# Opposition Brief — Patel v. California

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1991
- **Citation:** 500 U.S. 952

## Text

No. 90-1355

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1990

THAKORBHAI L. PATEL,
Petitioner,
v.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF APPEAL
FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION TWO

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, Attorney General
of the State of California

GEORGE Par an EOON, Chief Assistant
Attorney Gener - Criminal Division

HARLEY D. MAYFIELD, Senicr Assistant
Attorney General

ee M. FOSTER
Supervising Deputy Attorney General

M. HOWARD WAYNE
Deputy Attorney General

ie West A Street, Suite 700 .
ornia 9210]

Telephose: (6 619) 237-7765

Attorneys for Respondent

oie
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the First Amendment protects the conduct
of an individual who orally advises @ prostitute of an imminent
arrests by an undercover officer, so that the prostitute may try to
avoid arrest by fleeing from the police.
LIST OF PARTIES
Petitioner, Thakorbhai L. Patel, is on probation,
and is at liberty from a commitment of 90 days in the San
Bernardino County Jail pending appeal. The People of the State of
California are represented by Attorney General Danie! E. Lungren.
OPINION BELOW
Petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari to review an
unpublished opinion of the California Court of Appeal, Fourth
Appellate District, Division Two. (People of the State of California
v. Thakorbhai L. Patel, (Case E007180).) The opinion is attached to

the petition as Appendix }.

QUESTION PRESENTED

LIST OF PARTIES

OPINION BELOW

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defense .

SUMMARY OF REASONS WHY THE
PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED

ARGUMENT

1 A STATUTE WHICH IS DESIGNED TO
PREVENT ANYONE FROM OBSTRUCTING
AN OFFICER FROM THE PERFORMANCE
OF DUTY IS NOT DIRECTED AT FREE
SPEECH AND NEED NOT BE A SPECIFIC
INTENT CRIME

II. PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO
ESTABLISH THAT BECAUSE OF
THE ALLEGED ERROR IN
INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON HIS
OBSTRUCTION CHARGE HE WAS DENIED
A FAIR TRIAL AS TO THE OTHER OFFENSES
FOR WHICH HE WAS CONVICTED

CONCLUSION

10

1]

1]

27

- iii -
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Cohen v. California, 403 US. 15,
L.Ed.2d 284,91 S.Ct. 1789 (1971)

Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518,
31 LEd.2d 408, 92 S.Ct. 1103 (1972)

Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451,
96 L.Ed.2d 398, 107 S.C. 2502 (1987)

In re Gregory S., 112 Cal. App.3d 764,
169 Cal. Rptr. 540 (1980)

In re Joe R., 12 Cal App.3d 80,
90 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1970)

People v. Powell, 99 Cal.App.2d 178,
221 P.2d 178 (1950)

People v. Roberts, 131 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1,
182 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1982)

Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1,
93 LEd. 1131, 69 S.Ci. 894 (1949)

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District
393 U.S. 503, 21 LEd.2d 731, 89 S.Ct. 733 (1969)

Unued States v. Kelner
$34 F.2d 1020 (2nd Cir. 1976)

Unuted States v. Velasquez
772 F.2d 1348 (7th Cir. 1985)

Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705,
22 LEd.2d 664, 89 S.Ct. 1399 (1969)

21

15-19

12

12

13

21

21

2)

- iv -

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES, CONT'D

ONS Oo ONS Page
First Amendment 11, 20, 21, 23, 24
STATUTES
California Penal Code

§ 148 11-13, 15, 19, 20, 22, 24

Code of Ordinance, City of Houston, Texas
§ 34-11(a) 16

eo i «

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On May 16, 1989, the District
Attorney of San Bernardino County filed an
amended information in the consolidated
proceeding of SCR 47384 and SCR 48604,
which charged petitioner with violation of
California Penal Code section 266i
(pandering, count one), California Penal
Code sections 664/266h (attempted pimping,
count two), California Penal Code section
266h (pimping, count three), California
Penal Code section 316 (maintaining a
disorderly house, count four, a
misdemeanor) and California Penal Code
section 148 (obstructing an office in the
discharge of the duties of that office,
count five, a misdemeanor). {CT 207-209.)
Petitioner pled not guilty. (CT 205.)

Jury trial began on May 16,
1989, and petitioner was found guilty as
charged on all counts. (CT 205, 214-219,
290-294.)

ne

e 2 «

On August 31, 1989,
pronouncement of judgment was withheld and
petitioner was granted supervised
probation for three years on condition he
serve 90 days in county jail, to be served
on weekends. (CT 304-306.) Petitioner's
motion to post bail pending appeal was
granted. (CT 309.)

On September 11, 1990, the
California Court of Appeal, Fourth
Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed
petitioner’s conviction. On November 28,
1990, the California Supreme Court denied
petitioner’s petition for review. Two
justices voted to grant review, although
the record does not show whether they
voted to hear the case on the ground
raised by the petition to this Court.

(Appendix 2 to Petition.)

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On February 10, 1988, Jo Ann
Miller, a San Bernardino County Deputy
Sheriff, was working undercover. She was
posing as 4 prostitute as part of the
investigation of the Palms Motel. The
motel was located at 3424 Cajon Boulevard
in San Bernardino County. (RT 155-156,
186.) At 2:45 in the afternoon she went
to the motel office and asked petitioner,
who was behind the desk, if he had any
rooms which she could rent for a short
time. Petitioner said the minimal rental
was for an hour. Miller rented a room for
an hour for $10. She was not given a key
to the room, nor was she asked to sign a
registration form. (RT 158-160, 186, Exh.
23, p- 1.) Miller went into the motel
room with Deputy Sheriff William Sheble
for 15 to 20 minutes, then left and
returned to the Sheriff's station for a

briefing. (RT 159, 238.)

Fa ip on ee i:
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— a

At about 5 p.m. another deputy,
Lawrence Mosley, rented a room from
petitioner for the evening for $35. To
rent the room he completed a registration
card. (RT 222-223.) From the room Mosley
denies nate and female couples entering
motel rooms without luggage, staying
approximately 30 minutes and leaving. (RT
225.) About an hour after he rented the
room petitioner came to the room and told
Mosley that it was his policy not to allow
the curtains in his motel rooms to be
open. (RT 226.)

Miller returned to the motel at
about 5:00 that evening with Deputy Joe
Miller, who was dressed in civilian
clothes and remained in his truck. She
rented a room from another individual who
was at the clerk's desk for $10. She
stayed in the motel room fifteen to twenty
minutes with the deputy, then left. (RT

161-164, 167, Exh. 23, p. 2.)

— 2

Miller later returned to the
motel with two reserve deputies. She went
to the office to rent a room and
petitioner asked how many people she had.
She responded two, and petitioner said
that she was not allowed to have more than
one person with her in the room at any
time. When she said she would have more
than one person there at a time,
petitioner said she would have to pay $10
per person. (RT 169-170, Exh. 23, p. 3.)
She went back to the car to get more
money, then returned, paid $20, and had a
room rented to her. She did not sign a
registration card. (RT 170-171.) The
male deputies went into the room with
Miller in sequence. Fifteen minutes after
the second deputy went into the room, he
and Miller left together in the same
vehicle. (RT 174.)

At about 7 p.m. Al Barnett, a4

reserve officer acting in an undercover

» @ «
capacity, went to the Palms Motel and
asked petitioner if Miller had been there.
(RT 198-200, Exh. 24, pp. 1-4.)

Miller returned to the motel
shortly after 7:00 with another deputy,
also dressed in civilian clothes.
Petitioner said someone had been asking
for her. He asked Miller if she had asked
someone to meet her there at a certain
time. She said that she did. She asked
petitioner to describe the person,
Barnett, and then she said he was a “high
dollar” person. (RT 175, Exh. 23, pp. 5-
6.) During this conversation petitioner
came over to Miller and, as he talked to
her, touched her around her bare midriff.
(RT 178.) Petitioner rented her a room
for one hour for $10. Again, she neither
signed a registration card nor received a
key to the room. (RT 176.) Miller and
the deputy went into the room. (RT 179.)

While they were in the room a buzzer went

—
off. She went outside the motel and saw
Barnett with petitioner. (RT 179-180.)

Barnett asked petitioner if he
would have to pay for the room, and
petitioner responded that he would. (RT
181-182.) Barnett paid petitioner $10,
then went into the room with Miller. (RT
182-183, 209, 211.) When the undercover
officers left the motel room they arrested
petitioner. (RT 183.)

On April 20, 1988, San
Bernardino Deputy Sheriff Sheble was
driving a van on Mt. Vernon Avenue in San
Bernardino. Officer Lawrence Mosley, was
a passenger in the vehicle. Emma
Henderson waived at the vehicle and, when
it stopped, she got into the van.
Henderson solicited Sheble and Mosley for
sex, and they agreed on a price of $15 per
person. Sheble asked if she had a place
where she comfortable in going. Henderson

said Sheble had a bedroom on wheels, and

» 6 «
Sheble responded he wanted to take a
little more time. He asked if she had a
motel, and Henderson directed them to the
Palms Motel. (RT 131-135, 227-228, 244-
245, 255-256, 262-263.) Henderson had
previously rented rooms at the motel from
petitioner for prostitution. She would be
charged $8 to $12 to use a room for one to
two hours. (RT 137-139.)

At the motel Sheble told
Henderson he did not want to be seen by
the people there and expressed concern
about registering. He asked her how much
money was needed to rent a room, then gave
her a five dollar bill and seven one
dollar bills. (RT 245.)

When Henderson returned she
began to suspect Sheble was a police
officer. She started to walk down the
street and Sheble drove after her. Sheble
demanded to know what had happened to his

money. Henderson replied she did not have

~~
it on her and accused Sheble of being a
police officer. Sheble convinced her that
he was not an officer. She entered the
vehicle and they returned to the motel.
Henderson lead Sheble to room number five.
They did not have a key, but the door was
open. (RT 246-247.)

As they were standing at the
motel room door, petitioner stepped out of
his office and saw Sheble. He began to
yell that Sheble was un undercover police
officer.+’ Petitioner demanded
identification from Sheble and yelled
“you're undercover. You're undercover.”
Henderson fled. Mosley pursued her and

placed her under arrest. Petitioner was

i. Henderson testified that when
she attempted to rent the room
petitioner told her Sheble was an
undercover officer. However, it is
unclear that petitioner would have been
able to see Sheble at that time since
petitioner was in the motel office and
Sheble was in the van. (RT 140.)

» 20
arrested shortly thereafter. (RT 140-143,

227-228, 231-232, 248.)

DEFENSE
al Petitioner rested without

putting on any evidence. (RT 273.)

SUMMARY OF REASONS WHY THE PETITION
SHOULD BE DENIED
The petition for writ of

certiorari does not raise any issues that
merit the exercise of this Court’s
discretionary jurisdiction. The decision
of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate
District, was in full accord with the
prior decisions of this Court, and the
position advanced by petitioner borders on

the frivolous.

wa

Sen

—

A STATUTE WHICH IS DESIGNED TO PREVENT
ANYONE FROM OBSTRUCTING AN OFFICER FROM
THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY IS NOT DIRECTED AT
FREE SPEECH AND NEED NOT BE A SPECIFIC
INTENT CRIME

In a two part argument,
petitioner contends the trial court
committed error by failing to instruct the
jury that to find him guilty of
obstructing an officer in the performance
of duty, the jury would have to find that
petitioner acted with that specific
intent. He argues that absent such
intent, petitioner engaged in a mere
utterance which was protected by the First
Amendment to the United States
Constitution. (Pet., pp. 13-20.) Because
California Penal Code section 148 is not
directed at speech, the contention does
not reach constitutional dimensions.

Petitioner was convicted of,

inter alia, violating California Penal

os 42

Code section 148, a misdemeanor, which
provided, in pertinent part, at the time
of the offense:

"Every person who willfully
resists, delays or obstructs any
public officer, [or] peace
officer . . . in the discharge
or attempt to discharge any duty
of his or her office or
employment .. . is punishable
by a fine not exceeding one
thousand dollars ($1,000) or by
imprisonment in a county
be « « «© e®

The crime may be committed by

conduct such as flight to avoid arrest (In
re Gregory S., 112 Cal.App.3d 764, 780,
169 Cal. Rptr. 540, 548 (1980)),
physically attacking an officer (People v.
Powell, 99 Cal.App.2d 178; 221 P.2d 178
(1950)), and harassing an officer so that
the officer is unable to elicit
information (In re Joe R., 12 Cal.App.3d
80, 86; 90 Cal. Rptr. 530, 533 (1970)).
California Penal Code section
148 is a general intent crime, and thus no

instruction on the specific intent with

« 33 @
which the act is performed is required.
(People v. Roberts, 131 Cal.App.3d Supp.
1, 8-9; 182 Cal. Rptr. 757, 760-761
(1982).)

The jury was instructed that to
establish a violation of Penal Code
section 148, the prosecution would have to
prove that petitioner “willfully resisted,
delayed, or cbstructed a peace
officer . . . engaged in the performance
of his duties.” (RT 298.) The jury was
further told that "[a] peace officer is
discharging or attempting to
discharge .. . his duties if he is making
or attempting to make a lawful arrest or
lawfully detaining or attempting to detain
a person for questioning or ’
investigation.” (RT 299.) Thus the jury
was aware that to convict petitioner, it
would need to find that petitioner's
conduct (i.e. shouting “you're undercover.

You're undercover") was committed for the

~——' oe
purpose of obstructing the officer from
arresting or detaining the prostitute. In
this regard the prosecutor argued to the
jury:
", . » [Petitioner] knew that
Miss Henderson, being a
prostitute, would have been
arrested .. . . And s0, by
throwing out a couple of words
indicating that [Sheble] was a
police officer, words that she
would understand, he knew that
he could mess up the
. operation... .
oe ([T]hat is where we get
the charge of obstructing a
police officer during the course
of his investigation... .”
(RT 309-310.)

From the instructions the court
gave, and from the argument of the
prosecutor, the jury was informed that to
find petitioner guilty it would need to
determine that the purpose of his conduct
was to obstruct the officer in the
performance of his efforts to arrest or
detain Miss Henderson. They could not
convict him solely on the basis that he

spoke a few words.

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Petitioner argues that
application of California Penal Code
section 148 to his conduct violates this
Court’s holding in Houston v. Hill, 482
U.S. 451; 96 L.Ed.2d 398; 107 S.Ct. 2502
(1987). Because the statute here is not
directed at speech, petitioner is
incorrect.

In Houston v. Hill, Hill had
observed a friend intentionally stopping
traffic on a busy street, apparently to
enable a vehicle to enter traffic. Two
police officers approached the friend and
began speaking with him. Shortly
thereafter Hill began shouting at the
officers, in an attempt to divert an
officer's attention from the friend. Hill
first shouted “‘Why don’t you pick on
somebody you own size?'* When the officer
asked if Hill was interrupting him in his
official capacity, Hill shouted *‘Yes, why

don't you pick on somebody my size?’*

— 2

(Houston v. Hill, supra, 482 U.S. at pp.
453-454; 96 L.Ed.2d at p. 398: 107 S.Ct.
at p. 2502.)

Hill was prosecuted and
acquitted of violating an ordinance of the
city of Houston which provided:

"(a) It shall be unlawful

for any person to assault,

strike or in any manner oppose,

molest, abuse or interrupt any

policeman in the execution of

his duty, or any person summoned

to aid in making an arrest.”

(Code of Ordinance, City of

Houston, Texas § 34-ll(a),

quoted at Houston v. Hill,

supra, 451 U.S. at p. 455; 96

L.Ed.2d at p. 408; 107 S.Ct. at

p. 2506.)
Following his acquittal, Hill brought suit
to have the ordinance declared
unconstitutional both on its face and as
applied to him.

Because the provisions of the
ordinance making it unlawful for any
person to assault or strike a police
officer were preempted by the Texas Penal

Code, the only portion of the ordinance at

» 19 «
issue was that directed at speech.

(Houston v. Hill, supra, 451 U.S. at p.

460; 96 L.Ed.2d at p. 411; 107 S.Ct. at
pp. 2508-2509.) This Court concluded that
the ordinance was overly broad in that it
provided the police with unfettered
discretion to arrest individuals for words
or conduct that annoy or offend then.
(Houston v. Hill, supra, 451 U.S. at pp.
465-467; 96 L.Ed.2d at pp. 414-415; 107
§.Ct. at p. 2512.)

In his concurring and dissenting
Opinion in Houston v Hill, Justice Powell
stated:

". « « I question the
implication of the Court's
opinion that the First Amendment
generally protects verbal
‘challenge([s) directed at police
officers,’ [citation]. A
‘challenge’ often takes the form
of opposition or interruption of
performance of duty. In many
situations, speech of this type
directed at — officers will
be functionall

indistinguishable from conduct
that the First Amendment clearly
does not protect. For example,
I have no doubt that 4

—— a

municipality constitutionally
may punish an individual who
chooses to stand near a police
officer and persistently attempt
to engage the officer in
conversation while the officer
is directing traffic at a busy
intersection. Similarly, an
individual, by contentious and
abuse speech, could interrupt an
officer's investigation of
possible criminal conduct. A
person observing an officer
pursuing @ person suspected of a
felony could run beside him in a
public street shouting at the
officer. Similar tactics could
interrupt a policeman lawfully
attempting to interrogate
persons believed to be witnesses
to a crime.” (Houston v. Hill,
supra, 482 U.S. at p. 479, 96
L.Ed.2d. at pp. 423-424; 107
§.Ct.at p. 2519, footnote
omitted.)

In response, the majority
Opinion stated that the concern in Justice
Powell's example was not contentious
speech, but rather that the shouting and
running in the hypothetical might
physically obstruct the officer's
investigation. The majority opinion
stated that such conduct might
constitutionally be punished under «a

» 19 «
tailored statute that forbade individuals
from physically obstructing an officer in
the performance of duty, rather than under
a broad statute aimed at speech. (Houston
v. Hill, supra, 451 U.S. at p. 463, 96
L.Ed.2d at p. 412; 107 S.Ct. at p. 2510,
n. 11.)

California Penal Code section
148 is a statute directed an forbidding
individuals from physically obstructing an
officer in the performance of official
duties. Just as in the hypothetical set
forth in Justice Powell's opinion,
petitioner, by advising Henderson that
Sheble was a law enforcement officer, was
attempting to obstruct the officer from
the performance of official duties, here
by affording Henderson an opportunity to

flee from arrest.”’ Petitioner was not

2. Petitioner urges that no duty
was being discharged because Henderson
was already in constructive police
custody. (Pet., p. 14.) The Court of
Appeal found the distinction petitioner

= 96 «
engaging in free speech, but instead,
conduct designed to frustrate the officer
in the performance of his duties.

Section 148 is not a statute
aimed at speech. The reported decisions
involving it deal almost exclusively with
conduct. The particular conduct here was
conduct (i.e. obstructing an arrest or
investigation) manifested as words. The
First Amendment does not immunize conduct
because the conduct is manifested in
words. (Watts v. United States, 394 U.S.
70S, 707; 22 L.Bd.2d 664; 69 S.Ct. 1399,

asserts unavailing:

*. « « Without voicing our
opinion whether the prostitute
was indeed in constructive
custody at the time of Patel’s
interference, we need only say
that even if she was, this
fact is irrelevant ..
Obyiously, [the officers’
overriding purpose was to
investigate activities at
Patel’s motel and that
operation was ongoing until
Patel caused is premature
termination.” (Pet., Appendix
1, p. 14.)

, e MD «

1401 (1969) [statute prohibiting threats
against the President is constitutional on
its face); United States v. Velasquez, 772
F.2d 1348, 1357 (7th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied 475 U.S. 1021; 89 L.Ed.2d 323; 106
S.Ct. 1211 [threat to retaliate against
informant is not protected by the First
Amendment); United States v. Kelner, 534
F.2d 1020, 1025-1027 (2nd Cir. 1976),
cert. denied 429 U.S. 1022; 50 L.Ed.2d
623; 97 S.Ct. 639 [threat to injure
another is not protected by First
Amendment } . )

Petitioner's action was not
speech manifested as conduct (e.g., Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent School District,
393 U.S. 503; 21 L.Ed.2d 731; 89 S.Ct. 733
(1969) [arm bands worn by high school
students protesting the Vietnam war);
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15; 29
L.Ed.2d 264; 91 S.Ct. 1789 (1971) [wearing

a jacket in a courthouse that said *Puck

» 22 <
the draft”"}), but conduct manifested as
words. Conceptually it was no different
than tackling the officer so he could not
pursue Henderson, or driving 4 getaway car
for the suspect. Such conduct would not
be protected, and does not obtain
constitutional protection by being
manifested in words.

Consequently, California Penal
Code section 148 differs from the
ordinance invalidated in Houston v. Hill
and is constitutionally sound as written.

Moreover, the evil addressed in
Houston v. Hill was that the ordinance was
an effort to criminalize speech directed
at the officer. (fn. 11, supra; Gooding
v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518; 31 L.Bd.2d 408;
92 S.Ct. 1103 (1972) [etatute which made
it a crime for anyone to direct to
another, in hie presence, “opprobrious
words or abusive language tending to cause
@ breach of the peace” found to be

,

« 33 <
overbroad in context of shouting at a
police officer while picketing against the
war in Vietnam].) The speech here was not
directed at the officer, but at the
suspect.

The balance of cases cited by
petitioner concern protection of speech,
rather than protection of conduct
manifested as words. For example,
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1; 93
L.Ed. 1131; 69 S.Ct. 894 (1949), involved
the suppression of controversial views
under the rubric of a “breach of the
peace” statute. In contrast, the entire
thrust of the statute and the prosecution
here was petitioner's conduct in
obstructing an officer by warning a
suspect that police were present.

Petitioner fails to raise any
valid First Amendment issue and his
petition should be denied.

e 96 -
II

PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT
BECAUSE OF THE ALLEGED ERROR IN
INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON HIS OBSTRUCTION
CHARGE HE WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL AS TO
THE OTHER OFFENSES FOR WHICH HE WAS
CONVICTED

Petitioner also contends that
the failure to give the instruction
discussed in Argument I for the
misdemeanor offense of obstructing an
officer infected his convictions for three
felonies and another misdemeanor. /(Pet.,
p. 21.) Not only has petitioner failed to
substentiate this claim, but he has failed
to raise a constitutional issue.

Petitioner’s basic position is
that Penal Code section 148, as applied
here, violated his rights under the First
Amendment to the Constitution. He does
mot even claim that his conduct of
pandering, pimping, attempted pimping and
maintaining a disorderly house is

similarly protected.

=
What he does instead assert is
that “(a)ll verdicts were infected by what
must have been confused and easily awry
jury instructions” inasmuch as different
definitions of intent were given for
different crimes. (Pet., p. 21, emphasis
added.) In fact the jury was properly
instructed, since pandering and attempted
pimping are specific intent crimes, and
the jury was instructed on the required
specific intent (RT 295, 297), while
pimping and maintaining a disorderly house
are general intent crimes and the jury was
properly instructed on that element. (RT
294.) These are not confusing and “easily
awry” instructions, these are the law.
Moreover, the jury was told that each
count charged a distinct crime which must
be decided separately. (RT 301.)
The speculation that the jury
was confused is unsubstantiated, and the

—
claim, in any event, does not raise a
constitutional issue.

Petitioner's attempt to
piggyback reversal of his four other
convictions on his claim of denial of
freedom of speech for a misdemeanor
conviction should be recognized for what
it is and dismissed.

» 23 «
CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons stated
above, petitioner has failed to establish
the existence of any issue which merits
the grant of certiorari. The decision of
the Court of Appeal was in accord with the
Constitution and established precedent.
Accordingly, the petition should be
denied.
DATED: May 7, 1991

Respectfully submitted,

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, Attorney General
of the State of California

GEORGE WILLIAMSON, Chief Assistant
Attorney General - Criminal Division

HARLEY D. MAYFIELD, Senior Assistant
Attorney General

ROBERT M. FOSTER
Supervising Deputy Attorney General

4 Ve Jd hvQ7e
M. HOWARD WAYNE th
Deputy Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondent

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_1724%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.