# Appendix — Function Junction, Inc. v. Crowe

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1991
- **Citation:** 499 U.S. 955

## Text

Supreme Court, J.S,
FILED

FEB ¢ 1991

FFICE OF THE CLERK *

—— BROT LE NI, te
Tr
=r

No.

|

In The

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1990

') =

FUNCTION JUNCTION, INC., et al.,
Petitioners,

v.

PAUL CROWE, et al.,
Respondents.

f).
~

APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 7
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

rg*
VV

Eric A. LaTINSKY, EsQuIRE

1206 South Ridgewood Avenue
Daytona Beach, Florida 32114
(904) 257-5555

Fla. Bar #302831

Attorney for Petitioners

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ADpenGix A. .......000c00e00

Appendix B ................

Se

Opinion of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Order of United States Court of Appeals
Denying Petition for Rehearing and
Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc dated
November 11, 1990

Memorandum Opinion and Order on
Motion for Summary Judgment of the
United States District Court, Middle
District of Florida, Orlando Division

Order of Dismissal of the United States
District Court, Middle District of Florida,
Orlando Division

Orders (of Dismissal) of County Court,
Seventh Judicial Circuit, in and for
Volusia County, Flotida in Daytona
Beach v. Lesley Jennir.g Grier, #V82-
6880-DB

Order (of Dismissal) in Daytona Beach
v. Grier, #V82- 12397 -DB in the County
Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit, in and
for Volusia County, Florida

Opinion in Keiser v. Daytona Beach,
#83-3161-CA-01 D, in the Circuit Court,
Seventh Judicial Circuit, in and for
Volusia County, Flonda

APPENDIX A

Chris GEANEAS, Pink Pussycat, Inc,
d/b/a Red Garter Club, Del Percio,

Inc., d/b/a Shingle Shack, Function
Junction, Inc., Dawn Boido, Denise Del
Pinto, Leslie Grier, Plantiffs- Appellants,

Kinzey Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Oyster
Pub, Linnie Shiftlett, Lois Young, Plaintiffs,

Vv.

Charles W. WILLETS, The City of Daytona Beach,
Defendants-Appellees,

John M. Power, Lawrence Kelly,
Defendants.

No. 89-3308.

United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.

September 10, 1990.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida

Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge,
TUTTLE, and RONEY* Senior Circuit
Judges.

TJOFLAT, Chief Judge:

The plaintiffs in this case own or manage bars
providing nude dancing, or work in those establishments as
nude dancers or bartenders. They brought suit in federal

APP. A-1

district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) claiming that a
Daytona Beach ordinance, which prohibits exposure of certain
body parts in establishments dealing in alcohol, violated their
rights under the first and fourteenth amendments. The district
court granted partial summary judgment for the defendants and,
following a bench triai on the remaining issues, dismissed the
plaintiffs' case. The plaintiffs appeal, and we affirm. We also
hold that the plaintiffs’ appeal is frivolous under Rule 38,
Fed.R.App.P. 38.
I.

In 1981, the City of Daytona Beach enacted an
ordinance prohibiting exposure of certain body parts in
establishments dealing in alcoholic beverages.'! Daytona Beach

1 The ordinance provides as follows:

Section 5-25. Nudity, Sexua! Conduct Prohibited.

(a) No person shall expose to public view his or her
genitals, pubic area, vulva, anus, anal cleft or cleavage or
buttocks or any simulation thereof in an establishment dealing in
alcoholic beverages

(b) No !emale person shall expose to public view any
portion of her breasts below the top of the areola or any
simulation therof in an establishment dealing in alcoholic
beverages

(c) No person maintaining, owning, or operating an
establishment dealing in alcoholic beverages shall suffer or permit
any person to expose to public view his or her genitals, pubic
area, vulva, anus, anal cleft or cleavage or buttocks or any
simulation thereof within the establishment dealing in alcoholic
beverages.

(d) No person maintaining, owning, or operating an
establishment dealing in alcoholic beverages shall suffer or permit
any female person to expose to public view any portion of her
breasts below the top of the areola or any simulation thereof
within the establishment dealing in alcoholic beverages.

APP. A-2

police then began enforcing the ordinance. They arrested
dancers, including two plaintiffs in this case, at several "topless
bars" for dancing partially nude in violation of the ordinance.
They arrested bartenders and managers, including plaintiffs in

(e) No person shall engage in and no person
maintaining, Owning, or operating an establishment dealing in
alcoholic beverages shall suffer or permit any sexual intercourse,
masturbation, sodomy, beastiality [sic], oral copulation,
flagellation, any sexual act which is prohibited by law, touching,
caressing or fondling of the breasts, buttocks, anus or genitals or
the simulation thereof within an establishment dealing in
alcoholic beverages.

(f) No person shall cause and no person maintaining,
owning or operating an establishment dealing in alcoholic
beverages sahll suffer or permit the exposition of any graphic
representation, including pictures or the projection of film, which
depicts human genitals, pubic area, vulva, anus, anal cleft or
cleavage, buttocks, female breasts below the top of the areola,
sexual intercourse, masturbation, sodomy, bestiality, oral
copulation, flagellation, any sexual act prohibited by law,
touching, caressing or fondling of the breasts, buttocks, anus, or
genitals, or any simulation thereof within any establishment
dealing in alcoholic beverages.

Section 5-1 of the Code further provides.

Establishment dealing in alcoholic beverages. Any business or
commercial establishment (whether open to the public at large or
where entrance is limited by cover charge or membership
requirement) including those licensed by the state for sale and/or
service of alcoholic beverages, and any bottle club; hotel; motel;
restaurant; night club; country club; cabaret; meeting facility
utilized by any religious, social, fraternal or similar organization;
business or commercial establishment where a product or article is
sold, dispensed, sezved or provided with the knowledge, actual or
implied, that the same will be, or is intended to be mixed,
combined with or drunk in connection or combination with an
alcoholic beverage on the premises of said business or commercial
establishment, or business or commercial establishment where the
consumption or alcoholic beverages is permitted. A private
residence, whether permanent or temporary in nature, is not an
establishment dealing in alcoholic beverages.

APP. A-3

this case, who were working at establishments when nude
dancing arrests were made. They cited owners, including
plaintiffs in this case, for permitting nude dancing in their
establishment, and they ordered the owner of one
establishment, a plaintiff here as well, to remove graphic
photographs from his walls and to stop selling calendars
featuring pictures of his exotic dancers.

In the prosecutions that followed, the state courts issued
various interpretations of the ordinance. In the case of one of
the dancers involved in the present action, the county court
dismissed the charges against her,@ holding that the ordinance's
prohibition of exposed female breasts was overbroad and that
the ordinance proscribed exposure of only the entire buttocks,
and nothing less. In 1984, the state district court of appeal held
the ordinance unconstitutional on grounds of vagueness and
overbreadth. See Del Percio v. City of Daytona Beach, 449
So.2d 323 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1984). A year later, the Florida
Supreme Court reversed that court and upheid the ordinance as
constitutional. See City of Daytona Beach v. Del Percio, 476
So.2d 197 (Fla.1985). The supreme court's decision in De/
Percio, however, specifically addressed only the ordinance's
prohibition on exposed breasts, which it defined as exposure of
the breast below an imaginary line drawn across the top of the
areolae. See id. at 200. The decision did not define the
ordinance 's prohibition on exposed buttocks.

. The charges against the other plaintiffs here are no longer pending
either.

APP. A-4

In May 1983, the plaintiffs filed this section 1983 suit
in federal district court. They claimed that the ordinance
violated their right of free expression under the first
amendment, and their rights to due process and equal protection
of the law under the fourteenth amendment. Specifically, the
plaintiffs claimed that the ordinance was overbroad and void for
vagueness under the first amendment and that the City had
selectively enforced the ordinance against "topless bars" in
violation of the fourteenth amendment. The plainuffs requested
a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages.

On the defendant's motion for partial summary
judgment, the district court held that the ordinance was
constitutionally valid on its face. In the court's view, the
ordinance was a valid exercise of the state's broad authority to
regulate alcohol sales under the twenty-first amendment, and,
in light of the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Del Percio,
the ordinance was not unconstitutionally broad. The district
court, however, like the Florida Supreme Court in Dei Percio,
addressed only the ordinance's proscription on exposed
breasts. The district court also denied summary judgment on
the defendant's affirmative defense that the Del Percio decision
rendered the present case res judicata.3

The case then went to trial before the court on the
remaining claims. The court held that, although the plaintiffs
had proved they were singled out for prosecution, they had not

3 The city does not raise this issue on appeal, and we therefore do
not address it.

APP. A-5

shown that this prosecution was invidious or conducted in bad
faith. The court thus denied their claim. In addition, the court
upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance's prohibition on
exposed buttocks, rejecting the plaintiff's contention that the
provision was impermissibly vague. The district court,
therefore, dismissed the plaintiff's case. 715 F.Supp. 334.

On appeal, the plaintiffs attack the district court's
decision on four grounds: they claim that (1) the district court
erred in analyzing the ordinance under the twenty-first
amendment rather that under the first amendment; (2) the court
erred in denying the plaintiffs' claim that the ordinance's
provisions were overbroad; (3) the court erred in denying the
plaintiffs’ void-for-vagueness claim; and (4) the court erred in
denying the plaintiffs’ selective enforcement claim. We hold
that the plaintiffs’ claims entirely lack merit. In addition,
because the plaintiffs' contentions are no more than conclusory
assertions, unsupported by argument or reason, we hold that
this appeal is frivolous under Rule 38 and instruct the district
court to award the appellee double costs and attorneys’ fees for

its appeal.

Il.

A.
The plaintiffs claim that the district court erred in
analyzing the ordinance under the twenty-first amendment

APP. A-6

rather than under the first amendment.* Under the Florida
Supreme Court's decision in Del Percio and existing United
States Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit precedent, this
argument is clearly foreclosed.

In Del Percio, the court held that, as a matter of state
law, “Florida municipalities...have the authority to exercise the
regulatory power of the twenty-first amendment recognized in
New York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 101
S.Ct. 2599, 69 L.Ed.2d 357 (1981)." 476 So.2d at 201. In
Bellanca, the Supreme Court held that, although nude dancing
implicates the first amendment, the states’ broad powers under
the twenty-first amendment to regulate alcohol outweigh any
first amendment interest in nude dancing. 452 U.S. at 717,
101 S.Ct. at 2601 (quoting Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422
U.S. 922, 932-33, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 2568, 45 L.Ed.2d 648
(1975); see City of Newport, Ky. v. lacobucci, 479 U.S. 92,
915-96, 107 S.Ct. 383, 385, 93 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986);
Jorgenson v. County of Volusia, 846 F.2d 1350, 1351 (11th
Cir.1988); Lanier v. City of Newton, Ala., 842 F.2d 253, 255
(llth Cir. 1988); Fillingim v. Boone, 835 F.2d 1389, 1394
(11th Cir.1988); Del Percio, 476 So.2d at 201. Following this
established precedent, the district court in the present case

4 The twenty-first amendment provides, in pertinent part: " The
transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of
the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in
violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.” U.S. Const. amend.
21.

The first amendment provides, in pertinent part: “Congress shall
make no law...abridging the freedom of speech..." U.S. Const. amend. 1.

APP. A-7

properly analyzed the ordinance under the twenty-first
amendment and properly upheld it as a valid exercise of the
City's broad twenty-first amendment powers.

The plaintiffs, moreover, fail directly to join issue with
this precedent. Rather, they attempt to skirt this authority by
observing that the City Code broadly defines the term
“establishment dealing in alcoholic beverages," see supra note
1. The plaintiffs contend that, whereas the ordinances in
Bellanca and its progeny regulated only establishments licensed
to sell liquor, the ordinance in the present case is not limited to
establishments licensed to sell alcohol but also applies to
unlicensed establishments that permit alcohol consumption.
Consequently, they argue, the ordinance is an exercise of the
City's general police powers, which must be analyzed under
the first amendment rather than under the twenty-first
amendment.

The plaintiffs, however, provide no legal support for
this argument, and they fail to address the string of Eleventh
Circuit cases that have expressly analyzed virtually identical
ordinances under the twenty-first amendment. The plaintiffs
rely on this court's decision in Leverett v. City of Pinellas
Park, 755 F.2d 1536 () Ith Cir. 1985), a case that invalidated
under the first amendment an ordinance prohibiting nude
dancing in “any commercial establishment,': id. at 1540 n.2.
Aithough the ordinance in the present case is not limited to
licensed establishments like the ordinance in Bellanca, neither
does it apply to any commercial establishment like the

APP. A-8

ordinance in Leverett. Rather, the ordinance here falls in
between these other two categories of regulation: it applies to
establishments dealing in alcoholic beverages, and although
such establishments are not necessarily licensed to sell alcohol,
they must deal in alcoholic beverages. The regulation here thus
has a definite nexus to alcohol.

Not only is Leverett factually inapplicable to the present
case--a problem that the plaintiffs never address--but, in
addition, a string of cases in this circuit has clearly foreclosed
the plaintiffs' argument. The court in these cases has analyzed
this intermediate category of regulation of protected expression
by such an ordinance is incidental to the regulation of alcohol.
See, e.g., Lanier, 842 F.2d at 256-57 (ordinance applies to
"any business establishment...which sells, dispenses or
otherwise allows the consumption of alcoholic beverages on the
premises");° Fillingim, 835 F.2d at 1397 (ordinance
prohibited "nude or semi-nude entertainment in any commercial
establishment at which alcoholic beverages are, or are available
to be, sold dispensed, consumed, possessed or offered for sale
or consumption on the premises"); see also Jorgenson v.
County of Volusia, 625 F.Supp. 1543 1547 (M.D.Fla.1986)
(upholding ordinance identical to Daytona Beach ordinance).®

5 In Lanier, the court upheld the ordinance as applied. The court
expressly stated that it was not adopting the district court's holding that the
ordinance "clearly was passed as an incident to the regulation of alcohol,
and did not go beyond the bonds of the Twenty-first amendment.” 842
F.2d at 257.

6 On appeal in Jorgenson, this court in an unpublished opinion
reversed the district court for failure to provide the attomeys notice of

APP. A-9

These cases obviously foreclose the plaintiffs’ argument here,
and the plaintiffs have made no attempt to distinguish them.

_ Indeed, the plaintiffs’ briefs even fail to cite Fillingim and
Jorgenson.’

The plaintiffs also fail to address the Supreme Court's
statement in Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves that "[w]ithout doubt a state
may absolutely prohibit the manufacture of intoxicants, their
transportation, sale or possession, irrespective of when or
where produced or obtained," 308 U.S. 132, 138, 60 S.Ct.
163 167, 84 L.Ed. 128 (1939) (emphasis added). Ziffrin thus
indicates that the City's twenty-first amendment power extends
beyond licensed establishments and includes the power to
regulate the "possession" of alcohol even outside of licensed
establishments. In short, under established precedent, the
plaintiffs’ contention is entirely meritless.

The plaintiffs also attempt to argue that the ordinance
implicates the first amendment under the overbreadth doctrine.

The gist of the plaintiffs’ "argument" appears in a two-sentence

_ paragraph in their brief:

sanctions. See 824 F.2d 9973 (11th Cir.1987). On remand, the district
court reaffirmed the imposition of sanctions, and this court affirmed, see
846 F.2d at 1350.

References to Fillilngim appear only in block quotation and in
connection with the plaintiffs’ selective enforcement claim.

We also observe that the district court in Jorgenson imposed Rule
11 sanctions on Eric Latinsky, the same attorney who represents the
plaintiffs in this case, for failing to cite key cases (i.e. Bellanca and Del
Percio) in his memorandum of law attacking the Volusia County
ordinance. ies

APP. A-10

In general rigorous constitutional standards apply when
the government attempts to regulate expression and
precision of drafting and clarity of purpose are
essential... The definition of establishment dealing in
alcoholic beverages is not precisely drafted but includes
many establishments without liquor licenses or which
do not allow consumption on premises.

Charitably construed, this argument contends that the City's
broad definition of "establishment dealing in alcohol" creates
the possibility that the ordinance's application might, at the
margins, extend beyond the limits of the City's twenty-first
amendment powers. That is, the City might use the ordinance
to prohibit nude dancing in a context where alcohol is not in
fact consumed.® Such a use of the ordinance would
presumably extend beyond the City's twenty-first amendment
powers? and would implicate the first amendment as an
exercise of the City's general police powers. The plaintiffs
appear to be arguing that, because of this attenuated danger at
the extreme margins of the ordinance's possible applications,
any application of the ordinance--even an application to conduct
at the ordinance's core--must be analyzed under the strict
standards of the first amendment.

This argument, once fleshed out, is clearly frivolous.
Not only do the plaintiffs fail to provide any legal support for

8 Whether or not the ordinance would pruperly apply in such a
Situation, however, raises a question of state law, which the state courts
have not yet had occasion to address.

9 Of course, the plaintiffs would somehow have to explain away,
which they have not done, the Court's pronouncement in Ziffrin that the
States’ twenty-first amendment power includes the power to regulate the
mere possession of alcohol.

APP. A-11

such a contention, but the courts have carefully drawn the
contours of the overbreadth doctrine to exclude exactly such
claims. As the Supreme Court explained in Broadrick v.
Oklahoma:
Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional
adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a statute
may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to
chalienge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably
be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other situations
not before the Court... A closely related principle is that
constitutional rights are personal and may not be asserted
vicariously... These principles rest on more than the
fussiness of judges. They reflect the conviction that under
our constitutional system courts are not roving
commissions assigned to pass judgment on the validity of
the Nation's laws... Constitutional judgments, as Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall recognized, are justified only out of the

necessity of adjudicating rights in particular cases between
litigants brought before the Court...

413 U.S. 601, 610-11, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2915, 37 L.Ed.2d 830
(1973) (citations omitted). Only a few limited exceptions to
this rule exist, none of which the present case involves. For
example, a statute may be susceptible to a facial overbreadth
challenge if it threatens to chill protected speech in general.
Even then, as the Broadrick Court stated, "[a]pplication of the
overbreadth doctrine in this manner is, manifestly, strong
medicine. It has been employed by the court sparingly and
only as a last resort." /d. at 6113, 93 S.Ct. at 2916. As the
Court discussed, the doctrine's applicability becomes more and
more limited as the allegedly chilled expression “moves from
‘pure speech’ toward conduct and_ that conduct--even if

APP. A-12

expressive--falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal
laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining
comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally
unprotected conduct." /d. at 615, 93 S.Ct. at 2917.

The overbreadth doctrine clearly does not apply here.
As we discuss above, there can be no doubt that the Daytona
Beach ordinance constitutes a valid exercise of the City's
twenty-first amendment power to ban nude dancing in bars.
Such a proscription lies at the core of the City's powers under
the twenty-first amendment. The plaintiffs'conduct in the
present case, moreover, rests extremely close to this core.
Whether or not the ordinance reaches to conduct at a distance
from these core concerns, the plaintiffs clearly have no standing
under Broadrick to challenge, on this basis, the ordinance's
application to them. The plaintiffs’ overbreadth argument lacks
foundation.

As one last stab in support of their contention that the
district court should have analyzed this case under the first
amendment, the plaintiffs refer to a footnote in Justice Stevens’
Iacobucci dissent, in which he suggested that "[s]ince the
Twenty-first Amendment deals only with a State's power to
regulate ‘transportation or importation into’ the State, it would
have no effect on a Kentucky bar selling Kentucky Bourbon."
479 U.S. at 102 n. 7, 107 S.Ct. at 389 n. 7. Relying on this
footnote, the plaintiffs claim that the twenty-first amendment
does not apply in this case because the plaintiffs agreed to sell
only instate liquor in their establishments. The district court

APP. A-13

;

rejected this argument, observing that the plaintiffs cited no
legal support for their contention other than the footnote in
Justice Stevens'dissent.

Nor do the plaintiffs now provide any additional legal
support for their position or offer any argument explaining the
error of the district court's decision. They fail, moreover, to
distinguish, let alone cite, legal authority that explicitly rejects
their position. Based on a definitive review of the twenty-first
amendment, Judge Melton of the Middle District of Florida
concluded: "Certainly, the ‘twenty-first amendment power
over alcohol consumption is broad enough to embrace state
power to zone strong sexual stimuli away from places where
liquor is served,'...without being forced to distinguish between
domestic and imported alcohol." W.D.C., Inc. v. City of
Jacksonville, 710 F.Supp. 782, 789 (M.D. Fla.1989) (quoting
L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 6-225, at 478 n. 15
92d ed. 1988)). As Judge Melton also observed, the
ordinances at issue in /Jucobucci, Lanier, and Fillingim made. no
distinction between in-state and out-of-state liquor. The
plaintiffs’ contention on this point is meritless as well.

B.

The plaintiffs next raise another variation of an
overbreadth attack: they claim that the ordinance prohibits
forms of attire that are socially acceptable and that are regularly
worn on the beaches. They assert, for example, that a bar
owner would violate the ordinance simply by showing a
television newscast of people at the beach. In addition, they

APP. A-14

argue that patrons wearing such generally accepted attire subject
themselves to arrest for violating the ordinance once they enter
an establishment dealing in alcohol. The district court rejected
this claim, and we affirm.

With respect to the first argument, demonstrated by the
newscast hypothetical, the plaintiffs have asserted no basis for
challenging the City's broad powers to regulate alcohol under
the twenty-first amendment. As we discuss, "the Amendment
confers broad regulatory powers on the States," /acobucci, 479
US. at 95, 107 S.Ct. at 385, and those broad powers outweigh
the free speech interest in nude and semi-nude dancing, thus
enabling the states to ban that conduct. The plaintiffs,
however, fail to demonstrate any first amendment interest on
the bar owners’ part in allowing their patrons to wear revealing
attire. If the City can exercise its twenty-first amendment
power to ban conduct that implicates the first amendment, then
it can certainly exercise that power to ban conduct that does not
implicate the first amendment.

With respect to the plaintiffs’ assertion that the
ordinance violates their patrons' own right to wear revéaling
clothing, the plaintiffs lack standing to attack the ordinance on
that basis. As we discuss above, the Supreme Court in
Broadrick held that “a person to whom a statute may
constitutionally be applied will not be heard to chalienge that
Statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied
unconstitutionally to others, in situations not before the Court."
413 US. at 610, 93 S.Ct. at 2915. A party may bring such a

APP. A-15

challenge only when the broad language of a regulation chills
expression protected by the first amendment. The doctrine's
application becomes more unlikely as the allegedly chilled
expression "moves from ‘pure speech’ toward conduct and that
conduct--even if expressive--falls within the scope of otherwise
valid criminal laws." /d. at 615, 93 S.Ct. at 2917. Here, the
chilled expression--the conduct of wearing revealing clothing--
rests at a pronounced distance from the "pure speech" at the
first amendment's core; in fact, this conduct does not implicate
the first amendment at all and no one contends otherwise. '°
In addition, this conduct falls within the scope of the City's
otherwise valid ordinance proscribing exposure of certain body
parts in establishments dealing in alcohol.'' These
circumstances, obviously, justify no exception to the traditional
tules of standing articulated in Broadrick. We thus hold that
the district court properly rejected this overbreadth claim.
xf

The plaintiffs also attack the district court's decision to
deny their void-for-vagueness claim. The plaintiffs contend
that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague in defining the

10 The plaintiffs claim only that the conduct implicates a liberty
interest under the fourteenth amendment.

11 As the district court reasoned, even if this conduct implicates a
liberty interest under the fourteenth amendment, that liberty interest would
be entitled to no greater deference than the free speech interest in nude
dancing under the first amendment. Because the City's power under the
twenty-first amendment outweighs that free speech interest, it would also
outweigh this liberty interest. The ordinance would remain a valid exercise
of the City's twenty-first amendment powers.

APP. A-16

prohibition on exposed breasts and the prohibition on exposed
buttocks. By way of argument, the plaintiffs assert that various
Florida state courts have interpreted these provisions differently
and that this proliferation of interpretations demonstrates the
ordinance's vagueness.

In pointing to the various judicial interpretations of this
ordinance, however, the plaintiffs fail to mention that the
Florida Supreme Court in Del Percio and the district court in
this case defined these two provisions. With respect to the
ordinance's prohibition on exposure of breasts, the Florida
Supreme Court in Del Fercio held that the provision meant that
"no portion of the breast directly or laterally below the top of
the areola may be exposed to public view." 476 So.2d at 200.
In granting partial summary judgment, the district court held
that the Del Percio court's construction was clear and thus
rejected the plaintiffs’ void-for-vagueness claim regarding this
provision.

With respect to the ordinance's proscription on
exposure of buttocks, the district court ir. its final decision
acknowledged that the provision was somewhat vague. The
court observed that the ordinance did not specify "whether the
entire buttocks, or what portion thereof, must be covered" and
that the ordinance did not define the word 'buttocks.'" 715
F.Supp. at 337. The court, however, concluded that the
provision was not "unconstitutionally” vague, that is, it was
"not ‘impermissibly vague in all of its applications." /d.
(quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman

APP. A-17

Estates, Inc., 445 U.S. 489, 495-95, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1191,
71 L.Id..2d 362 (1982). Although the Florida Supreme Court
had not addressed the provision at issue, the district court was
able to “extrapolate [the ordinance's] allowable meaning." See
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110,92 S.Ct.
2294, 2300, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) (quoting Garner v.
Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 174, 82 S.Ct. 248, 257, 7 L.Ed.2d
207 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). The court decided
that the Florida Supreme Court would interpret the ordinance to
"prohibit exposure of any portion of the buttocks." 715
F.Supp. at 339. The court then determined that the Florida
Supreme Court would define "buttocks" to include:

the area at the rear of the body which lies between two
imaginary lines running parallel to the ground when a
person is standing, the first or top such line drawn at
the the top of the cleavage of the nates [i.e., the
prominence formed by the muscies running from the
back of the hip to the back of the leg] and the second or
bottom line drawn at the lowest visible point of this
cleavage or the lowest point of the curvature of the
fleshy protuberance, whichever is lower, and between
two imaginary lines on each side of the body, which
lines are perpendicular to the ground and to the
horizontal lines described above, and which
perpendicular lines are drawn through the point at
which each nate meets the outer side of each leg. The
Ordinance would be violated, therefore, if any portion
of this area is visible from any vantage point.

Id. at 339.
On appeal, however, the plaintiffs fail entirely to
mention, let alone critique, these discussions of the ordinance.

APP. A-18

The plaintiffs fail to explain how the ordinance remains vague,
let alone unconstitutionally vague, in light of the Florida
Supreme Court and the district court's statements. Those
statements, in our view, are persuasive. The plaintiffs are
merely groping in the dark. Accordingly, we reject the void-
for-vagueness attack and affirm the district court's decision on
that issue.
D.

Finally, the plaintiffs claim that the district court erred in
denying their selective enforcement claim. The plaintiffs
contend that the City of Daytona Beach has enforced the statute
only against "topless bars" and not against other, similarly
situated establishments dealing in alcohol but not providing
nude dancing. According to the plaintiffs, this selective
enforcement violates their right to equal protection under the
fourteenth amendment. The district court analyzed this claim
under the two-part selective enforcement standard set out in
Fillingim and Lanier. The court held that, although the
plaintiffs had demonstrated under the standard's first element
that they were singled out for prosecution among others who
were similarly situated, the plaintiffs had not satisfied the
standard's second requirement that this selection was invidious
or in bad faith. 715 F.Supp. at 340. Again, the plaintiffs on
appeal fail even to state, let alone to demonstrate, how the
district court's conclusion is erroneous. That failure alone
renders their appeal frivolous, but we find a more fundamental
problem with this claim as well.

APP. A-19

A selective enforcement claim generally arises in the
criminal context, when a defendant challenges the enforcement
of a criminal statute or ordinance against him. In that context,
the defendant does not claim that the ordinance itself is invalid;
rather, the defendant attacks the prosecution against him
pursuant to that ordinance. The defendant bases his attack on
the grounds that the prosecution against him constitutes a
selective enforcement and thus violates his right to equal
protection under the fourteenth amendment. If the court
decides to grant the defendant relief, then it dismisses the
criminal indictment against the defendant. The court, however,
does not strike down the statute itself: the selective
enforcement claim challenges the manner in which the state
enforces the statute, and not the statute itself.

In the present case, the plaintiffs bring a selective
enforcement claim in the civil context. Just as in the criminal
context, this selective enforcement claim provides no basis for
the court to invalidate the City ordinance: a selective
enforcement claim challenges the enforcement of the ordinance
and not the ordinance itself. Nor do the plaintiffs contend, on
selective enforcement grounds, that criminal prosecutions
against them should be dismissed: although the City did bring
criminal charges agairst some of the plaintiffs, no charges are
currently pending. Ranher, the plaintiffs request a declaratory
judgment that the City's selective enforcement is

APP. A-20

unconstitutional and an injunction preventing the City from
selectively enforcing the ordinance against them.'@

The district court held that the plaintiffs failed to prove a
selective enforcement claim, but even if the plaintiffs could
prove their claim, an injunction would not necessarily prevent
the City from enforcing the ordinance against them. The court
would enjoin the City not to enforce the ordinance against the
plaintiffs selectively. The City could satisfy such a mandate
simply by enforcing the ordinance against all similarly situated
violators. Thus, even if the plaintiffs were to succeed on this
selective enforcement claim, they could not escape the
ordinance's application to them; they could only require the
City to enforce it more widely--a result that is clearly not what
the plaintiffs desire.

As this discussion demonstrates, the plaintiffs’ selective
enforcement claim is entirely without purpose. In the context
of this civil suit, such a claim is an inappropriate basis for the
relief sought by the plaintiffs. We therefore affirm the district
court's disposition of this claim as well.

ITI.

For the forgoirg reasons, we hold that the plaintiffs’

contentions are wholly meritless and therefore AFFIRM the

12 In Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 930, 95 S.Ct. 2561,
2567, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975), the Supreme Court held that the Younger
abstention doctrine, see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27
L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), did not apply when a plaintiff requested an injunction
of future state criminal prosecutions. The doctrine of course applies when
a State criminal prosecution is pending.

APP. A-21

district court's disposition in this case. In addition, because the
plaintiffs’ claims are entirely without merit, we hold under Rule
38 that this appeal is frivolous and that plaintiffs be assessed
double costs and attorneys’ fees for this appeal. The Clerk of
this Court shall fix the double costs, and the District Court on
receipt of our mandate, shall determine the amount of the
defendants’ attorneys’ fee. for this appeal.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

APP. A-22

APPENDIX B

THE UNITED STATES COURT CF ‘PEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
iT
No. 89-3208
NOV -9
CHRIS GEANEAS, PINK PUSSYCAT, 1990
INC., d/b/a Red Garter Club, i
DEL PERCIO, INC., d/b/a Shingle
Shack, FUNCTION JUNCTION, INC., MIGUEL J. CORTEZ
DAWN BOIDO, DENISE DEL PINTO, CLERK

LESLIE GRIER,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

KINZEY ENTERPRISES, INC.,
@/b/a Cyster Pub, LINNIE SHIFTLETT,
LOIS YOUNG,
Plaintiffs,
versus
CHARLES @. W

ILLETS
THE CITY OF DAYT

ONA BEACH,
Defendants-Appellees,

JCHN M. POWER,
LAWRENCE KELLY,
pefendants.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the
} 5 : re! F

lobed

(November 9, 1 )

CN PETITION(S) FOR REHEARING AND SUGGESTION(S) OF REHEARING EN BANC

(Opinion_Seprember 10,1990, ~- llth Cir., 19490, it a
Before: TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, TUTTLE, and RONEY*, Senior Circuit
Judges.

PER CURIAM:

(YA The Petition(s) for Rehearing are DENIED and no member of
this panel nor other Judge in regular active service on the Court
having requested that the Court be polled on rehearing er: banc
(Rule 35, Federal Rules of Apvellate Procedure; Eleventh Circuit
Rule 35-5), the Suggestion(s) of Rehearing En Banc are DENIED.

( ) The Petition(s) for Rehearing are DENIED and the Court having
been polled at the request of one of the members of the Court and
a majority of the Circuit Judges who are in regular active service
not having voted in favor of it (Rule 35, Federal Rules cf
Appellate Procedure; Eleventh Circuit Rule 35-5), the Suggestiocn(s)
of Rehearing En Banc are also DENIED.

( ) and
Laura Iris Moore, for violations of section 5-25. Neither of
these individuals is a party to this case. However, Leonard Del
Percio was and is President of two of the Corporate Plaintiffs,
Del Percio, Inc., and Function Junction, Inc., involved in this
action. Furthermore, Defendant relies on the opinion of the
Florida Supreme Court for the proposition that Laura Iris
Moore was when arrested a bartender at Plaintiff Pink
Pussycat, Inc. d/b/a a Re.J Garter Club. Because of the close
relations of the parties in Del Percio. with the parties in this
case, and the similarity of issues involved, Defendant contends
that this action is barrec by the principles of res judicata.

Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on
this ground. Defendants make two separate arguments that
partial summary judgment should be granted based on res
judicata. First, Defendants contend that under the federal law of

preclusion as expressed in Montana v. United States, 440

APP. C-7

U.S. 147 (1979), Plaintiffs in this action are collaterally
estopped from asserting that section 5-25 is unconstitutional by
the result in Del Percio, Montana held that a nonparty to a prior
suit who assists in the prosecution or defense of that action in
aid of his own interest is as much bound by the result as if he
had been a party of record.’ Defendants contend that because
Leonard Del Percio was a party to Del Percio, the two
corporations of which he is President should be bound, as
should their employees. Similarly, Defendants contend that
Laura Iris Moore, the other defendant in Del Percio, was in
actuality the "manager" of Pink Pussycat, Inc. d/b/a the Red
Garter Club, and so it is also appropriate to bind that club, its
president Plaintiff Chris Geaneas, and the club's employees to
the result of Del Percio. Since section 5-25 was held to be
constitutional by the Florida Supreme Court in that case,
Defendants claim this action is barred in part.

Assuming arguendo that Montana is applicable,8 the

Defendants have not demonstrated that they are entitled to

7 Montana gleaned from the federal cases a four part standard designed to
determine whether it is appropriate to bind nonparties to the result of a
prior litigation. First, the nonparty must have been sufficiently involved in
the conduct of the prior litigation to actuate principles of estoppel. Second,
the issue involved must be the same in substance. Third, the controlling
facts and law must not have vhanged significantly. Fourth, other special
circumstances must not warrant an exception to the general rule. 440 U.S.
at 154-155.

8 Montana created a federal rule by examining federal cases. However, a
variety of recent Supreme Court cases have held that the full faith and
credit statute, 28 U.S.C. 1738, requires that the preclusive effect of a
State court judgment be determined under the law of the state which

APP. C-8

summary judgment thereunder. The first part of the Montana
test is that the nonparty must have been sufficiently involved in
the conduct of the prior litigation to actuate principles of
estoppel. 440 U.S. at 155? This is Clearly a question of fact
for the Court. Astron Industrial Associated, Inc, v, Chrysler
Motor Corp, 405 F.2d 958, 961 (Sth Cir. i968): C. Wright, A.
Miller & E. Cooper, 18 Federal Practice and Procedure 4451,
at 429-430 & n. 7 (1981). The Defendants have not sufficiently
proven control of the defense in Del Percio. by the Corporate

rendered the judgment. E.g., Marrese v, American Academy of Orthopaedic
Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 165 s. Ct. 1327, 1331-1335 (1985); Migra v.

Warren City School District Board of Education, 465 U.S. 75, 81-84
(1984); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96-105 (1980). But see DeWeese
v. Town of Palm Beach, 688 F.2d 731, 733 (11th Cir. 1982) (in a decision
subsequent to Allen, the Eleventh Circuit applied federal law to determine
the collateral estoppel effect of a state court criminal judgment in a later
federal action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). These cases in the main
address the question of whether a particular claim or issue is precluded by
the state court judgment, and not whether a particular party is bound.
However, their rationale applies equally well to the latter question.

Since the prior judgment at issue in Montana was a State court
judgment, and its preclusive effects were determined under federal law, there
exists a latent conflict between that decision and the later decisions cited
above. Montana may be disti guishable since it involved the preclusive
effects of a judgment as to th. ' Jnited States. Traditionally special rules of
res judicata and collateral estoppel are applied to the United States. See
¢.g.. United States v, Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984) (doctrine of
nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel does not apply the United States).
However, neither party has briefed this issue in any manner, and so the
Court will not closely examine it. The question need not be reached since
the Court concludes that the Defendants have not demonstrated their
entitlement to summary judgment under state or federal law.

9 See supra, note 7.

APP. C-9

Plaintiffs to justify preclusion even as to them.!0 No real
evidence of actual control has been presented to the Court.
Rather, the Defendants rely on the positions and employment of
the various Plaintiffs to argue that the Corporate Plaintiffs must
have controlled the defense in Del Percio, ! 1 The positions and
employment of the defendants in Del Percio_ do not create a
sufficiently strong inference of control to justify summary
judgment. See Ransburg Lectro-Coating Corp. v. Lansdale
Finishers, Inc., 484 F.2d 1037, 1038 (3rd Cir. 1973)
(reversing a district court's granting of summary judgment
where the movant failed to affirmatively establish sufficient
control). Cf, Concordia v. Bendekovic, 693 F.2d 1073, 1076
(11th Cir. 1982) (burden on the movant to introduce evidence
sufficient to establish defense of res judicata).

Defendants' second argument is that these parties are
precluded from bringing this suit by Florida law on res judicata

and collateral estoppel.'* Defendant cites Seaboard Coast Line

10 Therefore the Court does not reach the question of whether a collateral
estoppel bar to the Corporate Plaintiffs would also be a bar to their
employees.

11 For example, the Defendarts argue: "... [I]t would be naive to assume
that Moore brought her case all the way to the State Supreme Court
without any involvement by her employer, since the employer would have
received the primary benefit from a favorable ruling - that is, to operate a
topless bar.” Defendants’ Mj morandum of Law, p.6. Naive as the Court
may be, it will not assume hat Moore's employer was involved without
any evidence to that effect. A fortiori, the court will not find that Moore's
einployer controlled the Del Percio litigation.

12 Florida law on preclusion is said to be applicable since a Florida court
rendered the judgment alleged to have preclusive effect. See supra note 8.

APP. C-10

Railroad Co, v, Industrial Contracting Co,, 260 so. 2d 860
(Fla. 4th DCA 1972) for the proposition that nonparties to a

prior litigation can be held to be parties under certain
circumstances. In this respect, the case is similar to Montana.
Furthermore, as in Montana, the question of nonparty control
(here called "privity") is one of fact for the trial court.
Seaboard, 260 So. 2d at 864 (citing Astron Industrial
Associates, 405 F.2d at 961). As discussed above, the
evidence is insufficient to establish the requisite level of
involvement necessary to treat these Plaintiffs as parties to Del
Percio.
Defendants also cite Atlantic Cylinder Corp. v. Hetner,
438 So. 2d 922 (Fla. lst DCA 1983), review denied, 447 So.
2d 885 (1984), for the proposition that a corporation and one of
its corporate officers should (be) treated as the same party for
res judicata and collateral estoppel purposes. In Atlantic
Cylinder the plaintiff had formerly brought suit against a
corporation, and was partially successful and partially
unsuccessful. Then that plaintiff brought suit against several
corporate officers for the same conduct. The court held that the
former judgment on ‘'¢ merits for the corporation barred a
subsequent action against the corporate officers to the extent
that it seeks "... to relitigate issues adversely determined on the
previous action." Id., at 923. However, at issue in Hetner was
the allegedly tortious conduct of the officers. As such, the court

APP. C-11

relied heavily on notions of respondent superior and joint
tortfeasor liability. These doctrines could be extended to the
present case, which concerns criminal liability, but neither party
has sufficiently briefed the issue for the Court to be able to
determine whether such an action would generally be in accord
with Florida Law. Therefore the Court will not grant summary
judgment based on collateral estoppel or res judicata.

FACIAL CONSTITUTIONALITY

Defendants’ second ground for summary judgment is
that section 5-25 is wholly constitutional on its face. They
contend that the ordinance regulates nudity in conjunction with
the regulation of alcoholic beverages, and therefore the
ordinance must be reviewed deferentially given the "'added
presumption in favor of the validity of state regulation’
conferred by the Twenty-first Amendment, ..." New York
State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 718 (1981),
citing, California v. LaRue. 409 U.S. 109, 118 (1972).

The Plaintiffs assert to the contrary that the ordinance is
unconstitutional on its face because it is overbroad and vague.
They contend that section 5-25 must be strictly reviewed,
because it regulates conduct in all establishments "dealing in"
alcoholic beverages, us opposed to those establishments
licensed_to serve alcoholic beverages. Plainuffs argue that only
the latter are reviewed under the Twenty-first Amendment.

APP. C-12

Twenty-first Amendment Authority
Plaintiffs contend, inter alia, that the statute restricts
exercise of their first amendment rights. 13 Nude dancing is not

without its first amendment protection. Schad v, Borough of

Mount Ephriam, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981); Krueger v, City of
Pensacola, 759 F.2d 851, 854 (11th Cir. 1985). However, the

Supreme Court has held that states may regulate nude
entertainment under tieir broad powers, conferred by the
Twenty-First Amendment, to regulate the sale of liquor. E.g.,,
Bellanca, 452 U.S. at 717. The states’ power to regulate
pursuant to the Twenty-First Amendment outweighs any first
amendment protection afforded to nude entertainment. Id,

In order to review an ordiance which restricts protected
expression under the less strict standard of the Twenty-first
Amendment, two requirements must be met. First, the
legislative body must have been delegated the state's Twenty-
first Amendment authonty to regulate behavior in conjunction

13 Plaintiffs also attempt to assert the First Amendment rights of patrons
whose dress is regulated by *he ordinance. To the extent that the defendants
are entitled to raise these claims, the First Amendment interest of patrons
in their dress is no more, and almost certainly less, than that of nude
dancers who can claim some element of expression in their attire, or lack
thereof. See, South Floriga Free Beaches. Inc, v, City of Miami, 734 F.
2d 608, 610 (11th Cir. 1984) (nude sunbathing is not protected by the
First Amendment). Accordingly, even if Plaintiffs can raise the claims of
patrons, those claims present a weaker case for overturning the ordinance
than claims of the Plaintiffs.

APP. C-13

a.)

Ne

with the regulation of alcohol. Second, the regulation of
expression must actually be incidental to the regulation of
alcohol. These requirements are discussed below.

With respect to the first question, in Florida,
municipalities such as Daytona Beach are authorized to exercise
the power conferred by the Twenty-first Amendment. The
Florida Supreme Court held in Del Percio_ that, as a matter of
state law, municipalities have Twenty-first Amendment
authority to regulate behavior in "bars" despite the fact that they
lack the power to totally ban liquor sales. 476 So. 2d at 201.
Such allocation is clearly permissible under the Twenty-First

Amendment:
... [T]his court has never attached any constitutional
significance to a State's division of its authority over
alcohol. The Twenty-first Amendment has given broad
power to the States and generally they may delegate
this power as they see fit.

There is certainly no constitutional requirement that
the same governmental unit must grant liquor licenses,
revoke licenses, and regulate the circumstances under
which liquor may be sold."

ity of New Vv . 8. - wire ee. 23,
385 (1986) (footnote omitted). The Eleventh Circuit has

recognized this delegation of power. International Food &

Beverage Systems v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 794 F.2d 1520,
1527 (11th Cir. 1986). Thus, the City of Daytona Beach has

the Twenty-first Amendment authority to regulate behavior as
an incident to the regulation of alcohol.

Plaintiffs cite several Eleventh Circuit cases for the
proposition that an ordinance such as section 5-25 must be

APP. C-14

reviewed under a Stricter standard than that employed in
Bellanca, Because the ordinance restricts the exercise of a
fundamental right, Plaintiffs contend that the court must strictly
review the ordinance under First Amendment standards, such

as those set out in Leverett v, City of Pinellas Park, 775 F.2d
1536 (11th Cir. 1985), Krueger, 759 F.2d at 855-856, and

Grand Faloon Tavern, Inc, v, Wicker, 670 F.2d 943 (11th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982). However, in
these cases the statutes at issue were not reviewed under the
Bellanca _ standard for reasons inapplicable in this case.

Krueger. was based upon the belief that the State of
Florida had not delegated any of its Twenty-first Amendment
authority to municipalities, and so the court reviewed the
legislation at issue in that case under the stricter standard
employed when legislation infringing on protected liberty
interests is justified solely under the police power. 759 F.2d at
854. As noted above, this view of Florida law was rejected in
Del Percio. Grand Faloon was based on the same
misconception. 670 F. 2d at 944. Therefore, neither case is
strictly applicable here.

In Leverett, the court examined a municipal ordinance
which prohibited nude or semi-nude entertainment in any
commercial establishinent. The regulation of protected
expression involved was therefore not incidental to the
regulation of alcohol. 775 F.2d at 1540, at n.2. Accordingly,
the court applied the sirict standard of Krueger as opposed to
the Twenty-first Amendment standard of LaRue and Bellanca.

APP. C-15

a

Leverett is clearly in line with the weight of authority. When an
ordinance regulates protected expression in a manner not
incidental to the regulation of alcohol, a strict review of the

ordinance must be undertaken. See e.g,, Doran v. Salem Inn,
Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975) (ordinance applied to "any public

place"); Chase v. Davelaar, 645 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1981)
(resolution at issue applied to all non-theatrical establishments
selling food or beverages); Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 522
F.2d 1045 (2nd Cir. 1975) (ordinance applied to
establishments such as coffee shops).

However, section 5-25 regulates nudity and nude
expression only in establishments dealing in alcoholic
beverages. Therefore, the regulation is incidental to the
regulation of alcohol, and the second requirement for the
application of Twenty-first amendment analysis is met.
Accordingly, since the City of Daytona Beach posses the
Twenty-first Amendment authority to regulate behavior in
establishments which dal in alcoholic beverages, the ordinance
must be reviewed within the context of the Twenty-first
Amendment.

Analysis under Bellanca
In Bellanca, the Supreme Court held valid under the
Constitution a statute sirailar to the section 5-25:

No retail licensee for on premises consumption shall
suffer or permit any person to appear on licensed

APP. C-16

premises in such manner or attire as to expose to view
any portion of the pubic area, anus, vulva, or genitals,
or any simulation thereof, nor shall suffer or permit
any female to appear on licensed premises in such
manner or attire as to expose to view any portion of
breast below the top of the areola, or any simulation
thereof.

452 U.S. at 714, n.l. The Court held that the powers conferred
by the Twenty-first amendment to regulate the sale of alcohol
outweighed any First Amendment interest in nude dancing. No
specific factual evidence need be presented to the legislature.
Instead, the court aprroved as sufficient the following
legislative finding contained in the memorandum which
accompanied the statute at issue:

"Nudity is the kind of conduct that is a proper
subject for legislative action as well as regulation by
the State Liquor Authority as a phase of liquor
licensing. It has long been held that sexual acts and
performances may constitute disorderly behavior
within the meaning of the Alcoholic Beverage Control
Law ...

“Common sense indicates that any form of nudity
coupled with alcohol in a public place begets
undesirable behav or. This legislation prohibiting
nudity in public will once and for all, outlaw conduct
which is now quite out of hand."

Bellanca, 452 U.S. at 7:7-718. In the context of the Twenty-
first Amendment, the ~ourt found this "common sense"
rationale sufficient. "In short, the elected representatives of the
State of New York have chosen to avoid the disturbances
associated with mixing alcohol and nude dancing by means of a

APP. C-17

BEST AVAILABLE COP

reasonable restriction upon establishments which sell liquox for
on-premises consumption.” [d,. at 718.

Judged by this standard, the ordinance is clearly
constitutionally valid or its face. Section 2 of Ordinance 81-
334, which created section 5-25, contains sufficient rationale
on its face!4 to satisfy scrutiny under Bellanca, !5 The
prevention of rape, prostitution, and assaults on police officers
are legitimate legislative ends. The means chosen are within the
wide latitude given a legislative body under the Twenty-first
Amendment. See LaRue, 409 U.S. at 116. The city has not
totally prohibited nudity and sexual conduct, but has instead
proscribed such things in establishments dealing in alcoholic

beverages. See Del Percio, 476 So. 2d at 203.

14 Section 2 of the ordinance reads:

SECTION 2. It is hereby found that the acts prohibited in Section
1 above encourage the conduc: of prostitution, attempted rape, rape,
murder, and assaults on police officers in and around establishments dealing
in alcoholic beverages, that actual and simulated nudity and sexual conduct
and the depiction thereof coupled with alcohol in public places begets
undesirable behavior, that s * of the genitals, pubic area, vulva, anus
or anal cleft or cleavage, in light of the stated legislative
purpose to prohibit “nudity and sexual conduct and depiction
thereof coupled with alcohol in public place," and since the
words "or buttocks" appear as words in a series within the

APP. D-12

same clause as "genitals, public area, vulva, anus, or anal cleft
or cleavage,” a person of ordinary intelligence would assume
that the legislature intended to prohibit exposure of any portion
of the buttocks.

This construction is also consistent with the
interpretation of the buttocks provision by those charged with
enforcing the Ordinance. The officers who testified on the
subject stated that they interpreted the Ordinance as prohibiting
exposure of any portion of the buttocks. While the officers had
difficulty giving a precise definition of the term "buttocks," and
while they differed as to what would amount to a flagrant
violation for which they would arrests were made for, exposure
of areas of the buttocks outside the lines described above.

While two state trial courts have interpreted the
Ordinance to allow partial exposure of the buttocks and to
prohibit only exposure of the entire buttocks,’ the converse of
this Court's ruling, these state trial courts were apparently
straining to construe the statute narrowly in order to save it
from unconstitutional overbreadth. Later, in City of Daytona
Beach v. Del Percio, supra, the Florida Supreme Court
indicated that such narrow constructions were unnecessary in
light of the Twenty-first Amendment cases. The state Supreme
Court in that case was wil.ing to draw an imaginary line across
the top of the areolas, ad it seems probable that it would draw

7 See Order of County Judge Josephson dated September 23, 1982,
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 5-C' and Order of County Judge McDermoit dated April
21, 1983, Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 5-K and L.

APP. D-13

the lines described here as to the buttocks portion of the

Ordinance.
Il, SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF THE
ORDINANCE

Plaintiffs have also argued that the Ordinance has been
selectively enforced against them. To establish their claim of
selective enforcement, the Plaintiffs would have to show (1)
that they have been sing!ed out for prosecution while others
who are similarly situated have not been prosecuted while
others who are similarly situated have not been prosecuted, and
(2) that the selection of Plaintiffs for prosecution was invidious

or in bad faith. Fillingim v, Boone, 835 F.2d 1389, 1399

(11th Cir. 1988); Lanier v, City of Newton, 842 F.2d 253, 256
(11th Cir. 1988).

The court finds that Plaintiffs have set forth evidence
sufficient to meet the first prong of the selective enforcement
test. Section 5-25 has been enforced almost exclusively against
those presenting partially nude, non-obscene dance as
entertainment, even though by its terms the Ordinance is
applicable to all non-residential establishments dealing in
alcoholic beverages and even though violations of the
Ordinance do occur in other such establishments.

Plaintiffs have not shown, however, that the City's
prosecution of Plainti1's was invidious or in bad faith. The
United States Supreme Court has made clear that "the
conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in
itself a federal constitutional violation." Oyler v, Boles, 368

U.S. 448, 456 (1962); see also Owen v, Wainnght, 806 F.2d

APP. D-14

1519 (11th Cir. 1986), cert, denied sub nom, Owen v, Dugger,
481 U.S. 1071 (1987). As stated by the Eleventh Circuit,
"(t]he invidiousness requirement is satisfied oniy if-it can be
established that the government's selective prosecution is
motivated by constitutionally impermissible motives such as
racial or religious discrimination or interference with the
legitimate exercise of constitutional rights." Fillingim, supra at
1399, citing United States v. Lichtenstein, 610 F.2d 1272,

1281 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom, Bella v. United
States, 447 U.S. 907 (1980). While the Ordinance here affects

the exercise of constitutional rights, the selectivity evidenced by
the City in enforcing this Ordinance was not shown to have
been motivated by an intent to interfere with such nghts. Nor
have Plaintiffs suggested any other impermissible motive on the
part of the Defendants.

Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that Defendants
attempted to do anything other than effectuate the intent of the
Ordinance. While the Plaintiffs have offered no evidence of an
invidious motive, the City has indicated that it chose to enforce
the Ordinance against these particular Plaintiffs because the
violations of the Ordinance by these Plaintiffs have been
longstanding and flagrant and because these Plaintiffs have had
knowledge and fair w:rning of the Ordinance's provisions.®
Defendants have also convincingly demonstrated that

8 These warning include, but are not limited to, letters sent by
police officers to the Plaintiffs’ establishments prior to initiating
enforcement of the Ordinance. See Defendants’ Exhibit 3.

APP. D-15

enforcement of the Ordinance in other establishments dealing in
alcoholic beverages would involve persons unaware of the
Ordinance and, during events such as bike week and spring
break, would often be impractical, in some circumstances
endangering the safety of the officers and/or the public. The
burden of proof in establishing a claim of selective prosecution
is a heavy one. Fillingim, supra at 1398, citing United States
v. Johnson, 577 F.2d '304, 1308 (Sth Cir. 1978). Plaintiffs
have not met it here.
III. Conclusion

In summary, the Court not concludes that the
provisions of Daytona Beach City code Section 5-25
prohibiting buttocks exposure, as well as the provisions
prohibiting breast exposure, are not unconstitutional facially or
as applied, and that the Ordinance has not been selectively
enforced in a manner violative of Plaintiffs’ constitutional
rights. The issue of damages, therefore, is moot, and the case
is DISMISSED.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chamber at Orlando,
Florida, this 15 day of March, 1989.

PATRICIA C. FAWSETT
{JNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:
All counsel of Record

APP. D-16

APPENDIX E

IN THE COUNTY COURT,
SEVENTH JUDICIAL
CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR
VOLUSIA COUNTY,
FLORIDA

THE CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH,

v.

LENA LENORA DUCILLE, CASE NO. V82-6886-DB
Defendant.

THE CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH

v.

LESLIE JENNINGS GRIER, CASE NO. V82-6880-DB
Defendant.

ORDER

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the Defendant's
Motions to Dismiss the carges filed against them by the City of
Daytona Beach. This is the case of the bottomless ordinance.

The Defendants are charged with Violation of City
Ordinance 5-25 (a) which provides as follows:

"No person shall expose to public view his or her
genitals, pubic area, vulva, anus, anal cleft or cleavage
or buttocks or any simulation thereor in an
establishment dealing in alcoholic beverages."

APP.E-1

The cnarging instrument (SA-751) alleges that Ms.
Ducille “while employed by the above establishment and
performing on state in front of an audience of approx. 20
people perform three dances where her buttocks were exposed
to view. The small panties that the def. was wearing would
Slide into the anal cleft and the def. made made no attempt to
correct the violation.”

_ With reference to Ms. Grier, the charging instrument
(SA-751) states, "Def. wore a G-string type lower panty set
that clearly revealed def's buttocks. Panty covered the front
area of def., but oniy had a thin string down rear buttocks area.

The Defendants Motions to Dismiss raises several
points, one of which can be referred to as a C-4 Motion in
which it is asserted that there are no material disputed facts and
the undisputed facts failed to establish a prima facie case. One
of the facts asserted in the Motions to Dismiss was that the
defendant's buttocks were at least "partially covered."

The City did not traverse the Motion to Dismiss so that
the factual matters alleged in the Motion to Dismiss are deemed
admitted. (See Rule 3.190(d) FrCP).

The defendants also assert in their Motions to Dismiss
the constitutionality of the Ordinance on several grounds.

The constitution:'ity of the Ordinance and Ordinances
of similar nature have already been declared constitutional by
our Appellate Courts and the constitutionality of this particular
ordinance is now pending in the Circuit Court in this Judicial

APP.E-2

Circuit. (See Board of Commissioners of Lee County v.
Dexterhouse 348 So.2d 916 affirmed, Martin v, Board of
County Commissioners of Lee County, 364 So.2d 449, appeal

dismissed, 99 S.Ct. 2024, Del Percio v, City of Daytona
Beach, V81-11598-DB appeal number 82-1243-CA-0i-D)

It is a long established rule that Courts will not consider
the constitutionality of an ordinance unless it is necessary to do
so in order to dispose of the problem at hand (North American
Company v. Green 120 So.2d 603)

In the case at bar, the Court finds that it is not necessary
to consider the Constitutionality of the specific section of the
ordinance attacked in order to dispose of the matter. This
matter can be disposed of on a factual basis, rather than as a
matter of law.

The City, by failing to file a traverse to the Motions to
Dismiss admits that the defendant's buttocks were partially
covered.

"Buttocks" as defined in Webster's Seventh New
Collegiate Dictionary is as follows:

"Either rounded hal‘ of the lower part-of the back
together forming the part on which a person sits.”

It is also defined in Gould Medical Dictionary 3rd
Edition, McGraw-Hill, Inc., as being:

ret

"One of the two fleshy parts of the bodys posteria to
the hip joint."

APP.E-3

By the definitions there is no precise point at which the
buttocks begins or ends and covers a wide undefined area.

At least the ordinance in question, by proscribing the
exposure of breasts has a reference point by prohibiting the
exposing of the breast "below the top of the areola" (See
Section 5-25(g)) This is a reasonable restraint, otherwise any
person entering an establishment where alcoholic beverages are
served and wearing a low cut dress would be subject to
violation, having exposed the upper portion of her breast.

In todays society where the female dress code is quite
liberal, especially in bathing suit wear where female persons
waear bikinis and french cut bathing suits, much of their
buttocks are exposed to public view and can even be seen on
television advertisemeats. One might even include females
who wear "short shorts" and do their shopping in supermarkets
where alcoholic beverages are sold (See Steffens v. State 343
So.2d 90)

In Florida State Racing Commission v. McLaughlin
120 So.2d 574 it was held that the use by the Legislature of a
comprehensive term ordinarily indicates everything embraced
within the term.

In construing an ambiguous statute it is proper to take
into consideration the pa‘ticular evils at which the legislation is
aimed or mischief soug!it to be awarded (30) Fla Jur, Page
203)

The word buttocks by medical definition and common
language is to say the least ambiguous for one cannot define the

APP.E-4

beginning or ending of that part of the anatomy. The evil
sought to be avoided by this ordinance is nude dancing, not
semi-nude dancing. To construe the ordinance to read partially
exposed buttocks would please an unbridled discretion upon
the Courts to determine how much of the buttocks should be
partially exposed in order to find a violation of the ordinance.

It is therefore the interpretation of this Court that in
order to find any person in violation of the ordinance, all of his
or her buttocks must be exposed.

Admitting that the defendant's buttocks were partially
covered the Court finds that the City is unable to prove a prime
facia case.

With reference to the Defendant Ducille, she is charged
with a second violation of Ordinance 5-25 in that the charging
instrument (SA-751) alleges as follows:

"While employed by the above establishment approach
an unidentified white male in the area of the pin ball
machine and allow inerself to be hugged and kissed.
The white male was further observed to caress and
fondle the co-def around the ; f the buttocks in
plain view of approx. 30 patrons in the establishment."
underlines supplied.

Section 5-25(c) which s.ates:

"No person shall er.gage in and no person maintaining,
owning, or operating an establishment dealing in
alcoholic beverages shall suffer or permit any sexual
intercourse, masturbation, sodomy, beastiality, oral
copulation, flageliation, any sexual act which is
prohibited by law, touching, carressing or fondling of
the breast, buttocks, anus or genitals or the simulation

APP.E-S5

thereof within an establishment dealing in alcoholic
beverages."

The ordinance requires the touching or fondling of the
"buttocks" not the "area of the buttocks" as alleged in the
charging instrument. It is therefore the opinion of this Court
that the charging instrument is defective in failing to state a
violation of 5-25(c) of the ordinance, it is therefore

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motions to
Dismiss against these defendants on the charges pending
against them, be and the same, are hereby dismissed.

DONE, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED in Chambers at
Halifax Law Center, Holly Hill, Volusia County, Florida this
23rd day of September, 1982.

NORTON JOSEPHSON
COUNTY COURT JUDGE
Copies to:
Frank B. Gummey, Esquire
City Attorney
Suite 213, City Hall
Post Office Box 551

Daytona Beach, Florida 32015

Eric A. Latinsky, Esquire
Attorney for Defendants

404 S. Atlantic Avenue
Ormond Beach, Flordida 32074

APP.E-6

APPENDIX F
IN THE COUNTY COURT
OF VOLUSIA COUNTY,
FLORIDA
CASE NO: V82-12397-DB

CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH,
Plaintiff,

VS.

LESLIE JENNINGS GRIER,
Defendant.

ORDER

THIS CAUSE came on the be heard on Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss. Defendant is charged with violating
Daytona Beach Ordinance #5-25(a) and 5-25(b) which provide:

(a) No person shall expose to public view his or her
genitals, public area, vulva, anus, anal cleft or cleavage
or buttocks or any simulation thereof in an
establishment dealing in alcoholic beverages.

(b) No female person shall expose to public view any
portion of her breasts below the top of the areola or
any simulation thereof in an establishment dealing in
alcoholic beverages.

Defendant's Motior: to Dismiss contends:

a. That the undisputed facts do not establish a prima
facie case of guilt;

APP.F-1

b. That the Ordinance is unconstitutionaliy overbroad
as applied to this Defendant, in violation of the United States
and Florida Constitutions;

c. That the Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague as
applied to this Defendant, in violation of the United States and
Florida Constitutions;

d. That the charging document does not state an
offense under ordinance 5-25.

The Motion alleges as undisputed the following facts:

A. Defendant did not expose her entire buttocks;

B. Defendant did not expose her areola (or any portion
thereof);

C. Defendant did not expose that area directly
underneath her arecla.

The Court has considered the memoranda of law
prepared by counsel for the City and the Defendant, the City's
response to the Motion to Dismiss, the charging document and
the deposition in the court file as well as the arguments of
counsel at hearing.

In the aftermath of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Schad v, City of Moun, Ephraim 68 L. Ed 2d 671 (1981)
which finds nude dancing to be a form of expression which is
constitutionally protected by the First Amendment, this
Ordinance is overbroa } if the incidental restriction on First
Amendment freedoms is greater than what is essential to the
furtherance of a substantial governmental interest.

The Court has determined, however, that any
constitutional infirmities presented by the ordinance can be
resolved by construing the Ordinance as written while
considering the City's Announced purpose to prohibit nudity

APP.F-2

and sexual conduct in establishments dealing in alcoholic
beverages.

The Florida Supreme Court has held in State v Cotney
104 So. 2d 346 (Fl. 1958) that it is a court's duty to adopt an
interpretation that in order for a person to be in violation of
Section (a) of the Ordinance all of his or her buttocks must be
exposed. This Court finds persuasive the reasoning of Judge
Josephson in the combined cases of City of Daytona Beach vs
Ducille and Grier (attached).

With this limitation engrafted on Section (a) the Court
finds that the Ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague or
overbroad.

The case of Spees v State (attached) in which Circuit
Court Judge Kaney in Orange County, Florida narrowly
construed Orange Cour.ty Ordinance 77-8 in reliance on Foley
v_State 50 So. 2d 179 (Fl. 1951) was also considered as
persuasive authority by this Court. In Spees the court
construed the phrase "at or below the areola thereof" to require
only that the areola itselt be covered.

The Court construes Section (b) of the Ordinance to
require a female person to expose at least a portion of her areola
to the public view in order to be in violation. With these
limitations engrafted the Court finds the Ordinance is not
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.

The Court finds that the City's having failed to traverse
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, it is admitted that Defendant's
buttocks were partially covered and that no part of the areola

APP.F-3

was uncovered. Therefore, the City is unable to prove a prima
facie case.

It is therefore ordered and adjudged that the Motion is
granted and the pending charge dismissed.

DONE, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED in Chambers
this ___ at the Courthouse Annex, New Smyrna Beach, Volusia
County, Florida this 21 day of April 1983.

Judge Michael McDermott

cc: Eric A. Latinsky, Esq.
Reginald Moore, Esq.

APP.F-4

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT IN
THE NINTH JUDICIAL
CIRCUIT IN AND FOR
ORANGE COUNTY,
FLORIDA

CASE NO. CJAP 78-72
JULIE ANN SPEES,

Appellant,
VS.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
OPINION

THE APPELLANT, hereinafter referred to as
Defendant, was charged with two violations of the anti-nude
dancing ordinance of Orange County, 77-8. She filed motions
to dismiss. Upon the cenial of these motions, she pled Nolo
Contendere, reserving the right to appeal these denials. She did
so directly to the Supreme Court on the basis that the trial court
ruled on the constitutionality of the ordinance. The Supreme
Court found no jurisdictional basis for the appeal, and
transferred the cause to tnis court. She raises three points on
this appeal:

The ordinance is unconstitutional due to vagueness and
overbreadth; it violates equal protection because it applies only
to establishments serving liquor for on premises consumption;

APP.F-5

and there was a lack of evidence that the beer served was an
alcoholic beverage. She looses on all three.
I affirm.

I shall deal with these in inverse order. The second
motion to dismiss dealt with the fact that the State could not
prove that the beer being sold was an “alcoholic beverage". It
did not have to. The ordinance dealt with the offering for sale
of alcoholic beverages and that does not require proof that the
beer here was an alcoholic beverage.

Defendant's next point goes to the violation of the equal
protection clause and is twofold. First, she complains that the
ordinance is directed only at establishments offering alcoholic
beverages for sale, i.e., nightclubs, and then only nightclubs in
the unincorporated areas of the county.

The equal protection clause does not outlaw all
classifications or distinctions, only the unreasonable in dealing
with parties similarly situated. Atlantic Coastline Railroad
Company vs. Coachman 1910 59 Fla. 130 52 So 377. The
Orange County Ordini:.ice is not unreasonable or arbitray. It
applies equaily to all "persons" similarly situated, that is, all
commercial establishments offering alcoholic beverage for sale
for on-premises consumption. The classification in that the
activities sought to be regulated occurs in those establishments,
not in garden shops, be: uty parlors, or five and dime stores.

Defendant contends that the ordinance must fall because
it applies only in the unincorporated areas of the county. She
Cites article section | (F) as authority for this contention. That

APP.F-6

section does not prevent the county from enacting an ordinance
applying only to the areas outside the municipalities. As a
matter of fact, the section provides that if there is a conflict
between the two governments, the county ordinance does not
apply within the municipal limits. In the present case none of
the municipalities have spoken on this subject one way or the
other. Orange County Ordinance 77-8 climates the possibility
of a conflict by exempting those areas wherein a municipality
has superior right to regulate the conduct of establishments
offering alcoholic beverages for sale for on the premises
consumption. o

Her last point deals with the claim of vagueness and
overbreadth of the ordir.ance.

Defendant contends that the word areola is not a word
of common understanding, and so the ordinance is vague. This
word is the anatomical word for tha: portion of the human
breast to which it applies. There can be no better word. But
this is a rather minor point.

Her primary thrust on the vagueness is that the words
“at or below the areola thereof" are not clear and concise and
that the ordinance as worded, makes criminal the wearing of a
padded bra and the excnsing of the anal cleft in the ladies
restroom.

A principle of judicial construction of laws is that the
court should construe the wishes of the legislative body in a
manner that would make the legislatiou constitutionally
permissible. The court has a duty to avoid a holding on

APP.F-7

unconstitutionality if a fair construction of the legislation will so
allow. As our Supreme Court said in Foley vs, State (951,
Fla.) 50 So 2d 179 "The general legislative intent will control
the strict letter of the statute where an advertence to the strict
letter would lead to absurdities or unreasonable conclusions."

"If the language of a particular provision imports an
absurd intent or one which leads to civil consequences, the
strict letter of the law may yield to the clear legislative intent."

It is clear to this court that the county commission did
not intend to prohibit ihe use of the restroom facilities in the
regulated establishments. In such restroom facilities it would
be necessary to expose certain portions of the anatomy thus the
ordinance could not be used to regulate ordinary or normal
conduct in such restrooms.

In accordance with the principles laid down in Foley the
court interprets the phrase "at or below the areola" to mean
from the upper portion oi the areola to the bottom of it on each
breast. This would not require a covering on a line running
from the top of one arcola across to the top of the other. That
interpretation would require more covering than is presently
seen on our beaches or vehind ski towboats.

With these limi:ations engrafted on the court finds and
so rules that the ordinance is constitutional and that the County
Court was correct in denying the motions to dismiss.

The order appealed from is affirmed.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Orlando,
Orange County, Florida this 7th day of September, 1979.

APP.F-8

FRANK N. KANEY, CIRCUIT JUDGE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing
Opinion has been furnished by mail/hand delivery to the office
of the State Attorney, 250 N. Orange Avenue, Orlando,
Florida, and to Richard L. Wilson, Esq., 27 E. Pine Street,
Orlando, Florida 32801, this 7th day of September, 1979.

Secretary

APP.F-9

APPENDIX G
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT,
SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIKCUIT, IN
AND FOR VOLUSIA COUNTY,
FLORIDA
APPEAL NO: 83-3161-CA-01-D

COUNTY CASE NO: V83-5736-DD

SUZANNE M. KEISER

Appeliant,
VS.
CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH,
Appellee.
OPINION

THIS CAUSE is an appeal from a "Final Order of
Disposition" entered in the county Court of volusia County on
August 22, 1983. That Order refers to and "clarifies" a prior
Order entered by the same Judge in April of 1983. Based on
this clarification the Defendant entered her plea of no contest,
reserving her right to appeal the denial of her motions to

dismiss.

APP.G-1

The appellant, the defendant below, was arrested on
May 3, 1983 and charged with violating Section 5-25(B)!' of
the Daytona Beach Municipal Code. The appellant had
performed a dance on stage at the Shingle Shack lounge in
Daytona Beach wearing "pasties," which covered only the
areola of her breasts. The appellant performed in this matter in
reliance on a prior ruling of the trial Judge in City of Daytona
Beach Vs. DelPinto, Case No: V82-13010-DB.2@

On the date of the trial, the trial Judge clarified this prior
ruling and agreed to withhold adjudication of guilt and waive
sanctions if the Defendant pled no contest. The clarification
(paragraph (5) of the Order being appealed) reads as follows:

"(S) that the undersigned hereby clarifies his Orders
entered in April of 1983 to rule that the areolae must be
concealed by a brassiere-type cover made of an opaque
fabric which does not and cannot adhere directly to the
breasts without the aid of supporting straps, for a

defendant to be found not to have violated the pertinent
sub-sections of the Code:”

The main issue for this Court's determination is of
whether the ordinace as interpreted by the trial court is
unconsttutionally overbroad.

1 "No female person shall expose to public view any portion of her
breasts below the top of the areola or any simulation thereof in an
establishment dealing in alconolic beverages."

2 "The Court construes Section (B) of the Ordinance to require a
female person to expose at least a portion of her areola to the public view
in order to be in violation.

APP.G-2

a a

The basic task for any court reviewing a statue of
ordinace which has been challenged as being overbroad, is
to attempt to give effect to the ordinance as written, while
at the same time interpreting the statute or ordinance as
written, while at the same time interpreting the statute or
ordinance so that its constitutionality is preserved. Here
that task involves reading the ordinance so that it prohibits
the exposure of breasts as described in the ordinance, but

without extending the prohibition to include those types of
attire which are commonly accepted by modern society.3

In todays society, women's dress standards are
quite liberal, especial in bathing suits and evening or
"cocktail" wear. The modern women is free to wear brief
bikinis, french cui bathing suits and varying degrees of
lowdresses and gowns.4

In its clarifying order of August 22, 1983 the tral
court interpreted the ordinance to require a certain type of
clothing-a brassier-type top with supporting straps. In
making this interpretation the trial court added terms to the
ordinance which were not placed there by the City of
Daytona Beach; and in so doing, the trial court brought
into the ordinance's prohibition many types of female attire
which are commonly accepted by modern society, thereby

3 Broadrick V. Okiahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.
2d 830, (1973): Schad V. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 L.Ed. 2d 67,
101 S.Ct. (1981).

4 City of Daytona Beach Vs. Ducille and Grier, Case No: V82-
6886-DB.

APP.G-3

rendering the ordinance overbroad. The City uf Daytona
Beach need not be accused of enacting an ordinace which
would outlaw in lounges and restaurants clothing which is
seen daily in public and even on prime-time television.
The trial court failed to apply the ancient doctrines of casus
Omissus, ¢xpressio unius est exclusio alterius. and ut res
magis valeat Quam pereat.

ACCORDINGLY, the Order of the trial court is
reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent herewitn.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers at Daytona
Beach, Volusia County, Florida this 21 day of November,
A.D., 1983.

C. MCFERRIN SMITH, III
CIRCUIT JUDGE

APP.G-4

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_1645%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
