# Opposition — Comeau v. City of Brookside Village

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition
- **Published:** January 1, 1982
- **Citation:** 459 U.S. 1087

## Text

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1982

HOMER N. COMEAU, ef ux.,

Petitioners,
Vv.

CITY OF BROOKSIDE VILLAGE, et ai.,
Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

WILLIAM E. KUHLMANN
Manley & Kuhimann, P.C.
3616 Preston Road
Pasadena, Texas 77505
(713) 947-1670

DAVID J. LaBREC, General Counsel
Texas Municipal League
1020 Southwest Tower
Austin, Texas 78701
(512) 478-6601

CHARLES S. RHYNE
Counsel of Record

THOMAS D. SILVERSTEIN
1000 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Suite 800
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 466-5420

Attorneys for Respondents

THE CASILLAS PRESS, INC. — 1717 K Street N.W. — Washington, D.C. — 223-1220

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF CONTENTS ...........:ccccceccccceesscceseeees i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............ccccescceecccceeeess iii
OPINIONS AND JUDGMENTS BELOW .............66.00555 2
EOS oivns Cicvescdcentdveccrssnsddcceveiccceasenee 2
CONSTITUTION, STATUTE AND ORDINANCES ............ 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE........ 2.66660 ccceceeeeeeeeeee 3
1. The City of Brookside Village. ............ 0.6600 ceeeees 2
Il. Actions Taken By the Comeaus................000eeeeee 5
Ill. Proceedings Below... .. 2.0.6... cccccceeeeeeeeeeeeeees 6
PEED Sevcvecddcccocccccdccedenceveccpedesoesvecoens 10
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION................. il

1. Petitioners Have Abandoned the Taking Issue, and, in
Any Event, Numerous Decisions of This Court Establish
that a Taking Has Not Occurred...............000seuee 11

Il. Ordinances 58 and 78 Are Valid Under the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses Because They Are
Reasonably Related to the Protection of the Public
Health, safety, Morals and General Welfare, and Peti-
tioners Have Failed To Meet Their Burden of Showing
NS cécdentedcavdxdebdedenunedheeossees Gecke st 16

Ill. Congress, Through the National Manufactured Housing
Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974, Has Not
Attempted To Pre-Empt the Power of States and Cities
To Legislate the Location of Mobile Homes ........... 27

et PPT TTETTTITITITIT TTT ree TTL Te 30

(ii)

Page
APPENDIX
A. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and
Orders of the District Court in Comeau v. City of
Brookside Village, No. 78-F2056 (Dist. Ct. Tex.) ........ la
1. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.. ....... la
0 SP Tere T CTT ee TTT ee da
3. Order Granting Temporary Injunction........... 7a
4. Temporary Restraining Order and Show Cause
Gl cadun heeds coldautiuesadbunégucuvesed . 10a
B. Constitution, Statute and Ordinances.............. 13a
Be Gs GE, GI, Tn a ccnwewctvcccccecccccces 13a
2. Section 5401 of the National Manufactured Hous-
ing Construction and Safety Standards Act of
1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5401-5426 (1976 & Supp V.
SD div on uadadd dheed debekas dcnenedd ueeéeuus . 13a
3. Brookside Village, Tex., Ordinance 78
SEAR A Oe re ts l4a
4. Brookside Village, Tex., Ordinance 58
i ih Ss casdwsbdinee 6aeasosensbue sass 17a
C. Opinion in Stewart v. Inhabitants of Durham, No.
81-252 (Maine Oct. 14, 1962)... .......... cee eees 60a
D. Article in Austin American Statesman,

(iii)
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:

Agin v. City of Tiburon,

BEF ae SPENDS oo Sac ciccscvctccccceecsesecess

Berman v. Parker,

pL ® 7 | PPPOTTTITTLTTIT TTT Tee eee

Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines,

TED UB. TRO CTSED «ccc ccccccccccccccccsccscccces

Brown v. Board of Education,

DET TEE, GID IO oc ccc cccccesccccccccccscccece

Chicago and North Western Transportation Co. v.
Kalo Brick & Tile Co.,

SOU, FOE CITTED oc ccccccccccccccscsccseccccces

City of Brookside Village v. Comeau,
633 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. 1982), petition for
cert. filed sub nom. Comeau v. City of Brookside
Village, $1 U.S.L.W. 3, 341 (U.S. Sept. 28, 1982)

Ge BPG c cccvecccccnsescccascveccssccccceces

City of Colby v. Hurtt,

212 Kan. 113, 509 P.2d 1142 (1973) .............545-

City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc.,

426 U.S. 668 (1976)... 2... cece cece en eeecewences

Comeau v. City of Brookside Village,
616 S.W. 2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981), rev'd sub
nom. City of Brookside Village v. Comeau,
633 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. 1982), petition for cert. filed
sub nom. Comeau v. City ef Brookside Village,
$1 U.S.L.W. 3, 341 (U.S. Sept. 28, 1982)

GRU HD coc ccrcccccccveccsntestsccesccccccccs

Page

(iv)

Comeau v. City of Brookside Village,
No. 78-F2046 (Dist. Ct. Tex. May 9, 1980)
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) ................. 7,8

Comeau v. City of Brookside Village,
No. 78-F2046 (Dist. Ct. Tex. Mar. 4, 1980)
(Judgment), rev'd, 616 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App.
1981), rev'd sub nom. City of Brookside Village v.
Comeau, 633 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. 1982), petition for
cert. filed sub nom. Comeau v. City of Brookside
Village, 51 U.S.L.W. 3,341 (U.S. Sept. 28, 1982)
ED es on ce eee eEWRGes oa chdeetsseceadeases 7

Comeau v. City of Brookside Village,
No. 78-F2046 (Dist. Ct. Tex. Oct. 30, 1978)
(Order Granting Temporary Injunction) ..................+.- 7

Comeau v. City of Brookside Village,
No. 78-F2046 (Dist. Ct. Tex. Sept. 21, 1978)
(Temporary Restraining Order and Show Cause
BED 6 couvbchdomesel ew casebindkndecetcescvendesvecduaes 7

Duckworth v. City of Bonney Lake,
91 Wash. 2d 19, 586 P.2d 860 (1978) .... 2... cece 26

Eisenstadt v. Baird,
GES UB. GIB TGIED oc ccc cccccccccccccccccescsccccceceucs 25

Ferguson v. Skrupa,
cn oeGc sc oucndeesbeoecovsceveves gna 21, 24

Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,
EES Gi cadéedbudsddgdens cdedsescéces 12-13, 21

Gravatt v. Borough of Latrobe,
44 Pa. Commw. Ct. 47, 404 A.2d 729 (1979) .... 0... ce eee ees 26

Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware,
I an os oan suc Seb Nbc bbenedaupeostonene 21

Maryland v. Louisiana,
SEs SEIN dnc dices degetsthuceecccodtcsscgee scout 28

(v)

Page

Matthews v. Fayette County,

233 Ga. 220, 210 S.E.2d 758 (1974) .. 2... 1 cece cece cece eees 26
McLaughlin v. Florida,

Ns cccaddddbebsébddedied cvetvosnceceta 17
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,

SS dncccde 6oeuted 6666060866 véenedees 19, 20
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.,

EE EE SS ES Se oe Sm 21,24
Moore v. City of East Clevaland,

PED + ciuaniderebbsdsoosedéuncesccovcess 19, 20
National League of Cities v. Usery,

EE icc bud dmendetdadaddebeseocecenscocegee 29
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of

New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) ................ 12, 13-14, 20, 29
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,

i end ccc ceebieesdnevedeseocceséveni 13
Robinson v. Township of Knoll,

410 Mich. 293, 302 N.W.2d 146 (1981) .... 2.2.6.6 ee cee eee 26
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,

nd hee heeeuardteneedercseceusodn’ 17,19
State v. Larson,

292 Minn. 350, 195 N.W.2d 180 (1971) .... 2... 2... ee cece eee 26
Stewart v. Inhabitants of Durham,

EE, WO MUN cc ncdineneccvcencocceces 26
Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins,

Ds scdebacdobicddettab bane cooavecesee 21, 24

Town of Londonderry v. Faucher,
112 N.H. 454, 299 A.2d 581 (1972) ... 2... ccc cece eee 26

(vi)

Page

Townsend v. Yeomans,

oi nn dia skdéebensvdebdbeseete 21, 23, 24
United States v. Carolene Products Co.,

EE Se Cs rare sg cde nesbekeeedabed 17, 21
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,

Pa deddatdabdsvtebddeescccotvecne 17, 18, 20, 29
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,

EET Per passim
Warth v. Seldin,

LE osc dubiutee éuehedececusntscnencesamaser 29
Welch v. Swasey,

PP pdasnbpsncdddadiutionchvchededasesenie 11-12
Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc.,

EE EE oink ou cow unde uetides cece sabébndssnetbeeds 19
Constitution:

PEL, Fé cbchscee cecheccecucéovcnecwesneemnn 19

EE Wg occ ddabecdctec ecédedacnescowons 11,14

DIL 1D cucssevenseséecs cocsduncecesouss 10, 29

eR GES BEET codavecicdeccccccccecosoncées passim
Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations:
Brookside Village, Tex., Ordinance 78 (Apr. 14, 1974) ....... passim
Brookside Village, Tex., Ordinance 58 (Aug. 6, 1970) ....... passim

Manufactured Home Construction and Safety Standards,
24 C.F.R. § 3280.1-3280.904 (1982), as amended at
IG res venakEaedcccvccddccicdsa passim

(vii)

Page
National Manufactured Housing Construction and
Safety Standards Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5401-5426
ELROD so sauiesGdowsdaccenasveccccccenss passim
US GUGG ke o ce 0 bbdudndtevdss od papWEab Reb cnr cdoawey 28
Texas Manufactured Housing Standards Act, Tex. Rev. Civ.

Stat. Ann. art. 5221f (Vernon 1971-1982 Supp.) ............ 9, 27
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art 101 1c (Vernon 1963) ........... 24-25
Es TED 6 bc ccd dws benewsapsdecccncccceveuwss 2
te ED nso koe cdgeuddesean bese cesbedchivd oes 2
Legislative Materials:

Senate Report No. 693, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess.,

reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4273 .......... 28
Miscellaneous:

Austin American Statesman, Nov. 4, 1982 ...........666000005 26

Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dept. of Commerce,
PHC80-V-45, 1980 Census of Population and
ED. 4) aiktise Wop b Psne UbEess ccntposinuenses 3

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1982

No. 82-689

HOMER N. COMEAU, ef ux.,
Petitioners,
v.

CITY OF BROOKSIDE VILLAGE, et ai.,
Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

Respondents City of Brookside Village (“Brookside” or
“City”), the mayor and the members of the city council, through
counsel, submit this opposition to the Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Texas (“Petition”) in the
above-captioned action.*

*In addition to petitioners Homer and Hazel Comeau and respon-
dent Brookside, the remaining parties are respondents, the mayor and
the members of the Brookside city council, who were made nominal
parties to this action. At the time the suit was filed, these individuals
were: Louis Boehm-Mayor; and Shirley Zamorsky, Frank Gonzales,
Stanley S. Chock, Boyd Christman, and Eugene Satterwhite-
councilmembers. At present, these officials are: Phillip W. Rutter-
Mayor; and Shirley Zamorsky, Sheryl Karolinski, Darvan Webb,
Jerry DeWeese, and Eugene Satterwhite — councilmembers. To the
extent that the present officials are different from the previous of-
ficials, the new officials are substituted for their predecessors pur-
suant to Rule 40.3 of this Court’s rules.

2

OPINIONS AND JUDGMENTS BELOW

The opinion of the Supreme Court of Texas is reported at 633
S.W.2d 790 (Tex. 1982), and is reprinted in Appendix A to the
Petition. The opinion of the Civil Court of Appeals of Texas is
reported at 616 S.W. 2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) and is
reprinted in Appendix B to the Petition. The Judgment of the
District Court of Brazoria County, Texas, 149th Judicial
District is unreported and is reprinted in Appendix A to this op-
position, at 4a. The district court’s Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law is unreported and is reprinted in Appendix A to this
opposition, at la. The district court’s Temporary Restraining
Order and Show Cause Order and Order Granting Preliminary
Injunction also are unreported and are reprinted in Appendix A
to this opposition, at 10a and 7a respectively.

JURISDICTION

Petitioners incorrectly allege jurisdiction of this Court under
28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1) (1976). Section 1254(1) only pertains to
cases in the federal courts of appeals. If this Court has jurisdic-
tion, it may be based only on 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976).

CONSTITUTION, STATUTE
AND ORDINANCES

In addition to the constitutional and statutory provisions set
forth in the Petition, the tenth amendment to the Constitution,
section 5401 of the National Manufactured Housing Construc-
tion and Safety Standards Act of 1974, Brookside Ordinances
$8 and 78 are involved, and are reprinted in Appendix B to this
opposition, at 13a.

3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. The City of Brookside Village.

Brookside is an incorporated city of approximately two
square miles' with a population of about 1,400 persons’. The
City is a residential or “bedroom” community and has no in-
dustry.‘ The land surrounding and within Brookside is compos-
ed of gumbo and clay, both of which have poor absorption
capabilities.‘ In addition, the City is in a low elevation area,
and, as a result, is susceptible to flooding’®.

Brookside has no water or sewage system.’ Instead, these
facilities are provided by individual water wells and septic
tanks." Due to the cost of installing either a water or sewage
system, it is unlikely that Brookside ever will have such
systems.”

On October 6, 1970, Brookside’s Board of Aldermen enacted

‘Statement of Facts at 132, Comeau v. City of Brookside Village,
No 78-F2046 (Dist. Ct. Tex. Mar. 4, 1980) (trial testimony of Eston
Louis Boehm, Jr., Mayor of Brookside) [hereinafter cite «: S.F.).

*Bureau of The Census, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, PHC80-V- 45,
1980 Census of Population and Housing-Texas 34 (1981).

‘S.F., supra note |, at 132 (testimony of Mayor Boehm).

“City of Brookside Village v. Comeau, 633 S.W.2d 790,793 (Tex.
1982), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Comeau v. City of Brookside

Village, 51 U.S.L.W. 3,341 (U.S. Sep. 28, 1982) (No. 82-689); S.F.,
supra note |, at 63 (testimony of Don Marshall Rives, building official
for Brookside).

°S.F., supra note |, at 26 (testimony of Mayor Boehm).

*Id. at 59 (testimony of Lloyd Yost, Superintendent of Brazoria
County Drainage District No. Four).

"City of Brookside Village v. Commeau, 633 S.W.2d at 793.
“Id.
“See S.F., supra note |, at 133-34 (testimony of Mayor Boehm).

4

Ordinance 58, which provided standards for mobile home
parks.'® Section I(N) defined a mobile home as:

a portable vehicle constructed on a chassis and which
has been designed so that it may be occupied and used
without a permanent foundation. For the purposes of
the Ordinance, a mobile home shall mean a single
family dwelling unit suitable for year-round occupan-
cy and which has provision for electrical and water
connections and which provides for waste disposal in
compliance with the Plumbing Code requirements for
dwellings.
To guard against flooding, erosion and other “adverse in-
fluences,” Ordinance 58 provided soil, ground cover and site
drainage requirements,'' In addition, the ordinance, inter
alia, set forth water supply, sewage disposal and fire protection
standards. '?

Subject to certain restrictions, ordinance No. 58 also allowed
mobile homes to be placed outside of mobile home parks. For
example, a single mobile home could be located outside a
mobile home park only if it were placed on a lot of at least nine
thousand (9,000) square feet.'¢

On April 14, 1974, Brookside’s city council enacted Or-
dinance 78, amending Ordinance 58, to limit the future location
of mobile homes in Brookside to mobile home parks.'* Mobile
homes previously installed in accordance with Ordinance 58
were allowed to remain in place and continue to be occupied. '*

'*Brookside Village, Tex., Ordinance 58 (Aug. 6, 1970).

"Id. § IX.

'24d.§§ X, XI, XVI.

'3fd.§ XVIII.

'*Id. § XVIUI(B).

'SBrookside Village, Tex., Ordinance 78, §§ I, II (Apr. 14, 1974).
‘S/d. § Ill.

$s

Among the stated reasons behind the enactment and continued
maintenance of Ordinance 78 were:

1) The higher incidence of fire among Brookside's
mobile homes, together with a restricted supply of
water and a small, volunteer fire department;'’

2) Concern for the placement of large numbers of
mobile homes on plots of land too small to accom-
area, in light of the poor absorbtion quality of the
soil;'* and

3) Aesthetic considerations'’ and the negative im-
pact of mobile homes on surrounding property
values, due in part, to the rapid rate of deteriora-
tion of mobile homes relative to site-built
houses. ?°

As of February 11, 1980, the date of the trial, there was one
mobile home park within Brookside and several mobile home
parks immediately outside of Brookside.?'

Il. Actions Taken by the Comeaus.

The Comeaus are the owners of a parcel of land located at
12700 Mykawa Road, Brookside, Texas.?? On or about July 10,

'"S.F., supra note 1, at 42-43, 48-49, 51 (testimony of Mayor
Boehm).

‘S/d. at 85-86 (testimony of city councilmember Frank Noe). The
ordinances of Brookside do not specify the size of land on which a
sité-built house must be placed. However, councilmember Noe
testified that the majority of site-built houses in Brookside are built on
plots of land of three-quarters to one acre, and that nine thousand
(9,000) square feet, the requisite size of plots for mobile homes outside
of mobile home parks, under Ordinance 58, § XVIII (B), was only
about one-quarter of an acre.

'*Id. at 27 (testimony of Mayor Boehm).
2"Id.at 79-80, 84-85 (testimony of Councilmember Noe).
2'Id. at 24 (testimony of Mayor Boehm).

22Agreed Order as to Stipulated Facts {Il (3) [hereinafter cited as
Stipulation}.

6

1978, more than four years after the enactment of Ordinance
78, petitioners applied to the city council for permission to place
a mobile home on their land.?* On or about August 3, 1978, the
city council advised petitioners of its denial of their request.’*
On or about September 7, 1978, petitioners purchased a mobile
home.?* Notwithstanding the council’s denial of their request,
and without applying for a permit to install a septic tank,’?* on
or about September 8, 1978, petitioners caused the above
mobile home to be transported to their property.’’ Thereafter,
petitioners took action to prevent the enforcement of Or-
dinances 58 and 78.

lll. Proceedings Below.

Petitioners instituted this action on September 8, 1978, by
filing in the District Court of Brazoria County, Texas, 149th
Judicial District, Plaintiffs’ Original Petition for Temporary
Restraining Order, Temporary Injunction and Other Relief
(“Complaint”). So that they could occupy their mobile home,
petitioners sought the issuance, without notice, of a temporary
restraining order enjoining Brookside and its agents from deny-
ing petitioners all permits and certificates necessary for the con-
nection of utilities.?* In the alternative, petitioners sought a

‘Plaintiffs’ Trial Brief at 1.

241d.

2*Stipulation, supra note 22, ¢ 11(2). Petitioners stipulated that the
structure which they purchased was a “mobile home.” S.F., supra note
a by plaintiffs’ counsel); Stipulation, supra note 22,

2°S.F., supra note 1, at 89 (testimony of Homer Comeau).

?’Stipulation, supra note 22, { II(2).

In addition to the mobile home, there is situated on petitioners’
land, a store and icehouse, in one building, and two trailers, one
twelve feet by fifty feet and the other twelve feet by sixty feet, whici:
Mr. Comeau brought onto petitioners’ land for use as storage sheds in
Mr. Comeau’s “trailer park.” S.F., supra note 1, at 90 (testimony of
Homer Comeau).

2*Compl. ad damnum clause.

>

temporary injunction requesting the same relief.?’ Finally, peti-
tioners sought a permanent injunction, a declaration that Or-
dinances 58 and 78 were unconstitutional as to their prohibition
“of the location of placement of a mobile home on private pro-
perty within the municipal limits of said City” and an
unspecified amount of monetary damages.*”

On September 21, 1978, the court issued a temporary restrain-
ing order enjoining and restraining Brookside and its agents
from denying petitioners the use and quiet possession of their
mobile home.*' Following a hearing on October 2, 1978, the
court converted the temporary retraining order into a temporary
injunction,’? which remained in effect through the trial.

Trial without jury was held on February 11, 1980, and, on
March 4, 1980, the court rendered its Judgment.*? The Judg-
ment upheld Ordinances 58 and 78, and, consequently, directed
petitioners to remove their mobile home from its unauthorized
location within sixty (60) days of the Judgment’s becoming
final. Following issuance of the Judgment, petitioners, on
March 4, 1980, filed a motion for a new trial.

At petitioners’ request, the court, on May 9, 1980, issued
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.**

"Id.
"Id.

‘'Comeau v. City of Brookside Village, No. 78-F2046 (Dist. Ct.
Tex. Sept. 21, 1978) (Temporary Restraining Order and Show Cause
Order).

"Comeau v. City of Brookside Village, No. 78-F2046 (Dist. Ct.
Tex. Oct. 30, 1978 (Order Granting Temporary Injunction).

Comeau v. City of Brookside Village, No. 78-F2046 (Dist. Ct.
Tex. Mar. 4, 1980), rev’d, 616 S.W. 2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981),
rev'd sub nom. City of Brookside Village v. Comeau, 633 S.W. 2d 790
(Tex. 1982), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Comeau v. City of
Brookside Village, 51 U.S.L.W. 3,341 (U.S. Sept. 28, 1982) (No.
82-689)

s v. City of Brookside Village, No. 78-F2046 (Dist. Ct.
Tex. May 9, 1980).

As fact, the court found: Ordinances 58 and 78 were duly
passed and in effect prior to the date petitioners purchased their
mobile home, which home met the definition of “mobile home”
in Ordinance 58; the lack of municipal water and sewage
systems in Brookside created a potential health hazard; Or-
dinances 58 and 78 bore a substantial relationship to the public
health, safety, morals and general welfare; and petitioners’
placement of their mobile home on their property violated Or-
dinances 58 and 78.*° As law, the court concluded that Or-
dinances 58 and 78 were not an abuse of discretion, were a valid
exercise of the city council’s police power, and, therefore, were
constitutional.**

On May 6, 1981, petitioners’ motion for a new trial was over-
ruled by operation of law, and petitioners thereafter filed an ap-
peal with the Court of Civil Appeals for the Fourteenth Supreme
Judicial District of Texas at Houston. The court of appeals
reversed the trial court’s decision holding Ordinances 58 and 78 to
be constitutional and directing petitioners to remove their mobile
home.*’ The court found that Brookside had not shown a threat
to public health to be present by the placement of petitioners’
mobile home outside of a mobile home park.** The court con-
cluded that there was no justification for treating mobile homes
differently from site-built houses, and that, therefore, Or-
dinances 58 and 78 were an invalid exercise of Brookside’s police
power.** The court of appeals denied respondents’ request for

Id. at 1.
1d. at 2.

‘Comeau v. City of Brookside Village, 616 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1981), rev'd sub nom. City of Brookside Village v. Comeau, 633
S.W. 2d 790 (Tex. 1982), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Comeau v.
City of Brookside Village, $1 U.S.L.W. 3,341 (U.S. Sept. 28, 1982)
(No. 82-689).

"Id. at 334.

3*Jd.

9

rehearing, and respondents then filed with the Supreme Court
of Texas an application for writ of error.

The Texas Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court
of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.*® The
court first outlined the standard of review applicable to a zoning
or other land use regulation and reiterated that such a regulation
is presumed valid and is upheld unless the party challenging the
regulation shows it to be arbitrary and unreasonable.‘' The
court recognized that passage of Ordinances 58 and 78 was
motivated by the considerations set forth at 5 supra, and
concluded that they bore “a substantial relationship to the
public health, safety, morals or general welfare” and were “not
clearly arbitrary and unreasonable.”*? Next, the court observed
that improvements had been made in the quality and ap-
pearance of mobile homes subsequent to passage of the Na-
tional Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Stan-
dards Act of 1974 (“NMHCSSA”),*? noted that a majority of
Brookside’s mobile homes were made prior to implementation
of federal standards for mobile homes, and concluded that, in
any event, any change in Brookside’s policy toward the location
of mobile homes should be made by the city council and not the
court.** Finally, the court held that Ordinances 58
and 78 were not in conflict with either the NMHCSSA or the
Texas Manufactured Housing Standards Act (“TMHSA”),**
and, therefore, were not pre-empted by either act.**

Petitioners moved the Texas Supreme Court for a rehearing,
but, on June 30, 1982, the court overruled the motion.

“"City of Brookside Village v. Comeau, 633 S.W.2d 790 (Tex.
1982).

“Id. at 792-93.

“21d. at 793-94.

#942 U.S.C. §§ 5401-5426 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).

**633 S.W.2d at 795 & n.6.

**Tex Rev. Civ. Stat.Ann. art 5221f. (Vernon Supp. 1971-1982).
**633 S.W.2d at 796.

SUMMARY

The issues petitioners raise are neither novel nor unresolved
by this Court. Perhaps in recognition of this, petitioners have
abandoned entirely their first issue — whether Ordinances 58
and 78 have effected a taking of petitioners’ property. Even if
the Court, sua sponte, were to consider this issue, a multiplicity
of decisions of this Court establish that a taking has not occur-
red. Ordinances 58 and 78 were in effect prior to petitioners’
purchase of their mobile home. The ordinances limit only slight-
ly the uses of petitioners land, and certainly leave open
economically viable uses. Further, the ordinances advance
legitimate state interests, i.e. protection of the public health,
safety, morals and general welfare.

Ordinances 58 and 78 also do not violate the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Mobile
homes are not the same as site-built houses. If they were, this
case would not have been brought. The city council did not ex-
clude mobile homes from Brookside, but, in recognition of the
differences between site-built houses and mobile homes, re-
quired mobile homes to be located in mobile home parks. Or-
dinances $8 and 78 are presumed valid, and petitioners have not
met their burden of showing that the ordinances are
unreasonable and arbitrary, and could not reasonably be related
to the public heaith, safety, morals or general welfare.

Finally, the NMHCSSA has not pre-empted Ordinances 58
and 78. The NMHCSSA provides construction and installation
standards for mobile homes, while Ordinances 58 and 78 pertain
to the location of mobile homes and the requirements for
mobile home parks. As such, the ordinances in no way conflict
with the NMHCSSA. Any other conclusion, particularly with
respect to the ordinances’ locational requirements, would result
in a violation of the tenth amendment to the Constitution by
allowing the federal government to displace the traditional
power of states and cities to control land use.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

1. Petitioners Have Abandoned the Taking Issue, and,
in Any Event, Numerous Decisions of This Court
Establish that a Taking Has Not Occurred.

The first issue raised in petitioners’ Questions Presented is
whether the ordinances of Brookside which limit the location of
mobile homes to mobile home parks deprive “Petitioners of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s right to aquire, enjoy, own and
dispose of property” — the taking issue.‘*’ Petitioners, how-
ever, fail to address this issue either in their Reasons for Granting
the Petition or anywhere else in the Petition. From this, one on-
ly can surmise that petitioners have abandoned their first issue.
This factor, alone, provides the Court with ample justification
for not considering petitioners’ first issue. Even if the Court
were to consider the taking issue, it is readily apparent from
numerous decisions by this Court that respondents have not
taken petitioners’ property.

Even before the seminal case upholding the zoning power of
states and cities, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,** this
Court upheld land use regulations against taking challenges
brought under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Con-
stitution. For example, in Welch v. Swasey,** this Court upheld
a Massachusetts law restricting the height of certain buildings
within Boston to 80 to 100 feet. In dismissing the taking argu-
ment, the Court concluded:

We are not prepared to hold that this limitation of
80 to 100 feet, while in fact a discrimination or
classification, is so unreasonable that it deprives the
owner of the property of its profitable use without
justification, and that he is therefore entitled under
the Constitution to compensation for such invasion
of his rights. The discrimination just made is, as we

*’Petition at i.
**272 U.S. 365 (1926).
*"214 U.S. 91 (1901).

12

think, reasonable, and is justified by the police
power.’

Subsequently, in Euclid, the Court again rejected a taking
argument, this time in the context of an ordinance establishing a
zoning plan for the Village of Euclid, Ohio, the effect of which,
it was alleged, was to destroy certain uses for which plaintiff
had purchased lands in Euclid. The Court held that the or-
dinance was a valid exercise of the city’s police powers.*'
Although the Court did not adcress specifically the taking issue,
but focused nrimarily on the due process and equal protection
aspects of the case, it is evident from the Court’s holding that it
concluded that the ordinance in issue had not effected a taking.*?

The opinion in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead*® offers a
sound explanation of why land use restrictions are not con-
sidered unconstitutional takings:

It is an oft-repeated truism that every regulation
necessarily speaks as a prohibition. If the ordinance is
otherwise a valid exercise of the town’s police powers,
the fact that it deprives the property of its most
beneficial use does not render it unconstitution-
al. . . . As pointed out in Mugler v. Kansas, [123 U.S.
623, 688 (1887)] . . . ‘A prohibition simply upon the
use of property for purposes that are declared, by
valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals,
or safety of the community, cannot in any just sense,
be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property
for the public benefit. Such legislation does not
disturb the owner in the control or use of his property
for lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to dispose of
it, but is only a declaration by the State that its use by

**Id. at 107.
$1272 U.S. at 397.

*2See Agin v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980), Penn Ceni.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 125, 133-34 (1978).

**369 U.S. 590 (1962).

13

any one, for certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial
to the public interest. . . . The power which the States
have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their
property as will be prejudicial to the health, the
morals, or the safety of the public, is not — and, con-
sistently with the existence and the safety of organized
society, cannot be — burdened with the condition
that the state must compensate such individual
owners for the pecuniary losses they may sustain, by
reason of their not being permitted, by a noxious use
of their property, to inflict injury upon the communi-
ty.’>4

This reasoning is preseiit in recent zoning ard other land use
cases wherein the Court repeatedly has decii....' io find a taking
based upon property use restrictions.

In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,**

‘Id. at 592-93.

Citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), the
Court recognized the possibility that, under certain, limited cir-
cumstances, a land use regulation could amount to a taking. At issue
in Mahon was a Pennsylvania statute, enacted after plaintiffs’ sale of
surface property to defendants, which prevented plaintiffs from min-
ing coal beneath defendants’ property, and thereby destroyed entirely
plaintiffs’ rights to their coal. 260 U.S. at 412, 414. Even in holding
that a taking had occured, the Court recognized that “government
hardly could go on if, to some extent, value incident to property could
not be diminished without paying for every change in the general law.
As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limita-
tion, and must yield to police power.” Jd. at 413. This quotation is
directly applicable to the instant suit. As discussed more fully at 21-22
infra, Ordinances 58 and 78 were enacted for the health, safety,
morals and general welfare of the citizens of Brookside, and, thus,
were a proper exercise of the city council’s police power. Further, as
discussed at 15 infra, the uses to which the petitioners’ property may
be put have not been eliminated, but only lessened slightly. Therefore,
even under Mahon, the ordinances have not effected a taking.

55438 U.S. 104 (1978).

14

plaintiffs challenged under the property provisions of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments a New York City law enacted to
protect historical landmarks from destruction or significant
alteration. Specifically, plaintiffs challenged a decision of the
Landmarks Preservation Commission denying approval of
plaintiffs’ plan for construction of a fifty (50)-story office
building over New York’s Grand Central Terminal, on the
grounds that such a building would destroy the Terminal’s
aesthetic features. In holding that the law had not effected a
taking, the Court reviewed the history of taking challenges
under the fifth amendment’s property clause,** and, inter alia,
observed:
In instances in which a state tribunal reasonably con-
cluded that the “health, safety, morals or general
welfare’ would be promoted by prohibiting particular
contemplated uses of land, this Court has upheld
land-use regulations that destroyed or ae af-
fected recognized real property interests. . . . Zoning
laws are, of course, the classic example, ... which
have been viewed as permissible governmental action
even when prohibiting the most beneficial use of pro-

perty.°

More recently, in Agin v. City of Tiburon,** the Court reaf-
firmed the principles set forth in the above cases. Plaintiffs pur-
chased for residential development five acres of land in
Tiburon, California. In consequence, and pursuant to state law,
the city enacted two zoning ordinances which restricted to be-
tween two and five the number of single-family residences plain-
tiffs would be allowed to construct on their land. Plaintiffs’
facial attack on the ordinances alleged tliat the ordinances had
taken their property in violation of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. In again rejecting the taking argument, the Court

‘*The Court noted that the meaning of the fifth amendment’s pro-

perty clause had been made applicable to the States through the four-
teenth amendment. /d. at 122.

*"Id. at 125 (citations omitted).
"447 U.S. 255 (1980).

15

reasoned that a zoning law may effect a taking only if it “does
not substantially advance legitimate state interests . . . or denies
an owner economically viable use of his land. . . .”°” Neither of
these conditions is present in the instarit suit.

Ordinances 58 and 78 were in effect prior to the purchase of
petitioners’ mobile home. In addition, the city council had
denied petitioners’ request for permission to place a mobile
home on their land. Nevertheless, petitioners purchased a
mobile home,°*" and, in violation of the ordinances and the city
council’s decision, placed this mobile home on their property.
Petitioners, therefore, cannot complain, even if such a com-
plaint could have merit, that the ordinances deprived them of a
use of their property for which they could have had a reasonable
expectation at the time they purchased their mobile home.
Moreover, there are a variety of economically viable uses to
which petitioners’ property may be devoted. For example, there
already is a store on the premises.*' In addition, petitioners
assert that “the City ordinances will allow the Petitioners to
place a business or commercial venture (including a high densi-
ty, high rise apartment complex) on their property.”*? Indeed,
the only limitation at present on the uses of petitioners’ property
is the restriction against the placement thereon of a mobile
home. Under these circumstances, not even petitioners
legitimately could contend that Ordinances 58 and 78 leave them
without an economically viable use for their property.

5*Id. at 260.

*°The record does not reveal the exact date on which petitioners
purchased the land on which their mobile homes is situated. However,
it would appear that they bought the land in mid-1978, a short time
before they bought the mobile home but long after the effective dates
of the ordinances. This supposition is based on Mr. Comeau’s Af-
fidavit Supporting Temporary Order, wherein Mr. Coumeau stated
that he and his wife had purchased the land at 12700 Mykawa Road,
had sold their former residence and had to vacate its premises by
September 10, 1978.

*'S.F., supra note 1, at 90.
*2Peitition at 11.

16

Not only do the ordinances in question reserve to petitioners a
variety of uses for their property, but they also advance
legitimate state interests. As discussed more fully at 21-22 infra,
the limitation on the location of mobile homes was predicated
on considerations of the relative susceptibility to fire of mobile
homes, particularly in light of the availability of water and the
limited capabilities of the fire department, the absence of a
municipal sewage facility and aesthetics. This Court consistently
has held each of these concerns to be a valid state interest, which
warrants a city’s exercise of its police power. Ordinances 58 and
78, therefore, have not effected a taking of petitioners’ property
in violation of the fourteenth amendment."'

Il. Ovdinances 58 and 78 Are Valid Under the Due Pro-
cess and Equal Protection Clauses Because They Are
Reasonably Related to the Protection of the Public
Health, Safety, Morals and General Welfare, and
Petitioners Have Failed To Meet Their Burden of

The thrust of petitioners’ argument is that the ordinances re-
quiring mobile homes to be placed in mobile home parks violate
the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth
amendment because they do not “bear a substantial relationship
to public health, safety or general welfare but rather . . . [are]
arbitrary, unreasonable and irrationale [sic}].”°* Unable, how-

*3As noted at |! supra, as part of their taking issue, petitioners con-
tend that the ordinances deprive them of their right “to acquire . . .
own and dispose of property.” These contentions also are entirely
devoid of merit. That the ordinances have not deprived petitioners of
any right to acquire or own property is seen by the fact that, not-
withstanding the existence of the ordinances, petitioners purchased,
and own in fee simple, Comp 41, the land on which their mobile
home is situated. Further, there is no allegation that, as a result of the
ordinances, petitioners have been unable to sell their property.

**Petition at i. In their Questions Presented, petitioners only refer
to Ordinance 58 as dDeing violative of the due process and equal protec-
tion clauses. Presumably, petitioners meant Ordinance 58, as amend-
ed by Ordinance 78, because Ordinance 78 is the ordinance which ac-
tually limits the location of mobile homes to mobile home parks.

17

ever, to find zoning or other land use decisions from this Court
to support their position, petitioners attempt to equate mobile
home owners with black citizens in order to gain reliance on
such cases as Brown v. Board of Education**’ and McLaughlin
v. Florida** for their attack on Brookside’s mobile home ordi-
nances.*’ Not only does this approach trivialize these and other
cases which have marked significant gains for blacks and other
recognized minorities,** but it ignores decisions of the Court

$5347 U.S. 483 (1954).

$6379 U.S. 184 (1964).

*’Petition at 7-9, 18.

**While petitioners concede that mobile home owners are not a
“suspect classification,” Petition at 24, they contend that they are a
“discrete and insular minority,” Petition at 24-25. Petitioners support
this novel conclusion on the following phrase from United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938): “whether prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily
to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a cor-
respondingly more searching judicial inquiry,” 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
Petition at 20-21, 24-25. Petitioners took this phrase out of context,
and, in so doing, omitted the portion of the sentence which identified
the individuals who fell within the Court's classification of a discrete
and insular minority,” The portion of the sentence petitioners omitted
read: “Nor need we inquire into whether similar considerations enter
into the review of statutes directed at particular religions . . . or na-
tional . . . or racial minorities. . .” /d. (citations omitted). Because
petitioners are neither a “suspect classification” nor a “discrete and in-
sular minority,” Brookside’s ordinances are not subject to a standard
of review, for equal protection purposes, any stricter than the tradi-
tional reasonableness standard set forth in Euclid and its progeny.

Similarly, for due process purposes, petitioners neither have iden-
tified nor could identify any “fundamental right” which is in issue. In
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), the Court iden-
tified the following “fundamental rights”: voting, the right of associa-
tion, the right of access to the courts and the right of privacy. 416 U.S.
at 7. The “fundamental right” to freedom of expression, see, ¢.g.,
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981), also is not
in issue. Because “fundamental rights” are not involved, Brookside’s
mobile home ordinances are not subject to any strict standard of
review applicable where “fundamental rights” are involved.

which are directly on point, and resolve petitioners’ due process
and equal protections claims. As mentioned previously, Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. is the leading case on the zoning
power of states and cities. In upholding this power, the Court
set forth the standards which govern zoning and other land use
regulations:

If these reasons... do not demonstrate the
wisdom and sound policy in all respects of those
restrictions which we have indicated as pertinent to
the inquiry, at least, the reasons are sufficiently
cogent to preclude us from saying, as it must be said
before the ordinance can be declared unconstitu-
tional, that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.°”

The Court also noted that, “{i}f the validity of the legislative
classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the
legislative judgment must be allowed to control.” ° Subsequent
cases have emphasized the breadth of this power.

In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, ' the Court upheld an
ordinance which restricted land use to single-family dwellings,
and defined “family” in such a way as to allow to live together
only persons related by blood, marriage or adoption or two
unrelated persons. The Court recognized that the ordinance, for
example, permitted a group of ten (10) related individuals to live
together but prohibited from living together a group of six (6)
unrelated individuals, but concluded that “every line drawn by a
legislature leaves some out that might well have been included.
That exercise of discretion, however, is a legislative, not a
judicial, function.” ?

**272 U.S. at 395.

"Id. at 388.

"416 U.S. 1 (1974).

"24d. at 8 (footnote omitted).

In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,* the Court
sustained a challenge, based on the first amendment and the due
process and equal protection clauses, to an ordinance requiring
adult motion picture theaters to be dispersed throughout
Detroit, rather than allowing them to be located in a concen-
trated area. In a comment which is germane to this case, the
Court observed:

[W]e have no doubt that the municipality may control
the location of theaters as well as the location of other
commercial establishments, either by confining them
to certain specified commercial zones or by requiring
that they be dispersed throughout the city. The mere
fact that the commercial exploitation of material pro-
tected by the First Amendment is subject to zoning
and other licensing requirements is not a sufficient
reason for invalidating these ordinances. *

Even in those rare instances in which the Court has held un-
constitutional zoning or other land use ordinances,’ it has
recognized that the power of states and cities in this area is
great. Recently, for example, in Schad v. Borough of Mount
Ephraim,’* the Court reiterated that “[t}he power of local
governments to zone and control land use is undoubtedly broad
and its proper exercise is an essential aspect of achieving a
satisfactory quality of life in both urban and rural
communities.”’" While the Court struck down the ordinances
involved in Schad and ordinances involved in a few other suits,
it did so not because the matters addressed by the legislation
were improper subjects of regulation, but because the legislation

19427 U.S. 50 (1976).
"41d. at 62 (emphasis adde“i).

"SE.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981);
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981); Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1976).

7452 U.S.61 (1981).
"Id. at 68.

20

infringed upon “fundamental rights”, e.g., freedom of expres-
sion * and sanctity of family life, * which rights, on balance,
outweighed the interests advanced by the legislation as drafted.
However, as discussed at 17 n. 68 supra, no “fundamental
rights” are at issue in this suit.

Among the specific concerns which the Court has held war-
rant the exercise of a legislatives body’s police power are the
danger of fire,“' the avoidance of aesthetic harm and the
preservation of property vaives*' and the elimination of un-
healthy places*?. This is not to suggest, however, that there is a
narrow range of concerns which justify action by a legislative
body. Rather, as the Court concluded in Berman v. Parker:**

The concept of the public welfare is broad and in-
clusive .. . The values it represents are spiritual as
well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is
within the power of the legislature to determine that
the community should be beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well balanced as well as
carefully patrolled."

To the extent that a court reviews an action taken by a

te Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1982);
Schad.

”*Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1976). The Court
distinguished the ordinance involved in Village of Belle Terre from the
ordinance involved in Moore on the grounds that in Moore the or-
dinance prohibited certain related individuals from living together,
while in Village of Belle Terre the ordinance allowed all related in-
dividuals to live together. Jd. at 489-99.

**Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388.

*' Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 129; Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33
(1954).

*2Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
"9348 U.S. 26 (1954).
“Id. at 33.

21

legislative body, that body’s acts are presumed valid,** and
doubts are resolved in its favor**. Accordingly, the party
challenging a statute or ordinance has the burden of establishing
that, under no circumstances, may the considerations which led
to the legislature’s actions be conceived as true, and that,
therefore, the legislature has acted unreasonably and
arbitrarily... Further, because the legislature is presumed to
know the needs of the people,"" even if a court were to disagree
with the judgment of a legislature, it may not substitute its judg-
ment for that of the legislature.” When applied to the facts of
this case, the above holdings and their supporting rationales
resolve unequivocally that Ordinances 58 and 78 were a proper
exercise of the city council’s police power, and that the peti-
tioners have failed to meet their burden of showing that the
council acted unreasonably and arbitrarily.

Mobile homes are not the same as site-built houses. They are
subject to different construction standard. *” and, in Brook-
side’s experience, mobile homes have presented problems that

*sKassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware, 450 U.S.
662, 670 (1981); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 524
(1959); Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441, 450 (1937); see Min-
nesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981).

**Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388.

*’Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464
(1981) (quoting Vance v. Bradley 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979)); Goidbiatt,
369 U.S. at 596; United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
154 (1938).

**Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441, 451 (1937).

** Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 469
(1981); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963); Sunshine An-
thracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 394-95 (1940); Townsend
v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441, 451 (1937).

*°Site-built houses in Brookside must be constructed in accordance
with the Southern Standard Building Code, S.F., supra note 1, at 27
(testimony of Mayor Boehm), while, after 1976, mobile homes must
be constructed, in accordance with the NMHCSSA and the regula-
tions promulgated pursuant thereto, 24 C.F.R. § 3280.1-3280.904
(1982), as amended at 47 Fed. Reg. 28, 092 (1982).

22

site-built houses have not presented. Accordingly, without ex-
cluding mobile homes from Brookside, the city council has de-
termined that mobile homes only tnay be located in mobile
home parks.

As discussed at 5 supra, and as noted in the decision by
the Texas Supreme Court,’' among the considerations
behind Brookside’s locational requirements was the higher in-
cidence of fire among the mobile homes in Brookside. This
problem has been exacerbated because Brookside’s water is sup-
plied only by individual wells, and because Brookside only has a
small, volunteer fire department. As a result, the fire depart-
ment has been unsuccessful in fighting mobile home fires.”? Ad-
ditionally, the city council was concerned that, if mobile homes
could be located outside of mobile home parks, large numbers
of mobile homes, each requiring separate water and sewage
facilities, would be placed on plots of land too small adequately
to accommodate these facilities. By requiring mobile homes to be
located in mobile home parks, however, the possibility exists of
providing centralized water and sewage facilities for all of the
mobile homes in the respective mobile home parks.” Finally,
the city council determined that, largely due to their relatively
rapid rate of deterioration, mobile homes scattered throughout
Brookside would be aesthetically harmful and would lower pro-
perty values.

Petitioners do not claim that the above considerations are
beyond the scope of the public health, safety, morals or general
welfare, but, rather, contend that Ordinances 58 and 78 are
unrelated to these goals, and are, therefore, arbitrary and
unreasonable.”* With respect to the concerns for fire and the
lack of sewage facilities, petitioners support their argument by
contending that “no studies were performed, no experts

*'633 S.W. 2d at 793.

“§.F., supra note 1, at 48-49.
“See Ordinance 58, § 11(B)(4)(d).
“Petition at 10-11, 23.

solicited and no committees formed to review or evaluate the
problems prior to the enactment of the ordinances.””’ This
assertion, however, rings hollow in light of this Court's holdings
that the burden is on the party challenging an act to show that it
is unreasonable, arbitrary and not reasonably related to the
goals sought to be achieved. Further, in Townsend y.
Yeomans,** the Court concluded that “[t}here is no principle of
constitutional law which nullifies action taken by a legislature,
otherwise competent, in the absence of a special investiga-
tion... . Whether or not special inquiries should be made is a
matter for the legislative discretion.”*’ Additionally, even
assuming experts or special studies would have proven infor-
mative, petitioners offered no experts or studies of their own to
rebut the testimonies concerning the incidences of fire among
Brookside’s mobile homes or the absorption properties of
Brookside’s soil and the constraints thereby imposed.

With respect the aesthetic considerations, petitioners rely ex-
clusively on the testimony of only one person, Mayor Boehm,
who, according to petitioners, “had trouble differentiating be-
tween mobile homes and site-built structures in photographs.”"*
Apart from the inherent limitations of a two dimensional
representation of a three dimensional object, the photographs
bore no relation either to Brookside’s mobile homes or to its
site-built houses. Instead, petitioners used pictures of mobile
homes taken at the direction of the president and general
counsel of the Texas Manufactured Housing Association for in-
clusion in a booklet prepared by the Association.** In view of
the obvious interest of the Association in portraying mobile
homes in the most commercially advantageous light possible,
the usefulness of these pictures is, at best, dubious.

"id. at 10.

301 U.S, 441 (1997).
"ld, at 451.
**Petition at 21.

S.F., supra note |, at 118-19. The record does not reveal the
source of the pictures of the site-built houses.

24

Without providing any information as to cost or other conse-
quences, petitioners next attack Ordinances 58 and 78 by con-
tending that there were options available to the city council
other than the option of requiring mobile homes to be located in
mobile home parks.''' Even assuming the viability of these op-
tions, choices between options are the exclusive province of the
duly elected legislative body,''' which here has opted for requir-
ing mobile homes to be located in mobile home parks. Such a
determination, even where “fairly debatable,” must be upheld.'"’

Petitioners also attack Ordinances 58 and 78 because they are
the only zoning or land-use ordinances for Brookside,''' First,
petitioners claim that the ordinances are arbitrary and
unreasonable because, while prohibiting placement on their
land of a mobile home, the absence of other zoning restrictions
leaves open the possibility that petitioners could erect on their
land a high rise apartment complex or other commercial ven-
ture. There is, however, a simple explanation why Brookside
does not have a comprehensive zoning scheme. As discussed at
3 supra, Brookside is presently a “bedroom” community,
and has no industry. As a result, there has been no need for it
to zone for nonexistent property uses.

Second, petitioners claim that, under Tex. Rev. Civ.
Stat, Ann, art, 101 le (Vernon 1963), Ordinances 58 and 78 are
invalid because the Texas statute requires a comprehensive zon-

‘**Petition at 18-19, Among the options proposed by petitioners
was an ordinance “requiring all structures to be built with certain
kinds or types of exterior siding materials, roofing, etc. . .” /d. at 19.
One wonders if, following on petitioners’ suggestion, petitioners
would object to a requirement that the exteriors of all residences, in-
cluding mobile homes, be composed of brick.

'*' See, ¢.g., Minnesota v, Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456,
469-70 (1981); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S, 726, 729 (1963); Sun-
shine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S, 381, 394-95 (1940);
Townsend, 901 U.S. at 451.

'*Buclid, 272 U.S. at 388,
‘Petition at 11, 17,

ing scheme or no scheme at all, Petitioners, however, ignore the
Texas Supreme Court's holding on this issue: “Because
Brookside Village, a general law city, has no comprehensive
zoning plan, the ordinances in question do not come under arti-
cle 101 1a, which embodies legislative authorization for zoning.
See Tex, Rev, Civ, Stat, Ann, art, 10lle. . . . A city, however,
may regulate land use under its general police power.”''* As this
Court repeatedly has held, the interpretation of state law by the
highest court of that state is controlling and binding upon this
Court,''’ Petitioners’ argument, therefore, must fail.

Petitioners next contend that Ordinances 58 and 78 deny
them equal protection because their mobile home, unlike earlier
mobile homes, was manufactured in accordance with the
Manufactured Home Construction and Safety Standards (the
“HUD regulations”)'"* it is entitled to the same treatment as
site-built houses.'"’ This argument was resolved as early as
Euclid wherein the Court observed:

The inclusion of a reasonable margin to insure effec-
tive enforcement will not put upon a law, otherwise
valid, the stamp of invalidity, Such laws may also
find their justification in the fact that, in some fields,
the bad fades into the good by such insensible degrees
that the two are not capable of being readily
distinguished and separated in terms of legislation. In
light of these considerations, we are not prepared to
say that the end in view was not sufficient to justify
the general rule of the ordinance, although some in-
dustries of an innocent character might fall within the
proscribed class.'"*

16633 S.W. 2d at 793 0.4,

'*B.g., City of Bastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc,, 426 U.S, 668,
674 n.9 (1976); Bisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 442 (1972).

124 C.F.R. § 3280. 1-3280.904 (1982), as amended at 47 Fed Reg.
28, 092 (1982).
'*'Petition at 5-6, 25,

1272 U.S. at 388-89,

This quotation is particularly appropriate to this case in view of
the fact that the majority of mobile homes in Brookside were
not manufactured in accordance with the HUD regulations,’ *
and, as discussed at 21 n. 90 supra, even those that were are not
subject to the same construction standards as site-built houses.
In any event, the Texas Supreme Court has set forth the proper
course to be followed for any change in Brookside’s policy
toward mobile homes: “It is possible that the general improve-
ment in appearance and quality of manufacture of mobile
homes will persuade municipalities to alter ordinances similar to
the one before us. Such changes, however, should be made
through the legislative, not judicial, process.”'''

The Brookside city council has not excluded mobile homes
from Brookside, but only has required them to be placed in
mobile home parks, Based on a variety of decisions by this
Court and the record below, there is no doubt that this require-
ment was based on concerns for the health, safety, morals and
general welfare of Brookside’s citizens.''' As such, the ordinances

‘City of Brookside Village v. Comeau, 633 5.W. 2d at 795 n.6,
‘Jd. at 795.

As the Texas Supreme Court also noted, its decision upholding
locational restrictions on mobile homes is the majority rule. /d. at 794.
Most recently, for example, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court upheld
an ordinance requiring mobile homes to be placed in mobile home
parks, Stewart v. Inhabitants of Durham, No. 81-252 (Maine Oct. 14,
1982) (a copy of this decision is reprinted in Appendix C, at 60a.)
Numerous decisions of other state courts have upheld similar restric-
tions, E.w., Mathews v. Fayette County, 233 Ga. 220, 210 8.B.2d 758
(1974); City of Colby v. Hurtt, 212 Kan. 113, 509 P. 2d 1142 (1973);
State v. Larson, 292 Minn, 350, 195 N.W. 2d 180 (1972); Town of
Londonderry v, Faucher, 112 N.H, 454, 299 A.2d 581 (1972); Gravatt
v. Borough of Latrobe, 44 Pa, Commw, Ct. 47, 404 A.2d 729 (1979);
Duckworth v, City of Bonney Lake, 91 Wash. 2d 19, 586 P.2d 860
(1978). Contra Robinson Township of Knoll, 410 Mich. 293, 302
N,W.2d 146 (1981),

'''That mobile homes continue to present safety problems not
presented by site-built houses is evident from a November 4, 1982 arti-
cle in the Austin American Stateman newspaper, a copy of which is

27

represent a proper exercise of the city council's police power.
Petitioners have failed to meet their heavy burden of showing
that the ordinances were unreasonable and arbitrary, and could
not be related reasonably to the public health, safety, morals or
general welfare.

lll. Congress, Through the National Manufactured
Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act of
1974, Has Not Attempted To Pre-Empt the Power of
States and Cities To Legistate the Location of Mobile
Homes.

As their last gasp, petitioners contend that section 5403 of the
NMHCSSA has pre-empted Ordinances 58 and 78,''? This
argument is frivolous, as readily may be seen from even a cur-
sory review of the NMHCSSA and its legislative history, as well
as from consideration of the tenth amendment implications.

in Chicago and North Western Transportation Co, v. Kalo
Brick & Tile Co.,'"* the Court reiterated that “(p)re-emption of
state law by federal statute or regulation is not favored ‘in the
absence of persuasive reasons — either that the nature of the
regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion or that the

reprinted in Appendix D, at 70a, reporting a storm in Port Isabel and
South Padres Island, Texas, which uprooted and blew into canals a
total of approximately twenty-six (26) mobile homes.

''*Petition at i, 25-29. In their Questions Presented, petitioners
allege that the NMHCSSA has pre-empted state regulation of mobile
homes, but in their Reasons for Granting the Petition petitioners con-

any event, however, the Texas Supreme Court ruled thatthe entry of
an area of legislation did not pre-empt automatically a
city from legislating in that area, and that Ordinances 58 and 78 are

119450 U.S. 311 (1981),

Congress has unmistakably so ordained.’ "''* Even where a
federal statute or regulation pre-empts state law, it does so only
to the extent the state law is in conflict with the federal statute
or reguiation,''’

As set forth in the legislative history of the NMHCSSA, the
purposes to be served by the Act were “to reduce injuries,
deaths, insurance costs and property damage from mobile home
accidents and to improve the quality and durability of mobile
homes.”''* Accordingly, the HUD regulations were issued to set
construction and installation standards in order to improve the
quality of mobile homes relative to the quality of mobile homes
manufactured prior to implementation of the HUD regulations.
However, Ordinance 58 pertains only to mobile home parks and
the requirements therefor, and Ordinance 78, the ordinance
which is the specific subject of the instant suit, only per-
tains to the location of mobile homes. Therefore, Ordinance 58,
as amended by Ordinance 78, in no way conflicts with the
NMHCSSA or the HUD regulations, and petitioners point to
no provision indicating otherwise,''’

Petitioners, attempt to obfuscate the flaws in their argument
by contending that “the alleged public purpose goals of this City
have been pre-empted.”''" Even assuming this were a proper
application of the pre-emption standard, the NMHCSSA was

‘47d, at 317 (quoting Florida Lime & Advocado Growers v. Paul,
373 U.S, 132, 142 (1963).

''*Maryland v, Louisiana, 451 U.S, 725, 747 (1981).

16S, Rep. No, 693, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess, 143, reprinted in 1974 U.S,
Code Cong, & Ad, News 4273, 4408, See also 42 U.S.C, §5401 (Supp.
V 1981) (adopting almost word-for-word the legislative history's
declaration of purpose).

''’Bven if parts of Ordinance 58 could be seen as conflicting with
the NMHCSSA or the HUD regulations, that still would not provide a
basis for invalidating the locational requirements of Ordinance 78,
particularly since Ordinance 58, § XXIV(C) specifically provides for
the severability of any provision held to be invalid.

''*Petition at 28 (emphasis added),

not an attempt to make mobile homes the equivalent of site-
built houses, Rather, Congress simply was seeking to upgrade
the quality of mobile homes, The Brookside city council was
motivated by concerns for the differences betwen mobile homes
and site-built houses, and not the differences between pre- HUD
regulation and post-HUD regulation mobile homes.

Equally important to the pre-emption issue are the implica-
tions of petitioners’ argument on the tenth amendment to the
Constitution, As discussed previously, the sole portion of the
ordinances with which petitioners are concerned is the require-
ment that mobile homes be located in mobile home parks, In
National League of Cities v, Usery,''" the Court held thai the
federal government could not “operate to directly displace the
States’ freedom to structure integral operations of traditional
governmental functions.”'*" No one seriously may doubt that
zoning or other land-use planning is an area of traditional state
and local government function,'*' To suggest, therefore, that
Congress may pre-empt a city's zoning or other land-use deter-
minations is to suggest that Congress may displace a traditional
state and local government function, There is no basis what-
soever for petitioners’ suggestion that Congress, through the
NMHCSSA, sought to wield its power in such a fashion.

The NMHCSSA has not pre-empted either the ordinance pro-
viding for the location of mobile homes or the ordinance setting
forth the requirements for mobile home parks.

19426 U.S, 833 (1976),
Jd, at 852,

'*)Warth v, Seldin, 422 U.S, 490, 508 n, 18 (1975); see Penn Cen-
tral, 438 U.S. at 129; Village of Belle Terre, 416 U.S, at 8-9; Buclid,
272 U.S. at 386-90,

30

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the writ should be denied.

Respectfully Submitted,

WILLIAM E. KUHLMANN
Manley & Kuhimann, P.C.
3616 Preston Road
Pasadena, Texas 77505
(713) 947-1670

DAVID J. LaBREC, General Counsel
Texas Municipal League
1020 Southwest Tower
Austin, Texas 78701
(512) 478-6601

CHARLES S. RHYNE
Counsel of Record

THOMAS D. SILVERSTEIN
1000 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Suite 800
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 466-5420

Attorneys for Respondents

APPENDIX A

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment
and Orders of the District Court in Comeau v. City of
Brookside Village, No. 78-F2046 (Dist. Ct. Tex.).

1. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

No. 78-F2046

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
BRAZORIA COUNTY, TEXAS
300TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

HOMER N. COMEAU and HAZEL A. COMEAU
vs.

CITY OF BROOKSIDE VILLAGE, ET AL..,

FILED
MAY 9, 1980
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The above captioned cause came on for trial before the
Court without a jury on February 11, 1980. All parties and
their attorneys were present. After considering the
pleadings, the evidence and the argument of counsel, the
Court, in response to a request from Plaintiffs, HOMER
N. COMEAU and HAZEL A. COMEAU, makes its find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Ordinance 58 and Ordinance 78 of the City of
Brookside Village were duly passed and in ef-
fect prior to Plaintiffs’ purchase of their
mobile home.

2a

Plaintiffs’ Fairway Doublewide mobile home
is a mobile home as defined in the city or-
dinances of Brookside Village.

Plaintiffs’ placement of their mobile home on
their property within the limits of the City of
Brookside Village was a violation of Or-
dinances 58 and 78 of the City of Brookside
Village.

The City of Brookside Village has no public
sewage system.

Water is supplied to Brookside Village by
means of private water wells.

The lack of municipal water and sewage
systems creates a potential health hazard for
Brookside Village.

Ordinances 58 and 78 of the City of Brookside
Village bear a substantial relationship to the
public health, safety and welfare of the
residents of Brookside Village.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Ordinances 58 and 78 of the City of Brookside
Village are valid city ordinances.

Ordinances 58 and 78 of the City of Brookside
Village are constitutional.

Ordinance 58 and 78 of the City of Brookside
Village do not represent an abuse of municipal

Ordinances 58 and 78 of the City of Brookside

3a
Village represent a valid exercise of the police
power of municipalities.
Signed this 9th day of May, 1980.

Tom Kenyon
Judge

2. Judgment.
No. 78-F-2046

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
BRAZORIA COUNTY, TEXAS
300TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

HOMER N. COMEAU and HAZEL A. COMEAU
vs.

CITY OF BROOKSIDE VILLAGE, ET AL.,

FILED
MARCH 4, 1980

JUDGMENT

On the 11th day of February, 1980, came on to be heard
the above entitled and numbered cause and HOMER N.
COMEAU appeared in person for the Plaintiffs and by his
attorney of record and announced ready for trial, and
THE CITY OF BROOKSIDE VILLAGE, Defendant ap-
peared through its Mayor Louis Boehm and by its attorney
of record and announced ready for trial and no jury hav-
ing been demanded, ail matters of fact and things in con-
troversy were submitted to the Court.

The Court, after hearing the evidence and arguments of
counsel, is of the opinion that the City Ordinance No. 58
and City Ordinance No. 78 of Defendant, CITY OF
BROOKSIDE VILLAGE, are constitutional, and further
the Plaintiffs should remove their mobile home from its
unauthorized location.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that City Ordinance No. 58 and City Or-

Sa

dinance No. 78 of Defendant, CITY OF BROOKSIDE
VILLAGE, are constitutional;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED that Plaintiffs take nothing by this suit and
that Defendants be in all things discharged; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED by the Court that Plaintiffs remove their
mobile home from its unauthorized location within 60
days from the date this Court’s judgment becomes final.

All costs of court are taxed against the Plaintiffs for
which let execution issue. All other relief not expressly
granted herein is denied.

SIGNED this 4th day of March, 1980.

Tom Kenyon
Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM
AND SUBSTANCE:

By: /s/ William E. Kuhiman
William E. Kuhlman

3616 Preston Road

Pasadena, Texas 77505

947-1670

State Bar No.: 11756500
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

6a

APPROVED AS TO FORM ONLY:
/s/ John A. Wright, Jr.

John A. Wright, Jr.

777 South Post Oak Road

Suite 990

Houston, Texas 77056

871-9542

State Bar No.: 22043500
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS

7a
3. Order Granting Temporary Injunction.

No, 78-F2046

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
BRAZORIA COUNTY, TEXAS
300TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

HOMER N. COMEBAU and HAZEL A, COMEAU
vs.

CITY OF BROOKSIDE VILLAGE, ET AL.,

FILED
OCTOBER 3, 1978

ORDER GRANTING TEMPORARY INJUNCTION

On October 2, 1978, the Court heard and considered the
application of HOMER N. COMEAU and HAZEL A.
COMEAU, Plaintiffs, for a Temporary Injunction upon
their verified petition, to which was attached a sworn af-
fidavit in support of the Plaintiffs’ allegations, and the
Plaintiffs having appeared in person and by their attorney
and the Defendant, after due notice, by and through their
attorney of record, and the Court, having heard and con-
sidered the evidence and argument of counsel:

The Court finds and concludes that HOMER N, COM-
EAU and HAZEL A. COMEAU, Plaintiffs herein, will
probably prevail on the trial of this cause; that the CITY
OF BROOKSIDE VILLAGE, Defendant herein, has prior
to the granting of this Temporary Injunction issued cita-

tions against Plaintiffs in regard to their possession, use or
occupancy of their manufactured home on certain real
property owned by Plaintiffs, located at 12700 Mykawa
Road in the City of Brookside Village, and have also ex-
pressed their intention to have the manufactured home of
Plaintiffs removed from within the boundaries of the City
of Brookside Village.

That if Defendant carries out said intention, they will
thereby alter the status quo and tend to make ineffectual a
judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, in that Plaintiffs will be
put to unnecessary expense, and further, Plaintiffs’ pro-
perty will be made ineffectual for its intended use as a
homestead,

And that unless Defendant is deterred from carrying out
said intention, Plaintiffs will be without adequate remedy
at law in that irreparable injury and harm will occur to
Plaintiffs, their family and their homestead, by the denial
of their use of said property for its intended purposes.

IT 1S, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the City of
Brookside Village, its agents and employees, Defendants
herein, be, and they hereby are, commanded forthwith to
desist and refrain from the issuance of any citations or
other legal notices which are intended to act as a punitive
measure against Plaintiffs in regard to their posession, use
or occupancy of their manufactured home on their real
property located at 12700 Mykawa Road in the City of
Brookside Village:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that said Defendants
herein, be, and they are, commanded forthwith to desist
and refrain from denying Plaintiffs the use and quiet
possession of their manufactured home located on their
real property at 12700 Mykawa Road in the City of
Brookside Village.

The clerk shall forthwith, on the filing by Plaintiffs of
the bond hereinafter required, and on approving the same
according to law, issue a Temporary Injunction in comfor-
mity with the law and the terms of this order.

This order shall not be effective unless and until Plain-
tiffs execute and file with the clerk a bond, in comformity
with the law, in the amount of One Thousand Dollars
($1,000.00),

Sign this 30th day of October, 1978,

/s/ G.P. Hardy
JUDGE PRESIDING

10a
3. Temporary Restraining Order and Show Cause Order,

No, 78-F2046

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
BRAZORIA COUNTY, TEXAS
149TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

HOMER N. COMEAU and HAZEL A. COMEAU
Plaintiffs

vs.

CITY OF BROOKSIDE VILLAGE, ET AL.,
Defendants

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
AND SHOW CAUSE ORDER

The hereinabove entitled and numbered cause, and the
Plaintiffs’ Application for a Temporary Restraining
Order, without notice, was presented to and heard by the
Court on the date set forth hereinbelow. The Plaintiffs ap-
pearing by ond through their attorney, John A. Wright,
Jr., and the Court, having considered the verified
pleadings and the Affidavit of the Plaintiffs, finds that
Plaintiffs are entitled to a Temporary Restraining Order,
pending a hearing on the Application for a Temporary In-
junction, for the reason that Plaintiffs show probable
cause and irreparable harm and injury for which there is
no adequate remedy at law; the Court further finds that a
bond in the amount of ONE THOUSAND AND NO/100

($1,000.00) DOLLARS will fully and adequately protect
the rights and interest of Defendants until said hearing. It
is therefore,

ORDERED, on Plaintiffs executing and filing with the
Clerk of this Court, a good and sufficient bond in the sum
of ONE THOUSAND AND NO/100 ($1,000.00)
DOLLARS conditioned that Plaintiffs will pay to Defen-
dants any and all damages sustained if it shall be determin-
ed that Defendants have been wrongfully restrained pen-
ding the hearing on Application for Temporary Injunc-
tion, that Defendant City of Brookside Village, and its
agents and employees, are enjoined and restrained from
denying Plaintiffs the use and quiet possession of their
manufactured home located on their real property at
12700 Mykawa Road in the City of Bookside Village, and
it is further

ORDERED, that the City of Brookside Village, and its
agents and employees, cease the issuance of any citations
or other legal notices which are intended to act as a
punitive measure against Plaintiffs in regard to their
posession, use or occupancy of their manufactured home
on their real property located at 12700 Mykawa Road in
the City of Brookside Village, and if [sic] is further

ORDERED, that Defendants be directed to appear
before this Court in the 149th District Courtroom in the
County of Brazoria, Texas, at 9:00 o'clock, a.m. on Oc-
tober, 22nd, 1978, then and there to show cause, if any
there be, why a temporary injunction should not issue
against them enjoining and restraining Defendants from
denying Plaintiffs the use and quiet possession of their
manufactured home located on their real property at
12700 Mykawa Road in the City of Brookside Village, and
further enjoining and restraining from denying, and re-

12a

quiring Defendants to issue to Plaintiffs all permits and
certificates which may be required and necessary for
Plaintiffs to obtain utility building services at 12700
Mykawa Road, City of Brookside Village, Texas, and to
occupy said premises until the final hearing or other
disposition of this cause.

SIGNED on September 21, 1978, at 1:30 o'clock a.m.

/s/ Paul Ferguson
JUDGE PRESIDING

Entered on , 1978,

13a
APPENDIX B

Constitution, Statute and Ordinances.

1. U.S, Const. amend, X.

The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserv-
ed to the States respectively, or to the people.

2. Section 5401 of the National Manufactured Housing
Construction and Safety Standards Oct of 1974, 42
U.S.C. §§ 5401-5426 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).

§ 5401. Congressional declaration of purposes

The Congress declares that the purposes of this chapter
are to reduce the number of personal injuries and deaths
and the amount of insurance costs and property damage
resulting from manufactured home accidents and to im-
prove the quality and durability of manufactured homes.
Therefore, the Congress determines that it is necessary to
establish Federal construction and safety standards for
manufactured homes and to authorize manufactured
home safety research and development.

4a

3. Brookside Village, Tex., Ordinance 78 (Apr. 18, 1974).

ORDINANCE NO. 78

AN ORDINANCE AMENDING ORDINANCE NO. 58;
REGULATING THE PARKING OF MOBILE HOMES;
REGULATING THE CHANGE OR REPLACEMENT OF MOBILE
HOMES; PROVIDING FOR EMERGENCY USE OF MOBILE
HOMES; REQUIRING PERMITS FOR SUCH EMERGENCY
USE; PROVIDING FOR A PENALTY FOR VIOLATION
HEREOF; AND PROVIDING FOR AN EFFECTIVE DATE
HEREOF.

BE IT ORDAINED by the Board of Aldermen of
Brookside Village, Texas;

Section 1. Subsections B and C of Section XVIII of Or-
dinance No. 58 is hereby deleted in its entirety, and is
hereby amended to include the following provisions as set
out herein.

Section Il. Parking of mobile homes, camper buses,
motor homes and camper trailers, for use as a residence,
outside of a mobile home park shall be prohibited.

Section III. Mobile homes heretofore installed in com-
pliance with the Ordinances of Brookside Village may re-
main in place, and continue to be used or occupied. Ex-
change, replacement, alteration, relocation or additions to
mobile homes within Brookside Village is hereby pro-
hibited, unless such move, replacement, alteration, reloca-
tion or addition is to or in a licensed mobile home park.

Section IV. The Board of Aldermen of Brookside
Village, by a majority vote of its five (5) members, may
grant to individuals the temporary use of mobile home,
motor homes, camper busses, or camper trailers in the
event of an emergency. An emergency shall only be loss of
a permanent dwelling due to fire, flood or any other
natural disaster. In the event any such application for

emergency temporary use of said mobile homes, motor
homes, camper busses or camper trailers is granted by the
Board of Aldermen, no such temporary use shall begin un-

til:

A.

Section [V] VI. An existing mobile home that is destroyed
by fire, explosion, flood, or other natural disaster, may be
replaced, if such replacement is of the same size, length,

1Sa

A permit fee, to be established by the Board of
Aidermen, is paid by the applicant.

A determination of the period of time such
emergency use may continue, but in no event
shall such period exceed thirty (30) days.
However, each applicant may have his
emergency permit extended for additional thir-
ty (30) days periods. No permit shall be ex-
tended, or renewed, more than five times. All
such extensions shall require a majority vote of
the five (5) member Board of Aldermen.

The Board of Aldermen shall only grant an
emergency permit for the express purpose of
occupying a mobile home, motor home,
camper bus or camper trailer as a residence,
only while repairing, remodeling or replacing a
permanent residence.

Any such emergency permit granted shall re-
quire the applicant to locate his temporary
mobile home, motor home, camper bus or
camper trailer upon the same lot, or parcel of
real estate, as the permanent residence that is
being repaired, remodeled or replaced.

width and weight as the one destroyed.

16a

Section [VI] V. This Ordinance shall become effective
from and after the date of its passage, and after all ap-
plicable laws of the State of Texas, if any, have been com-
plied with.

Section [VII] VI. Any person violating this Ordinance is
guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be fined
not less than Ten Dollars ($10.00) and not more than One
Hundred-Dollars ($100.00). Each day a violation of this
Ordinance continues shall be a separate offense.

Passed and approved this 18th day of April, 1974.
George Carter
MAY’ *

ATTEST:
/s/ Aurora C. Rodriguez
CITY SECRETARY

17a
4. Brookside Village, Tex., Ordinance 58 (Aug. 6, 1970).
ORDINANCE NO. 58

AN ORDINANCE OF BROOKSIDE VILLAGE, TEXAS, FOR THE
PURPOSE OF REGULATING THE CONSTRUCTION. OPERA-
TION AND MAINTENANCE OF MOBILE HOME PARKS IN
THE VILLAGE OF BROOKSIDE; REQUIRING A CONSTRUC-
TION PERMIT FOR THE CONTRUCTION, ALTERNATION OR
EXTENSION OF MOBILE HOME PARKS AND PROVIDING
FOR INSPECTIONS AND FEES; REQUIRING A LICENSE FOR
THE OPERATION OF A MOBILE HOME PARK AND PRO-
VIDING FOR INSPECTIONS AND FEES; REQUIRING THAT
AN ANNUAL, A SEMI-ANNUAL OR A TEMPORARY PARKING
PERMIT BE OBTAINED FOR ANY MOBILE HOME OR
TRAVEL TRAILER OCCUPYING A STAND IN A MOBILE
HOME PARK AND PROVIDING FOR INSPECTIONS AND
FEES; PROVIDING FOR APPEALS; ESTABLISHING STAN-
DARDS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION, OPERATION AND
MAINTENANCE OF MOBILE HOME PARKS; PROVIDING
THAT OWNERS OR OPERATORS OF EXISTING MOBILE
HOME PARKS SHALL BE PERMITTED A PERIOD OF TIME AS
HEREIN PROVIDED TO OPERATE A MOBILE HOME PARK
WITHOUT OBTAINING A LICENSE: REGULATING MOBILE
HOMES AND TRAVEL TRAILERS OUTSIDE OF MOBILE
HOME PARKS: CONTAINING A REPEALING CLAUSE AND A
SEVERABILITY CLAUSE: CONTAINING A PENALTY PROVI-
SION AND PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE DATE.

BE IT ORDAINED BY THE BOARD OF ALDERMEN
OF BROOKSIDE VILLAGE, TEXAS:

MOBILE HOME PARKS
I. DEFINITIONS — The following terms, phrases and
words as used in this Ordinance shall have the follow-
ing respective definitions:
A. Annual parking permit means a permit required for
any mobile home or travel trailer which is occupying a
stand in a mobile home park and which permit is valid

for the period from January 1 through December 31
of the year of issuance.

Board means the Board of Aldermen.
Building Official is the Village Inspector or duly
authorized representative.

. Cash means United States currency or coin or a
cashier’s check or certified check or a postal money
order.

City means Brookside Village, Texas.

Construction permit means the permit required for
the construction, alteration or extension of any
mobile home park in the City.

. Construction permitee means the person to whom a
construction permit has been issued.

. Current parking permit means the person to whom a

construction permit has been issued.

Expandable room means an enclosed or a semi-
enclosed room or roofed portion which expands out-
ward from the basic mobile home by means of rollers,
hinges or other devices or arrangements, but which is
designed as a structural portion of the mobile home
and which is carried on, or within, the mobile home
while travelling. Also includes permanent additions to
mobile homes.

Health Officer means the Village or County
Sanitarian.

Label means a metal inspection label or plate which
has been permanently affixed by the manufacturer or
by an approved testing agency to a mobile home or
travel trailer or to equipment used in connection
therewith and which contains a serial number, if re-

19a

quired, the specifications of the vehicle or the equip-
ment to which it is attached and which refers to any
standards that have been met in the construction of
such vehicle or equipment.

License means a mobile home park operator’s license.

M. Licensee means the person to whom a mobile home

park operator’s license has been issued.

. Mobile Home means a portable vehicle constructed

on a chassis and which has been designed so that it
may be occupied and used without a permanent foun-
dation. For the purpose of this Ordinance, a mobile
home shall mean a single family dwelling unit suitable
for year-round occupancy and which has provision
for electrical and water connections and which pro-
vides for waste disposal in compliance with the Plum-
bing Code requirements for dwellings. Such vehicle
shall be eligible for registration and licensing by the
State of Texas for operation on the public streets and
highways, and be fourteen (14) feet in length or
longer.

. Mobile home lot means a parcel or tract of land for

the placement of a single mobile home and the ex-
clusive use of its occupants and which is located in a
mobile home subdivision approved by the Planning
Commission of the Village. This is to be distinguished
from a mobile home stand and site located within a
mobile home park.

. Mobile home stand means that part of a mobile home

park which has been improved for the placement of
the mobile home including all required appurtenant
structures and having provision for available utility
connections.

20a

Occupant means the person or persons who occupy a
mobile home or travel trailer in a mobile home park.
Owner means the owner or lessee, whether one or
more, of the premises on which a mobile home park is
operated when such person is not a licensee.

Overnight parking means the use of a mobile home
park for a period not to exceed seven (7) days by a
travel trailer or mobile home, provided that if said use
exceeds seven (7) days, a valid annual, semi-annual,
or temporary parking permit is required and the
beginning date shall be the initial date of occupancy
of the mobile home park. No permit or fee shall be re-
quired by the Village for the temporary use of a
mobile home park for a period of seven (7) days or
less.

Parking permit shall mean an annual or semi-annual
parking permit.

Person means a natural person, his heirs, executors,
administrators or assigns, and shall also include a
firm, partnership, or corporation, its successors or
assigns, or the agent of any of the aforesaid.

. Semi-annual parking permit means a permit required
for any mobile home or travel trailer which has been

placed upon a stand in a mobile home park and which
is valid for the period from January | through June
30 or for the period from July 1 through December 31
of the year of issuance.

. Service building means a structure housing toilet

facilities, lavatories, bathing facilities, and such other
facilities, as may be required or permitted under the
provisions of this Ordinance and which is used in con-
nection with the operation of a mobile home park.

Zia

Y. Sewer connection means the connection consisting of
the pipes, fittings and appurtenances from the drain
outlet of the mobile home or travel trailer to the inlet

of the corresponding sewer riser pipe or the sewerage
system serving the mobile home park.

Z. Sewer riser means that portion of the pipe of the
sewer lateral which extends vertically to the ground
elevation and terminates at each mobile home stand.

AA. Temporary parking permit means a permit which
may be used in lieu of an annual or semi-annual

parking permit and which is valid for thirty (30)
days from the date of issuance.

BB. Travel trailer means a portable vehicle built on a
chassis and designed as a temporary dwelling for
travel, recreation and vacation use and which has
been permanently identified by the manufacturer.
When such a vehicle has been equipped by the
manufacturer for use on public streets and
highways, the body of such vehicle shall not ex-
ceed eight (8) feet in width, but may be of any
length, provided its gross weight does not exceed
4,500 pounds, or a travel trailer may be of any
height, provided its length does not exceed four-
teen (14) feet, exclusive of the tongue. The term
travel trailer shall also be deemed to include all
other portable contrivances other than mobile
homes used or intended to be used generally for
living and sleeping quarters and which may be
moved under its own power, towed, or
transported by another vehicle.

CC. Utilities means the telephone, water, sewage, gas
or electrical distribution system, which are

DD.

22a

available for connection to mobile homes or travel
trailers in mobile home parks.

Utility connection means the connection of
available utilities in a mobile home park to a
mobile home or travel trailer placed on a mobile
home stand in a mobile home park.

Vehicle means a mobile home or a travel trailer
unless the context in which the word is used in-
dicates that another meaning is intended.

Water connection means the connection of the
pipes, fittings and appurtenances from the water
riser pipe to the water inlet pipe for the water
distribution system of a mobile home or travel
trailer.

Il. CONSTRUCTION PERMIT REQUIRED FOR
MOBILE HOME PARK

A.

It shall be unlawful for any person to construct,
alter or extend any mobile home park within the
corporate limits of the Village of Brookside,
unless he shall first have obtained a mobile home
park construction permit therefor from the
Village.

Application for such permit shall be made to the

Planning Commission in triplicate and the follow-

ing information and items shall be furnished:

1. Name and address of applicant.

2. Interest of the applicant in the mobile home
park.

3. Location and legal description of the mobile
home park.

4. Complete engineering plans and specifications
in triplicate for the proposed park showing:

Cc.

23a

a. The area and dimensions of the trace of
land.

b. A plat or map of the proposed mobile home
park showing the number, location and size
of all mobile home sites, stands, locations
and widths of roadways and walkways, ser-

vice buildings and other proposed structures.
c. The location of water and sewer lines and
riser pipes. '

d. Plans and specifications for the water sup-
ply, including fire plugs, and refuse and
sewage disposal facilities.

e. Plans and specifications for all buildings to
be constructed within the mobile home park.

f. The location and details of lighting and elec-
trical systems.

g. Surface drainage plan.

A separate permit shall be required for the
building, electrical, plumbing and driveway-
sidewalk and other permits when required.

Any person who has been denied a mobile home
park permit, may appeal such denial by following
the same procedure provided for an appeal from a
license denial, revocation or suspension by the
Building Official.

A.

It shall be unlawful to establish, maintain or
operate a mobile home park without first securing
a mobile home park operator’s license therefor.

As an exception to the requirement for a license,

Cc.

24a

and as limited hereinafter, the owner or operator
of an existing mobile home park will be permitted
to continue operation of such park for a period of
six (6) months from the effective date of this Or-
dinance without obtaining a license therefor upon
the following conditions:

1. He shall make application for a license, paying
the required fee therefor within ninety (90) days
from the effective date of this Ordinance.

2. Upon receipt of his application, an investiga-
tion and inspection will be made of the existing
mobile home park.

3. The applicant will not be required to make any
modifications or changes in his existing mobile
home park if the variance from the re-

quirements of this ordinance is not dangerous
to life, health and safety of the public.

4. The Building Official shall furnish to the appli-
cant, in writing, a list of any necessary changes
or modifications in the existing mobile home
park, and it shall be the duty of the applicant to

commence making such changes in good faith.

For good cause, the Building Official may extend the
period for completion of such necessary changes or
modifictions for one additional period of six (6) mon-
ths, but in no event will an existing mobile home park
be permitted to continue operations, if, at the end of
one (1) year from the effective date of this Ordinance,
the owner thereof has not obtained a mobile home
park license. The owner or operator of an existing
mobile home park license. The owner or operator of
an existing mobile home park shall be entitled to ap-

25a

peal any required changes or modifications and any
denial of an extension of time for such changes or
modifications to the Planning Commission by follow-
ing the procedure that is provided for appeals for
license denials, revocations or suspension by the
Building Official, but the Planning Commission shall
have no authority to extend the period for completion
beyond one (1) year from the effective date of this Or-
dinance.

. It shall be unlawful for any mobile home park owner

or operator to continue operating any mobile home
park unless he shall have made application for a
mobile home park operator's license as provided
herein within ninety (90) days from the effective date
hereof.

It shall be unlawful for any mobile home park occu-
pant to continue occupying a mobile home or a travel
trailer located in a mobile home park which has not
been duly licensed by the Village or the owner or
operator which has not, within ninety (90) days from
the effective date of this Ordinance, made application
for a mobile home park operator's license. A ten-day
written notice of such failure of the owner or operator
of an existing mobile home park shall be given to the
occupants of such moi ile home park and the failure,
refusal or neglect of sich occupant or occupants to
remove their mobile home or travel trailer therefrom,
or to cease occupying such mobile home or travel
trailer within said ten-day period, shall constitute an
offense.

Licenses shall be valid for a period of one (1) year
beginning on July 1 of each year and shall be
renewable annually during the month of June. A non-

26a

refundable license application investigation fee of
$25.00 shall accompany each application for license,
provided such investigation fee will be allowed as a
credit upon the license if it is granted, The license fee
and annual license renewal fee shall be determined by
the following fee schedule:

2 through 15 mobile home stands $ 25.00
16 through 40 mobile home stands $ 50.00
41 through 60 mobile home stands $ 75.00
61 through 80 mobile home stands $100.00
Each stand in excess of 80 $ 1.00 each

. PERMITS

It shall be unlawful for any person to occupy a mobile
home or travel trailer in a mobile home park without
first securing a parking permit therefor except that no
permit will be required for the use of a mobile home
park for a period of seven (7) days or less.

It shall be unlawful for any person to occupy a mobile
home or travel trailer in a mobile home park unless
such vehicle has first been connected to the approved
utilities exclusive of telephones available in such park.

It shall be unlawful for the occupant of a mobile
home or travel trailer to connect or permit such vehi-
cle to be connected to the available utilities in a
mobile home park or for such vehicle to remain so
connected, without first securing a parking permit ex-
cept that no permit will be required for the use of a
mobile home park for a period of seven (7) days or
less.

27a

It shall be the responsibility of a mobile home
park licensse, his agents or employees, to notify
the Village of Brookside, in writing, when any
mobile home or travel trailer is to be connected to
the available utilities in the mobile home park
operated by the licensee. Failure to perform such
notification shall constitute a misdemeanor under
the terms of this Ordinance.

An arinual parking permit shall be valid for the
period from January | through December 31 of
the year of issuance. A semi-annual parking per-
mit shall be valid for the period from January |
through June 30, or July 1 through December 31
of the year of issuance. An annual or a semi-
annual parking permit may be issued only by the
Village and such permits may not be issued by
licensees or mobile home dealers. Application for
an annual parking permit or a semi-annual park-
ing permit shall be made to the Building Official.
A cash fee of $18.00 shall be paid for an annual
permit and no proration shall be allowed for an
elapsed period of time in the year of issunce. A
cash fee of $10.00 shall be paid for a semi-annual
parking permit. Applications may be made by
mail to the Building Official.

A temporary parking permit may be used in lieu
of an annual or semi-annual parking permit and it
shall be valid for a period of thirty (30) days from
the date of issuance. A temporary parking permit
may be obtained from the Building Official, in the
same manner as an annual or semi-annual parking
permit upon payment of a $5.00 cash fee.

28a

A parking permit may be assigned in connection
with the sale, lease, or renting of a mobile home or
travel trailer or a permit holder may transfer a
parking permit from one vehicle to another. Ap-
plication for such assignment or transfer shall be
made to the Building Official who shall furnish
the necessary forms. A service charge of $2.00 will
be made for each transfer or assignment. This
provision is not to be construed as requiring an
assignment of a parking permit from the seller in
whose name the parking permit has been issued to
the purchaser, provided the seller has delivered to
the purchaser his receipt for such parking permit.

If the Building Official is furnished satisfactory
proof that a parking permit which has been issued
has been lost, destroyed or defaced, he may issue a
replacement permit for the unexpired term of such
permit, upon payment of a service charge of
$2.00. The Building Official may prescribe such
forms and requirements as he may, from time to
time, find necessary ‘0 insure that no replacement
parking permit is improperly issued.

The Building Official is hereby authorized to
prescribe the form of parking permits and to re-
quire that additional relevant information be fur-
nished, either in the application for parking per-
mits, upon the face or back of the parking permit,
or upon the receipt there>’, The Building Official
is further hereby authorized to designate the place
on or within a mobile home or travel trailer, that a
parking permit shall be affixed or replaced and the
failure, refusal or neglect of a parking permit
holder to comply with this requirement, shall con-

stitute an offense and the Building Official is
hereby authorized to disconnect or cause to be
disconnected the available utilities in a mobil
home park from such vehicle.

V. INSPECTION OF MORILE HOME PARK

A.

The inspecting authority shall make such inspec-
tion as necessary to insure compliance with the
provisions of this Ordinance, semiannually, on
the first day of January and the first day of July
each year, or as soon thereafter as possible.

By the acceptance of the license, the licensee shall
be deemed to authorize the inspection of a mobile
home park at all reasonable hours. Such hours
shall usually be during normal working hours and
failure to permit such inspection shall be a ground
for suspension and/or revocation of the license.
Where there is reason to believe a violation may
exist before or after the hours of normal inspec-
tion, the Building Official may authorize special
inspections at any time; provided, however,
nothing herein shall prohibit inspection for valid
parking permits at any time.

Failure or refusal of a mobile home park occupant
to permit inspection by the inspecting authority,
or to permit the licensee to make necessary repairs
or alterations in compliance with the requirements
of the inspecting authority shall constitute a
ground for disconnection of the utilities serving
such mobile home. The mobile home occupant
shall have the right to appeal any decision, order
or action of the Building Official or the inspecting

30a

authority by following the same procedure provid-
ed for appeals from license denials, suspensions or
revocations by the Building Official.

VI. WRITTEN NOTICES OF VIOLATIONS TO BE

CUMULATIVE OF PENAL PROVISIONS
A.

The inspecting authority may issue written notice
of violations to the licensee or his agent, or to any
owner or operator for a mobile home park
operating without a license during the first year
from the effective date of this Ordinance, or to
any mobile home park occupant, setting out the
particular violation and setting out a time for
making the necessary correction or repair.

The person receiving such a notice shall have the

right of appeal from license denials, suspensions
or revocations by the Building Official.

The provision for written notices shall be
cumulative of the penal provisions hereinafter
provided and the issuance of a written notice shall
not prevent the filing of a criminal charge for
violation of the provisions of this Ordinance.

VII. APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF BUILDING

A.

OFFICIAL, ETC.

Any person whose application for a license has
been denied by the Building Official, shall have
the right to appeal such decision to the Board of
Aldermen, by mailing postpaid or delivering to
the Village Secretary, City Hall, Brookside
Village, Texas, written notice of appeal within ten
(10) days after he has been notified of such denial.

3la

The Building Official shall have authority to sus-
pend or revoke licenses or to order utility discon-
nections for the following violations of the provi-
sions of this Ordinance:

1. A license may be suspended for any period of
time up to six (6) months for a violation affect-
ing the health, safety or welfare of occupants of
a mobile home or of other persons or property.

2. A license may be revoked for a violation which
is dangerous to life.

3. For a violation of the provisions of this Or-
dinance not deemed to require a license suspen-
sion or revocation, the utility connection servic-
ing any stand or stands, or any structure in a
mobile home park, may be disconnected or
caused to be disconnected, provided a utility
disconnection may be ordered in connection
with a license suspension or revocation as to all
or any part of a mobile home park if necessary
to protect life or property.

After the period of suspension, a suspended
license will be reinstated by the Building Official
upon a showing or ability and willingness by the
licensee to comply with the provisions of this Or-
dinance :

A person whose license has been revoked, may ap-
ply for a new license six (6) months after such
revocation by making a new application and pay-
ing the required fee therefor. Before granting such
new license, the Building Official shall require the
applicant to show ability and willingness to comp-
ly with the provisions of this Ordinance.

E.

32a

No sale, transfer or assignment of a revoked
license or of a license during the period of suspen-
sion will be recognized by the Village, provided a
person whose license has been suspended or
revoked, may sell, transfer or assign his interest in
the premises, if any, to another person who may
then make application for a license to operate the
mobile home park. If it is shown by the applicant
that he has had no responsible connection with the
mobile home park, he will be eligible for the
granting of a new license and if a new license is
granted, the new licensee may commence to
operate the mobile home park upon issuance of
the license.

Where a person whose license has been suspended
or revoked, has no interest in the premises other
than by agreement with the owner or owners of
the premises, such person may advise the Village
in writing of his withdrawal from any further con-
nection with the mobile home park. In this event,
and if it be shown that the owner or owners had
no responsibie connection with the actual opera-
tion and maintenance of the mobile home park, a
new application may be made by any person other
than the person whose license was suspended or
revoked and if the new license is granted, the new
licensee may commence to operate the mobile
home park upon issuance of the license.

Appeals:

1. Any license revocation or suspension, or any
order for a utility disconnection, or any deci-
sion, order or action taken by the Building Of-
ficial may be appealed by any person affectd by

33a

the decision, order or action to the Board by fil-
ing written notice of appeal within ten (10) days
from the date of notice of such action, by mail-
ing postpaid or delivering such notice to the
Village Secretary, Brookside Village, Texas.

2. Upon written appeal as described in VII. G. 1,
has been made within ten (10) days, a license
suspension or revocation, or any decision or ac-
tion by the Building Official, will be held in
abeyance and such person will be given a hear-
ing before the Board, provided any utility
disconnection shall not be reconnected unless
authorized by the Board after hearing.

VIII. MOBILE HOME REVIEW BOARD

A.

The Board of Aldermen is hereby designated to be
the Mobile Homes Review Board.

The Fire Marshal, Electrical Inspector and the
Chief Building Inspector are designated as exof-
ficio members.

Appeals to the Board shall be set for hearing
within fifteen (15) days from the date notice of ap-
peal was received by the Chairman, whenever
possible. Such hearings may be continued from
time to time until completed, but a final decision
shall be made within thirty (30) days from the date
notice of appeal was received by the Chairman,
unless by consent or request of the person appeal-
ing, a hearing is set for or continued beyond such
thirty (30) day period.

The Board shall have authority to affirm, modify
or reverse the decision of or action of the Building

34a

Official. The Building Official, a licensee, or any
person who appeals a decision or action of the
Building Official, may appeal a decision or action
of the Board to the Village Council by mailing
postpaid or delivering to the Village Secretary
written notice of appeal address to the Mayor and
the Village Council, City Hall, Brookside Village,
Texas, within ten (10) days after he has been
notified of the decision of the Board.

A license suspension, revocation, utility discon-
nection order, or other decision or action of the
Building Official, which has been upheld by the
Board, shall be immediately effective, subject
however, to the right of the person affected
thereby, to appeal to the Village Council as pro-
vided above. The decision of the Village Council
on any appeals from the Board to the Village
Council, shall be final.

IX. ENVIRONMENTAL, OPEN SPACE AND

ACCESS REQUIREMENTS
A.

General Requirements: Condition of soil, ground
water level, drainage and topography shall not
create hazards to the property or the health or
safety of the occupants. The site shall not be ex-
posed to objectionable adverse influences and no
portion subject to unpredictable and/or sudden
flooding, subsidence or erosion shall be used for
any purpose which would expose persons or pro-
perty to hazards.

Soil and Ground Cover Requirements: Exposed
ground surfaces in all parts of every mobile home
park shall be paved, or covered with stone screen-

J

35a

ings, or other solid material, or protected with a

vegetative growth that is capable of preventing
soil erosion and of eliminating objectionable dust.

Site Drainage Requirements: The ground surface
in all parts of every mobile home park shall be
graded and equipped iv drain all surface water in
a safe, 2fficient manner.

Park Areas for Non-resident uses

1. Mobile homes shall be separated from each
other and from other buildings and stri .. "res
by at least ten (10) feet on the sides and ena-to-
end clearance of ten (10) feet.

2. Nothing contained in this section shall be
deemed to prohibit the sale of a mobile home
located on a mobile home stand and connected
to the utilities.

Required Separation between mobile homes in

mobile home parks

1 Mobile homes shall be separated from each
other and from other buildings and structures
by at least ten (10) feet on the sides and end-to-
end clearance of ten (10) feet.

2. An accessory structure which has a horizontal
area exceeding twenty-five (25) square feet, is
attached to a mobile home or located within ten
(10) feet of its window, and has an opaque top
or roof that is higher than the nearest window,
shall, for purposes of all separation re-
quirements, be considered to be part of the
mobile home.

36a

F. Required recreation areas.

1. In all parks accommodating or designed to ac-
commodate twenty-five (25) or more mobile
homes, there shall be not less than one (1)
recreation area which shall be easily accessible
to all park residents.

2. The size of such recreation areas shall be based
upon a minimum of 200 square feet for each
mobile home stand. No outdoor recreation area
shall contain less than 2,500 square feet.

3. All mobile home parks shall provide screening
such as fences or natural growth along the pro-
perty boundary line separating the park and ad-
jacent land.

4. The minimum lot size shall be forty (40) feet by
seventy-five (75) feet.

G. Required Lot size, setbacks, ruffer strips and
screening in mobile home parks.

1. All mobile homes shall be located at least twenty-
five (25) feet from any boundary line abutting
upon a public street or highway and at least five
(5) feet from interior property boundary lines.

2. There shall be a minimum distance of ten (10) feet
between individual mobile homes and four (4) feet
from adjoining pavement of a park street, or com-
mon parking area, or other common areas.

3. All mobile home parks shall provide screening
such as fences or natural growth along the proper-
ty boundary line separating the park and adjacent
land.

37a

The minimum lot size shall be forty (40) feet by
seventy-five (75) feet.

Park street system.

1. General Requirements: All movile home parks
shall be provided with safe and convenient
vehicular access from abutting public streets or
roads to the internal parking area or mobile
home stand. Alignment and gradient shall be
properly adapted to topography.

2. Access: Access to mobile home parks shall be
designed to minimize congestion and hazards at
the entrance or exit and allow free movement of
traffic on adjacent streets. The entrance road
connecting the park streets with the public
streets or roads shall have a minimum road
pavement width of 34 feet, where parking is
permitted on both sides, or a minimum road
pavement width of twenty-seven (27) feet where
parking is limited to one side. Where the
primary entrance road is more than 100 feet
long and does not provide access to abutting
mobile home lots within such distance, the
minimum road pavement width may be 24 feet,
provided parking is prohibited at both sides.

3. Internal Streets: Surfaced roadways shall be of
adequate width to accommodate anticipated
traffic, and in any case shall meet the following
minimum requirements:

a. All streets, except minor streets, shall be not
less than 24 feet in width.

b. Minor streets, when parking is prohibited,

38a

shall not be less than 20 feet in width. Such a
street will be acceptable ony if it is less than
500 feet long and serves fewer than 25 mobile
homes, provided, such street may exceedd
500 feet if it is a one-way street and provides
access to abutting mobile home sites on one
side only.

Dead-end streets shall not exceed 1,000 feet
in length. Such street shall be provided with
a turn-around at the closed end and having
an outside roadway diameter of at least 75
feet.

4. Required Illumination of Park Street Systems:
All mobile homes shall be furnished with
lighting units so spaced and equipped with
luminaries placed at such mounting heights as
will provide the following average maintained
levels of illumination for the safe movement of
pedestrians and vehicles at night:

All parts of the park street system shall
average 0.6 foot-candles and no part shall
have less than 0.1 foot-candles.

. Potentially hazardous locations, such as ma-

jor street intersections and steps or stepped
ramps shall be individually illuminated and
shall have a minimum of 0.3 foot-candles. -

5. Street Construction and Design Standards

Pavement: All streets shall be paved and well
drained under normal use and weather con-
ditions. Pavement edges shall be protected to
prevent raveling of the wearing surface and
shifting of the pavement base. Street sur-

39a

faces shall be maintained free of dust,
cracks, holes and other hazards.

b. Grades: Grades of all streets shall be suffi-
cient to insure adequate surface drainage,
but shall be not more than eight (8%) per-
cent. Short runs with a maximum grade of
twelve (12%) percent may be permitted, pro-
vided traffic safety is assured by appropriate
paving, adequate leveling areas and
avoidance of lateral curves.

c. Intersections: Within 100 feet of an intersec-
tion, streets shall be approximately right
angles. A distance of at least 150 feet shall be
maintained between center lines of offset in-
tersecting streets. Intersections of more than
two(2) streets at one (1) Point shall be avoid-
ed.

d. Minimum standards for paving streets is six-
inch (6”) cement, limestone or stabilized shell
sealed and topped with one-and-one-half
inch asphalt.

I. Required Off-Street Parking Areas

1. Off-street parking areas shall be provided in all
mobile home parks for the use of park oc-
cupants and guests. Such areas shall be fur-
nished at the rate of not less than two (2) spaces
for each mobile home stand, each space to be
accessible without moving another car.

2. Required car parking spaces shall be so located
as to provide convenient access to the mobile
home, but shall not exceed a distance of forty

40a

(40) feet from the mobile home that it is in-
tended to serve.

J. Walks

1. General Requirements: All parks shall be pro-
vided with safe, convenient all-season pe-
destrian access walks of adequate width for
the intended use, constructed of durable
material (asphalt, concrete, or other masonary
construction approved by the Building
Official), and convenient to maintain, and such
walk shall be placed between individual mobile
homes, the park streets and all community
facilities provided for park residents. Sudden
changes in alignment and gradient shall be
avoided. Shell walk are unacceptable.

2. Common Walk System: A common walk system
shall be provided and maintained between loca-
tions where pedestrian traffic is concentrated.
Such common walks shall have a minimum of
three (3) feet, and meet the requirements of J. 1.
above.

3. Individual Walks: All mobile home stands
shall be connected by individual walks to a
common walk, or paved street, or to a paved
driveway or parking space which is connected
to a paved street. Such individual walks shall
have a minimum width of two (2) feet and
otherwise meet to requirements of J. 1. above.

K. Mobile Home Stands

1. The area of the mobile home stand shall be im-
proved to provide en adequate foundation for

4la

the placement and tie-down of the mobile
home, thereby securing the superstructure
against uplift, sliding, rotation and overturn-
ing.

2. The mobile home stand shall not heave, shift or
settle unevenly under the weight of the mobile
home due to inadequate drainage, vibration or
other forces acting on the superstructure.

3. Mobile home stands shall be constructed of
reinforced concrete and plan shall be subject to
approval of the Village Engineer.

X. WATER SUPPLY

A. General Requirements

1. An accessible, adequate, safe, and potable sup-
ply of water shall be provided in each mobile
home park. Where a public supply of water of
satisfactory quantity, quality, and pressure is
available, connection shall be made thereto and
its supply used exclusively.

2. When a satisfactory public water supply is not
available, a private water supply system may be
developed and used as approved by the Village.

B. Source of Supply
1. The water supply shall be capable of supplying
a minimum of 150 gallons per day per mobile
home.

2. Every well or suction line of the water supply
system shall be located and constructed in such
a manner that neither underground nor surface
contamination will reach the water supply from

42a
any source. The following minimum distances
between wells and various sources of con-
tamination shall be required:

Contamination Source Well or Suction Line

Building Sewer 50 feet
Septic Tank 50 feet
Disposal Field 100 feet

3. No well casings, pumping machinery or suction
pipes shall be placed in any pit, room or space
extending below ground level nor in any room
or space above ground which is walled in or
otherwise enclosed, unless such rooms, whether
above or below ground, have free drainage by
gravity to the surface of the ground.

4. The treatment of a private water supply shall be
in accordance with applicable laws and regula-
tions.

Water Storage Facilities

1. All water storage reservoirs shall be covered,
watertight and constructed of impervious
material. Overflows and vents of such reser-
voirs shall be effectively screened. Manholes
shall be constructed with overlapping covers, so
as to prevent the entrance of contaminated
material.

2. Reservoir overflow pipes shall discharge
through an acceptable air gap.

Water Distribution System

1. The water supply system of a mobile home park

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shall be connected by pipes or other approved
material to all mobile homes, buildings, and
other facilities requiring water.

2. All water piping, fixtures and other equipment
shall be constructed and maintained in accor-
dance with the requirements of the Building
Code and shall be of a type and in a location ap-
proved by the inspecting authority.

3. The water piping system shall not be connected
with nonpotable or questionable water supplies
and shall be protected against the hazards of
backflow, back siphonage or cross connection.

4. The system shall be so designed and maintained
as to provide a pressure of not less than twenty
(20) pounds per square inch, under normal
operating conditions at service buildings and
other locations requiring potable water supply.

5. The system shall be a looped system in order to
better maintain water pressure.

Individual Water-Riser Pipes and Connections

1. The individual water riser pipes shall be located
within the confined area of the mobile home
stand at a point where the water connection will
approximate a vertical position.

Water riser pipes shall extend at least four (4) in-
ches above ground elevation. The pipe shall be
not less than three-quarter inch in diameter.
The water outlet shall be capped when a mobile
home does not occupy the stand.

d4a

3. Adequate provision shall be made to prevent
freezing service lines. Valves and riser pipes
shall be protected from heaving and/or thawing
actions of the ground. Surface drainage shall be
diverted from the location of the riser pipe.

4.A shut-off valve shall be provided near the
water riser on each mobile home stand.

5. Underground stop waste valves shall not be in-
stalled on any water service.

Fire Plugs - Fire plugs shall be placed on at least
six (6) inch lines and all mobile home stands must
be within 400 feet of the nearest plug, if a public
water supply system is available. This requirement
shall not apply if a private water system services
said park, or if a public water supply source is not
available.

XI. SEWAGE DISPOSAL

A.

General - An adequate and safe sewerage system,
shall be provided in mobile home parks. Such
system shall be designed, constructed and main-
tained in accordance with Village ordinances and
the Village of Brookside Building Code. All sewer
lines shall be connected to the Village of
Brookside sewer lines, if such sewer lines are
availablle.

Sewer Lines - All sewer lines shall be located in
trenches of sufficient depth to be free of breakage
from traffic or other movements and shall be
separated from the park water supply system at a
safe distance as provided by State law and or-
dinance of the Village. Sewers shall be at a grade
which will insure adequate flow as provided in the

4Sa

Building Code. All sewer lines shall be constructed
of approved materials, shall be adequately vented,
and shall have watertight joints.

Individual Sewer Connections

1. Each mobile

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_1032%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
