoke to Officer
Leone on February 21st at the Hospital and
reported that Leone's statement had been
basically the same as Golden's.

Lt. Monahan as a result of these
interviews decided to prepare photo arrays
on February 21 and prepared those photo

arrays from the police department files.

B-14

Photos of all of the six officers who
had taken lost time in regards to the
basketball game were included in order to
show those photos to the complainant, Mr.
Vogelsang, Mr. Hewitt and Mr. Bridget, and
also they were utilized for canvass
purposes on February 2lst.

As a result of the canvass on February
21st, persons were located at the
frankfurter store at the location of the
assault. A Mr. Nelson, a Mr. Morero, and
a witness, Patten, were also located at the
frankfurter store. I believe it is alsoa
Nathan's.

Officer Sheehan and Egan were also all
[479] interviewed on February 2lst.

Officer Leone had been removed to St.
Vincent's Hospital.

Lt. Monahan asserted, and I accept for
present purposes, that he never gave the

information he had obtained from Officers

B-15

Grim and Goodacre as a result of the
P.G.118-9 of these two defendants to the
district attorney, and that Capt. Stone had
directed that the G.0.15 of these two
defendants not be disclosed, and Monahan
obeyed that.

Lineups were conducted involving both
of these defendants on April 20th, 1988,
at Poplar Street in Brooklyn, the I.A.D.
headquarters, about 4:00 in the afternoon
for each of these defendants. Those
lineups were viewed by Mr. Johnson and by
the complainant.

I find the procedures utilized were
appropriate. The witnesses were told not
to discuss the matter with each other.
They were brought to the lineup separately.

There were six people in each lineup.

Attorneys were present for each of the

defendants who could have objected. Each

{480} defendant chose his number and his

B-16

position in the lineup.

People's Exhibit 3 is the photo of the
lineup of Sgt. Goodacre in which he is
number 3 in that lineup, and People's
number 4 is the photo of a lineup of
Officer Grim in which he is number 2 in
that lineup.

The witnesses were asked separately,
did they recognize anyone. Mr. Johnson
indicated separately, yes; he represented
he recognized in one lineup Sgt. Goodacre,
number 3, and Officer Grim, number 2.

The same process was repeated with Mr.
Vogelsang and he made the same
identification.

I do find that the I.A.D. file was
made available to Assistant District
Attorney Braver in April of 1988, prior to
the Grand Jury in May of 1988, but that not
included in that I.A.D. file were pages 16

and 31, which were the summaries of the

B-17

Grim and Goodacre worksheets, and also page
21, which is simply a duplicate of page 16.

I find that there did come a time that
the investigation by the police department,
in which [481] two bartenders from McAnn's
were spoken (cto, one Brody and one
Fitzgerald, and information derived from
those interviews was conveyed to the
Assistant District Attorney Braver.

Lt. Kid testified as well, February
23 he went to the hospital with Assistant
District Attorney Braver and Officer Rich
interviewed the complainant and showed a
photostat of the police department
identification photos which included Police
Officer Grim, and Lt. Kid's memory of this
was not as clear as that of now Detective
Rich, whose recollection was far more clear
about that. And I will go into that in a
moment.

He indicated that the I.A.D. unit is

B-18

aware that G.O. 15 information was not to
be disclosed to the district attorney, that
no one ever asked him for G.0O. 15s
regarding these defendants, that the I.A.D.
folder is kept in the file cabinet and he
was not present in the G.O. 15s of these
two defendants.

Det. Rich did testify that she was on
Midtown South on February 21st, 1988, with
Det. Weeks at about 10 a.m. She was
present at the interview with Rodney Grant
conducted by Assis- [482] tant District
Attorney Braver. She prepared a worksheet
and statement which the defendant signed,
and made a taped statement of the statement
that he made.

She also interviewed Toussaint
Vogelsang February 23, 1988, with Lt. Kid
and Assistant District Attorney Braver.
She indicated that a photo array consisting

of six separate folders, each with six

B-19

separate photographs, was prepared, one
folder containing a photo of Sgt. Goodacre;
that before showing the photo arrays to the
complainant, they first asked the
complainant fer descriptions. The
complainant gave descriptions of the two
persons and couldn't identify two others.

People's Exhibit 5 now in evidence is
one of the six folders which contains
photos of Police Office Grim in which he
is number 2 in that photo. That folder was
shown to Mr. Vogelsang and he was asked if
he recognized anybody and he said, yes,
number 2 was one of the assailants, and
additionally he initialed that photo or
that portion of the photo right near that
photo. [483]

People's 6 is also one of the six
folders in which a photo of Sgt. Goodacre
appears and is photo number 4, and the

complainant likewise identified that photo

B-20

and initialed it.

Det. Rich also indicated that she
never told Assistant District Attorney
Braver of the contents of the 188-9
interviews of these defendants.

She did indicate that she interviewed
Christopher Waldron and that the summary
of that appears on page 17 of the I.A.D.
folder; that she interviewed him. on
February 22nd; that Mr. Waldron indicated
that he knew Police Officer Grim, that he
was at the basketball game with Ms. Murphy,
his fiance, and that Grim invited he,
Waldron, to a party at the Hyatt Hotel, and
that therefore he dropped off his fiance at
the train station and went to the Hyatt
Hotel, but he didn't see Officer Grim at
the hotel.

He testified, that is, Waldron
testified before the Grand Jury, and I will

make further reference to his testimony

B-21

later.

Assistant Chief Frank Corsello
testified he [484] is now retired from the
police department, as one of July 1988, he
was assistant chief of I.A.D and indicated
there had been six C.I.U. teams under him
during the time that he served as
assistant chief; that in February of 1988
a 118-9 was in effect and applicable to
Goodacre and Grim; that there was no
written or hard and fast policy regarding
separation of C.I.U. teams or modules with
regard to those involved in a criminal
investigation; that there had been such a
practice in certain cases where there was
an indictment or an indictment was imminent
-- it is not relevant in this situation;
and that there was no requirement or policy
that would have required the separation to
which the defense attorneys have alluded in

this kind of case under the circumstances

B-22

at the time that the 188-9s were given to
Grim and Goodacre; that he did confer, or
it was common, that the I.A.D would confer
with the assistant district attorney
regarding the use of G.O. 15s, and if the
D.A. had no objection then they would use
G.O. 15.

The police department would not
necessarily [{485]) defer to the assistant
district attorney generally dependent on
the seriousness of the charges. Ultimately
it would be the Deputy Commissioner of
Legal Affairs to decide whether the G.0.15s
would be released. He does not have a
present recollection of whether or not he
had conferred with the legal affairs
commissioner in this particular matter.

Det. Eng of the I.A.D also testified
that on February 22nd, 1988, he became
involved in this investigation; that he

went to the Civil Complaint Review Board

B-23

regarding Officers Grim and Goodacre, and
that he compiled the photo display arrays
that were ultimately shown.

He also participated in an interview
with Ray Durand on February 26th, and he
went with Lt. Monahan for that purpose.

Sgt. Polacino of I.A.D. also testified
primarily that he escorted witnesses to the
lineup and back, that he knew of interviews
of the defendants, G.0.15s of these
defendants, but did not know of their
substance, and that he had not had any
contact with the assistant district
attorney. (486)

He served subpoenas on the witnesses
for the lineup, he did sit it on 118-9
interviews with other police officers, but
not these police officers [sic}.

He indicated that there was an
unwritten procedure with regard to 118-9s,

that 118-9 interviews would be separate

B-24

from other criminal investigations, to
preserve the integrity of the
investigation.

Det. Sorrentino of I.A.D. indicated
that Lt. Monahan was his superior, that on
February 22nd of 1988 he was deing a 4 to
12 tour, and that at that time he went to
the scene on 34th Street and Seventh Avenue
to do a canvass of the area with photo
arrays, including the arrays containing the
pictures of Grim and Goodacre; that he
interviewed certain witnesses from the
canvass, and he was not present at the G.O.
15 on [sic) either Officer Grim or Sgt.
Goodacre. He did review, however, the G.O.
15 of Officer Grim shortly after February
22nd.

Some time between February 22 and
February 29 he learned about Christine
Murphy from Lt. Monahan and knew that

Officer Grim had mentioned (487) Ms.

B-25

Murphy. And he interviewed Ms. Murphy on
February 25 along with Lt. Monahan.

He also knew of Chris Waldron from the
G.O. 15 of Officer Grim, but Mr. Waldron
had previously indicated Det. Rich
interviewed Mr. Waldron. He reviewed the
worksheet of the G.0.15 interviews of both
defendants but had not listened to the
tapes. He did not go to McAnn's Bar as a
result of the G.O. 15 of Sgt. Goodacre.
He received daily updates from Lt. Monahan
and he would have a number of conversations
with A.D.A. Braver.

He indicated that when the Grand Jury
was about to receiving [sic] evidence in
late April the assistant district attorney
had requested G.O. 15s of other police
officers, not these two defendants, and he
did not testify before the Grand Jury.

He did show photo arrays to various

civilians on F. sruary 22nd and showed photo

B-26

arrays to Greg Nelson, who was one of the
workers in the frankfurter store, and also
to Rodney Johnson on February 27. By the
photo arrays, it means the six folders,
each containing six [488] photographs, for
a total of 36 photos.

He asked when he showed those photos,
do you recognize anyone, and he indicated
that Nelson picked out Officer Grim. Also
showed photo array to Rodney Johnson.

He interviewed witnesses who made
identification after the lineup. He was
not present to [sic] the lineup when they
were conducted.

All right. Those are my findings of
fact. And let me deal initially with the
weight [sic][(Wade] aspect of the hearing.

I have looked at the photo arrays
which are in evidence, and I find them to
have been extremely fair.

The argument had been made by Mr.

B-27

Dienst with regard to the photo arrays that
his client is an Asian-American and that it
was therefore an unfair photo array because
Mr. Dienst alleges that Sgt. Goodacre was
the only male Asian-American in the photo
array.

I have previously said during the
hearing, and I will repeat now, that Sgt.
Goodacre may or may not be an Asian-
American, and indeed if Sgt. Goodacre had
been put in the photo array with six other
Asian-Americans, it seems to me it would
have been an unfair photo array precisely
because he does not look Asian-American.
That would have been an unfair photo array,
to have put him in a photo array with five
other people whom he did not look like.

As does appear in this photo array
that I have seen in this case, it was a
fair photo array.

Additionally, it seems clear to me

B-28

that Sgt. Goodacre appears to me to have
white skin. I don't hold myself out to be
an expert, but neither are the witnesses
who viewed these arrays lineup experts, and
it seems to me, as I have indicated, if he
were in a photo array with five other
Asian-Americans, he would stand out. He
did not stand out in this photo array.

And this photo array, as was the photo
array involving Police Officer Grim, was a
fair photo array, fair and non-suggestive.

Similarly, in the lineup photos which
were available to me, I find that the
persons in the lineup bore similar physical
characteristics with (490) regard to each
of these defendants, and that there was
nothing about the lineup makeup that was
either unfair or suggestive.

Similarly, I find that the procedures
followed by the police officer both during

the showing of the photo arrays and during

B-29

the administration of the lineups were fair
and non-suggestive, and the motion to
suppress the pre-trial identifications is
denied.

Now, the law is relatively clear with
regard to the Kastigar aspect of this
particular case.

First, I do find, as I indicated
during the hearing, that the defendants
have carried their burden of going forward,
that is, that they have demonstrated that
they made statements or testified under a
grant of immunity to matters concerning the
prosecution.

And having done that, the People have
the burden of showing that their evidence
is not tainted, by establishing that they
had an independent legitimate source for
the disputed evidence which is wholly
independent of the compelled testimony.

Perhaps before going further with this

B-30

|

[491] aspect of the case, I ought to
address myself to the Grand Jury minutes.

I have read -- I have reviewed the
Grand Jury minutes in their entirety as
submitted to me by Ms. Braver, and there
are two possible sources of taint that
arise.

The first relates to the testimony of
Det. Rich of the I.A.D. Rich's testimony
before the Grand Jury did not include any
statements by these defendants on any
information derived from G.O. 15s. She
primarily testified about statements made
to her by a Mr. Grant and the
identification of Grim and Goodacre by
Johnson and the complainant. That
testimony did not contribute otherwise to
identifying either police officers [sic]
as the assailants.

I don't find that to be a valid sourcé

of taint in regard to either the trial or

B-31

the grand Jury minutes.

The second possible source of taint
relates to Mr. Waldron, Chris Waldron, Mr.
Waldron in his testimony. And I find that
his identity was ascertained from Officer
Grim. He was unable to say what Grim wore
on February 20th when he left [492) the
bar, or who he left with.

He did place Grim in the bar from
11:30 to 12:20 a.m., as did other police
officers, and, parenthetically, I am
advised he probably will be an alibi
witness for Officer Grim and possibly
Officer Goodacre at the time of the trial.

He also testified that, although Grim
arranged to meet him at a party at the
Hyatt Hotel after leaving the bar, Grim was
not present when he arrived at 1 a.m.,
according to Grim's brother.

The Grand Jury was instructed by the

district attorney to disregard this

B-32

statement as hearsay.

Waldron stated that he waited for 20
minutes at the Hyatt and he Ileft.
Obviously this might incriminate Grim since
he did not appear as planned. However, it
adds nothing material to prove the crime.

_ There are myriad {[sic} innocent

explanat‘ons for Grim's failure to appear
at the hotel. The inference that he was
in fact there at the time is also left
open.
[493] I do not believe, given the district
attorney's instructions to disregard the
brother's statement to Mr. Waldron, that
this contributed in any manner to the
indictment.

Disregarding Waldron's testimony
altogether, the evidence before the Grand
Jury is sufficient, and Waldron's testimony
does not differ in any respect from that of

other witnesses.

His failure to meet Grim as planned
does not substantiate the charges in any
significant way, although it should be, it
seems to me, excluded at trial.

The other police officers and police
records establish that Goodacre, Grim and
the other four signed out at 8 p.m. to
attend the game at Madison Square Garden.

The police officers all concur that
they left the game between 11 and 11:30 and
went to McAnn's, where they remained at
least 20 minutes.

No police officers attended the Hyatt
party or testified about Grim and
Goodacre's movement after leaving the bar.

No one knew what Grim wore.

The civilian witnesses testified that
Grim, [494] Goodacre and two others beat
Toussaint Vogelsang for approximately 15
minutes at about midnight following an

argument and a chase.

B-34

In addition to two positive IDs,
Johnson and Vogelsang, the cab driver
Hewitt gave descriptions matching the
others of Grim and Goodacre.

Officers Golden and Leone testified
that they were present at the fight where
Vogelsang was beaten, but that they could
neither describe nor identify his
assailants.

Leone admitted being struck by
Johnson. Golden arrested Johnson.

A cashier at the Nathan's frankfurter
stand, one Patten, corroborates both
Vogelsang and Johnson. A second
corroborating witnesses was Nelson, a
restaurant manager. Neither of these
witnesses made an identification, however.

The case in no way relies on the
statements of the two defendants.

All right. To return then to the law,

there is not really much in dispute between

B-35

the parties as to what the law is in this
case. It seems to me that it is fairly
Clear, and the only issue is to apply the
law to the facts. [495)

Let me then restate it.

Once the defendants demonstrate, as
these defendants have, that they have
testified under a grant of immunity to
matters relating to the prosecution, the
People have tt.e burden of showing that
their evidence is not tainted, by
establishing that they had an independent
legitimate source for the disputed evidence
wholly independent of the compelled
testimony.

The People's burden has been referred
to as a “heavy burden," but the Byrd case
indicates clearly that heavy burden means
that they must show by a preponderance of
the evidence an independent source for all

of the evidence introduced.

B-36

In effect, the law states that the
witnesses must be left in substantially the
same position as if they claimed the Fifth
Amendment privilege and had never testified
at all.

The Gallo case, a Second Circuit 1988
decision has held that harmless error is
applicable if, even without the immunized
testimony, the People would have acted
exactly as they (496) did.

I am satisfied that the People have
met their burden. It is clear that there
were a large number of independent
legitimate sources wholly independent of
the compelled testimony.

There were the police officers with
whom these defendants went to the
basketball game and thereafter to McAnn's.

There were the complainant and Mr.
Johnson, who are identifying witnesses, and

there were other corroborating witnesses,

B-37

such as Mr. Nelson and Hewitt and Patten.

And, having reviewed the extensive and
lengthy Grand Jury minutes, I am satisfied
that they were in no way dependent upon
anything that these defendants in their
largely exculpatory statements had
indicated in their G.O. 15s.

The unexculpatory part of their
statement placing--placing themselves in
the vicinity and at the time are supplied
by the other four police officers who were
with them at the basketball game and at
McAnn's Bar.

I do however indicate to Ms. Braver,
as I did a moment ago, that it seems to me
that she (497) should not elicit from sr.
Waldron, certainly not on direct cause,
that when he went to the Hyatt Hotel, that
Officer Grim was not present.

The foregoing is the opinion and

decision and order of the Court.

B-38

eee

SENTENCING MINUTES
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.
COUNTY OF NEW YORK,
Criminal Term : Part 56
oe
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF New York,
against
PeTer Gam, CHARLES GOODACRE,
Defendants
Index No. 4300-88
Charge: Aslit. 2
>

100 Centre Street
New York, New York 10013
June 28, 1989
Before

Hon. Harold Rothwax., Justice

Appearances

For the People: Susan Braver, Esq., Assistant District
Attorney

For Defendants: Francis Ganun, Esq. Richard A. Dienst,
bsg

(2) The Clerk: Number 39 on the calendar, Peter Grim
and Charles Goodacre.
Ganun, 118-21 Queens Boulevard, Forest Hills, New York.
Good morning, your Honor.

The Court Good morning.

Mr. Dienst: For defendant Goodacre, Richard A. Dienst,
225 Broadway, New York, New York.

May we approach the bench with the District Attorney”

The Court: If you wish.

(Counsel for both sides approach the Bench in a discus:
sion off the record.)

The Court We'll have a further call so that counsel can

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I've asked the defense attorncys whether or not they wished
an adjournment so that Miss Braver could respond in writ-
img and they've indicated to me that they're content that she
respond orally.

I have reviewed the motions on my own, so I'm familiar
with their contents. Before we hear her response, you may
wish to orally argue in support of that. The defendants can
be seated while we're doing this.

You want to add «© anfthing, Mr. Ganun?

(4) Mr. Ganun: Just to bring the Court's attention, your
Honor, the main thrust of the motion to set aside is that
based upon evidence or material that's in the record, that
there was what we characterize as a Castargar,
CASTARGAR, issue, the Castargar issue became
evident during the course of the trial especially in the sense
that it became admitted that the defendants, as police offi-
cers, were interviewed pursuant to the terms of 118-9 of
the Patrol Guide. They were given assurances that anything
they said and any product of what they had said would not
be used against them.

The District Attorney took the tactic that she did not
want to have specifically the statements of the particular
defendant. She took the complete IAD file save their state-
ments and went on with her preparation for trial.

I brought to the Court's attention the case of Castargar
and also the case of McDaniel, your Honor, which seems to
stand for the proposition that if the evidence as given to the
prosecution is tainted by the former use of immunized
testimony, that that taint, even if it’s indirect—we (5) main-
tain that the taint in this case was direct but certainly was
imelirect in the sense that Mr. Grim made a statement. In the
statement he said as to what his activities were on February
20th, 1988, where he went, who he met.

As a@ result of that statement, the District Attorney,
through its investigators, could go out and check out and
interview these individuals whom he claimed he met, which

C-3

they did. That statement led to the ability of the District
Attorney to form or shape her prosecution in this case.

As the case of McDaniels points out, if the taint is even
indirect and even if it forms the basis of the prosecution's
tactics in the prosecution of the case, then the remedy
should be a dismissal of the indictment and therefore, your
Honor, based upon my statement here and my notice of
motion which have been submitted to the Court, |
respectfully request that the indictment in this case be
dismissed and that the conviction be set aside.

The Court: All right. The record should reflect that
before the trial in this matter, the case had been referred to
me for Wade and Castargar (6) hearings and that a full
Castargar hearing was held in this matter and | was satis-
fied that Castargar and its progeny did not preclude this
prosecution from going forward. It seems to me, it’s not
necessary to repeat the record that was made at that time.
Nothing that subsequently occurred at the trial did anything
to, in my judgment, undermine the validity of the ruling
that I rendered at the end of that hearing.

Did you wish to respond at this point in time, Miss
Braver?

Ms. Braver: With respect to the Castargar hearing, your
Honor, People’s position remains what it was at the ime of
the hearing and we maintain that the use immunity which
was granted to the defendants was honored and that
nothing that occurred during the course of this trial abro-
gated his Fifth Amendment privileges as found in Cas-
targar or in rulings in cases of this jurisdiction.

With respect to the other statements made in Mr.
Ganun’s motion to set aside the verdict, | believe they
reiterate the facts which were heard at trial and heard by
the jury and I will not (7) respond to them at this point.
Clearly, suffice it to say, the jury found those facts that they
regarded as compelling and convicted the defendant

C-4

accordingly and we believe that the motion to set aside the
verdict should not be granted.

The Court: Mr. Dienst, do you wish to be heard?

Mr. Dienst: Yes, your Honor. Throughout this entire trial,
any application made on behalf of the defendant Grim or
any motion made on behalf of the defendant Grim was
deemed to be made on behalf of Goodacre. Mr. Ganun has
moved pursuant to Section 330.30 subdivision | and |
would adopt that motion and—

The Court: I have no problem with your doing so.

Mr. Dienst: —and Mr. Ganun has indicated to me that
for the 440 motion which | have made, he adopts the
positions that I take on behalf of Police Officer Grim in
connection therewith. | will not repeat the arguments that |
raised in connection with General Order 15 on the issucs
that were decided by the Court at the Castargar-type hear-
ing. They are fully set forth in my notice of (8) motion.

However, in addition to that, I believe that the verdict
should be set aside under the following grounds: First, the
defendant was charged in a single count with assault in the
second degree. Neither the grand jury nor the District
Attorney charged these defendants with acting in concert.
However, during the course of the trial, it was the People’s
theory and the Court, over objection, charged that the
defendants were acting in concert.

I respectfully submit, your Honor, that it was error for the
Court to charge acting in concert when the jury in fact—the
grand jury in fact had not found that they had been acting in
concert or acting in any form of conspiratorial manner. At
no time did the District Attorney move to amend the indict-
ment, nor, in my opinion, would such an application to
amend the indictment have been appropriate. Nowhere in
any of the discovery material was there any indication that
these defendants acted in concert. Basically, the case as
tried constituted a different theory and the case submitted
to the jury constituted a different charge than that which

C-5

was (9) set forth in the indictment by the grand jury. Most
respectfully, neither the Court nor the District Attorney can
substitute its jedgment for the judgment of the grand jury as
to what the charge may be in a particular case.

In addition to that, this verdict should be set aside upon
the grounds that the People failed to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt the intent of the defendant, Charles
Goodacre, to inflict serious physical injury on Toussaint
Vogelsang. nor was there any direct proof that Charles
Goodacre inflicted any serious physical injury upon Tous-
saint Vogelsang, nor was there any proof that it was Good-
(sic).

I don't wish to go through the testimony of the trial. Your
Honor’s recollection of it, I'm sure, is equal to if not better
than my recollection but just as to one or two salient items.

Let us disregard for a moment, if we may, the alibi
defense that was raised during the course of the trial which
obviously was rejected by the jury. Let us assume, therefore,
that Grim and Goodacre (10) were the persons who al-
legedly committed this assault. Testimony of the complain-
ant, Mr. Vogelsang, clearly indicated that a tall blondhaired
individual! was the one who struck him in the jaw at the first
encounter and at that pointed, fractured his jaw. He also
testified that others, somewhere between four to six or at
times six to cight others, tried to refrain or restrain that tall
blond individual from further engaging in an altercation
with Mr. Vogelsang.

The testimony thereafter, some twenty minutes later, Mr.
Vogelsang came back and I think his testimony was that he
was seeking vengeance, that he had obtained a broken
broom handle and that he went after the persons who he
had met in the previous encounter with the full intent of
striking them with a broom handle in order to get ven-
geance. Again, the testimony was vague.

C-6

There was no testimony beyond a reasonable doubt to
establish that it was the defendant Goodacre who had any
intent or who in fact did inflict any serious physical injury
upon the complainant Vogelsang. Assuming for the pur-
poses of this argument but clearly not admitting that (11)
Goodacre was present, the indications are that it was Good-
acre who attempted to intercede and prevent any fight,
intercede and prevent any altercation that occurred in the
street. The evidence shows that it was only after Vogelsang
attempted to attack whoever the group of individuals were
with a broom handle that a fight in the street ensued but
there has been no definitive evidence showing that this
defendant inflicted any serious physical injury.

Now, aside from the failure of proof of the People to
establish as a matter of law the guilt of this defendant
beyond a reasonable doubt for that charge, we have another
significant reason why this indictment should be dismissed
and why the motion to set aside the verdict should be
granted.

Prior to your Honor’s charge to the jury, I requested a
charge of justification. Although the defense of alibi was
raised, | submitted to your Honor that the jury could choose
to disbelieve the alibi defense and that the defense of
justification would be appropriate based upon the evidence
that was educed at the trial and most particularly, based
upon the testimony of Toussaint Vogelsang, (12) that in the
second incident he was the aggressor. -

Again, most respectfully, your Honor, I submit the Court
in its charge to the jury and its refusal to charge justifica-
tion, committed reversible error which mandates this Court
in the first instance to correct its error, set aside the verdict
and grant the defendants a new trial based upon that issue.

I will not at this particular point in time go into what is
raised in the motion papers as to what | consider, again
most respectfully in my position as a defense attorney, to be

C-7

prejudicial conduct on behalf of the Court. They are con-
tained in my motion papers and need not be repeated at this
i point in time.

The Court: Okay.

Mr. Dienst: Based upon the totality of the circumstances
and the other issues raised in the motion, | join Mr. Ganun
to set aside the verdict in this particular case.

The Court: You want to respond, Miss Braver?

Ms. Braver: Your Honor, | appreciate the opportunity
afforded to respond orally in the case and the courtesy.

With regard to the first point raised by (13) Mr. Dienst,
the grand jury clearly had al! the evidence before it that was
apparent at trial as well and there was clearly no change in
the theory of the prosecution from the time it was presented
to the grand jury until the time it was presented to the petit
jury in this case. When the grand jury voted on that evi-
dence, it clearly found and charged that both these defend-
ants were actually intending to cause serious physical
injury and that is exactly what the petit jury found as well
and the law clearly reflects the culpability attendant to the
acts of one who is found to act with the intent to cause
serious physical injury when in fact such injury results.

I believe the evidence at trial throughout and the evi-
dence replete throughout the entire IAD file which was
available for many many months prior to counsel and
which was in their possession reflect the theory of the
prosecution always was that these two defendants were

acting together throughout the incident up to and including
the point in time during which Mr. Vogelsang was beaten.
Therefore, I believe that the charge regarding acting in
concert was perfectly consonant with the evidence (14)
before the petit jury, as well as with the evidence before the
grand jury and therefore, there was no change in theory
which would require cither a dismissal of the indictment or
which would preclude the Court from reviewing the evi-

C-8

dence on a reasonable basis from assuming the grand jury
intended exactly that, as well as the fact that they both
acted as principals.

With regard to counsel's argument that the there was no
proof beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to Mr. Good-
acre’s involvement in striking of the complainant, the beat-
ing, it was indicated to the jury the beating took place for
approximately seven to ten minutes. It was also clear from
the testimony of Toussaint Vogelsang that he implicated
Mr. Grim was participating in that beating throughout.

It also was indicated by Rodnacy Johnson that he was
positive that the defendant Goodacre participated in that _
beating throughout his opportunity to view Mr. Goodacre.~
Officers Golden and Leone clearly said there were only two
people involved in the beating of Mr. Vogelsang.

The complainant did not appear to be injured (15) to
either Mr. Johnson or to Mr. Greg Nelson when he returned
to 34th Street where the second confrontation took place.
He certainly—Mr. Vogelsang himself is certainly not quali-
fied to determine at what moment in time an injury such as
a fracture to the jaw occurred. That was certainly not the
only injury that he suffered nevertheless. In fact, Mr.
Vogelsang said he was all right when he returned to 34th
Street to get his belongings.

Clearly, all his injuries were suffered during the course of
the beating by the two individuals whom the jury, on the
basis of substantial evidence, found to be these two defend-
ants. I believe that, therefore, there was ample evidence for
them to have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr.
Goodacre as well as Mr. Grim intended to cause serious
physical injury to Mr. Vogelsang and did so.

With regard to the third charge that Mr. Dienst raises as
to his motion to set aside the verdict, he believes and he
asserts that the charge of justification should have been
given upon his request to the jury. | believe that there is no

c-9

reasonable ground in the evidence, no reasonable (16) basis
in the evidence, to determine—for the Court to have found
that a charge of that kind was warranted. The evidence at
trial in fact established that Mr. Vogelsang was not the
initial aggressor, that he had returned to 34th Street to get
his belongings and even if he possessed a stick at that ume,
was going there with the intent to defend himself in the
event that another assault was made upon him by a group
of persons, he being alone at the time to his own belief and
the evidence demonstrated that these defendants rushed
Mr. Vogelsang at the time that he was holding that stick and
that he did not in fact swing with that stick, if in fact he did
so, unul such time as he was rushed by what he believed to
be an excess of two persons at that time and certainly, as he
described it, at the very least, the first two people under the

Therefore, | don't believe there's any basis in the evi-
dence to dem—to in—to warrant a charge of justification.
Mr. Vogelsang at no time was the initial aggressor, nor at
any time possesse | the degree of force which would have
required cither of these two gentlemen to act (17) cither in
self-defense or in defense of another. Therefore, | believe
that those grounds in support of the motion to set aside the
verdict are insufficient to warrant such an action by the
Court and as to the other grounds which are alleged in the
papers, the Court was present throughout and I do not
believe that any of those other grounds, including the alle-
gation that counsel was prejudiced by any actions by the
Court, have merit and does not require the drastic action of
setting aside a verdict which was properly found upon
sufficient evidence by a petit jury in this case.

Therefore, the People believe that the entire motion, the
motion in its entirety to set aside the verdict should be
denied.

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The Court: All right, this was a one-count indictment in

which the defendants were charged with assaulting the
complainant in this case. It's clear that the theory of the

tical count and it's clear to me (18) that the failure of the
defense attorney to understand and to realize that this was a
charge of acting in concert is attributable to him and not to
either the indictment or the District Attorney.

The issue of the defendant's intent is obviously a matter
for the jury to decide based on all of the evidence before it.
I'm satisfied that the jury was justified in concluding that
each of these defendants inter.ded to cause serous physical
injury to the person they were found by the jury to have
beaten. In my view, there was no basis for a justification

The defendants did argue alibi and did argue that they
weren't present at the time that the assault occurred. That
by itself would not mean that justification could not be
charged. Defendants under our system of law can charge
inconsistent —can request inconsistent defenses.

The fact was that in this particular case, there was no
reasonable view of the evidence under which the jury could
have found that the persons who assaulted the complainant
were acting in self-defense. Indeed, the testimony of wit-
nesses and of complainant himself was that he was on his
(19) back throughout the entire assault; that he kept on
being beaten. In the event, he was in the hospital for two
weeks. His ribs were broken. His lung was punctured. There
was testimony that the perpetrators pulled his shirt over his
head binding his arms so that he could not even swing his
arms.

There's simply nothing in the record that would indicate
that the people who were beating the complainant were

C-11

Now, I don't intend to go into any great detail with
regard to the other matters on the motwn to set asnde the
verdict cither. There's only one thing | feel that deserves
comment because it is not otherwise a part of this record

In his motion to set aside the verdict, Mr. Dienst, who |

trial and that they cannot have a fair trial if a judge indi-

(21) I may say parenthetically that Sergeant Goodacre’s
father, who was present throughout the trial, had sent a

C-12

letter to the Court saying that he thought | was especially
faw during the tnal and makes no menahon in hs letter that |
rolled my cyes skyward of any other way during the test-
mony of those witnesses.

These motions to set asade the verdict are denred in thew
enurety and defendants have cxicepions to that ruling

I showkd say that both sides have had the opportunity to
review the pre-sentence reports. | have received a large
number of letters with regard to doth defendants and Ive
made those available to the clerk and | will ask at the end of
these proceedings that those letters be attached to the pre-
sentence reports for cach of these defendants for any
reviewing authority that wishes to look at them

All right. Please arraign the defendants for sentence at
ths ume

The Clerk: Is your name Peter Grim”

The Defendant Grim: Yes.

The Clerk: Is Mr. Ganun, standing besxle you (22)
court, your attorney”

The Defendant Grim: Yes

The Clerk: Is your name Charles Goodacre”

The Defendant Goodacre. Yes

The Clerk: Is Mr. Dienst, standing beside you m court,
your attorney’

The Defendant Goodacre: Yes, he

The Clerk: You are cach now being arraigned for sen-
tence upon your conviction after jury trial to the crime of
assault in the second degree, the one and only count of
indictment 4300 of "88. Pror to the unposition of sentence,
first the Assistant District Attorney, then cach of your
attorneys and then cach of you, will have an opportunity to
address the Court on any matter relative to sentence

Miss Braver

Ms. Braver: Your Honor, these defendants were found
guilty by a jury after a full trial of the felony of asauk im

c-13

the second degree, a D felony. Statute lays out a scheme of
punishment with respect to that. These certainly afford the
Court ample latitude within which to impose a just
sentence.

(23) 1 would point out that, as the Court has indicated,
this was a very brutal act on the part of both of these men,
far in excess of a mere street fight which is what they
allege, at least Mr. Ganun alleges, in his pre-sentence mem-
orandum. This complainant was not only in the hospital for
two weeks but in fact left against the orders of his doctor
and was likely to have remained there longer still because
of the nature of the injuries that were done to him. He was
defenseless and it was a vicious act and fully qualified for
the verdict of an intent to cause serious physical injury and
did cause it.

I would point out that—

The Court: Excuse me. Why don’t you sit down while
she’s talking? There's no reason to stand. Go ahead.

Ms. Braver: I would point out in this particular instance,
these two gentlemen who otherwise appear to have no prior
criminal history, and I'm assuming that that is so, acted in a
criminal fashion; did not act while they were acting in their
capacity as police officers but rather acted as civilians and
as such, are subject (24) to the same laws and inhibitions as
are applied to all persons in this society.

The Court, I think and I urge, should consider the follow-
ing factors, though, in imposing sentence. These two gen-
tlemen were in fact police officers at the time, although off
duty officers. As such, they bore an additional responsibility
to the community. It became quite apparent to a large
crowd assembled in a very busy public thoroughfare on a
Saturday night that the people who were committing this
vicious assault on Mr. Vogelsang were in fact police offi-
cers because at least one person amongst those that were
beating Mr. Vogelsang, upon responding to a person in the

C-14

crowd who said, “Leave the boy alone. Haven't you done
enough,” held up his hand and said, “Stay out of it. Mind
your own business. I’m a police officer.” By so doing and by
drawing the attention of the crowd to the fact that these
were police officers, albeit that they were off duty at the
time, they created a very bad impression, to say the least, of
the quality of the police force in general of New York City
which I believe is very high.

(25) The police force in New York City is, by and large, a
very responsible, caring force and they do their best to
make sure that all persons are properly safeguarded under
the laws of this community. These two gentlemen acted
outside the laws of this community and in the manner in
which they acted and the knowledge became available to
the public, they caused great disillusionment on the part of
the persons who were present and the part of anybody they
might have spoken to with respect to the entire police force
and they, in effect as well, when they took the stand and
perjured themselves.

The Court: They both didn’t take the stand.

Ms. Braver: They both took the stand.

The Court: Again, only one took the stand. Go ahead.

Ms. Braver: I did not cross-examine one of them, your
Honor, but both of them did take the stand and they both
gave similar statements. I believe they both perjured them-
selves in the course of this trial.

Mr. Vogelsang initially told me when I first came into this
case that he was terribly distressed (26) that when he found
out subsequently in the course of the case that these two
gentlemen had been police officers, that in fact they were
police officers, that when he had been in that area before,
he had taken great pains to speak to people who were at—
appearing to be outside of this community and tell them
that they should cooperate with the police; the police were
just there to protect them and that they were frends of

C-15

theirs and he said he didn’t recall any moment in his life
when he had been more disillusioned than upon finding out
that the people who had beaten him were in fact themselves
police officers.

The fact that one of the persons who testified in this case
was, by his own words and also in defense counsel's pre-
sentence memorandum, characterized as a hustler by both
the statements of both these defendants does not mean that
he should not be accorded the same degree of respect and
protection under the laws. I believe their characterization
of that witness, Mr. Johnson, as a hustler and thereby not
worthy of anything, was characteristic of their contempt in
general for population—for a segment of this population
(27) which they believed to be—attacked themselves—to
be attacking on the night of this incident.

I urge that the Court consider the factors of their being
police officers in the sense that their duty to the public has
been betrayed; their duty to their fellow officers has been
betrayed, as well as the acts committed directly against Mr.
Vogelsang, in imposing sentence upon these gentlemen
within the structure that the statute requires and makes
available.

The Clerk: Mr. Ganun.

The Court: Do you have a specific recommendation?

Ms. Braver: I believe incarceration is warranted, your
Honor.

The Court: Beyond that, do you have any recom-
mendation?

Ms. Braver: The felony statute, the D felony, for which
they were incarcerated, mandates a state prison term whose
minimum, I believe, is one to three and whose maximum
term would be seven years.

The Court: No, it is not. There's no mandatory state
felony —

C-16

Ms. Braver: I believe there is on this (28) assault two, it
being a violent felony, your Honor.

The Court: Wrong. Mr. Ganun.

Ms. Braver: If I'm wrong on that, I still do believe that
incarceration is warranted in this case and would not rec-
ommend more than the one to three which I believe the
statute applies.

Mr. Ganun: Your Honor, on behalf of Peter Grim, I would
just like to indicate to the Court that I'm not going to
reargue the case. The Court has heard the testimony of all
of the witnesses.

The District Attorney has indicated that these individuals
should be treated like all other civilians. I venture to say
that so far, they were police officers. As the Court knows,
my client was a twenty-nine-year-old, or twenty-cight-
year-old at the time, probationary police officer.

Assuming arguendo that he was involved in this situa-
tion, we have the statements of Mr. Vogelsang that—and
taking the statements of the District Attorney that after the
initial confrontation, that Mr. Vogelsang came back armed
with a broomstick; that Mr. Vogelsang allegedly struck out
and hit my client on the head, or he identifies my client, on
the head with a bottle, struck my client in the (29) cheek
with a stick causing a purple mark; that according to him,
my client hit him with his fist causing his jaw to be broken.
The People—the defense put up a district surgeon from
New York City Police Department that testified that
defendant Grim had no marks on his head, no marks on his
cheek, no trauma to his knuckles.

Apparently, the jury didn’t understand or was not aware
of the position of the district surgeon. If the district surgeon,
I submit, had found such marks, Mr. Grim would have been
arrested on February 22nd, 1989.

Mr. Grim, your Honor, as indicated in a pre-sentence
memorandum, has never been in trouble before. He comes

C-17

from a tight, religious family. His father happens to be a
New York City firefighter. He's been that for over twenty-
nine years, your Honor. Mr. Grim has—his mother is a
homemaker. His two brothers have never been in trouble.
Mr. Grim has never been in trouble.

I respectfully submit, your Honor, that you treat Mr.
Grim as you would treat anybody faced with this type of
situation with no prior criminal record. I had suggested in
my pre-sentence (30) memorandum that perhaps the Court
could see fit to grant to Mr. Grim probation or probation
combined with community service and I had recommended
in my pre-sentence memorandum that perhaps, not tongue-
in-cheek or not in a sense of irony, that the community
service would entail perhaps working with street people
who apparently Mr. Vogelsang and Mr. Johnson were or
perhaps working with an organization such as Covenant
House.

Your Honor, the D. A. indicates that Mr. Vogelsang was
supposedly outraged. I'd like to point out that the Probation
Department has indicated that they could not even contact
Mr. Vogelsang to give an impact report on this particular
incident.

Based upon all of the foregoing, your Honor, I'd
respectfully request that this Court take into consideration
the numerous letters that have been submitted to the Court
setting forth the good background of Mr. Grim. He was at
the time a probationary police officer. As a result of this
incident, he was forced to retire. He lost his job. It was
because of probably his father, he wanted to follow his
father’s footsteps serving the People of the State of New
York. Unfortunately, that won't come to pass. He's been
tremendously penalized so far, not only himself, his wife,
his family, and we respectfully request that this Court take
into consideration all of the letters.

Your Honor, during the course of the trial your Honor
saw fit to advise counsel that it’s our responsibility to

C-18

suggest to the Court whenever we deem or see fit that he
may be going awry. The Court indicated that it would
accept suggestions to prevent it from making a court error.

I respectfully request that the Court take my recommen-
dation that the Court show mercy in affording Mr. Grim a
probation with community service that would be apropos to
this type of case. Society is not going to be threatened by
Mr. Grim doing anything in the future. If this happened, it
was an aberration. The business—the fact that he was a
New York City police officer, it sometimes sticks in my
craw that police officers, because of their duty or supposed
duty and oaths that they take, are held to extraordinarily
high level with regard to—

The Court: Shouldn't they be?

(32) Mr. Ganun: Excuse me?

The Court: Shouldn't police officers be held to that high
level of responsibility?

Mr. Ganun: They should, your Honor, but on the same
token, these men are human beings, you know. In the case
of Police Officer Grim, he was a probationary police offi-
cer, maybe hadn't, quote, gotten involved in the police
family. I had suggested in my memorandum to overturn the
verdict, your Honor, that it's my experience that there's
been in this society that police officers have become the
new minority. Everybody is biased against police officers.
I'm not just saying in this case but all cases, people jump to
conclusions; cops, they're accused of a crime, other cops
testify in their behalf, therefore, there's this blue wall of
silence or conspiracy.

Your Honor, I think Police Officer Grim should be given
the benefit of any privilege that any othér person in his
position would be able to ask of this Court. As I indicated to
you, I respectfully request that the Court consider probation
and probation involved with community service. I think
that the modern thinking with (33) regard to penology is to

C-19

try to have the punishment fit the crime, the situation, the
individual who s charged, and | think that in this case with
the factors that are here and that came through in the trial,
that probation and community service would be most
appropriate and society would be most satisfied.

The defendant, as | indicated, has been dismissed from
the Police Department. There's no threat to him going
back. I just respectfully request that the Court temper any
sentence with mercy. Thank you for your time, your Honor.

The Court: All right, Mr. Grim, is there anything you
wish to say?

The Defendant Grim: No, your Honor.

The Court: Mr. Dienst.

Mr. Dienst: Your Honor, on behalf of Mr. Goodacre, I'd
like first to address a remark that was made by the District
Attorney and that is the status of police officers. What is
conspicuously absent from the remarks of the District
Attorney is that a young police officer, Police Officer
Leone, who testified at the trial, was attempting to do his
duty and do his job that (34) particular night, sustained a
very serious injury inflicted by either the persons who
testified or Mr. Rodney Grant who was associated in some
way with the complainant, Mr. Vogelsang. That young man
has sustained serious permanent and protracted disabilities
which will mandate his retirement and his career being lost
from the New York City Police Department.

Your Honor, I'd like to respectfully suggest that police
officers are not entitled under law to any higher standard
than anybody else. They're not entitled to any greater privi-
leges or any greater immunities than anybody else but the
obverse of that is also correct. Police officers are not rele-
gated to a watered down version of the United States Con-
stitution and they should not be treated in a disparate
manner from any gther first offender that may appear
before your Honor fet a crime such as this. Had these
circumstances rose or arisen out of the performance of their

C-20

official duties, had they be acting as police officers at the
time of this incident, I think the remarks of the District
Attorney might have more merit than they do at this partic-
ular point.

(35) I would just like to say, during the course of the trial
and by the enormous amount of letters your Honor has
received on their behalf, it was pointed out to the Court that
Charles Goodacre is a quiet, peaceful young man. He is an
eight-year veteran o* the police force. He has made that
police force his career. In those eight years, including his
promotion to the rank of sergeant, he was never the subject
of any departmental charges or specifications of brutality.
He was decorated for his bravery. Even Police Department
witnesses who appeared on behalf of the prosecution testi-
fied as to his good character, as to his good reputation, as to
a peaceful, quiet guy in connection with his services with
the Police Department.

I don’t wish to characterize Mr. Vogelsang nor any of the
other witnesses that testified. Certainly, nobody should
receive a beating on behalf of anybody’s hands but to
suggest that in this off-duty situation that because they
serve the public and put their lives on the line every day for
years and years in the street that they should be penalized
for that service because of a single (36) isolated off-duty
incident which was counter to their whole sense of history
and sense of time and place, | think is inappropriate, an
inappropriate suggestion by the District Attorney. There is
no connection between the acts for which these defendants
stand convicted and their performances, their other duties
as a police officer and to seek to impose an additional
sanction and an additional penalty on them because they
chose law enforcement as a career, I think is inappropriate.

Your Honor has received a letter from Father Costello
who is active in the Queens courts. He knows Goodacre and
Goodacre’s family; has made a strong suggestion to your

C-21

Honor that incarceration, in his opinion, would not be
appropriate; that a period of prcoation and community
service would be appropriate. I suggest that the eight years
that Mr. Goodacre has served this community, he has per-
formed a significant amount of community service. Clearly,
if he did in fact commit this single isolated act of abhorrent
behavior, it is precisely that and | would ask the Court to
take into consideration his eight years of service on the
street and that all the good deeds be not (37) washed away
with this single isolated bad act and this felony conviction.
As your Honor knows, upon the verdict of guilty being —
coming in, Charles Goodacre forfeited eight years of con-
tributions to his pension fund, all future career paths and
opportunities with the New York City Police Department.
Should some court at some particular point in time vacate
the sentence or set aside this verdict, or vacate the judg-
ment, that will not reinstate Mr. Goodacre to the Police
Department. The Court of Appeals has definitively ruled
that a public official who is found guilty by a jury verdict of
a felony forfeits his office and there is—should he be exone-
rated from these charges at some point down the road by an
appellate court, if there is an appeal in this situation, would
not result in his restoration to his duty. Certainly, his dignity
and respect that he held in the community will never be
restored.

For all practical purposes, by this verdict, Sergeant
Goodacre is now homeless; homeless in the sense of not
having a career, homeless in the sense of not having a job;
homeless in the sense that his (38) entire pension and future
and salary and benefits and honors have all been stripped of
him.

In addition to that, there is pending in the Civil Court of
the Supreme Court, civil side, a multimillion-dollar action
for monetary damages. The finding of guilt in this particu-
lar case will be res judicata or at least collaterally estopped
Mr. Goodacre from asserting any defense to any claims for

C-22

monetary damages brought by Mr. Vogelsang. Your Honor
recalls at the trial you heard the telephone numbers that
were being demanded in connection with this case.

The man’s life is shattered. His career is shattered. His
conviction has brought disgrace to his father who served in
the Police Department for many many years. His family is
here. He’s been stigmatized and disgraced in the eyes of the
entire community. With the totality of the significant pun-
ishments that have already been imposed, I respectfully
suggest to your Honor that the imposition of a jail sentence
would be inappropriate under the circumstances.

Again, I don’t wish to attribute any greater or lesser
degree of responsibility as to what (39) transpired in that
street that night during those few minutes. Your Honor
heard the testimony. Your Honor heard of the passive
aspect of Mr. Goodacre’s participation as found by the jury.
I'd ask your Honor to consider the letters that were sent,
perhaps even consider my remarks that I've made to the
Court and in the interests of finding fairness, in the interests
of justice, impose a sentence of probation on behalf of Mr.
Goodacre. Thank you.

The Court: Mr. Goodacre, do you have anything to say?

The Defendant: No, your Honor.

The Court: The record should reflect that the Court is
satisfied that the jury's verdict was warranted by the evi-
dence. In other words, I'm satisfied that these defendants
arguably are guilty of the crimes of which they have been
convicted even though they continue to deny that fact.

Their continuing denial of that fact makes it difficult to
understand the exact circumstances in which this assault
took place. We have the testimony of the complainants but
the defendants have denied us their version of that fact. It is
clear that there was some kind of verbal (40) confrontation
initially between the complainant, Mr. Vogelsang, and
Police Officer Grim and that that escalated to a level of

C-23

extraordinary rage which resulted in Officer Grim and then
Sergeant Goodacre in viciously and repeatedly assaulting a
person who was at the time helpless to defend himself. He
was on the ground. His arms were restrained and he was
repeatedly beaten while police force was used, albeit off-
duty, to keep the crowd from assisting that person.

I do not believe that I have any bias against police
officers. I believe that they have a very difficult job. I do
believe, however, that public service is a public trust and
that when police officers take their oath and take their
arms, they undertake a level of responsibility and restraint
which they are not free to discard and which these officers
did discard and compounding what they did was what they
did after the assault.

In my view, they engaged in a process that would cover
up, confuse and mislead authorities and that that continued
throughout the entire process of this investigation. | believe
that these gentlemen have no prior record. They have good
(41) families. I don’t believe they pose any threat to this
community but I do believe that the criminal law exists to
punish wrongdoing and to assert moral condemnation of
acts which are serious and violent and unjustified and |
believe that we must be held responsible for what we do.

These were not mistakes. These were wrongs. These
were wrongs engaged in by police officers who, more than
others, should have been aware of their public obligation to
keep the peace. They violated that obligation and it seems
to me, they are to be held responsible for it. | am not
satisfied that a probationary sentence is sufficient response
by society. I'm aware that they have lost their police posi-
tions but it seems to me any public officer who commits a
crime loses is his public position. It seems to me there must
be a deterrent impact to the sentence that we impose

I'm mindful that the District Attorney is wrong when she

says | am obliged to impose a state prison sentence. | am
not obliged to do that. | could impose a probationary sen-

C-24

tence but given the excessiveness of this assault, the severe
injuries (42) that were inflicted upon a person who was
helpless to defend himself at the time that it occurred and
given the actions that they engaged in after that was done, it
seems to me appropriate that a state prison sentence be
imposed and it is the judgment of the Court that each
defendant be sentenced to an indeterminate sentence the
minimum of which shall be no less than one year and the
maximum of which shall be no more than three years

I am mindful that my view may not be shared by others,
even in the judiciary, and I therefore indicate to counsel
that I will stay the execution of that sentence to July 26th,
four weeks from today, to afford counsel ample opportunity
to seek a further stay from the Appellate Division

Please advise counse! the defendants of their rights to
appeal and advise me that you've done so. Have you
advised them of their right to appeal?

Mr. Dienst: Yes, your Honor, I have

The Court: The record should reflect that each defendant
has been provided with an information sheet that indicates
to him how he may perfect his appeal, if he wishes to do so
The defendant's parole will be continued until (43) July
26th. Absent a stay, they should be prepared to surrender at
that time. Obviously, if there is a stay, then we'll work out a
different adjourned date at that time

You may step out at this ume

Mr. Ganun: Thank you

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and
correct transcript of proceedings had upon the aforemen-
tioned matter

JOYCE HOUNSELI
Court Reporter

C-25

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_1728%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
