# Opposition Brief — Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Roberson

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1991
- **Citation:** 500 U.S. 916

## Text

|} FILsD

( |
Sh APR 12 W998

: AME CLERK

Su the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAILWAY
COMPANY, PETITIONER

Vv.

OLEN ROBERSON, AND DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’
COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES DEPART-
MENT OF LABOR

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENT
IN OPPOSITION

KENNETH W. STARR
Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 514-2217
ROBER? P. DAVIS
Solicitor of Labor

STEVEN J. MANDEL
Deputy Associate Solicitor
ELIZABETH HOPKINS
Attorney
Department of Labor
Washington, D.C. 20210

ECT AVAILABLE COPY * ——

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether a railroad worker who works in or around
a coal mine or coal preparation facility in employ-
ment that is integral to the extraction or preparation
of coal is a ‘‘miner” within the statutory definition of
that term in the Black Lung Benefits Act.

(1)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Nee ies ssh acwcenioset aksnnicatnsnenvainsntadaeoiien 1
i nceccesnicnscdacccensasascae Bass RUS ee OO 1
Nee ors iiks ciacihcianwnsktwwnhantebnheaxaenakareaneenmens 2
Argument .............. SEIIELIEE osedcnasgcegnieasianstnihiianiensnentheunnicmnlsans 6
Nee oo. cinieinennhgusbsvecenavs aaealaiatbsiiedeasieeaisors 13
Re aa a ssp cian phntinnpuanatiionastnnceamrsseknbs la
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. vV. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) ........... MA 4
Fox Vv. Director, OWCP, 889 F.2d 1037 (11th Cir.
ne iianlincabciaaingapededsiainsanvsoneen 13”
Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 110 S. Ct. 304
Rd Eee all SE ea 6
Hanna v. Director, OWCP, 860 F.2d 88 (3d Cir.
ee ousk ongicanicenvtins 7
Harmon Mining Corp. v. FMSHRC, 671 F.2d 794
Nee a sauunastinssnhbnevanon 8
Louisville & N. R.R. v. Donovan, No. 80-0611-L(G)
(W.D. Ky. 1981), 713 F.2d 1243 (6th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936 (1984) _...... 10, 11, 12
Mitchell vy. Director, OWCP, 855 F.2d 484 (7th Cir.
1988) . GELDER, Pret aS CEN 7
Mullins Coal C pe. V¥. Director, OWCP, 484 U.S. 135
Teen lias craphiseiindnatnnssununacsenis 13
Otis Elevator Co. Vv. Secretary of Labor, 921 F.2d
3985 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ........... 10
Roberts Vv. arama 527 F 2a 600 (5th Cir.
a ee FC Nee Nee 8
Southard v. Director, OWCP, 732 F.2d 66 (6th
Cir. 1984) . Pt sR OT 7
Stroh v. Director, OWCP, 810 F.2d 61 (3d Cir.
a es . 9,13
West Virginia U niversity Hospitals, ‘Ine. Vv. Case y,
No. 89-994 (Mar. 19, 1991) ...... ee 8,9

(III)

IV

Statutes, regulations and rule: Page
Whisman v. Director, OWCP, 8 Black Lung Rep.
1-96 (Ben. Rev. Bd. June 17, 1985) 0.000. 2,13
Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901 et seq.
§ 402(d), 30 U.S.C. 902(d) ............. 3, 4, 5, 6-7, 9, 10, 11 -
Black Lung Benefits Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-
239, § 2(b), 92 Stat. 95 (30 U.S.C. 902(d))_....... 9
Federal Empioyers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 51
et seq.:
og RR ERISA ec Pe A NT li Oe ON Pos Oe 5
TI oer ee ah le ee 5, 10
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30
reas Ur en ea or 7
RNs ID oi son tlnceslcnsessiorseiannsninsoaaitens 8
20 C.F.R.:
Pt. 725:
Section 725.101 (a) (22)-(25) 000. x
Section 725.101 (a) (26) -..0000 * 7
RUG PAE GOD oo ocececcsnccncececscceceneneereeee 4
Section 725.491 (a) .................-..cccccccccocococeeee 3
5 pe dich asetdiaeiie Sree ane ae Danas ee aS 2
NII I eres rae li

Miscellaneous:

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 864, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
RON OMe Nt eR A ors METER REIT ITE 9

At the Supreme Caurt of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

No. 90-1271
NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAILWAY
COMPANY, PETITIONER
U.
OLEN ROBERSON, AND DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’

COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES DEPART-
MENT OF LABOR

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENT
IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion cf the court of appeals (Pet. App.
la-10a) is reported at 918 F.2d 1144. The decision
of the Benefits Review Board (Pet. App. 17a-28a)
and the decision of the administrative law judge
(App., ivfra, la-15a) are unreported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered
on November 16, 1990. The petition for a writ of
certiorari was filed on February 11, 1991. The juris-
diction of the Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
1254(1).

(1)

2

STATEMENT

1. Petitioner Norfolk & Western Railway Com-
pany (N&W) employed respondent Olen R. Rober-
son as a brakeman and conductor from 1947 until
his retirement in 1979. Between 1956 and 1973,
Roberson worked on rail cars used to haul raw coal
from several coal extraction sites to a preparation
plant where the coal was cleaned, washed. graded, and
loaded for delivery. His duties at those locations in-
cluded coupling and uncoupling hoses between the
railroad cars, setting and releasing brakes, and ob-
taining loading numbers from individual cars. A\l-
though he rode on the trains from the extraction sites
to the preparation plant, a distance as far as 36
miles, his duties required him to spend a significant
part of his workday at the extraction and preparation
sites, where he was exposed to large amounts of coal
dust. Pet. App. 3a-4a.

Roberson filed an application for benefits under
the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901 ef seq.,
which provides benefits to coal miners who are totally
disabled due to pneumoconiosis arising out of coal
mine employment. Following an evidentiary hear-
ing, an administrative law judge determined that
Roberson had established entitlement to benefits un-
der the interim regulations, 20 C.F.R. Pt. 727, and
ordered N&W, as the responsible operator, to pay
those benefits. App., infra, la-15a. Applying the
three-pronged “status/function/situs” test of cover-
age established by the Benefits Review Board in
Whisman v. Director, OWCP, 8 Black Lung Rep, 1-
96, 1-97 (Ben. Rev. Bd. 1985), the ALJ determined
that between 1956 and 1973, Roberson primarily
worked with raw rather than processed coal (status),
that his work transporting coal from the extraction

3

sites to the preparation plant during that period was
integral to the coal production process (function),
and that he spent a significant portion of his time at
the extraction and preparation sites (situs). App.,
infra, 3a-7a. The ALJ concluded that Roberson
qualified as a “miner” under the Act, id. at 6a, and
that petitioner was the operator responsible for the
payment of black lung benefits, id. at 7a-9a. The
ALJ reasoned that N&W maintained a continuing
presence at the mine sites and, by transporting raw
coal to the preparation plant, it provided services es-
sential to the preparation of the coal within the mean-
ing of the regulatory definition of “operator,” 20
C.F.R. 725.491(a). App., infra, 9a.

2. The Benefits Review Beard affirmed the ALJ’s
order awarding benefits. Pet. App. 17a-28a. Apply-
ing the legal standard set forth in Whisman, the
Board concluded that there was substantial evidence
supporting the ALJ’s findings that Roberson trans-
ported raw coal as an integral part of the coal pro-
duction process and spent a significant portion of his
workday at the mine sites and preparation plant. /d.
at 19a-22a. The Board rejected N&W’s “policy-
based” considerations, noting that neither the Act nor
its implementing regulations specifically exclude rail-
road workers from coverage and that no such exclu-
sion was intended. Jd. at 22a. The Board also was
unpersuaded that the existence of other federal stat-
utes pertaining te disabled railroad workers limits
the scope of coverage of the Black Lung Benefits Act.
Id. at 22a-23a. Finally, the Board held that N&W
was an “operator” in that it employed a “miner” and
maintained a “continuing presence” at the mine. /d.
at 23a-25a.'

1 The Board also upheld the ALJ’s finding that Roberson
met the health-related requirements for benefits under

4

3. The court of apepals affirmed in a ‘necessarily
narrow” holding. Pet. App. la-10a. Applying this
Court’s analysis in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984),
the court of appeals looked first to the statutory def-
inition of a “miner” set forth in Section 402(d) of
the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 902(d). The
court concluded that a transportation worker who
works in or around a coal mine in the extraction or
preparation of coal comes within that definition under
the plain language of Section 402(d). Pet. App. 4a-
5a.” The court then determined that Roberson met
this definitional test because he was involved in haul-
ing raw coal from coal mines to the coa! preparation
plant, such transportation was part of the prepara-
tion process, and Roberson spent a significant amount
of time in or around ‘“‘coal mines,” which the Act
defines to include a coal preparation plant. Jd. at 5a-
6a. The court therefore had “little difficulty in con-
cluding that the plain language of the Act, especially
when reinforced by the 1978 amendment [adding a
reference to “transportation” workers], manifests a
clear Congressional intent to include in the definition
of miner a small group of transportation workers of
which Roberson was a member.” /d. at 6a.

The court rejected petitioner’s various arguments

the Act. Pet. App. 25a-27a. N&W did not challenge that find-
ing in the court of appeals and does not do so in this Court.

2 The court concluded that the statutory language also re-
quires, in the case of a transportation worker, that the
worker has been “exposed to coal dust as a result of such
employment,” but noted that N&W did not dispute Roberson’s
coal dust exposure (Pet. App. 5a). See also 20 C.F.R.
725.202(a) (providing a rebuttable presumption that a trans-
portation worker is exposed to dust when working in or
around a coal mine or coal preparation facility).

5

that railroad employees are fundamentally different
from other transportation workers. Pet. App. 6a-9a.
First, the court observed that because the “plain lan-
guage” of the Act supports the Board’s decision, it
did not need to resort to the legislative history. Jd. at
6a-7a. It added that, in any event, the legislative
history is not to the contrary since the Conference
Committee report—the “‘most persuasive evidence of
Congressional intent’’—“‘sticks closely to the literal
language of the statute” and does not exclude railroad
workers from the Act’s coverage. Jd. at 7a n.3. Sec-
ond, the court rejected petitioner’s argument that cov-
erage under the Black Lung Benefits Act would be
inconsistent with other federal legislation protecting
railroad employees. /d. at Ta-8a. The court noted
that there was nothing to indicate that Congress in-
tended any of the statutes pertaining specifically to
railroad workers to preclude resort to the Black Lung
Benefits Act and that, in fact, the Federal Employers’
Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. 51, 58, specifically
provides that it is not exclusive of any other federal
remedy. Pet. App. 8a.

The court of appeals found irrelevant petitioner’s
observation that interstate railroads are regulated by
the Interstate Commerce Commission. Pet. App. 8a.
The court held that the ALJ’s undisputed finding that
toberson spent a significant portion of his workday
at the mines and preparation plant defeated petition-
er’s implicit argument that Roberson’s role as a crew
member during the 36-mile trip from the mines to
the preparation plants took him outside of the Act’s
“situs” and “function” requirements. /d. at 8a-9a.
After noting that “[i]n the ordinary case” many
railroad employees may not qualify for benefits, the
court stated: “If a claimant fulfills all the statutory
requirements, however, as Roberson has here, we

6

decline to hold that his status as a railroad employee
negates his recovery of benefits under the Act to
which he otherwise would be entitled.” /d. at 10a.’

ARGUMENT

The judgment of the court of appeals is correct
and does not conflict with any decision of this Court
or any other court of appeals. Although petitioner
suggests otherwise, the court of appeals’ ‘necessarily
narrow” (Pet. App. 10a) and fact-based holding is
unlikely to have a significant impact on the railroad
industry. Accordingly, further review is unwar-

ranted.
1. Petitioner primarily contends (Pet. 9-14) that
, the court of appeals’ determination that Roberson

comes within the statutory definition of ‘‘miner”’ is in-
consistent with the purposes and legislative history of
the Act. As the court below properly noted, however,
the starting point in statutory interpretation is the
language of the statute. Pet. App. 5a. See Hall-
strom vy. Tillamook County, 110 S. Ct. 304, 308
(1989). Section 402(d) of the Black Lung Benefits
Act, defines a “miner” as

any individual who works or has worked in or
around a coal mine or coal preparation facility
in the extraction or preparation of coal. Such
term also includes an individual who works or
has worked in coal mine construction ov trans-
portation in or around a coal mine, to the extent
such individual was exposed to coal dust as a
result of such employment.

* The court also upheld the ALJ’s finding that N&W quali-
fied as an “operator” under the Act based on its continuing
presence at the mines and its provision of services essential
to the preparation of coal. Pet. App. 9a. Petitioner does not
challenge that determination in this Court (Pet. 5 n.4).

7

30 U.S.C. 902(d) (emphasis added). See 20 C.F.R.
725.101(a) (26). Based on this language, the court
of appeals properly concluded (Pet. App. 5a), as
has every other court of appeals to address the issue,
that the statute includes within its definition of
“miner” any transportation worker involved “in the
extraction or preparation of coal” who works “in or
around a coal mine.” '

The court properly applied that “situs ‘function”
test to the facts of this case and concluded that Rob-
erson’s work during the relevant period placed him
within the statutory definition of “miner.” It was
undisputed that Roberson hauled “raw coal from ex-
traction sites (mines) to the preparation plant, which
also is considered a coal mine under the Act.” Pet.
App. 5a-Sa.” His work transporting coal to the prep-

4 See, e.g., Hanna Vv. Director, OWCP, 860 F.2d 88 (3d Cir.
1988) (tug boat operator who assisted with loading process
at tipple covered) ; Stroh v. Director, OWCP, 810 F.2d 61, 63
(3d Cir. 1987) (self-employed truck driver who hauled coal
to processing plants covered) ; Southard v. Director, OWCP,
732 F.2d 66, 69 (6th Cir. 1984) (applying identical analysis
to question of whether transportation worker is covered) ;
Mitchell vy. Director, OWCP, 855 F.2d 485, 489 (7th Cir.
1988) (railroad employee who shoveled and cleaned out rail-
ro2zd cars to ready them for loading at adjacent preparation
plant was covered “miner’’).

*The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977
(F MSHA), which is applicable to the Black Lung Benefits
Act (subchapter IV of the FMSHA), provides:

For the purposes of subchapters II, III, and IV of this
chapter, “coal mine” means an area of land and all struc-
tures, facilities, machinery, tools, equipment, shafts,
slopes, tunnels, excavations, and other property, real or
personal, placed upon, under, or above the surface of such
land by any person, used in, or to be used in, or resulting

aration plant was part of the preparation process
(function); and he spent a significant part of his
time in or around a “coal mine” (situs). Jd. at 6a.
Indeed, the facts here are virtually “indistinguish-
able” (ibid.) from the Fourth Circuit’s earlier de-
cision in Roberts vy. Weinberger, 527 F.2d 600 (1975),
in which the court held that even before the 1977
amendment, the Act was “unambiguous in extending
coverage” to truck drivers who haul coal between a
strip mine and the tipple.
2. Although the broad statutory language contains
no express or implicit exclusion for railroad workers,
et. 7-14) that inclusion of such
workers is not consistent with the Act’s legislative

petitioner asserts (P

history or purposes. As this Court recently reiterated,
however, the best evidence of a statute’s purpose ‘‘is
the statutory text adopted by both Houses of Con-
gress and submitted to the President.” West Vir-
ginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, No. 89-994
(May. 19, 1991), slip op. 15. “Where that contains
a phrase that is unambiguous—that has a clearly

from, the work of extracting in such area bituminous
coal, lignite, or anthracite from its natural deposits in
the earth by any means or method, and the work of pre-
paring the coal so extracted, and includes custom coal
preparation facilities.

30 U.S.C. 892(h) (2) (emphasis added); see also 20 C.F.R.
725.101 (a) (22)-(25). This extremely broad definition of the
term “coal mine” evidences congressional intent that all facili-
ties at a preparation plant be covered. See Harmon Mining
Corp. V. FMSHRC, 671 F.2d 794, 796-797 (4th Cir, 1981)
(railroad tracks that were owned by railroad but that ad-
joined preparafon plant and were on mine property con-
stituted a facility at the preparation plant and were therefore
part of mine).

VX

9

accepted meaning in both legislative and judicial
nractice—we do not permit it to be expanded or con-
tracted bh the statements of individual legislators or
committees during the course of the enactment proc-
ess.” Jiid, Tn any event. the purpose and legisla-
tive history of Section 402(d) support the court of
appeals’ construction of the term “miner.”

In 1977, Congress expanded Section 402(d)’s defi-
nition of a “miner” from “any individual who is or
was employed in a coal mince” to include ‘an individ-
ual who works or has worked in * * * transportation
in or around a coal mine.” The Black Lune Benefits
feform Act of sib Pub. L. No. 9 5-2! 9, § 2(b), 92
Stat. 95. codified at 30 U.S.C. 902(d). The focus of
that amendment was not upen exclusion. but upon
inclusion of additional workers within the Act’s cov-
erage. While the Senate Committee Report and the
statement by Senator Randolph on which petitioner
relies (Pet. 11-13) speak restrictively of the contours
of the amended Aeaition’ s coverave of transperta-
tion workers, the Conference Report specifically
clarifies

that transportation and construction workers
are covered only to the extent chat they work in
oy arcund a coal mine and are exposed to coal
dust. The conference substitute elsewhere pro-
vides that coal mine construction and transpor-
tation em»lovers who are not also mine opera-
tors shall not be obligated to sagem insurance
* * * Thut! shall be individually liable for the
payment of approved claims in) appropriate
Cases.

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 864, 95th Cone., 2d Sess. 15-16

(1978) Consistent with the language of the

amended definition, the Conference Report, which

10

the court below properly recognized as the most per-
suasive evidence of congressional intent, Pet. App.
7a n.3, indicates that Congress intended the Act to
cover transportation workers who work in or around
coal mines and are exposed to coal dust. See Lowis-
ville & N. R.R. vy. Donovan, 713 F.2d 12438, 1248
(6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936 (1984) ;
ef. Otis Elevator Co. vy. Secretary of Labor, 921 F.2d
1285 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Congress intended to expand
FMSHA’s definition of “operator” in 1977 notwith-
standing two limiting ‘snippets’ of legislative
history).

The court of appeals’ determination is also sup-
ported by the Black Lung Benefits Act’s statutory
purpose of providing benefits to workers at coa!
mines when those workers are disabled by exposure
to coal dust. Petitioners err in attaching significance
(see Pet. 9-10) to the fact that railroad workers are
covered by other federal legislation, since those stat-
utes bv their terms do not preclude the availability
of benefits under other programs, such as the black
lung benefits program. See Lowisville & N. R.R. vy.
Donovan, 713 F.2d at 1248 n.3.° Nor is there any
provision in the Black Lung Benefits Act that re-
stricts coverage based on receipt of benefits under
these other programs. Although petitioner argues
(Pet. 10) that the existence of other federal benefit
programs for railroad workers indicates that Con-
gress could not have “intended to include railroad
workers under [the Black Lung Benefits Act] with-

® Indeed, FELA—upon which petitioner primarly relies
(Pet. 9-10) —specifically states that it does not limit rights or
liabilities under other federal programs. 45 U.S.C. 58. More-
over, as the court below recognized, Pet. App. 8a, liability
under FELA requires negligence, while liability under the
Black Lung Benefits Act does not.

11

out even addressing the potential for overlapping
coverage, [or] duplicative benefits,” it is more rea-
sonable to conclude that ‘Shad Congress intended to
provide an exception for independent railroad com-
panies, it would have done so.”” Pet. App. 25a.

3. Petitioner also contends (Pet. 14-16) that cer-
tiorari is warranted because the court of appeals’ de-
cision conflicts with the vacated decision of the dis-
trict court in Lowisville & N. R.R. vy. Donovan, No.
80-0611-L(G) (W.D. Ky. 1981), rev’d, 713 F.2d
1243 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936
(1984). There is no merit in this contention. As a
general matter, a conflict between a court of appeals
decision and a district court decision would not estab-
lish “special and important reasons” for this Court
to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction, even if the
lower court’s decision had not been reversed on ap-
peal. See Sup. Ct. R. 10.1.

To be sure, the Sixth Circuit specifically based
its reversal in Lowisville d& N. R.R. on the district
court’s lack of jurisdiction to review the Depart-
ment of Labor’s guidelines defining ‘‘the transporta-
tion of coal” under the Black Lung Benefits Act, and
it disclaimed “the intent of making any defini-
tive construction” of the Act. But the court also
stressed Congress’s explicit recognition ‘that a per-
son working in transportation in or around a coal
mine might be exposed to coal dust as a result of
such employment and should not be deprived of
[Black Lung Benefits Act] benefits merely because
its employer is not an ‘operator’ in the traditional
sense.” 713 F.2d at 1249. In addition, the court
criticized the district court’s construction of the
statute as excluding the railroad industry, stating:

12

The statute, however, far from clearly excluding
railroads, expressly encompasses not only mine
operators in the traditional sense but also ‘any
independent contractor performing services or
construction at [a] mine.” 30 U.S.C. $ 802(d).
This expanded definition does not clearly exclude
railroads, especially when viewed in conjunction
with the amended definition of ‘miners’ which
includes “an individual who works or has
worked in . . . transportation in or around a
coal mine... .” 30 U.S.C. § 902(d).

713 F.2d at 1247. Thus, the court of appeals’ deci-
sion in Lowisville & N. R.R. is consistent with the
court’s decision in this case.

There is similarly no merit to petitioner’s sugges-
tion (Pet. 16-17) that the court of appeals’ decision
in this case conflicts with the Eleventh Circuit’s deci-
sion in Fox vy. Director, OWCP, 889 F.2d 1037
(1989). The Fox case involved a worker at a coke
oven—not a railroad or transportation worker. The
Eleventh Circuit found that the coke oven worker
was not a miner because “the washing and crush-
ing of coal performed [at the coke oven] were the
first steps in the coke manufacturing process rather
than the last step in the coal extraction and prepara-
tion process.” Jd. at 1042. The court relied on the
Senate Report for the limited point that “coverage of
coal preparation activities is contingent on such ac-
tivities being an integral part of the coal production
process” rather than merely “coal processing activi-
ties (such as coke production) performed by the ulti-
mate consumer for his own use.” /d. at 1040-1041.
The Eleventh Cireuit’s analysis would not require a
different outcome here since Roberson hauled raw—-
not processed-—coal, and the AL.J explicitly and cor-

13

rectly found that Roberson’s activities were an in-
tegral part of the preparation process.’

CONCLUSION

The petition fer writ of certiorari should be
denied.

Respectfully submitted.

KENNETH W. STARR
Solicitor General
ROBERT P. DAVIS
Solicitor of Labor

STEVEN J. MANDEL
Deputy Associate Solicitor

ELIZABETH HOPKINS
Attorney
Department of Labor

APRIL 1991

* Petitioner asserts (Pet. 5-6) that the decision below will
expose railroads to “thousands” of claims for black lung bene-
fits, but can identify only 174 pending claims. Even as to
those, of course, “[t]he demanding tests of function and situs
must be met.”’ Pet. App. 10a.

APPENDIX

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Office of Administrative Law Judges
1111 20th Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

OWCP No. 223-12-5682
Case No. 83-BLA-7557
IN THE MATTER OF OLEN R. ROBERSON, CLAIMANT
VU.

NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY,
EMPLOYER

and

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
PROGRAMS, PARTY-IN-INTEREST

Lawrence L. Moise III, Esq.

Robert Austin Vinyard, Esq.

116 E. Valley Street

P.O. Box 1127

Abingdon, Va. 24210-1127
Fur the Claimant

J. Randolph Query, Esq.

Jackson, Kelly, Holt & O’Farrell

P.O; Box 553

Charleston, W. Va. 25322
For the Employer

(la)

2a

Ronald Gurka, Esq.
Office of the Solicitor
U.S. Department of Labor
Room 1237-A
4015 Wilson Boulevard
Arlington, Va. 22203

For the Party-in-Interest

BEFORE: LAWRENCE E. GRAY
Administrative Law Judge

DECISION AND ORDER AWARDING
BENEFITS

This proceeding arises from a claim for benefits
under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. § 901
et seq. (“the Act”). In accordance with the Act and
the Regulations issued thereunder, found in Title 20
of the Code of Federal Regulations (‘‘the Regula-
tions”), this case was referred for hearing to the
Office of Administrative Law Judges by the Direc-
tor, Office of Workers’ Compensation Program (“the
Director’), on September 14, 1983.

A formal hearing was held in Abingdon, Virginia
on July 15, 1985, at which all parties were afforded
the opportunity to present evidence and argument as
provided in the Act and the Regulations. The record
was held open for the receipt of additional medical
evidence and briefs.

Statement of the Case

Claimant Olen R. Roberson, a 68-year-old man
with a 9th-grade education, seeks benefits under the
Act, aserting that he is totally disabled as a result
of coal workers’ pneumoconiosis. Employer contests
(1) whether it properly has been designated as the

3a

responsible operator; (2) whether Claimant is a
miner within the meaning of the Act and the Regula-
tions; (3) Whether Claimant has pneumoconiosis
within the meaning of the Act and the Regulations;
(4) if so, whether Claimant’s pneumoconiosis arose
out of coal mine employment; (5) whether Claimant
is totally disabled within the meaning of the Act and
the Regulations; and (6) whether Claimant’s dis-
ability, if any, resulted from pneumoconiosis. The
Director maintains that Employer properly has been
designated as the responsible operator and_ that
Claimant qualifies as a miner.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Coal Miner

“The term ‘miner’ means any individual who
works or has worked in or around a coal mine or
coal preparation facility in the extraction or prepa-
ration of coal. Such term also includes an individual
who works or has worked in coal mine construction
or transportation in or arond a coal mine, to the ex-
tent such individual was exposed to coal dust as a
result of such employment.” 30 U.S.C. § 902(d);
see 20 C.F.R. § 725.202(a).

Claimant commenced employment with Norfolk
and Western Railway Company on October 10, 1947.
Claimant worked continuously for Norfolk and West-
ern until October 1, 1979, when Claimant retired.

Between 1947 and 1956, Claimant served as a
Brakeman on eertain “local runs.” These trains car-
ried “local freight”: they did not carry coal. There
being no indication that Claimant’s duties involved
the extraction or preparation of coal. I find that
Claimant was not a coal miner during this period.

ra 4a

From April or May 1956 until the early part of
1973, Claimant served as a brakeman and conductor
on the “Carbo run.” The trains on this run hauled
raw coal across a 1.iountain from the mine site to a
preparation plant, where the coal was cleaned,
washed and graded.

During the trip from the mine site to the prepara-
tion plant, Claimant was exposed to coal dust that
blew from the loaded cars. When checking the cou-
plings between the cars and performing other duties
at the mine site and the preparation plant, Claimant
was exposed to coal dust that had been pulverized
between rails and wheels and stirred by air hoses and
the movement of the workers’ feet. “As far as dust
exposure, you could blow your nose and it would ke
like tar, and it looked like real coal dust,” Claimant
testified. “If you would cough, it looked like real coal
dust. So, we were exposed to an awful lot of dust.”
Relying upon Claimant’s credible testimony, I find
that he was exposed to coal dust as a result of his
employment as a coal transportation worker. If this
employment occurred “in or around a coal mine,”
Claimant falls within the statutory definition of
“miner.”

The Benefits Review Board has established a three-
part test for determining whether a claimant quali-
fies as a “miner”:

First, claimant must prove that the coal with
which he worked was still in the course of being
processed, and not yet a finished product in the
stream of commerce (status of the coal test).
Second, claimant must establish that the worker
performer a function integral to the coal produc-
tion process (7.e., the extraction or preparation
of coal), and not one merely ancillary to the de-

5a

livery and commercial use of processed coal
(function test). The status of the coal and the
functions performed by the worker are ques-
tions of fact to be resolved by the administrative
law judge. Third, the work must have occurred
in or around a coal mine or coal preparation fa-
cility (situs test). A coal mine is an area of
land used or intended to be used for the extrac-
tion or preparation of coal, including a custom
coal preparation facility.

Whisman v. Director, 8 BLR 1-96, 1-97 (1985) (ci-.
tations omitted). Claimant’s letter of February 12,
1980 and his uncontradicted testimony indicate that
Claimant primarily worked with raw coal rather
than processed coal during his employment on the
“Carbo run.” Relying upon this evidence, I find that
Claimant has satisfied the “status of the coal’ test.

In Roberts »v. Weinberger, 527 F.2d 600 (4th Cir.
1975), the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit found that a truck driver’s delivery
of coal from a mine site to a tinple for processing,
grading, and loading was part of the extraction and
preparation process. Similarly, in Seltzer v. Direc-
tor, 7 BLR 1-912 (1985), the Board found that the
haulage of coal from a mine to a “breaker” for wash-
ing, crushing and sizing constituted coal mine em-
ployment. Likewise, I find in this case that Claim-
ant’s transportation of coal from the mine to the
preparation plan was integral to the coal production
process and therefore satisfies the “function’’ test.
The case law simply does not support Employer’s
position that the haulage of raw eceal is not the work
of a “miner.”

Emplover argues that Claimant did not spend a
significant portion of his workday at a coal mine site

6a

or coal preparation facility. See Bower v. Amigo
Smokeless Coal Co., 2 BLR 1-729 (1979). The facts
do not support this argument. At the coa! mine site
and preparation plant, Claimant performed duties
such as coupling cars, knocking brakes, checking car
numbers, classifying cars, and keeping records. <Ac-
cording to the letter of February 12, 1980, Claimant
sometimes handled 250-309 cars in a day. According
to Claimant’s testimony, he sometimes “walked” a
hundred cars at a time; and then walked back. These
duties necessarily occupied a significant portion of
time. Relying upon the evidence discussed above, I
find that Claimant has satisfied the “‘situs’” test. I
further find that Claimant worked “in or avound a
coal mine’ within the statutory definition of “miner.”
This conclusion is consistent with the Roberts deci-
sion, in which the court of appeals found that a truck
driver who hauled coal from a mine site to a prepara-
tion facility “was employed in a coal mine.” 527
F.2d at 602 (emphasis supplied by court). Citing the
broad definition of “coal mine” found at 20 C.F.R.
§ 410.110(h), the court explained “that the boundar-
ies of the mine extend at least to the point where the
coal is processed and loaded for further shipment.”
Id.

Claimant’s employment on the “Carbo run” satis-
fies each of the three parts of the Whisman test.
Accordingly, I find that Claimant qualifies as a
“miner” within the meaning of the Act and the Reeu-
lations.

Between 1973 and 1979, Claimant worked as a
conductor out of Norton. During this period, Claim-
ant primarily hauled processed coal. The transporta-
tion of processed coal in the stream of commerce is
not integral to the extraction or preparation process

Ta

and therefore does not qualify as coal mine employ-
ment.

Dependents

For the purpose of augmentation of benefits,
Claimant has one dependent: his wife, Ruby Helen
Roberson.

Responsible Operator

Section 725.491/a) of the Regulations defines
“operator” as follows:

In accordance with section 3(d) of the Act
[30 U.S.C. § 802(d)], an operator for purposes
of this part is “any owner, lessee or other person
who operates, controls, or supervises a coal mine
or any independent contractor performing serv-
ices or construction at such mine.” In accord-
ance with sections 402(d) and 422(b) of the
Act, certain other employers, including those en-
gaged in coal mine construction, maintenance,
and transportation, shall also be considered to be
operators for purposes of this part. An inde-
pendent contractor or self-employed miner, con-
struction worker, coal preparation worker, or
transportation worker may also be considered a
coal miner operator for purpose of this part. /t
is Conaress’ intent that any employer of a miner
as defined in § 725.202(a) shall, to the extent ap-
propriate, be considered an operator for the pur-
poses of this part, and the provisions of this part
shall be construed in accordance with this intent.

‘Emphasis added.) The last sentence of Section 725.-
491(a) supports the position advanced by the Direc-
tor, who argues that Norfolk and Western is “the

8a

responsible operator in this case because it is the em-
ployer of a miner as defined in the Act.”

In Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company et
al. v. Donovan, No. 80-0611-L(G) (W.D. Ky. 1981),
the United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Kentucky, without distinguishing the trans-
poration of raw coal to a preparation plant from the
transportation of processed coal within the stream
of commerce, held that railroads are not “operators.”
The court enjoined the Department of Labor from
applying the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety
Act, as amended by the Black Lune Benefits Act of
1972 and the Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of
1977, to railroads. ‘‘A railroad obviously does not
extract coal,” the court reasoned, ‘‘nor does the work
done by a railroad in connection with transporting
coal fall within the definition of ‘work of preparing
the coal’ set forth in 30 U.S.C. $ 802(i).”

That reasoning does not accord with the decision
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit which found that the transportation of raw
coal to a preparation facility was part of the prepa-
ration process. Roberts v. Weinberger, 527 F.2d 600
(4th Cir. 1975): see also Whisman v. Director, 8
BLR 1-96 (1985); Seltzer v. Director, 7 MLR 1-912
(1985). This case having originated in the Fourth
Circuit, I place no weight upon the district court’s
opinion.

The regulatory definition of “operator” inclutles
“any independent contractor performing services. . .
at [a] mine.” 20 C.F.R. § 725.491(a). In J/tell v.
Ritchey Trucking Company, 8 BLR 1-356 (1985),
the Benefits Review Board held that a lessor of heavy
equipment, having a continuing presence at a mine
site and providing essential mine services, was an

9a

“operaiar”’ within the meaning of the Act. Likewise,
I find that Norfolk and Western, having a continuing
presence at the mine site and providing services es-
sential to the preparation of the coal, is an “opera-
tor.” This conclusion is consistent with Section
725.491(a) of the Regulations, which advises that
“any employer of a miner as defined in § 725.202(a)
shall, to the extent appropriate, be considered an
operator... .” See also 20 C.F.R. § 725.491(c) (1).

An operator is not the “responsible operator” un-
less it satisfies the requirements of Section 725.492
of the Regulations. The evidence indicates that Em-
ployer satisfies these requirements. Accordingly, I
find that Employer properly has been designated as
the “responsible operator” in this case.

Length of Coal Mine Employment

As discussed supra, all of Claimant’s coal mine em-
ployment occurred from 1956 to 1973 during Claim-
ant’s tenure as a brakeman and conductor on the
“Carbo run.” During this period, Claimant occasion-
ally served on other “runs.” Claimant estimated that
he worked on the “Carbo run” for a total of 14 years
during this period. Claimant’s testimony is credible
and uncontradicted. Relying upon Claimant’s testi-
mony, I find that Claimant accumulated 14 years of
coal mine employment.

Applicable Part of the Regulations

Claimant filed an application for benefits with the
Department of Labor on February 27, 1978, prior to
the effective date of Part 718 of the Regulations.
Claimant having accumulated more than 10 years of
coal mine employment, I will consider this case under
Part 727. To secure benefits, Claimant must estab-

10a

lish that he is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis
arising out of coal mine employment.

The Interim Presumption

Section 727.203(a) of the Regulations provides
that a living miner with more than 10 years of coal
mine employment is presumed to be totally disabled
due to pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine em-
ployment if the evidence satisfies any one of the re-
quirements set forth in subsections (1) through (4).
In Stapleton v. Westmoreland Coal Company, 785
I'.2d 424 (4th Cir. 1986), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a single
qualifying ventilatory study is sufficient to trigger
the interim presumption under Subsection 727.203
(a)2). Applying Stapleton, I find that the qualify-
ing, conforming ventilatory study of July 2, 1985
triggers the interim presumption.

Rebuttal

Section 727.203(b) of the Regulations provides
four means of rebutting the interim presumption.
In determining whether rebuttal has been established,
all relevant medical evidence must be considered.

Under Subsection 727.202(b)(1), the presump-
tion is rebutted if the evidence establishes that the
miner is doing his usual coal mine work or compara-
ble and gainful work. Because Claimant has not
worked at any job since his retirement in 1979, the
interim presumption is not rebutted under Subsection
727.203(b) (1).

Under Subsection 727.203(b) (2), the presumption
is rebutted if the evidence establishes that the miner
is able to do his usual coal mine work or comparable
and gainful work. The Benefits Review Board has
held that an employer may establish rebuttal under

lla

this subsection by demonstrating that the claimant
does not suffer from a totally disabling respiratory
impairment. Bibb v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 7 BLR 1-
134 (1984).

No physician offered an opinion that Claimant does
not suffer from a totally disabling respiratory im-
pairment. Indeed, Dr. Joseph F. Smiddy and Dr.
John G. Byers, Jr., specifically diagnosed such a con-
dition. The qualifying results of all of this ventila-
tory studies of record support these opinions. On the
basis of this evidence, I find that the interim pre-
sumption is not rebutted under Subsection 727.203
(b) (2).

Under Subsection 727.203(b) (3), the presumption
is rebutted if the evidence establishes that the dis-
ability of the miner did not arise in whole or in part
out of coal mine employment. Under Subsection
727.203(b) (4), the presumption is rebutted if the
evidence establishes that the miner does not have
pneumoconiosis. The X-ray evidence of record, in
conjunction with the medical opinions of record, is
relevant to rebuttal under both of these subsections.
The record contains the following X-ray evidence:

Date of
X-ray Reader Qualifications 4 ae Interpretation
1/24/79 h.L. Bassham Board-certified 0/0

radiologist

‘Where the physicians’ qualifications are not in evidence,
I have taken official notice of their qualifications by reference
to the following sources: an official listing provided by the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; Marquis
Who’s Who Directory of Medical Specialists, published under
the direction of the American Board of Medical Specialties;
and the 30th edition of the American Medical Directory, pub-
lished under the direction of the American Medical Associa-
tion.

12a

Qualifications Interpretation

Board-eligible
radiologist and
B-reader

E.D. Aycoth

Pulmonary specialist; 0/0
Board-certified in
internal medicine

11/1/79 J.G. Byers Jr.

8/24/84 §.N. Fisher Board-cer tified 1/1 p,p
radiologist and
B-reader
E.D. Aycoth Board-eligible 1/0 p,q
radiologist and
B-reader
M.A. Bassali Board-certified 1/0p,s
radiologist and
B-reader
W:S. Cole Board-certified 0/0
radiologist and
B-reader
P.S. Wheeler Board-certified moderate
radiologist and emphysema
B-reader no
pneumoconiosis
7/2/85 L.H. Westerfield Radiologist Mild COPD and

emphysema ; no

pneumoconiosis

In addition to this X-ray evidence, the record con-
tains relevant medical opinions submitted by Dry.
Smiddy, Dr. Byers, and Dr. Richard S. Buddington.
Dr. Buddington and Dr. Byers both examined
Claimant in 1979. Relying upon Dr. Bassham’s 0 0
interpretation of the January 1979 X-ray, Dr. Bud-
dington concluded that Claimant’s “primary pulmon-
ary disorder is probably large and small airway ob-
struction:”’ Relying upon his own interpretation of
the November 1979 X-ray and Claimant’s history of
smoking (one pack per day for 10-15 years before
quitting in the early 1960’s), Dr. Byers concluded

13a

that Claimant suffered from emphysema, chronic
bronchitis and “an element of reversible obstructive
airway disease” that “could have been caused by
chronic tobacco abuse or by some granulomatous dis-
ease of the lung resulting in pulmonary calcifica-
tions.” In Dr. Byers’ opinion, coal dust exposure did
not cause Claimant’s pulmonary disease.

Both physicians relied upon X-ray evidence. Nei-
ther physician had an opportunity to consider the
most recent X-rays of August 1984 and July. 1985.
Because pneumoconiosis is a progressive disease,
these two X-rays are the most probative as to the
existence of pneumoconiosis. Of the six interpreta-
tions of record of these two X-rays, five were ren-
dered by B-readers who also were Board-certified or
Board-eligible radiologists. Of these five readers,
three diagnosed pneumoconiosis. In light of these cir-
cumstances, I find that the opinions of Drs. Budding-
ton and Byers are insufficient to rebut the interim
presumption under Subsections 727.203(b)(3) or
727.203(b} (4). I rely upon the following considera-
tions: (1) Drs. Buddington and Byers based their
opinions upon X-ray evidence without having had an
opportunity to consider the most probative X-ray
evidence of record; and (2) the positive readings
rendered by Drs. Fisher, Aycoth, and Bassali of the
August 1984 X-ray ‘suggest that Claimant’s condition
changed subsequent to Dr. Buddington’s and Dr.
Byers’ examinations. My conclusion is not affected
by the negative opinions readings of the August 1984
X-ray offered by Drs. Cole and Wheeler, whose qual-
ifications are equal to those of Drs. Fisher and
Rassali. Applying the ‘‘true doubt” rule, I must re-
solve these conflicting X-ray interpretations in favor
of Claimant. My conclusions also is not affected by
the negative reading of the July 1985 X-ray offered

l4a

by Dr. Westerfield, whose qualifications are inferior
to those of Dis. Fisher, Aycoth and Bassali. More-
over, my conclusion is supported by 1985 opinion of
Dr. Smiddy, who concluded that Claimant suffered
from a “severe respiratory impairment with total dis-
ability related to a combination of severe chronic ob-
structive pulmonary disease and an element of sig-
nificant coal dust exposure.” Dr. Smiddy having
examined Claimant significantly later than Drs. Bud-
dington and Byers, I find that Dr. Smiddy’s opinion
warrants greater weight than the opinions of the
other physicians.

For the reasons discussed above, I find that the
medical opinions of Drs. Buddington and Byers in
conjunction with the negative X-ray interpretations
of Drs. Cole, Wheeler and Westerfield, in light of the
contradictory opinions and readings of Drs. Smiddy,
Fisher, Aycoth, and Bassali, are insufficient to rebut
the interim presumption under Subsections 727.203
(b) (3) or 727.203 (b) (4).

Entitlement

Employer has failed to rebut the interim pyesump-
tion. Accordingly, I find that Claimant is entitled to
benefits under the Act as augmented by reason of his
dependent sponse.

The evidence does not establish a date of onset of
total disability. For this reason, benefits are payable
from the beginning of the month when the claim was
filed or the month when review was elected under
Part 727 of the Regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 725,503(b).
Unless the miner suffers from complicated pnenmo-
coniosis, however, no benefits are payable for any
period during which the miner engaged in coal mine
work or comparable and gainful work. 20 C.F.R.
§ 725.503A.

15a

Claimant filed his application for benefits in Feb-
ruary 1978. He did not retire until October 1979.
In the interim, Claimant served as a conductor out of
Norton. Claimant’s description of his duties during
this period indicates that his work was substantially
similar to his coal mining work. Claimant sJmply
hauled a different product: processed coal rather than
raw coal. Because Claimant engaged in “comparable
and gainful work” until October 1979, he is entitled
to benefits commencing as of the beginning of that
month.

Based upon the forgoing findings of fact and con-
clusions of law, and upon the entire record, I hereby
make and enter the following order.

ORDER

Employer, Norfolk and Western Railway Com-
pany, is ordered to provide for payment to Claimant,
Olen R. Roberson, of all benefits to which he is en-
titled under the Act, as augmented by reason of his
dependent sponse, commencing as of October 1, 1979.

Administrative Law Judge

‘'s/ Lawrence E. Gray
LAWRENCE E. GRAY

Dated: Dec. 30, 1986
Washington, D.C.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS: Any party dissat-
isfied with this Decision and Order may appeal it to
the Benefits Review Board within 30 days from the
date of this Decision by filing a Notice of Appeal with
the Benefits Review Board, 1111 20th Street, N.W.,
Suite 757, Washington, D.C. 20036 (20 C.F.R.
$ 725.481). 7

WY U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE; 1991 282061 20486

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_1646%3A4. Public record. Not legal advice.
