# Petitioners Brief — United States v. Mendoza

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petitioners Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1984
- **Citation:** 464 U.S. 154

## Text

Office Supreme Court, US,
FILED

| MAY 18 i993

No.
0 82-849 Ae KANOER a STEVAS,
—$—_—_—_—_—_—_—_—_—_—_—_—_—_———————

Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1982

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER

SERGIO ELEJAR MENDOZA

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FORTHE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

Rex E. LEE

Solicitor General

KENNETH S. GELLER
Deputy Solicitor General
JOSHUA I. SCHWARTZ
Assistant to the Solicitor General

Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 633-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the United States may be collaterally estopped
from litigating a question of constitutional law of public
importance by the judgment of a district court in a prior
case, involving different parties, in which the question
was resolved adversely to the United States.

(1)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I l

EEE 1

Statutes and regulation involved 2.0.0.0... ccecccceceeeee 2

EEE 2

A. The background of this case 2000.0... 3

B. Prior Filipino veteran litigation ........................ 7

a seutincmenunsesounons 14

EE 17
Argument:

The United States may not be collaterally estopped
from litigating the legal question whether respond-
ent is entitled to become a naturalized citizen by
the judgment of a district court in a prior case in-
volving different parties ...20..0.........ccccccccccccceeeeeeceees 20
A. Collateral estoppel is inapplicable to an unmixed

question of law arising upon the successive
claims of different parties 2.000000... cece 20

B. Collateral estoppel should not be applied against
the government to preclude determination of
recurring questions of public law 2.000000... 25
“. The court of appeals’ decision disregards other
established limitations on the issue preclusion

EE SS 37
EEE 43
EEE eT la

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Allen V. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 20. 39
American Medical International, Inc. v. Secretary
ae 28, 30
Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212 200000000000... 32

(m1)

IV

Cases—Continued Page
Barretto Vv. United States. 694 F.2d 603, rev’g

Pet. No. 248806 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 1980)... 22, 37,

38, 41

Barter v. Palm igiano, 425 U.S. 308. 24
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories. Inc. V. University of

Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. eee 26
Bunker Hill Co. v. EPA, 658 F.2d 1280, aff’g Civ.

No. 80-2087 (D. Idaho Oct. 15, a 33
Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 ) | =e 29
Colmenar, In re, No. 808-P-22551 (S.D. Cal. Mar.

BR BIPUUD eee ees 10
NLRB Vv. Iron Workers, 434 RATT 32
NLRB Vv. Enterprise Ass’n of Pipefitters, 429 U.S.

SDT <covsnenscsesemnsustenereesinessetensintenntenmenseamaamesiassesaniis 34
Naturalization of Inton, In re, No. SA-79-CA-284

(W.D. Tex. July 3, Sa 37
Naturalization of 68 Filipino War Veterans, In re,

cecereaisbe i EES ent 38, 9, 10, 11, 22

Nisperos, In re, 471 F. Supp. 296 13

Vv
Cases—Continued

North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512......
Olegario Vv. United States, 473 F. Supp. 185, rev'd,

629 F.2d 204, cert. denied, 450 U.S. 980 ....12, 13, 14, 33

Pangilinan v. INS, Pet. No. 251849 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 24, 1980). rev’d, 694 F.2d 603 _................

37

Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 .....13, 15, 16,
17, 20, 24, 26, 28, 37, 43

Santiago V. INS, S26 F.2d 466 ..................-.-0c-e0-.00-0-

ll

Standefer v. United States, 447 U S. 10 ...18, 20-21, 26, 32

Stauffer Chemical Co. v. United States, 647 F.2d
1075, aff’'g 14 Env’t Rep. Cases 1737 _...............
Steadman ¥. SEC, 450 US. 91 .............-....22---.-2-.--- ;
Tuten Vv. United States, No. 81-6756 (Mar. 30,
1983) _... a a
United States v. Foster Lumber Co.. 429 U.S. 32...

31

United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236 —................ 17, 21, 23

United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 684 F.2d
1174, cert. granted, No. 82-1448 (Apr. 18,
ES ae ee ee es ene ee eID

United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, No. 81-450
Aeon ae

Western O'! & Gas Ass'n V. EPA, 633 F.2d 803......

Constitution, statutes. regulations and rules:
U.S. Const.:

te | OF
FS TU stininctnnieeetemeepeniternimmremasvnnimnsennses

Amend. V (Due Process Clause) ................. 10, 22,

Act of Dec. 28, 1945, ch. 590, Section 202(c) (1),
yg A EE ee Se

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 7607 (b) (1).

Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. 1094

First Supplementa! Surnlus Appropriation Rescis-
sion Act. 1946. ch. 30, 60 Stat. 6. 14 00.000...

Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C.
(& Supp. V) 1101 et seq.:

42
30

Section 319/(e). 8 U.S.C. 1421(e) _........ 2, 8, 14, 15, 39

Section 329. 8 U.S.C. (& Supp. V) 1440 ..........

Nationality Act of 1940. 8 U.S.C. (1940 ed. &
Supp. V 1945) 501 et seq.:

7,14

Section 701, 8 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1945) 1001_...passim

VI
Constitution, statutes, regulations

and rules—Continued Page
Section 701 et seq., 8 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1945)

BODE GO GO, cccccccccscccscceseecnsessesscesasesssssscssasseeee 4
Sections 701-705, 8 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1945)

OEE . 9,38

Section 702, 8 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1945) 1002...... _passim

Section 705, 8 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1945) 1005......2, 4, 3a
Philippine, Independence Act of 1934, ch. 84, Sec-

IIR 3
Second War Powers Act, 1942, ch. 199, Section
AIG (SEE 4
__————————————— 33
28 C.F.R.:
ee
a seiiaabaicteneninaihiat ll, la
SG eeEEyEE—————— 33
AIG IR SE, EE iste elaiinie itt 29
Miscellaneous:
Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
Annual Report cf the Director (1982) ................ 27-28

Bork, The Problems and Pleasures of Being Solici-
tor General, 42 A.B.A. Antitrust L. J. 701

(—( 31
Carrington, United States Appeals in Civil Cases,
11 Hous. L. Rev. 1101 (1974) ..................---......--- 31

Note, Government Litigation in the Supreme Court:
The Roles of the Solicitor General, 78 Yale L. J.

ff _ 31
Note, The Solicitor General and Intragovernmental
Conflict, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 324 (1977) ...............-.. 31

Oversight of INS Programs and Activities, Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citi-
zenship and International Law of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
ETTIIE cxccccisscessenerenststenneunteanensiinisnesmumeniniaipmceinnetnts 12
Restatement (Second) of Judgments (1980) .......... 21, 30
Sobeloff, Attorney for the Government: The Work
of the Solicitor General's Office, 41 A.B.A.J. 229
I ———————————————————— 31

Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1982

No. 82-849

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER
v.

SERGIO ELEJAR MENDOZA

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la-
2la) is reported at 672 F.2d 1320. The opinion of the
district court (Pet. App. 22a-24a) is not officially re-
ported. The findings of fact, conclusions of law and rec-
ommendations of the designated naturalization examiner
(Pet. App. 25a-33a) are likewise unreported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 34a)
was entered on April 2, 1982, and a timely petition for
rehearing was denied on July 22, 1982 (Pet. App. 35a).
On October 13, 1982, Justice Rehnquist extended the time
in which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to and
including November 19, 1982. The petition was filed on

(1)

the latter date and was granted on January 24, 1983.
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
1254/1).

STATUTES AND REGULATION INVOLVED

Sections 701, 702 and 705 of the Nationality Act of
1940, 8 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1945) 1001, 1002 and 1005; Sec-
tion 310‘e) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, 8 U.S.C. 1421/e) ; and 28 C.F.R. 0.20(b) are repro-
duced in an appendix to this brief, infra, la-3a.

STATEMENT

Respondent, a Filipino national, entered the United
States in 1975 in a nonimmigrant status. On May 10,
1978, after other legal avenues intended to prolong his
stay in the United States had been exhausted or aban-
doned, respondent filed a petition for naturalization un-
der Section 701 of the Nationality Act of 1940. Section
701, a provision then no longer in force, had relaxed the
norma! naturalization requirements for certain individ-
uals who fought in the United States armed forces in
World War II. Respondent claimed that he was entitled
to naturalization based upon his service during World
War II in the Army of the Commonwealth of the Philip-
pines. The designated naturalization examiner recom-
mended that the petition be denied, noting that respond-
ent was not eligible for naturalization under the provi-
sions of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
then in effect and that naturalization under Section 701
of the 1940 Act was unavailable because petitioner had
not filed for naturalization by December 31, 1946, the
date on which that provision expired. The examiner also
rejected respondent’s argument that naturalization was
necessary to remedy an alleged denial of due process in
the administration of Section 701 in the Philippines at
the close of World War II.

The district court rejected the naturalization exam-
iner’s recommendation and granted the petition without
reaching “the Constitutional issues or other merits of
the petition” (Pet. App. 22a). The district court con-
cluded that the United States was collaterally estopped
to oppose respondent’s naturalization petition because the
constitutional question presented by that petition had
been resolved adversely to the United States in a case
involving the naturalization petitions of different indi-
viduals, In re Naturalization of 68 Filipino War Veter-
ans, 406 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Cal. 1975). The court of
appeals affirmed, like the district court relying solely
upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

A. The Background of this Case

1. Respondent served as a physician with the Philip-
pine Commonwealth Army from December 1, 1941, until
June 30, 1946. During that time, as the United States
became involved in World War II, the Commonwealth
Army, which was ordinarily under the control of the
semi-autonomous Commonwealth government in peace-
time, was incorporated into the armed forces of the
United States pursuant to the order of President Roose-
velt.' Respondent was held prisoner by Japanese forces
from Apri] 1942 until February or March 1945. Upon
his release respondent remained in the Commonwealth
Army. In the fall of 1945 the United States Army sent
respondent to Pennsylvania for approximately six months
of medica] training. Shortly after his return to the Phil-
ippines, on June 30, 1946, respondent secured his dis-
charge from the Commonwealth Army. Pet. App. 7a.

1 Pursuant to Section 10(a) of the Philippine Independence Act
of 1934, ch. 84, 48 Stat. 463, the Philippines were scheduled to be-
come a fully independent, self-governing nation on July 4, 1946. Al-
though the Philippines was a United States possession prior to the
latter date, it enjoyed considerable autonomy under the terms of the
Independence Act.

4

2. The statute upon which respondent’s petition for
naturalization rests is Section 701 et seg. of the Nation-
ality Act of 1940, 8 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1945) 1001 et seq.,
as added by the Second War Powers Act, 1942, ch. 199,
Section 1001, 56 Stat. 182-183. Section 701 exempted
from some of the usual requirements for naturalization
(including literacy in English and a period of residence
in the United States) certain alien servicemen who had
served honorably in the United States armed forces dur-
ing World War II in locations beyond the continental
limits of the United States. As amended by Section
202(c) (1) of the Act of Dec. 28, 1945, ch. 590, 59 Stat.
658, the Act specified that any petition thereunder was to
be filed no later than December 31, 1946.

Section 702 of the 1940 Act provided for the overseas
naturalization of persons actually serving in the United
States armed forces who were eligible for naturalization
under Section 701 but who were beyond the jurisdiction
of the United States courts vested with naturalization
authority. Representatives designated by the Commis-
sioner of Immigration and Naturalization were author-
ized to receive petitions, conduct hearings, and grant nat-
uralization outside the United States. Pursuant to Sec-
tion 705 of the 1940 Act, the Commissioner and the At-
torney Genera] implemented the provisions of Sections
701 and 702. Between 1943 and 1946 immigration offi-
cers traveled on rotation through Great Britain, Ireland,
North America and the Pacific Islands, admitting thou-
sands of foreign nationals serving in the United States
armed forces to citizenship.

Naturalization of alien servicemen in the Philippines
was, of course, impossible during the Japanese occupa-
tion.’ The liberation of the Philippines by Allied forces
began in February 1945. After resolution of some thresh-

2 Between 1942 and 1945, however, approximately 7,000 Filipino
servicemembers were naturalized under Section 701 at locations out-

side the occupied Philippines.

5

old questions respecting the application of Section 701 to
Filipino servicemen,’ the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service, in early August 1945, designated George
Ennis, an American vice-consul in Manila, to naturalize
aliens pursuant to Section 702. Almost immediately, the
Philippine government expressed its concern to the State
Department about the possibility that large numbers of
young Filipino men, perhaps as many as 250,000, would
be naturalized and leave for America on the eve of the
scheduled Philippine independence ‘see page 3 note l,
supra). On September 13, 1945, the Commissioner of
Immigration and Naturalization recommended to Attor-
ney General Clark that the situation be handled by revok-
ing the authority previously granted to Ennis. The Attor-
ney General approved the Commissioner’s recommendation
on September 26, 1945, and Ennis’ authority to naturalize
alien servicemen was thereafter revoked. Naturalizations
ceased by October 27, 1945.

The INS subsequently reconsidered and abandoned its
prior position ‘see note 3, supra) that members of the
Commonwealth Army were eligible for citizenship under

3 One question was whether service in the Army of the Common-
wealth of the Philippines qualified as service in the military forces
of the United States for purposes of Section 701. Doubt existed be-
cause the Army of the Commonwealth, an instrumentality of the
Philippine government, was simply incorporated as a unit into the
United States armed forces by Presidential order. By contrast, a
separate unit known as the Philippine Scouts was an integral unit
of the United States Army; its members thus had individually en-
listed in the armed forces of the United States, and their status for
this purpose was comparatively free from doubt. In 1945 the INS
concluded that members of both Philippine units were covered by
Section 701 (but see page 6 & note 4, infra).

A second question concerned the eligibility for naturalization un-
der Section 701 of Filipinos who had never resided in the United
States. The Attorney J neral concluded that prior residence in the
Philippines, then an American possession, satisfied the statute's re-
quirements on that score.

6

Section 701.* The revised administrative interpretation
substantially diminished the foreign relations difficulties
posed by the presence in the Philippines of a United
States official authorized to naturalize alien servicemen.
Accordingly, in August 1946, the Service once again des-
ignated a naturalization representative for the Philip-
pines. The representative remained on duty until Decem-
ber 1946 and naturalized many Philippine Scouts (see
page 5, note 3, supra) who were still on active duty at
that time and were still regarded as eligible under Section
702."

3. Although respondent was present in the Philippines
between August and October 1945, when naturalization
under Section 702 was possible there, it is undisputed that
he made no effort to take advantage of that opportunity.
Nor did he make any effort to avail himself of the sub-
stantive provisions of Section 701, which were available
to him without any need for recourse to the special over-
seas naturalization provisions of Section 702, during the
time he was stationed in Pennsylvania.*

* The agency’s action was triggered by enactment of the First
Supplemental Surplus Appropriation Rescission Act, 1946, ch. 30,
60 Stat. 6, 14, which provided in part that service in the Army of
the Commonwealth of the Philippines was not to be deemed service
in the United States Armed Forces for purposes of any United States
statute conferring benefits on military veterans. But see page 10
note 9, infra.

© Neither the First Supplemental Surplus Appropriation Rescis-
sion Act nor the altered administrative interpretation of Section 701
prompted by that Act (see note 4, supra) had any application to
members of the Philippine Scouts.

* The INS did not adopt its revised interpretation of Section 701,
excluding members of the Commonwealth Army from the benefits
of that provision, until] after the date of respondent’s return to the
Philippines and his discharge from service.

By the time naturalization was again available in the Philippines
under Section 702, respondent was doubly ineligible. First, he was
no longer in service. Second, the INS regarded service in the Com-

7

Respondent returned to the United States in 1975 in a
nonimmigrant status. His right to remain was extended
by the INS through June 9, 1976. During this time re-
spondent operated a restaurant and attempted to start
an export-import business. On July 15, 1976, respondent
sought to change his status to that of a Treaty Investor.
This application was denied by the INS District Director
on August 29, 1977, because respondent had not complied
with the conditions of his nonimmigrant status. Respond-
ent took an administrative appeal from that decision, but
subsequently abandoned that appeal and filed the petition
for naturalization under Section 701 that gave rise to
this case.

B. Prior Filipino Veteran Litigation

Because Section 701 required filing of a naturalization
petition prior to the close of 1946, its provisions did not
give rise to litigation in the ensuing years. In the late
1960's, however, there commenced a significant flow of lit-
igation under Section 701 involving novel arguments rest-
ing upon the manner in which Section 702 had been ad-
ministered in the Philippines during 1945 and 1946. In
every case, the immigration petitioner, a Filipino veteran,
asserted that naturalization should be granted notwith-
standing the expiration of Section 701.’

monwealth Army as nonqualifying under Section 701. In any event,
respondent made no application for naturalization at this time ei-
ther.

7 Section 329 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8
U.S.C. 1440, currently authorizes naturalization of aliens who fought
in this nation’s armed forces during World War II. Unlike its
predecessor, Section 701 of the 1940 Act, however, the benefits
of Section 329 are available only to those who either (1) en-
listed or were inducted in certain geographical areas (which do
not include the Philippines) or (2) are lawfully admitted to the
United States for permanent residence. It is accordingly signifi-
cantly more restrictive than Section 701. Respondent does not claim
eligibility for naturalization under the current provision.

1. In INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5 (1973), this Court con-
sidered the ramifications of the course of administration
of Section 702 in the Philippines upon facts strikingly
similar to those of the present case. Hibi, a veteran of
the Philippine Scouts, entered the United States in 1964
and petitioned for naturalization under Section 701 in
1967. He argued that despite 8 U.S.C. 1421/e), which
expressly precludes naturalization under provisions of law
no longer in effect, the United States was estopped from
enforcing the statutory time limit for filing a petition
under Section 701. Hibi claimed that an estoppel arose
from the alleged failure of government officials to inform
him of his opportunity for naturalization, and from the
revocation of Vice-Consul Ennis’ naturalization authority
in October 1945 and the failure to provide a substitute
until August 1946. The district court granted Hibi’s peti-
tion, adopting his estoppel argument, and the court of ap-
peals affirmed. 475 F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1973).

This Court summarily reversed, explaining that no es-
toppel could lie against the government in these circum-
stances (414 U.S. at 8-9):

It is well settled that the Government is not in a
position identical to that of a private litigant with
respect to its enforcement of laws enacted by Con-
gress. * * * Here [the INS) has been charged by
Congress with administering an Act which both made
available benefits of naturalization to persons in
[Hibi’s] class and established a cutoff date for the
claiming of such benefits. [The INS], in enforcing
the cutoff date established by Congress, * * * is en-
forcing public policy established by Congress.

While the issue of whether “affirmative misconduct”
on the part of the Government might estop it from
denying citizenship was left open in Montana v. Ken-
nedy, 366 U.S. 308, 314, 315 (1961), no conduct of
the sort there adverted to was involved here. We do
not think that the failure to fully publicize the rights
which Congress accorded under the Act of 1940, or
the failure to have stationed in the Philippine Islands

during all of the time those rights were available an
authorized naturalization representative, can give rise
to an estoppel against the Government.

{Hibi’s] effort to claim naturalization under a stat-
ute which by its terms had expired more than 20
years before he had filed his lawsuit must therefore
fail.

2a. In In re Naturalization of 68 Filipino War Vet-
erans, 406 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (hereinafter
“68 Filipinos”), the district court (Renfrew, J.) consid-
ered petitions for naturalization resting upon Sections
701-705 of the Nationality Act of 1940 filed by 68 Filipino
veterans who had served in the Commonwealth Army or
the Philippine Scouts during World War II.* Rejecting
the recommendations of the naturalization examiners, the
district court granted the petitions with certain excep-
tions.

The district court first considered the claims of those
who it found to have filed timely preliminary applications
for naturalization that had not been acted upon. 406 F.
Supp. at 937-940. As to these “Category I” veterans, the
court held in the alternative that: (1) the failure to proc-
ess the submitted applications was “affirmative miscon-
duct,” which, notwithstanding JNS v. Hibi, supra, “estop-
ped [the United States] from relying upon the expiration
date of Sections 701-705 as grounds for denial of their pe-
titions for naturalization” ‘406 F. Supp. at 939; footnote
omitted), and (2) because they had done all that was
practical to avail themselves of the opportunity provided
by Section 701 at the proper time, they should be deemed
to have “constructively filed” formal petitions for natural-
ization within the statutory time limit (id. at 940).

The district court defined a second category to include
53 veterans who, like respondent Mendoza, made no ef-
fort to secure naturalization under Section 702 in a timely
manner. These “Category II” veterans claimed that the

* 68 Filipinos was not a class action.

10

absence from the Philippines during the period October
1945 through August 1946 of an official empowered to ef-
fect naturalizations denied them equal protection in viola-
tion of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
and that because of that violation they were entitled to
have their tardy naturalization petitions granted. In re-
sponse the government argued that: ‘1) Filipinos were
overseas aliens unprotected by the Due Process Clause at
the time in question because of the enactment, in 1934, of
the Philippine Independence Act; (2) the veterans’ claims
were foreclosed by INS v. Hibi, supra: (3) because At-
torney General Clark’s decision to withdraw naturaliza-
tion authority from Vice-Consul Ennis responded to the
complaint of a foreign government and was based upon
considerations of foreign policy, the veterans’ claims pre-
sented a nonjusticiable political question; and (4) the At-
torney General’s action did not deny the veterans’ due
process.”

The district court rejected each of these contentions
(406 F. Supp. at 940-951). The court acknowledged that
“the actions of the Commissioner of the INS were moti-
vated by reasonable concern for the maintenance of ami-
cable relations between the United States and the Philip-
pine Islands” (id. at 951). Nevertheless, the court, apply-
ing a strict scrutiny standard,’® held that “the failure of
the Government to have stationed in the Philippine Islands
a representative of the INS authorized to naturalize mem-

* ..fter the decision in Jn re Munoz, 156 F. Supp. 184 (N.D. Cal.
1957), the INS abandoned the argument that provisions of the First
Supplemental! Surplus Appropriation Rescission Act, 1946, rendered
the benefits of Section 701 unavailable to veterans of the'Common-
wealth Army, and did not otherwise argue thereafter that service in
the Commonwealth Army was nonqualifying for purposes of Sec-
tion 701. Compare pages 5-6 & notes 3-4, supra.

1 In the district court’s view, absence of a naturalization officer
from the Philippines constituted discrimination upon the basis of
race, alienage or nationality, and was accordingly subject to strict
scrutiny (406 F. Supp. at 950).

ll

bers of the American armed forces pursuant to Section
702 of the 1940 Act during all of the time those statutory
rights were available denied petitioners due process of
law” (406 F. Supp. at 951). Thus, the district court
granted the naturalization petition of each of the Cate-
gory II veterans. Only those (“Category III”) veterans
who were unable to show that they had ever been eligible
for naturalization under Section 701 were denied natural-
ization (id. at 937, 951).™

b. Pursuant to authority delegated by the Attorney
General to determine whether an appeal should be taken
from a judgment adverse to the interests of the United
States, see 28 C.F.R. 0.20(b), in March 1976 the Solicitor
General authorized an appeal from the district court’s de-
cision. An appeal to the Ninth Circuit was docketed and
the case was briefed and readied for oral argument.

In the interim, however, a new Administration had
taken office. By memorandum dated September 21, 1977
(Pet. App. 36a-42a), newly appointed INS Commissioner
Castillo sought authorization to withdraw the pending ap-
peal (see id. at 30a). Noting that “[t)he desire expressed
by the Philippine Government in 1945 to hold onto its
young manpower in the post-war period” was no longer
an operative consideration (id. at 41a), the INS Commis-
sioner stressed that acquiescence in the naturalization of
the 68 Filipinos petitioners “would be in keeping with the
policy of the [new] Administration,” described as “a
course of compassion and amnesty” (id. at 42a). Commis-
sioner Castillo’s request provoked considerable discussion,
and some dissent, within the Department of Justice. The

11 Shortly after rendering its opinion, the district court issued an
addendum thereto, responding to the decision in Santiago v. INS,
526 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc), which apparently had given
it cause to reconsider its application of equitable estoppel to the
claims of Category I veterans. In the addendum (406 F. Supp. at
951), the district court reaffirmed its alternative holding that the
Category I veterans had constructively met the stautory time limit,
and observed that the court’s due process ruling respecting Category
II veterans was applicable, as well, to the Category I veterans.

12

memoranda prepared for the Solicitor General’s considera-
tion reflect the conviction that the district court’s legal
conclusions were legally erroneous, but that acquiescence
in naturalization of the petitioners would be an acceptable
accommodation in light of the inequities perceived by the
officials vested by law with policy making authority, and
would not affect significant numbers of individuals or es-
tablish a binding precedent. In response to these recom-
mendations, on November 14, 1977, the Solicitor General
authorized withdrawal of the pending appeal. On Novem-
ber 30, 1977, the court of appeals granted the government’s
motion to dismiss the appeal.

ce. In the aftermath of these events, Commissioner
Castillo was questioned during congressional oversight
hearings about his recommendation that the appeal in 68
Filipinos be dismissed.** The government’s position re-
specting Filipino veterans’ naturalization petitions under
Section 701 was also reconsidered within the Department
of Justice. The position ultimately adopted in 1978, after
thorough reexamination, was that the Department would
not ordinarily oppose naturalization of Filipino veterans
who had actually attempted to become naturalized United
States citizens pursuant to Sections 701 and 702 while
those provisions were in effect—i.e., “Category I” veter-
ans. Contrary to the position adopted in withdrawing the
appeal in 68 Filipinos, however, the Department instructed
the INS thereafter to oppose naturalization of all those
who could not satisfy this prerequisite, including “Cate-
gory II” veterans. See Pet. App. 30a; Olegario v. United
States, 629 F.2d 204, 214 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 980 (1981).

12 Commissioner Castillo explained that his recommendation had
been based on equitable considerations “aside from the legal argu-
ment of, was correct procedure of process used.” Oversight of INS
Programs and Activities, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immi-
gration, Citizenship and International Law of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 272 (1978).

18 To mitigate any hardship that might otherwise result from this
change in policy, the Solicitor General adopted a “grandfather rule”

13

3. The issues presented by the filing of tardy naturali-
zation petitions by Filipino veterans resting on Section 701
were next considered by the Second Circuit in Olegario v.
United States, supra. Adopting Judge Renfrew’s reason-
ing in 68 Filipinos, the district court had granted Ole-
gario’s petition for naturalization, 473 F. Supp. 185 (S.D.
N.Y. 1979), and the government appealed.** On appeal,
the Second Circuit considered the argument that under
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), the
unappealed final judgment in 68 Filipinos should be given
collateral estoppel effect, so as to preclude denial of nat-
uralization to any “Category II” Filipino veteran. The
Second Circuit rejected this contention, observing that
“(i]n contrast to Parklane, the government is the defend-
ant here, and the case raises issues of national concern.”
629 F.2d at 215. The court noted that the government’s
failure to appeal an adverse decision may rest upon policy

exception to this general rule, declining to authorize appeal] from or-
ders granting naturalization to Category II F ilipino veterans who
had filed naturalization petitions prior to the withdrawal of the gov-
ernment’s appeal in 68 Filipinos. See Olegario v. United States, su-
pra, 629 F.2d at 214-215. The grandfather exception was adopted
because there was reason to believe that processing of at least some
such petitions had been delayed by INS, either unilaterally or by
agreement with opposing counsel, in anticipation of securing a defi-
nitive ruling upon appeal in 68 Filipinos. It was further recognized
that absent that procedure some of the petitions involved would have
been granted at the time the government withdrew its 68 Filipinos
appeal. Because it was thought difficult to determine with conf-
dence which naturalization petitioners had relied to their detriment
upon such procedural understandings, the Solicitor General author-
ized withdrawal of previously authorized appeals in all cases falling
within the “grandfather rule” and declined to authorize appeal in
other such cases. Among the appeals withdrawn were those in Jn re
Nisperos, 471 F. Supp. 296 (C.D. Cal. 1979), and Jn re Colmenar,
No. 308-P-22551 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 1979). See Pet. App. 8a.

14 Olegario was a “Category II” veteran—i.e., he had not made a
timely effort to avai] himself of the benefits of Section 701. Nor was
his petition filed in time to benefit from the “grandfather rule”
adopted by the Solicitor General (see page 12 note 13, supra).

14

considerations, rather than acquiescence in the decision’s
legal reasoning, and that the invocation of collateral es-
toppel would compel the Solicitor General to authorize ap-
peal from adverse decisions in an uncritical manner
(ibid.). The court also stressed that the United States has
broad discretion whether to pursue an appeal in a partic-
ular case and remains free to change positions previously
adopted whenever a prior position is determined to have
been ill-advised ‘id. at 216). Turning to the merits, the
Second Circuit concluded that the absence of a naturaliza-
tion officer from the Philippines during part of the period
when naturalization under Section 701 was authorized did
not violate the statute itself or work a denial of due proc-
ess or equal protection. 629 F.2d at 223-233. Accordingly,
the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s decision
and directed that Olegario’s petition be denied.

C. Proceedings Below

1. Respondent filed his naturalization petition, invok-
ing Section 701 of the 1940 Act, on May 10, 1978. The
designated naturalization examiner recommended denial
of the petition (Pet. App. 25a-33a'. The examiner noted
that respondent could not qualify for naturalization under
the current provision for naturalization of alien service-
men, 8 U.S.C. (& Supp. V) 1440 ‘see page 7 note 7,
supra), and that 8 U.S.C. 1421‘e) precludes naturaliza-
tion under expired or superseded statutory authority. Be-
cause respondent had not claimed that he sought naturali-
zation under Section 701 in a timely manner, and because
respondent had actually been in Pennsylvania for much
of the time overseas naturalization under the extraordi-
nary provisions of Section 702 was unavailable in the
Philippines, the examiner concluded that respondent could
not be deemed constructively to have timely filed his peti-
tion under the 1940 Act; respondent’s petition was there-
fore barred by 8 U.S.C. 1421/e). Similarly, given these
facts, the examiner found that Hibi barred relief on an

15

estoppel theory and, notwithstanding ¢8 Filipinos, that
respondent had not suffered any denial of due process.

The district court granted respondent's petition without
reaching the merits of respondent's constitutional claim,
treating the matter as a routine application of the doctrine
of offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel governed by
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, supra.” Although the nat-
uralization examiner had noted (Pet. App. 3la! that the
effect of 8 U.S.C. 1421\e) hed not been considered in 68
Filipinos, and that respondent, unlike the 6° Filipinos
petitioners, had been in Pennsylvania for most of the rele-
vant time period, the district court did not address the
legal effect of these circumstances.

2 The Solicitor General authorized an appeal.’* The
government once again argued that respondent’s constitu-
tional claim was nonjusticiable, and in any event without
merit. Several arguments not considered in 68 Filipinos
were also advanced. The government argued that: (1)
respondent’s constitutional claim was barred by laches ;
(2) naturalization under Section 701 was barred by 8
U.S.C. 1421(e:; (3) the remedy awarded for the alleged
constitutional violation—naturalization—was tantamount
to an equitable estoppel. and thus inconsistent with Hibi;
and (4) respondent lacked standing to complain of the
withdrawal of a naturalization officer from the Philip-
pines, and had suffered no personal deprivation of rights,
because he was in Pennsylvania for most of the period in
question. The court of appeals affirmed, reaching only the
collateral estoppel issue.”

18 The district court’s decision was rendered prior to the Second
Circuit's ruling in Olegario.

16 Like Olegario, respondent is a “Category II” veteran and had
not filed his petition in time to benefit from the Solicitor General's
“grandfather rule” (see page 13 note 14, supra).

17 The court of appeals stated that because respondent may have
been in the Philippines for as much as three months during which
time he was eligible for naturalization but no naturalization official

16

The court of appeals concluded that, under Parklane
Hosiery, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
applying collateral estoppel to bar consideration of the
government’s arguments against respondent’s naturaliza-
tion. The court of appeals stated that none of the circum-
stances listed by this Court in Parklane Hosiery (439
U.S. at 329-331 & nn. 14 & 15) as factors precluding
an estoppel was present here. The court also stressed the
lack of record support for the government’s suggestion
that the withdrawal of the appeal in 68 Filipinos was
based in part upon a misapprehension of the practical
consequences of doing so, and it questioned whether the
underlying issue was of sufficient practical importance to
warrant a fresh determination of the legal issue ( Pet.
App. 12a-15a). The court of appeals acknowledged the
conflicting decision of the Second Circuit in Olegario, but
it rejected the Second Circuit’s analysis of the collateral
estoppel issue (id. at 18a) and held that the Second Cir-
cuit’s ruling on the underlying merits, although contrary
to 68 Filipinos, was not sufficient reason to deny preclu-
sive effect to 68 Filipinos (id. at 16a-18a).

Finally, the court of appeals rejected the government’s
contention that Parklane Hosiery is inapposite because of
the special attributes and interests of the United States
as a litigant, and the purely legal character of the ques-
tions presented here (Pet. App. 18a-20a). Although it
acknowledged that “the government is frequently involved
in cases raising issues of great public importance, and
that in such cases the public interest in permitting the
government to relitigate those issues may outweigh the
public interest in avoiding needless litigation” (id. at
18a), the court concluded that this is not such a case be-
cause it found “no ‘critical’ need for redetermination” of

was present, “this is * * * sufficient * * * to implicate his due process
rights and place him in the same situation as [the] Category II
veterans” whose rights were litigated in 68 Filipinos (Pet. App. 12a
n.8). The court did not address the remaining issues raised by the
government that had not been decided in 68 Filipinos.

17

the issue and “no compelling public interest in opposirg
naturalization” of persons such as respondent (id. at 19a,
20a). On the contrary, the court thought that the equities
strongly supported preclusion (id. at 20a-2la).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The decision of the court of appeals is without prece-
dent. To our knowledge no other appellate court has ever
held that the United States may be estopped from litigat-
ing a pure question of law, much less a question of con-
stitutional law affecting the special prerogatives of the
Executive in the sphere of foreign relations, by the un-
appealed adverse decision of a trial level court rendered
in a different action involving a different opposing party.

A. Contrary to the view of the court of appeals, Park-
lane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), is not
controlling here. In Parklane Hosiery, the issues upon
which preclusion was upheld were factual ‘see id. at
324) ; here, the underlying issue in dispute is an unmixed
question of law, indeed a significant question of constitu-
tional law. This Court has recognized that powerful con-
siderations militate against extension of the preclusion
doctrine to purely legal issues—especially those of consti-
tutional import—even when the parties in the successive
lawsuits are the same. Montana v. United States, 440
U.S. 147, 162-163 (1979); United States v. Moser, 266
U.S. 236, 242 (1924). Application of the preclusion doc-
trine to a legal issue where there is no identity of parties
is especially inappropriate.

B. In Montana v. United States, supra, 440 U.S. at
155, and Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, supra, 489 U.S.
at 331, this Court stressed that issue preclusion should
not be applied in circumstances where such application
would be unfair to a litigant or contrary to significant
public policies. The unique attributes and role of the
United States as a litigant constitute a special factor that
warrants such an exception.

18

First, application of the issue preclusion doctrine in
eases involving the United States must take account of
the public interest in the uniform and rigorous enforce-
ment of laws of general importance and applicability. See
Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 24-25 (1980);
INS vy. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5, 8 (1973). Here, as in Stande-
fer, this public interest outweighs the considerations that
ordinarily underlie the preclusion doctrine.

Second, critical practical and legal considerations, ap-
plicable whenever the United States is engaged in liti-
gation on questions of public law, argue strongly against
the estoppel invoked by the court of appeals. The govern-
ment is involved in far more litigation than any other
party. Moreover, many legal! issues of substantial public
importance arise only in government litigation. There is
a substantial likelihood that, in litigating a recurring is-
sue, the government will at some point encounter an ad-
verse decision. Application of collateral estoppel to bar
determination of a legal question in such cases, which
include the present one, would substantially disrupt the
existing process of development of the law through reso-
lution of conflicts by appeal, en banc review and certi-
orari, by supplanting the more flexible doctrine of stare
decisis and the persuasive effect of decisions of coordi-
nate courts with the rigid doctrine of issue preclusion.

Third, invocation of collateral estoppel against the gov-
ernment on recurring legal issues is inappropriate be-
cause, through the Office of the Solicitor General, the
government, unlike any other litigant, employs a formal
and selective mechanism for determining whether to take
an appeal from or seek certiorari review of an adverse
judgment. The Solicitor General frequently decides
against appeal or certiorari even though the legal conclu-
sions of the deciding court are believed to be erroneous.
Such decisions rest upon factors including a substantial
measure of prosecutorial discretion, equitable and policy
considerations, the practical importance of the decision,
the limited resources of the government and sensitivity to

19

crowded dockets of the courts. The decision not to pur-
sue an appeal in 68 Filipinos was based on several of
these factors.

The court of appeals’ ruling, if sustained, would re-
quire the United States to reconsider its practice of selec-
tive pursuit of appeals and certiorari. The existing prac-
tice benefits the public interest and facilitates sound ju-
dicial management. The alternative—an inflexible policy
of appealing (and even seeking certiorari on) the first
adverse decision rendered on a legal issue—would burden
the courts of appeals and this Court unnecessarily. Judi-
cial economy—the touchstone of the preclusion doctrine—
would be disserved.

C. Even if, contrary to our submission, the special
status of the government does not warrant consideration
in the application of collateral estoppel, and Parklane
Hosiery is controlling here, the court of appeals erred in
approving application of the issue preclusion doctrine in
the circumstances of this case.

First, the district court’s decision in 68 Filipinos given
preclusive effect is contrary to intervening decisions of a
court of appeals and numerous district courts. Second,
the court below improperly precluded the United States
from litigating not only the issues decided in 68 Filipinos
but also alternative contentions that were never ad-
dressed in the earlier case. Third, the facts of this case
are materially different from those considered in 68 Fili-
pinos because respondent was not prejudiced by the chal-
lenged government actions. Finally, the court of appeals
overlooked the substantial tension between the district
court’s decision in 68 Filipinos and this Court’s decision
in INS v. Hibi, supra. Due regard for the authority of
this Court’s rulings required the court of appeals inde-
pendently to assess the merits of respondent’s claim.

20

ARGUMENT

THE UNITED STATES MAY NOT BE COLLATER-
ALLY ESTOPPED FROM LITIGATING THE LEGAL
QUESTION WHETHER RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED
TO BECOME A NATURALIZED CITIZEN BY THE
JUDGMENT OF A DISTRICT COURT IN A PRIOR
CASE INVOLVING DIFFERENT PARTIES

A. Collateral Estoppel is Inapplicable to an Unmixed
Question of Law Arising upon the Successive Claims
of Different Parties

The court of appeals viewed this case as a routine ap-
plication of the doctrine of nonmutual offensive collat-
eral estoppel, which this Court sanctioned—albeit condi-
tionally—in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322
(1979). See Pet. App. 9a-lla. The issue in Parklane
Hosiery, however, was whether the potential for unfair-
ness that infects the issue preclusion doctrine when a
plaintiff seeks to foreclose a defendant from litigating
an issue that the defendant has previously litigated un-
successfully in an action with another party is so perva-
sive that resort to the doctrine should be barred in all
cases. 429 U.S. at 324, 326 n.4, 331. In providing a
negative answer to that question, the Court stressed that
care must be taken to ensure that collateral estoppel is
not applied in circumstances where such use would for
any reason “be unfair to a defendant.” Jd. at 331. More-
over, nothing in the Court’s opinion dispenses with the
established limitations on the issue preclusion doctrine de-
veloped in other cases. The court of appeals erred in dis-
regarding these established exceptions to and limitations
upon the rule of collateral estoppel.

For instance, the issue whose redetermination was
barred in Parkiane Hosiery was, unlike the underlying
issue in this case, factual. 439 U.S. at 324.
focus in cautioning against improper resort
estoppel accordingly was upon circumstances that
militate against precluding relitigation of factual
439 U.S. at 331. See Standefer v. United States,

i

shi

21

U.S. 10, 21 (1980). Thus, it is hardly surprising that
the court of appeals was able to conclude (Pet. App. 1la-
16a & n.11) that none of the arguments against use of
collateral estoppel specifically mentioned in Parklane
Hosiery is present here.** This case, by contrast, is gov-
erned by the pre-existing exception to the rule of collat-
eral estoppel applicable to pure questions of law arising
in successive actions on substantially unrelated claims—
an exception recognized in United States v. Moser, 266
U.S. 236, 242 (1924), and recently acknowledged in
Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 162-163 (1979).

1. The Court defined the “unmixed questions of law”
exception to the rule of collateral estoppel in Montana v.
United States, supra, 440 U.S. at 162, quoting United
States v. Moser, supra, 266 U.S. at 242 (emphasis added
by the Montana Court) :

Where * * * a court in deciding a case has enunciated
a rule of law, the parties in a subsequent action upon
a different demand are not estopped from insisting
that the law is otherwise, merely because the parties
are the same.

See also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(2) &
comments b & c, § 29/7) & comment i (1982). This
rule applies with special force when the issues of law are
of constitutional dimensions {Montana v. United States,
supra, 440 U.S. at 163) :

Unreflective invocation of collateral estoppel against
parties with an ongoing interest in constitutional is-
sues could freeze doctrine in areas of the law where
veness to changing patterns of conduct or
mores is critical.

The question presented to the district court for deci-
sion in this case—whether the Attorney General violated

18 As explained below (pages 37-38), however, the court of appeals’
decision does not in fact comport with the Court’s cautionary warn-
ings in Parklane Hosiery.

22

the Due Process Clause by failing to station an author-
ized naturalization representative in the Philippine Is-
lands throughout the time citizenship was available under
Section 701—is an unmixed question of law. This Court
treated the closely related question presented in Hibi in
terms of equitable estoppel doctrine as purely legal. 414
U.S. at &9; compare id. at 9-11 ‘ Douglas, J., dissenting).
Similarly, the district court in 68 Filipinos regarded the
,sestion decided there as one of purely legal dimensions.
406 F. Supp. at 948-951. The court of appeals did not
suggest that the issue presented in this case is other than
purely legal. See Pet. App. 17a & n.14, 20a n.15, 21a
(estoppel applied to “the constitutional issues decided in
68 Filipinos”); see also Barretto v. United States, 694
F.2d 603, 607 (9th Cir. 1982).'* Instead, the court below
simply asserted (Pet. App. 18a), in reliance on Montana,
that “[i]t is by now well settled * * * that collateral es-
toppel * * * may be invoked on * * * pure issues of law.”

Contrary to the court of appeals’ assertion, however,
Montana v. United States, supra, does not support this
sweeping proposition. It is true that the Court there up-
held the application of collatera] estoppe] to preclude de-
termination of a question of law. But the doctrine applied
in Montana was, in practical effect, res judicata. The
Court applied the collateral estoppel label because the
government had undertaken the first round of litigation
through a proxy (see page 23, infra). 440 U.S. at 154-
155. Moreover, the Court’s decision in Montana rests
upon its conclusion that the case entailed an effort to
relitigate a claim not meaningfully distinguishable from
that previously adjudicated. The Cuurt explained (440
U.S. at 163): “[T]he legal ‘demands’ of this litigation
are closely aligned in time and subject matter to those

1% The court of appeals’ decision in Barretto, which reaffirms and
extends its decision in this case, is reproduced in the appendix to the
government's reply brief in support of the petition in this case.

23

in [the prior case].”” The Court’s holding thus rests upon
the distinction, recognized in Moser itself, between re-
consideration of a “rule of law” announced in a prior
case “upon a different demand,” and redetermination of
“a fact, question or right distinctly adjudged in the ori-
ginal action.” Under Moser, as reaffirmed in Montana,
preclusion is impermissible in the former situation, but
permissible in the latter. 440 U.S. at 162-163, quoting
266 U.S. at 242.

The Court recognized in Montana (440 U.S. at 163)
that “the scope of the Moser exception may be difficult to
delineate, particularly where there is partial congruence
in the subject matter of successive disputes.” But in the
circumstances of this case there can be little doubt that
preclusion is improper, for respondent’s claim of eligi-
bility to become a naturalized citizen presents, by defini-
tion, a “different demand” from the separate naturaliza-
tion petitions of the individual petitioners in 68 Filipinos.
See Montana v. United States, supra, 440 U.S. at 154.
The rights of respondent were in no sense “distinctly ad-
judged” in the earlier litigation.

Of course, in Montana itself the Court applied preclu-
sion even though the plaintiff, the United States, had
not formally participated as a named party in the prior
adjudication. 440 U.S. at 155. The Court concluded that
there was no reason to prevent the operation of collateral
estoppel simply because the causes of action in successive
cases against the same defendant were technically dis-
tinct, because in the first action the government had liti-
gated by proxy, financing and controlling the earlier case.
Id. at 154-155. Here, however, respondent’s claim was
not presented vicariously or otherwise in the prior ac-
tion. There is accordingly no reason to treat that claim
as indistinguishable for preclusion purposes from the in-
dividual claims of the veterans that were before the dis-

24

class action of sorts, holding that the 68 Filipinos judg-
ment binds the United States as against any Filipino
veteran who may hereafter seek naturalization under
Section 701. But 68 Filipinos was not certified as a class
action and the government accordingly had no reason to
expect that its failure to prosecute the appeal in 68 Fili-
pinos would bind it in all future cases. See Baxter v.
Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 311 n.1 (1976). Thus, by
lending preclusive force to the legal holding of 68 Fili-
pinos in litigation brought by unrelated claimants, the
court of appeals upset the reasonable expectations of the
government as a litigant.

2. In treating the naturalization petitions of different
individuals as presenting a single “demand” for purposes
of the “unmixed question of law” exception to collateral
estoppel, the court of appeals also divorced collateral es-
toppel from the fundamental purposes served by the pre-
clusion doctrine: “protecting litigants from the burden
of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or
his privy” and “promoting judicial economy.” Parklane
Hosiery Vv. Shore, supra, 439 U.S. at 326. Plainly the
first of these purposes is not served by preclusion on the
legal issue in this case—respondent is not asked to bear
the burden of relitigating any issue that he has previ-
ously litigated. In fact, respondent cannot fairly be said
to bear any untoward burden at all; assuming that collat-
eral estoppel does not apply he will merely be required
to establish his qualifications for admission to United
States citizenship.

Judicial economy is likewise little served by preclusion
in the circumstances of this case, because no trial or
other evidentiary proceedings would have been required
to decide respondent’s legal claim. The underlying legal
issues were fully briefed and argued to the district court
and the court of appeals. To be sure, the courts below
were spared the labor of actually deciding the claim, but
any economy achieved is a false one. As we explain be-
low pages 30-34), if collateral estoppel bars redetermi-

25

nation of legal issues such as that presented here in sub-
sequent unrelated cases, the government will be obliged
to pursue appeals in an uncritical manner, abandoning
the selective appeal policy currently in effect, and im-
posing substantial burdens upon the courts of appeals
and this Court. In short, the court of appeals’ analysis
will retard rather than advance the pursuit of judicial
economy.

3. The underlying issue in this case—whether respond-
ent is entitled to naturalization because of an alleged
denial of due process in the administration of Section
702 in the Philippines in 1945 and 1946—is, of course,
one of constitutional law. Because Congress has no
power to correct the decision in 68 Filipinos by legisla-
tion, the effect of the court of appeals’ decision is espe-
cially onerous. And it is significant that the decision in
68 Filipinos, which is effectively accorded the force of a
decision of this Court by the decision below, trenches
upon the constitutional authority of the Executive to
conduct the foreign relations of the United States ( Art.
II, §2) and the authority of Congress to “establish a
uniform Rule of Naturalization” (Art. I, § 8, Cl. 4). Ace-
cordingly, the court’s warning against “[{u]nreflective in-
vocation of collateral estoppel against parties with an
ongoing interest in constitutional issues” (Montana v.
United States, supra, 440 U.S. at 163) applies with spe-
cial force here.

B. Collateral Estoppel Should Not Be Applied Against
The Government To Preclude Determination Of Re-
curring Questions Of Public Law

Any ambiguity in the application of the Moser excep-
tion to the issue preclusion doctrine is removed by con-
sideration of the additional circumstances that set this
case apart from Parklane Hosiery and Montana. As the
Court recognized in Montana, collateral estoppel is inap-
plicable whenever “special circumstances warrant an ex-
ception to the normal rules of preclusion.” 440 U.S. at

26

155. And in Parklane Hosiery, the Court stated that courts
should not apply collateral estoppel whenever for the rea-
sons there discussed or for any “other reasons, the appli-
cation of offensive [collateral] estoppel would be unfair
to a defendant.” 439 U.S. at 331. We submit that the
unique attributes and role of the United States as a liti-
gant strongly militate against application of the issue pre-
clusion doctrine to the government, particularly when it is
engaged in the uniquely sovereign function of enforcing
the public law.

1. This Court recognized these unique attributes in
Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10 (1980), in de
clining to apply the rule of nonmutual collateral estoppel
announced in Parklane Hosiery and Blonder-Tongue La-
boratories, Inc. Vv. University of Illinois Foundation, 402
U.S. 313 (1971), against the government in a criminal
case. The Court stated, in terms that are fully applicable
here (447 U.S. at 24-25):

Finally, this case involves an ingredient not present
in either Blonder-Tongue or Parklane Hosiery: the
important federal interest in the enforcement of the
criminal law. Blonder-Tongue and Parklane Hosiery
were disputes over private rights between private lit-
igants. In such cases, no significant harm flows from
enforcing a rule that affords a litigant only one full
and fair opportunity to litigate an issue, and there is
no sound reason for burdening the courts with repeti-
tive litigation.

That is not so here. The court of appeals put the
point well:

“(T]he purpose of a criminal court is not to pro-
vide a forum for the ascertainment of private
rights. Rather it is to vindicate the public inter-
est in the enforcement oi the criminal law while
at the same time safeguarding the rights of the
individual defendant. The public interest in the
accuracy and justice of criminal results is greater

27

than the concern for judicial economy professed
in civil cases and we are thus inclined to reject,
at least as a general matter, a rule that would
spread the effect of an erroneous acquittal to all
those who participated in a particular criminal
transaction. To plead crowded dockets as an ex-
cuse for not trying criminal! defendants is in our
view neither in the best interests of the courts,
nor the public.” 610 F.2d. at 1093.

In short, this criminal case involves “competing pol-
icy considerations” that outweigh the economy con-
cerns that undergird the estoppel doctrine.

The fact that this case is not a criminal prosecution
does not dilute the strength of the factors canvassed in
Standefer. Whenever the government acts in its sovereign
capacity to enforce the public laws, public policy dictates
the applicability of the Standefer analysis. This is es-
pecially so where, as here, the government acts to ensure
enforcement of the immigration and naturalization laws,
which this Court has recognized as “[a]n increasingly
important interest * * * of broad public concern.” INS Vv.
Miranda, No. 82-29 ‘Nov. 8, 1982), slip op. 5; see also
Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 506-507 (1981).
As the Court recognized in INS v. Hibi, supra, 414 US.
at 8: “{T)}he Government is not in a position identical
to that of a private litigant with respect to its enforce-
ment of laws enacted by Congress. * * * [I)n enforcing
the cutoff date established by Congress [in Section 701,
the INS] is enforcing public policy established by Con-
gress.”

Numerous practical and legal considerations, applicable
in criminal and non-criminal cases alike, also set the
United States apart from any other litigant and argue
strongly against the estoppel invoked by the court of ap-
peals. First, the government is involved in far more liti-
gation than any other party.” In 1982, for instance, the

2 In 1982, the United States was a party to 75,773 civil cases filed
in the United States District Courts, out of a total of 206, 193 filings.
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Annual Report of

Solicitor General acted upon recommendations respecting
the desirability of appellate, en banc or certiorari review
of a decision adverse to the government in over 2,100
cases. Second, many of the issues of greatest public im-
portance, including constitutional issues, arise only in liti-
gation to which the government is a party: others are
characteristically associated with government litigation.
See American Medical International, Inc. v. Secretary of
HEW, 677 F.2d 118, 121 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Third,
the government, unlike other litigants, necessarily finds
itself in litigation presenting a particular legal issue in a
host of jurisdictions—indeed potentially ‘and not uncom-
monly) in every district and circuit. In such cases, which
include the present one, the potential unfairness of invok-
ing the preclusion doctrine absent mutuality ‘see Park-
lane Hosiery Co. Vv. Shore, supra, 439 U.S. at 330 & n.14)
is necessarily present, for there is a substantial likelihood
that in litigating a recurring issue, the government will
at some point encounter an adverse decision.

Because of these unique attributes of government litiga-
tion, application of collateral estoppel in the circumstances
of cases such as the present one would substantially dis-
rupt the existing process of development of the public law.
In that system courts of coordinate rank are not bound by
each other’s decisions on questions of law. See, e¢.g., Frock
v. United States Railroad Retirement Board, 685 F.2d
1041, 1046 (7th Cir. 1982) (“Federal appellate courts
can, and do, differ in their conclusions as to the law * * *”
(footnote omitted)). Instead, the courts apply the more
flexible doctrine of stare decisis, and give such persuasive
effect as is due in a particular case to the decisions of
coordinate courts from other jurisdictions and the decisions

the Director 98 (1982). In the same year the United States was a
party to 5,517 of 18,784 civil cases appealed from the district courts
to the courts of appeals as well as 4,767 criminal appeals and 3,118
original actions to review the decision of an administrative agency.
Id. at 79, 82.

29

of inferior courts.“ The law emerges through the hiera-
chical process of appeal, en banc review and, in proper
cases, certiorari.

Issue preclusion in private litigation—even if extended
to legal questions—ordinarily does not unduly undermine
this process of development of the law because no sin-
gle litigant is party to more than a small fraction of fac-
tually unrelated cases presenting a common legal question.
By contrast, the government is characteristically, if not
invariably, a party to litigation on public law questions.
Accordingly, application of collateral estoppel when the
government has unsuccessfully litigated a question of law
in any court inferior to this one would freeze the develop-
ment of the law. Yet this Court has repeatedly recognized
the value of allowing independent consideration of legal
issues by the various courts of appeals. See, e¢.g., Califano
v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979); E.J. duPont de
Nemours & Co. Vv. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 185 & n.26
(1977). Of course, that practice is a centerpiece of the
Court’s scheme for administering its certiorari jurisdic-
tion. Sup. Ct. R. 17.1/a).#

Like the Second Circuit in Olegario ‘see pages 13-14,
supra), the courts of appeals have generally recognized
that these considerations preclude application of collateral

21 The court of appeals’ suggestion (Pet. App. 17a) that the con-
siderations we have canvassed might be more weighty when an
issue arises in two different circuits simply illustrates the court’s
failure to recognize the difference between collateral estoppel and
stare decisis. Under the court of appeals’ analysis the decision of a
single district court may be binding upon a court of appeals, while
the authority of decisions of one or more courts of appeals, even
those rendered en banc, may be regarded as merely persuasive.

2 On those rare occasions when Congress has wished to make the
decision of a single court of appeals respecting a particular issue
final save only for review by this Court, it has done so explicitly, by
designating a single forum for litigation of questions of nationwide
importance. See, ¢.g., Section 211/b)(1) of the Economic Stabiliza-
tion Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. 1904 note; Section 307(b) (1) of the
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 7607(b) (1).

80

estoppel to the government on recurring legal issues.
American Medical International, Inc. v. Secretary of
HEW, supra, 677 F.2d at 121-124; Western Oil & Gas
Ass’n V. EPA, 633 F.2d 803, 808 (9th Cir. 1980) ; Divine
v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1974). The
American Law Institute also Nas recognized that preclu-
sion is inappropriate when

The issue is one of law and treating it as conclusively
determined would inappropriately foreclose opportu-
nity for obtaining reconsideration of the legal rule
upon which it was based * * *.

Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 29/7) (1980).
Thus, when “the party against whom the rule of preclu-
sion is to be applied is a government agency responsible
for continuing administration of a body of law applicable
to many similarly situated persons * * * the rule of pre-
clusion should ordinarily be superseded by the less limit-
ing principle of stare decisis.” Id. at § 29 comment i; see
also id. at § 28(2) & comment c.~

2. Furthermore, invocation of collateral estoppel against
the government on legal issues of public importance is in-
appropriate because, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, the government, unlike any other litigant, em-
ploys a formal mechanism for determining whether to take
an appeal from or seek certiorari review of an adverse
judgment. See 28 C.F.R. 0.20. This process is rather se-
lective, particularly at the certiorari stage.** Moreover,

23 The Restatement also cautions against use of collateral estoppel
“when the issue was determined in the first action by a trial court
and in the second action will probably be taken to an appellate
court,” and when “the issue is of general interest and has not been
resolved by the highest appellate court that can resolve it.” Restate-
ment (Second) of Judgments, § 29 comment i. The decision of the
court of appeals disregards these strictures as well.

24In 1982 the Solicitor General decided against appeal to a court
of appeals from an adverse district court judgment in 621 of the
1,118 cases submitted for his consideration. Moreover, notwithstand-
ing the substantial volume of appellate litigation in which the gov-

31

to a degree not approached by any private party, the gov-
ernment regularly takes into account factors other than
its narrow interest in prevailing in a particular lawsuit
in determining whether to seek further judicial review.
As a result, the Solicitor General frequently decides against
appeal or certiorari, in cases where the legal conclusions
of the deciding court are believed to be erroneous.” Such
decisions rest upon a host of other factors, including: a
substantial measure of prosecutorial discretion, equitable
and policy considerations, the perceived practical impor-
tance of the decision, recognition of the limited resources
of the government and sensitivity to crowded dockets of
the courts.** As we have explained above (pages 11-12 &
note 12), the decision not to pursue an appeal in 68 Fili-
pinos was just such a decision.

The fact that the Solicitor General authorized with-
drawal of the appeal in 68 Filipinos does not affect the

ernment is engaged (see page 28 note 20, supra), the Solicitor Gen-
eral authorized filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari in only
64 of the 579 cases in which formal consideration was given to
seeking such review in 1982.

*% The Solicitor General often acquiesces in the grant of a petition
for a writ of certiorari to review a judgment favorable to the United
States where a conflict between the circuits has developed. In many
such instances, the conflicting decision adverse to the government is
one that, although regarded as (and later held by this Court to be)
erroneous, did not provoke the filing of a petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari. See, ¢.g., Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473, 479 (1981); Stead-
man V. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 95 (1981); Lewis v. United States, 445
U.S. 55, 58 & n.4 (1980). See also Tuten v. United States, No. 81-
6756 (Mar. 30, 1983), slip op. 3 n.3.

26 See, e.g., Note, The Solicitor General and Intragovernmental
Conflict, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 324, 324-330 (1977) ; Carrington, United
States Appeals in Civil Cases, 11 Hous. L. Rev. 1101, 1101-1105
(1974); Bork, The Problems and Pleasures of Being Solicitor Gen-
eral, 42 A.B.A. Antitrust L. J. 701 (1973) ; Note, Government Liti-
gation in the Supreme Court: The Roles of the Solicitor General,
78 Yale L. J. 1442, 1453-1457 (1969); Sobeloff, Attorney for the
Government: The Work of the Solicitor General's Office, 41 A.B.A.J.
229 (1955).

proper analysis here. The United States, even as a liti-
gant, does not abandon its role as the government. JNS
v. Hibi, supra, 414 U.S. at 8. As this Court has remarked,
“{t}here is, of course, no rule of law to the effect that the
Government must be consistent in its stance in litigation
over the years. It has changed positions before.” Barrett
v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 222 n.6 (1976). See also
NLRB v. Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 351 (1978) ; Dixon
v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 70-75 (1965) ; Automobile
Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 183 (1957). As this
case illustrates, the political process by which the United
States changes policies from time to time in a democratic
society is itself a powerful reason to preclude collateral
estoppel against the government on matteis of public law.
Indeed, the decision of the court of appeals permits one
administration to bind its successors even on questions of
constitutional law. Contrary to respondent’s suggestion
(Br. in Opp. 13), the government did not in any relevant
sense “concede[] the validity of the district court’s judg-
ment” by withdrawing the appeal in 68 Filipinos. Of
course, the government thereby bound itself not to chal-
lenge the judgment itself (see Federated Department
Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981) )—an obligation the
government has more than fulfilled (see p.ge 12 note 13,
supra)—but it did not acquiesce thereby in the correct-
ness of the district court’s legal ruling.”

Nor is there any anomaly in the Department of Jus-
tice’s reconsideration of its legal position on naturaliza-
tion of Filipino veterans. The present position of the
United States is quite simply that 68 Filipinos was wrongly
decided; the withdrawal of the earlier appeal did not
reflect any different view. Respondent’s suggestion (Br.

27“The estoppel doctrine,” as this Court noted in Standefer v.
United States, supra, 447 U.S. at 23 n.18, “is premised upon an
underlying confidence that the result achieved in the initial litigation
was substantially correct.” As this case shows, the government’s
failure to seek appellate review is not an accurate indicator that the
adverse decision was correctly decided. See also page 31 & note
25, supra.

33

in Opp. 14), echoing the court of appeals ‘Pet. App. 12a,
13a, 15a), that the government has not adequately justi-
fied its change in position assumes that the United States
has an obligation to justify its litigating conduct to the
courts. That assumption is inconsistent with fundamental
principles of our adversary system of justice, see Hickman
v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-512 (1947); cf. 5 U.S.C.
552(\b) (5); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26/b) (3), and raises serious
questions of separation of powers.

The government’s practice of selective pursuit of appel-
late review benefits the public interest and facilitates sound
judicial management. Adoption of the broad preclusion
rule applied by the court of appeals would compel the
United States to reconsider this salutary practice. In-
stead, the government would be obliged to consider an in-
flexible policy of appealing ‘and even seeking certiorari
on) the first adverse decision rendered on a legal issue
lest further review be foreclosed. See Olegario v. United
States, supra, 629 F.2d at 215. As a result, the courts of
appeals and this Court would be burdened prematurely
and unnecessarily, and judicial economy—the touchstone
of the preclusion doctrine—would be disserved. More-

2% United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 684 F.21 1174 (6th Cir.
1982) (“Stauffer IJ”), cert. granted, No. 82-1448 (Apr. 18, 1983),
well illustrates these considerations. There the court of appeals held
that the government was collaterally estopped on a question of inter-
pretation of a provision of the Clean Air Act by the decision of the
Tenth Circuit on the same issue in Stauffer Chemical Co. v. United
States, 647 F.2d 1075 (1981), aff’'g 14 Env’t Rep. Cases 1737 (D.
Wyo. 1980) (“Stauffer I”), notwithstanding the contrary decision
of the Ninth Circuit on that same issue in Bunker Hill Co. v. EPA,
658 F.2d 1280 (1981), aff’'g Civ. No. 80-2087 (D. Idaho Oct. 15,
1980). The Sixth Circuit commented (684 F.2d at 1181):

If EPA really believed that the decision of the Tenth Circuit in
Stauffer I was wrong, it could have petitioned the Supreme
Court for certiorari, but it did not avail itself of that remedy,
and it is too late to do so now. EPA cannot collaterally attack
the Tenth Circuit decision in the present case.
It is true that the government did not seek certiorari in Stauffer I.
But at the time the case us decided there was no conflicting deci-

34

over, because of the limited docket of this Court, and the
proliferation of statutes and litigation in recent years,
constructions of the law that this Court might ultimately
determine to be erroneous would more often be given fi-
nality. See, e.g., North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456
U.S. 512 (1982) ‘rejecting the view of four courts of
appeals); United States v. Foster Lumber Co., 429 U.S.
32 (1976) ‘rejecting the view of three courts of appeals) ;
NLRB v. Enterprise Ass'n of Pipefitters, 429 U.S. 507
(1977) ‘rejecting the view of five courts of appeals).
Plainly, there is no interest served by invocation of col-
lateral estoppel in the circumstances of this case that
would justify these detrimental consequences.”

3. Contrary to respondent’s contention (Br. in Opp.
5-7) and the view of the court of appeals ‘ Pet. App. 18a),
Montana Vv. United States, supra, does not support the ap-
plication of collateral estoppel in the circumstances of this
case. As explained above ‘pages 21-25), this case, un-
like Montana itself, plainly calls for the application of the
“unmixed question of law” exception to the doctrine of
issue preclusion.*”” Montana is also distinguishable be-

sion of any court of appeals. Moreover, the pendency in the Ninth
Circuit of Bunker Hill—an appeal from a district court decision
favorable to the government on the statutory question—together
with the pendency in the Sixth Circuit of Stauffer’s appeal from the
district court decision in Stauffer J] that also favored the govern-
ment necessarily counseled against application to this Court for fur-
ther review in Stauffer J]. Any other course would have disserved
both the Court and those litigants who compete for a spot on its
limited docket.

# At a minimum there is no basis for the court of appeals’ asser-
tion (Pet. App. 15a) that “[i]t should have come as no surprise to
the government” that Judge Renfrew’s decision in 68 Filipinos
would reach the claim of every Filipino veteran. As noted above,
68 Filipinos was not a class action. Moreover, Parklane Hosiery had
not been decided at the time the 64 Filipinos appeal was withdrawn.

* As explained below (pages 39-42), the applicability of the
Moser exception is especially clear here for the additional reason
that the facts of this case are materially different from those ad-
dressed in 68 Filipinos.

35

cause the circumstances presented there may essentially
have called for application of res judicata principles.

More fundamentally, the policy and practical considera-
tions we have outlined above (pages 25-34) had little ap-
plication in Montana, for the issue presented in that case
could arise in only two forums—the Montana state courts
and the United States District Court for Montana. This
consideration is especially significant because in Montana,
unlike here, the government had engaged in conduct
that may implicate the core concerns underlying the pre-
clusion doctrine. It had litigated the issue to a conclu-
sion in the Supreme Court of Montana, noted an appeal
to this Court, then dismissed the appeal and pursued its
parallel action in the federal court. The federal action,
moreover, was filed just after the action in state court
had been filed, and was stayed upon the government’s
stipulation pending resolution of the state court litigation.
Montana is further disinguishable because the issue there
was not one involving a body of law applicable to a class
of similarly situated persors, but one affecting the pro-
prietary interest of the United States. Accordingly, the
government did not argue in Montana, as it does here,
that application of the preclusion doctrine was inappro-
priate in light of its special attributes and responsibilities,
and the Court’s opinion does not reflect any view respect-
ing our present contentions.

4. Both the court of appeals (Pet. App. 19a) and re-
spondent (Br. in Opp. 12, 16) appear to acknowledge that
collateral estoppel should not be applied against the gov-
ernment in some cases presenting legal issues. But be-
cause the court below saw no “ ‘critical’ need for redeter-
mination” of the underlying constitutional issue (Pet.
App. 19a), saw no “compelling public interest in opposing
the naturalization” of persons such as respondent (id. at
20a) and believed that the equities favored respondent
(id. at 20a-21a), it held that the government was pre-
cluded from relitigating the constitutional issues pre-

36

sented here. None of these considerations justifies the
court of appeals’ decision.

The court of appeals’ necessarily subjective conclusions
regarding the “critical need for redetermination” and
“compelling public interest” provide no standard for ac-
curate prediction of which legal rulings, if not appealed by
the government, would be given collateral estoppel effect
in the future. Nor has respondent identified any objective
criterion that could guide the government in its litigating
decisions in the wake of the decision below. Because it is
too late to reconsider whether to appeal by the time a
court has decided in a subsequent case that a prior deci-
sion is binding, the decision of the court of appeals places
the government in an unacceptable position. The court of
appeals has arrogated to itself a standardless discretion to
determine with the benefit of hindsight whether a fresh
determination of the merits of a particular legal issue is
in the public interest (see Pet. App. 20a).

In any event, the court of appeals erred in concluding
that determination of the merits of the instant case is
unwarranted. As explained above (page 27), the deci-
sions of this Court, including Hihi, reflect that the en-
forcement of the naturalization laws in every individual
case is of utmost public importance. The district court’s
holding in 68 Filipinos that the actions of an Attorney
General, taken for foreign policy reasons that the court
acknowledged to be valid, violated the Due Process Clause
is necessarily significant, without regard for the number
of persons involved or the court of appeals’ assessment of
the equities. Moreover, while this Court’s decision in Hibi
makes clear that the equitable considerations mentioned
by the court below are irrelevant to the merits of respond-
ent’s claim, it is particularly clear that these equities have
no place in the calculus of decision where the issue is not
whether respondent is entitled to naturalization, but only
whether the United States is foreclosed from securing an
adjudication of that question.

37

C. The Court of Appeals’ Decision Disregards Other
Established Limitations on the Issue Preclusion
Doctrine

We have explained thus far that, because of the unique
role of the government in enforcing the public law, non-
mutual collateral estoppel on issues of law should never be
applied against the United States. But even if that were
not so generally, and Parklane Hosiery were regarded as
controlling in government litigation, the court of appeals
erred in approving application of that doctrine here.

1, The Court emphasized in Parklane Hosiery that the
doctrine of nonmutual collateral estoppel must always be
applied selectively and cautiously. 439 U.S. at 329-331.
The Court mentioned, for example, that issue preclusion
would be inappropriate when “the judgment relied upon
as a basis for the estoppel is itself inconsistent with one
or more previous judgments in favor of the defendant.”
Id. at 330; footnote omitted. Here, as the court of ap-
peals acknowledged (Pet. App. 16a), Judge Renfrew’s
decision conflicts with the Second Circuit’s subsequent
decision in Olegario. See pages 13-14, supra. In addition,
decisions inconsistent with 68 Filipinos were rendered in
In re Kapili, 473 F. Supp. 600 (E.D. N.Y. 1979); In re
Naturalization of Inton, No. SA-79-CA-284 (W.D. Tex.
July 3, 1980) ; Pangilinan v. INS, Pet. No. 251849 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 24, 1980); Barretto v. United States, Pet. No.
248806 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 1980), and Litonjua v. INS,
Pet. No. 23358-GT (S.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 1981). In view of
this division of authority, the court of appeals should have
taken an independent look at the merits of respondent’s
constitutional claim.

Of course, the district court decisions in the last three
cases mentioned above were reversed by the Ninth Circuit,
in reliance upon the decision in this case, citing stare
decisis as the governing principle. Barretto v. United
States, supra, 694 F.2d at 607." But at the time the dis-

%1In Barretto the court of appeals considered the naturalization
applications of 16 Filipino “Category II” war veterans resting, like

trict court decisions in Pangilinan, Barretto, and Litonjua
were rendered, the Second Circuit’s decision in Olegario
created a precedent in conflict with 68 Filipinos. (By
contrast, Olegario had not been decided when the district
court ruled in the present case, although it had been de-
cided prior to the time the court of appeals rendered its
own decision.) Although the Ninth Circuit in Barretto
refused to hold that the district courts’ rejection of col-
lateral estoppel was erroneous (694 F.2d at 607 n.9), the
court of appeals, quite properly concerned about consist-
ency of decision between this case and Barretto, invoked
stare decisis to achieve the same result. In extending the
holding of this case by means of stare decisis to cover
cases first decided after Olegario, however, the court of
appeals highlighted its original error in invoking colla-
teral estoppel in this case.

The dilemma faced by the court of appeals in Barretto
was of its own making. Because the claim presented in
this case arises under a scheme of public law applicable
to a class of persons, it was foreseeable (if not inevitable)
when the court decided this case that cases such as Bar-
retto would arise. Rather than employing stare decisis to
extend the troublesome holding of this case to cover cir-
cumstances where the application of collateral estoppel
was properly rejected by the district court, the court of
appeals should have recognized that the very policies of
“consistency and fairness” it invoked in Barretto (694
F.2d at 607) required it to reach the merits in the present
case, rather than relying upon the artifice of collateral
estoppel.

2. Other factors also should have precluded any estoppel
here. As we have noted (page 15 & note 17), the court of
appeals rested its decision entirely upon the preclusive

respondent Mendoza’s, upon Sections 701-705 of the 1940 Act and
the due process theory endorsed by the district court in 68 Fili-
pinos. The facts and proceedings in Barretto are described in
detail in our reply brief in support of the petition in this case
(at 2-5).

effect of 68 Filipinos, even though significant legal con-
tentions not addressed by Judge Renfrew in that case
were presented by the government throughout the litiga-
tion of respondent’s claim. The court of appeals thus ef-
fectively applied the broader res judicata (“claim preclu-
sion”) doctrine, rather than collateral estoppel, to bar all
arguments the United States might raise in answer to
respondent’s claim. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90,
94 & n.5 (1980). There can be no justification for the
court of appeals’ refusal to consider legal arguments that
might have been, but were not, addressed in 68 Filipinos.

Among the points the court of appeals simply did not
address were arguments that respondent's claim is ex-
pressly barred by 8 U.S.C. 1421(e) and by laches, and
that respondent is not entitled to naturalization because
he suffered no prejudice, which is an essential] element
of any due process claim. The government also made ad-
ditional arguments, not considered in 68 F ilipinos, that
respondent’s due process claim cannot be reconciled with
this Court’s decision in Hibi. The issues raised by the
government that the court of appeals ignored are impor-
tant ones, not previously litigated, that bear upon the uni-
form'ty and Stability of administration of our nation’s
naturalization laws, the availability of judicial oversight
of executive action in the sensitive sphere of foreign rela-
tions, and the stare decisis effect of this Court’s rulings.
Accordingly, the court of appeals’ failure to limit the
Scope of collateral estoppel to those issues actually liti-
gated and determined in a prior action is particularly
troublesome.

3a. An equally remarkable feature of the decision below
is the court’s conclusion (Pet. App. lla-12a n.8) that
respondent’s residence in Pennsylvania during most of the
time a naturalization examiner was absent from the
Philippines does not serve to distinguish him sufficiently
from the petitioners in 68 Filipinos to require an inde-
pendent determination of his right to naturalization. It
is fundamental that collateral estoppel has no application

40

where the facts of successive cases are in material respects
different. Montana v. United States, supra, 440 U.S. at
158-159; Commissioner V. Sunnen, supra, 333 U.S. at 601.

While we question whether any person who made no
effort to avail himself of the opportunity for naturaliza-
tion provided by Section 701 of the 1940 Nationality Act
should be heard to complain of the temporary absence of
a naturalization official from the Philippines, it is far
clearer that persons such as respondent can make no such
claim. And even if, as the court of appeals thought, the
facts of this case “implicate” respondent’s due process
rights (Pet. App. 12a n.8; emphasis added), there is no
reason whatever to conclude that the holding of 68 Fili-
pinos, which takes no account of these facts, precludes a
determination whether those rights were actually violated.
By invoking collateral estoppel, the court of appeals thus
failed to discharge its duty to determine whether, on the
facts of this case, respondent is entitled to naturalization
under the laws of the United States.*

b. Again the court of appeals’ error is highlighted by
its subsequent decision in Barretto. In that case individ-
ual petitioner Barretto, unlike the 15 other naturaliza-
tion petitioners whose claims were considered, had filed
his naturalization petition prior to withdrawal of the
appeal in 68 Filipinos. He thus arguably fell within the
grandfather rule applied by the Solicitor General in cases
arising before that date ‘see page 12 note 13, supra).
Barretto’s naturalization petition was nevertheless opposed
by the INS because he could establish no prejudice resulting
from the manner in which Section 702 had been admin-
istered in the Philippines. Barretto had spent the period
February 1945 through June 10, 1946, in the United

32 Because of the differences between the facts of this case and
those considered in 68 Filipinos, this case, unlike Montana v. United
States, supra, 440 U.S. at 163, plainly calls for application of the
“unmixed question of law” exception to the doctrine of issue preclu-
sion. See pages 20-25, supra.

41

States undergoing flight training, and had actually filed
a preliminary application for naturalization under the
1940 Act while in the United States. That application
had evidently been rejected because it lacked the neces-
sary signature of his commanding officer. Twenty days
after his return to the Philippines, Barretto was dis-
charged from the United States armed forces and be-
came ineligible for overseas naturalization under Section
702 of the 1940 Act. He thus was stationed in the Philip-
pines for only 20 days when naturalization there under
Section 702 was impossible because of the absence of a
naturalization official.

The court of appeals nevertheless held that Barretto’s
situation was indistinguishable from that of other Cate-
gory II veterans who filed their petitions in time to avail
themselves of the “grandfather rule,” and that Mendoza
required that Barretto’s petition be granted. 694 F.2d at
608-609. The court explained ‘id. at 608; emphasis
added} :

In Mendoza we found that Dr. Mendoza’s presence in
the Philippines for as much as three months, after
having been in the United States for several months,
was sufficient to implicate Dr. Mendoza’s due process
rights, 672 F.2d at 1326 n.8; we know of no princi-
pled basis—and the government offers none—for draw-
ing a line between three months in Dr. Mendoza’s
case and three weeks in this case. If the govern-
ment’s conduct violated the constitutional rights of
Filipinos serving in the United States armed forces
in the Philippines, it violated their rights whether
they were in the Philippines for nine months or nine
days.

The court of appeals’ holding that neither respondent
nor Barretto is situated sufficiently differently from the
Category II veterans in 68 Filipinos to warrant an in-
dividualized determination of his rights is nothing short
of bizarre. Barretto was deprived of the opportunity for
overseas naturalization for only 20 days, had ample op-

portunity for naturalization in the United States, and
actually made such an application. Despite these material
distinctions from 68 Filipinos, the court of appeals or-
dered the government to grant Barretto’s naturalization
petition, even though the district court had found, after
reaching the merits, that he was not entitled to that bene-
fit. The court of appeals’ decision in this case thus indi-
cates that all Filipino veterans are entitled to naturaliza-
tion notwithstanding the absence of any showing of prej-
udice in a particular case. That result squarely conflicts
with this Court’s teaching that a showing of prejudice is
a necessary element of a due process claim. See Lnited
States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, No. 81-450 ‘July 2, 1982),
slip op. 10.

4. A final factor that should have caused the courts
below to eschew reliance upon collateral estoppel and to
make a fresh determination of the merits is the substan-
tial tension between the holding of 68 Filipinos and this
Court’s decision in Hibi. In Hibi this Court confronted
a claim identical to respondent’s in all respects, except
one—the label attached to the legal theory employed,
which has now been changed from “estoppel” to “denial of
due process”. But the Court’s conclusion in Hibi, stated
without qualification, was that Hibi’s “effort to claim
naturalization under a statute which by its terms had
expired more than 20 years before he filed his lawsuit
must * * * fail.” 414 U.S. at 9. Moreover, neither the
Court’s opinion nor the argument of Hibi’s counsel was
dependent upon the technica] elements of equitable estop-
pel doctrine. On the contrary, the argument advanced by
Hibi and rejected by this Court is not meaningfully dis-
tinguishable from the arguments later adopted in 68 Fili-
pinos.**

33 In this Court Hibi argued that under Section 701 the INS had
an absolute duty to make naturalization possible for servicemen eli-
gible under Section 701 except where wartime conditions made that
impractical(Memo. in Opp. at 3-5, INS v. Hibi, No. 72-1652 (1973
Term) ); that the Attorney General impermissibly “single'd) out
Filipino soldiers in the Philippines * * * to deny to all of them the

It is difficult to reconcile Judge Renfrew’s conclusion
in 68 Filipinos that Attorney Genera] Clark’s actions de-
nied due process of law to Filipino veterans with this
Court’s conclusion (414 U.S. at 8-9) that the very same
actions did not constitute “affirmative misconduct.” For
present purposes, however, we need not conclude that Hibi
is dispositive of the merits of respondent's claim. It is
enough to conclude that due regard for the authority of
this Court’s decisions required the district court and court
of appeals in this case to treat the decision in 68 Filipinos
as one at least potentially “inconsistent with * * * [a]
previous judgment!) in favor of” the United States
(Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, supra, 439 U.S. at 330),
and thus to consider respondent's claim against the United
States on its merits.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be re-
versed.

Respectfully submitted.

Rex E. Lee
Solicitor General

KENNETH S. GELLER
Deputy Solicitor General

JosHva I. SCHWARTZ
Assistant to the Solicitor General
May 1983

opportunity to accept the offer of citizenship tendered them by Con-
gress” (id. at 6; emphasis added) ; that the Executive’s action vio-
lated the principle of separation of powers: and that the Executive
“failed to obey his constitutional mandate to enforce the laws”
(ibid.; emphasis added). Hibi also disavowed any narrow or tech-
nical construction of his “equitable estoppel” claim, arguing that
“Ce]quitable estoppel is only the name for a legal principle employed
by the courts below to enforce [the] promise” to alien servicemen
said to be contained in Section 701 (Mem. in Opp. at 12).

la
APPENDIX

STATUTES AND REGULATION INVOLVED
1. 28 C.F.R. 0.20 provides in pertinent part:

The following-described matters are assigned to,
and shall be conducted, handled, or supervised by
the Solicitor General, in consultation with each
agency or official concerned:

(b) Determining whether, and to what extent, ap-
peals will be taken by the Government to all
appellate courts (including petitions for rehear-
ing en bane and petitions to such courts for the
issuance of the extraordinary writs) * * *.

2. Sections 701, 702, and 705 of the Nationality Act
of 1940, as amended, ch. 199, 56 Stat. 182-183, 8 U.S.C.
(Supp. V 1945) 1001, 1002 and 1005, provided in per-
tinent part: '

Sec. 701. * * * [A]ny person not a citizen regard-
less of age, who has served or hereafter serves hon-
orably in the military or naval forces of the United
States during the present war and Who shall have
been at the time of his enlistment or induction a
resident thereof and who (a) was lawfully admitted
into the United States, including its Territories and
possessions, or (b) having entered the United States,
including its Territories and possessions, prior to
September 1, 1943, being unable to establish lawful
admission into the United States serves honorably in
such forces beyond the continental limits of the
United States or has so served may be naturalized
upon compliance with all the requirements of the

1 The Nationality Act of 1940 was repealed by Section 403(a) (42)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414,
66 Stat. 280.

2a

naturalization laws except that (1) no declaration
of intention, no certificate of arrival for those de-
scribed in group (b) hereof, and no period of resi-
dence within the United States or any State shall
be required; (2) the petition for naturalization may
be filed in any court having naturalization jurisdic-
tion regardless of the residence of the petitioner;
(3) the petitioner shall not be required to speak the
English language, sign his petition in his own hand-
writing, or meet any educational test; * * * Pro-
vided, however, That * * * the petition shall be filed
not later than December 31, 1946. * * *

Sec. 702. During the present war, any person en-
titled to naturalization under Section 701 of this
Act, who while serving honorably in the military
* * * forces of the United States is not within the
jurisdiction of any court authorized to naturalize
aliens, may be naturalized in accordance with all
the applicable provisions of section 701 without ap-
pearing before a naturalization court. The petition
for naturalization of any petitioner under this sec-
tion shall be made and sworn to before, and filed
with, a representative of the Immigration and Nat-
uralization Service designated by the Commissioner
or a Deputy Commissioner, which designated repre-
sentative is hereby authorized to receive such peti-
tion in behalf of the Service, to conduct hearings
thereon, to take testimony concerning any matter
touching or in any way affecting the admissibility
of any such petitioner for naturalization, to call
witnesses, to administer oaths, including the oath
of the petitioner and his witnesses to the petition
for naturalization and the oath of renunciation and
allegiance prescribed by section 335 of this Act, and
to grant naturalization, and to issue certificates of
citizenship; * * *

3a

Sec. 705. The Commissioner, with the approval of
the Attorney General, shall prescribe and furnish
such forms and shal] make such rules and regula-
tions, as may be necessary to carry into effect the
provisions of this Act.

3. Section 310(e) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952, as added by Pub. L. No. 87-301, 75 Stat. 656,
8 U.S.C. 1421(e), provides:

Notwithstanding the provisions of section 405
(a)'! any petition for naturalization filed on or
after September 21, 1961, shall be heard and deter-
mined in accordance with the requirements of this
subchapter.

2 Section 405(a) of the Immigration ard Nationality Act of 1962,
. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 280, was a general savings clause that
the legal effectiveness of certain acts taken under provi-
prior law that were in other respects superseded by the

iF

of
Act.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_1191%3A4. Public record. Not legal advice.
