# Petition — Astorga-Torres v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1982
- **Citation:** 459 U.S. 1040

## Text

Office - Supreme Court,
FILED

OCT 22 ee

ALEXA
Ho. NDER L. STEVA®
CLERK

Iu THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1982

RAFAEL ASTORGA-TORRES ,
Petitioner,
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

MICHAELSON & WITHEY

BY: ALVIN S. MICHAELSON
Suite 2512
1900 Avenue of the Stars
Los Angeles, CA 90067
(213) 278-4984

Attorneys for Petitioner

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

(I) Whether the evidence, seized by
federal agents in a warrantless search
of Petitioner's motel room many hours
after Petitioner had been arrested and
taken from the motel room, was admitted
into evidence at trial in violation of
Petitioner's Fourth Amendment's right
against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures and in direct contradiction with
the decisions of this Court in Mincey v.
Arizona, 537 U.S. 385, and Stoner v.
California, 376 U.S. 483.

(II) Whether the Court's error in
giving the Jewell instruction, which the
Ninth Circuit held erroneously invited
the jury to find that Petitioner was in
constructive possession of the heroin
possessed by Ambriz, and required rever-

sal of his conviction of Count MII

i.

permeated the jury's finding of guilt on
Count I and denied Petitioner his Fifth
Amendment right to due process of law?

ii.

Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES vi
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 1
OPINIONS BELOW 2
JURISDICTION 3
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED 3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4
STATEMENT OF FACTS 9

I. Motion to Supress 9
It. The Trial 19
III. The Jewell Instruction 36
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT 39

iii.

I.

Il.

THE EVIDENCE SEIZED BY
FEDERAL AGENTS IN A WAR-
RANTLESS SEARCH OF PETI-
TIONER'S MOTEL ROOM, MANY
HOURS AFTER PETITIONER
HAD ARRESTED AND
TAKEN FROM THE ROOM, WAS
ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE AT
TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF
PETITIONER'S FOURTH
AMENDMENT RIGHTS AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES, AND THE DECI-
SION OF THIS COURT IN
MINCEY V. ARIZONA, 437
U.S. 385 AND STONER V.
(1964).

THE COURT'S ERROR IN
GIVING THE JEWELL IN-
STRUCTION, WHICH THE
NINTH CIRCUIT HELD ERRON-
EOUSLY INVITED THE JURY
TO FIND THAT PETITIONER
WAS IN CONSTRUCTIVE POS-
SESSION OF THE HEROIN
POSSESSED BY AMBRIZ, AND
REQUIRED REVERSAL OF HIS
CONVICTION OF COUNT II,
PERMEATED THE JURY'S
FINDING OF GUILT ON COUNT
I, AND DENIED PETITIONER
HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT
IN DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

iv.

Page

39

53

CONCLIIS ION
APPENDIX "A"

OPINION, UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT, FILED MARCH 15, 1982

APPENDIX "B"

ORDER, UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIR-
CUIT, FILED MAY 21, 1982

APPENDIX "C"

ORDER DENYING REHEARING,
UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIR-
CUIT, FILED JULY 26, 1982

APPENDIX “D*

SUPERSEDING OPINION, UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT, FILED
JULY 26, 1982

APPENDIX "E"

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR
REHEARING AND SUGGESTION FOR
REHEARING EN BANC, UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT, FILED
SEPTEMBER 20, 1982

v.

Rage

Agnello v. United States
269 U.S. 20 (1925)

Arellanes v. United States
302 F.2d 603
(9th Cir. 1962)

Chapman v. California
386 U.S. 18,
87 &.Ct. 824,
17 L.Bd.2d 705

Chapman v. United States
365 U.S. 610 (1961)

Chimel v. California
395 U.S. 752,
89 S.Ct. 2034,
23 L.B4.24 685 (1969)

Eng Fung Jem v. United States
281 F.2d 803
(9th Cir. 1960)

Jeffers v. United States
342 U.S. 48 (1951)

Johnson v. United States
333 U.S. 1068,
92 L.Ed. 436 (1948)
Jones v. United States
357 U.S. 493 (1958)

vi.

46

47

57

48

46

48

46

Mincey v. Arizona
537 U.S. 385

Silverstone Lumber Co. v.
United States
251 U.S. 385 (1920)

Stoner v. California
376 U.S. 483 (1964)

United States v. Agapito
620 F.2d 324
(24 Cir. 1979)

United States v. Batimana
623 F.2d 1366
(9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 499 U.S.
1038 (1980)

United States v. Camacho
528 F.2d 464
(9th Cir. 1976)

United States v. Erwin
625 F.2d 838
(9th Cir. 1980)

United States v. Gardner
627 F.2d 906
(9th Cir. 1980)

United States v. Jewell
532 F.2d 911

United States v. Mapp

476 F.2d 67
(2nd Cir. 1973)

vii.

45

i, 39-41
45, 46, 48

40, 42, 43

48

54

42

i, 36, 38
53, 54, 56-58

46

United States v. Maretta-Bejanno
552 F.2d 1323
(9th Cir. 1977)

United States v. Valle Valdez
554 F.2d 911

Vaccaro v. United States
461 F.2d 626
(5th Cir. 1972)
Vale v. Louisiana
399 U.S. 30,
90 S.Ct. 1969 (1970)

Weeks v. United States
232 U.S. 383 (1914)

tatutes

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)

Rules

Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, Rule 29

viii.

57

50, 51

45

6, 36

Constitution

United States Constitution:
4th Amendment
5th Amendment

ix.

i, 4
ii, 3, 53

In THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1982

RAFAEL ASTORGA-TORRES ,
Petitioner,
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

The petitioner, RAFAEL ASTORGA-
TORRES, respectfully prays that a Writ
of Certiorari issue to review the judg-
ment and opinion of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
entered in this proceeding on July 26,
1982.

A Petition for Rehearing was denied
and the suggestion for Rehearing en banc
was rejected by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Winth Circuit on
September 20, 1982.

OPINIONS BELOW

A copy of the Winth Circuit Court of
Appeals original opinion filed on
March 15, 19862, is attached as Appendix
"A". The order of the Court of Appeals
requesting Appellants’ specific response
to Appellees’ Petition for Rehearing is
attached as Appendix "B". The order of
the Court of Appeals denying Rehearing,
withdrawing the March 15, 1982, opinion
and superseded by the July 26, 1982,
Opinion is attached as Appendix "c".
This superseding opinion is attached as
Appendix "DD". Lastly, the order of the

Court of Appeals denying Appellants‘
Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion
for Rehearing en banc is attached as
Appendix “E".

JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit became final when
the Petition for Rehearing was denied
and Suggestion for Rehearing en banc was
rejected on September 20, 1982. This
Court's jurisdiction is invoked under

Title 28, United States Code, §1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Fifth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion provides in pertinent part:

"[No person shall] be deprived of

life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law..."

3.

The Fourth Amendrainc to the Constitu-
tion provides in pertinent part:

"The right of the people to be

secure in their persons, houses,

papers and effects, against un-

reasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, ..."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On June 19, 1980, a federal grand
jury for the Eastern District of Cali-
fornia indicted defendants, Jose Inez
Ambriz-Ambriz (hereinafter referred to
as Ambriz), petitioner Rafael Astorga-
Torres, (hereinafter referred to as
Rafael), and Jesus Torres-Torres (here-
inafter referred to as Jesus).
Petitioner Rafael was charged in four
counts:
(1) That commencing on or about June
11, 1980 he conspired to distribute

heroin.

4.

(2) Count Two (2) of the indictment
charged the petitioner with possession
with intent to distribute heroin on or
about June ll, 1980.

(3) Count Three (3) of the indict-
ment charged the petitioner with assult
on federal officers with a deadly wea-
pon.

(4) Count Four (4) of the indictment
charged petitioner with the unlawful
carrying of a firearm during the commis-
sion of a felony.

On June 23, 1989, petitioner Rafael
and Jesus entered pleas of not guilty to
all counts of the indictment. At a
later date, prior to the trial, co-
defendant Ambriz entered a guilty plea
to the indictment.

On August 22, 1980, petitioner's

Motion to Supress Evidence was denied.

Prior to trial the court conducted a
hearing to rule on the admissibility of
evidence found in the septic tank and
ruled that the evidence was admissible.

Throughout the jury trial the peti-
tioner made timely objections to the
admissibility of certain evidence and
testimony.

On November 24, 1980, at the close of
the government's case, petitioner made a
motion for judgment of acquittal pur-
suant to Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which motion was
denied. (Reporter's Transcript [R.T.]
1367.)

On November 24, 1980, the Court ruled
on the use of various jury instructions
to which the petitioner made timely

objections.

On November 25, 1980, the jury found
the petitioner guilty as charged in all
counts of the indictment.

On January 19, 1981, petitioner was
sentenced to the custody of the Attorney
General on Counts I and II and to a
concurrent period of twelve years with a
six year special parole term, and on
Counts III and IV to a concurrent period
of three years, to run consecutive to
Counts I and II. The petitioner was
therefore sentenced to a total period of
fifteen yeurs.

On January 19, 1981, petitioner filed
a Notice of Appeal to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals.

On March 15, 1982, a panel of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
petitioner's conviction of Counts I and

7.

II and remanded the case for a new
trial.

On March 27, 1982, the government
filed a Petition for Rehearing and Sug-
gestion for Rehearing en banc.

_ On May 21, 1982, a panel of the Ninth
Circuit directed petitioner to respond
to the issue of whether a certain state-
ment was inadmissible hearsay.

On July 26, 1982, the same three
judge panel of the Ninth Circuit ex-~-
pressly reversed its own opinion of
March 15, 1982. The court withdrew its
March 15, 1982 opinion, affirmed peti-
tioner's conviction of Counts I, III and
IV and reversed petitioner's conviction
of Count II.

On August 12, 1982, petitioner filed
a Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion
for Rehearing en banc.

On September 20, 1982, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals denied this
Petition and rejected the Suggestion for

Rehearing en banc.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

I. Motion To Supress

On August 22, 1980, the Court heard
petitioner's Motion to Supress. The
government admitted that there was no
search warrant obtained for the search
of the motel room.

The testimony at the hearing demon-
strated that on May 3, 1980, and May 14,
1980, Ambriz, by himself, made hand-to-
hand sales of heroin to government
agents (R.T. 173-175).

On June 10, 1980, Ambriz told under-
cover agent Delgado that he was going to

make another sale of heroin to him on

June 11, 1980, and that he may bring
some guards (R.T. 176). It was, in
effect, stipulated that the source of
the heroin to Ambriz was an “old man"
from Sinoloa, Mexico and therefore not
the defendant Jesus or petitioner Rafael
(R.T. 194-195).

On June 11, 1980, government agents
conducted a surveillance of Ambriz's
residence in South Gate, California.
Agent Quander testified that on the
morning of June 11, 1980, he observed
Ambriz alone drive his green Mustang
from his residence to the Weatherby Gun
Shop and back twice (R.T. 32, 33.). He
was then seen driving to a hardware
store and back to his residence alone,
He was observed leaving his residence
again and was lost in traffic. The
officers next saw him driving his

10.

Mustang with a passenger identified as
defendant Torres. They went to a park-
ing lot near a 7-1l store where they
parked. Rafael went over to a blue
Camero where he met Jesus. Rafael and
Jesus took the Camero and got gas.
Ambriz was seen going into the Tri City
Gun Shop and purchasing some shells.
Later the two cars, with Ambriz in the
green Mustang and Rafael and and Jesus
in the Camero, were observed driving up
Interstate 5 to Tulare County.

Agent Quander testified that at this
point they did not have probable cause
to obtain an arrest or search warrant
(RL. 43).

Agent Plavan testified that at around
3:00 p.m. on June 11, 1980, the Mustang
and the Camero pulled into the parking
lot of the Sky Ranch Motel in Tulare

ll.

(R.T. 47-48). Ambriz checked into Room
7 and Jesus and Rafael checked into Room
4. Rafael was seen taking a paper bag
out of the Camero and bringing it into
Room 4, then bringing it back out to the
Camero, and then back into Room 4 (R.T.
47).

Agent Delgado testified that Ambriz
called them and told him that he was
staying in Room 7 (R.T. 178). He testi-
fied that the plan was that he would
test the heroin in Room 7 (R.T. 178).

Agent Plavan testified that just
prior to 5:00 p.m. he went to the motel
office and told Mr. Raga, the manager/
owner, that they were investigating a
narcotics case (R.T. 49-50). At that
time he obtained the manager's consent
to enter Rooms 4 and 7 (R.T. 51, 132).

12.

Agent Delgado testified that about
5:00 p.m. he met Ambriz alone in the
parking lot of the motel. He asked
Ambriz where the heroin was and Ambriz
told him it was in his room (Room 7).
Ambriz went to room 7 and came out with
a bag, showed him the heroin, and Del-
gado walked to his car, ostensibly to
get the money (R.T. 180). Agent Delgado
then took off his hat which was the pre-
arranged arrest signal, and Ambriz was
arrested and taken into custody outside
the motel in the parking lot (R.T. 182).

At this point cgeveral (which at trial
it was determined to be approximately
15) state and federal officers converged
on Room 4, banging on the door and yell-
ing in Spanish and English that they
were federal police (R.T. 52). About
thirty seconds later an officer thought

13.

he heard a clicking sound of a gun in-
side the room. They immediately kicked
in the door, and a gun battle ensued
(R.T. 52-54). After approximately ten
minutes a tear gas canister was shot at
the room and the officers observed the
weapons being thrown out of the room
(R.T. 55). The petitioner Rafael came
out of the room with his hands up (R.T.
55). He had been seriously wounded in
the gun battle. He came out, laid face
down on the pavement, was arrested and
was taken into custody in the parking
lot outside the motel room (R.T. 55, 65,
88). Thereafter, Jesus crawled out of
the motel room and collapsed on the
pavement. He was arrested and taken
into custody in the parking lot (R.T.
55, 56, 65.). Jesus was seriously in-

jured in the gun battle (R.T. 88, 156).

14.

It should be noted that at trial it was
shown that the officers feared that
Jesus was going to die (R.T. 345-346).
Both were secured and subsequently taken
to a hospital for emergency care.

Agent Plavan testified that he ar-
rested Jesus and Rafael for distribution
of heroin and conspiracy to distribute
heroin based upon the information that
they had been "involved" with Ambriz in
the Los Angeles area (R.T. 65).

Agent Delgado testified that they had
been advised that there were only three
suspects total -- Ambriz, Jesus and
Rafael (R.T. 197).

Agent Plavan testified that after he
arrested and secured Jesus and Rafael,
in the parking lot outside of the hotel,
that he entered Room 4 (R.T. 84). As he
entered the room Agent Hendrix yelled to

15.

him that all was clear (R.T. 95). He
testified that as he understood it,
Agent Hendrix had preceded him and had
secured the room (R.T. 84). It should
be noted that at the trial in this mat-
ter Agent Hendrix testified that he had
gone into Room 4 and found that there
was no one in there and that he said it
was secure (R.T. 366, 954).

Agent Plavan then entered the hotel
room which he described as being one
large room and a bath (R.7. 61). He
testified that he visually inspected the
main room, walked into the bathroom and
heard and saw water running full in the
sink. At that time he inspected the
toilet bowl and found torn papers, docu-
ments and currency. These documents
included the drivers’ iicenses of Rafael

and Jesus, a wallet and miscellaneous

16.

money and pictures. He reached into the
toilet bowl and put the documents on top
of the tollet (R.T. 56). He testified
that he did not seize anything at that
time (R.T. 90).

Much later that night, without any
warrant, the agents returned to the room
and searched it and seized the documents
in the bathroom and photographed the
room (R.T. 191). The next day the
agents obtained a search warrant for the
automobiles and found nothing (R.T. 101-
102, 192).

At the conclusion of the hearing the
petitioner's Motion to Suppress the
documents found in the toilet bowl in
Room 4 was denied. The court stated
that it denied the motion on the grounds
that the manager consented to the search

17.

and that it was incident to the arrest
of the appellants (R.T. 214).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the denial of petitioner's Motion
to Suppress (Appendix "D", Op. at p.
4). The Court found that Agent Plavan's
initial warrantless entry into the motel
room was proper (Op. at p. 4). The
Court reasoned that this entry was jus-
tified as a protective search for addi-
tional dangerous persons, to guard
against threat of fire created by the
tear gas canister and to prevent des-
truction of evidence (Op. at p. 5).
Further, the agents could later return
without a warrant to retrieve the docu-
ments seized from the toilet during the
earlier "justifed" entry, because “there
was no further prejudicial intrusion

upon [petitioner's] privacy, especially

18.

in light of [his] ciear abandonment of
the seized items." (Op. at p.6.)

II. The Triv«

The government's theory of the case
was that Ambriz had brought fifteen (15)
ounces of heroin with him to the motel,
that he delivered seven (7) ounces to
Agent Delgado and left the other eight
(8) ounces with Jesus and Rafael in Room
4. Further, that Jesus and Rafael ini-
tiated a gun battle with the agents for
the purpose of destroying the contraband
and flushed the "“missing" eight (8)
ounces down the toilet.

The government offered the following
evidence in an effort to prove that
Jesus and Rafael actually possessed the
eight (8) ounces of heroin which Ambriz

19.

was supposed to, but did not, deliver on
June ll.

Ambriz had told the Agent Delgado
that he would sell him fifteen (15)
ounces of heroin on June 11 at $3,300.00
per ounce for $49,500.00.

On June 10 he told Delgado that he
would bring guards with him (R.T. 190-
210.) but that the transaction would be
with him alone (R.T. 198-199). However
on June 11 he handed Agent Delgado a bag
containing only 7 condoms each holding
one (1) ounce of heroin (R.T. 239-242).
A motel brochure was found in Room 7
with the figures seven (7) times thirty-
three (33) and at the bottom a total of
$49,500.00 (R.T. 1072-1076, 705-745).

These numbers corresponded to the
volume Agent Delgado was to receive and
the price he was to pay on June 11.

20.

The evidence against petitioner at
most showed that he was associated with
Ambriz but in no way supported that he
knew Ambriz possessed heroin or
possessed it himself. The only evidence
regarding the petitioner was that he was
observed briefly speaking with a lady
and Ambriz in the yard of the Ambriz
residence on May 14, 1980 (R.T. 397) and
that he drove up to the Sky Ranch Motel
with Ambriz and Jesus on June 11, 1980,
and checked into Room 4 with Jesus. All
of the drug transactions and conversa-
tions were with and by Ambriz alone.

As the trial court observed there was
no proof prior to June ll that a con-
spiracy existed, i.e. that anyone other
than Ambriz was knowingly involved in
the sale of the heroin. Further, as the
trial court noted, the evidence at the

21.

end of the government's case at most

suggested that on June 10, a conspiracy
was about to be formed because of
Ambriz's June 10 statement that he was
going to bring guards with him (R.T.
1283-1286). Ambriz repeatedly stated
that the transaction was to be with him
alone (R.T. 198-199, 212).

A vast majority of the testimony
during the three week trial related to
the May 3 and May 14 heroin transactions
between Ambriz and the agents prior to
June 11, 1980. These events occurred
prior to the alleged date of the con-
spiracy, without any demonstrated invol-
vement or presence of the petitioner.
Over petitioner's objection, the Court
admitted into evidence the heroin pur-
chased from Ambriz on May 3, May 14 and
June 11 and denied petitioner's motion

22.

to strike testimony regarding the acts
and declarations of aAmbriz prior to
June 11 (R.T. 1269, 1322).

Agent Delgado testified that on
May 3, 1980, he and Agent Camarena met
with Ambriz alone and had a conversation
with him in which they purchased an
ounce of heroin from him for $3,350.00
(R.T. 173-175). He testified that at
that time he told Ambriz that if they
liked the heroin they “would get in
contact with him, and probably order up
some more." (R.T. 175.) The condom of
heroin he received on May 3, 1980, was
identified by the witness (R.T. 176).

Agent Delgado testified that after
May 3, 1980, 2 had additional conversa-
tions with Ambriz (R.T. 178). He testi-
fied that on May 14, 1980, he purchased

two ounces of heroin from Ambriz alone

23.

for a total of Sixty-six Hundred Dollars
($6,600.00) (R.T. 178). He then identi-
fied the heroin purchased on that date
(R.T. 179).

He testified that between May 14 and
June 11, 1980, he had several conversa-
tions with Ambriz negotiating the deli-
very of heroin (R.T. 183). He testified
that they spoke about the purchace of
thirty ounces of heroin for $99,000.00
(R.T. 183-184).

The conrt agreed with the petitioner
that the statements or conduct of Ambriz
made prior to the formation of the al-
leged conspiracy were not admissible
against petitioner (R.T. 1288-1289).
Further, that there was no way the pro-
secutor could tie Jesus or Rafael to the
May 3 transaction (R.T. 1288-1289). The
court ultimately ruled that the evidence

24.

was admissible against Jesus and Rafael
on the grounds that it was relevant to
the case and that it tended to establish
a “course of conduct" by Ambriz (R.T.
1327). Accordingly, the Court gave a
limiting instruction (R.T. 1498-1501).

The government's comments during
argument on the admissibility of
Ambriz's conduct and statements reveal
that without this evidence “all [the
government had] is seven ounces of
heroin and some heroin found in condoms
in the septic tank." (R.T. 1291, lines
16-19; see below.)

The prosecutor argued that the acts
and declarations of aAmbriz prior to
June ll, 1980, were necessary to prove
that “Jesus and Rafael were members of
the conspiracy to distribute heroin on
June 11, that Jesus and Rafael were in

possession of heroin with the intent to
distribute it, and that Jesus and Rafael
initiated a gun battle with the agents
for the purpose of disposing of the
contraband." (R.T. 1314.)

The government offered the following
evidence to show that Jesus and Rafael
had flushed the “missing" eight (8)
ounces down the toilet.

Approximately two months after the
arrest of Jesus and Rafael, federal
agents pumped out one of the septic
tanks of the motel and found twelve (12)
condoms. Three of these were saved and
admitted into evidence at trial. Two of
the condoms were partially torn and had
knots on the end (R.T. 253-258). The
third condom had some liquid and eub-
stance in it (R.T. 251-252).

The condoms were analyzed and the
partially torn condoms contained no
controlled substance. The one condom
with the substance in it was analyzed
and found to contain heroin of seven
percent (7%) purity (R.T. 842-844). The
heroin seized from Ambriz on June 11 was
found to be fourteen percent (14%) pure
(R.T. 830-837). The chemist testified
that the liquid from the septic tank in
the condom would lower the percentage of
purity of the heroin (R.T. 842).

There were several septic tanks at
the motel and room 4 and other rooms
flushed into the septic tanks where the
evidence was found. Room 7 and other
room flushed into other tanks (R.T.
695).

The evidence showed that the heroin
seized from Ambriz on June 11, 1980, was

27.

tied in Trojan condoms with a date of l-
80, that the two partial condoms found
in the septic tank were Trojan condoms
Gated 12-79 and that the “full condom"
was a Trojan condom but that you could
not read the date. All that could be.
seen was the number 9 (R.T. 844-847).
Mr. Brenner of Young's Rubber Corpora-
tion, who manufacture Trojan condoms,
testified that a Trojan condom dated 12-
79 would probably reach the market by
Pebruary, 1980, but not before December,
1979 (R.T. 641-7).

The documents found in the toilet of
Room 4 were analyzed and the ch<mical
acetylmorphine was found on them _(R.T.
848-849). The chemist testified that
acetymorphine can be formed by the
breaking down cf heroin when mixed with
water (R.T. 852).

Rafael was seen walking out to the
Camero and picking up a brown paper bag
and walking into Room 4 and then back
out to the car with the bag and back
into the room (R.T. 491-496). No brown
paper bag was found in Room 4 (R.T.
1250).

During the trial, this testimony was
thoroughly impeached. The testimony at
trial revealed that by the time the
septic tank was pumped by the agents in
August, 1980, it had not been emptied
for almost a year (R.T. 700). Mr. Raga,
the motel manager, testified that the
eight toilets for Rooms 1, 2, 3, 4, 30,
31, 32 and 33 flush into the subject
septic tank (R.T. 701). He testified
that between the period of January,
1980, and August, 1980, alone the rooms
had been rented out to various people

for two hundred and twenty-one (221)
Gays (R.T. 704). There were times when
people would rent these rooms for only a
few hours and that he gets sort of a
"mixed clientele", charging $18.00 to
$22.00 per night (R.T. 753-755). He
admitted that during this time he had
called the Sheriff's Department to come
out to evict people who were not welcome
there (R.T. 702). He said that during
this ten month period he personally
called the police to his motel to kick
out people three or four times (R.T.
763).

The testimony of Agent Delgado re-
vealed that when he pumped out the tank
in August, 1980, two months after the
arrest of appellants, he found and took
at least twelve other condoms (R.T. 254,
269.). He testifieé that there were

30.

still others that could have gone
through the screen and not been caught
(R.T. 261). He testified that he looked
at these condoms and threw out all but
the three he saved for evidence (R.T.
254). He was not sure if the condoms he
Giscardeé were Trojan condoms and didn't
note the dates of any of them (R.T.
273). He testified that he discarded
them because he did not think they were
important because they were not tied at
the top (R.T. 254). Appellants moved to
dismiss on the grounds of destruction of
evidence and the motion was denied (R.T.
282).

Mr. Brennen of the Young Drug Pro-
ducts Corporation, who manufacture Tro-
jan concvms, testified that his company
manufactured approximately twelve mil-
lion Trojan condoms in December, 1979,

31.

and that twenty percent are distributed
in the west (R.T. 654-663). He testi-
fied that it is possible for a 12-79
condom to reach a retail market after a
January, 1980, condom (R.T. 662).

Mr. James A. Heagy, a forensic chem-
ist for the 0.5. Department of Justice,
Scug Enforcement Administration, was
called by the prosecution (R.T. 830).
He testified that he analyzed some of
the papers which were found in the motel
room toilet and found that there was
very small “trace” of acetylmorphine on
some of the papers (R.T. 850, 873). He
testified that acetylmorphine can be
chemically formed with heroin breaks
down but that he could not say that the
trace of acetylmorphine found on the
paper was from any heroin in the toilet
and could not tell when, or if, the

32.

papers had come in contact with heroin
(R.T. 854). He testified that normally
heroin would break down into acetylmor-
phine quickly, after a period of days it
woul? be all gone, and he did not get
the papers until after the state labora-
tory had analyzed them (R.T. 861).
Stephen John O'Clair of the Califor-
nia Department of Justice, Fresno
Regional Laboratory, testified that he
analyzed the documents on June 20, 1980,
before they went to Mr. Heagy of the
D.E.A (R.T. 879). He testified that he
examined the papers under a stereomicro-
scope looking for any kind of powder
residue and did not find any. He found
some powder residue in the wallet but
the tests he ran were negative for any
drugs. He testified that, in his opin-
ion, if papers were dumped into a toilet

33.

with heroin, it would leave a microsco-
pic residue and that there was none
present on the subject papers when he
examined them (R.T. 889-890).

The state chemist also testified that
when he examined the papeis, he placed
them on a work bench, which, over the
years, had contained heroin and that it
is possible that the fibers of the
papers would have absorbed the heroin on
the work bench (R.T. 893).

It should be noted that although
Agent Plavan testified that he thought
the water in the toilet in Room 4 was
brown when he saw it, Detective Diaz,
who was in charge of the crime scene
investigation and who was assigned the
task of observing, marking and preserv-

ing the evidence, testified that the

34.

water in the toilet was clear (R.T. 522,
1222, 1263).

The government seemed to point out
the fact that the petitioner had been
seen carrying a paper bag into Room 4
and that the bag was not found by the
agents in the room, thereby implying
that it was flushed down the toilet with
the drugs. However, no bag or remnants
of a bag was found in the septic tank.
Agent Diaz did testify that he found
discarded paper bags when he was search-
ing the parking lot area (R.T. 1266).

Agent Rodriguez testified that he is
able to detect the odor of neroin and
that if there was a large amount of
heroin in that room, even if completely
sealed in rubber condoms, he could smell
it as soon as he walked through the door
(R.T. 1155, 1166).

35.

No one testified that they detected
any smell of heroin in Room 4. No one
testified that they saw petitioner at
any time have, hold or dispose of any
heroin. No one testified that they
heard the sound of a flushing toilet
from Room 4 at any time from the time
the officers announced their presence to
the time of the arrest.

The court denied petitioner's motion
for judgment of acquittal pursuant to
Rule 29 as to Counts I - IV (R.T. 1367).

III. Jewell Instruction

Over the objection of the petitioner,
the Court ruled that it would give the
following instruction based upon the
holdings in the cases of United States
v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 911, and United
States v. Valle Valdez, 554 F.2d 911:

36.

"If you find that a defendant now
on trial was not in possession of
the heroin when it was brought to
Tulare County, but you find that
the defendant was present to
guard aAmbriz-Ambriz, you may
still find the defendant guilty
as to the offense charged in
Count II of the Indictment if you
find beyond a reasonable doubt
that, one, the defendant acted
with a conscious purpose to avoid
learning that Ambriz-Ambriz was
going to be selling heroin, and
two, was subjectively aware of a
high probability that Ambriz-
Ambriz was to sell some heroin.
Thus, actual or positive know-
ledge is not necessary to convict
the accused if he was subjec-
tively aware of a high probabil-
ity of the crucial fact, gape
that Ambriz-Ambriz was to sell
some heroin, even though he con-
sciously or deliberately disre-
garded that probability in an
effort to remain ignorant of the
fact." (R.T. 1506.)

The petitioner argued that the in-
struction was not applicable and highly
prejudical since (1) neither appellant
took the stand, and there was no evi-
dence that they ever denied anything;
(2) there was no evidence that pointed

37.

in the direction of deliberate ignor-
ance; and (3) this instruction has not
been applied nor should be applied to
the facts present before this Court
(R.T. 1395-1397).

The Court not only proceeded to give
this instruction to the jury, but empha-
sized its importance by reading the
instruction twice, stating in between
each reading, "I am going to read this
to you again -- because it's -- you've
got to deal with this instruction care-
fully and deliberately.” {(R.T. 1505-
1506.) At the conclusion of the trial
the petitioner was found guilty on all
counts.

The Ninth Circuit found that the
court erred in giving the Jewell in-

struction and this error was far from

38.

harmless. The court reversed peti-
tioner's conviction of Count II (the
substantive possession count), but af-
firmed petitioner's conviction of Count
I (conspiracy to distribute heroin).
(Appendix "D", Op. at p. 10.)

a

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, AND
THE DECISION OF THIS COURT IR
MINCEY V. ARIZOWA, 537 U.S.

365 AND STONER V. CALIFORNIA,
376 U.S. 4863 (1964).

The Winth Circuit erroneously held
that the subsequent search of the peti-

tioner‘'s motel room, without a warrant,

39.

many hours after Jesus' and the peti-
tioner's arrest, was justified on the
theory that the petitioner abandoned the
seized items when arrested (Appendix
"Dp", Op. at p. 6). This holding is
contrary to the overwhelming weight of
authority. See, Eng Fung Jem v. United
States, 281 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1960);
United States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324
(24 Cir. 1979); Mincey v. Arizona, 437
U.S. 385 (1978); Stoner v. California,
376 U.S. 483 (1964).

There is no question that petitioner
had a right to privacy in his motel
room. In Eng Fung Jem v. United States,
supra, state and federal officers con-
ducteé a warrantless search of appel-
lant's motel room and seized the drugs.
In reversing the conviction, the court

stated:

40.

"Surely the guarentee of the
Fourth Amendment may not be conm-
promised by nice distinctions as
to the length of time a defendant
remains as a guest of the hotel
at which he is stopping. The
right of privacy must be accorded
with equal vigor both to tran-

sient hotel sts and to occu-

pants of Tete, permanent

dwellings."

Eng Fung Jem v. United States,

supra, at 805.
It should be noted that this right to
privacy is not forfeited or waived mere-
ly because there was a shootout during a
narcotics raid. See, Mincey v. Arizona,
437 U.S. 285, 391 (1978).

It is well-settled that a person has
a reasonable expectation of privacy in a
motel room that cannot be relinquished
by a motel clerk. Eng Fung Jem v. United

States, supra; Stoner v. California,
supra.

41.

Neither can the search be justified,
as the Ninth Circuit held, as a "“secur-
ity check" in order to insure that no
additional persons or danger was within
(Appendix "D", Op. at p. 5). ‘The police
could not have reasonably believed that
additional dangerous persons were pre-
sent. Cf. United States v. Gardner, 627
F.2d 906, 911 (9th Cir. 1980). Jesus
and Rafael had been under constant sur-
veillance for many hours, the agents
Clearly knew and were in fact advised
that there were only three suspects
involved (Ambriz, Rafael and Jesus)
(R.T. 197), and at no time did the
agents hear or see anyone in the room
other than Jesus and Rafael who, by the
time of entry, were under arrest.

As in United States v. Agapito, 620
P.2d 324, 336 (24 Cir. 1980), the

42.

"security check" exception to the
warrant requirement is inapplicable. In
Agapito, the agents' constant surveil-
lance for two days indicated the room
was empty; the agents at one point
looked through the open door and never
saw or heard anyone in the room other
than the appellants who were under
arrest at the time of the entry.

Moreover, in the present case, Offi-
cer Hendrix had checked the room and
told Agent Plavan that all was clear
before Agent Plavan entered the room.
(R.T. 84, 366, 954) Thus, there was no
reason for Agent Plavan to enter and
search the room.

Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's hold-
ing, Agent Plavan's entry was not rea-
sonable to guard against preserving

evidence from possible destruction. At

43.

the time of the arrest, the officers had
every reason to believe that Ambriz
alone had all the drugs in Room 7.
Ambriz had previously told the agents
that the drugs were in Room 7 and in
fact went to Room 7 to get the drugs.
There was no reason to believe that any
of the drugs were in Room 4.

Petitioner submits that the search
and seizure of evidence in Room 4 did
not fall within any recognized exception

to the warrant requirement.

ARGUMENT
It is well-established that evidence
obtained by a federal officer as a re-
sult of an illegal search and seizure is
inadmissible into evidence in a federal
prosecution. The exclusionary rule

extends to any evidence obtained as a

44.

result of information or leads received
or secured by means of an unreasonable
search and seizure. Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385
(1920); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383 (1914).

It is also settled law that a war-
rantless search can survive constitu-
tional inhibition only upon a showing
that it comes within a recognized excep-
tion to the rule that a search must rest
upon a search warrant; e.g., if the
search is contemporaneous with an arrest
and confined to the vicinity thereof, or
that a search is made with consent. In
our case, since there was no search
warrant, and the burden thus fell upon
the government to establish that the
search falls within some exception to

the warrant requirement. Stoner v.

45.

California, 376 U.S. 483, 486 (1964);
Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493,
499 (1958); United States v. Mapp, 476
F.2d 67 (2nd Cir. 1973); Agnello y¥y.
United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Jef-
fers v. United States, 342 U.S. 48, 51
(1951).

The petitioner respectfully submits
that there was no probable cause to
arrest the petitioner or to search the
bathroom. As set forth in the statement
of facts herein, Agent Quander admitted
that at the time the petitioner was seen
driving to Tulare, they had no probable
cause to arrest him. There was nothing
that the petitioner did subsequent to
that time which would have provided
sufficient cause to arrest him for con-
spiracy to distribute heroin or posses-
sion of heroin. All the petitioner did

46.

was check into motel Room 4 and was seen
carrying a bag into the room. At the
time of the arrest, the officers had
every reason to believe that Ambriz
alone had all the drugs in Room 7 and
there was no reason to believe that any
of the drugs were in Room 4. Ambriz had
previously told the agents that the
drugs were in Room 7 and in fact went to
Room 7 to get the drugs.

At the time the officers attempted to
arrest the petitioner, the only informa-
tion known to them was that the peti-
tioner had been in the company of An-
briz. Mere association with Ambriz and
presence on the scene is not sufficient
to find that they were in possession of
contraband. Arellanes v. United States,
302 F.2d 603, 606 (9th Cir. 1962);

47.

United States v. Camacho, 528 F.2d 464
(9th Cir. 1976).

Should this Court decide, however,
that there was probable cause to arrest
the petitioner, it is well established
that a finding of probable cause cannot
of itself justify a search without a
search warrant. Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 1068, 92 L.Ed. 436
(1948); Eng Func Jem v. United States,
281 F.d 803 (9th Cir. 1960).

Petitioner contends that the trial
court erred in finding that the search
was not justified by the consent of the
motel manager. It is well-settled that
a motel clerk does not have the author-
ity to give consent to a police search
of a guest's room. Stoner v. Califor-
nia, supra, See also, Chapsan v. United
States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961), (landlord

48.

has no authority to consent to search of
tenant's rented premises).

Finally, petitioner respectfully
submits that the search and seizure
cannot be justified as incident to the
lawful errest of petitioner.

In the landmark case of Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034,
23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), the United States
Supreme Court held that a search inci-
dent to a lawful arrest made without a
warrant can extend only to areas within
the defendant's immediate control which
was construed to mean the area from
which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence. The
court clearly stated in that case that
there is no justification for searching
rooms other than that in which the ar-

rest occurred pursuant to the arrest.

49.

In Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 90
§.Ct. 1969 (1970), the court held that a
“search may be incident to an arrest
‘only if it is substantially contempor-
aneous with the arrest and is confined
to the immediate vicinity of the ar-
rest'".

In Vale, the appellant was arrested
on the front steps of the premises imme-
diately after the arresting officers had
observed a sale of narcotics. The court
held that a warrantless search of the
house was illegal and cou!’ not be jus-
tified as a search incident to an ar-
rest, stating that if the search is to

be upheld as incident to the arrest, the

arrest must take place inside the house,
not somewhere outside -- whether two

blocks away, twenty feet away or on the

sidewalk near the front steps. The

search must be constitutionally confined
to the area within the arrestee's reach
at the time of his arrest. Vale v.
Louisiana, supra, citing Chimel v. Cali-
fornia, supra.

In the matter before this Court, both
Jesus and Rafael were arrested outside
of the motel room in the parking lot.
They had been seriously wounded, were
totally secured and in custody in the
parking lot before the officers entered
the motel room. Although the officers
knew there were only two possible sus-
pects that had been in the room, Officer
Hendrix secured the room and advised
Agent Plavan that all was clear. It was
only after all was secured that Agent
Plavan went into the motel room and
discovered the documents in the toilet.

Even then, he did not seize the

51.

evidence. It was not until approxi-
mately midnight that night, long after
both Jesus and Rafael were in custody at
the hospital, did the agents go back
into the motel room and seize the docu-
ments. This search and seizure, without
warrant, can hardly be said to have
occurred contemporaneously with the
arrest of petitioner and Jesus in an
area within their immediate control.

The petitioner respectfully contends
that there was no reason why the offi-
cers should not have been required to
obtain a warrant.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the
motion to suppress should have been

granted.

II.

gee
ot
i!
:

as
a
:
;

The Ninth Circuit agreed with peti-
tioner that the trial court erred in
giving the Jewell instruction. The
district court twice instructed the jury
as follows:

"If you find that a defendant now
on trial was not in possession of
the heroin when it was brought to
Tulare County, but you fi that
the defendant was present to
guard aAmbriz-Ambriz, you may
still find the defendant guilty
as to the offense charged in
Count II of ‘She Indictment if you
find beyond a reasonable doubt
that, one, the defendant acted
with a conscious purpose to avoid
learning that Ambriz-Ambriz was

53.

going to be voy pe | heroin, and
two, was subjectively aware of a
high probability that Ambriz-
Ambriz was to sell some heroin.
Thus, actual or positive know-
ledge is not necessary to convict
the accused if he was subjec-
tively aware of a high probabil--
ity of the crucial fact, namely,
that Ambriz-Ambriz was to sell
some heroin, even though he con-
sciously or deliberately disre-
garded that probability in an
effort to remain ignorant of the
fact." (R.T. 1506.)

The Ninth Circuit properly found that
the Jewell instruction was not appro-
priate in this case where the petitioner
did not claim lack of knowledge and no
facts pointed in the direction of deli-
berate ignorance. (Op. at.p.9); United
States v. Erwin, 625 F.2d 838 (9th Cir.
1980); United States v. Maretta-Bejanno,
552 F.2d 1323, 1325 (9th Cir. 1977).
The Ninth Circuit articulated the pre-
judice suffered in this case.

"A given here, the instruction

invited the jury, if unable to

54.

conclude that appellants had been
in actual possession of the eight
ounces of heroin, to find that
they were in constructive posses-
sion of the seven ounces pos-
sessed by Ambriz. To find such
constructive possession, the
instruction required the jury to
find only that appellants knew,
or should have known, that Ambriz
had heroin he planned to sell.
Yet we have held that ‘'(m)ere
proximity to the druc, mere pre-
sence, or mere association with
the person who does control the
drug is insufficient to support a
finding of possession."

United States v. Batimana, 623
F.2d 1366, 1369 (9th Cir.) cert.
denied, 499 U.S. 1038 (1980).

Because the government's case as to the
actual possession was not without its
elements of doubt, the court's error in
instructing the jury as to constructive
possession was far from harmless.

The court emphasized the inetruction
by repeating it twice and telling the
jury, "You've got to deal with this
instruction carefully and deliberately."

(R.T. 1505-1506.) It was the only in-
struction which the court read twice.

The Ninth Circuit found that this
error required reversal of Count II (the
substantive possession count).

Petitioner contends, as he did before
the Ninth Circuit, that the prejudicial
error of the Jewell instruction not only
permeated Count II of the Indictment
(the substantive possession count) but
also must, of necessity, have permeated
the finding of guilt on the conspiracy
charge (Count I) since petitioner's
knowing possession was, by the prosecu-
tor's own admission, an integral part of
the conspiracy charge.

It is well-settled that errors in-
volving an instruction which states an
unconstitutional presumption are “harm-

ful per se”. See, Vaccaro v. United

States, 461 F.2€ 626 at 635 (5th Cir.
1972). “When a jury is instructed in an
unconstitutional presumption, the con-
viction must be overturned, though there
was le evitence rt from the e-
sumption to sustain the verdict." Chap-
man v. California, 386 U.S. 18, at 44,

87 S.Ct. 824 at 838, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 at
721-722; Vaccaro v. United States,
supra, at 635 (emphasis in original).

In the matter before this Court, the
Ninth Circuit properly found that the
Jewell instruction erroneously allowed
the jury to presume that the petitioner
was in constructive possession of the
heroin possessed by Ambriz. Based upon
this clear error, the Court reversed the
possession count. The Cuurt admits that
there was doubt in the government's case

57.

as to any actual possession by the Peti-
tioner. Under these circumstances, it
is inconceivable that the jury could not
have relied upon their erroneous finding
of constructive possession in finding
the petitioner guilty of conspiring with
Ambriz to possess the heroin as alleged
in Count I.

Both the trial court and the prosecu-
tor acknowledged that the Jewell in-
struction applied to Count I as well as
to Count II and that the jury could rely
on it to find guilt as to both counts
(R.T. 1414, 1415). This Court cannot be
assured that the jury did not decide
Count II first and then after having
used erroneous criteria to find posses-
sion did not use the finding of joint
possession to conclude that the Peti-
tioner had also conspired to possess and

distribute the heroin, This monumental
error as well would require a reversal
of the judgment on Count I.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, a Writ
of Certiorari should issue to review the
judgment and opinion of the Ninth Cir-

cuit.

Respectfully submitted,
ALVIN S. MICHAELSON

Attorney for Petitioner
RAFAEL ASTORGA-TORRES

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_1048%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
