# Jurisdictional Statement — Florida v. Zafra

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Jurisdictional Statement
- **Published:** January 1, 1982
- **Citation:** 459 U.S. 986

## Text

g2-867

- Supreme Court, ¥
FILED -

OCci 13 1982

NO ALEX uri) ta
CPFRK

\. STEVAS,

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1982

THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Petitioner,
vs.

SILVIO P. ZAFRA,
Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the Florida Third District Court of Appeal

BRIEF OF PETITIONER ON JURISDICTION

JIM SMITH
Attorney General

CALVIN L. FOX

Assistant Attorney General
401 N.W. 2nd Averue

Suite 820

Miami, Florida 33128

(305) 377-5441

i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED

WHETHER THE DECISION OF THE FLORIDA
COURT LIMITING THE AUTHORITY OF THE
UNITED STATES CONGRESS AND CONSTRUING
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION,
HOLDING THAT UNDER 19 U.S.C. $1581(a)
UNITED STATES CUSTOMS OFFICERS MAY
NOT BOARD A VESSEL IN CUSTOMS WATERS
FOR A ROUTINE DOCUMENT EXAMINATION
WITHOUT REASONABLE SUSPICION OR
PROBABLE CAUSE, IS IN DIRECT
DEROGATION OF THIS COURT'S OON-
STITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF SEARCHES IN
PROXIMITY TO A BORDER AND IS IN
DIRECT OONFLICT WITH THE HIGHEST
FOS. CNT WS BE SOS JeRIeDIC-
TION IN UNITED STATES v. ALFREY

620 F.2d (5th Cir. 1980) HOLDING THAT
UNDER 19 U.S.C. §1581(a) UNITED
STATES CUSTOMS OFFICERS NEED NEITHER
REASONABLE SUSPICION NOR PROBABLE
CAUSE TO BOARD A VESSEL IN CUSTOM'S
WATERS FOR A ROUTINE DOCUMENT EXAMI-
NATION.

WHETHER THE TRIAL DISTRICT COURT'S
FLAT REJECTION OF THE STATE'S CUSTOMS
DRUG SMUGGLER PROFILE PRESENTATION
REASONABLE SUSPICION ANALYSIS IS IN
DIRECT CONFLICT WITH UNITED STATES v.
MENDENHALL, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) AND —
UNITED STATES v. CORTEZ, 449 U.S.
GIT (1981) AND IS AN ERRONEOUS CON-
STRUCTION OF THE UNITED STATES OON-
STITUTION.

ia

3. WHETHER THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE SHOULD
BE APPLIED TO NON-EGREGIOUS POLICE
CONDUCT. SEE, MICHIGAN v.
DEFILLIPPO, 443 U.S. 31 (1979), SEE,
ALSO, UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS, 622
F.2d 830, at 840-847 (Sth Cir. 1980)
a. cert. den., 449 U.S. 1127

ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CITATIONS. ......

iii
TABLE OF CITATIONS

UNITED STATES CASES PAGE

Carroll v. United States,
a oh Cee CUMS «6 @ 6 © 6 a oe) We eee

24
Chambers v. wwii
ck Se! 2, ee ee

Texas v. White,

423 U.S. 67 (1975) . . 23

United States v. Cortez,
a wa. Gey Geeeise 6 6 6 ee 6 8 caus
3

United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544 (1980) ......-s acs
3

United States v. Ramsey,
i eR ee 6 ee ee ee

CASES

Bonner v.

Casal v.
375

Hetland
366

Hetland
387

Morales
407

State v.

iv

TABLE OF CITATIONS

State,

City of Prichard, Alabama,
661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir.

1981) .

So.2d 1077 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).

v. State,
So.2d 831

v. State,
So.2d 963

v. State,
So.2d 321

Doyle,

(Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
(Fla. 1980) ...

(Fla. 3d DCA 1981)

409 So.2d 1168 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).

State v.

Hayes,

333 So.2d 51 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)

State v.

Zafra,

408 So.2d 745 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)

United States v.
569 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1978) ..

United States v.

United States v. spe
630 F.2d 328 (Sch Cir. 19 0) —

Adams,

Alfrey,
620 F.2d (5th Cir. 1980) ....

pinosa-Cer

PAGE

11,20

i,11,18
20 ,21

v

TABLE OF CITATIONS

CASES

United States v. Forbicetta,
484 F.2d 645 (5th Cir. 1973) ..

United States v. Freeman,

579 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1979)...
United States v. Glaziou,

402 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1968). ....

United States v. bmw &
546 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1977) ..

United States v. Sandler,
644 F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1981)...

United States v. Williams,
617 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1980).

PAGE

vi
TABLE OF CITATIONS

OTHER AUTHORITIES PAGE

Amendment IV, U. S. Constitution... 4
Amendment XIV, U.S. Constitution... 4&4

First Congress Act of July 31, 1789,
Gh.3, § Stat. 29 CUFGD). we ec ecevcee VW

Title 19, United States Code $1401(j). 17
Title 19, United States Code $1581(a). i,2,5,8
11,14
15,17
18,19
21,25
27
Title 19, United States Code $1582 .. 14
Title 21, United States Code $955. .. 15

Title 28, United States Code $1257(3). 2

vii
PREFACE

The Petitioner, THE STATE OF FLORIDA, was
the Petitioner in the Supreme Court of Florida;
the Appellant in the District Court of Appeal
of Florida, Third District and the prosecution
in the Florida trial court. The Respondent,
SILVIO P. ZAFRA, was the Respondent in the
Supreme Court of Florida; the Appellee in the
District Court and the Defendant in the trial
court. In this brief, the parties will be
referred to as they appeared in the Florida
trial court below.

The following reference is made in this
brief:

(A) For the portions of the record below
sufficient to show jurisdiction in this court,
which are contained in the Petitioner's
Appendix and consist of pages Al-A30.

1
I.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the District Court of
Florida, Third District affirming the Florida

trial court's granting of the Defendant's
Motion to Suppress is reported at State v.
Zafra, 408 So.2d 745 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). The
opinion of the Florida Supreme Court denying
the State's Application for review , is
contained in the Petitioner's Appendix at "A2"
and will be reported by the West Publishing
Company. The West Publishing Company citation
is the official reporter for citation to these
opinions.

2
Il.
JURISDICTION

On July 15, 1982, the Supreme Court of
Florida denied the State's timely application
for review. A2. On September 13, 1982, this
Honorable Court (by Justice Powell) extended
the time for filing the present petition up to
and including October 13, 1982. The
jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under the
provisions of Title 28, United States Code,
$1257(3); Title 19, United States Code
$1581(a); and Amendments IV and XIV of the
United States Constitution.

The interpretation of the Florida
Constitution and the United States Constitution
are identical for purposes of the application
of the criminal law and search and seizure
issues. Hetland v. State, 366 So.2d 831 (Fla.

2d DCA 1979) approved and adopted, Hetland v.

3
State, 387 So.2d 963 (Fla, 1980). The
constitutional issues herein were presented and
fully argued at all levels of the proceedings
below. See, State v. Zafra, 408 So.2d 745
(Fla. 3d DCA 1982); A25-A30.

The second issue in the present cause
regarding the use of a drug smuggler's
“profile” is pending on the merits before this
Court in Florida v. Royer, U.S.Sup.Ct. Case No.
80-2146. The issues of the authority of law
enforcement officers to conduct routine
document and inspections of watercraft in the

present case is pending on the merits in
Florida v. Casals, U.S.Sup.Ct. Case No.
81-2318, cert. granted October 4, 1982.

4
Ill,

CONSTITUTION AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Amendment IV of the Constitution of the United
States provides that:

"The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized."

Amendment XIV of the Constitution of the United
States provided that:

"All persons born naturalized in
the United States,and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States
and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or
immmities of the citizens of
the United States; nor shall any
State ve any person of
life, liberty, or .
without due process law; nor
deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the

protection of the y

5
Title 19 United States Code §1581(a) provides
specifically that:

“Any officer of the customs
May at time go on board of
any ves or vehicle at any
place in the United States or
within the customs waters or, as
he amy be authorized, within a
customs enforcement area
established under the
Anti-Smuggling Act, or at any
other authorized place, without
as well as within its district,
and examine the manifest and

package, or cargo on board, and
to this end may hail and stop
such vessel or vehicle, and use
all necessary force to compel
compliance."

6
IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant, Silvio P. Zafra, was
charged by information with three counts

consisting of one count of trafficking in
marijuana, arising out of his attempt on
October 10, 1980 to bring ashore one thousand
(1000) pounds of marijuana in a twenty five
(25) foot speedboat. The Defendant filed a
motion to suppress, which the Florida trial
court granted after a hearing.

At the hearing below the State produced
three witnesses. The Defendant did not testify
and produced no witnesses or evidence. United
States Customs Officer Richard Ogden said that
he had been trained by the Customs Service to
intercept contraband coming into the United
States by plane and boat. AIl0. On October 10,
1980 he went duty at six p.m. and began a

7
routine survey of boats in the Crandon boat
ramp area. Al2.

The customs officers at 3:00 o'clock a.m.
encountered the Defendant's boat in customs
waters. A25. It was undisputed below that the
customs officer thereupon decided to conduct a
routine customs boarding. Al5. Officer
Nassosis checked the boat's papers. A24,
Officer Ogden stepped onto the trailer fender
and looked into the boat. AI5. The deck was
much higher than the manufacturer had put in.
Al5. Ogden said that this was a characteristic
profile of smugglers. Al6. The trend among
smugglers had evolved from throwing contraband
into cabins to stowing contraband in hidden
compartments. Al6. Odgen testified that he
observed marijuana residue on the boat carpet.
Al7. There was also a rise in the carpet
evidently covering a hatch area. Al7. Odgen
testified that he considered this suspicious--

8
the way the vessel was constructed there should
not have been a hatch of that nature under the
carpet tacked to the deck. Al8. The boat had
no fishing gear and only tools and mechanics
tools om the deck. Al8. Odgen said he pulled
the carpet back and an odor of marijuana was
coming out. A21. The hatch was secured by
screws. AZ1. In the hatch were twelve (12)
bales of marijuana weighing one thousand
pounds. A22. The other custom's officers
testimony was similar.

Upon the foregoing the prosecutor argued
in part that the present custom's boarding was
proper under 19 U.S.C. §1581(a) even if neither
reasonable suspicion nor probable cause was
present. See, State v. Zafra, 408 So.2d 745
(Fla. 3d DCA 1982); A23. The Florida trial
court suppressed the evidence holding that
there was no reasonable suspicion or probable

cause for the seizure. Id.

9
On Appeal to the Third District Court of
Appeal the District Court affirmed the trial
court, holding that customs officers cannot
conduct routine customs boarding to check
papers without reasonable suspicion or probable
cause, to wit:

"We join the trial court in
rejecting the state's position
that the apparently unrestricted
authority conferred by the terms
-5.C, 1(a) is not
limited by the reasonableness
requirement of the fourth
amendment and that a customs
officer may therefore make an
investigative stop and
subsequent search of the vessel
in inland waters even though
there is neither (a) evidence of
a boarder cross or its
functional equi t, nor (b)
prior reasonable suspicion of

a. activity." [Emphasis
footnotes omitted].

On July 15, 1982, the Florida Supreme Court
denied the State's timely Petition for Review.
A2. On September 13, 1982 this Honorable Court
extended the time for filing the present
petition up to and including October 13, 1982.

10
V

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The present cause presents a
constitutional crisis, which only this Court
can resolve, The Florida Third District Court
of Appeal in Miami, Florida, which is the
leading and controlling Florida state court!
for analysis of federal and state “boat law,"
see, e.g., Casal v. State, 375 So.2d 1077 (Fla.
3d DCA 1979), affirmed in part, 410 So.2d 152
(Fla. 1982), cert. granted, Florida v. Casal,
U.S. Sup.Ct. Case No. 81-2318, opinion filed
October 4, 1982; State v. Doyle, 409 So.2d 1168
(Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Morales v. State, 407 So.2d
321 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), has reached a directly

1All Florida trial courts are bound by the
9 decision of the Florida Third District

Court. See, State v. 333 So.2d 51 (Fla.
4th DCA 1976). Moreover with the present joint
federal and state task force on narcotics
traffick centered in Miami and Florida, the
impact of the present decision cannot be
gainsaid.

11
contrary result upon the authority of federal
officers under a federal statute, than has the
highest federal court in the same
jurisdiction? in United States v. Alfrey, 620
F.2d 551 (Sth Cir. 1980) and United States v.
Freeman, 579 F.2d 942 (Sth Cir. 1979). In sum,

the Florida Third District Court of Appeal has
told the United States Congress that it cannot
do in Florida that which the face of 19 U.S.C.
§1581(a) clearly states Congress intended to
do: to give customs officers authority in
“customs waters” to board vessels for document
and customs examination, irrespective of
reasonable suspicion or probable cause.

The Florida trial court's rejection and
the Florida Third District Court's absolute
2all decisions of the United States Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals issued prior to
September 30, 1981 are binding upon the present
Eleventh Circuit Court of . Bonner v.

City of Prichard, Alabama, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th
Cir. (en banc).

12
refusal to accept the State's argument upon the
aspect of reasonable suspicion as predicated
upon a customs profile of drug smugglers and
the experience, training and observations of
the customs officers, is in direct conflict
with the proper constitutional analysis in
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544
(1980) and United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.
411 (1981). The State specially argued below
the application of the Carroll doctrine. See,
A27- A28; A25-A26. The Florida District
Court's erroneous analysis of “profiles;" the
experience of law enforcement officers and
reasonable suspicion herein is a continuation
and extension of the error by the same court
presently pending on the merits before this
Court in Florida v. Royer, U.S. Sup.Ct. Case
No, 80-2146. Additionally on October 4, 1982,
this Court accepted jurisdiction in Florida v.
Casal, U.S.Sup.Ct. Case No. 81-2318, which

13
involves state marine patrol officers and their
authority under a state statute, together with
an application of the Carroll doctrine which
are the same issues herein with respect to
federal officers under a federal statute.

The present case is therefore a
significant case relating directly to pending
cases in Casal and Royer, which would serve as
a substantial basis for this Court's analysis
of an area of critical importance to both the
proper analysis of the Criminal law and the
security and safety of the citizens of the
nation, The matter of the extent of the
authority of federal officers under a federal
statute as it occurs in the interdiction of
drug traffic is of crucial importance to both
Florida and the nation. This Court therefore
has jurisdiction herein and should exercise it.

14

Finally the approach, document examination
and search herein was conducted by the officers
in the good faith belief, that their actions
were lawful under 19 U.S.C. §1581(a) and that
the observed facts together with their
experience and training amounted to reasonable
suspicion and probable cause. See, Michigan
v. DeFillippo, 443 U. 31 (1979); United
States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (Sth Cir.
1980) (en banc), cert. den,, 449 U.S. 1127
(1981). The harsh result of the exclusionary
rule should not therefore be applied to

non-egregious conduct.

15
VI

ARGUMENT

The State stipulated below that this was
not a customs “border” search under 19 U.S.C.
$1582, but was a customs search under the
companion section, 19 U.S.C. $1581(a). A
border search by customs under 19 U.S.C. §1582
traditionally requires some degree of proof by
the prosecution that the vessel, vehicle,
aircraft or person has crossed a border. See,
e.g., United States v. Ivey, 546 F.2d 139 (Sth
Cir, 1977), cert. den. 431 U.S. 943, 97 S.Ct.
2662, 53 L.Ed.2d 263 (1977) (mere nexus); United
States v. Adams, 569 F.2d 924 (Sth Cir.
1978) (mere proof of nexus to border is
sufficient). The prosecutor herein for
whatever reason, did not argue that the matter
was a border search. But see, United States v.
Ivey; United States v. Adams, supra.

16
Through the enactment of 19 U.S.C. §1581(a)
Congress has also authorized customs officers

to stop and search vessels in customs waters,

to stem the importation of contraband or
undeclared merchandise to wit:

“Any officer of the customs may

See, United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063

(Sth Cir. 1980)(en banc). Concurrent with 19
U.S.C. $1581(a) Congress has also provided
customs officers with authority to stem the
importation of narcotics, in 21 U.S.C. $955,
which provides that it is:

or the cus territory of the
United States, ———*
substance. . ." [Emphasis
added].

See, United States v. Espinosa-Cerpa, 630 F.2d
328, at 334 (5th Cir. 1980). These statutes
have been broadly construed with respect to the
statutory powers of customs officials. See,
United States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. den. 393 U.S. 1121, (1969). The
Supreme Court has only limited the historical

right of the sovereign to control its borders
to proximity to the border. Warrantless

searches in customs territory are deemed
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment by virtue of the fact that they occur
at the border. See, United States v. Sandler,
644 F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Freeman, 579 F.2d 942 (Sth Cir. 1978); approved

18

in, United States v. Williams, 617 F.3d 1063,
at 1081 (5th Cir. 1980)(en banc); see also,
United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925);
First Congress Act of July 31, 1789, Ch.5, 1
Stat. 29 (1789). As the Third District Court
conceded, the authority o” customs officers
under 19 U.S.C. $1581(a) in customs waters in
indeed, plainly on the face of the statute not
limited by traditional Fourth Amendment
analysis. See, A5.

In the case at bar, and for all purposes,

"customs waters" are defined in 19 U.S.C.
1401(j) as, “the waters within four leagues [12
nautical miles) of the coast of the United
States." Within such a definition for purposes
of international law, the area from the coast
to three (3) nautical miles is also nom as
“territorial sea" and the area from three (3)
nautical miles to twelve (12) nautical miles is

19
also known as the “contiguous zone." See,
United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d at 1073,

n.6.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that
the vessel, which was searched was encountered

by the Customs officer's herein in customs
waters. Al4; A25 (prosecutor argument). Under
19 U.S.C. §1581(a) the customs officers herein
were not required to have either reasonable
suspicion nor probable cause for a detention or
search, See, United States v. Alfrey, 620 F.2d

551 (Sth Cir. 1980); United States v. Freeman,
579 F.2d 942 (Sth Cir. 1979), approved, United
States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063 at 1081 (Sth
Cir. 1980)(en banc). In Alfrey, supra, the
court held specifically that:

[T]he recent decision of this
Court in United States v.
Whitaker, 592 F.2d 826 (5th Cir.
1979), rehearing en banc denied,
601 F.2d 586, cert. denied, 444
U.S. 950, 100 S.Ct. 422, 62
L.Ed.2d 320, clearly holds that

20

United States Customs Officers
have authority under 19 U.S.C.
§1581(a) tos and board
vessels initially cited in
customs waters for document
check even in the absence of a
modicum of suspicion or le
cause. See also United States
v. Freeman, 579 F.2d 942, 945
(5th Cir. 1978). This
intepretation of section 1581(a)
does not offend the Fourth
Amendment. Whitaker, supra, 591
F.2d at 829; Freeman, supra, 579
F.2d at 946." [Emphasis added].

Similarly in Freeman, the customs officers
encountered, a sailboat within the three mile
limit with no indication whatsoever that it had
crossed any border, The Freeman Court noted
that there was no warrant, no probable cause
for a warrant and no reasonable suspicion to
stop the vessel, 579 F.2d at 945. However, the
court upheld the warrantless search of the
vessel pursuant to the express language in 19
U.S.C. $1581(a) explaining that:

21

"(T]he authority embodied within
§1581 may be traced back to the
commencement of the Republic
when the First Congress
statutorily granted Customs
officials powers. The
historical significance of the
enactment of such Customs
statutes by the same Congress
which proposed the Fourth
may st has been ——e by
Supreme Court. early,
members of the First

regaried neither seizures nor
° zed

by $1581 unreasonable’ or

embraced py the prouminen of
" is

added}.

Id. at 946-947.

Both Alfrey and Freeman are binding law for the
present federal jurisdiction. See, Bonner v.
Pritchard, supra, at n.2.

In the case at bar, it was undisputed that
after observing the circumstances, the Customs
officers decided to conduct a routine boarding
(A15) and that Officer Nasossis checked the

vessel's papers (A24). Under the express

22
authority of §1581 and the foregoing federal
substantive law, the initial detention and
search herein was without constitutional
defect. The District Court's holding that
under 19 U.S.C. §1581(a) that the federal
officers must show reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment cannot be reconciled and is in
direct conflict with the interpretation of the
United States Constitution in United States v.
Alfrey and United States v. Freeman, supra.

The present conflict presents a grave
constitutional crisis between the highest
federal appellate court having jurisdiction in
Florida and the Florida Third District Court of
Appeal which is the leading court for the
interpretation of 19 U.S.C. §1581(a) and "boat
law" in Florida. See, Florida v. Casals; State
v. Doyle; Morales v. State, supra. Furthermore
all Florida trial courts are bound by the pre-
sent decisions. State v. Hayes, supra, at nl.

23
Furthermore, the State would note that the
federal officers did indeed have reasonable
suspicion, based upon both their experience
with smugglers and their observations, to board
the vessel. See, United States v. Cortez, _

U.S.__, 101 S.Ct. 690 (1981); see, also,
United States v. Mendenhall, U.S. _, 100
S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (approving use
of profile characterisics); United States v.
Forbicetta, 484 F.2d 645, 646 (Sth Cir.

1973) (approving use of “profile”
characteristics at border search). Im Cortez
the Court repeated its approval of an officer's
use of his experience for probable cause and
art culable suspicion thus:

"The idea that an assessment of
the whole picture must yield a
particularized suspicion
contains two elements, each of
which must be present before a
stop is permissible. First, the
assessment must be based upon
all the circumstances. The
analysis proceeds with various

24

objective observations,
information form police reports,
if such are aailable, and
consideration of the modes or
patterns of operation of certain
kinds of lawbreakers. From
these data, a trained officer
draws inferences and makes
deductions--inferences and
deductions that might well elude
an untrained perrson."” [Emphasis
added]. 101 S.Ct. at 695.

Additionally, after the officers were on the
vessel, they certainly acquired probable cause
to search the hold from the presence and smell
of marijuana on the deck. When the officers so
clearly had probable cause to search the hold,
the warrantless search was obviously justified
by the exigency exception for vehicles and
boats. See, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925); See also, Texas v. White, 423 U.S.
67 (1975); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42
(1970).

The Florida District Court's and the trial

court's flat rejection of the States argument

25
upon articulable suspicion which was based upon
the customs "profile" and the observations,
training and experience of the officers, is
patently erroneous in the face of the correct
constitutional analysis in Mendenhall and

Cortez. The fact that the events transpired in
the proximity of a border is additionally a
fact, which the Florida courts erroneously
absolutely refused to credit. See, Cortez.

The Florida District Court's erroneous analysis
of "profiles" reasonable suspicion and “boat”

law is a direct continuation and extension of
the same erroneous analysis presently on review
upon the merits in Florida v. Royer, U.S.
Sup.Ct. Case No. 80-2146 and Florida v. Casal,
U.S. Sup.Ct. Case No. 81-2318, cert. granted,
October 4, 1982. Casal involves a state
statute authorizing document and safety checks
by state marine officers and the application of

26
the Carroll doctrine to that event. The
present cause involves precisely the same
authority and the Carroll doctrine in the
context of a special federal statute and
federal officers. This Court has never written
a definitive “boat" case opinion or explained
the parameters of 19 U.S.C. §1581(a). ‘The
State submits that the extraordinary federal
and state interest in resolving these issues is
cogently and timely presented by the present
cause and Casal. Florida with the presense of
a massive federal and state joint task force on
narcotics traffick; the greatest coast line and
the most geographic vulnerability to drug
traffic, is the ideal situs for consideration
of these issues. Certainly, the nation's stake
in Florida | a recognized corridor of drug
traffic is paramount. See, SELECT COMMITTEE ON
NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL, 95th CONG. 2D
SESS., REPORT ON PROBLEMS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT

27
AND ITS EFFORT TO REDUCE THE LEVEL OF DRUG
TRAFFICKING IN SOUTH FLORIDA. (Com. Print
1978). This Court should also exercise its
jurisdiction herein in the context of Florida
v. Royer, and the Florida Third District's
absolute rejection of any “profile” analysis
and refusal to credit the experience and
training of federal and state officers and the
proximity of the present transaction to the
nation's border, in its analysis. The issue of
the profile and reasonable suspicion for these
highly trained officers was raised at all
levels below. See, A25-A30.

Finally, the State submits that the cause
herein is in direct contravention to the good
faith analysis of this Court in Michigan v.
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979) where despite
the unconstitutional nature of the statute this
Court nevertheless sustained the seizure where
the officers were relying in good faith upon

28
the statute and its validity. The relationship
of DeFillippo to the present circumstance is
direct. The federal officers herein were
relying upon 19 U.S.C. $1581(a) and that, which
even the Florida District Court admits that the

statute plainly says the officers can do:
board any vessel in customs waters for document
and customs inspection. For Florida and all

federal customs officers in state court, the
present ruling squarely conflicts with Michigan
v. DeFillippo. Moreover, the officer's good
faith reliance upon their observations,
training and experience to conclude that a
detention was necessary, presents a
circumstance herein of plainly non-egregious
police conduct, to which the harsh penalty of
the exclusionary rule should find no
application. See, California v. Minjares, 443
U.S. 916 (1981) (Rehnquist, J. and Burger, J.,
dissenting); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, at

29
496-502 (1976) (Burger, J., concurring); Id, at
537-542 (White, J., dissenting); Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 419, at 420-429
(1977) (Burger, J. dissenting; Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, at 610-612 (Powell, J.
concurring); United States v. Williams, 622
F.2d 830 (Sth Cir. 1980)(en banc), cert. den.,
449 U.S. 1127 (1981).

30
VII
CONCLUS ION

The Florida Third District Court of Appeal's
holding that under 19 U.S.C. §1581(a) that the
State must show reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment cannot be reconciled and is in direct
conflict with the proper interpretation of the
United States Constitution and §1581(a) in,
United States v. Alfrey, and United States v.
Freeman, supra. At the same time, the decision
of the Florida Third District Court is binding
on all Florida trial courts and emanates from
the leading Florida state court in the
construction and analysis of “boat” law and
drug courier case law. The present matter is
plainly governed by the federal law and the
federal interest in maintaining the integrity
of the borders and “customs waters” of the
United States. This Court should take
jurisdiction of the present matter. Florida

31
has the greatest coastline of any state and a

grave interest in the consistent interpretation
of “boat law." The inconsistent and erroneous
analysis of the Florida District Court presents
a conflict on a matter of substantial public
and national importance, warranting the
exercise of this Court's jurisdiction. The
present decision's direct effect upon a
national federal and state effort in Florida to
stem the tide of drug traffic manifestly
supports the propriety of the exercise of this
Court's jurisdiction. The present cause
presents a most cogent and timely companion
Case on the question of federal officer's
authority under federal statutes together with
the issue of a state officer's authority and
the Carroll doctrine in Florida v. Casal, cert.
granted, October 4, 1982. Finally, the
extraordinary penalty of the exclusionary rule
should not be applied, to the federal officer's

32
good faith reliance upon the plain language of
the statute and where their actions are
non-egregious.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this _ day of
October, 1982, at Tallahassee, Leon County,
Florida.

JIM SMITH
Attorney General

CALVIN L. FOX, Esquire
Assistant Attorney General

APPENDIX

Al
CONTENTS

PAGE
Opinion, Supreme

Gemee OG PROUEEB. « oc ew ee et se ek

Opinion Florida
Third District

Court of Appeal. ......+-+-+ A&-A7

EXCERPTS: Hearing

On Motion to Suppress. ..... A8=-24

EXCERPT: Argument of Prosecutor. A25-A26

EXCERPT: State's Brief on Appeal. A27-A30

A2
SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
THURSDAY, JULY 15, 1982

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Petitioner, $
CASE NO. 61,844
vs. : District Court of
Appeal 3d District
SILVIO P. ZAFRA, : Case No. 81-474

Respondent. :

This cause having herefore been
submitted to the Court on jurisdictional
briefs and portions of the record deemed
necessary to reflect jurisdiction under
Article V, Section 3(b), Florida Consit-
tution (1980), and the Court having de-
termined that it should decline to accept
jurisdiction, it is ordered that the Pe-
tition for Review is denied.

No Motion for Rehearing will be en-
tertained by the Court. See Fla.R.App.P.
9.330 (d).

ALDERMAN, C.J., ADKINS, BOYD, OVFRTON, and
McDONALD, JJ., Concur

TC
cc:

A3

Hon. Louis J. Spallone, Clerk
Hon. James R. Jorgenson, Judge
Hon. Richard P. Brinker, Clerk

Calvin L. Fox, Esquire
Paul Morris, Esquire
William A. Clay, Esquire

A4

IN THE DISTRICT COURT
OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
THIRD DISTRICT

JANUARY TERM, A.D. 1982

THE STATE OF FLORIDA, ak

Appellant, ae
vs. ** CASE NO. 81-474
SILVIO P. ZAFRA, ae

Appellee. ae

Opinion filed January 12, 1982.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for
Dade County, James R. Jorgenson, Judge.

Jim Smith, Attorney General, for
appellant.

Paul Morris; Rosen,Portela, Bronis,
Angueira & Clay and William A. Clay, for
appellee.

Before HUBBART, C.J. and BARKDULL AND
SCHWARTZ, JJ.

Schwartz, setes.

We join the trial court in rejecting
the state's position that the apparently
unrestricted authority conferred by the
terms of 19 U.S.C. §1581 a te not
limited by the reasonableness requirement

of the fourth amendment and that a customs

officer may therefore make an investigation

1. $1581. Boarding vessels

(a) Any officer of the customs may at
any time go on board of any vessel or vehi-
cle at any place in the United States or
within the customs waters or, as he may be
authorized, within a customs-enformecenmt
area established under the Anti-Smuggling
Act, or at any other authorized place, with-
out as well as within his district, and ex-
amine the manifest and other documents and
papers and examine, inspect, and search the
vessel or vehicle and every part thereof
and any person, trunk, package, or cargo on
board, and to this end may hail and stop
such vessel or vehicle, and use all necessary
force to compel compliance.

A6
stop and subsequent search of a vessel

[2]

in inland waters even though there

is neither (a) evidence of a border cross-
ing or its functional equivalent, (Snore
(b) prior reasonable suspicion of illegal
activity. It is clear that this contention
is incorrect and that, under the stated
circumstances, such activity is not con-
stitutionally permissible. United States
v. Villamonte-Marquez, 652 F.2d 481, 484
(Sth Cir. 1981); United States v. Guillen-
Linares, 643 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1981);
United States v. D'‘Antignac, 628 F.2d 428,

432-33 (Sth Cir. 1980), cert. denied,

2. Compare United States v. Freeman, 579
2d 942 ‘Sth Cir. 1978) (stop and boarding
on open waters for document check; sub-
sequent search based on probable cause dis-
covered thereafter); Morales v. State,
So.2d (Fla. 3d DCA Case nos. 80-248, 80-
249, opinion filed, December 15, 1981).

3. Compare United States v. Sandler, 644
F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1981); State v. Smith,

399 So.2d 22 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).

A7

___U.S.__, 101 S.Ct. 1485, 67 L.Ed.2d
617 (1981); Morales v. State, _So.2d
_____ (Fla. 3d DCA Case nos. 80-248, 80-
249, opinion filed, Decemler 15, 1981)
(dictum); Earnest v. State, 293 So.2d 111
(Fla. lst DCA 1974); see, United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct.
2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). In the pos-
ture in which the case was presented and
decided below, we need and do go no further

in determining the outcome of this appeal.

Affirmed.

A8

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT
OF THE ELEVENTH
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN
AND FOR DADE COUNTY,
FLORIDA
CRIMINAL DIVISION
THE STATE OF FLORIDA )
Plaintiff, )
vs. ) No. 80-19386
SILVIO ZAFRA, )

Defendant. )

Metropolitian Justice
Building,

Miami, Florida,
Friday, 9:00 a.m.,
February 20, 1981.

The above-entitled case came on for
motions before The Honorable James R.
Jorgenson, Circuit Judge, pursuant to

Notice.

A9

APPEARANCES:

JANET RENO, State Attorney, by
ELYSE TARG, Assistant State Attorney,
Attorney for Plaintiff.

ROSEN, PORTELA, BRONITS, ANGUELRA, &
CLAY, by WILLIAM A. “SLAY, Esq. of
counsel.

Attorneys for Defendant.

A10
[EXCERPT OF TESTIMONY]

RICHARD D. OGDEN was called as a
witness and, having been previously sworn,
was examined and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MS. TAEG:

Q Would you please state your
name and official capacity for the
record.

A Richard D. Ogden. I ama
patrol officer for the United States
Customs Service.

Q How long have you been so

employed as a Customs Patrol Officer?

A For approximately eighteen
months.

Q Pursuant to that job, did you
have any training?

A Yes, ma'am, I did.

Q What training was that?

A I attended a seven week integ-

rated law enforcement course of the

All

Federal Enforcement Center in Glencoe,
Georgia. In addition, I attended a four
and a half week course at the same location,
which dealt with specific duties assigned to
Customs Patrol Officers.
Q Officer, what are the duties of
a Customs Patrol Officer--and, for the
record, I will use a CPO.

What are the duties of a CPO?

A To intercept the flow of con-
traband coming into the United States,
primarily narcotics, and to enforce
other customs and related laws.

Q Are your powers basically deal-
ing with boats, airplanes or what?

A Yes, ma‘am.

A high percentage of our work
deals with boats and aircraft coming
into the country.

Q Were you employed on August 10,
1980?

A Yes, ma‘an.

Al2

Q Were you employed as a CPO then?
A Yes, ma‘anm.

Q Did you come on to duty that
day?

A I came--reported for duty at

6:00 p.m. on October °.

Q What were you going to do that
night?
A Generally that night we conducted

a routine servey--myself and my partners
--of the public boat ramps situated in
the local Miami area going from Key
Biscayne up to Bakers Haulover and
making an analysis on the different
types of trucks and boat trailers park-
ed at these locations.

Q How many boat ramps did you in-
vestigate that night, approximately?

A Approximately eight.

Q At any of these ramps did you
notice anything unusual or was anything

brought to your attention?

Al3

A Yes, ma‘am.
Q What was that?
A At Crandon Boat Ramp, I would

estimate at approximately eight to
nine p.m. that evenin:;, we observed
two pick-up trucks with trailers at~-

tached which attracted our attention.

Q Why did they attract your at~
tention?
A Based on my prior experience as

well as the documented experience of
all the other officers in our office,
this particular trailer, which was a
three axle float on, fit somewhat of a
profile commonly used in smuggling ac-
tivities.

Q Why did this seem suspicious?
What was it about this type of trailer
which seemed suspicious?

A That this particular type of
trailer has the capability of carrying

a very large vessel as opposed to what

Al4

would be used just for fishing around the
bay.

* a *
Q Opportunity when was the next time
you saw somebody approach that trailer?
A The first and only time we saw some-
one approach that trailer was when one of
two persons boarded the 25 foot Bertram,
which arrived at Crandon Marina.
Q What time was that, approximately?
A I believe that was a little after

three o'clock in the morning.

Q Was that on October 10?
A Yes, ma‘am.
Q Was the length of time between which

you had first seen it and the fact that it
was three o'clock--did that affect you in
any way?

[Objection overruled].

A Yes, ma‘am.

Q How so?

Al4a
A From the time we first spotted the
truck and trailer until the time someone
approached it, it was nearly seven hours.

That, to me, aroused my suspicions
in that it would have been an unusually
long fishing trip, in my opinion.

Q Would it have any other influence on
you, as to the length of time?
A Yes, ma'am.

We have made notes in our office and
calculated on several occasions that it
generally takes vessels approximately four
and a half to five hours to go from here
to any of the islands in the Bimini area
and to return. This affected my thinking
in that they had more than sufficient time
to go to any of the islands, which could
be used as a stash site--and there are
intelligence bulletins that we have with
indicate that that is a common method--

store the marijuana on a vessel and return.

Al4b
Q Did you have occasion to see anybody

on the boat?

A Yes, ma‘am.
Q Who was that?
A The defendant, Mr. Silvio Zafra, and

one other individual.

* x *
Q Officer Ogden, was there anything
else about the appearance of these two

Latin males which you found to be suspi-

cious?

A Yes ma‘anm.

Q What was that?

A On the initial glance at the two

individuals they appeared to be some-
what--excuse the term--weatherbeaten.
They looked like they had been out for
some time engaging in perhaps heavy work
or something.

Their clothes were somewhat dirty.
They just looked like they had really

been worked over.

Al4c
Q Did there come a time when you stopped

the two individuals?

A Yes, ma‘am.
Q When was that?
A A few minutes after we first stopped

the boat coming up to the dock.

Q What was the purpose of the stop?

AlS5S

A. The purpose of the stop was

to conduct a routine Customs boarding.

Q Pursuant to that, what did you
do?
A My two partners went up to talk

to the incividuals and to obtain the
necessary registration forms. I went
to the vessel, which was already
aboard the three axle float-on trailer
and had already been pulled out of the
water. I stepped on the fender above
the wheels of the trailer and looked
over the gunwale of the vessel into

the boat.

Q At that time did you notice any-

thing unusual about that boat?

A Yes, ma‘am.
Q What was that?
A I noticed that the main deck of

the vessel was considerably higher than
what I would believe the manufacturer

would have put it. This is also a

Al6
profile which has become quite common
among smugglers.

The trends have changed over the
years. They have gone from just throw-
ing it into the cabin and loading it
in remote spots along the coast to
using secret compartments and bring-
ing it on to the public boat ramps.

Q Have you ever encountered boats
like this in your experience?

A Yes.

Q Have you encountered contraband
in these boats?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q How many seizures have you made

in boats of this type?

A I would approximately maybe
fifteen.

Q What did you do next?

A I climbed aboard the vessel, took

a quick glance into the cabin area to

assure myself that there was no other

Al7
persons on board the cabin, and it was

more or less a visual--just a quick visual
check,

I looked down at the deck and got down
on my hands and knees where I could get a
closer look at it.

I had one flashlight and I did observe
marijuana residue embedded in the carpet.

You could not see it until you got
down on your hands and knees and looked
really close and spread the pieces of car-
pet, you know, apart.

Q Did you find anything else?

A Yes, ma‘am.

Prior to finding the residue, I
did run my hand over the carpet itself in
an effort to determine if I could feel any-
thing underneath and I did feel what appear-
ed to be a small rise underneath the carpet.
Due to its shape and size it led

me to believe that there was a hatch under-

neath the carpet.

A18

Q This was covered by the carpet
though?

A That is correct.

Q In your experience, was that
suspicious?

A Yes, ma‘am, it was.

Q Why?

A Because, the way the vessel was

constructed, there shouldn't have been a
hatch of that nature under carpet tacked
down to the deck.

Q Was there anything else about
what you saw on the deck of that boat which
made you suspicious?

A Yes, ma'am. There were several
tools and a lot of odds and ends wa the
deck that really had nothing to do with
any fishing expedition, as far as I could
tell--the tool boxes, odds and ends, mech-
anics’ tools and things that I, ordinarily,
would not expect to see on a boat, especially

for a fishing expedition.

Alg9

To the best of my recollection,
there was no fishing gear on board the
boat. I believe there might have been
an ice chest, but I didn't see any fish
nor did I see any bait.

Certainly anyone engaging in a
fishing trip for six or seven hours would,
in my opinion, at least come back with some-
thing.

Q What led you to believe that
these people might have been on a fishing
trip?

You said that anyone on a fishing
trip would have had something there.

What led you to believe that they
might have been cn a fishing trip?

A. Generally--it was just an assump-
tion on my part at that point that they
were.

Generally, when we stop boats and
ask the routine questions, they generally

are fishing or they're taking the boat out

A20

for a test run to test it out.

Q In your experience, when you
find this residue on the ground what do
you usually find?

A Usually when we find residue,
in my experience, we'll either find a stash
of marijuana on the vessel or we'll find a
secret compartment which has other residue
in it which is an indication that perhaps
at one time or another it did carry mari-
juana.

Q What did you do after you had
gotten down on your hands and knees?

A After I had gotten on my hands
and knees and picked up a little residue
and saw the incongruency in the deck below
the carpet, I asked my partner, Richard
Nasossis, to come aboard the vessel and
give me a hand.

Q Did he?

A Yes, ma‘am, he did.

Q What happend then?

A21
A I told him what I had found
and he agreed that there was definitely
something amiss.

We pulled back the carpet off
the deck, which was--it was just lightly
tacked down with a little adhesive, and
he put his nose---

We did dind a hatch. It was
basically rectangular in shape and secured
by probably a dozen or more screws.

He got down on his hands and
knees and put his nose to one of the seams
in the hatch and took a whiff and came up
and said yeah--he could smell what he
thought was marijuana.

Q What did you do then?

A We proceeded to remove the screws
from the hatch and lifted the hatch and the
marijuana was visible--immediately visible--

below the deck.

Q Have you seen marijuana before?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q To your trained eyes, this was

marijuana?

A22

A Yes, ma‘an,.

Q Did you run any test on it?

A Yes, ma'am, we did run a field
test.

Q What did you do?

A We have a small test tube fill-

ed with a chemical agent whch, when exposed
to THC, which is in marijuana and hashish,
will turn bright red.

We removed a few leaves. I tore
open one of the bales and removed a few
leaves and a couple of seeds, put them in
the tube, mixed it with the chemical , shook
it up, and it tested positive and turned
bright red.

Q How much marijuana was there?

A We found twelve bales and we
estimated the weight to be approximately
1000 pounds.

These were somewhat large bales.

Q Did all of this take place in
Dade County, Florida?

A Yes, ma‘am.

A23
(EXCERPT: CUSTOMS OFFICER CARLIN }

Q What did you do?

A As we approached in the vehicle,
Officer Butchko, who was the Dade County
man there, was sort of--I think he was
getting ready to leave, and we identified
ourselves as Custom Officers to him and we
approached the vessel.

We informed the--well, I had
what we call a Customs Raid jacket. It's
a nylon windbreaker with the Customs badge,
you know, embossed on it, and on the back
it says, "U.S. Customs" I think in two inch
lettering. It has a Customs patch on each
sleeve.

So, they more or less knew who
we were, but we identified ourselves with
our badge holder in the case and told them
we were from U.S. Customs and that we would
like to inspect their vessel and check their
documents on the vessel.

Q What happened next?

A24
A I believe Mr. Zafra identified

himself as the master of the vessel and he
was asked for documents, I think, by--I
believe Officer Nasossis who asked him for
his documents in English, and I think I
also asked him in Spanish, you know, to
further clarify what we wanted.

At that time I returned to our
vehicle to begin filling out a search and
boarding form, which we routinely do in
most cases involving Custom seizures.

MS. TARG: I have no further

questions of this witness, Your Honor.

A25

(EXCERPT: ARGUMENT OF PROSECUTOR

fl. Customs Search}

MS. TARG: I will argue that it was
a Customs search and, in determining whe-
ther the search was good or not good, you
just have to look at the federal law on
searches and the federal law on boarding
on vessels.

Customs authority 19 U.S.C. 1581A
provides that Customs has a right to board
any vessel in Customs water to ask for doc-
uments or other papers regarding the boat
within twelve miles of the coast of the
United States, and this boat was seen com-
ing from the waters.

The officers testified that it was
only a few miles outside the Atlantic
Ocean. It was clearly in Customs waters.

a * A

2. Articulable Suspicion]
The Court cases have held that, in de-

ciding whether there is reasonable suspic-

ion, a Customs Patrol Officer is entitled

A26

to assess the facts in the light of their
experience, and you must look at the total-
ity of the circumstances.

We would, for those reasons, argue
that the test to be given is: Did these
CPO's, in their experience in the Customs
Service, have articulable facts together
with rational inferences from these facts
to engender a reasonable suspicion that the
vessel in this case was being used for nar-
cotics trafficking and, again, we rely on
those cases and on U.S. versus Brignoni-
Ponce, a Supreme Court case cites at 95

Supreme Court 2574.

A27

[EXCERPT OF STATES BRIEF ON APPEAL
TO FLORIDA 3d DCA)

B. Furthermore, the State would note
that the officers did indeed have reason-
able suspicion, based upon both their ex-
perience with smugglers and their observa-

tions, to board the vessel. See, United

States v. Cortez, U.S. » 401 $.Ce.

690 (1981); see, also, United States v.

Mendenhall, U.S. » 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64

L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (approving use of pro-

file characteristics); United States v.

Forbicetta, 484 F.2d 645, 646 (5th Cir.

1973) (approving use of “profile” charact-
eristics at border search). In Cortez the
Court repeated its approval of an officer's
use of his experience for probable cause
and articulable suspicion thus:

“The idea that an assessment of

the whole picture yield a par-

ticularized suspicion contains

two elements, each of which must

be present before a stop is per-
missible. First, the assessment

A28

must be based upon all the cir-
cumstances. The analysis pro-
ceeds with various objective
observations, information from
police reports, if such are
available, and consideration

of the modes or patterns of
operation of certain kinds of
lawbreakers. From these data,
a trained officer draws in-
ferences and makes deductions
-~-inferences and deductions that
might well elude an untrained
person." Emphasis added .

101 S.Ct. at 695,

Additionally, after the officers were on
the vessel, they certainly acquired pro-
bable cause to search the hold from the
presence and smell of marijuana on the
deck . (Citations Omitted]. When the
officers so clearly had probable cause to
search the hold, the warantless search was
obviously justified by the exigency excep-

tion for vehicles and boats. See, Carroll

v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 54 S.Ct.
280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), adopted by statute

in Florida Statute §933.19. See also,

Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 96 S.Ct. 304,

A29
46 L.Ed.2d 209 (1975); Chambers v. Maroney,

399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed. 419
(1970); State v. Lopez, 369 So.2d 623 (Fla.

2d DCA 1979). In Chambers v. Maroney, the

Court explained the exigency requirement
thus:

"Arguably, because of the
preference for a magistrate's
judgment, only the immobiliz-
ation of the car should be
permitted until a search warrant
(sic) is obtained; arguably,

only the ‘lesser’ instrusion is
permissible until the magistrate
authorizes the ‘greater’. But
which is the ‘greater’ and which
the ‘lesser’ intrusion itself a
debatable question and the an-
swer may depend on a variety of
circumstances. For constitution-
al purposes, we see no difference
between on the one hand seizing
and holding a car before present-
ing the probable cause issue to a
magistrate and on the other hand
carrying out an immediate search
without a warrant. Given probable
cause to search, either course is
reasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment”. [Emphasis added) 399 U.S.
at p. 51-52.

Undoubtedly the exigency exception to the
warrant requirement was manifest in the

case at bar. The trial court's suppression

A30

of the evidence is therefore erroneous
even under traditional search and seizure

analysis and must be reversed.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_1010%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.