# Appendix — Scarfo v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1983
- **Citation:** 459 U.S. 1170

## Text

A-l
APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 81-2181

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.

NICODEMO SCARFO,
Appellant

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

(D.C. Criminal No. 81-00010)

Argued March 30, 1982

Before: GIBBONS, SLOVITER, and BECKER,
Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed July 22, 1982)

Pamela W. Higgins (Argued)
Higgins & Madden

Suite 1112

Western Savings Bank Building
Broad & Chestnut Streets
Philadelphia, PA 19107

Robert F. Simone

42 S. 15th Street

Suite 1500

Robinson Building

Philadelphia, PA 19102
Attorneys for Appellant

‘

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A-2

W. Hunt Dumont
United States Attorney
Robert P. LaRusso (Argued)
Special Assistant U. S. Attorney
Maryanne Trump Desmond
Executive Assistant U.S. Attorney
Federal Building
970 Broad Street — Room 502
Newark, N.J. 07102

Attorneys for Appellee

OPINION OF THE COURT
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.

Defendant, Nicodemo Scarfo, appeals from the
judgment of conviction and sentence imposed following
his conviction under 18 U.S.C. App. §1202(a)' for pos-
session of a firearm by a convicted felon. We affirm the
conviction.

On December 23, 1979 at 2:00 a.m., investigators
from the Atlantic County Prosecutor's Office? executed

1. Section 1202(a), in pertinent part, provides:

Any person who —

(1) has been convicted by a court of the United States

or of a State or any political subdivision thereof of afelony,. _ .

and who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or af-

fecting commerce, after the date of enactment of this Act, any
firearm shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for
not more than two years, or both.

Section 1202(c 2) defines “felony” as:

|Ajny offense punishable by imprisonment for a term exceed-

ing one year, but does not include any offense (other than one

involving a firearm or explosive) classified as a misdemeanor
under the laws of a State and punishable by a term of imprison-
ment of two years or less.

2. Investigators Edward Hepburn, Anthony Porcelli, Andrew
Allegretto and Lieutenant James Barber participated in the search
of the Scarfo residence. Investigator Dennis McQuigan was sta-
tioned outside the residence during the search.

?

A-3

a search warrant at Scarfo’s residence in Atlantic City,
New Jersey. At the time of the search defendant was not
at home. The warrant was issued by a county judge in
connection with a state murder investigation and au-
thorized the seizure of a “jogging suit and handgun/or
property of the victim.” App. at 8a. None of the items
sought in the warrant were found at the residence. How-
ever, the investigators did seize the following items from
the residence: (1) a .22 caliber derringer contained in an
eyeglass case; (2) the bottom half of a blue jogging suit
(not the one sought in the warrant); (3) a pair of eye-
glasses contained in an eyeglass case; (4) a bulletproof
vest; (5) an envelope containing newspaper clippings
and police reports; (6) a list of telephone numbers and
(7) miscellaneous pieces of paper.*

Scarfo was subsequently arrested, tried, and acquit-
ted of the state murder charge. Thereafter, on January
20, 1981, he was indicted by a federal grand jury for vio-
lation of 18 U.S.C. App. §1202(a)(1) by possession of the
.22 caliber derringer seized at his residence on
December 23, 1979. Scarfo filed a pretrial motion seek-
ing to suppress the items seized by the investigators on
December 23, 1979 on the ground, inter alia, that “the
items seized were not those sought and named in the
warrant.” App. at 13a. The district court denied that mo-
tion, holding that “the items taken were lawfully seized
under the plain view doctrine.” App. at 59a.

Thereafter, trial commenced on April 6, 1981 and
the jury returned a verdict of guilty on April 9, 1981. On
appeal, defendant contends (1) that Exhibits 7(A) (the
miscellaneous papers ) and 7(B) (the telephone list) were
illegally seized under the plain view doctrine and were

3. The inventory of property taken from the Scarfo residence,
App. at 10a, indicates that in addition to these items a “marksman
pellet rifle” and two “switch blade knifes” were also taken. No issue
as to these items has been raised.

A-4

erroneously admitted into evidence,* and (2) that
prosecutorial misconduct requires reversal of the jrdg-
ment of conviction and remand for a new trial.

To prove that Scarfo violated 18 U.S.C. App.
§1202(a) the goverment was required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant (1) had been convicted
of a felony under the laws of the State of Pennsylvania,
(2) thereafter knowingly possessed a firearm, and, (3)
that his possession of the firearm was in or affected com-
merce. Evidence was introduced at trial that Scarfo pled
guilty to involuntary manslaughter in Pennsylvania state
court in 1964, a crime punishable under the laws of
Pennsylvania at the time by imprisonment for more than
two years and thus falling within 18 U.S.C. App.
§1202(c)\(2), and that the derringer was manufactured
in Illinois and sold by a gun dealer in Pennsylvania. The
principal factual issue at trial stemmed from the govern-
ment’s attempt to establish that the derringer gun was
constructively possessed by Scarfo. Defendant attempt-
ed to show through cross-examination that the gun be-
longed to Scarfo’s wife, Dominica Scarfo. Defendant re-
lied in large part on the testimony of County ~ 2stigator
Hepburn that when Hepburn found the derringer in
question during his search of the drawer of the bureau
in the master bedroom of the Scarfo residence, Mrs.
Scarfo stated that it was her gun.

Defendant does not argue on appeal that the evi-
dence was insufficient to prove the requisite statutory
possession by Scarfo. Instead he argues that some of the
evidence which was introduced by the government to

A-5

establish such possession was inadmissibie because it
had been illegally seized, and that, as a result, the con-
viction must be reversed. The evidence which is chal-
lenged is the “miscellaneous papers”, introduced as Gov-
ernment Exhibit 7(A), which consists of 11 small pieces
of paper or: which are handwritten notations, sometimes
on both sides, of names, numbers, or both, and includes
one telephone call message “To Nick”, App. at 264a-78a,
and the “telephone list” introduced as Government Ex-
hibit 7(B), two sheets of paper with names and tele-
phone numbers. App. at 279-81la. Investigator Hepburn
testified he found these papers along with cther items in
the same bureau drawer in which he found the derrin-
ger gun. Id. at 86a. The telephone list, Exhibit 7(B), is a
eg a ee eS een ee eta oy aml

low lined paper, Exhibit 7(B)(1), which was taken from
Scarfo's wallet by Investigator McQuigan when he ar-
rested Scarfo the morning following the search and sei-
zure. Id. at 135a. Thus these exhibits tended to link
Scarfo to the bureau drawer in which the derringer was
found by the police. They have no independent signifi-
cance in this case, and none was suggested.

Scarfo contends that the plain view exception to the
requirement of a search warrant cannot be used to justi-
fy the seizure of Exhibits 7(A) and 7(B). Under the plain
view exception, law enforcement authorities must have
been lawfully on the premises, the discovery must have
been inadvertent, and the incriminating nature of the
item must have been immediately apparent. See Coo-
lidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-73 (1971).
Scarfo contends that in this case the discovery was not
inadvertent and the items seized could not be considered
to be of an immediately apparent incriminating nature.
The government responds that the testimony of Investi-
gator Hepburn establishes both the inadvertence of the
discovery and the incriminating nature of the evidence.
Hepburn testified that he started his search for the items
in the search warrant with the top of the bureau in the

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master bedroom, and when he didn't find anything of
any evidential value he proceeded to search the top bu-
reau drawer. App. at 28a-29a. After finding the derringer
gun in that drawer, he resumed the search of that draw-
er and noticed “some pieces of paper which appeared to
be records of some type, possibly loansharking records or
bookmaking records. I seized them.” Id. at 30a. The gov-
ernment argues that since these records were “with the
gun and with the glass case |an eyeglass case in which
the derringer was found which had been cut down and
acted as a holster],” id. at 32a, they were discovered in-
advertently. It also argues that the incriminating nature
of the documents was apparent because Hepburn had
had prior police training at “two organized crime
schools” where he was taught how “different records
. . . are kept by bookmakers and loansharks”, id. at
30a-3la, and that background, combined with Hep-
burn’s knowledge that “Mr. Scarfo allegedly was in-
volved in that type of activity, according to the police
community”, id. at 3la, suffices to establish the incrimi-
nating nature of the evidence for purposes of the appli-
cation of the plain view doctrine.

It would be unnecessary for us to resolve this close
question of the constitutionality of the seizure if the ad-
mission of the evidence would, in any event, be consid-
ered harmless. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 53
(1970). Application of the harmless error doctrine re-
quires the court to “be able to declare a belief that it was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt", Chapman v. Cali-
fornia, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), an inquiry similar to
“whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evi-
dence complained of might have contributed to the con-
viction.” Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87
(1963).

This court has had several occasions to apply the
harmless error doctrine when the evidence which was
admitted on appeal was claimed to have been obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United

,

A-7

States ex rel. Riffert v. Rundle, 464 F.2d 1348, 1352 (3d
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974); United
States v. Gimelstob, 475 F.2d 157, 161 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 828 (1973). In United States v. Vallzjo,
482 F.2d 616, 618 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
940 (1974), this court eschewed as unnecessary and
thus inappropriate the “intellectually alluring” question
of the legality of the seizure of certain evidence because
we determined that the mass of evidence aside from the
challenged evidence was overwhelming against the de-
fendant. Therefore we affirmed the conviction on the
ground that the admission oi the “fruit” of the allegedly
unlawful search was harmiess beyond a reasonable
doubt.

More recently, in United States v. Molt, 615 F.2d
141 (3d Cir. 1980), we considered defendant's conten-
tion that his conviction for violation of the Tariff Act by
knowingly importing reptiles should be reversed on the
ground that records obtained from a company to which
defendant allegedly sold six imported iguanas were
fruits of an illegal seizure. This court, in an opinion
authored by Judge Gibbons, applied the harmless error
doctrine because the allegedly tainted evidence was
“merely cumulative”, “was not needed to establish de-
fendant’s guilt”, “its admission could not. . . have in-
fluenced the trial judge’s determination” and “there is
overwhelming evidence of guilt apart from [that which
was challenged].” Id. at 146. The government had pro-
duced abundant untainted evidence in the form of testi-
mony from Molt’s co-conspirators that was probative of
Molt’s involvement in the smuggling operation and es-
tablished that he knowingly imported the reptiles con-
trary to the Tariff Act.

Turning then to the inquiry as to whether the ad-
mission of the miscellaneous papers and the telephone
list could be viewed as harmless error, we must first ex-
amine the purpose for which they were used when intro-
duced. They were used in the summation of the pros-

A-8

ecutor as additional evidence to “establish the fact that
that drawer [where the gun was found], that dresser was
that of the defendant and that it was under his control.”
App. at 222a. Had this been the only evidence or the
principal evidence to establish a nexus between defen-
dant Scarfo and the dresser drawer, we should be
obliged to consider the constitutionality of the seizure.
However, there was abundant other evidence to estab-
lish Scarfo’s connection to that drawer.

Investigator Hepburn testified that his search of the
Scarfo residence began in the master bedroom. In the
top drawer of the bureau in thst bedroom he found an
eyeglass case, which contained a pair of eyeglasses, and
another eyeglass case “cut down to act as a holster”,
which contained the .22 caliber derringer. App. at
78a-79a. The two eyeglass cases were attached to each
other by a rubberband which was wrapped around them.
Id. at 79a. When Hepburn removed these items from the
drawer, Mrs. Scarfo stated that the gun belonged » her,
but admitted that the eyeglasses belonged to her hus-
band. Id. An optician, Robert Foerster, testified that the
eyeglasses seized were identical to a pair of bifocals
which his records indicated were prepared for Scarfo.
Tr. at 212-13 (April 7, 1981).

Hepburn further testified that in the same drawer in
which he found the gun he recalled seeing the defen-
dant’s passport and “male socks.” App. at 79a. The pass-
port, which contained Scarfo’s photograph,” was intro-
duced into evidence at the trial and identified by
Investigator Hepburn as the same passport he observed
in the drawer at the time of the search. Id. at 81a.

Hepburn stated that he did not recall seeing any fe-
male clothing in the drawer in which he found the gun.
Id. at 79a-80a. He seized the bottom part of a jogging

5. The passport was not seized at the time of the December 23,
1979 search and was surrendered by Scarfo at the time of his bail
hearing before the district court.

A-9

suit from another drawer in the dresser and described
the clothing in the rest of the dresser as “male clothing.”
Id. at 118a. Hepburn also testified that he searched the
closet next to the bureau and found numerous male
suits, shoes and shirts. Id. at 192. He characterized the
closet as “a male’s closet, all male clothing in it and
shoes.” Id. at 193a. He stated that he recalled seeing no
female clothing in the room. Id.

Investigator Andrew Allegretto testified that he
searched a smaller bedroom in the Scarfo residence, lo-
cated about five feet from the master bedroom, and “all
the belongings in there appeared to belong to a woman.”
Tr. at 43 (April 8, 1981). He stated that he searched both
the dresser and the closet and found “woman's cloth-
ing.” Id. at 44.

We believe that there was overwhelming evidence
that the drawer in which the gun was found contained at
least some personal effects belonging to defendant
Scarfo. The defense sought to show through
cross-examination that the police officers made a
selective search, that they were not looking for any items
of Mrs. Scarfo’s, and that therefore their failure to recall
or to seize any items of Mrs. Scarfo from the drawer did
not establish her lack of possession of the gun. This, of
course, was an issue for the jury which rejected the de-
fense theory after hearing the respective arguments.®
Significantly, defendant s counsel did not argue to the
jury that none of the items in the dresser drawer be-
longed to Scarfo, an argument which would have been
difficult to make in light of the presence of Scarfo’s pass-

6. The jury was instructed without objection that a finding
that defendant actually or constructively possessed the gun jointly
with his wife would be sufficient to satisfy the possession element of
the crime. Tr. at 109 (April 9, 1981). Thus, evidence establishing
that certain items in the drawer belonged to Mrs. Scarfo would not
necessarily be inconsistent with a finding that Scarfo shared con-
structive possession of the gun with his wife.

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port. The presence of two additional items connecting
the defendant to the drawer, which were not so physical-
ly large as to exclude the possibility that Mrs. Scarfo’s ef-
fects could also have been there or so personal in nature
as to preclude the argument that ihe drawer may have
been shared, was at most cumulative to show Scarfo’s
use, at least in part, of that drawer. In light of the fact
that the gun was found in an eyeglass case attached by
rubberband to another eyeglass case which contained.
eyeglasses which were admittedly Scarfo’s, in a drawer
which contained Scarfo’s passports and male clothing, it
strains credulity to conclude, as the dissent does, that
the telephone list found in the same drawer “is clearly
the strongest” circumstantial evidence suggesting that
the gun was Scarfo’s. Dissenting typescript op. at 3. Un-
der the circumstances of this case, we believe applica-
tion of the harmless error doctrine is appropriate. There-
fore, we do not reach the Fourth Amendment issue to
which the dissent is directed.

Defendant's claim of prosecutorial misconduct has
two parts. The first focuses primarily upon the testimony
by Investigator Hepburn on redirect examination that
the search was conducted as part of a “major investiga-
tion” which involved “a majority of the investigators of
the special prosecutors’ unit of the Atlantic County Pros-
ecutor’s Office.” App. 114a-115a. Scarfo argues that this
information was “wholly gratuitous” on the part of the
government, was irrelevant to the charge before the jury
and “can only have been intended by the government to
prejudice the jurors against this defendant.” Appellant's
brief at 11. He analogizes this conduct to that considered
in United States v. Blanton, 520 F.2d 907 (6th Cir.
1975). In Blanton, during a trial of a defendant also
charged with violation of 18 U.S.C. App. §1202(a)(1), a
government agent had testified that the firearm was
seized during a search for guns. Questioning of two
prosecution witnesses elicited testimony that defendant
was under investigation for bank robbery. The court of

A-11

appeals ordered a new trial after finding that “[{t|he delib-
erate injection of testimony concerning another wholly
unrelated offense . . . was error.” Id. at 910.

The facts of the Blanton case are distinguishable
from those before us because in Blanton, unlike this
case, the jury was told both that defendant was the tar-
get of an investigation and the nature of the offense for
which he was being investigated. In this case the jury
might have deduced that Scarfo was under investigation
for something since they already knew that five investi-
gators came to his apartment at 2:00 a.m. to execute a
search warrant authorizing seizure of a hand gun and a
jogging suit. However, they were not told that he was, in
fact, a target or that he was being investigated for mur-
der. Therefore, the line of cases dealing with the issue of
introduction of evidence of viher crimes has no applica-
bility here.

The government claims that it was necessary for it
to elicit the testimony about the investigation to show
that the investigators had a legitimate purpose for being
on the premises. It contends this was needed to rebut the
defense attorney’s cross-examination of Investigator
Hepburn in which the defense sought to demonstrate
that Hepburn was looking for items which would tie the
defendant, but not Mrs. Scarfo, to the derringer. The
government argues that it sought to rehabilitate its wit-
ness by demonstrating that there was an independent le-
gitimate purpose for the witness’ action in seizing cer-
tain items of evidence and not others.

Even if the prosecutor’s questions and the re-
sponses went somewhat beyond that necessary to meet
this objective, the matter was adequately cured by the
cautionary instruction given by the trial court on this
point. Judge Brotman instructed the jury:

No testimony was received during the trial nor evi-
dence introduced about the defendant, Nicodemo
Scarfo, being other than a target or subject of the

A-12

investigation mentioned. | instruct you that you are
not to consider such testimony as bearing on any of
the issues in this case, nor are you to draw any infer-
ences from the mention of such investigation.

In this case you must decide the defendant's
guilt or innocence solely on this charge. You are in-
structed not to consider any evidence not relative to
this issue.

Tr. at 110-111 (April 9, 1981).

Defendant's other claim of prosecutorial miscon-
duct is that the prosecutor improperly injected his per-
sonal opinions and beliefs during his summation. In
United States v. LeFevre, 483 F.2d 477, 478-79 (3d Cir.
1973), we adupied Standard 5.8(b) of the American Bar
Association's Prosecution Standards which provides that
“ijt is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to ex-
press his personal belief or opinion as to the truth or fal-
sity of any testimony or evidence of the guilt of the de-
fendant.” We stated that such comments, if based on the
evidence, are not reversible errors per se.

On several occasions during the prosecutor's clos-
ing argument he expressed his personal belief and views
as to certain evidence. In each instance when the de-
fense counsel objected, the prosecutor apologized, and
the court gave a cautionary instruction. App. at
208a-209a; App. at 214a. On one occasion, the prosecu-
tor told the jury:

It is your decision in the case and the objection was
proper and | will try to refrain from doing it during
the course of my argument. I apologize. If I use that
phrase, forgive me and remember the court's
admonition.

App. at 209a. In addition to the immediate cautionary in-
struction which the court gave, the court charged the
jury in a manner which helped dispel any improper in-

A-13

ferences which might have been drawn from the pros-
ecutor’s comment.

In rejecting the defendant’s post-trial motions, the
court found that these statements were not shown to
have prejudiced the jury. We have reviewed the entire
transcript including the prosecutor's initiai remarks, his
apology, the court’s cautionary instructions, and the
court’s charge, and agree that the statements did n *
constitute such misconduct as to warrant a new trial.

In considering a defendant’s contention that a pros-
ecutor’s remarks in summation were improper, it is im-
portant to keep in mind that the appropriate inquiry is
whether such remarks, in the context of the entire trial,
were sufficiently prejudicial to violate defendant’s due
process rights. Although we have more latitude on direct
appeal when we can exercise our supervisory power
than we have on reviewing a claim on habeas corpus, see
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 639, 642-43
(1974); United States ex rel. Perry v. Mulligan, 544 F.2d
674, 678 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 972
(1977), the focus must still be upon the fairness of the
trial. Our review convinces us that the prosecutorial con-
duct complained of did not rise to a level which compro-
mised defendant's right to a fair trial.

For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the judg-
ment of conviction.

GIBBONS, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I join in the opinion of the court insofar as it ad-
dresses and rejects Mr. Scarfo’s contention that his con-
viction should be reversed for prosecutorial misconduct.
I cannot, however, join in the majority conclusion that
the fourth amendment violation which Scarfo alleges
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Since I am

A-14

convinced that the admission of the telephone number
list could have influenced the outcome of the jury’s de-
liberations I must consider whether that evidence was
lawfully obtained. I conclude that it was not, and thus I
would reverse the conviction and order a new trial.

The majority's harmless error analysis proceeds
upon the assumption that the evidence to which Mr.
Scarfo objected was ir fact obtained in violation of the
fourth amendment. In order to sustain his conviction de-
spite that assumption this court must apply the rule laid
down in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 25-26
(1967):

And though the case. . . presented a reasonably
strong “circumstantial web of evidence” against the
petitioners. . . it was also a case in which, absent
the constitutionally forbidden comments, honest,
fair-minded jurors might well have brought in not-
guilty verdicts. Under these circumstances, it is
completely impossible for us to say that the State
has demonstrated, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the prosecutor’s comments and the trial judge’s
instructions did not contribute to petitioners’ con-
victions. (Emphasis supplied).

The Chapman rule thus places the burden upon the gov-
ernment, not to establish that there was sufficient other
evidence tc convict, but to establish that the constitu-
tional violation did not contribute to the verdict because
no fair minded juror could vote for a not-guilty verdict.
This court has so interpreted Chapman. In Government
of the Virgin Islands v. Bell, 392 F.2d 207, 209 (3d Cir.
1978), we observed:

While the evidence introduced to convict Bell was
adequate to support the jury’s verdict, we cannot
confidently assert that the district court’s authoriza-

A-15

tion to the jury to consider the inferences from the
defendant's failure to testify had no effect on the
outcome of the verdict. That the jury may have been
so influenced is not rebutted by the government.

The “could not have influenced the factfinder’s determi-
nation” test was reiterated as recently as United States
v. Molt, 615 F.2d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 1980).

In considering whether the government has estab-
lished beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury was not
influenced by the illegally obtained evidence, the first
point which must be noted is that its case against Mr.
Scarfo was entirely circumstantial on the sole matter in
dispute. That matter was Mr. Scarfo’s possession of a
gun found in a dresser drawer in a bedroom he shared
with his wife. In the government's case it was estab-
lished that at the time of the seizure Mrs. Scarfo claimed
to be the owner. There was no evidence of any admission
of ownership or possession by Scarfo' and no direct evi-
dence of either. The government's case required that the
jury infer his possession from a totality of circum-
stances. Those circumstances, as the majority correctly
observes, include the fact that the dresser drawer in
which the gun was found contained some other personal
property of Scarfo, and that most of Mrs. Scarfo’s person-
al belongings were in another location. Undoubtedly the
jury could have inferred from those circumstances that
Mrs. Scarfo lied when she claimed ownership of the
gun. That, however, is not the test. The government
must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that in draw-
ing that inference the jury did not rely at all upon the
illegally obtained evidence.

For several reasons the government has failed to
meet that burden. First, the gun was found in close

1. Compare Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972) (ad-
mission of statement illegally obtained but cumulative of three other
full confessions lawfully obtained).

A-16

proximity to Exhibit 7(B), a photocopy of a telephone
list, the original of which was later found in Mr. Scarfo's
wallet. Of all the circumstantial evidence suggesting
that the gun was his, the duplicate telephone list found
in close proximity to it in the same drawer is clearly the
strongest. In order to conclude that the jury was not in-
fluenced by that evidence we would have to conclude,
against reason and common sense, that each juror, in
drawing the inference that Mrs. Scarfo lied about her
ownership, disregarded the strongest piece of circum-
stantial evidence in the case.

As the case comes to us, moreover, the government
is in no position to argue that the jury did not rely on the
illegally obtained evidence in drawing the necessary in-
ference. First, it urged the trial court to admit the tele-
phone list, over objection, on the ground that it was rel-
evant to his possession of the gun. As the majority notes,
its only relevance is as circumstantial evidence of Mr.
Scarfo's possession. Second, in its closing argument the

government urged the jury to consider the list to “estab-
lish the fact that the drawer, that the dresser was that of
the defendant and that it was under his control.” App.
22a. In order to prevail under Chapman the government
must persuade us beyond a reasonable doubt that the tri-
al judge, an eminently reasonable man, made an unrea-
sonable ruling on relevancy, and thai the jury rejected
the argument that the reasonable prosecutor persuasive-
ly advanced. I am not so persuaded. Indeed, | am per-
suaded to a moral certainty that the jurors did rely upon
the strongest piece of circumstantial evidence in the
case, as both the trial judg» and the prosecutor anticipat-
ed they would.

In short, what the majority has done is to disregard
the Chapman rule and apply a quite different test, which
lifts the government's burden of establishing that the
jury did not rely upon the illegally admitted evidence
and requires a showing by the defendant that had the
evidence been excluded the verdict would have been

A-17

otherwise. Neither the Supreme Court's precedents nor
ours permit that result.

One final observation is in order. The conventional
wisdom supporting the exclusionary rule is the deter-
rence of police misconduct. I have noted elsewhere that
this conventional justification is less than satisfactory.
See, e.g., United States v. Bazzano, —— F.2d ——., No.
81-1936 (3d Cir. 1982) (Gibbons, J., dissenting). But ac-
cepting the deterrence rationale, the application of a
harmless error rule to illegally obtained evidence is so in-
consistent with that justification as to be irrational. As
the majority observes, this court nevertheless on several
occasions made a harmless error analysis in fourth
amendment contexts. E.g., United States v. Molt, 615
F.2d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Vallejo,
482 F.2d 616, 618 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 830
(1973); United States v. Gimelstob, 475 F.2d 157, 161
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 828 (1973); United
States ex rel. Riffert v. Rundle, 464 F.2d 1348, 1352 (3d
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 415 F.2d 927 (1974). Those
precedents, inconsistent as they are with the deterrence
rationale, nevertheless authorize application of a harm-
less error analysis to fourth amendment violations. Were
the question open I would hold that the Chapman rule
should never be applied on direct appeal to justify the
participation by the trial court and the prosecutor in an
ongoing invasion of privacy. But the precedents referred
to are no authority for the gross distortion of the Chap-
man rule which the majority perpetrates.

Since I cannot conscientiously conclude that the
Chapman test has been met, | turn to Mr. Scarfo’s fourth
amendment contention, which is that certain exhibits
admitted in evidence were illegally seized on December
23, 1979.

A-18

On that date investigators from the Atlantic County
Prosecutor's Office executed a search warrant at the
Scarfo home. The warrant, issued in connection with a
state murder investigation, authorized a search for a jog-
ging suit and handgun. None of the items specifically
named in the warrant were seized, but other items, in-
cluding a pair of eyeglasses, a .22 caliber derringer, pa-
pers and a list of telephone numbers were taken from
the bureau drawer in the master bedroom.

The search began with the top of the bureau. After
finding nothing there, Edward Hepburn, the investiga-
tor in charge of the search, opened the top dresser draw-
er. He first found Mr. Scarfo’s passport and two eyeglass
cases attached together with a rubber band. One of the
eyeglass cases contained the revolver. Mrs. Scarfo, who
was present, stated that the eyeglasses were her hus-
band’s, but that the gun belonged to her, and the investi-
gator resumed his search of the drawer. Mr. Scarfo was
not present during the search. Hepburn testified that he
next noticed scraps of paper which, based on his train-
ing and experience, appeared to be loansharking and
bookmaking records. (App. 30a-3la). Hepburn testified
that he knew that “Mr. Scarfo allegedly was involved in
that type of activity, according to the police community.”
(App. 3la). According to Hepburn, the pieces of paper
were “with the gun and with the glass case,” and below
the scraps of paper, Hepburn found a copy of a list of
telephone numbers. (App. 32a-33a). The original of the
telephone list was found later in Scarfo’s wallet.

On January 20, 1981, a federal grand jury returned
a one-count indictment charging Scarfo with possession
of a weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C. App. §1202(a)(1),
which makes it unlawful for a convicted felon to possess
a firearm.’ Prior to trial, Scarfo filed a motion to suppress

2. It is undisputed that in 1964 Scarfo had pled guilty to man-
slaughter in Philadelphia and had been sentenced to not less than
six nor more than twenty-three months.

A-19

press all items seized in the search as being neither
named in the warrant not within its scope. The district
court denied the motion to suppress on the ground that
all of the items not mentioned in the warrant were in
plain view and thus were lawfully seized. (App. 41a). A
jury trial was held beginning on April 9, 1981.

The government concedes, as it must, that seizure
of the items was not specifically authorized by the war-
rant. \Appellee’s Brief at 26). It argues, however, that
the telephone list and miscellaneous papers were inad-
vertently discovered and immediately recognized as in-
criminating during the course of an otherwise lawful
search, and that seizure of the items was therefore au-
thorized under the plain view doctrine.

In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971), the Supreme Court held that under the plain
view doctrine it was permissible for police to seize items
found while executing a search warrant naming other
objects. Coolidge, however, did not establish that any-
thing in view can be seized. The police must come
across the object not named in the warrant during the
course of a search of proper scope and intensity. In addi-
tion, the article seized must be of an incriminating char-
acter, it must be immediately apparent to the police that
it is incriminating, and the police must have come upon
the evidence inadvertently. E.g., United States v. Antill,
615 F.2d 648 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 866
(1980); United States v. Sanders, 631 F.2d 1309 (8th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1122 (1981); United
States v. Schire, 586 F.2d 15 (7th Cir. 1978).

Appellant Scarfo concedes that the county investi-
gators were lawfully on the premises to search for a
handgun and a jogging suit but maintains that the sei-
zure of the other items was not inadvertent and that the
incriminating nature of the items was not immediately

apparent. (Appellant's Brief at 33).

A-20

A. The “Immediately Apparent” Requirement

The case law does not clearly establish the extent to
which police may go in examining an item to determine
whether it is incriminating. While it is clear that under
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (Stewart, J.,
concurring), police cannot remove film from containers
and view it on a projector, Justice Stewart's opinion in
Stanley v. Georgia has not been interpreted as prohibit-
ing all examination of an article. It is generally assumed
that there is nothing improper in merely picking up an
article for the purpose of noting identifying characteris-
tics found on the surface; a “casual” inspection is
permitted, but a “close” inspection is not.’ United States
v. Roberts, 619 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1980). The line be-
tween a permissible examination and an overly intrusive
one is thin and poorly defined. In United States v. Rob-
erts, supra, police officers obtained a warrant to search
for stolen property and while on the premises observed
tables set up with football score sheets, phones and cal-
culators. The police inspected the football scoresheets by
a “mere glance.” Once alerted to the existence of a book-
making operation, they had probable cause to believe the
items on the table were evidence of crime and could
therefore seize them. 619 F.2d at 381.

Cases involving address books go somewhat further
than Roberts, and generally hold, at least in conspiracy
cases, that police may page through the book before
seizing it. In United States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535,
559 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980),
the fifth circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to sup-
press address books, because the police were investigat-

ing a conspiracy, and the investigator “recognized that

3. The prohibition of a close inspection applies only to items
not already in police custody. If there is a probable cause to seize an
article, once it is in custody, police may properly inspect it. United
States v. Duckett, 583 F.2d 1309, 1313 (Sth Cir. 1978).

A-21

the address books might be of significance before he
leafed through them.” Id. See also, United States v.
Hillyard, 677 F.2d 1336, 1342 (9th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Phillips, 593 F.2d 553 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. de-
nied, 441 U.S. 947 (1979).

Similarly, in United States v. Crouch, 648 F.2d 932
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, ——— U.S. ——, 102 S. Ct. 491
(1981), a case upon which the government relies, the
fourth circuit upheld a ruling admitting in evidence let-
ters containing a formula for manufacturing drugs
which were seized during a search authorized by a war-
rant for paraphernalia used in drug manufacture. The
court attached no significance to the fact that “a cursory
reading” of the letters was necessary to establish their
incriminating nature. Even though there was nothing
incriminating about the envelopes in which the letters
were discovered, the court noted that the agents “acted
within the scope of the search warrant in removing the
letters from those envelopes to search for the chemicals
and paraphernalia named in the warrant.” Id. at 933.*

In other cases, courts have rejected a plain view jus-
tification for seizure of items when the investigator had
to conduct a more searching inspection of the item. In
United States v. Scios, 590 F.2d 956, 963 n.15 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (en banc), the court held that the agent unlawful-
ly riffled through defendant's file folders, located on a
countertop in wire stands. The labels on the folders were
not plainly visible; the agent had to bend over, thumb

4. The government also relies on United States v. Ochs, 595
F.2d 1247 (2d Cir. ), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 955 (1979). in Ochs, dur-
ing a warrantless investigation of a car allegedly involved in a travel-
ers’ checks theft ring, police opened and looked at contents of an
unlocked briefcase, which were “on their face” records of a loan-
sharking operation and a house of prostitution. The second circuit
noted that plain view can include some perusal, generally fairly
brief, of documents to perceive the relevance of the document to
crime. Id. at 1257 n.8. Ochs’ discussion of plain view does not elabo-
rate on the extent to which the police may examine an item.

A-22

through the files and finger them so that their labels
could be read. The agent was lawfully on the premises
pursuant to an arrest warrant, and was looking for
“nothing in particular” when he focused on the file fold-
ers.” Id. at 958. See also, United States v. Robinson, 535
F.2d 881, 885-86 (5th Cir. 1976) (not plain view when
officer had to open brown paper bag to inspect envelopes
inside). Most cases also hold that an investigator cannot
write down an item’s identifying characteristics, such as
a serial number, and check it later. United States v.
Clark, 531 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1976) (officers authorized
to search for drugs could not seize pistol, check serial
number and prosecute defendant for firearms violation );
United States v. Gray, 484 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1158 (1974) (where warrant au-
thorized search for illegally stored beer, officers could
not seize rifle and later check serial number). But cf,
United States v. Shire, supra, 586 F.2d at 18-19 (looking,

5. There are cases in courts of appeals pointing the other wav.
In United States v. Sedillo, 496 F.2d 151 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 947 (1974), defendant was stopped on the street by a po-
lice officer. The officer noticed an envelope which appeared to con-
tain a treasury check addressed to someone else sticking out of de-
fendant’s pocket. The officer removed the check, noticed that it had
been endorsed, compared the endorsement with a sample of defen-
dant’s handwriting, and arrested defendant for forgery. The ninth
circuit decided that the officer had probable cause at the time he
seized the envelope, and upheld the seizure based on plain view.
Judge Hufstedler dissented, arguing that the incriminating aspects
of the check were not apparent until after the officer removed the
check from defendant's pocket Three members of the Supreme
Court agreed, and dissented from a denial of certiorari, 419 U.S.
947. Similarly, in United States v. Gentile, 419 U.S. 979 (1974), po-
lice were searching defendant's home for stolen goods when an offi-
cer noticed a check payable to someone else laying under some
clothing. The officer seized the check and later learned it was sto-
len. The fifth circuit, without opinion, affirmed the district court's
decision to allow the check into evidence. 493 F.2d 1404 (5th Cir.
1974). Certiorari was denied, with Justice Douglas, joined by Jus-
tice Marshall, dissenting.

A-23

at serial number permissible; immediately apparent re-
quirement means apparent without information other
than that which officers properly possessed before the
search was over). In a more extreme case, United States
v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1971), a defen-
dant consented to a search of his house for narcotics.
During the search, the agents went far beyond the scope
of the defendant’s consent by opening and reading
through his personal papers “to determine whether they
gave any hint that defendant was engaged in criminal
activity.”

This case falls between cases such as United States
v. Dichiarinte and United States v. Roberts, supra.
Here, the evidence was not fully exposed to view, as in
Roberts, but Investigator Hepburn was authorized to be
in the drawer at the time when he found the papers.
Thus, the issue is whether the contents of the phone list
and other papers were “immediately apparent” in light of
the fact that Hepburn had to examine the papers before
coming to the conclusion that they were incriminating.
The search warrant in this case authorized F e«>urn to
look for a gun and a jogging suit and, unlike the officers
in United States v. Crouch and United States v.
Diecidue, Hepburn was not acting within the scope of
the search warrant in examining the papers. There is no
indication in the record, however, that the papers were
in an envelope, bag, folded up or otherwise concealed.
Hepburn did not have to take information back to head-
quarters, analyze it, or conduct any further search of the
premises; he merely had to look at the papers to be able
fully to view their contents.° See, United States v. Schire,
supra, 586 F.2d 15. In light of the minimal and casual

6. None of the papers constituting Exhibit 7A measure larger
than 3 inches by 5 inches. App. 264a-279a. They appear to have
been simply laying in the drawer. Exhibit 7B, the phone list, ap-
pears to cover two sides of a piece of paper. App. 280a-28 1a. Officer
Hepburn described them as “scraps of paper” laying in the drawer.

A-24

nature of the inspection necessary to ascertain the con-
tents of the papers, the “immediately apparent” require-
ment, in my view, poses no obstacle to application of the
plain view doctrine.

B. Probable Cause

The requirement that an article be incriminating in
character has proved troublesome for the courts. Since
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), an article need
not be inherently incriminating; the “incriminating na-
ture” of an object is generally deemed apparent where
police have probable cause to believe it is evidence of
crime. United States v. Strahan, 674 F.2d 96, 100 (Ist
Cir. 1982); United States v. Ochs, supra, 595 F.2d at
1258; United States v. Duckett, 583 F.2d 1309, 1313-14
(5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Johnson, 541 F.2d
1311, 1316 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Truitt, 521
F.2d 1174 (6th Cir. 1975). See also 2 LaFave, Search &
Seizure §4.11 at 167 (1978). Although courts often are
not explicit in articulating the test they are applying, a
probable cause standard seems to be the most often used
and preferable one.’ E.g., United States v. Johnson, 541
F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1976). Requiring any less of a con-
nection between items which are not inherently incrimi-
nating and some criminal activity could authorize
wholesale seizures, since the police often find many
items during the course of a warrant search which could
possibly (as opposed to probably) later turn out to have
evidentiary value. See 2 LaFave, Search & Seizure $4.11
at 169 (1978).

7. Some courts have applied what appears to be a slightly less-
er standard and have required only a “reasonable relation” to the
purpose of the search or a “nexus” between the seized item and the
criminal behavior under investigation. E.g., United States v. Barber,
495 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Wolfe, 375 F. Supp.
949 (E.D. Pa. 1974). This standard has only been applied in cases
where the item seized related to the crime under invesigation. That
is not the case here.

A-25

The cases do not establish precisely what nature or
degree of connection between an item and some crimi-
nal activity is required for probable cause. In some cases,
determinations of sufficient cause to believe the item
was incriminating have been based on the fact that the
items seized were of the same type as those named in
the warrant. E.g., United States v. Golay, 502 F.2d 182
(8th Cir. 1974) (warrant issued for stolen property; po-
lice justified in seizing other property believed to have
been stolen); United States v. Kuntzweiler, 487 F.2d
426 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 910 (1974)
(police search for one type of controlled substance and
find another). In other cases, seizures of unnamed items
have been justified on the basis of the item’s clear rela-
tionship to the crime under investigation, e.g., United
States v. Decidue, 603 F.2d 535, 559 (5th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980) (seizure of address
book justified because crimes being investigated includ-
ed conspiracy); United States v. House, 604 F.2d 1135,
1143 n.10 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 931
(1980) (incriminating nature of photograph of car argu-
ably relevant in investigation involving stolen cars but
not in investigation for drugs); United States v. Schire,
supra, 586 F.2d at 18 (where officers investigating auto
theft ring, proper to check car’s identification number);
United States v. Griffin, 530 F.2d 739, 744 (7th Cir.
1976) (evidentiary nature of mail strewn about apart-
ment apparent when officers investigating reports of sto-
len mailbag); or the location of the item, United States v.
Pincus, 450 F. Supp. 66, 70 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (seizure
proper of records located outside normal filing system
next to records sought in insurance fraud scheme).®

8. The government relies on United States v. Phillips, 593 F.2d
553 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 947 (1979). Although the
fourth circuit in Phillips upheld a trial court's decision to admit ad-
dress books on the basis of plain view, that case does not offer solid
support to the government's position. First, the circuit court viewed

A-26

Although the courts thus appear to consider all the
circumstances in determining whether there was prob-
able cause to believe the item was a fruit, instrumental-
ity or evidence of crime, seizure must be based on more
than mere suspicion and must be supported by objective
facts. See, United States v. Ochs, supra, 595 F.2d at
1258; United States v. Benn, 441 F. Supp. 1268
(E.D.N.Y. 1977). Cf. Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (car search).

In this case, the record is devoid of facts upon which
the police could base probable cause for seizing the pa-
pers. As a justification for the seizure, the government
argues that the records were evidence that Scarfo had
committed the separate crimes of bookmaking or loan
sharking. Hepburn’s testimony as to why he had prob-
able cause to believe the records were evidence of these
crimes consists of his testimony on direct examination:

Q: The other items that you seized, briefly de-
scribe them to the Court, would you please?

A: Upon looking through that drawer, I seen
some pieces of paper which appeared to be records
of some type, possibly loan sharking records or
bookmaking records. I seized them.

Q: Have you ever had experience in examin-
ing and determining documents to be either loan-
shark or gambling records?

NOTE — (Continued)

any error which might have occurred in admitting the evidence as
harmless. Id. at 557. Second, the crime under investigation in Phil-
lips was conspiracy, and arguably the address book's incriminating
or evidentiary nature, in light of the crimes under investigation, was
more apparent than here. In addition, the court in Phillips offered
no explanation as to why the police properly seized the address
books, other than to say they were in plain view.

A-27

A: I have been in two organized crime schools
and I'm aware, they went over different records that
are kept by bookmakers and loansharks.

Q: Did you have any prior knowledge whether
or not Mr. Scarfo was ever involved in either of
those two types of operations?

A: Mr. Scarfo allegedly was involved in that
type of activity, according to the police community.

App. 30a-31a. On cross-examination as to his motivation
for taking the records, Hepburn stated that he “felt they
were loansharking records,” and denied that he took
them to tie the gun to Scarfo. Hepburn further testified
that Scarfo was not arrested or charged with any crime
in relation to the papers which were taken. App. 37a.
Thus, two factors are asserted as supporting probable
cause: Hepburn’s experience in recognizing loan-
sharking or gambling records and Scarfo’s reputation “in
the police community.” While both are legitimate con-
siderations in determining probable cause, cf., Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (skill and experience of officer
relevant in evaluating determination of reasonable sus-
picion to stop suspect); Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160 (1949) (officer's knowledge of prior conviction
relevant to probable cause); United States v. Flynn, 664
F.2d 1296, 1304 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. —,
102 S. Ct. 1979 (1982) (probable cause based on sum of
what police know and have heard as officers); United
States v. Ochs, supra, 595 F.2d at 1247 (police officers
had cause to believe in defendant’s widespread partici-
pation in criminal activity and could therefore seize
notebooks), beyond these mere assertions, Hepburn’s
scanty testimony does not present any objective facts
which would warrant a finding of probable cause to be-
lieve the papers were evidence of loansharking or book-
making. The investigating officer need not be absolutely

A-28

certain that he is faced with evidence of crime, e.g.,
United States v. Duckett, 583 F.2d 1309, 1313 (5th Cir.
1978), but he must have had more than a suspicion that
seized records in Exhibit 7A were “possibly” evidence of
either of two crimes, loansharking or bookmaking.
There is no testimony whatsoever which connects Ex-
hibit 7B, the telephone list, with criminal activity. The
exhibit is indistinguishable, except for the names, from
the list of names and telephone numbers of members of
this court which I have carried in my wallet for over
twelve years.

The government relies on United States v. Ochs,
supra, as support for its position that seizure was proper.
In Ochs, the court explicitly applied a probable cause
standard. There was no dispute that the police had prob-
able cause to arrest Ochs for trafficking in stolen travel-
ers’ checks and possessing a gravity knife. 595 F.2d at
1253. The police were entitled to search the car in which
Ochs was traveling at the time of his arrest for the stolen
checks and weapons, and within the context of that
search, they could search containers which they had
probable cause to believe contained evidence of the
crime. By the time the police had gone that far in their
search in Ochs, they had probable cause to believe that
Ochs was also engaged in conducting a house of prosti-
tution and loansharking. Based on probable cause sug-
gesting the commission of three separate crimes involv-
ing records, police were entitled to glance at and seize
bankbooks and notebooks. Id. at 1258. In this case by
contrast, the police did not have probable cause inde-
pendent of the seized records themselves. There were no
other facts which gave the discovered records any sig-
nificance beyond what their contents could convey.

The government also argues that the lack of testi-
mony in the record as to why Hepburn believed the
records were incriminating is because Scarfo specifically
waived a hearing. This contention must be rejected,
however, since the plain view doctrine carves out an ex-

A-29

ception to the warrant requirement on which the gov-
ernment bears the burden of proof. Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21
(1968); Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502
F.2d 914, 928 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909
(1975). The government did not meet its burden of
pointing to specific and articulable facts which made it
probable that the evidence seized implicated Scarfo in
bookmaking or loansharking.

Although a district court’s findings of fact on a mo-
tion to suppress must be upheld unless they are clearly
erroneous, United States v. Duckett, 583 F.2d 1309,
1313 (5th Cir. 1978), the district court here made no
findings of fact as to probable cause. The court simply
asserted, without findings, that the plain view doctrine
applied. App. 59a. This court's standard of review is ple-
nary, since the issue is whether the evidence supports
the district court’s conclusion of law. This court should
reverse the district court’s decision not to suppress Ex-
hibits 7A and 7B, and grant a new trial.

Scarfo claims that other seized items, including
newspaper articles and a bullet proof vest, should have
been suppressed. (Appellant’s Brief at 31). These items
were marked as exhibits by the district court, but they
were not offered in evidence by the prosecution. Since
the items were not introduced in evidence, failure to
suppress them is harmless error. United States v.
House, 604 F.2d 1135, 1142 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. de-
nied, 445 U.S. 931 (1980); United States v. Mendoza,
473 F.2d 692, 697 (5th Cir. 1972).

C. Inadvertence

Scarfo also asserts that the plain view doctrine
should not apply because the police did not come across
the items inadvertently. Since for me the reasons set
forth in Part II B require a new trial I have no reason to
discuss this contention. But see United States v. Crouch,

A-30

supra, 648 F.2d at 933; United States v. Clark, supra,
531 F.2d at 932.

Since illegally obtained evidence relevant to the
critical issue of Scarfo’s possession of the gun was ad-
mitted in evidence over objection, and I cannot consci-
entiously say that it did not contribute to his conviction, I
would grant a new trial.

A True Copy:
Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

A-31
APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 81-2181

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Us.
SCARFO NICODEMO
a/k/a NICHOLAS SCARFO
a/k/a NICHOLAS SCARTO

NICODEMO SCARFO,
Appellant
(D.C. Crim. No. 81-00010)

ON APPEAL FROM
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Present: GIBBONS, SLOVITER AND BECKER,
Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

This cause came on to be heard on the record from
the United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey and was argued by counsel on March 30,
1982.

On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered
and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the said
District Court, entered July 9, 1981, be and the same is
hereby affirmed.

ATTEST:

Clerk
July 22, 1982

A-32
APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 81-2181

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee
v.

NICODEMO SCARFO,
Appellant

SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING

Present: SEITZ, Chief Judge, ALDISERT, ADAMS,
GIBBONS, HUNTER, WEIS, HIGGINBOTHAM,
SLOVITER, and BECKER, Circuit Judges

The Petition for Rehearing filed by Appellant,
Nicodemo Scarfo, in the above entitled case having been
submitted to the judges who participated in the decision
of this court and to all the other available circuit judges
of the circuit in regular active service, and no judge who
concurred in the decision having asked for rehearing,
and a majority of the circuit judges of the circuit in regu-
lar active service not having voted for rehearing by the
court in banc, the petition for rehearing is denied.

Judge Gibbons would grant the petition for
rehearing.

By the Court,

Circuit Judge
Dated: August 16, 1982

A-33
APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :

7 Criminal No. 81-0010

NICODEMO SCARFO Order:
a/kia NICHOLAS SCARFO _ Pretrial Motions
a/k/a NICHOLAS SCARTO _

The defendant, Nicodemo Scarfo, a/k/a Nicholas
Scarfo, a/k/a Nicholas Scarto, having filed motions for
discovery, bill of particulars, exculpatory evidence, sup-
pression of evidence, and dismissal of the indictment,
with the United States having responded, and the Court
having read and papers submitted in support and in op-
position, in addition, the Court having heard oral argu-
ments, and having taken testimony on a limited issue on
the motion to suppress,

It is on this 23rd day of April, 1981,

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED as to the defendant's
motion to suppress:

1. the officers properly knocked and announced
their identity and purpose when executing the war-
rant;

2. the application in support of the search war-
rant adequately established the informant’s reliabil-
ity;

3. probable cause existed for issuance of the
search warrart;

4. the items taken were lawfully seized under
the plain view doctrine;

5. (see paragraph 3 above)

6. the request for a hearing under Franks v.
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), is denied in so far
as the defendant withdrew his request for such a

A-34

hearing and relied instead on his supporting memo-
randum and oral argument.

JUDGE STANLEY S. BROTMAN
United States District Court

Dated: April 23rd, 1981
Camden, New Jersey

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_1052%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
