# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1991
- **Citation:** 499 U.S. 960

## Text

9 @ ¥Fiu aD !
0-130 FEB 19 v8 |
No.
In The

Beew en bw rent 4 6 Bie 6.40.16 chee’. 4 me

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1990

STATE OF COLORADO,

Petitioner,

IDARADO MINING CO. et al.,

Respondents.

,
4

Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The United States
Court Of Appeals For The Tenth Circuit

La
vv

PETITION FOR WRIT OF-CERTIORARI

a.
vv

Gate A. Norton
Attorney General

TimotHy M. TyMKOvICH
Solicitor General
(Counsel of Record)

JACQUELINE HERNANDEZ BERARDINI
Deputy Attorney General

James D. ELLMAN
First Assistant Attorney General
CERCLA Litigation Section

Attorneys for Petitioner

110 Sixteenth Street, 10th Floor
Denver, Colorado 80202
Telephone: (303) 620-4500

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

‘

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Section 121(e)(2) of the Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 as
amended (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(e)(2) (1988),
grants states the power to enforce federal or state require-
ments to which a remedial action is required to conform
under CERCLA in United States District Court. Does
§ 121(e)(2) authorize a district court to grant injunctive
relief to a state with respect to a state-selected remedial
action that has been approved by that court?

ii

LIST OF PARTIES

Petitioner is the State of Colorado.

Respondents are [darado Mining Company; New-

mont Services, Ltd.; and Newmont Mining Corporation.

ae

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ............... i
EES ii
I IEE vc vn acccsscccccsscccaseccce iii
po iv
ie kb 66h 65 65% Kk 600 senccncsace 1
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT...................... 1
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS
RR UC ELAR hese ceeesisscsnnsececss 1
emueeeeeree GPP CUM CAGE... ccc ccc cece ee 2
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ......... 7

I. THE ISSUE OF WHETHER CERCLA § 121(e)(2)
AUTHORIZES INJUNCTIVE RELIEF TO
ENFORCE STATE-SELECTED REMEDIAL
ACTIONS IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO
COLORADO AND OTHER STATES AND
SHOULD BE SETTLED BY THIS COURT......... 7

Il. THE TENTH CIRCUIT’S UNDULY RESTRIC-
TIVE INTERPRETATION OF CERCLA § 121(e)(2)
IGNORES THAT SECTION’S EXPLICIT LAN-
GUAGE AND MISCONSTRUES CERCLA’S
occ nanscncctcscencsescs 11

A. Section 121(e)(2) is not limited to remedial
actions selected by the federal government or its
IIE ES TE 12

B. There are requirements to which state-selected
remedial actions must conform under CERCLA.. 15

eee eee Chess uc cechsssccseaceess 17

iv

e

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page

CASES

Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co., 707 F. Supp. 1227
ew Se Mrrrrrrerrerrresrr ere Tere rire 1, 5, 6

Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co., 916 F2d 1486
Re PT Peer ore ver Tere Teer ee passim

Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy,
Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986) ........ 11, 15

FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 349 (1958) .... 12

Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237
STE akin nce Adeeb vent nwun a sndwebbaaseescenncckee: 7

Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S.
DU BU UD hn 860 cc cae eadcnndsedccweweesnscccess 7

Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U'S.
eee eC eh eho ncee Reken as Pes + The Tenth Circuit concluded that Colorado cannot rely
on 40 C.FR. § 300.68(i)(1) (1989) because that section only
applies to lead agencies. Appendix A at App. 25 to App. 26.
However, 40 C.F.R. § 300.71(a)(2) (1989) lists the NCP require-
ments with which a state must comply in order to be not
inconsistent with the NCP whether or not the state is acting as
a lead agency. 40 C.F.R. § 300.71(a)(2)(ii)(B) requires Colorado
to comply with 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(e)-(i). Thus, the court was
incorrect in ruling that § 300.68(i)(1) does not apply to the
present case.

17

Fed. Reg. 8666, 8850 (1990) (to be codified at 40 C.FR.
§ 300.430(f)(1)(i)(A) and (ii)(A), (B) and (D) (1990)). These
requirements are requirements to which state-selected
remedial! actions are required to conform under CERCLA,
and thus the Tenth Circuit was incorrect in ruling that
§ 121(e)(2) does not authorize injunctive relief with
respect to state-selected remedial actions.

a
_

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ
of certiorari should be granted.

Gace A. Norton
Attorney General

Timotuy M. TyMKOvVICH
Solicitor General
(Counsel of Record)

JACQUELINE HERNANDEZ BERARDINI
Deputy Attorney General

James D. ELLMAN
First Assistant Attorney General
CERCLA Litigation Section

Attorneys for Petitioner

110 Sixteenth Street, 10th Floor
Denver, Colorado 80202
Telephone: (303) 620-4500

App. 1

APPENDIX A
PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT

STATE OF COLORADO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

IDARADO MINING COMPANY,

Nos. 89-1077

valle 89-1326
Defendants-Appellants and 89-1344
Third-Party Piaintiffs, 90-1129

VS.

BAUMGARTNER OIL COMPANY,
et al.,

ee eee eee

Third-Party Defendants.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FROM THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. No. 83-C-2385)

(707 F. Supp. 1227)

James D. Ellman, Assistant Attorney General, CERCLA
Litigation Section (Duane Woodard, Attorney General,
Charles B. Howe, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Rich-
ard H. Forman, Solicitor General, & Michael R. Hope,
Deputy Attorney General, CERCLA Litigation Section,
with him on the brief), State of Colorado, Denver, Colo-
rado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

f

e
BD

App. 2

Nancy C. Shea, Shea & Gardner, Washington, D.C. (James
R. Bieke, Michael S. Giannotto & Paula A. Sweeney, Shea
& Gardner, Washington, D.C. and Christopher Lane &
Cassandra G. Sasso, Sherman & Howard, Denver, Colo-
rado, with her on the brief), for Defendants-Appellants.

Richard B. Stewart, Assistant Attorney General, David C.
Shilton & Dirk D. Snel, Attorneys, Land and Natural
Resources Division Appellate Section, Department of Jus-
tice, and Charles Openchowski, Office of the General
Counsel & Nancy Mangone, Office of Enforcement and
Compliance Monitoring, United States Environmental
Protection Agency, Washington, D.C., for the United
States, Amicus Curiae.

Before McKAY, ANDERSON and BALDOCK, Circuit
Judges.

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge.

Defendants-appellants Idarado Mining Company,
Newmont Mining Corporation, and Newmont Services
Limited appeal from a mandatory injunction issued by
the district court on February 22, 1989. Plaintiff-appellee
State of Colorado (State) is the beneficiary of the injunc-
tion, issued on the authority of the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9626, as amended by the
1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act

App. 3

(SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). Subse-
quent to the issuance of the injunction, the district court
entered judgment in favor of the State for past response
costs plus prejudgment interest. State of Colorado v. Idarado
Mining Co., 735 F. Supp. 368 (D. Colo. 1990). That inter-
locutory order is not the subject of this appeal. See Appel-
lants’ Motion for Consolidation at 3 (filed May 10, 1990).

The injunction issued on the authority of § 121(e)(2)
of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9621(e)(2), directs appellants to
carry out an extensive environmental cleanup plan pro-
posed by the State and adopted, with various modifica-
tions, by the district court. See Colorado v. Idarado Mining
Co., 707 F. Supp. 1227, 1232, 1261-63 (D. Colo. 1989),
amended in part, 735 F. Supp. 368 (1990). In December
1989, a three-judge panel of this court stayed the injunc-
tion pending appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 8(a); 10th Cir. R.
8.1. The district court’s jurisdiction arose under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201 and § 113(b) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 9613(b); our
jurisdiction to consider the appeal from the district
court’s grant of an injunction arises under 28 U.S.C.
1292(a)(1).

I.

As enacted in 1980 and amended in 1986, CERCLA
was designed to facilitate cleanup of environmental con-
tamination caused by releases of hazardous substances.
The act sets forth several inechanisms for responding to
such releases and delineates the respective powers of the
federal government, the states, Indian Tribes and private
parties. Section 111 of CERCLA provides for the creation
of a Hazardous Substance Superfund to finance cleanup

App. 4

actions at sites affected by releases or threatened releases
of hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C. § 9611. Section 104(a)
authorizes the federal government to take necessary
cleanup actions financed by the Superfund to respond to
such releases or threatened releases. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a).
Alternatively, under § 104(d), the federal government
may enter into cooperative agreements with states, politi-
cal subdivisions or Indian Tribes to conduct cleanup
actions using the Superfund. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(d).

To shift the financial burden of a cleanup to the
parties responsible for the releases, a governmental entity
may sue these parties for the costs incurred in responding
to a release. CERCLA § 107(a); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). In such
a cost recovery action, responsible parties include, among
others, the “owner or operator” of the facility from which
the release occurred. Id. Even when no cooperative agree-
ment exists permitting use of Superfund money for
cleanup, CERCLA § 114(a) preserves the right of a state
or other party to proceed under applicable state law to
conduct a cleanup of a site affected by hazardous subs-
tances. 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a). States or other parties which
incur response costs not financed by the Superfund may
bring a cost recovery action against the responsible par-
ties. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).

When a cost recovery action is brought by the federal
government, a state, an Indian Tribe or a private party,
§ 107(a)(4) imposes liability on responsible parties for
response costs “not inconsistent with the national contin-
gency plan [NCP].” 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4). The NCP con-
sists of procedurai and substantive guidelines issued by
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) governing
CERCLA cleanup actions. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (1989).

App. 5

Liability among responsible parties is joint and several,
O'Neill v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178-79 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1115 (1989), and one responsible party may seek
contribution from other responsible parties, 42 U.S.C.
9613(f).

In addition to the authority to finance cleanups from
the Superfund and to recover costs from responsible par-
ties, CERCLA provides the federal government with
additional power to deal with releases of hazardous subs-
tances by bringing an abatement action in federal district
court. See generally Koppers Indus., Inc. v. United States
EPA, 902 F.2d 756, 757 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990) (discussing
federal options); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Mor-
rison Grain Co., 734 F. Supp. 437, 441 (D. Kan. 1990)
(same). If the President determines that a release or
threatened release may pose “an imminent and substan-
tial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the
environment,” § 106(a) provides that the federal govern-
ment may seek “such relief as the public interest and the
equities of the case may require.” 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).
Such relief may include a mandatory injunction compel-
ling responsible parties to perform a cleanup. See, e.g.,
United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162,
192 (W.D. Mo. 1985). However, § 106(a) does not allow a
state, with or without a cooperative agreement, to seek
injunctive relief against responsible parties. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 9606(a). Whether that authorization is found elsewhere
in CERCLA is the subject of this appeal.

Il.

This action relates to a cleanup of a highly miner-
alized area that has been prospected and mined

App. 6

extensively throughout the century. Idarado, 707 F. Supp.
at 1234. According to the State, Idarado and iis codefen-
dants are responsible for various metallic releases in cer-
tain rivers and creeks located between the towns of
Teluride [sic] and Ouray in southwestern Colorado. The
sources of these releases are tailings piles, mine portals
and waste rock piles. Tailings essentially are finely
ground ore from which most of the valuable metal has
been removed by the milling process. Because some metal
remains, however, tailings piles release metal when water
flows over or seeps through them. Portals are mine open-
ings originally used for access to underground mines.
Water entering a mine by seepage from the surface or by
groundwater movement can pick up metals while flowing
through mineralized materials underground and then
exiting through the mine portals. Waste rock is material
removed from a mine lacking sufficient metal content to
warrant further processing. Like tailings, waste rock can
release metals upon contact with water flows.

Idarado’s properties are located in three areas. Two
are in the Telluride and Red Mountain valleys, separated
by the mountains in which Idarado’s mine is located. The
Telluride Valley property contains six tailings piles and
two mine portals. Id. at 1233. The San Miguel River flows
through Idarado’s property, down the valley, and past the
town of Telluride. The Red Mountain Valley property
contains five tailings piles and several portals and waste
rock piles. Id. Red Mountain Creek flows through the
valley past Idarado’s property and empties into the
Uncompahgre River above the town of Ouray. The third
property is known as the High Country, consisting of the

App. 7

mountain basins between the Telluride and Red Moun-
tain Valleys. The parties have agreed in large part upon
remediation for the High Country.

The State of Colorado initiated this action against

Idarado, its parent company, Newmont Mining Corpora-

tion, and a subsidiary of the parent which had provided

| services to Idarado, Newmont Services Limited. The

State’s complaint, as amended, sought to hold the defen-

dants liable for cleanup costs associated with the Idarado

mining properties.! Following the enactment of SARA in

1986, the state further supplemented its pleadings to seek
an injunction directing Idarado to cleanup the sites.

In March 1987, the State issued a Record of Decision
(ROD) which contained its proposed plan for remedial
activities to be undertaken at the sites. Thereafter, the
district court ruled that Newmont Mining was an “owner
and operator” of the Idarado facilities and that Newmont
Services was an “operator” of those facilities because

1 The State’s amended complaint also included pendent
state law claims, but these were dismissed by the district court.
The State also sought monetary recovery for damage to natural
resources pursuant to CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(C). See 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(4)(C). Idarado filed third-party claims for contribu-
tion under CERCLA § 113(f), against certain other owners of
mining facilities in the Red Mountain Valley. See 42 U.S.C.
9613(f). With the consent of the parties, the district court bifur-
cated the trial into two consecutive phases: a remedy/response
cost phase and a natural resource damage phase. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 42(b); State of Colorado v. Idarado, No. 83-C-2385, Order
Bifurcating Trial at 1-2 (D. Colo. filed Apr. 20, 1987). The
district court also severed Idarado’s third-party claims for
contribution. The natural resource damage phase and the con-
tribution phase have yet to take place.

ill

App. 8

both entities “were involved directly in day-to-day opera-
tions of Idarado Mining Company and the sites here in
dispute.” See Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co., 18 Env’tl. L.
Rep. (Envt'l. L. Inst.) 20578, 20579 (D. Colo. 1987); see also
United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 22
(D.R.I.), aff'd, 910 F2d 24,___ (Ist Cir. 1990). Accordingly,
Newmont Mining and Newmont Services, as well as
Idarado Mining, were held liable under CERCLA
§ 107(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1).

During twenty-six trial days, the district court con-
sidered the testimony of over thirty witnesses and
received over 1,000 documents into evidence. The record
on appeal consists of sixty volumes and we obtained the
pleadings below. Much of the evidence concerns the
extent, if any, of environmental harm and whether the
proposed remediation alternatives presented by the State
and Idarado were technically feasible, cost-effective and
consistent with the NCP. The district court determined
that surface and ground water had been contaminated by
releases from tailings, as evidenced by damage to the
aquatic environment. Idarado, 707 F. Supp. at 1236-37,
1249, 1252, 1255. With various modifications, the district
court determined the State’s plan “effectively protects
and minimizes threats to public health, welfare and the
environment.” Id. at 1261. Having declared the defen-
dants liable for future cleanup activity under CERCLA
§ 107(a)(4)(A), the court entered a mandatory injunction
requiring the defendants to execute the State’s plan as
modified. Idarado, 707 F. Supp. at 1262. The district court
indicated that it would retain jurisdiction over the parties

App. 9

to insure full compliance with its order conc »rning reme-
dial activities. Id. The district court also retains jurisdic-
tion also to resolve the plaintiffs’ pending claims for
natural resource damage and defendants’ third-party
claims for contribution.?

Il.

On appeal, defendants contend that the district court
(1) lacked authority under CERCLA to grant the State
injunctive relief, (2) made inadequate and unsupported
findings of fact in deciding that the State’s cleanup plan
was “not inconsistent with” the NCP, (3) lacked authority
to hold the defendants liable for the permanent relocation

2 In interlocutory appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), the district court retains jurisdiction to act
on matters not involved in the appeal. 9 J. Moore, B. Ward & B.
Lucas, Moore’s Federal Practice J 203.11 (2d ed. 1990); Garcia v.
Burlington N. R.R. Co., 818 F.2d 713, 721 (10th Cir. 1987).
However, the district court is generally without jurisdiction to
proceed when an interlocutory appeal is from the rejection of a
double jeopardy defense or the denial of absolute or qualified
immunity. Stewart v. Donges, Nos. 88-2454 & 88-3020, slip op. at
9-10 (10th Cir. Sep. 17, 1990) [1990 WL 132564].

Here, the interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)
is from the district court’s grant of a mandatory injunction,
thus, “the district court retains power to act on the case pend-
ing appeal.” 16 C. Wright, A. Miller, E. Cooper & E. Gressman,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 3921 at 26 (1977). And the
district “court in its discretion may suspend, modify, restore,
or grant an injunction during the pendency of the appeal.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c). Accord 9 Moore’s Federal Practice J 203.11
(appeal from the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction
does not “divest the district court of jurisdiction to proceed
with the action on the merits.”).

App. 10

of the residents of a trailer park, (4) improperly held
defendants liable for cleaning up Red Mountain Creek,
(5) improperly held defendant's [sic] liable for remedia-
tion of releases from certain mine portals, and (6) improp-
erly held that the defendants Newmont Mining Corp. and
Newmont Services Ltd. were owners or operators of
defendant Idarado’s facilities. We vacate the district
court’s injunction and remand on the basis of the first and
third points. We decline to decide the remaining issues at
this time because the district court will modify its relief
based upon this opinion and various portions of the case,
which could affect the phase just completed, have yet to
be resolved. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetri-
cians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 757 (1986) (discussing
principles of pendent appellate jurisdiction in the injunc-
tion context); Tri-State Generation & Transmission v. Sho-
shone River Power, Inc., 874 F.2d 1346, 1351-53 (10th Cir.
1989) (same); see also Hill v. Department of the Air Force, 884
F.2d 1318, 1320 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206
(1990) (on appeal from denial of qualified immunity,
court considered merits of non-immunity issue); Dube v.
State Univ., 900 F.2d 587, 598-600 (2d Cir. 1990) (same).

A.

Defendants argue that even if we decide that the
district court lacked authority to issue the mandatory
injunction, we should exercise pendent appellate jurisdic-
tion over whether the State’s plan is “not inconsistent
with” the NCP because this issue is critical to the imple-
mentation of an appropriate remedy, regardless of who
actually implements the remedy. Appellaris’ Brief at 41
n.28. Without question, we have jurisdiction to consider

App. 11

those matters which are closely related to the grant or
denial of the injunction. Asset Allocation & Management v.
Western Employers Ins. Co., 892 F.2d 566, 568-69 (7th Cir.
1989); Tri-State, 874 F.2d at 1351-52. We also have discre-
tionary jurisdiction to consider “rulings that are related
but not essential to the validity of the injunction.” Asset
Allocation, 892 F.2d at 569; Tri-State, 874 F.2d at 1352-53.
Important factors which inform our discretion whether to
exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction include (1)
whether the otherwise nonappealable issue is sufficiently
developed, both factually and legally, for our review, Tri-
State, 874 F.2d at 1352, (2) whether review of the appeal-
able issue involves consideration of factors closely related
or relevant to the otherwise nonappealable issue,
McCowan v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 908 F.2d 1099, 1104 (2d
Cir.), petition for cert. filed, No. 90-274 (Aug. 13, 1990);
Dube, 900 F.2d at 598; Tri-State, 874 F.2d at 1352, and (3)
whether judicial economy will be better served by resolv-
ing the otherwise nonappealable issue, notwithstanding
the federal policy against piecemeal appeals, see
McCowan, 908 F.2d at 1099 (although pendent appellate
jurisdiction should be used sparingly, pendent review of
otherwise nonappealable issue was “a wise and time
saving exercise of . . . discretion”); Tri-State, 874 F.2d at
1352 (not exercising pendent appellate jurisdiction over
otherwise nonappealable issue that did not need further
development of record would be a “waste of judicial
resources”).

B.

This is a case in which the district court bifurcated
the trial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b), see supra n.1;

App. 12

“{t]here is no final judgment until all of the issues have
been resolved and judgment entered on the whole case.”
9C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2392
(1971 & 1990 Supp.). This interlocutory appeal concerns
the district court’s authority to grant injunctive relief; our
resolution turns on the construction of CERCLA §§ 121(e)
and 101(24), rather than on the remaining issues raised by
defendants under other provisions of CERCLA. Although
the defendants are confident that the district court will
not reconsider its findings and conclusions on these
remaining issues, see Appellants’ Brief at 41 n.28., we
simply do not have before us a judgment which finally
resolves the remedial issue consistent with liability per-
mitted under the Act. Nor do we have before us the
district court’s interlocutory order awarding the State
past response costs, which, in the interest of judicial
economy, should be considered at the same time the
State’s plan (as modified) is evaluated for cost recovery.

Any appellate determination about whether the
State’s plan is “not inconsistent with” the NCP, is primar-
ily factual, and in view of our resolution of the injunction
issue, not closely related to the merits we must address.
In Tri-State, we stated that “this court as a matter of law
may justifiably, though cautiously, decide other generally
nonappealable legal issues.” 874 F.2d at 1352 (emphasis
added). There, the district court determined as a matter
of law that the buyer in a requirements contract did not
have an implied obligation to remain in business and
declined to grant a permanent injunction. On appeal, this
court found an absence of irreparable harm which would

App. 13

support a permanent injunction, but nonetheless consid-
ered the merits of the contract issue, a legal issue involv-
ing contract interpretation. Id. at 1352-53. This court
reversed the district court on its application of contract
law, but declined to exercise pendent appellate jurisdic-
tion over matters which involve the application of well-
established legal standards of review (e.g. abuse of dis-
cretion, sufficiency of the evidence) to the trial evidence.
Id. at 1353. Thus, although some issues were sufficiently
well developed factually to review, see Thornburgh, 476
U.S. at 757, the court nonetheless declined to exercise
pendent appellate jurisdiction over issues concerning
remititur, new trial and judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. Tri-State, 874 F.2d at 1353.

In points two (adequacy of district court findings
whether State’s plan is “not inconsistent with” the NCP)
and four (whether defendants are liable for remediation
of Red Mountain Creek), the defendants are challenging
in large part whether the district court’s factual findings
are supported by the record. These claims primarily con-
cern application of the clearly erroneous standard of
review to the voluminous record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
We decline to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over
these claims in the interest of judicial efficiency and con-
sistency. These issues should be resolved when past
response costs and any natural resource damages are
considered. At that time, any subsequent factual findings
will be before us. Resolving numerous fact-bound issues
in a single appeal from a final judgment is in keeping
with this court’s concern with judicial efficiency.

Defendants’ point five (whether releases from the
Mill and Meldrum Tunnel mine portals constitute

App. 14

federally permitted releases which are exempt from
CERCLA liability) and point six (whether Newmont Min-
ing may be held liable as an “owner and operator” and
Newmont Services as an “operator”) do contain legal
issues, however, our preliminary review of the district
court’s factual findings and legal conclusions and the
record on appeal convince us that the factual issues pre-
dominate and are best resolved on appeal from a final
judgment. In the exercise of our discretion, we decline to
review all points but those most directly related to the
injunctive relief. Hence, we decide defendants’ points one
and three at this time.

IV.

The State’s position concerning the authority of the
district court to grant injunctive relief must be examined
with reference to those courts which have considered this
issue, legislative history and, most importantly, the lan-
guage of the statute and its reasonable interpretation in
light of CERCLA. CERCLA is a remedial statute and its
provisions should be construed liberally, but with due
regard for executive and legislative intent as reflected in
the enactment process and the statute itself. See Kayser-
Roth, 910 F.2d at __; State of New York v. Shore Realty, 759
F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d Cir. 1985).

A.

Prior to the amendment of CERCLA, several courts
had rejected the position that injunctive relief was avail-
able to states and other non-federal plaintiffs. In Shore
Realty, the Second Circuit rejected New York’s claim that

App. 15

a district court has inherent or implied power to grant
injunctive relief under § 107 of CERCLA in view of the
express injunctive authority and accompanying standard
for injunctive relief contained in § 106. 759 F.2d at 1049-50
(construing 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606, 9607). Section 106 specifi-
cally identifies the federal government as entitled to
injunctive relief; allowing an injunction under § 107
(which is silent concerning injunctive relief) would ren-
der § 106’s express language surplusage. Shore Realty, 759
F.2d at 1049. Moreover, the standard for obtaining relief
in an abatement action under § 106 is narrower than that
in a cost recovery action under § 107. Allowing injunctive
relief to any § 107 plaintiff would conflict with § 106’s
narrower scope. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1049. Accord
Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. at 231-32; Cadillac
Fairview/California, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 21 Env’t Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1108, 1115-17 (C.D. Cal. 1984), aff’d in perti-
nent part, 840 F.2d 691, 696-97 (9th Cir. 1988); Velsicol
Chem. Corp. v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 21 Env’t Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 2118, 2121 (E.D. Tenn. 1984). On appeal and below,
the State concedes that, prior to the effective date of the
SARA amendments in 1986, a state could not obtain
injunctive relief under CERCLA requiring private defen-
dants to implement a state cleanup plan.3

Courts have adhered to the view that injunctions are
not available to states and other non-federal plaintiffs

3 See State’s Answer Brief at 5; Plaintiff’s Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Claims
for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief to Enforce or Approve Its
Remedial Action Plan at 9 (D. Colo. filed May 14, 1987), incor-
porating Plaintiff’s Trial Memorandum § XIII at 150-51 (D. Colo.
filed Apr. 20, 1987).

App. 16

under CERCLA, even after the 1986 SARA amendments.
See Cadillac Fairview, 840 F.2d at 696-97; United States v.
Cannons Eng’g Corp., 720 F. Supp. 1027, 1052 (D. Mass.
1989), aff’d, 899 F.2d 79 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v.
Akzo Coatings, 719 F. Supp. 571, 577-78 (E.D. Mich. 1988);
McGregor v. Industrial Excess Landfill, Inc., 709 F. Supp.
1401, 1408-09 (N.D. Ohio 1987), aff'd, 856 F.2d 39 (6th Cir.
1988); State of Vermont v. Staco, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 822, 835
(D. Vt. 1988); Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176, 1180
(M.D. Tenn. 1988); Utah State Dep't of Health v. Ng, 649 F.
Supp. 1102, 1105-06 (D. Utah 1986).

B.

The State argues that injunctive relief for states is
now authorized by CERCLA § 121(e)(2), 42 U.S.C.
9621t{e)€2) which provides in part:

A State may enforce any Federal or State stan-
dard, requirement, criteria, or limitation to
which the remedial action is required to con-
form under this Act in United States district
court for the district in which the facility is
located.

Section 121 of CERCLA, added by SARA, deals with
cleanup standards applicable to federal cleanup actions,
and with the rights of the states to participate in such
federal remedial activities. Section 121(e)(2)4 allows a

4 The section provides:

A State may enforce any Federal or State standard,
requirement, criteria, or limitation to which the
remedial action is required to conform under this Act

(Continued on following page)

App. 17

state to insure that a remedy of federal character will
comply with substantive federal and state cleanup stan-
dards required of federal remedies under CERCLA.

The district court referenced § 121(e)(2) and con-
cluded that “injunctive relief also is available to the State
under CERCLA.” Idarado, 707 F. Supp. at 1232. For the
reasons that follow, we hold that the structure of
CERCLA does not permit the injunctive relief granted in
these circumstances, notwithstanding § 121(e)(2).

In a presentation that does not cultivate simplicity,
the State reminds us that § 121(e)(2) allows a state injunc-
tive relief “to enforce any requirement to which the reme-
dial action is required to conform.” Appellee’s Brief at 6.
According to the State, the standards, requirements, crite-
ria, or limitations referred to in § 121(e)(2) include the
requirements of CERCLA and the NCP, as well as appli-
cable requirements of federal and state environmental

(Continued from previous page)

in United States district court for the district in
which the facility is located. Any consent decree
shall require the parties to attempt expeditiously to
resolve disagreements concerning implementation of
the remedial action informally with the appropriate
Federal and State agencies. Where the parties agree,
the consent decree may provide for administrative
enforcement. Each consent decree shall also contain
stipulated penalties for violations of the decree in an
amount not to exceed $25,000 per day, which may be
enforced by either the President or the State. Such
stipulated penalties shall not be construed to impair
or affect the authority of the court to order compli-
ance with the specific terms of any such decree.

42 U.S.C. § 9621(e)(2).

App. 18

law (ARARs).5 Appellee’s Brief at 6 (citing CERCLA
121(d); 40 C.FR. 300.68(i)(1) & 300.71(a)(4) (1989)). The
State then argues that it was required to integrate all
ARARs described in the NCP regulations into its plan
pursuant to 40 C.FR. § 300.71(a)(4), and, therefore,
should be granted an injuction [sic] to enforce such
requirements. Appellee’s Brief at 9. The State further
argues, relying upon 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(e)(1), that because
its cost recovery action under CERCLA § 107 was
required to be “not inconsistent with” the NCP, the
State’s remedial action plan has incorporated NCP stan-
dards as well, and the State must be allowed injunctive
relief to uphold NCP standards. Appellee’s Brief at 9-11.
Next, the State argues that when the district court
approved the State’s remedial action plan with minor
modification, the State’s plan became an additional
requirement to which the remedial action was required to
conform and, consequently, injunctive relief was avail-
able. Id. at 12-13. Finally, the State argues that the district
court had inherent equitable authority to grant injunctive
relief. Id. at 25-28.

“a

The State’s position is untenable because it ignores
the scope of § 121 and fails to view the provision in the
context of CERCLA, which still contains an express and
limited grant of injunctive authority in § 106. Section
§ [sic] 121(e)(2) allows states to enforce requirements of

5 These other federal and state requirements are com-
monly designated as “applicable or relevant and appropriate
requirements,” and abbreviated as ARARs.

sisal namin

App. 19

remedial actions embodied in consent decrees under
CERCLA and describes requirements of such consent
decrees. We may consult legislative history as a second-
ary source of a statute’s meaning, Miller v. Commissioner,
836 F.2d 1274, 1282-83 (10th Cir. 1988), and our under-
standing of § 121(e)(2) is in accord with the Conference
Report addressing the 1986 amendments enacted by
SARA. About § 121(e)(2), the Report indicates:

States are given the authority to enforce require-
ments of consent decrees to which the remedial
action must conform, in Federal district court.
Consent decrees are to contain dispute resolu-
tion and enforcement provisions, and may
include administrative enforcement. Consent
decrees must contain stipulated penalties for
violations of the decree of $25,000 per day,®
enforceable by the President or the State.

H.R. Rep. No. 99-962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 249 (1986). Our
job in construing statutes is to effectuate the intent
reflected in the language of the enactment and the legisla-
tive process, however, neither the text of § 121(e)(2) nor
the relevant legislative history supports the State’s expan-
Sive interpretation.

By its express terms, § 121(e)(2) limits a state’s
enforcement authority to “any Federal or State standard,
requirement, criteria, or limitation to which the remedial
action is required to conform under this Act [CERCLA].”
We agree with amicus United States and the defendants
that the term “the remedial action” for purposes of
§ 121(e)(2) pertains to the remedial action encompassed

® Section 121(e)(2) as enacted allows for penalties “in an
amount not to exceed $25,000 ner day.”

App. 20

by § 121. Section 121 unquestionably envisions a remedial]
action selected by the federal government or its dele-
gates.

Section 121 provides a general description of the
criteria, methods, and procedures which EPA must follow
in the selection_of a remedial action. Section 121 begins:

(a) Selection of remedial action. The President
shall select appropriate remedial actions deter-
mined to be necessary to be carried out under
section 104 or secured under section 106 which
are in accordance with this section and, to the
extent practicable, the national contingency
plan, and which provide for cost effective
response... .

Section 121 pertains to remedial actions selected by the
President through EPA. Not only in § 121(a), but also in
§§ 121(c) and (d)(2)(A), § 121 refers to remedial actions
under §§ 104 and 106, which are remedies selected by the
federal government or its delegates. Section 121(d) like-
wise refers to “[r]emedial actions selected under this
section or otherwise required or agreed to by the Presi-
dent under this Act. ...” Thus, the term “remedial
action” in § 121(e)(2) means a remedial action which is
selected by the federal government or its delegates. The
remedial action plan developed by the State of Colorado
was not undertaken by the EPA pursuant to CERCLA
§§ 104 or 106.7

7 The State’s Record of Decision (ROD) puts the matter
this way:

The remedial action in this case is not undertaken

pursuant to section 104 or 106 of . . . CERCLA, as

(Continued on following page)

ee ee

App. 21

To adopt the State’s interpretation would defeat the
intended scope of state involvement as contained in
§ 121(f). Section 121(f) provides a mechanism for state
involvement in the selection and adoption of remedial
actions which are federal in character. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9621(f)(1)-(3). For example, states must be given a “rea-
sonable opportunity for... review and comment” on
investigations, feasibility studies, and planned remedial
actions. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(f)(1)(E). Prior to entry of a
federal consent decree in which the EPA waives a federal
or state standard (ARAR), under § 121(d)(4), a state is
given an opportunity to concur in the remedial action
and, if it does not, the state may intervene as of right. 42
U.S.C. § 9621(f)(2)(A) & (B). If the court upholds EPA’a
[sic] waiver of a standard, the state may seek to have the
standard incorporated into the remedial plan, provided
the state pays the additional costs. 42 U.S.C.
§ 121(f)(2)(B). When the EPA has determined that a par-
ticular standard or requirement is an ARAR for a particu-
lar remedial action, § 121(e)(2) merely allows a state to
enforce that standard or requirement as an ARAR con-
tained in a federal remedial action and implemented by a
consent decree.

(Continued from previous page)

amended by . .. SARA, 42 U.S.C. sec. 9604 and 9606
(1986), respectively. Therefore, the remedial action
selection process set out in section 121 of SARA, 42
U.S.C. sec. 9621 (1986), is not strictly applicable.

ROD, pl. ex. 168A at 73, reproduced in Appellants’ Addendum
of Exhibits at A-l. The State indicates that notwithstanding it

has determined cleanup levels in general conformity with § 121
and the NCP.

App. 22

To allow a state to select a plan independently and
then to commence an abatement action under § 121(e)(2)
would render these provisions irrelevant. Akzo Coatings,
719 F. Supp. at 578. Moreover, in cases in which the EPA
has waived a standard and a state does not agree, the
state could have two bites out of the apple when it comes
to challenging the waiver of an ARAR. Id. First, the state
could follow the procedure of § 121(f) and seek judicial
review prior to the entry of a consent order. Id. If the
district court upheld the EPA and the state was unwilling
to pay the extra cost of incorporating the waived ARAR
into the remedial action, the state could seek to enforce
the ARAR under § 121(e)(2), all without paying the extra
cost required under § 121(f)(2)(B). Id.

it is of no moment that such circumstances will not
occur in this case because the federal government is not
involved in the remedial plan. Peculiar consequences
would result from allowing a state to use § 121(e)(2) to
compel performance of its remedial plan when that plan
was developed without federal involvement. Most signif-
icantly, the states would enjoy greater injunctive author-
ity than the federal government, because the federal
government must make a showing of “imminent and
substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare”
when it seeks injunctive relief under § 106; no such
showing is necessary under § 121(e)(2). Finally, constru-
ing § 121(e)(2) to authorize injunctive relief in these cir-
cumstances, but relegating states challenging federal
consent decrees to the procedures in § 121(f)(2)(A) & (B)
would amount to pure judicial legislation.

App. 23

D.

Apart from these problems, we also must reject the
State’s arguments that conforming its plan to the NCP
and federal and state standards (ARARs) automatically
meant that its independently selected and financed reme-
dial plan was required to conform to those criteria within
the meaning of § 121(e)(2). Even if the State could over-
come the hurdle that § 121(e)(2) identifies a remedial
action selected by the federal government or its dele-
gates, the State would have to identify standards with
which CERCLA requires a state to comply as a prerequi-
site to selecting a plan. To be sure, several advantages
accrue to the State from compliance with CERCLA § 121
and the NCP, see NCP Proposed Rule, 53 Fed. Reg. 51,394,
51,4588 (Dec. 21, 1988). But § 121(d)(2), with exceptions

8 53 Fed. Reg. at 51,458 provides in part:

Subpart F does not require that States select
remedies for non-Fund-financed State-lead enforce-
ment sites in conformance with CERCLA section 121
and the remedy selection process specified in the
NCP. However, where a State-selected remedy does
not so conform, States and or PRPs may be at risk in
several ways, includig [sic] but not limited to the
following: (1) EPA will not concur with the recom-
mended remedy; (2) EPA may refuse to designate the
State as lead agency for any subsequent response
activities; (3) States and PRPs may be deprived of the
assurance that EPA will find it necessary later to
seek to compel further response actions; (4) EPA may
be unable to delete a site from the NPL and/or (5)
State cost recovery efforts may be hindered.

Failing to comply with CERCLA § 121 and the NCP selection
process would appear to carry far more significant conse-

quences than amicus United States and the defendants are
willing to admit.

App. 24

contained in § 121(d)(4), (f)(2) & (3), requires remedial
plans selected by the federal government or its delegates
to conform to federal and state standards, requirements,
criterion, or limitations, regardless of whether response
costs are sought. The same cannot be said with respect to
remedial plans selected independently by the State,
which developed this plan to be “not inconsistent with”
the NCP and with attention to § 121, in order to accrue
certain advantages, including cost recovery. See supra n.8.

The State has not identified “any Federal or State
standard, requirement, criteria, or limitation to which
[its] remedial action is required to conform under
[CERCLA]” see CERCLA § 121(e)(2) (emphasis added),
within the meaning of § 121(e)(2). The State’s reliance
upon 40 C.F.R. § 300.71(a)(4)9 (1989) is misplaced. The
State must comply with “all otherwise legally applicable
or relevant and appropriate Federal, State, and local

9 40 C.F.R. § 300.71(a)(4) (1989) provides:

Persons performing response actions that are
neither Fund-financed nor pursuant to action under
section 106 of CERCLA shall comply with all other-
wise legally applicable or relevant and appropriate
Federal, State, and local requirements, including per-
mit requirements.

This regulation was superseded by a new NCP effective April
9, 1990. EPA, National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution
Control Contingency Plan, 55 Fed. Reg. 8,666-8,865 (March 8,
1990). The new NCP provides that “[alny person may under-
take a response action to reduce or eliminate a release of
hazardous substance, pollutant or contaminant,” and also sets
forth prerequisites for § 107(a) cost recovery, including consis-
tency with the NCP and compliance with ARARs. Id.
§ 300.700(a)-(c), 40 [sic] Fed. Reg. 8,858-59.

App. 25

requirements, including permit requirements” id., not as
a condition to selecting its plan, but to recover its costs
under § 107. This interpretation is supported by the pre-
amble accompanying the 1985 NCP: “§ 300.71 does set
out the requirements that a private party or State must
meet for a response to be ‘consistent [or not consistent]
with the NCP’ to recover its costs from a responsible
party pursuant to CERCLA section 107.” NCP Final Rule,
50 Fed. Reg. 47,912, 47,934 (Nov. 20, 1985). The EPA
explained that “[tlo be consistent with the NCP for the
purposes of cost recovery under CERCLA, non-Fund-
financed responses must... . comply with all otherwise
applicable or relevant and appropriate Federal, State and
local requirements.” Id. at 47935.

Nor can the State take comfort from its citation of 40
C.F.R. § 300.68(i)(1)° (1989), requiring selection of a
remedial plan that complies with federal ARARs. Section
300.68(i)(1) by its terms applies to a “lead agency” which

10 40 C.FR. § 300.68(i) (1989) provides:

Selection of remedy. (1) The appropriate extent of
the remedy shall be determined by the lead agency’s
selection of a cost-effective remedial alternative that
effectively mitigates and minimizes threats to and
provides adequate protection of public health and
welfare and the environment. Except as provided in
§ 300.68(i)(5), this will require selection of a remedy
that attains or exceeds applicable or relevant and
appropriate Federal public health and environmental
requirements that have been identified for the spe-
cific site.

App. 26

is defined in § 40 C.F.R. 300.61! (1989) to include only
federal agencies and their delegates. The State is not a
lead agency under the regulation.

E.

The State also contends that its remedial actions were
required to comply with the NCP and other standards by
virtue of § 107(a). But merely because § 107(a) allows cost
recovery for response costs “not inconsistent with the
NCP does not mean that the State’s actions were required
by § 107(a) and now may [sic] enforced by injunctive
relief under § 121(e)(2). An action for state cost recovery
is permissive, not mandatory. To adopt the State’s
approach would mean that entitlement to injunctive relief
under § 121(e)(2) would turn on whether a state seeks
response costs. Building on this argument, however, the
State offers the following tautology: once the district
court found that the State’s plan was “not inconsistent
with” the NCP, the elements of the plan became require-
ments “to which the remedial action is required to con-
form under CERCLA.” That the plan must conform to
itself is circular, but putting that problem aside, the dis-
trict court’s finding that the plan is “not inconsistent
with” the NCP merely allows the State response costs on
remand (should it choose to implement the plan), not

11 40 C.FR. § 300.6 (1989) provides in pertinent pari:

Lead agency means the Federal agency (or State agency
operating pursuant to a contract or cooperative agree-
ment executed pursuant to section 104(d)(1) of
CERCLA) that has primary responsibility for coordinat-
ing response action under this Plan.

App. 27 :

injunctive relief. Neither the State nor anyone else is
required under CERCLA to implement this specific plan.

F.

The State’s last argument is that the district court had
inherent equitable authority to issue the injunction. How-
ever, application of a district court’s equitable power is
not appropriate when the statute carefully limits injunc-
tive relief as a remedy. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors,
Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19-20 (1979); Shore Realty, 759
F.2d at 1049; Ng, 649 F. Supp. at 1106; Cadillac Fairview, 21
Env’t Rep. Cas. at 1116. Although the State reminds us of
our obligation to construe CERCLA to effectuate its broad
remedial purpose, this does not endow federal courts,
carte blanche, to upset the balance between federal and
state authority envisioned by CERCLA. The states have
been given certain express authority in the statute. See,
e.g., CERCLA §§ 121(f)(1) (permitting review and com-
ment on proposed remedies); 121(f)(2) (permitting states
to seek compliance with state ARARs waived pursuant to
121(d)(4)); 107(a)(4)(A) (allowing cost recovery); 104(d)
(providing for cooperative agreements with states);
121(e)(2) (enabling states to enforce ARARs set forth in a
federal consent decree, regardless of whether the state is
a signatory to that decree). For us to imply injunctive
authority in these circumstances would exceed what was
contemplated by the executive and legislative branches in
enacting CERCLA and arrogate to ourselves powers
rightfully retained by those two branches of government.
See The Federalist No. 78 (A. Hamilton); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(h) (limiting federal court jurisdiction concerning
challenges to remedial action); Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d

App. 28

1091, 1095-98 (7th Cir.) Gudicial challenge to remedial
action under CERCLA §§ 104 or 106 permitted only after
remedial action is completed), petition for cert. filed, No.
90-354 (Aug. 28, 1990); State of Alabama v. United States
EPA, 871 F.2d 1548, 1557-60 (11th Cir.) (same), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 538 (1989).

V.

As part of the remedial action plan, the district court
thought itself empowered to order the defendants to relo-
cate permanently the month-to-month tenants of the Pan-
dora Trailer Park, so that the State could implement its
remediation plan. Idarado, 707 F. Supp. at 1258-59. The
trailer owners rent the land from defendant Idarado. Id.
at 1259. From the preceding, it is clear that the district
court did not derive such power from § 121(e)(2).

Defendants argue that the district court’s action con-
flicts with CERCLA § 101(24), which in defining “reme-
dial action” provides in pertinent part:

The term includes the cost of permanent reloca-
tion of residents and businesses and community
facilities where the President determines that,
alone or in combination with other measures,
such relocation is more cost-effective than and
environmentally preferable to the transporta-
tion, storage, treatment, destruction, or secure
disposition offsite of hazardous substances, or
may otherwise be necessary to protect the pub-
lic health or welfare;....

42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (emphasis added). As an initial mat-
ter, we note that the statute refers to the “cost of perma-
nent relocation,” so § 101(24) does not empower the

App. 29

district court to grant injunctive relief to implement the
State’s permanent relocation plan. Continuing, however,
the district court looked to the purpose of the relocation
in deciding that a Presidential order was not a prerequi-
site for such permanent relocation costs. It determined
that because the State was “not attempting to relocate the
persons to a new area to isolate them from exposure to
toxic waste,” but rather to implement its remediation
plan for the Idarado facility as a whole, the requirement
of a Presidential order contained in § 101(24) did not
apply. Idarado, 707 F. Supp. at 1258. Another district court
has concluded that permanent relocation costs “must be
approved by the President to be categorized as reimburs-
able response costs.” T & E Indus. v. Safety Light Corp., 680
F. Supp. 696, 707 (D.N.J. 1988).

The legislative history on this point indicates that on-
site remediation normally is preferred because it is signif-
icantly less expensive. S. Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 55-56. Even among off-site remedial alternatives,
permanent relocation is one “of the most costly possible
actions.” Id. “To assist the President in determining the
appropriate remedial action, specific criteria are included
in the definitior of remedy for” permanent relocation. See
id. at 55. The Senate Report on the bill from which this
provision originated continues:

The term “remedy” includes the cost of per-
manently locating residences, businesses, or
community facilities when relocation would be
more cost-effective than, an [sic] environmen-
tally preferable to, other off-site remedial
actions. In addition to these considerations, a
decision to provide permanent relocation may

App. 30

be based, at least in part, on findings from epi-
demiological or other health effect studies
which, in the opinion of the President, demon-
strate that a) there is a substantial probability
that exposure to hazardous substances from the
site has caused or is likely to cause or contribute
to adverse health effect; b) even after remedial
actions are taken, persons remaining in the
vicinity of the site would be exposed to hazard-
ous substances; and c) such exposure has a sig-
nificant likelihood of causing or contributing to
adverse health effects or exacerbating existing
conditions.

Id. This legislative history confirms that permanent
relocation ordinarily would be permissible only upon a
Presidential finding that on-site and other off-site cleanup
alternatives would not be as cost-effective or environ-
mentally sound as permanent relocation. See 40 C.FR.
300.6 (1989) (definition of “remedy or remedial action”).

Thus, the Presidential determination requirement
applies when permanent relocation is to protect residents
from exposure to hazardous substances. Given the over-
riding concern for efficient use of remediation resources,
the requirement also should apply when the land on
which they reside is to be used for constructing remedial
facilities. The statute is broad enough to encompass the
latter situation; the President could make a finding that
such action “was otherwise necessary to protect public
health and welfare,” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24); 40 C.F.R. 300.6
(1989). Merely because the legislative history addresses
the most common (and potentially serious) situation does
not mean that § 101(24) does not apply to other perma-
nent relocation proposals. The purpose of requiring a

App. 31

Presidential determination for the alternative of perma-
nent relocation is to inform and control discretion con-
cerning the very costly alternative of permanent
relocation; our holding serves these purposes. We note
that “temporary evacuation and housing of threatened
individuals” is within the definition of a removal action
under CERCLA § 101(23). 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) [sic]; Lutz
v. Chroamtex, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 413, 419-20 (M.D. Pa.
1989); T & E Indus., 680 F. Supp. at 707. However, the
State’s plan calls for permanent relocation under
CERCLA § 101(24). See Appellee’s Brief at 45.

Moreover, the district court’s decision requiring
defendants to bear the costs of permanently relocating
the tenants would diminish defendant Idarado’s rights
under Colorado law, in the likely event that Idarado
chooses to cease renting its property so that the property
may be used in the cleanup effort. Under Colorado law, a
month-to-month tenancy may be terminated on thirty
days notice. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-12-202(d) (1989 Supp.);
Hurricane v. Kanover, Ltd., 651 P.2d 1218, 1222 (Colo. 1982).
The contended-for judicial rule, that recovery of “perma-
nent relocation” costs is permissible without reference to
extant property interests, is a call for abrogation of State-
created property interests which the statute or legislative
history of § 101(24) does not support. Under ° ¢e district
court’s approach, Idarado gets only the burdens of the
tenancies, without the obvious benefit that month-to-
month tenancies provide should the State perform the
plan. The district court’s approach would lead to the odd
result that, having permanently relocated all the tenants
and incurring massive capital expenditures, Idarado
would bear the risk that any or all of the tenants could

App. 32

terminate on thirty days notice. CERCLA does not require
such fleecing.

REVERSED and REMANDED. Upon remand, the dis-
trict shall VACATE its mandatory injunction requiring the
defendants to perform the State’s cleanup plan (as mod-
ified) and VACATE its prohibitory injunction concerning
the relationship between Idarado and its tenants in the
Pandora Trailer Park.

App. 33

APPENDIX B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

CASE NO. 83-C-2385

STATE OF COLORADO,
Plaintiff,

V.

IDARADO MINING COMPANY, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

CARRIGAN, J.

Plaintiff State of Colorado instituted this declaratory
judgment action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 asserting
claims under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601 et seq., as amended by the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act of 1986 [“SARA”], Pub. L. No.
99-499, 100 Stat. 1615 (1986) (collectively “CERCLA”) and
under the Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601
et seq., (“the TSCA”). Plaintiff seeks to impose liability
against the defendants for the cleanup of hazardous
wastes and for natura: resources damage at and near the
defendants’ mine and milling facilities located between
Ouray and Telluride, Colorado. Defendants are Idarado
Mining Company, Newmont Mining Corporation (“New-
mont Mining”) and Newmont Services Limited (“New-
mont Services”), all owners and operators of the Idarado
Mine. (For convenience only, these defendants may be

App. 34

referred to collectively as “Idarado” in this opinion. Maps
of the area at issue are appended as Exhibits A, B and C.)

Pursuant to CERCLA § 107(a)(1)-(4)(A) and (D), [42
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4)(A) and (D)], the State has sued to
recover its response costs incurred and to be incurred in
the cleanup of past and ongoing releases of hazardous
wastes at the mining site. Plaintiff state also seeks an
injunction under CERCLA § 121(e)(2), [42 U.S.C.
§ 9621(e)(2)] to implement certain remedial actions it
proposes to effectuate the cleanup process. In addition,
pursuant to CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(C), [42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(4)(C)], the State has sued for damages for
destruction of natural resources. Finally, the State seeks
an injunction under the TSCA compelling the defendants
to remedy the adverse environmental consequences
caused by their allegedly illegal mishandling of poly-
chlorinated biphenyls (“PCB’s”) at the site.

1 earlier granted the State’s motion to bifurcate trial
on the claim for natural resources damage. The State’s
claims under the TSCA and the CERCLA response costs
were tried to the court over twenty-six trial days. This
opinion constitutes my findings of fact, conclusions of
law and order as to the matters tried, pursuant to Rule 52,
Fed. R. Civ. P.

I. Scope of Liability Under CERCLA § 107(a), [42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)].

To establish liability under CERCLA, the State must
prove that (1) the defendants are owners or operators (2)
of a facility (3) from which there has been a release or a
threatened release, of a hazardous substance that causes

App. 35

response costs to be incurred. State of Colorado v.
ASARCO, Inc., Civil Action No. 83-C-2383, Slip Op. at 2
(D. Colo. Nov. 27, 1985). Defendant Idarado Mining Com-
pany has admitted that it is an owner and operator of the
Idarado Mine. In a previous order, | ruled that, for pur-
poses of CERCLA liability, Newmont Mining was both an
owner and an operator, and that Newmont Services was
an operator, of the Idarado property and sites at issue.

Moreover, I have previously determined that the
defendant Idarado Mining Company is liable to the State
under CERCLA § 107(a), [42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)] for the
release, or threatened release of a hazardous substance
from a facility that has caused the State to incur response
costs. That holding applies equally to the liability of
Newmont Services and Newmont Mining.

Generally, CERCLA authorizes the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (“USEPA”) to under-
take pollution abatement and cleanup efforts and then
seek reimbursement for cleanup costs from responsible
parties. The National Contingency Plan (“the NCP”), 40
C.F.R. Part 300 (1986), prepared by the USEPA, outlines
the administrative process that governs these cleanup
efforts by establishing procedures and standards applica-
ble to the response actions.

Like the USEPA, states can sue responsible parties to
recover remedial and removal costs. To prevail, a State’s
response efforts must be “not inconsistent with the NCP.”
United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co.,
810 F.2d 726, 747 (8th Cir. 1986); State of New York v. Shore
Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1041 (2d Cir. 1985); State ex rel.
Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F.Supp. 1300, 1315 (N.D. Ohio

App. 36

1983). CERCLA § 121(d)(1), [42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(1)], pro-
vides that:

“Remedial actions selected under this sec-
tion . . . shall attain a degree of cleanup of
hazardous substances, pollutants, and contami-
nants released into the environment and of con-
trol of further release at a minimum which
assures protection of human health and the
environment. Such remedial actions shall be rel-
evant and appropriate under the circumstances
presented by the release or threatened release of
such substance, pollutant, or contaminant.”

Pursuant to the NCP, a detailed environmental inves-
tigation of the area is performed and the feasibility of
various remedial alternatives is analyzed. The Remedial
Investigation (“RI”), or first component, determines the
nature and extent of the harm caused or threatened by
the release of hazardous substances into the environment
at a site. The Feasibility Study (“FS”), or second compo-
nent, is the evaluation of proposed remedies. These two
components are interdependent and may be conducted
concurrently.

CERCLA § 121(d)(2)(A), [42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(2)(A)]
requires that applicable or relevant and appropriate fed-
eral and state environmental and public health require-
ments be identified and applied to the response action
undertaken at the site. Under the NCP, ‘applicable
requirements’ mean “those Federal requirements that
would be legally applicable, whether directly, or as incor-
porated by a Federally authorized State program, if the
response actions were not undertaken pursuant to
CERCLA section 104 or 106.” 40 C.F.R. § 300.6. Also,
pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 300.6,

scinaiaditnaiiaitta ——

App. 37

“{rlelevant and appropriate requirements are
those Federal requirements that, while not
‘applicable,’ are designed to apply to problems
sufficiently similar to those encountered at
CERCLA sites that their application is appropri-
ate. Requirements may be relevant and appro-
priate if they would be ‘applicable’ but for
jurisdictional restrictions associated with the
requirement.”

After notice and an opportunity for public comment,
a comprehensive remedial action plan appropriate for the
site as a whole is selected utilizing the data gathered from
the RI/FS activities. The final remedy selected for the site
is issued as the Record of Decision (“ROD”). CERCLA
§ 121(d)(2)(A)(ii), [42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(2)(A)(ii)]; 40 CER.
§§ 300.68(i)(1), 300.71(a)(2)(ii)(B) and 300.71(a)(4).

CERCLA § 121(a), [42 U.S.C. § 9621(a)], requires that
the governmental response be “cost-effective,” taking
into consideration total long and short term costs, includ-
ing costs of operation and maintenance. Pursuant to 40
C.F.R. § 300.68(i), the NCP provides that:

“(1) The appropriate extent of the remedy shall
be determined by the . . . selection of a cost-
effective remedial alternative that effectively
mitigates and minimizes threats to and provides
adequate protection of public health and welfare
and the environment. . . . [T]his will require
selection of a remedy that attains or exceeds
applicable or relevant and appropriate Federal
public health and environmental requirements
that have been identified for the specific site.”

“(2) In selecting the appropriate extent of the
remedy from among the alternatives that will
achieve adequate protection of public health
and welfare and the environment in accordance
with § 300.68(i)(1), the lead agency will consider

App. 38

cost, technology, reliability, administrative and
other concerns, and their relevant effects on
public health and welfare and the environ-
ment.”

“(3) If there are no applicable or relevant and
appropriate Federal public health or environ-
mental requirements, the lead agency will select
that cost-effective alternative that effectively
mitigates and minimizes the threats to and pro-
vides adequate protection of public health and
welfare and the environment, considering cost,
technology, and the reliability of the remedy.”

“(4) Pertinent other Federal criteria, adviso-
ries, and guidance and State standards will be
considered and may be used in developing
alternatives, with adjustments for site-specific
circumstances.”

+ + *

Determining the appropriate removal and remedial
action involves specialized knowledge and expertise.
Where the federal government has sued polluters, the
courts have recognized that the choice of a particular
cleanup method is within the USEPA’s discretion, and the
applicable standard of judicial review is whether the
agency’s decision is arbitrary and capricious. United
States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co., 810
F.2d at 748; United States v. Ward, 618 FSupp. 884, 900
(E.D. N.Car. 1985). See also, CERCLA § 113(j)(2), [42
U.S.C. § 9613(j)(2)]. By analogy, this reasoning would
seem to apply to actions initiated by the states, at least
after a threshold showing of expertise in the state lead
agency. Nevertheless, at a pretrial hearing, I indicated

that I also would review the State’s response plan on the
merits.

—————x— °°

App. 39

Pursuant to CERCLA § 113(j)(3), [42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(j)(3)], if the court determines that the selected
response action was arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise
not in accordance with the law, “the court shall award (A)
only the response costs or damages that are not inconsis-
tent with the National Contingency Plan, and (B) such
other relief as is consistent with the National Contin-
gency Plan.” Thus, it is within my authority to modify the
State’s proposed plan or, alternatively, remand the matter
to the State for further study. Costs or damages may be
disallowed if serious procedural errors were made relat-
ing to matters of significant relevance. CERCLA
§ 113(j)(4), [42 U.S.C. § 9613(j)(4)].

I have previously ruled that the defendants bear the
burden of proving that the State’s selected remedial plan
and response costs incurred are not consistent with the
NCP. See, United States v. Ward, 618 FSupp. at 901; United
States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co., 579
F.2d at 747. The focus of this lawsuit is on that narrow
issue.

As I ruled in Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., supra, Con-
gress mandated that the parties responsible for environ-
mental pollution be held strictly liable for governmental
costs incurred in responding to clean up hazardous waste
and for natural resource damage, regardless of fault. See
also United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 FSupp. 1361,
1401 (D. N.H. 1985). The government is not required,
however, “to match the waste found to each defendant as
if it were matching fingerprints.” United States v. Ottati &
Goss, Inc., 630 F.Supp. at 1402. The defendant polluter

App. 40

must have deposited his waste at the site, and the hazard-
ous material found in that waste also must be present at
the site. Id.

This strict liability standard, however, is not absolute.
Under CERCLA § 107(b), [42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)], available
defenses include acts of God, acts of war, and acts or
omissions by third parties other than the defendants’
employees or agents, or other persons whose causal acts
or omissions occur in connection with a contractual rela-
tionship with the defendants. State of New York v. Shore
Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1042. The available defenses thus
are strictly defined by statute.

Defendants here asserted the additional defenses of
laches, estoppel, failure to mitigate damages and the
State’s encouragement of mining, but at trial produced no
adequate evidence to support any of these purported
defenses. Thus, while I have concluded that these
“defenses” are not available under the statute, I further
find and conclude that even if they were available none
of them has been established by the evidence.

With respect to suits involving several defendants, |
have held that the removal and remedial action liabilities
imposed by CERCLA § 107(a), [42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)] are
joint and several. State of Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., Case
No. 83-C-2388 (D. Colo., Order of May T3, 1985). See also
United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co.,
810 F.2d at 742-44. Moreover, since SARA, CERCLA
§ 113(f)(1), [42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1)] expressly provides for
the right to contribution in cases of multiple liability.

During trial, I denied the defendants’ several
motions to dismiss this action on the asserted grounds

Seni.

App. 41

that the State was not entitled to a declaratory judgment
or to injunctive relief. CERCLA § 113(g)(2), [42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(g)(2)], indicates that a declaratory judgment may
be entered, where appropriate, in government initiated
cost-recovery actions. See also State ex rel. Brown v. Geor-
geoff, 562 F.Supp. at 1316 (declaratory judgment available
to State in suit filed prior to SARA).

The State has incurred initial response costs as a
result of its remedial investigation conducted at the
Idarado site. The defendants have challenged the results
of the State’s investigation and proposed remedy. A sub-
stantial controversy exists between the parties and the
matter is now ripe for decision. CERCLA § 121(e)(2), [42
U.S.C. § 9621(e)(2)], added by SARA, provides that “A
State may enforce any Federal or State standard, require-
ment, criteria, (sic) or limitation to which the remedial
action is required to conform under this Chapter in the
United States district court for the district in which the
facility is located.” Thus injunctive relief also is available
to the State under CERCLA.

II. Overview of the Site.

The Idarado Mine (“mine” or “site”) is located in San
Miguel, Ouray and San Juan Counties in southwestern
Colorado. Idarado currently owns 10,574.46 acres, or
16.5226 square miles, of the property in this area. The
property consists largely of patented and unpatented
mining claims, and generally includes the adits, shafts,
underground mine workings, mine portals, mine waste
rock, and tailings ponds. The site involves three distinct

App. 42

natural areas: (1) the Telluride Valley, (2, the Red Moun-
tain area, and (3) the High Country between the two.

A. The Telluride Valley.

The Telluride Valley is a box canyon. Defendants’
mining and milling facilities are located near the canyon
head. The Town of Telluride is located downstream from
the mine and mill, toward the open end of the canyon
below. The San Miguel River originates in the mountains
at the closed upper end of the canyon and flows down-
ward through Telluride. The San Miguel increases in size
as it is supplemented by tributaries over its 81 mile
length until ultimately it empties into the Dolores River
near Uravan, Colorado.

The Telluride Valley portion of the Idarado Mine
(elevation approximately 9,062 feet) includes two mine
openings, or portals, called the “Mill Level Tunnel” and
the “Meldrum Tunnel,” located at the valley head. Next
to the Mill Level Tunnel is the Pandora Millsite, which
includes a former mill, support buildings and storage
areas. Four infiltration lagoons are located up the valley
from the Millsite. Below the Millsite, and adjacent to the
San Miguel River, are four consecutive tailings piles (piles
nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4), and one very large merged or com-
bined tailings pile (pile no. 5/6). All of these tailings piles
are a short distance up the San Miguel river valley from
the Town of Telluride. The tailings piles contain deposits
of ground mine rock that remain after most of the valu-
able metals have been removed by milling.

At the lower end of the valley, below the Town, is an
area along the San Miguel River known as “Society

App. 43

Turn.” Tailings piles are located near Society Turn and
other locations along the San Miguel River as it flows
down the valley. These tailings are approximately five
miles or more downriver from the Pandora Millsite.

B. The Red Mountain Valley.

The Red Mountain Valley portion of the mine (eleva-
tion 10,650 feet) is located in an uninhabited area adjacent
to State Highway 550 and approximately twelve miles
southwest of the Town of Ouray. It includes a mill com-
plex of administrative offices and shop areas comprising
the Red Mountain yard. Downgradient from the Red
Mountain yard are four tailings piles (piles nos. 1, 2, 3
and 4) adjacent to Red Mountain Creek.

The tailings pile farthest from the yard area (Red
Mountain pile 4) is located at the head of Ironton Park,
approximately two miles down valley from the Red
Mountain mine office. Ironton Park is a marshy area that
adjoins the creek for about one and one-half miles. It is
located about two miles above Red Mountain Creek’s
confluence with the Uncompahgre River.

The Red Mountain Valley area also includes a
“buried” tailings pile, the “Treasury Tunnel” mine portal,
and several other scattered mines, tailings piles, mine
waste rock piles and portals.

The headwaters of Red Mountain Creek originate in
the Uncompahgre National Forest near the Ouray/San
Juan County line, which is the forest boundary. Red
Mountain Creek flows from Red Mountain Pass in a

App. 44

northerly direction to its confluence with the Uncom-
pahgre River about 2.75 miles upstream from the Town of
Ouray, Colorado.

The Uncompahgre River continues its course through
Ridgway, Colorado, emptying into the Gunnison River
which, in turn, flows inte the Colorado River near Grand
Junction, Colorado.

The Red Mountain Valley and the Telluride Valley are
separated by mountains. Both areas, however, are con-
nected by a maze of horizontal mine tunnels at various
depths interconnected by hoists and chutes for vertical
travel of staff or movement of materials. Although the
mine has not operated since about 1978, a skeleton crew
maintains it and one can travel from one end to the other
by underground railcar a horizontal distance of about
seventeen miles. However such a trip requires several
transfers from one mine tunnel level up or down to
another.

C. The High Country

The High Country consists of mountain basins gener-
ally above 10,000 feet between the Red Mountain and
Telluride Valleys. The High Country drains into the San
Miguel River and Red Mountain Creek watersheds.
Idarado owns much of the High Country land but has
never carried on mining activity there. The High Country
contains scattered waste rock piles, portals and relics of
past mining activities by prior owners or occupants.

App. 45

III. Brief History of the Idarado Mine.

The Telluride/Red Mountain area is highly miner-
alized, and has been extensively prospected and mined
for approximately 100 years.

Idarado was formed in 1939 by Telluride Black Bear
Mines, Inc., San Juan Metals Corporation, Newmont Min-
ing Corporation and Barstow-Imogene Mines, as a corpo-
rate entity under which they consolidated several mining
properties in the Red Mountain area. In 1953, Idarado
purchased the Telluride Mines. Between 1954 and 1956,
the Red Mountain mill was decommissioned, and the
Pandora milis**e, located in the Telluride Valley, was
reconstructed and expanded.

From 1956 until Idarado’s mining operations were
shut down, all ore was run through the Treasury and Mill
Level Tunnels and milled near Telluride at the Pandora
Mill. Zinc, copper, lead, silver and gold were produced.
In 1978, depressed metal prices necessitated cessation of
Idarado’s operations. In August 1986, approximately 80%
of Idarado’s mining and milling equipment and machin-
ery wis sold at public auction. As stated, it now retains
only a skeleton crew to perform maintenance at the site.
During its years of operation, Idarado had a net income
of $130 million.

IV. The State’s Remedial Investigation.

In 1984, the State, through the State Attorney Gen-
eral’s office, entered into contracts with independent
environmental consultants to develop or assist in the
development of the Remedial Investigation, Feasibility

App. 46

Study and Record of Decision regarding the Idarado
Mine. These consultants acted under the direction of sev-
eral state officials.

The Remedial Investigation included a review of his-
torical records with respect to mining and milling opera-
tions and a field investigation. That investigation
consisted of sampling all environmental media, including
the soil, air and water at the site, and determining the
sources, pathways and receptors of contaminants.

A Feasibility Study was conducted to analyze the
remediation alternatives. Initially, the State’s consultants
began with over 200 different possible response actions.
These alternatives were screened using the following fac-
tors: technical feasibility, practicality, technical reliability,
applicability, environmental effectiveness, short and long
term benefits, adverse impact, health effects, and costs.
Six alternatives ultimately were selected for each side of
the mountain.

The State issued the RI and FS for public comment.
Public meetings were held at Telluride and Ouray, and
comments were received.

Next, a Preliminary Record of Decision was prepared
as a preliminary draft of the State’s decision regarding
remedial action. The State’s consultants then performed
cost analyses and environmental effectiveness analyses
with respect to the proposed remedies. The cost analyses
were obtained by standard engineering and construction
practices and other methods approved by the USEPA’s FS
guidance documents.

App. 47

Finally, the State issued its Record of Decision as its
final remedial action decision with respect to the Idarado
site. The Colorado Department of Health served as the
lead agency in the ROD’s preparation. This ROD docu-
ment was admitted as a trial exhibit.

V. Areas of Contamination at the Idarado Facility, the
Parties’ Proposed Remedies and the Court’s Selected
Remediation Plan.

The State has identified three main sources of metals
contamination at the Idarado Facility: tailings, mine
drainage and waste rock. Tailings are the waste products
from the milling process and are composed of finely
crushed and ground waste rock containing the small frac-
tion of metals not recovered during milling as well as
chemical reagents and water used in the milling process.
Water, including water from rain, snow, underground
sources, and the mines, flows across and through the
tailings, eroding the tailings piles and picking up metals
to be deposited in the area’s rivers and creeks. The waters
that flow over and through the tailings contain cadmium,
copper, lead, zinc, and in some instances, arsenic, chro-
mium, nickel and silver. All of these metals are hazardous
substances within the meaning of CERCLA § 101(14), [42
U.S.C. § 9601(14)].

Water flows out of mine portals and crosses waste
piles, where it picks up metals and hazardous materials
on its downward course, ultimately carrying hazardous
waste and metals into the area’s streams.

With respect to the proposed remediation plans, |
heard separately the evidence as to each contamination

App. 48

source or affected area. The evidence was presented in
the following order: (1) the Telluride tailings piles; (2) the
Telluride soils; (3) the Society Turn tailings; (4) the mine
portal discharges and mine waste rock; (5) the millsite
cleanup; (6) the miscellaneous tailings along the San
Miguel River, stream bank cleanup and habitat enhance-
ment; and (7) the Red Mountain tailings. Evidence also
was presented on the State’s proposed monitoring sys-
tem. I now will address (albeit not in the order above
listed) each of the specific contamination sources or
affected areas, discussing the parties’ respective pro-
posals for remediation addressed to each source or area.
As to each I will then state my findings and conclusions
with respect to each source or area.

(A) The Telluride Tailing Piles.

On the Telluride side, there are six large tailings piles
located near the Pandora Millsite.

Piles one through four contain between 431,000 and
807,000 dry tons of tailings and cover a surface area of
between 14.3 and 18.1 acres. Considered individually, pile
1 contains approximately 72,000 dry tons of tailings and
covers a surface area of approximately 1.4 acres; pile 2
contains approximately 214,000 dry tons of mine tailings
and covers a surface area of approximately 2.2 acres; pile
3 contains approximately 327,000 dry tons of mine tail-
ings and covers a surface of approximately 6.1 acres; and
pile 4 contains approximately 194,000 dry tons of mine
tailings and covers a surface area of approximately 4.6
acres. Tailings were deposited in these piles between 1938
and 1944. Piles 1 and 2 have an average height of fifteen

App. 49

to thirty-five feet. The average height of piles 3 and 4 is
thirty-five feet.

The “merged” tailings pile formed from combining
piles 5 and 6 is approximately 100 feet high. It contains
approximately ten million tons of tailings and covers
between fifty and sixty-five acres. Tailings were depos-
ited in pile 5 between 1944 and 1952, and between 1955
and 1978. Pile 6 received tailings deposits between 1955
and 1976.

The metals concentration in piles 1 through 6 varies,
but all piles contain «zdmium, copper, lead, zinc, silver,
chromium and arsenic. Piles 5 and 6 contain 30 million
pounds of lead and zinc, over five million pounds of
arsenic and over two thousand pounds of cyanide.

The Telluride tailings piles are not lined and were not
required to be lined when they were constructed. All six
piles are the result of mining and milling activities at the
Idarado mine. No newly mined tailings have been added
to these piles since milling ended in 1978.

Oxidized acidic “hot spots” occur in the tailings
where water is seeping out from the piles’ sides or near
the basins of the tailings. Materials that are oxidized are
generally more soluble in water and thus are more mobile
in the environment. When water contacts the tailings,
hazardous substances are released into the water. These
six tailings piles are eroded by water caused by precipita-
tion, snowmelt and flood events. The piles show evidence
of erosion gullies. As a result, tailings have flowed
directly into the San Miguel River, contaminating its sedi-
ments. Tailings constitute the majority of sediment within
the San Miguel stream bed along piles 5 and 6. Sediment

App. 50

contamination extends as far as the confluence of the San
Miguel with its South Fork.

Water from run-on, snowmelt and precipitation flows
off the tailings piles, and seeps from the piles’ side
slopes. The water carries high concentrations of heavy
metals, including lead and zinc, leached from the tailings.
Metal sampling in the San Miguel River has indicated
heavy metal concentrations, including lead and zinc, over
the stream reach from above pile 1 to below pile 5/6.

Hazardous substances also are released into the
ground water from the six piles as a result of rain and
snow melt. The ground water is eventually discharged
into the San Miguel River.

Concentrations of zinc, cadmium and copper in the
San Miguel River were relatively low upstream but
increased downstream past the Pandora Mill site. The
high zinc concentration and the other heavy metals in the
surface water and sediments in the San Miguel River
have resulted in significant degradation of the water
quality as a habitat for aquatic life.

In the fall of 1985, the defendants’ experts, assisted
by the State’s experts, conducted a fish population esti-
mate by electro-shock fishing. The greatest number of
fish, insects and algae were found at the upstream edge
of the San Miguel River, below Bear Creek. Bear Creek is
a San Miguel tributary that enters the river from the
south below tailings pile 5/6 near the Town of Telluride.
Lower numbers of fish, insects and algae were found in
the smaller tributaries of the upper basin and in the
headwaters of the San Miguel River, upstream from Bear
Creek and adjacent to Idarado’s property. There was

App. 51

some evidence that natural barriers preclude fish migra-
tion.

Brook trout, the resident fish, were located in the San
Miguel River below Bear Creek. The State’s evidence
indicated that the fish population survives there because
the inflow from Bear Creek dilutes the heavy metal load,
and because the brook trout has been able to adjust to
stream waters with increased metal content. Brook trout
are fairly resistant to metals compared to other kinds of
trout. Liver tissue samples taken from fish indicated ele-
vated metal levels, and elevated cadmium and lead levels
were found in their other tissues. The metal levels in San
Miguel fish were 6 to 6,000 times higher than the metal
concentrations found in fish from Lake Powell (a large
recreational lake located across the Arizona-Utah border).
But for the metals concentration in the San Miguel River,
cut-throat, rainbow and brown trout would be expected
to be present. Toxic effects of metals on aquatic life
include death, growth reduction, diminished egg hatch-
ability and, in the case of lead, deformities as well as
breakdowns in the metabolic system.

Lower insect density on the river corresponded to the
lower fish density. Plant life density in the San Miguel
River also decreased substantially downstream from the
tailings piles, and this too is attributable to the presence
of heavy metals.

Flooding occurred in the Telluride Valley in 1911,
1914, 1923, 1927, 1964 and 1966. Future flooding of the
San Miguel River would cause more tailings pile erosion
and additional releases of hazardous metals into the
River.

atest ile

App. 52

The six tailings piles also are continually eroded by
wind. Blowing tailings contaminate soils and surface
water with cadmium, lead, zinc and copper. Water is
sprinkled on pile 5/6 as part of Idarado’s dust control
program. A portion of that water infiltrates the tailings,
enters the ground water and eventually flows into the
San Miguel.

Tailings are blown into the Town of Telluride, pro-
ducing a whitish-gray dust cloud that deteriorates the air
quality. Tailings also have been used as “fill” on Teiluride
properties and as ditch linings when sewer and water
lines have been laid in the town.

In 1977, the Town of Telluride constructed two wells
downgradient from pile six. The concentration of chro-
mium in Telluride’s drinking water wells was elevated
during the late 1970’s because of a slug release of chro-
mium from pile 5/6. However, chromium concentrations
in those wells have decreased steadily and they are now
within drinking water standards.

Tests indicated that tailing pile 5/6 is “EP toxic,”
meaning that it contains high concentrations of lead. The
EP toxicity test identifies wastes that are capable of pos-
ing a substantial hazard to the public health and environ-
ment when improperly managed.

The State has determined in its Record of Decision
that all activities must comply with the Colorado Water
Quality Control Act, C.R.S. §§ 25-8-101 through 25-8-612
(1986). Stream classification and water quality standards
apply for all pollutants except that certain numeric stan-
dards for zinc and lead have been selected for the San
Miguel River. The State also has determined that all point

App. 53

source discharges must, at a minimum, meet effluent
limitations and Colorado Discharge Permit System
Requirements, and that the antidegradation and basic
standards of 5 CCR 1002-8, at 3.1.8 and 3.1.11 (1-84) apply
to all surface water.

Regarding ground water, the Record of Decision indi-
cates that the Colorado Safe Drinking Water authorities
[C.R.S. §§ 25-1-107(1)(x) and (y); 25-1-114 - 25-1-114.1
(Supp. 1986)], and the Colorado Primary Drinking Water
Regulations apply to ground water at the site that may be
a source of municipal water supplies. The Basic Stan-
dards for Ground Water [5 CCR 1002-8, at 3.11.0 to 3.11.9
(1-87)] also are applicable.

Based on the evidence presented, I find and conclude
that the Telluride tailings piles 1 through 6 contain haz-
ardous substances as defined under CERCLA § 101(14),
[42 U.S.C. § 9601(14)], and that the release of those haz-
ardous substances poses a threat to and has harmed the
public welfare and the environment in the Telluride Val-
ley. As a result the State has incurred response costs. I
further find that the San Miguel River and the area
ground water are contaminated because of the presence
of these hazardous substances that have caused endan-
germent and injury to aquatic life. I conclude that the San
Miguel River contamination violates applicable, or rele-
vant and appropriate State standards. | further conclude
that the releases of hazardous substances from the Tell-
uride tailings piles constitute one source of this contam-
ination and that a cleanup remediation plan must be
implemented.

App. 54

(i) The State’s Proposed Plan.

Generally, the State’s Plan for the Telluride tailings
piles calls for isolating the approximately ten million tons
of tailings in piles 1 through 6 to prevent tailings dis-
persal into the environment. The plar. consists of:

(a) consolidating piles 1 through 4 at the loca-
tion of pile 5/6;

(b) constructing a multilayer cap on the consol-
idated tailings;

(c) constructing surface water run-on diver-
sion ditches; and

(d) constructing flood control measures
designed to withstand the probable maxi-
mum flood event to protect the consoli-
dated tailings impoundment from erosion
and structural failure.

With respect to the piles consolidation aspect, after
removal of the tailings, original soil material beneath the
piles would be removed to approximately a one foot
depth. The tailings would be moved by conveyor, trucks
or both. The conveyor would cross the San Miguel River,
using standard supports or culverts. To prevent discharg-
ing tailings into the environment while they are being
moved, the State proposes using a pipeline conveyor
system that encapsulates the moving tailings.

The multilayer cap covering the ultimate consoli-
dated pile or piles would consist of a low permeability
layer, an erosion resistant layer and a growth media layer.
As proposed, the low permeability layer would retard the
downward movement of water through the piles and
would thus reduce tailings oxidation and the leaching of

App. 55

hazardous substances from the tailings by water, thereby
preventing, or at least minimizing, any further metals
loading to surface and ground water. This layer also
would reduce root penetration into the tailings, and thus
prevent the uptake of hazardous substances by growing
plants. The State indicated that the low permeability
layer can be constructed using compacted tailings mate-
rial and slimes from piles 1 through 4.

The erosion resistant layer would provide a perma-
nent remedy to reduce long-term erosion by wind and
water. This layer would consist of coarse rock material
available from the Royer Gulch debris fan located on the
Idarado mill site near tailings piles 1 through 4. Theo-
retically, the erosion resistant layer would act like a
sponge, retaining water and providing moisture to the
vegetative cover.

The growth media layer would consist of locally
available soil and would provide for a self-sustaining
plant population on top of the cap. The soil could be
obtained from the Royer Gulch debris fan. The State
asserts that tree roots and vegetation would aid in ero-
sion control.

It appears undisputed that runoff and run-on diver-
sion control structures are necessary to prevent water
from running onto and standing on the tailings piles. The
State contends that the appropriate diversion remedy
should be designed to withstand the probable maximum
flood. The probable maximum flood is defined as the
largest flood that reasonably could be expected to occur
in an area.

App. 56

Under the State’s plan, diversion control structures
would be constructed on the south side of the consoli-
dated tailings impoundment. The impoundment’s base
would be lined with riprap, or large rock that is available
on-site. After consolidation, the tailings impoundment
would be approximately 120 feet above the surface of the
San Miguel River. Riprap would be placed 50 feet up the
side of the impoundment so that the impoundment could
withstand the effect of the probable maximum flood
event.

The State estimates that execution of its plan would
cost approximately $9.3 million.

(ii) Defendants’ Proposed Plan.

Defendants propose stabilizing Telluride tailings
piles 1 through 6 in place and revegetating the areas by
applying fertilizer, manure and straw to naturally manu-
facture soil. In fact, the defendants have begun to imple-
ment their revegetation plan on the surfaces and slopes of
piles 1 through 4, and some vegetation growth has
occurred. Defendants propose using limestone to neutral-
ize the piles’ acidic “hot spots.” Revegetation would
reduce water flow through the piles.

Defendants plan to control erosion from direct pre-
cipitation by modifying the drainage patterns on the
piles, contouring the piles’ surfaces and placing riprap on
the piles’ side slopes. Under this plan, run-on/runoff
contour ditches would be constructed for drainage and

App. 57

diversion. Erosion gullies would be backfilled and cov-
ered with erosion blankets. At trial, the defendants’ reme-
dial evidence addressed the issue of protection to
withstand the 100 year flood event. In subsequent papers
submitted to the court, it appears that the defendants
have agreed to construct flood protection for the area to
withstand the 500-year flood event, but not the probable
maximum flood event.

The over-all cost of the defendants’ plan is estimated
to be approximately $1.8 million.

(iii) The Court’s Remediation Plan.

Defendants do not appear to dispute the need for
cleanup of the Telluride tailings piles, or their liability for
that cleanup. Thus the issue is the scope of that cleanup.

At trial I expressed my concerns about the cost of the
State’s proposed remedy, and the disturbing and possibly
dangerous side effects of transporting huge amounts of
tailings, some by truck through the town. Specifically, I
am concerned about tailings being released into the air,
water and environment, even though the State’s plan
contemplates an encapsulated conveyor system to trans-
port the tailings for consolidation. Clearly tailings consol-
idation to the degree suggested by the state would
severely disrupt the Town of Telluride and the entire
valley because of heavy construction traffic, and other
factors, for an indefinite time. Based on the evidence
presented from both sides, a remediation plan such as the
State’s, designated to prevent contamination and insure
protection of the environment against even the worst of

App. 58

all imaginable or possible natural catastrophes does not
appear to be technically feasible or necessary. CERCLA
requires that the plan be cost-effective, taking into con-
sideration long and short-term costs, operation and main-
tenance.

I conclude that certain components of the State’s
plan, i.e., moving and consolidating the tailings piles and
use of a six-foot multilayer cap, do not comport with
CERCLA’s overall scheme and goal of achieving accept-
able health and environmental protection. Nor is the
state’s plan for consolidating tailings piles cost-effective.
In sum, the State’s plan would go too far.

On the other hand, I conclude that the defendants’
proposed plan does not go far enough. While stabilizing
these enormous tailings piles in place appears feasible,
doing so by merely “manufacturing” soil from mulch to
achieve revegetation is neither practical nor likely to
succeed.

I asked the parties to submit alternatives to their
proposals presented at trial. I find and conclude that the
State’s alternative proposal best satisfies CERCLA’s aims.
Generally, this alternative plan calls for stabilizing the six
tailings piles in place and constructing a multilayered
cover on each pile using locally available material. The
cover would contain a two-foot thick erosion resistant
(random fill) layer, amended by bentonite, and topped by
a plant growth media layer that is also two feet thick. The
sides of the combined tailings piles 5 and 6 would be
similarly covered, but without the bentonite, and a self-
sustaining vegetative cover would be established on the

top.

App. 59

Drainage and erosion control structures as described
by the State, would be utilized. They would be designed
to withstand the 500-year flood event and the forces of a
maximum credible earthquake. Flood protection design
would encompass the San Miguel River, Royer Gulch and
Marshall Creek. Monitoring activities for the Telluride
tailings piles would include surface water, ground waiter,
soils, vegetation, erosion, and construction aspects as out-
lined in the State’s alternative plan.

The State is ordered to submit, within thirty days, a
cost estimate for executing its alternative plan for these
tailings piles.

(B) The Society Turn Tailings.

The three Society Turn tailings piles are situated adja-
cent to the San Miguel River in the immediate vicinity of
the Highway 145 intersection. The three piles, each
located at the site of a glacial moraine and mostly barren
of vegetation, contain a total of approximately 120,000 to
160,000 tons of tailings.

These man-made tailings piles were formed around
1900 when tailings were impounded behind wooden tim-
ber dams that trapped the tailings previously deposited
upstream. The tailings settled in the calmer waters
behind the dams. Later, when the dams were breached or
removed, the San Miguel River, the natural course of
which had run through the tailings piles, returned to its
channel and washed out a renewed channel through the
tailings. The remaining tailings form the Society Turn
tailings.

App. 60

At Society Turn there are three tailings piles, one
upstream and two downstream. The upstream tailings
pile is one to five feet deep, and the first downstream pile
is up to fifteen feet deep. These two piles contain approx-
imately 90 to 95 percent of the total Society Turn tailings.
The third, or westernmost, downstream pile contains the
remainder.

The estimated total volume of tailings at Society Turn
is about 145,000 cubic yards. River meander continues to
erode the piles, particularly during spring snowmelt each
year. The Society Turn tailings contain heavy metals,
including cadmium, copper, lead and zinc. Lead content
is 3,338 mg/kg. The two large tailings piles are respec-
tively, thirty-two times and four times above the EP tox-
icity threshold for lead. The deepest pile is EP toxic for
cadmium.

The Colorado stream standards for cadmium, lead
and zinc applicable to the San Miguel River are violated
all the way past Society Turn. Stream bed sediments in
the Society Turn area are high in metals, including zinc,
copper, arsenic, cadmium and silver. In fact, the highest
silver concentration in sediments for the entire reach of
the San Miguel River occurs in the Society Turn area.

Sources of elevated metal concentrations in the sedi-
ments at Society Turn include previous tailings deposits
in the area, and erosion and transport of tailings from the
upper Marshall Basin and of materials from Idarado’s six
Telluride tailings piles. The materials from these six piles
either wash downstream through Society Turn or are
deposited in the area. Metals loading at Society Turn has
occurred continuously since tailings and sediments were

App. 61

first deposited there. Although metal concentrations
appear to decrease as the river proceeds downstream
toward Society Turn, metal toxicity increases because of
the sediments and tailings, the increased silver concentra-
tions, and the reduced role of organic materials in bind-
ing the metals.

The macroinvertebrate population at Society Turn is
approximately one-tenth of the population found
upstream. This indicates that the aquatic system, overall,
is in poor condition and there is probably a major disrup-
tion in the aquatic food chain for all fish species.

There was evidence that the Society Turn stream area,
if not polluted, should provide an excellent habitat for
various trout species. However, only brook trout are pres-
ent, and they are found at only half the rate of their
upstream population. Because of the presence of heavy
metals in the San Miguel, brook trout density is only one-
third the population density predicted by the defendants’
modeling analysis. There also was evidence that the cad-
mium and silver concentrations in sediments at Society
Turn are directly toxic to rainbow trout eggs.

Defendants contend that the Society Turn tailings do
not present a substantial danger to public health, welfare,
or the environment. They have attempted to absolve
themselves of cleanup liability by asserting that they do
not own any property at Society Turn. Defendants also
assert that the State cannot quantify any amount of
Idarado’s tailings at Society Turn, nor can the State
directly identify or trace any specific tailings as having
eroded from the six Telluride tailings piles and come to

App. 62

rest in the Society Turn area. I find and conclude, how-
ever, that the defendants’ arguments are not sufficient to
absolve them of responsibility for cleanup of the Society
Turn tailings.

When the Society Turn piles were first formed, the
general practice among mining companies operating
upstream from the area was to dump tailings into the San
Miguel River or its tributaries. By 1918, as much as 1,400
tons of tailings were being dumped daily. Smuggler
Union Company, Liberty Bell Gold Mining Company, and
The Tomboy Gold Mines Company, Ltd. (a corporation
organized under the laws of Great Britain) were among
the mining companies operating at the San Miguel’s
headwaters during the early 1900’s. All had placed tail-
ings in the river by 1904. Smuggler Union and Liberty
Bell were later acquired by Telluride Mines, Inc. Tomboy
England was acquired by Tomboy Gold Mines, Inc., a
Colorado corporation. In the 1950’s, Idarado ultimately
acquired the assets, and assumed the obligations and
liabilities of, Telluride Mines and Tomboy Colorado.

None of the defendants, nor any of their associated
concerns, currently own any of the property on which the
remaining Society Turn tailings piles are deposited. In
October 1967, however, an Idarado affiliate, on Idarado’s
behalf, acquired placer claims in the Society Turn area
that included the upstream tailings pile. Between 1967
and 1971, Idarado rechanneled the San Miguel River
upstream from the Society Turn tailings piles. Idarado
sold its placer claim property in December 1983, to Cor-
dillera Corporation, a company not associated with the
defendants.

App. 63

Defendants contend that neither Idarado nor any of
its affiliates disposed of tailings on that property, nor did
they move or disturb any of the existing tailings at Soci-
ety Turn, except as incidental to rechanneling the San
Miguel. Defendants, however, do not dispute that tailings
material from the six Telluride piles have eroded into the
San Miguel River and have been carried downstream
toward Society Turn.

As indicated in United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F.
Supp. at 1072, Congress made it clear when it initially
enacted CERCLA, that generators, transporters, con-
sumers, or dumpsite owners who have profited or other-
wise benefited from commerce involving hazardous
substances should bear the cleanup cost for affected
areas. Under CERCLA § 107(a), [42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)],
persons liable (other than a facility’s current owners or
operators) include past owners or operators of any facil-
ity at the time the hazardous waste was disposed; and
persons who by contract, or otherwise, arrange for the
disposal of hazardous substances by another party at a
facility. CERCLA § 101(9)(B), [42 U.S.C. § 9601(9)(B)]
defines “facility” as “any site or area where a hazardous
substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or
placed, or otherwise come to be located... . ”

Contaminated tailings deposits have “come to be
located” in the Society Turn area because tailings were
“released” into the San Miguel River and ultimately set-
tled there behind the dams and in the river’s sediments.
(See CERCLA § 101(22), [42 U.S.C. § 9601(22)] for the
definition of “release,” which includes “spilling,” “dis-

charging,” “injecting,” “escaping,” “dumping” or “dis-

” “4

posing” into the environment). These tailings areas are

App. 64

the result of dumpings by Idarado’s predecessor mining
companies, for whom Idarado assumed all debts, lia-
bilities and obligations, at the time of acquisition in the
1950’s. Idarado continued its mining operations in the
area until 1978.

Moreover, Idarado, through its subsidiary, previously
owned property at Society Turn that included the
upstream tailings area. The evidence is undisputed that
the Society Turn tailings piles have eroded in the past and
continue to erode, into the San Miguel River. Tailings
from the defendants’ six Telluride piles also have eroded,
and continue to erode, into the San Miguel. This erosion
releases heavy metals into the waters and sediments.
Defendants are liable in part as past owners and opera-
tors of a “facility” at the time of waste disposal. CERCLA
§ 107(a)(2), [42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2)]. They also are liable
because they “otherwise arranged for . . . disposal,” of
hazardous waste by placing their contaminated tailings in
the San Miguel River and those tailings “have come to be
located” at Society Turn. CERCLA § 107(a)(3), [42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(3)].

As I earlier indicated, the State is not required to
match specific waste found to a particular defendant, nor
is strict proof of causation required. See United States v.
Otatti [sic] & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. at 1402; State of New
York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F. 2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir.
1985).

In sum, the evidence establishes that the defendants
“released” contaminated tailings that “have come to be
located” at Society Turn, and that are being “released”
from Society Turn, a “facility” previously owned by the

App. 65

defendants. The release of contaminated waste from this
area is posing a threat to the environment and to the
public welfare for which the State has incurred response
costs. Defendants thus are liable under CERCLA for those
response costs and for cleaning up the affected area.

(i) The State’s Proposed Plan.

The keystone of the State’s plan is the removal of the
tailings from the area of active erosion to a hydrologically
and geologically suitable disposal site within one mile of
the tailings’ present location. The tailings will be consoli-
dated at this new site and placed in a lined impound-
ment. The State has suggested using Mancos shale to
construct the liner because it is indigenous and generally
suitable for the intended purpose. The soils beneath and
adjacent to the old tailings site will be cleaned to 1,000
parts per million (“ppm”) lead or less. During trial, the
State initially proposed consolidating the Society Turn
tailings piles onto Telluride tailings piles 5 and 6. That
preliminary proposal was changed, however, after the
public voiced objections because impiementing it would
have necessitated substantial truck traffic along the high-
way and through the Town of Telluride to transport the
Society Turn tailings upstream.

The State now proposes constructing a multilayer cap
six feet deep on top of the consolidated tailings, using
material excavated from the selected disposal site. The
cap’s design would include the same features proposed
for capping the Telluride tailings piles. The tailings

App. 66

impoundment would be designed to withstand the maxi-
mum credible earthquake, probable maximum precipita-
tion and probable maximum flood. Surface water run-on
and runoff diversion ditches would be installed.

_ All areas disturbed by the construction activities
would be recontoured and revegetated.

The State estimates that its proposed plan would cost
approximately $2,580,000.

The State considered rechanneling the San Miguel
River but that option was rejected because of the poten-
tial cost, the lack of permanence, and the negative fea-
sibility based on the area’s topography. Moreover, certain
permits would be required from the Army Corps of Engi-
neers. There was evidence that channelization would
negatively impact the aquatic habitat and reduce aquatic
biota.

As earlier discussed, none of the parties own the
subject property. The State has identified several avail-
able options for gaining access to the property to imple-
ment the remedy. One option calls for the State to
purchase the property at a cost of approximately $100,000
for ten acres. Other options include gaining access
through negotiations with the current land owners, con-
demnation proceedings and state injunctive relief to abate
a nuisance. The cost of obtaining property access is not
reflected in the State’s cost estimate.

(ii) Defendants’ Proposed Plan.

Defendants have not proposed a remedial plan for
the Society Turn tailings because they contend that they

App. 67

are not liable for the area’s cleanup. I have rejected the
defendants’ position in my above stated findings.!

(iii) The Court’s Remediation Plan.

The State has not asked for a mandatory injunction
requiring the defendants to begin cleanup of the Society
Turn tailings. Rather, the State asks that declaratory judg-
ment be entered in its favor addressing the scope of the
cleanup effort.

Since I have determined that the defendants are lia-
ble for cleanup of the Society Turn tailings, I further
conclude that declaratory relief must be entered in favor
of the State. I also conclude that the State’s cleanup plan
shall be implemented as proposed with the following
restrictions: (1) The State’s plan for moving and consol-
idating the three Society Turn tailings piles shall be
implemented, but rather than utilizing the six foot multi-
layer cap, the capping component shall be installed fol-
lowing the same guidelines as specified for capping the
Telluride tailings piles. Within six months, the State shall
select the site for the consolidated tailings. Selection of
that site must take into consideration the objections
voiced by Telluride citizens, and substantial construction
vehicle traffic shall not be permitted to traverse and

1 Defendants at trial did submit evidence suggesting
(without admitting liability) that it would be possible to divert
the San Miguel River away from the tailings piles. They sug-
gested the tailings could then be stabilized in place by covering
them with natural geological (glacial morainal) material and
buttressing the sides with riprap. The areas would then
become revegetated by grass growing on the covering material.

App. 68

disrupt the Town of Telluride or expose its people or their
homes to undue traffic hazards, or blowing or dropping
of tailings dust or material from trucks in or near the
town. In short, a site shall be selected that would not
involve hauling tailings through or near the town of
Telluride.

(C) Miscellaneous Tailings along the San Miguel
River, Stream Bank Cleanup and Aquatic Habi-
tat Enhancement.

The State estimates that there are between fifty and
seventy-five thousand tons of tailings material located
along the stream banks of the San Miguel River between
the Town of Telluride and Society Turn. Some of these
tailings have vegetation covers, are mixed with soil, or
have a “soil gravel cover.” The “barren tailings,” which
the State seeks to remove, are located in unvegetated or
sparsely vegetated areas. These barren tailings were
deposited during times of high water, and have eroded
into the San Miguel River. Defendants were once owners
of the affected stream bank areas, but the land is now
owned by persons not parties to this lawsuit.

These miscellaneous tailings are exposed to direct
precipitation, such as rain and snow melt. At least 1,000
cubic yards of the tailings are oxidized, causing the haz-
ardous substances to be more soluble and mobile in the
environment. The State contends that these stream bank
tailings cause significant metals loading to the San
Miguel River, especially during storm events and when-
ever water leaches through the tailings. The metals that
are being deposited into the San Miguel inciude zinc,

App. 69

copper and lead. Humans, livestock and wild animals
come into contact with the tailings, although there was no
direct evidence of resulting health problems.

Defendants contend that the miscellaneous tailings
are not responsible for elevated concentrations in, or
metals loading to, the San Miguel River. There was evi-
dence that once the San Miguel has flowed past Idarado’s
property, in the vicinity of Bear Creek, metals concentra-
tions in the water decline from there on downstream.
Defendants further assert that if indeed any metals con-
tribution at all occurs from the miscellaneous tailings, it
is from seepage or surface runoff (surface water washing
across the tailings), or other unidentified sources, includ-
ing groundwater recharge.

Defendants again emphasize that before Idarado’s
existence, the general practice of mining companies in the
area was to dump tailings directly into the San Miguel
River or its tributaries. I conclude, however, that the
defendants’ contention that the stream bank tailings con-
tribute a de minimus amount of hazardous substances to
the San Miguel River does not preclude their liability.

Defendants’ six tailings piles above the Town of Tell-
uride contribute major contamination to the San Miguel.
On the average, the tailings piles contribute less than fifty
per cent of the metals loading to the San Miguel River.
The major contributors are the Mill Level and Meldrum
Tunnel discharges. As compared to the tailings piles,
however, the stream bank tailings have greater surface
area per unit volume exposed to the atmosphere. More-
over, the State’s evidence, and common sense, indicate
that tailings are deposited on the stream banks during

App. 70

times of high water. The tailings are deposited either in,
or adjacent to, the river. As stated before, it is unnecess-
ary for the State to “fingerprint” waste. United States v.
Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. at 1402. Defendants,
whose waste is located along the San Miguel River stream
banks, are liable for clean up even as de minimus pollu-
ters. United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F.
Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985).

(i) The State’s Proposed Remedy.

Generally, the State’s plan would require removal of
tailings from stream banks that are not vegetated or that
are sparsley vegetated. The State, however, has not
clearly identified the areas targeted for tailings removal.
The removed tailings would be deposited on the Telluride
or Society Turn tailings piles. Disturbed areas would then
be revegetated.

The State proposes removing the tailings with a
track-mounted backhoe, and hauling them away in dump
trucks. The State estimates that, using ten-yard capacity
trucks, it will take approximately 5,000 truck loads to
remove the 50,000 cubic yards of tailings. Approximately
ten percent as many truck loads will be required to haul
the cover material to the affected areas.

The aquatic habitat will be restored and improved,
and fish, including species other than brook trout (brown
and rainbow trout), will be stocked in the San Miguel
River, between Bear Creek and Society Turn. All habitat
improvements will be designed to allow for channel sta-
bility at flows of up to the one hundred year flood level.

App. 71

Much of the land along the river is owned by Cor-
dillera Corporation, not the defendants. However, the
State asserts that access to the affected stream banks is
available from several side roads, and that an abandoned
railroad berm that extends for almost the full stretch of
the river can be used. In areas where there are no roads to
the river, tailings would be loaded on sleds and the sleds
would be hauled by backhoe to truck loading points on
the nearest road.

The State estimates that its plan will cost approx-
imately $582,000.

(ii) Defendants’ Proposed Plan.

Defendants did not submit a proposed remedy for
this area. However, the defendants suggest that it would
be feasible to vegetate the barren tailings deposits in
place. Defendants also have challenged the State’s plan
on several grounds.

First, the defendants contend that roads are not avail-
able to provide access to all areas. Nor has the State
presented any evidence that it has obtained, or could
obtain, access rights.

Next, the defendants argue, the State has not quan-
tified the extent of the-environmental disturbance that
would result from the extensive hauling activities
required. Defendants contend that it would be necessary
to remove trees and other vegetation existing on private
property, and that vehicles would have to be driven
across the San Miguel River, or bridges would have to be

i ee

App. 72

constructed, causing a significant adverse impact on the
environment.

In sum, the defendants assert that the State’s plan is
not cost-effective, nor is it the least environmentally dis-
ruptive alternative.

(iii) The Court’s Remediation Pian.

Since I have found and concluded that the defen-
dants are liable for the environmental arm caused by the
miscellaneous tailings, a cleanup remedy must be imple-
mented. I am persuaded by the evidence that the State’s
general cleanup proposal recommending tailings
removal, revegetation of affected areas, and general habi-
tat enhancement will be effective in restoring the environ-
mental balance to these areas, and reflects, overall, the
most cost-effective available remedy.

The State’s plan, however, is deficient in several
respects. To remedy these deficiencies, the State, within
ninety days of this order, shall provide to the court a
more specific plan that: (1) identifies the areas of tailings
removal, the site where removed tailings will be depos-
ited, and the areas to be revegetated; (2) sets forth the
methods by which the State will gain access to the
affected areas; and (3) addresses the extent of environ-
mental disturbance that will result from the State’s con-
struction activities. The State also shall submit, within
ninety days, a revised cost estimate of its proposed reme-
dial activities.

App. 73

(D) Telluride Soils.

In 1986, the State, using a grid pattern, sampled the
soil at approximately 100 locations within the Town of
Telluride. Surface and depth samples were taken, focus-
ing on high soil contact areas such has [sic] day care
centers and playgrounds. In approximations, 30% of the
samples indicated soil lead levels over 560 ppm (parts per
million), 20% indicated soil lead levels over 1,000 ppm,
and the remainder of the samples indicated soil lead
levels below 500 ppm. Three of ten garden soil samples
contained between 500 and 1,000 ppm lead, and one
sample contained over 1,000 ppm lead. Twenty-five per-
cent of the grid samples exceeded 3 ppm cadmium.

By comparison, the background concentration of lead
in Telluride soils is approximately 45 to 110 ppm, and the
background for cadmium is 0.4 ppm.

Through consultation with the Colorado Department
of Health and the United States Department of Health
and Human Services,:Center for Disease Control
(“CDC”), categories were developed for ascertaining
appropriate remediation levels. According to the State’s
evidence, soil sample groups reflecting 500 to 1,000 ppm
lead require reduced human exposure through some type
of remediation. The State asserts that soil lead levels that
exceed 1,000 ppm require remediation by soil removal.

The State’s case concerning the Telluride soils cen-
tered around the testimony of Dr. Ellen Jones Mangione,
acting director of the Division of Disease Control an

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_1674%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
