# Appendix — O'Connor v. Nevada

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1982
- **Citation:** 459 U.S. 1071

## Text

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DENNIS O’CONNOR,
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) No, 81-5423

vs, ) (D.C. No. CV-80-76,
) RDF)
STATE OF NEVADA, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees. )

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada

Roger D. Foley, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 5, 1982

BEFORE: WALLACE and CANBY, Curcuit Judges, and
EAST,* District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

O’Connor appeals a dismissal of his civil rights actions
brought against the State of Nevada, several of its agencies,
Churchill County District Attorney Hill, and Fallon Munici-
pal Court Judge Teurman. O’Connor alleged various viola-
tions of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C.§§
1983, 1985 and 1986, as well as various constitutional amen-
dments and provisions. The district court granted motions to
dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(1) and (6) as to all
defendants. The essential facts can be found in the district
court’s opinion. O’Connor v. State of Nevada, 507 F. Supp.
$46 (D. Nev. 1981) (O’Connor). We affirm.

As to the dismissal of suit against Judge Teurman and
District Attorney Hill, we agree with the district court that
Judge Teurman, as a witness in a state judicial proceeding,
and District Attorney Hill, as a state prosecutor, are both

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absolutely immune from civil rights suits. O’Connor, supra,
507 F. Supp. at 548-50. O’Connor also suggests that besides
Judge Teurman’s participation as a witness in the state judi-
cial proceeding, his handling of O’Connor’s prior municipal
court action violated his constitutional rights. Clearly,
though, Judge Teurman is immune from civil rights suits for
judicial acts not taken in the absence of all jurisdiction.
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 (1978); Rankin v.
Howard, 633 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 939 (1981).

O’Connor alleged that the State of Nevada denied him
his rights under the seventh and fourteenth amendments by
requiring a deposit for a civil jury trial pursuant to Rule 38
of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure. O’Connor sought
injunctive relief and damages for these alleged constitutional
violations. The district judge dismissed the action on the
basis that the seventh amendment right to jury trial in civil
cases does not apply in state court. O’Connor, supra, 507 S.
Supp. at 548.

It was error for the district court to decide this issue. It
is clear that under the eleventh amendment a state or its
agencies cannot be sued in federal court without its consent.
Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); Mills Music,
Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1979). Nevada has
explicitly refused to waive its immunity to suit under the
eleventh amendment. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.031(3). The
Supreme Court has made it clear that section 1983 does not
constitute an abrogation of the eleventh amendment im-
munity of the states. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338-41
(1979). The district court should have dismissed the claims
against the State on the basis of the eleventh amendment.

The district court also granted a motion to dismiss on
behalf of the State Bar of Nevada. The district court
reasoned that the state bar is the investigative arm of the
Supreme Court of Nevada, charged with investigating and
disciplining the legal profession of the state, and as such an

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agency, it too is immune from suit in federal court under the
eleventh amendment. O’Connor, supra, 507 F. Supp. at 550.
We agree. Ginter v. State Bar of Nevada, 625 F.2d 829 (9th
Cir. 1980) (per curiam).

The Supreme Court of Nevada and the Third Judicial
District Court of Nevada, as agencies of the state, were also
properly dismissed from suit on eleventh amendment groun-
ds. O’Connor, supra, 507 F. Supp. at.550-51.

AFFIRMED.

* Honorable William G. eee ee ee en Se Dis-
trict of Oregon, sitting by designation.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEVADA

DENNIS L. O’CONNOR,

)
Plaintiff,
we. ) Civil LV 80-76 RDF
STATE OF NEVADA, et al.,
Defendants. )
ORDER RE MOTIONS

Plaintiff’s pro se complaint alleges that various agencies
and public officials of the State of Nevada, the City of Fal-
Jurisdiction of this Court arises under Title 28, U.S.C. §
1331 and Title 28, U.S.C., § 1343. Plaintiff institutes this ac-
tion under Title 42, U.S.C., §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986, and Ar-
ticle I, Section 9, and the First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

MOTIONS BEFORE THIS COURT

Defendants State Bar of Nevada, the Nevada Supreme
Court, the Third Judicial District Court of Nevada, Church-
ill County District Attorney John Hill, and Fallon Municipal
Court Judge William Teurman filed motions to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pur-
suant to Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. De-
fendant State of Nevada filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)
and Rule 12(b)(6), FRCP. Plaintiff filed a motion to strike
defendant State of Nevada’s motion to dismiss.

Defendants Nevada Supreme Court, the Third Judicial
District Court, and the State Bar of Nevada have also filed

Sa
motions for a protective order to stay discovery. In return,
the plaintiff has filed a motion to compel responses to in-
terrogatories from defendants Nevada Supreme Court, the
Third Judicial District Court, and the State Bar of Nevada.
Plaintiff has also filed a motion to enlarge the time for
notice of discovery.

This Court recognizes that pro se complaints are to be
held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings draf-
ted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct.
594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972), reh. denied, 405 U.S. 948, 92
S.Ct. 963, 30 L.Ed.2d 819 (1973). Also, that pleadings in
civil rights suits are to be liberally construed. Roberts v.
Acres, 495 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1974). This Court will not give a
complete factual summary because not all of the defendents
have filed motions with this Court. Instead, the relevant
alleged facts will be given concerning each motion.

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANT
STATE OF NEVADA’S MOTION TO DISMISS

The plaintiff moved, pursuant to Rule 12(f) and Rule 8,
FRCP, to strike defendant State of Nevada’s motion to
dismiss allegedly because the case authority relied upon by
the State of Nevada to support its motion had recently been
overturned by the United States Supreme Court. However, a
Rule 12(f) motion to strike only concerns striking matters
from pleadings and a motion to dismiss is not a pleading.
C.F. Hanraty v. Ostertag, 470 F.2d 1096 (10th Cir. 1972);
Rule 7(a), FRCP. Therefore, the plaintiff’s motion to strike
is hereby denied.

MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY
DEFENDANT STATE OF NEVADA

Plaintiff alleges that defendant State of Nevada denied
him his rights under the Seventh and Fourteenth Amen-
dments by requiring a deposit for a civil jury trial pursuant
to Rule 38 of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff

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prays for an order to show cause why the State of Nevada
should not honor the Seventh Amendment to the United
States Constitution and for $500,000 in general damages and
$500,000 in punitive damages. Defendant State of Nevada
moves for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is a basic tenet of constitutional law that the Seventh
Amendment guaranty of a jury trial in civil cases is not an
element of due process applicable to the state courts through
the Fourteenth Amendment. Woods v. Holy Cross Hospital,
$91 F.2d 1164 at 1171 (Sth Cir. 1979), n.12 Olesen v. Trust
Company of Chicago, 2A5 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1957).. The
motion to dismiss of the State of Nevada is hereby granted.

MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY
DEFENDANT JUDGE WILLIAM TEURMAN
Plaintiff alleges in his fourth, fifth, eighth and tenth

causes of action that Judge William Teurman conspired with
the City of Fallon and the Third District Court to deny him
his Sixth, Eighth, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. Plaintiff prays for a judgment of $500,000 in general
damages and $500,000 in punitive damages.

The factual basis for his claims is somewhat confusing.
Plaintiff was apparently arrested on August 2, 1978, by
police officers of the City of Fallon. Plaintiff was later con-
victed in Fallon Municipal Court where Judge Teurman was
presiding. Plaintiff exercised his right of appeal by having a
trial de novo in the Third District Court. NRS 177.015.
Plaintiff alleges that his constitutional rights were violated
when Judge Teurman appeared as a witness for the prosecu-
tion.

Judge Teurman filed a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to
Rule 12(6)(6), FRCP. Courts have held that witnesses in
state judicial proceedings are to be given absolute immunity

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from suits under the Civil Rights Acts or under a Bivens type
remedy.' Myers v. Bull, 599 F.2d 863 (8th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 901, 100 S.Ct. 213 (1980); Blevins v. Ford,
$72 F.2d 1336, 1338 (9th Cir. 1978); Burke v. Miller, 580
F.2d 108, 109-10 (4th Cir. 1978); Taylor v. Nichols, 558
F.2d 561, 564 (10th Cir. 1977); Brawer v. Horowitz, 535
F.2d 830, 836-37 (3rd Cir. 1976). Therefore, defendant
Judge Teurman’s motion to dismiss is hereby granted.

DEFENDANT JOHN HILL’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff alleges that Churchill County District Attorney
John Hill wilfully and negligently failed to investigate two
criminal complaints filed by the plaintiff and his wife against
the Fallon City Attorney and the stenographer of the Third
District Court of Nevada for obstruction of justice. Plaintiff
alleges that John Hill is conspiring to deny plaintiff his Four-
teenth Amendment right to due process and equal protection
of the laws. Plaintiff prays for $500,000 in general damages,
$500,000 in punitive damages, and an order to show cause
why the District Attorney should not conduct an investiga-
tion of the charges filed by the plaintiff. Defendant District
Attorney John Hill filed a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6), FRCP.

It has long been held that a prosecutor is absolutely im-
mune from civil rights suits for activities allegedly committed
while in the course and scope of his employment and duties
as a prosecuting attorney. Jmbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). The question of
whether the failure to initiate prosecution could lead to
award of damages in a civil rights action was specifically ad-
dressed in Raitport v. Provident Nat. Bank, 451 F. Supp.
$22, 528 (E.D. Pa. 1978). The Court held:

“*[T]hat the decision to approve or disapprove a pri-
vate criminal complaint fits squarely within the
broader function of ‘initiating a prosecution,’ and

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therefore it cannot subjeci 2 prosecutor to civil liabil-
ity for damages under section 1983 . . . It would be
anomalous to hold that because /*abier spoke only of
‘initiating a prosecution,’ the prosecutor who ap-
proves a complaint is subject so civil liability for dam-
ages . . . Just as the prosecutor who initiates a crimi-
nal case requires protection from the defendant who
‘transform{s] his resentment at being prosecuted into
the ascription of improper and malicious actions to
the State’s advocate.’ Jmbler, supra, 424 U.S. at 425, ©
96 S. Ct. at 992, so the prosecutor who concludes
that prosecution is unwarranted requires protection
from the complainant whose excessive zeal for invok-
ing the criminal process blinds him to any aspects of
the case that counsel against prosecution.”’ Id.
Therefore, plaintiff’s civil rights claims against District At-
torney John Hill are dismissed as to damages.

The prayer for equitable relief presents a more difficult
question. It has long been held that prosecutors are natural
targets for injunctive suits since they are state officers who
are threatening to enforce and who are enforcing the law.
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54
(1975); Boyd v. Adams, 513 F.2d 83 (7th Cir. 1975). How-
ever, this case does not involve a situation in which a
prosecutor is threatening to enforce an unconstitutional stat-
ute. Instead, the plaintiff is asking this Court to order the
Churchill County District Attorney to conduct an in-
vestigation.

It has been held that federal district courts cannot order
a United States Attorney to conduct an investigation or initi-
ate a prosecution because it would violate the doctrine of
separation of powers. Ross v. United States Attorney’s Of-
fice, $11 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 831
(1975); Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v.
Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2nd Cir. 1975); United States v.
Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (Sth Cir. 1965), cert denied, 85 S.Ct. 1767

9a

(1965). The same considerations would seem to apply to this
Court’s power to order a district attorney to conduct an in-
vestigation under the doctrine of federalism. This matter was
addressed in the case of Jnmates of Attica Correctional Fa-
cility v. Rockefeller, supra. In Altica, a civil Aghts action
was instituted in order to compel federal and stuie officials
to investigate and prosecute persons who allegedly violated
certain federal and state criminal statutes. The Court granted
the defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), FR-
CP. The Court stated:

“In the absence of statutorily defined standards
governing reviewability, or regulatory or statutory
policies of prosecution, the problems inherent in the
task of supervising prosecutorial decisions do not
lend themselves to resolution by the judiciary. The re-
viewing courts would be placed in the undesirable
and injudicious posture of becoming ‘superprosecu-
tors.’ . . . Such interference with the normal opera-
tions of criminal investigations, in turn, based solely
upon allegations of criminal conduct, raises serious
questions of potential abuse by persons seeking to
have other persons prosecuted.”’ Id. at 380.

For these reasons, then, the defendant District Attorney
John Hill’s motion to dismiss is also granted as to the claim
for equitable relief.

MOTIONS TO DISMISS FILED BY THE STATE BAR
OF NEV.14DA AND THE NEVADA SUPREME COURT

Plaintiff alleges in his twelfth cause of action that the
State Bar of Nevada and the Nevada Supreme Court denied
the plaintiff due process and equal protection of the law un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment because they allegedly failed
to investigate certain complaints that the plaintiff filed. The
factual basis of the allegations is unclear from the plaintiff's
complaint. Plaintiff prays for $500,000 in general damages,
$500,000 in punitive damages, ai.d an order to show cause

;

10a

why the defendants should not conduct an investigation.
Defendant State Bar of Nevada filed a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), FRCP. Defendant Supreme
Court of Nevada has also filed a motion to dismiss pursuant
to Rule 12(6)(6), FRCP, and a motion to quash service pur-
suant to Rule 12(b)(5).

The State Bar of Nevada is the investigative arm of the

“persons” subject to suit under Title 42, U.S.C., § 1983 et

seq. Ci v. Supreme Court, Colorado, 465 F.2d
993 (10th Cir. 1972); Harris v. Louisiana State Supreme
Court, 334 F. Supp. 1289 (E.D. La. 1971); Fox v. Juvenile
Court, 321 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Pa. 1970). The United States
Supreme Court has recently ruled that municipalities are
““persons”” subject to suit under the Civil Rights Acts.
Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New
York, 463 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1979).

However, the Supreme Court has specifically reasserted its
position that the State and its agencies are not “‘persons”’
subject to suit under the Civil Rights Acts. Quern v. Jordan,
440 U.S. 332, 338-40, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358, 365-66

lla

However, plaintiff has also asserted Title 28, U.S.C. §
1331 as a jurisdictional basis for this suit. Defendants State
Bar of Nevada and the Nevada Supreme Court argue that
the Eleventh Amendment bars the plaintiff’s claims for
damages and injunctive relief. It is clear that under the Elev-
enth Amendment a state or its agencies cannot be sued
without their consent. Alabama v. Pugh, 328 U.S. 781, 782,
98 S.Ct. 3057, 57 L.Ed.2d 1114, 1116 (1978); Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890);
Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1979).
Nevada has explicitly refused to waive its immunity to suit
under the Eleventh Amendment, Nrs 41.031(3). In Ex Parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), it
was held that suits against state officials to enjoin violations
of constitutional rights were not forbidden by the Eleventh
Amendment. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct.
1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974); Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, 566 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1977). The State Bar
of Nevada and the Nevada Supreme Court, however, are not
state officials but are arms of the state itself. It is this Court’s
opinion that the State Bar of Nevada and the Nevada
Supreme Court do not fal) within the exception stated in Ex
Parte Youg, supra, and are accordingly dismissed from the
suit.

MOTION TO DISMISS ON BEHALF OF THIRD
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF NEVADA

Plaintiff alleges that the defendant Third Judicial
District Court violated plaintiff’s civil rights as set forth in
title 42, U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986, and the First, Four-
th, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution. The alleged violations are said to have
occurred when plaintiff had a trial de novo in the Third Dis-
trict Court concerning his conviction in the municipal court.
Plaintiff alleges that there was malicious prosecution
because of a conflict of interest on the part of the prosecu-

tt)

&)

12a

tor, that he was denied his right to confront witnesses when
Judge William Teurman testified and that he was found
guilty under an ordinance which had not yet been adopted.
Plaintiff also alleges that the Court allowed the transcript to
be altered in another civil trial to which he was a party and
that the Court improperly granted summary judgment in still
another civil action. Again, the factual basis for these allega-
tions are unclear. Plaintiff prays for $500,000 in general
damages, $500,000 in punitive damages, and an order ex-
punging plaintiff’s criminal conviction and returning his
fine, plus interest. Defendant Third Judicial District Court
has filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), FR-
CP.

The Third Judicial District Court, a part of the Judicial
Branch of the state, is also a creature of the Nevada Consti-
tution, article 6. Neither a state or its agencies are “‘persons’”’
subject to suit under the Civil Rights Acts. Quern v. Jordan,
supra; Alabama v. Pugh, supra; Coopersmith v. Supreme
Court, supra; Quadra v. Superior Court of San Francisco,
378 F. Supp. 605 (N.D. Cal. 1974). Therefore, plaintiff's

Plaintiff also has asserted Title 28, U.S.C., § 1331 asa
jurisdictional basis for this suit. :

For the same reasons given above as to the State Bar of
Nevada and the Nevada Supreme Court, this motion to
dismiss is granted.

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO ENLARGE TIME FOR
COMPLETION OF DISCOVERY

Plaintiff filed a motion to enlarge the time for comple-
tion of discovery. The original date set for such discovery
was July 6, 1980. Plaintiff requested this Court to extend
that time an additional six months or until January 6, 1981.
The defendants have not filed a responsive memorandum in
opposition to this motion as required by Local Rule 16(c).

13a
For this reason, plus the multiplicity of defendants, this
Court grants the plaintiff's motion and the new date for
completion of discovery to April 1, 1981.

DISCOVERY MOTIONS

Since this Court has dismissed the State Bar of Nevada
and the Nevada Supreme Court from this action, the defend-
ants’ motions for a protective order and the plaintiff’s
motion to compel responses to interrogatories are rendered
moot.

Since this Court has dismissed the Third Judicial
District Court of Nevada from this action, the defendant’s
motion for a protective order and the plaintiff’s motion to

compel responses to interrogatories are rendered moot.
DATED: January 26, 1982.

Roger D. Foley
District Judge

' Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29
L.Ed.2d 619 (1971).

«0?

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DENNIS L. O’CONNOR, |
Plaintiff/Appellant, )
a ) No. 81-5423
} DC CV 80-0076 RDF
)
)

ORDER ON MOTION FOR STAY OF MANDATE
(Rule 41(b) Fed.R.App.P.)

Upon due consideration of appellant motion for stay of
the mandate of this Court in the above cause pending the
filing, consideration and disposition by the Supreme Court
of the United States of a petition for writ of certiorari, such
petition to be filed in the Clerk’s Office of the Supreme
Court of the United States on or before October 14, 1982,

IT IS ORDERED that the motion for stay of mandate
be, and the same is hereby granted.*

Wallace
United States Circuit Judge

* In the event that the motion for stay of mandate and the petition for
writ of certiorari are granted, then this stay will continue pending the
final disposition of the case by the Supreme Court of the United States.

Sa

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, AND RULES

Article VI, Paragrah (2), United States Constitution:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.

Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.

Sixth Amendment, United States Constitution:

In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the ac-
cusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the assistance of counse) for his defense.

Seventh Amendment, United States Constitution:

In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-
examined in any Court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law.

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l6a
Eleventh Amendment, United States Constitution:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any foreign
State.

Fourteenth Amem » nt, United States Constitution; Sec-
tion 1:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United Staves; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or proper-
ty, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Article I, Section 2, Nevada State Constitution:

All political power is inherent in the people. Govern-
ment is instituted for the protection, security and benefit of
the people; and they have the right to alter or reform the
same whenever the public good may require it. But the
paramount allegiance of every citizen is due to the federal
government, in the exercise of all its constitutional powers,
as the same has been, or may be, defined by the supreme
court of the United States, and no power exists in the people
of this or any other state of the federal union to dissolve
their connection therewith, or perform any act tending to
impair, subvert, or resist the supreme authority of the
government of the United States. The Constitution of the
United States confers full power on the federal government
to maintain and perpetuate its existence, and whensoever
any portion of the states, or people thereof, attempt to
secede from the federal union, or forcibly resist the
execution of its laws, the federal government may, by
warrant of the constitution, emnloy armed force in com-
pelling the obedience to its authority.

17a
Article V1, Secticn 6, Nevada State Constitution:

The district courts in the several judicial districts of this
state shall have original jurisdiction in all cases in equity;
also, in all cases at law which involve the title or right of pos-
session to, or the possession of real property or mining
claims, or the legality of any tax impost, assessment, toll or
municipal fine, and in all other cases in which the demand
(exclusive of interest) or the value of the property in con-
troversy exceeds three hundred dollars, . . . They shall also
have final appellate ‘jurisdiction in cases arising in justices
courts and such other inferior tribunals as may be
established by iaw.

Article VIII, Section 1, Nevada State Constitution:

The legislature shall pass no special act in any manner
relating to corporate powers except for municipal purposes;
but corporations may be formed under general laws, and all
such laws may, from time to time, be altered or repealed.

Article VIII, Section 9, Nevada State Constitution:

The state shall not donate or loan money or its credit,
subscribe to or be interested in the stock of any company, as-
sociation, or corporation, except corporations formed for
educational or charitable purposes.

Article IX, Section 4, Nevada State Constitution:

The state shall never assume the debts of any county,
town, city, or other corporation whatever, unless such debts
have been created to repel invasion, suprress insurrection, or
to provide for the public defense.

Nevada Revised Statutes:

NRS 7.275 State Bar of Nevada: Continuation as public

corporation; powers; rules of supreme court. (NRS, Vol. 1,
p. 201 (1981) .)

1. The State Bar of Nevada, a public corporation
heretofore, created by statute, is hereby continued unde~ the
exclusive jurisdiction and control of the supreme court.

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2. The State Bar of Nevada has perpetual succession
and a seal and it may sue and be sued.

Nevada Supreme Court Rules:

Rule 76. State Bar of Nevada: Public corporation;
powers. (2.) The state bar has perpetual succession and a seal
and it may sue and be sued ... (NRS, Vol. 1, p. 346
(1979). )

Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure:

46(b) (as revised in 1981) Appearances in Proper Per-
son. With leave of the Supreme Court, a party may file, in
preper person, written briefs and papers submitted in accor-
dance with these rules, NRS, Vol. 2, p. 1433 (1981).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_1040%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
