# Appendix — Florida Businessmen for Free Enterprise v. City of Homestead

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1983
- **Citation:** 459 U.S. 1127

## Text

NO. 82-

in the

Supreme Court

of the
United States

Oetober Term, 1982

„ BUSINESSMEN FOR FREE ENTERPRISE,
ted association, and
MERLIN'S MUSIC, INC., a Florida Corporation,
Petitioners,

vs.

THE CITY OF HOMESTEAD, FLORIDA,
A Florida Municipal Corporation,
Respondents.

On Petition for Writ Of Certiorari
From The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Eleventh Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

App. 1

(
ORDINANCE NO. 80-04-28

AN EMERGENCY ORDINANCE OF THE
CITY OF HOMESTEAD, FLORIDA,
NECESSITATED BY CONSIDERATIONS OF
THE HEALTH, SAFETY, AND WELFARE
OF ITS CITIZENS AND INHABITANTS
AMENDING CHAPTER 29, CODE OF LAWS,
ENTITLED, “OFFENSES — MISCEL-
LANEOUS”, BY CREATING SECTIONS
29-58.1 THROUGH 29-58.5 TO PROHIBIT THE
DISPLAY OR SALE OF INSTRUMENTS,
SIMULATED DRUGS, SIMULATED
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES, OR OTHER
NARCOTIC PARAPHERNALIA, PROVIDING
A SEVERABILITY CLAUSE, AND
PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE DATE.

WHEREAS, the City Council of the City of
Homestead, Florida, has become very concerned about
the increased use of illegal drugs and controlled substances
within the City; and,

WHEREAS, the sale, advertisement and distribution
of instruments, drug paraphernalia and simulated
controlled substances, contribute to an atmosphere of
community acceptance of illegal use of controlled

substances; and

WHEREAS, the City Council finds that it is in the
best interest of the health, safety and welfare, of the
citizens of the City to restrict access to such drug

paraphernalia;

App. 2

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE
CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF HOMESTEAD,
DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA:

Section 1: That Chapter 29, Code of Laws, entitled
“Offenses — Miscellaneous” be and is hereby amended
by creating Sections 29-58.1 through 29-58.5 to read
and provide as follows:

Sec. 29-58.1 Definitions.

A. “Controlled substance” means any drug or
substance as described and defined in Florida Statutes
Section 893.03, which is adopted by reference.

B. “Marijuana” means all parts of the plant of
the species Cannabis sativa, L., including all varieties
thereof, whether growing or not; the seeds thereof, the
resin extracted from any part of the plant; and every
compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or
preparation of the plant or its seeds or resin. It does
not include the mature stalks of the plant, fiber produced
from the stalks; oil or cake made from the seeds of the
plant; any other compound, manufacture, salt, derivative,
mixture, or preparation of the mature stalks (except
the resin extracted therefrom), fiber, oil, or cake; or the
sterilized seed of the plant which is incapable of
germination.

C. “Person” means any individual natural person,
corporation, government, or governmental subdivision
or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership or
association or any other legal entity.

D. The term “Drug Paraphernalia” means all
equipment, products and materials of any kind which
are used, intended for use, or designed for use in planting,
propagating, cultivaing, growing, harvesting,
manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing,
processing, preparing, testing, analyzing, packaging,
repackaging, storing, containing, concealing, injecting,
ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing into the
human body a controlled substance in violation of this
ordinance, or of any section of Chapter 893, Florida
Statutes or Chapter 465, Florida Statutes. It includes,
but is not limited to:

1. Kits used, intended for use, or designed for
use in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing
or harvesting of any species of plant which is a
controlled substance or from which a controlled
substance can be derived;

2. Kits used, intended for use, or designed for
use in manufacturing, compounding, converting,
producing, processing, or preparing controlled
substances, or planting, propagating, cultivating,
growing or harvesting of any species of plant which
is a controlled substance or from which a controlled
substance can be derived.

3. Isomerization devices used, intended for use,
or designed for use in increasing the potency of
any species of plant which is a controlled substance;

4. Testing equipment used, intended for use,

or designed for use in identifying, or in analyzing
the strength, effectiveness or purity of controlled
substances;

App. 4

5. Scales and balances used, intended for use,
or designed for use in weighing or measuring
controlled substances;

6. Diluents and adulterants, such as quinine
hydrochloride, mannitol, mannite, dextrose and
lactose, used, intended for use, or designed for use
in cutting controlled substances;

7. Separation gins and sifters used, intended
for use, or designed for use in removing twigs and
seeds from, or in otherwise cleaning or refining,
marijuana;

8. Blenders, bowls, containers, spoons and mixing
devices used, intended for use, or designed for use
in compounding controlled substances;

9. Capsules, balloons, envelopes and other
containers used, intended for use or designed for
use in packaging small quantities of controlled
substances;

10. Containers and other objects used, intended

for use, or designed for use in storing or concealing
controlled substances;

11. Hypodermic syringes, needles and other
objects used, intended for use, or designed for use
in parenterally injecting controlled substances into
the hu ian body;

12. Objects used, intended for use, or designed
for use in ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing

App. 5

marijuana, cocaine, hashish, or hashish oil into the
human body, such as:

(a) Metal, wooden, acrylic, glass, stone,
plastic, or ceramic pipes with or without screens,
permanent screens, hashish heads, or punctured
metal bowls;

(b) Water pipes;

(ec) Carburetion tubes and devices;

(d) Smoking and carburetion masks;

(e) Roach clips: meaning objects used to
hold burning material, such as a marijuana
cigarette, that has become too small or too
short to be held in the hand;

(f) Miniature cocaine spoons, and cocaine
vials;

(g) Chamber pipes;

(h) Carburetor pipes;
(i) Electric pipes;
Air driven pipes;

*) Chilams;

) Bongs:

(m) lee pipes or chillers;

App. 6

E. In determining whether an object is drug
paraphernalia, in addition to all other logically relevant
factors, the following may be considered:

1. Statements by an owner or by anyone in
control of the object concerning its use;

2. Prior convictions, if any, of an owner, or of
anyone in control of the object, under any State or
Federal law relating to any controlled substance;

3. The proximity of the object, in time and
space, to a direct violation of this ordinance;

4. The proximity of the object to controlled
substances;

5. The existence of any residue of controlled
substances on the object;

6. Direct or circumstantial evidence of the intent
of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object,
to deliver it to persons whom he knows, or should
reasonably know, intend to use the object to
facilitate a violation of this ordinance; the innocence
of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object,
as to a direct violation of this ordinance shall not
prevent a finding that the object is intended for
use, or designed for use as drug paraphernalia;

7. Instructions, oral or written, provided with
the object concerning its use;

8. Descriptive materials accompanying the object
which explain or depict its use;

App. 7

9. National and local advertising concerning
its use;

10. The manner in which the object is displayed
for sale;

11. Whether the owner, or anyone in control of
the object, is a legitimate supplier or like or related
items to the community, such as a licensed distributor
or dealer of tobacco products;

12. Direct or circumstantial evidence of the
ratio of sales of the object(s) to the total sales of
the business enterprise;

13. The existence and scope of legitimate uses
for the object in the community;

14. Expert testimony concerning its use.
Sec. 29-58.2 Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.

It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess
with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate,
cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound,
convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack,
repack, store, contain, conceai, inject, ingest, inhale, or
otherwise introduce into the human body a controlled
substance in violation of this ordinance.

Sec. 29-583 Manufacture or Delivery of Drug
Paraphernalia.

It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess
with intent to deliver, or manufacture with intent to

App. 8

deliver, drug paraphernalia, knowing, or under
circumstances where one reasonably should know,
that it will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow,
harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce,
process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store,
contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise
introduce into the human body a controlled substance
in violation of this ordinance.

Sec. 29-58.4 Advertisement of Drug Paraphernalia.

It is unlawful for any person to place in any
newspaper, magazine, handbill, or other publication any
advertisement, knowing, or under circumstances where
one reasonable should know, that the purpose of the
advertisement, in whole or in part, is to promote the
sale of objects designed or intended for use as drug
paraphernalia.

Sec. 29-58.5 Penalty.

Any person who violates any term, condition, or
provision of Sec. 29-58.1 through 29-58.5 shall be liable,
upon conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction, to
a fine not to exceed Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00), or
by imprisonment not to exceed ninety (90) days, or
both, at the discretion of the court. Each day of violation
of any term, provision, or condition of Secs. 29-58.1
through 29-58.5 shall constitute a separate and distinct
offense.

Section 2: It is the intention of the City Council

and it is hereby ordained that the provisions of this
ordinance shail become and be made a part of the Code

App. 9

of Laws of the City of Homestead, Florida, and the
sections of this ordinance may be renumbered to
accomplish such intention.

Section 3: If any word, phrase, clause, subsection
or section of this ordinance is for any reason held
unconstitutional or invalid, the invalidity thereof shall
not affect the validity of any remaining portions of this
ordinance.

Section 4: That all sections or parts of sections of
the Code of Laws, all ordinances or parts of ordinances,
and all resolutions or parts of resolutions, in conflict
herewith, be and the same are hereby repealed to the
extent of such conflict.

Section 5: That this ordinance shall take effect
upon becoming a law.

PASSED AND ADOPTED this 21st day of April,
1980.

/s/ {illegible}
Mayor-Councilman
APPROVED AS TO FORM
AND CORRECTNESS:
/s/ {illegible}
City Attorney
ATTEST:
/s/ {illegible}
City Clerk
(Deputy)

App. 10

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 80-1160-Civ-JCP

FLORIDA BUSINESSMEN FOR FREE ENTERPRISE,
an unincorporated association, and
MERLIN’S MUSIC, INC., a Florida corporation,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

THE CITY OF HOMESTEAD, FLORIDA, a Florida
municipal corporation, NICHOLAS R. SINCORE,
individually and as Mayor of the City of Homestead,
and WILLIAM F. DICKINSON, individually and
as Vice-Mayor of the City of Homestead, Florida
and RUTH L. CAMPBELL, WILLIAM M.
McCONNELL, WALTER C. RUTZKE, WILLIAM
TOMMY WILSON and IRVING PESKOE, all
individually as members of the City Council of the
City of Homestead, Florida,

Defendants.

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY
RELIEF AND COMPENSATORY AND
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

The Plaintiffs, FLORIDA BUSINESSMEN FOR

FREE ENTERPRISE and MERLIN’S MUSIC, INC.,
by undersigned counsel, bring this action and state:

App. 11

Jurisdiction

Count I of this Complaint is an action for declaratory
relief, pursuant to 28 U.S. Code §2201, and preliminary
injunctive relief ancillary thereto. Jurisdiction is conferred
upon this Court by 28 U.S. Code §§ 1331 and 1343.

Count II of this Complaint is an action for
compensatory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant
to 42 U.S. Code §1983. Jurisdiction is conferred upon
this Court by 28 U.S. Code §1343.

Count III of this Complaint is an action for
compensatory and punitive damages, costs and attorneys’
fees as against the individual defendants pursuant to
42 U.S. Code §1983. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this
Court by 28 U.S. Code §1343.

The actions of the Defendants have caused the
Plaintiffs herein to suffer a deprivation of rights
guaranteed under the First, Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well
as financial damages in excess of $10,000, exclusive of
interest and costs.

Parties

The Plaintiff FLORIDA BUSINESSMEN FOR
FREE ENTERPRISE, is an unincorporated association
whose members engage in the wholesale and retail
distribution of certain items in interstate commerce,
throughout Florida in general and in the CITY OF
HOMESTEAD, FLORIDA, in specific.

App. 12

The Plaintiff MERLIN’S MUSIC, INC., is a Florida
corporation which operates a retail establishment at
797 N. E. Eighth Street, Homestead, Florida. The Plaintiff
MERLIN’S MUSIC, INC. sells items which constitute
a part of interstate commerce and which may or may
not be proscribed under Ordinance No. 80-04-28, enacted
by the Defendant CITY OF HOMESTEAD, on April
21, 1980.

The Defendant CITY OF HOMESTEAD, is a
incorporated municipality within the State of Florida.
On April 21, 1980, the CITY OF HOMESTEAD enacted
Ordinance No. 80-04-28, 2 true copy of which is attached
hereto and by reference made a part hereof.

The Defendant NICHOLAS R. SINCORE, is the
duly elected Mayor of the Defendant CITY OF
HOMESTEAD, FLORIDA, a municipal corporation
[hereinafter “HOMESTEAD”, and is a resident of Dade
County, Florida.

The Defendant WILLIAM F. DICKINSON, is the
duly elected Vice-Mayor of HOMESTEAD, and is a
resident of Dade County, Florida.

The Defendants, RUTH L. CAMPBELL, WILLIAM
„ MeCONNELL, WALTER C. RUTZKE, WILLIAM
TOMMY WILSON, and IRVING PESKOE, are duly
elected members of the City Council of HOMESTEAD,
and are residents of Dade County, Florida.

At all times material hereto, each and every

Defendant was acting “under color of [a] statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage of . . .” the State of Florida.

App. 13

COUNT I

1. This is an action seeking declaratory relief
against the Defendant CITY OF HOMESTEAD,
FLORIDA, pursuant to Title 28, U.S.C. §2201.

2. The purpose and effect of Ordinance No. 80-04-28
is to prohibit possession, sale, or advertisement of certain
items described in the ordinance as “drug paraphernalia.”
This ordinance defines “drug paraphernalia,” inter alia,
as such innocuous and overridingly lawful items as
scales, spoons, bowls, containers, envelopes, and other
objects “intended” for the described, prohibited use.

3. Ordinance No. 80-04-28 prescribes a criminal
penalty for the possession, delivery or advertisement
of those items vaguely defined in the ordinance. Upon
conviction, any person who violates this ordinance may
be liable “to a fine not to exceed Five Hundred Dollars
($500.00), or by imprisonment not to exceed ninety (90)
days, or both. .. .”

4. The Plaintiffs are in the business of selling,
both at wholesale and retail, items of jewelry, smoking
accessories, and other articles which are or may be
proscribed by the vague and overbroad language of the
challenged ordinance. Plaintiffs are, therefore, precluded
from pursuing their lawful business by the enactment
and enforcement of this ordinance. Additionally, the
Plaintiffs are prohibited by the ordinance from advertising
or communicating to the public those items which the
Plaintiffs hold for resale.

5. The challenged ordinance violates the due
process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments

App. 14

to the United States Constitution by virtue of both
vagueness and overbreadth in its language. The language
of the ordinance is overbroad in that it proscribes
activity which is constitutionally protected, and thus,
violates the Plaintiffs’ rights under the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution. Additionally, the
ordinance’s definitional sections are so broad as to
proscribe the possession and/or sale of items whose uses
are overwhelmingly legal, without any legitimate
relationship between this proscription and the health,
safety, welfare, or morals of the people of the CITY OF
HOMESTEAD.

6. The challenged ordinance is very vague in that
it does not provide the Plaintiffs, or any persons of
ordinary intelligence, with the requisite warning of
that conduct which will be considered illegal in order
that the Plaintiffs, and others, may conform their conduct
accordingly. Additionally, by failing to provide
ascertainable standards for the inclusion or exclusion of
items, the ordinance fails to provide sufficient guidelines
for its enforcement, promoting arbitrary and capricious
enforcement in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.

7. Ordinance No. 80-04-28 is unconstitutional in
that it creates an irrebuttable presumption that the
proscribed items described as “drug paraphernalia”
will be used for unlawful purposes. This presumption
is neither true in fact, nor supportable in law, and
therefore, violates the Plaintiffs’ right to due process
of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.

App. 15

8. The challenged ordinance precludes
advertisement of items vaguely defined as “drug
paraphernalia” and therefore has a chilling effect
prohibited by, and is violative of, the First Amendment
rights of the Plaintiffs herein and the public at large.

9. The challenged ordinance constitutes an

i burden on interstate commerce in violation

of the Commerce Clause, Article I, Section 8 of the

United States Constitution, and constitutes a denial of

the Plaintiffs’ right to pursue their livelihood in a lawful
manner.

10. The Plaintiffs have fully and completely
complied with Ordinance No. 80-04-28 pending this action,
in order to avoid criminal prosecution. The Plaintiffs
have in the past, and are now, suffering irreparable
harm and injury through the expenditure of large sums
of money to separate, transport, and store those items
which may be proscribed; a loss of sales and income
due to the inability to sell their lawful merchandise;
and loss of customers due to the nonavailability of
these and other items which the Plaintiff has been
forced to remove from its inventory due to the vagueness
of the definitiona! sections of the challenged ordinance.

11. The Plaintiffs have in the past and continue
to suffer the substantial and real threat of imminent
prosecution through enforcement of the challenged
ordinance as against the Plaintiffs, their agents and
employees.

12. Lastly, Plaintiffs suffer a present inability to

exercise their rights guaranteed under the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution to

App. 16

communicate with present and prospective customers
concerning the items held for resale by the Plaintiffs,
such restriction of First Amendment activities being
irreparable harm and injury as a matter of law.

13. As an additional ground for the invalidity of
the challenged ordinance, the same was enacted as an
“emergency” ordinance, without providing either notice
to those whose businesses are affected or an opportunity
to be heard prior to the enactment and vigorous
enforcement of the ordinance. In fact, no emergency
exists, nor has it ever existed, and the procedure utilized
by THE CITY OF HOMESTEAD in enacting this
ordinance is void under the Florida and United States
Constitutions.

WHEREFORE, and by reason of the foregoing,
the Plaintiffs pray this Honorable Court will take
jurisdiction of the within cause and:

A. Issue an order declaring that Ordinance No.
80-04-28 is void and unenforceable as the same violates
the United States Constitution.

B. Issue a final order declaring the challenged
ordinance to be void and unenforceable.

C. Award Plaintiffs costs and attorneys’ fees in
this action.

D. Grant such other and further relief as the
Court deems just and equitable.

App. 17

COUNT II

14. This is an action for compensatory damages,
costs and attorneys’ fees by the Plaintiffs against the
Defendant CITY OF HOMESTEAD, FLORIDA, a
municipal corporation, and the individual Defendants
in their capacities as officers, agents, or officials of the
CITY OF HOMESTEAD, FLORIDA, a municipal
corporation, pursuant to 42 U.S. Code §1983.

15. The Plaintiffs reallege each and every allegation
set forth above, as if fully set forth herein.

16. As a result of the enactment and vigorous
enforcement of the challenged ordinance by the
Defendants, the wholesaler members of the Plaintiff
FLORIDA BUSINESSMEN FOR FREE ENTERPRISE
have suffered, and continue to suffer, the inability to
transact lawful business within the CITY OF
HOMESTEAD, FLORIDA. Additionally, the wholesaler
members of FLORIDA BUSINESSMEN FOR FREE
ENTERPRISE are being restrained from advertising
and/or offering their lawful wares for sale within the
CITY OF HOMESTEAD, all of which amounts to a loss
of profits in excess of $10,000, exclusive of interest and
costs.

17. The Plaintiff MERLIN’S MUSIC, INC., a
Florida corporation, has suffered severe financial damage
in excess of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, by
virtue of the following facts:

a. The Plaintiff MERLIN’S MUSIC, INC., a Florida
corporation [hereinafter “MERLIN’S”] has been forced

App. 18

to expend large amounts of money in removing, crating,
transporting, and storing items arguably within the
prohibition contained in the challenged ordinance, pending
the outcome of this litigation.

b. MERLIN'’S is unable to effect the sale of lawful
items to its customers, and therefore, has lost both its
customers and its revenues as a direct result of the
Defendants’ actions. MERLIN’S has suffered a loss of
net profits in excess of $10,000 as of June 1, 1980, and
continues to suffer lost profits in excess of $10,000 per
month as a result of the actions of the Defendants.

ec. MERLIN’S is presently unable to advertise
its wares for sale to its customers, and engage in other
activities protected by the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution, thus, aggrevating the loss
of business and net income identified above.

18. Both of the Plaintiffs have been forced to
retain undersigned counsel to represent them in this
cause, and have obligated themselves to pay a reasonable
fee for the services rendered. Additionally, each Plaintiff
has been forced to expend funds for court costs and
other expenses both reasonable and necessary to the
prosecution of this action.

WHEREFORE, and by reason of the foregoing,
the Plaintiffs pray this Honorable Court will take
jurisdiction of the within cause and set a prompt time
for final hearing, following which it will assess
compensatory damages against the Defendants, jointly
and severally, award costs, attorneys's fees and such
other and further relief as the Court deems just and
equitable.

App. 19

COUNT III

19. This is an action seeking compensatory and
punitive damages, costs and attorneys’ fees against
the individual Defendants NICHOLAS R. SINCORE,
WILLIAM F. DICKINSON, RUTH L. CAMPBELL,
WILLIAM McCONNELL, WALTER C. RUTZKE,
WILLIAM TOMMY WILSON and IRVING PESKOE,
pursuant to 42 U.S. Code §1983.

20. The Plaintiffs reallege each and every allegation
set forth above as if fully set forth herein.

21. Following the enactment of Ordinance No.
80-04-28, by the Defendants, acting as the City Council
for the CITY OF HOMESTEAD, a hearing was held on
the Plaintiffs’ Application for Preliminary Injunction.
Following that hearing, and after hearing argument of
counsel for the CITY OF HOMESTEAD, as well as
counsel for the Plaintiffs herein, the Court determined
that based upon the “case law and memorandum provided,
the Court finds that there is a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits for movant.” By this finding, the
Court indicated a substantial likelihood that the ordinance
here challenged would be found unconstitutional following
a trial on the merits.

22. Additionally, each individual Defendant was
afforded the opportunity to review decisions from ten
courts which have considered similar ordinances, each
of which court has found the ordinance to be
unconstitutional.

23. On Monday, June 2, 1980, the individual
Defendants were apprised that the Plaintiff MERLIN’S

App. 20

MUSIC, INC., a Florida corporation, and the Plaintiff
FLORIDA BUSINESSMEN FOR FREE ENTERPRISE,
were being deprived of their constitutionally protected
right to engage in their lawful business as a result of
the enforcement of this ordinance, and were further
apprised that the damages incurred as of the date of
that meeting were in excess of $10,000. Each Defendant
was additionally advised that the Plaintiffs’ damages
would continue each and every day that the ordinance
remained in effect and enforced by their direction,
notwithstanding the constitutional infirmity of the
ordinance.

24. Further, the individual Defendants were
apprised, both by counsel for the Plaintiffs and by
counsel for the CITY OF HOMESTEAD that the
ordinance was likely to be held unconstitutional.

25. Based upon the foregoing, and in malicious
disregard for the constitutional rights of the Plaintiffs,
the Defendants conspired and confederated together
to continue to enforce this void and unconstitutional
ordinance against the Plaintiffs, well-knowing that there
was no basis in law for that action. Further, the Defendants
specifically intended, by their actions, to impose the
financial harm upon the Plaintiffs as more fully set
forth in Count II of this Complaint.

26. These actions of the individual Defendants
were taken, not pursuant to any lawful duties imposed
upon them by virtue of their offices, but rather out of
personal animosity towards the Plaintiff MERLIN’S
MUSIC, INC. in specific and FLORIDA BUSINESSMEN
FOR FREE ENTERPRISE in general, and in complete

App. 21

disregard to their obligations to uphold the Constitution
of the United States of America.

27. The actions of the Defendants have resulted
in the financial harm set forth in Count II of this Complaint,
each and every item of which was well-known to the
individual Defendants, and specifically intended by them
in taking the actions identified above.

WHEREFORE, and by reason of the foregoing,
the Plaintiffs pray that this Honorable Court will take
jurisdiction of the within cause, grant compensatory
and punitive damages against the individual Defendants,
along with costs, attorneys’ fees and such other and
further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.

SIMON, SCHINDLER & TRIPP,
P.A.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

1492 South Miami Avenue
Miami, Florida 33130

(305) 358-8611

By: /s/ Theodore L. Tripp, Jr.
THEODORE L. TRIPP, JR.

App. 22

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the
foregoing Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief
and Compensatory and Punitive Damages has been
hand delivered to Royall P. Terry, City Attorney, 790
North Homestead Boulevard, Homestead, Florida 33030,
this 5th day of June, 1980.

By: /s/ Theodore L. Tripp, Jr.
THEODORE L. TRIPP, JR.

App. 23

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 80-1160-Civ-JCP

FLORIDA BUSINESSMEN FOR FREE ENTERPRISE,
an unincorporated association, and
MERLIN'S MUSIC, INC., a Florida corporation,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

THE CITY OF HOMESTEAD, FLORIDA, a Florida
municipal corporation, NICHOLAS R. SINCORE,
individually and as Mayor of the City of Homestead,
Florida, and WILLIAM T. DICKINSON, individually
and as Vice-Mayor of the City of Homestead, Florida
and RUTH L. CAMPBELL, WILLIAM F.
McCONNELL, WILLIAM TOMMY WILSON,
WALTER RUTZKE, and IRVING PESKOE, all
individually and as Council of the City of Homestead,

Florida,
Defendants.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AS TO COUNT I, AND ESTABLISHING
LIABILITY AS TO COUNT Il

The Plaintiffs, FLORIDA BUSINESSMEN FOR
FREE ENTERPRISE, an unincorporated association,
and MERLIN’S MUSIC, INC., a Florida corporation,
through undersigned counsel and pursuant to Rule 56,
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, present this Motion
for Summary Judgment and state:

App. 24

1. The pleadings in this cause, specifically the
sworn Application for Preliminary Injunction previously
filed herein, affirmatively disclose that there is no dispute
as to the following material facts:

a. The Defendant CITY OF HOMESTEAD, is
a duly incorporated city in the State of Florida. On
April 21, 1980, the City Council for the CITY OF
HOMESTEAD enacted Ordinance No. 80-04-28 [a true
copy of which is attached hereto and by reference
made a part hereof]. The purpose and effect of such
ordinance is to prohibit the possession, delivery or
advertisement of certain items described in the ordinance
as “drug paraphernalia.” The ordinance defines as “drug
paraphernalia,” inter alia, scales, spoons, bowls, containers,
envelopes and other objects intended for the described
prohibited use. The challenged ordinance carries a criminal
penalty for the possession, delivery or advertisement
of those items vaguely defined in the ordinance. THE
CITY OF HOMESTEAD has declared its avowed
intention to vigorously enforce, and is in fact, vigorously
enforcing the challenged ordinance.

b. The Plaintiff FLORIDA BUSINESSMEN FOR
FREE ENTERPRISE is an unincorporated association
of wholesalers and retail businessmen doing business
throughout Florida and in the CITY OF HOMESTEAD.
The wholesaler members of Plaintiff FLORIDA
BUSINESSMEN FOR FREE ENTERPRISE, are in
the business of selling to retail outlets merchandise
which may or may not be prohibited by the vague and
overbroad language of the challenged ordinance, and
are therefore deprived of their right to engage in a
lawful business. The members of the Plaintiff FLORIDA
BUSINESSMEN, who are in the retail business of

App. 25

selling objects arguably prohibited under the challenged
ordinance, are prohibited by the ordinance from obtaining,
advertising, or selling said merchandise, which severely
diminishes their income and viability of their businesses
and essentially curtails many of their retail business
establishments.

e. The Plaintiff MERLIN’S MUSIC, INC.
{hereinafter “THE STORE”) is in the business of selling
gift items. THE STORE is a small record shop located
in a shopping center at 797 N.E. Eighth Street,
Homestead, Florida. THE STORE carries records, posters,
and certain novelty items which may come within the
ambit of the challenged ordinance. The removal of the
latter items from Plaintiffs shop, in compliance with
the ordinance results in a substantial loss of income to
Plaintiff.

d. On May 14, 1980, the Plaintiffs filed a
Complaint in this Court seeking declaratory and injunctive
reliei challenging the constitutionality of Ordinance
No. 80-04-28, enacted and enforced by the CITY OF
HOMESTEAD.

e. The Plaintiffs are, and since the effective
date of enforcement have been, suffering substantial
harm through the loss of business and substantial income
as the direct result of the enactment and threat of
imminent enforcement of the challenged ordinance. THE
STORE has physically crated and removed a large
percentage of its inventory from the place of business,
because the language is so vague that Plaintiffs have
been forced to remove all merchandise which arguably
comes within the ambit of the ordinance. The Plaintiff

App. 26

THE STORE, for example, expended a great dea! oi
time, money, and effort to pack, move, and store all of
the containers, spoons, jewelry, scales, mirrors, and
bowls, among other items, which may arguably be
prohibited by the challenged ordinance, in order to
avoid criminal prosecution. All of the Plaintiffs continue
to suffer a substantial loss of income, business, and
customers due to compliance with the ordinance, which
may result in bankruptcy. Furthermore, the ordinance's
prohibition against advertising certain items constitutes
a denial of First Amendment rights which even for
minimal periods of time constitutes irreparable harm.

2. By reason of the authorities cited in the
accompanying Memorandum of Law, the challenged
ordinance is unconstitutional on its face, and the Defendant
CITY OF HOMESTEAD is liable for the damages incurred
by the enactment and enforcement thereof by the CITY
against the Plaintiffs, as a matter of law.

3. Based upon the foregoing facts, as to which
there is no dispute among the parties, the Plaintiffs
are entitled to a Summary Judgment as to the liability
of the Defendant CITY OF HOMESTEAD, as a matter
of law, for the damages incurred by the Plaintiffs as a
result of the enactment and enforcement of this ordinance
by the Defendant CITY OF HOMESTEAD.

WHEREFORE, and by reason of the foregoing,
the Plaintiffs pray this Honorable Court will enter an
Order on Counts I and II, pursuant to Rule 56(d), Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, establishing the liability of
the Defendant CITY OF HOMESTEAD, as a matter of
law, for any damages suffered by the Plaintiffs as a
result of the enactment and enforcement of this ordinance

App. 27

by the Defendant CITY OF HOMESTEAD, and declaring
the ordinance to be void and unconstitutional.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the
foregoing Motion for Summary Judgment As to Count
I, and Establishing Liability as to Count II has been
furnished by hand delivery to Royall P. Terry, Jr., City
Attorney, 790 North Homestead Boulevard, Homestead,
Florida 33030, this 5th day of June, 1980.

SIMON, SCHINDLER

& TRIPP, P.A.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
1492 South Miami Avenue
Miami, Florida 33130
(305) 358-8611

By:
THEODORE L. TRIPP, JR.

App. 28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA.

CASE NO. 80-1160-Civ-NCR

FLORIDA BUSINESSMEN FOR FREE
ENTERPRISE, ete., et. al.,
Plaintiffs,

vs.

THE CITY OF HOMESTEAD, etc., et al.,
Defendants.

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants, by and through their undersigned
attorneys, and pursuant to Rule 56, Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, move for the entry of an order granting
Summary Judgment, and as grounds therefore would
state:

1) That Plaintiffs have filed a three count Amended
Complaint in this cause seeking (a) a declaratory judgment
ruling that Defendant, CITY OF HOMESTEAD’S,
Oridnance Number 80-04-28 is unconstitutional; (b)
compensatory damages for Defendant CITY OF
HOMESTEAD; and (c) compensatory and punitive
damages from the individual Defendant public officials.

2) That by reason of the authorities cited in the

accompanying Memorandum of Law, the challenged
ordinance is constitutional on its face.

App. 29

3) That there is no genuine issue of fact, and all
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law.

WHEREFORE, Defendants request that the Court
enter summary judgment in favor of all Defendants
herein, pursuant to Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, upholding the constitutionality of CITY OF
HOMESTEAD Ordinance Number 80-04-28; Defendants
further move for the entry of an order taxing their
costs and attorneys fees against the Plaintiffs.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy
of the foregoing was mailed this 9th day of September,
1980, to: THEODORE L. TRIPP, JR., ESQUIRE,
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS, 1492 SOUTH MIAMI
AVENUE, MIAMI, FLORIDA 33130; ROYALL P. TERRY,
CITY ATTORNEY, 790 N. HOMESTEAD BLVD.,
HOMESTEAD, FLORIDA 33030.

KUVIN, KLINGENSMITH

& LEWIS, P.A.
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
7160 S.W. 62ND AVE.
P.O. BOX 431481
SO. MIAMI, FLORIDA 33143
(661-5008)

BY: /s/ [illegible]
FOR: H. JACK KINGENSMITH

App. 30

[Filed FEB 26, 1981]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

No. 80-1160-Civ-NCR

FLORIDA BUSINESSMEN FOR FREE ENTERPRISE,
an unincorporated association and
MERLIN’S MUSIC INC.,

Plaintiffs,
Vs.

THE CITY OF HOMESTEAD, FLORIDA, ete.,
Defendants

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGEMENT

This cause came on for oral argument on defendant's
motion for summary judgement.

After a review of the record, and after considering
the arguments advanced by counsel at oral argument,
the Court is not persuaded that there are material
facts at issue in this cause of sufficient gravity to
warrant a finding that is not identical to Florida
Businessmen for Free Enterprise v. The City of Fort
Lauderdale, et al, No. 80-6157-Civ-NCR. Plaintiffs’
allegations of “selective enforcement,” “discriminatory
intent,” and “systematic design” to harass are simply
not supported in the record. Therefore the Drug
Paraphrenalia Ordinance, as construed in The City of

App. 31

Fort Lauderdale, is not repugnant to the United States
Constitution. Accordingly, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that summary judgement
is hereby entered for defendants as against plaintiffs.

DONE and ORDERED this 25th day of Feb, 1981.

si __{illegible]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGE

CC: Simon, Schindler & Tripp
1492 South Miami Ave.,
Miami, Fl. 33130

Kuvin, Klingensmith & Lewis
7160 S.W. 62nd Ave.

P.O. Box 431481

So. Miami, Fl. 33143

[Received MAR 4 1981]

App. 32

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 80-1160-Civ-NCR

FLORIDA BUSINESSMEN FOR FREE ENTERPRISE,
an unincorporated association and
MERLIN’S MUSIC, INC.

vs.

THE CITY OF HOMESTEAD, FLORIDA, ete.

THIS CAUSE is before the court on motion of plaintiff
to correct clerical error.

Upon consideration of the record, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that said motion is
hereby granted. It is

FURTHER ORDERED that the order granting
summary judgment in this cause where it refers to
Case No. 80-1657-Civ-NCR is hereby amended to provide
that the correct style of No. 80-6157-Civ-NCR is FLORIDA

BUSINESSMEN FOR FREE ENTERPRISE vs. THE
CITY OF HOLLYWOOD.

DONE AND ORDERED this 3 day of April, 1981.

/s/__{illegible]
U.S. District Judge

ee Simon, Schindler & Tripp
Kuvin, Klingensmith & Lewis PA

[Received APR 7 1981]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 80-6157-Civ-NCR

FLORIDA BUSINESSMEN FOR FREE ENTERPRISE,

an unincorporated association; and M. P. DERRICO

& SONS, FLORIDA, INC., a Florida corporation,
d/b/a DANDYLION HUT

Plaintiffs

vs.

THE CITY OF HOLLYWOOD, a Florida

municipal corporation Del 8

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

THIS CAUSE came on for oral argument on cross-
motions for summary judgment.

Plaintiffs commenced this action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. §1983 seeking a temporary restraining order,
preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction to
enjoin the enforcement of the City of Hollywood's
ordinance No. 0-80-15, amending Chapter 21 of the City
Code, which was enacted on February 20, 1980. Plaintiffs’
motion for a temporary restraining order was denied
and the application for a preliminary injunction was
consolidated with the trial on the merits on an expedited
basis, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(aX2). The parties
stipulated that there are no material facts at issue and
that the court need only resolve the legal issues presented.

App. 35

At the hearing on the merits the court requested and
received supplemental memoranda. After a review of
the record and after consideration of the arguments
advanced by counsel, the court enters this order as its
findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).

HOLLVYWOOD'S ORDINANCE

The city of Hollywood, Florida has recently enacted
ordinance 0-80-15 (hereinafter “the ordinance”),' which
has the avowed purpose of restricting public access to
drug paraphenalia. The ordinance is based upon the
“Model Drug Paraphernalia Act” (hereinafter M.D.P.A.)
drafted by the Drug Enforcement Administration of
the United States Department of Justice.

The ordinance prohibits the possession of drug
paraphernalia, Sec. 21-81, the manufacture or delivery
of drug paraphernalia, Sec. 21-82, and the placing of
advertisements promoting the sale of drug paraphernalia,
Sec. 21-83. Each violation of the ordinance is punishable
by a maximum fine of five hundred dollars ($500), or by

imprisonment not to exceed ninety (90) days, or both.

Because the ordinance seeks to restrict possession,
distribution, and advertisement of drug paraphernalia,
its definition of drug paraphernalia is critical. In pertinent
part it provides:

‘Holly wood's ordinance No. 0-8-15 is set out in the appendix of
this order.

App. 36

The term “Drug Paraphernalia” means all
equipment, products and materials of any kind
which are used, intended for use, or designed
for use in planting, propating, cultivating,
growing, harvesting, manufacturing,

converting, producing, processing,
preparing, testing, analyzing, packaging,
repackaging, storing, containing, concealing,
injecting, ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise
introducing into the human body a controlled
substance in violation of this ordinance. Section

21-80 (emphasis added).

Supplementing the definitional section is a seemingly
endless, but not exclusive, list of items covered by the
ordinance, Sec. 21-80 (AU) UA. Additionally, there
are fourteen factors which are set forth intended, along
with “other logically relevant factors”, to aid in the
determination of whether an object is drug paraphernalia
within the meaning of the ordinance. Sec. 21-80(B\1)— (14).

Section 21-82, which proscribes the manufacture

punish those acts where they are knowingly done.
Additionally, a violation of the ordinance has occurred
where one “reasonably should know” that an object
will be employed in the preparation, processing, or
consumption of a controlled substance, and a violation
has occurred where one has placed an advertisement in
the media, where one “reasonably should know that
the purpose of the advertisement . . . is to promote
the sale” of prohibited objects.

App. 37

THE CHALLENGES

Plaintiffs are individuals who own the Dandylion
Hut, a Hollywood business establishment which sells
prohibited objects, and Florida Businessmen for Free
Enterprise, an unincorporated association.

Plaintiffs attack the ordinance on three fronts;
they allege that the ordinance is vague, that it is
overbroad, and that it contravenes the First Amendment's
guaranty of freedom of speech. Defendant strenuously
argues that the ordinance is valid in its entirety, and
that it is not repugnant to any right secured by the
Constitution.

As a preliminary observation the court notes that
abstention is not appropriate in this cause in light of
the Fifth Cireuit's holding in High Ol’ Times Inc. u
Busbee, ___. F.2d ____ , No. 78-2192 (July 9, 1980). In
High Ol’ Times, the court concluded that the district
court had erred in abstaining from considering the
validity of the Georgia drug paraphernalia statute.
Here, as in High Ol’ Times, the issues “are all questions
of federal constitutional law; there are simply no difficult,
obscure, or unclear issues of state law.” Jd. at 7096. Nor
is there an “ongoing state scheme or regulatory program
involved here such that a federal ruling might engender
confusion . . . Id.

In recognition of the incidence of drug use and
dependence, particularly among the young, states and
individual communities have recently passed laws
endeavoring to stem the tide. Hollywood's ordinance is
typical in this respect. However, it is atypical in that it

App. 38

is based upon the M.D.P.A. drafted by the federal Drug
Enforcement Administration. The court will therefore
not essay at great length on the other types of ordinances
which have been challenged, except to note that they
have been invalidated generally for sweeping too broadly;?
a cannon is not sufferable where an arrow will suffice.

This opinion will scrutinize those cases in which
the M.D.P.A. or statutes very similar to the M.D.P.A.
have been construed in light of similar challenges. A
perusal of the relevant authority confirms this court's
initial analysis; the M.D.P.A., and therefore Hollywood's
ordinance when given the reasonable and proper
interpretation is not repugnant to the Due Process
Clause and the First Amendment.

In general, legislative enactments which are vague
do not provide notice to the ordinary person of what
conduct is proscribed, nor are law enforcement officers
provided with standards for enforcement. “First, because
we assume that man is free to steer between lawful
and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity
to know what is prohibited so that he may act
accordingly . . . . Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide
explicit standards for those who review them.” Grayned
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-109, 92 S.Ct.
2294-2298, 33 L.Ed. 2d 218, 222-223 (1972) (notes omitted).

*See generally, Knoedler v. Roxbury Township, 485 F.Supp.
990 (D.N.J. 1980); Banbu Sales, Inc. u Gekson, 474 F.Supp. 1297
(D.N.J. 1979); Music Stop, Inc. u City of Ferndale, ___. F.Supp.
__—(E.D. Mich. 1980).

App. 39

Additionally, overbreadth is also repugnant to the
constitution because it deters privileged activity. Id.

The Eighth Circuit applied the vagueness standards
as articulated in Grayned v. City of Rockford in Geiger
u City of Eagan, 618 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1980), and invalidated
an ordinance which prohibited possession and sale of
“drug-related devices.” Id. at 28. However, in a footnote,
the court noted that the M.D.P.A., as contrasted with
the invalidated ordinance, is a “properly drawn ordinance.”
Id. at 28, n.4. The court’s comments are, of course,
dicta; however, it illustrates the judicial recognition of
the narrowness of the M.D.P.A.

The M.D.P.A. has recently passed judicial muster
in Record Revolution, No. 6, Inc. u City of Parma, ___
F.Supp. ___, No. (80-35) (N. D. Ohio April 14, 1980).
There the court concluded that the statute was valid,
but it struck a portion of the complaint for vagueness.
It reasoned that the indicium, “whether the owner or
anyone in control of the object is a legitimate
supplier . .”, is vague because there “are no guidelines
as to what constitutes legitimacy.” However, this court
concludes that none of the indicia set forth in Section
21-80 (BX1)(14) are vague. The indicium directed to the
issue of “legitimacy” is supplemented by an example.
It is clear that this indicium attempts to distinguish
“head shops”, the subject of the ordinance, from other
retail establishments which might sell objects with
both innocent and prohibited uses. An ordinance need
not be drafted with absolute certainty; the appropriate
criteria is whether it is drafted so that its meaning is
reasonably apparent. Winters v. New York, 333 US.
507, 68 S.Ct. 665 (1945).

App. 40

As previously mentioned, two portions of the
ordinance (Section 21-82 and 21-83) proscribe conduct
where one actually knows or “reasonably should know”,
that a violation of the ordinance is ensuing. These
sections impose criminal penalties where there is actual
intent to commit the proscribed acts, as well as where
one ought to be aware that one is facilitating an act
proscribed by the ordinance. Although the courts in
Record Revolution No. 6 Inc. v. City of Parma, supra,
and Knoedler v. Roxbury Township, 485 F.Supp. 990
(D.N.J. 1980), invalidate portions of the ordinance imposing
a “reasonably should have known standard” this court
concludes that the standard is not unconstitutionally
vague. In World Imports, Inc. v. Woodbridge Township,
No. 80-1414 (D.N.J. June 20, 1980), the district court
considering an ordinance based on the M.D.P.A. reasoned
that “reasonably should know” standard does not
significantly differ from the actual knowledge standard.
The court considers this reasoning sound. When the
statute is applied there is really no difference between
the two standards.

The ordinance does present problems in its attempt
to define and apply intent. While it clearly prohibits
the manufacture, delivery, possession, and advertisement
of “drug paraphernalia”, the indicia set forth in section
21-80(BX1)}(14) could arguably support the interpretation
that a manufacturer who sells an object without intent
to commit the acts proscribed is subject to prosecution
if the shopowner or the purchaser intends it for use as
drug paraphernalia. A similar conclusion could be reached
with regard to the shopowner who sells an object without
intent to commit the acts proscribed. And further, an
innocent purchaser might be subject to prosecution for

App. 41

the acts and statements of those who distribute the
item. Similarly, a person using an item described in
section 21-80 (IK AY) without intent to use the item
as drug paraphernalia would be subject to prosecution.
These interpretations of the ordinance would not survive
judicial scrutiny.

The more reasonable and plausible meaning and
the one implicit in the ordinance, is that each defendant
charged with violating the ordinance must have general
criminal intent with respect to the offense alleged (as
previously discussed “reasonably should have known”
will suffice). As the court in Record Revolution No. 6,
Inc. u City of Parma, supra, stated:

There are three forms of state of mind on
which the definition of drug paraphernalia turns:
“{[Ajll equipment, products and materials of
any kind which are (1) used, (2) intended for
use; or (3) designed for use . . . in introducing
into the human body. controlled substances.
. . The court construes each of these three
elements as requiring the existence of general
criminal intent by the defendant. Thus the
criminal defendants voluntary and intentional
use of an item with illegal drugs makes it drug
paraphernalia within the meaning of the
ordinance. Similarly, if the defendant intends
an item for use with illegal drugs or designs
for that use the item is drug paraphernalia.
Adding the element of general intent not only
narrows the scope of the ordinance, it insures
that no one will be convicted because of mistake,
accident or other innocent reason. For example,

App. 42

if a person smokes marijuana from a pipe
believing it contains tobacco, he could not be
convicted of using drug paraphernalia. . . .
Similarly, if a person smokes tobacco in a
waterpipe which was designed for use with
drug paraphernalia because he did not intend
to use the pipe to ingest an illegal controlled
substance. Id. at 11.

This court is informed that the Sixth Circuit has
stayed the judgment in Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. u
City of Parma pending consideration of the appeal filed
by the plaintiffs in that case. Nevertheless, this court
considers the district court's findings and logic sound,
and it supports this court’s conclusions. Additionally,
the district court in World Imports, Inc. v. Woodbridge
Township, supra, reached precisely the same result.

PROHIBITION OF ADVERTISING

Plaintiffs have argued that the ordinance's alleged
overbreadth violates their First Amendment rights.
Initially, plaintiff suggests that symbolic speech is
prohibited by the ordinance. See generally, Tinker u
Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 21 L.Ed. 2d 731, 89 S.Ct. 733
(1969). As previously discussed, the court has concluded
that general criminal intent is required before it can be
said that a violation of the ordinance has occurred.
Therefore, one intending to promote and express a
political position does not have the requisite criminal
intent to commit a proscribed act.

Speech which does no more than “propose a
commercial transaction” is entitled to First Amendment

protection. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy u Virginia

App. 43

Citizens Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761, 96 S.Ct. 1817,
1825 (1976). However, speech which solicits illegal activity
is not protected. Pittsburgh Press Company u Pittsburgh
Commission on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 93 S.Ct.
2553 (1978). The justification for protection of commercial
speech is that the free flow of commercia! information
benefits of the public. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy,
supra, clearly, however, the free flow of information
concerning drug paraphernalia has a potentially
deleterious effect upon the community. Having concluded
that the ordinance is valid and that the possession,
manufacture, and delivery of drug paraphernalia can
be proscribed, a logical corollary is that advertising
intended to “promote the sale of objects designe* or,
intended for use as drug paraphernalia” can be prohi ted.

App. 44

CONCLUSION

There can be little doubt that communities have a
valid interest in preventing the proliferation of drug
paraphernalia. This court believes and holds that the
Model Drug Paraphernalia Act adopted in the City of
Hollywood's Ordinance No. 0-80-15 as construed in this
order, validly serves the community's interest and does
not infringe upon rights secured by the Constitution.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED AN ADJUDGED that defendant's
motion for summary judgment shall be and is hereby
granted.

DONE AND ORDERED this 29 day of August,
1980.

/s/ {illegible}
U S District Judge

attachment

ec- Simon, Schindler & Tripp
1492 South Miami Avenue
Miami, Florida 33130

ec- Sherman Bennett Mayor, Esq.
Suite 300
2450 Hollywood Bivd.
Hollywood, Florida 33020

App. 45

FLORIDA BUSINESSMEN FOR FREE ENTERPRISE,

Plaintiffs-A ppellants,
u
The CITY OF HOLLYWOOD,
Defendant-A ppellee.

FLORIDA BUSINESSMEN FOR FREE ENTERPRISE,
an incorporated association, High Quality
Headquarters, Inc., a Florida Corp., Three Guys
Distributors, Inc., a Florida Corp., and Correct
Count Co., Inc., a New York Corp.,

Plaintiffs-A ppellants, Cross-Appellees,

U.

The STATE OF FLORIDA Jim Smith, as Attorney
General of the State of Florida, Kenneth Katsaris,
as a representative of the class of Defendants being
the sixty-seven duly elected Sheriffs of the State
of Florida, and Harry Morrison, etc.,

Defendants-A ppellees, Cross-Appellants.

Nos. 80-5769, 80-5813.

United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.

April 23, 1982.
Consolidated appeals were taken by merchants

from a judgment of the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida, at Tallahassee,

App. 46

Lynn C. Higby, J., upholding state “head shop” law,
and a judgment of the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida, at Ft. Lauderdale,
Norman C. Roettger, Jr., J., upholding a similar ordinance.
The Court of Appeals, Hatchett, Circuit Judge, held,
inter alia, that: (1) the scope of advertising provisions
of state and city “head shop” laws, which forbid placing
in any publication “any advertisement, knowing, or
under circumstances where one reasonably should know,
that the purpose of the advertisement, in whole or in
part, is to promote the sale of objects designed or
intended for use as drug paraphernalia,” does not embrace
protected noncommercial speech; (2) the respective laws’
definition of drug paraphernalia as items “designed for
use” with controlled substances gave fair notice of
which items fall within the statutory prohibition; the
phrase “designed for use” refers to structural features
of objects deemed inherently fashioned for drug use,
the intent implicated is that of the designer, and such
intent is reflected by the objective physical characteristics
of the finished product; and (3) the phrase “reasonably
should know” in the respective laws was not impermissibly

vague.

Affirmed.

See also, Fifth Circuit, 648 F.2d 956.
1. Constitutional Law—82(4)

Reviewing court will sustain a facial overbreadth
challenge if the enactment reaches a substantia) amount

of constitutionally protected conduct engaged in by the
complainant or others.

App. 47

2. Drugs and Narcotics—46
Municipal Corporations —594(1)

Scope of the advertising provisions of state and
city “head shop” laws, which forbid placing in any
publication “any advertisement, knowing, or under
circumstances where one reasonably shouid know, that
the purpose of the advertisement, in whole or in part,
is to promote the sale of objects designed or intended
for use as drug paraphernalia,” does not embrace
protected non-commercial speech. West's F.S.A.

§893.147(4).
3. Constitutional Law—90.1(1)
Drugs and Narcotics—43

Municipal Corporations—594(1)

Insofar as any commercial speech interest was
implicated by the ban of state and city “head shop”
laws on advertisements promoting the sale of drug
paraphernalia, the enactments were directed towards
commercial activity promoting or encouraging illegal
drug use, speech that is not entitled to First Amendment
protection. West's F.S.A. §893.147(4); U.S. C. A. Const.
Amend. 14.

4. Constitutional Law—90.1(1)

Although speech which merely proposes a
transaction is entitled to First Amendment

protection, the government may regulate or ban entirely

App. 48

commercial speech related to illegal activity. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 1.

5. Drugs and Narcotics—43

An enactment is not overbroad merely because it
may encompass “innocent” and “lawful” uses of items
as well as uses with illegal drugs.

6. Statutes—47

A law which does not impinge upon constitutionally
protected conduct and thus survives an overbreadth
claim may nevertheless suffer from vagueness.

7. Drugs and Narcotics—43

Municipal Corporations—594(2)

To succeed on their facial vagueness challenge to
state and city “head shop” laws, merchants had to
demonstrate that the statute and ordinance were
impermissibly vague in all of their applications. West's
F. S. A. §§ 893.145-893.147.

8. Constitutional Law — 2582)

Two basic requirements comprise the Fourteenth
Amendment due process guarantee against vague
statutes: laws must provide fair warning to persons of
ordinary intelligence of the persons covered and the
conduct prohibited, and must provide ascertainable
standards of guilt to protect against arbitrary, erratic
and discriminatory enforcement. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend.
14.

App. 49

9. Constitutional Law—60

Without sufficiently precise standards in statutes,

the legislature impermissibly delegates basic policy
decisions to the personal predilections of police,

prosecutors, and juries.
10. Criminal Law—13.1(1)

Statutes defining criminal offenses must be drawn
with a greater degree of precision.

11. Drugs and Narcotics—43

Municipal Corporations—594(1)

State and city “head shop” laws’ definition of drug
paraphernalia as items “designed for use” with controlled
substances gave fair notice of which items fall within
the statutory prohibition; the phrase refers to structural
features of objects deemed inherently fashioned for
drug use, the intent implicated is that of the designer,
and such intent is reflected by the objective physical
characteristics of the finished product. West's F.S.A.
§893.147(4).

12. Drugs and Narcotics—46

Municipal Corporations—594(1)

In respect to state and city “head shop” laws, the
three states of mind on which the definition of drug
paraphernalia relies, namely, “used,” “intended for use,”
or “designed for use,” require proof of general criminal
intent of the accused. West's F.S.A. §893.147(4).

App. 50

13. Drugs and Narcotics—43
Municipal Corporations—594(2)

In respect to state and city “head shop” laws
prohibiting the use, possession with intent to use, delivery,
possession with intent to deliver, and the manufacture
with intent to deliver drug paraphernalia “knowing or
under circumstances where one reasonably should know”
that the recipient will use the paraphernalia with
controlled substances, the phrase “reasonably should
know” is not impermissibly vague. West's F.S.A.

§893.147(4).
14. Criminal Law—568

Proof that a defendant reasonably should have
known something is established in substantially the
same manner as actual knowledge.

15. Constitutional Law—257.5
Municipal Corporations—121

While the risk of discriminatory enforcement
inherent in the “legitimate supplier” language of state
and city “head shop” laws is more than slight, merchants
could raise such due process claim only in a
postenforcement proceeding where they might attempt
to show that the ordinance and statute were being
enforced in an unconstitutional manner. West's F.S.A.
§893.146(10).

App. 51

16. Drugs and Narcotics—43

Municipal Corporations—594(2)

While merchants argued, in respect to state and
city “head shop” laws, that the “design for use” and
“reasonably should know” standards in the definition
of drug paraphernalia and the legitimate supplier indicium
were insufficiently explicit to prevent arbitrary
enforcement, the ordinance and statute were drafted
with sufficient specificity that this speculative danger
of discriminatory and arbitrary enforcement could not
render the laws void for vagueness. West's F.S.A.
§§ 893.145-893.147.

17. Constitutional Law—46(1)

A facial challenge to the constitutionality of the
subject drug paraphernalia enactments was not the
appropriate time for litigating claims of selective
enforcement; rather, such a claim could only be raised

in a postenforcement proceeding when the possibility
of selective enforcement had ripened into a prosecution.

Appeals from the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Florida.

Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida.

Before THORNBERRY*, FAY and HATCHETT,
Circuit Judges.

*Honorable Homer Thornberry, U.S. Circuit Judge for the
Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.

App. 52

HATCHETT, Circuit Judge:

This consolidated appeal involves a review of the
constitutionality of drug paraphernalia laws enacted
by the State of Florida and the City of Hollywood to
curb the increased incidence of drug abuse. The District
Court for the Northern District of Florida upheld the
state “head shop” law, but declared unconstitutionally
vague and severed a portion of the statute prohibiting
mere possession of drug paraphernalia. The District
Court for the Southern District of Florida upheld a city
its possession, manufacture, or sale in Hollywood. We
affirm both decisions.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Proceedings Below

Appellants, Florida Businessmen for Free Enterprise,
High Quality Headquarters, Inc., and Correct Count
Company, Inc. (hereinafter State Merchants), as
representatives of a plaintiff class of manufacturers,
distributors, and retailers of arguably vutlawed items,
sought injunctive and declaratory relief from enforcement
of Florida’s allegedly unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad “head shop” law. The United States District
Court for the Northern District of Florida granted the
state’s motion to dismiss and certified defendants Katsaris,
Sheriff of Leon County, and Morrison, State’s Attorney
for the Second Judicial Circuit of Florida, as
representatives of the defendant class solely for the
purpose of restraint by injunction. The court dec.ared
a provision of the statute unconstitutional, upheld the

App. 53

remainder and issued a stay and injunction pending
appeal prohibiting enforcement of the law in its entirety.

Appellants, Florida Businessmen for Free Enterprise
and M. P. \’Errico & Sons, Florida, Inc. (hereinafter
Hollywood Merchants), sought declaratory and injunctive
relief in the District Court for the Southern District of
Florida from the enforcement of an allegedly
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad ordinance of
the City of Hollywood, Florida. The district court denied
the Hollywood Merchants’ motion for a temporary
restraining order, and pursuant to Rule 65(a\(2),
Fed.R.Civ.P., consolidated the hearing on the preliminary
injunction with the trial on the merits. On cross-motions
for summary judgment, the district court upheld the
ordinance under the fourteenth amendment due process
clause and the first amendment and denied the Hollywood
Merchants’ motion for a stay pending appeal. A panel
of the Fifth Circuit entered an injunction pending appeal
precluding enforcement of the ordinance.

B. The Drug Paraphernalia Laws

The state head shop law, Fla. Stat. §§ 893.145-.147
(Supp.1982), like its city ordinance counterpart, is modelled
after the Model Drug Paraphernalia Act (MDPA) (1975),
drafted by the Drug Enforcement Administration of
the United States Department of Justice. Sec Appendix
A (setting forth text of state statut). Unlike the
Hollywood ordinance and the MDPA, however, the state
law mandates consideration of thirteen factors in
determining whether an object is drug paraphernalia,
whereas consideration of these same factors in the
Hollywood ordinance and the MDPA is discretionary.

App. 54

Hollywood, Florida, Ordinance No. 0-80-15 (Feb.
20, 1980), prohibits the use, possession with intent to
use manufacture, delivery, and advertisement of drug
paraphernalia. See Appendix B (reprinting text of
ordinance). “Drug paraphernalia” is defined as all items
“used, intended for use, or designed for use” with
controlled substances. A non-exclusive list of items
within the ambit of the ordinance supplements the
definitional section. The ordinance also permits
consideration of fourteen factors in addition to “other
logically relevant factors” in determining whether an
object is drug paraphernalia. Section 21-82, which
proscribes the manufacture and delivery of drug
paraphernalia, and section 21-83, which proscribes the
advertisement of drug paraphernalia, punishes the
commission of those acts by one who knows or “reasonably
should know” that the object will be used with illicit
drugs or that the advertisement’'s purpose is to promote
the sale of prohibited drug paraphernalia.

II. ISSUES

We must consider (1) whether the definition of
“drug paraphernalia” and the prohibition against
advertising drug paraphernalia is unconstitutionally
overbroad; and (2) whether the definition of “drug
paraphernalia” and the scienter requirement in these
laws are impermissibly vague.**

**On cross appeal, the State argues that the District Court
for the Northern District of Florida abused its discretion in declining to
abstain or defer to state courts prior to declaring the provision
proscribing mere possession unconstitutional. The subsequent
amendment of Fla. Stat. §893.147(1) (Supp.1982) to prohibit possession
with intent to use drug paraphernalia renders this issue moot on
appeal.

App. 55

III. Overbreadth

The State and Hollywood Merchants argue that
the statute and ordinance are unconstitutionally overbroad
because of the broad definition of drug paraphernalia.
Specifically, they contend that the “designed for use”
standard sweeps into its proscription a myriad of
otherwise innocent and lawful objects. They also assert
that the “reasonably should know” standard of knowledge
is unconstitutional because it inhihits constitutionally
protected conduct. The Merchants further argue that
the ban against advertising drug paraphernalia
impermissibly infringes “protected commercial speech”
and “protected political speech“ debating drug
paraphernalia laws and the use of drugs.

III A reviewing court will sustain a facial
overbreadth challenge if the enactment reaches “a
substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct”
engaged in by the complainant or others. Village of
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.,
— ‘ 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1189 91, 71 L.Ed.2d
— 0982).

[2] Both the State and the Hollywood “head shop”
laws forbid placing in any publication “any advertisement,
knowing, or under circumstances where one reasonably
should know, that the purpose of the advertisement, in
whole or in part, is to promote the sale of objects

or intended for use as drug paraphernalia.”
Fla.Stat. §893.147(4) (Supp.1982); Hollywood, Florida,
Ordinance No. 0-80-15, §21-83 (Feb. 20, 1980). We initially
consider whether this provision infringes upon the first
amendment rights of the Merchants or of others. This
section is narrowly drawn to prohibit advertising

App. 56

promoting the sale of “drug paraphernalia” within the
meaning of the head shop laws. It does not address
advertisements commenting upon the wisdom or efficiency
of these laws nor upon any other matter. This provision
does not regulate “speech as such, but simply regulates
the commercial marketing of items that . . may be
used for an illicit purpose.” Flipside, at 102 8. Ct.
at 1191. We therefore hold that the scope of the advertising
provisions does not embrace protected noncommercial

speech.

3. 4 Insofar as the ban implicates any commercial
speech interest, we note that the enactments here are
directed towards commercial activity promoting or
encouraging illegal drug use. Although speech which
merely “propose|s] a commercial transaction” is entitled
to first amendment protection, the government may
regulate or ban entirely commercial speech related to
illegal activity. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy u
Virginia Citizens Council, 425 U.S. 748, 761, 96 S.Ct.
1817, 1825, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976); Central Hudson Gas
& Electric Corp. u Public Service Commission, 447
U.S. 557, 563-64, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 2350-51, 65 L. Ed. 2d 341
(1980); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations
Commission, 413 U S. 376, 388, 93 S.Ct. 2553, 2560, 37
L.Ed.2d 669 (1973). The justification for protecting
commercial speech is that the free flow of information
in advertising benefits the public. Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 763-64, 96 S.Ct. 1826-27. As the
district court noted in the instant case, however,

the free flow of information concerning drug
paraphernalia has a potentially deleterious effect
upon the community. Having concluded that the

App. 57

ordinance is valid and that the possession,
manufacture, and delivery of drug paraphernalia
can be proscribed, a logical corollary is that
advertising intended to ‘promote the sale of objects
designed or intended for use as drug paraphernalia’
can be prohibited.

[5] Flipside also decided that an enactment is not
overbroad merely because it may encompass “innocent”
and “lawful” uses of items as well as uses with illegal
drugs. U.S. at n.9, 102 S.Ct. at 1192 n.9. The
Merchants’ assertion that they cannot ascertain whether
the statute and ordinance regulate items with some
lawful uses addresses vagueness. In Flipside, the Court
deemed such a complaint premature in a preenforcement
facial challenge. at n.9, 102 S.Ct. at 1192 n.9. The
Court also characterized the assertion that the provision
would inhibit innocent uses of covered items as a complaint
of denial of substantive due process, devoid of merit.
At — n.9, 102 S.Ct. at 1192 n.9. The Court stated: “A
retailer's right to sell smoking accessories, and
purchaser's right to buy and use them are entitled oniy
to minimal due process protection. . . . Regulation of
items that have some lawful as well as unlawful uses is
not an irrational means of discouraging drug use.” At
.—— 0.9, 102 8. Ct. at 1192 n.9 (citations omitted).

IV. VAGUENESS

16, 7] A law which does not impinge upon
constitutionally protected conduct and thus survives
an overbreadth claim may nevertheless suffer from
vagueness. To succeed on their facial vagueness challenge,
however, the Merchants must demonstrate that the

App. 58

statute and the ordinance are impermissibly vague in

all of their applications. Flipside, at 102 8. Ct. at
1191.

[8-10] Two basic requirements comprise the
fourteenth amendment due process guarantee against
vague statutes: Laws must provide fair warning to
persons of ordinary intelligence of the persons covered
and the conduct prohibited and must provide ascertainable
standards of guilt to protect against arbitrary, erratic,
and discriminatory enforcement. Grayned u City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-99,
33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972), Papachristou u City of Jacksonville,
405 U.S. 156, 162, 92 S.Ct. 839, 843, 31 L.Ed.2d 110
(1972). Without sufficiently precise standards in statutes,
the legislature impermissibly delegates basic policy
decisions to the personal predilections of police,
prosecutors, and juries. Smith u Goguen, 415 U.S. 566,
576, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1248, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1976). Further,
statutes defining criminal offenses must be drawn with
a greater degree of precision. Winters v. New York, 333
U.S. 507, 515, 68 S.Ct. 665, 670, 92 L.Ed. 840 (1945). The
State and Hollywood Merchants contend that certain
phraseology in the Hollywood ordinance and the Florida
statute violates theso constitutional criteria.

A. Fair Notice
1. “Designed for Use.”
{11] Quoting extensively from Indiana Chapter,
NORML v. Sendak, 631 F.2d 734 (7th Cir. 1980), the

Merchants argue that the definition of drug paraphernalia
as items “designed for use” with controlled substances

App. 59

fails to give fair notice of which items fall within the
statutory prohibition. Specifically, they assert that the
definition is unclear with respect to whether prohibited
devices must be suited solely for drug use or may
encompass multi-purpose objects which include legitimate
uses. The Merchants also criticize the phrase as
unconstitutionally ambiguous for failing to precisely
state who is intended as designer. The Merchants thus
argue that this language permits an accused to be
prosecuted and convicted based on the transferred
intent of another.

Like the trial courts in the instant cases, numerous
courts have upheld “designed for use” language against
similar challenges. See, e. g., The Casbah, Inc. u Thone,
651 F.2d 551, 559-60 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied.
U. 8... 8.Ct. __, 71 L.Ed.2d . 50 U.. L. W.
3713 (U.S. Mar. 8, 1982); Mid-Atlantic Accessories Trade
Association u Maryland, 500 F.Supp. 834, 844-45
(D.Md.1980); Delaware Accessories Trade Association
u Gebelein, 497 F.Supp. 289, 291-92 (D.Del.1980). The
United States Supreme Court recently decided that
“designed for use” language is not unconstitutionally
vague on its face. The Court held that this standard
encompasses items principally used with illegal drugs
as determined by the objective physical features of the
object in conjunction with the intent or plan of the
manufacturer. Flipside. U.S. at 102 8. Ct. at
1193 (1982). The Court stated that:

[A] business person of ordinary intelligence would
understand that this term refers to the design of
the manufacturer, not the intent of the retailer or
customer. It is also sufficiently clear that items

App. 60

which are principally used for nondrug purposes,
such as ordinary pipes, are not ‘designed for use’
with illegal drugs.

At — 102 8.Ct. at 1193.

{12} We therefore hold that the phrase “designed
for use” refers to structural features of objects deemed
inherently fashioned for drug use and that the intent
implicated is that of the designer (i.e., patent holder or
manufacturer). We further hold that the designer's intent
for a design is reflected by the objective physical
characteristics of the finished product. To ensure that
defendants will not be convicted based on the transferred
intent of others, we also note that the three states of
mind on which the definition of drug paraphernalia
relies —(1) “used,” (2) “intended for use,” or (3) “designed
for use“ —require proof of general criminal intent of
the accused. See, The Casbah, Inc. v. Thone, 651 F.2d
551, 559 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied. U.S. —__.,
—. §.Ct. __., 71 L.Ed.2d ___., 50 U.S. L. W. 3713 (U.S.
Mar. 8, 1982); Delaware Accessories Trade Association
u Gebelein, 497 F.Supp. 289, 292-93 (D.Del.1980); Record
Revolution No. 6, Inc. u City of Parma, 492 F.Supp.
1157, 1169-70 (N.D.Ohio), rev d. 638 F.2d 916, 928 & n. 14
(6th Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 451 U.S. 103, 101
S.Ct. 2998, 69 L.Ed.2d 384 (1981).

2. “Reasonably Should Know.”

{13] The Hollywood and Florida Merchants also
argue that the “reasonably should know” language in
the sections defining substantive offenses is vague.
The Hollywood ordinance prohibits the use, possession

App. 61

with intent to use, the delivery, the possession with
intent to deliver, and the manufacture with intent to
deliver drug paraphernalia “knowing or under

Both laws further prohibit any advertising “under
circumstances where one reasonably should know” that
the purpose of the advertisement is to promote the
sale of objects designed or intended for use with drug
paraphernalia. Fla.Stat. §893.147(4) (Supp.1982);
Hollywood, Fla., Ordinance No. 0-80-15, §21-83 (Feb. 20,
1980). Both trial courts in the instant case held that the
“reasonably should know” language was constitutionally
permissible. The Hollywood and State Merchants argue,
however, that this constructive knowledge standard
lacks a specific intent requirement and thus fails to
give notice to innocent persons of what constitutes

prohibited conduct.

[14] We hold that the phrase “reasonably should
know” is not impermissibly vague and adopt the reasoning
advanced by the district courts. We note that proof
that a defendant reasonably should have known something
is established in substantially the same manner as
actual knowledge. “Even if someone testifies that he
told a defendant something, the defendant's knowledge
may be inferred only if the trier of fact proves that the
defendant heard, understood, and believ's what he
was told.” World Imports, Inc. u Woodbridge Township,
493 F.Supp. 428, 433 (D.N.J.1980).

Further support is found in the many statutes
imposing criminal liability under a “reasonably should

App. 62

know” standard and which have withstood constitutional
attack. See, e. g., The Casbah, Inc. u Thone, 651 F.2d at
561 n.13 (collecting federal statutes). Florida courts
alsc have construed this standard to require proof that
“the circumstances of the transaction were sufficiently
suspicious to put a person of ordinary intelligence and
caution on inquiry.” Hutton u State, 332 So.2d 686, 687
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1976); B. S. W State, 2 461
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1975).

We also hold that this standard is sufficiently certain
to provide fair notice to persons of ordinary intelligence
of its meaning and application. See Gorin u United
States, 312 U.S. 19, 27-28, 61 S.Ct. 429, 433-434, 85
L.Ed. 488 (1941); United States u Featherston, 461 F.2d
1119, 1121-22 (5th Cir. 1972). The “reasonably should
know” standard does not punish innocent or inadvertent
conduct but establishes a scienter requirement that
the defendant acted in bad faith, with intent or knowledge
that the recipient will use the paraphernalia with
controlled substances.

3. Factors Relevant to Determining Drug
Paraphernalia: “Legitimate Supplier”.

Section 21-80B in the ordinance and section 893.146
in the statute lists fourteen and thirteen indicia,
respectively, that law enforcement authorities must
consider in determining whether an object is “drug
paraphernalia.” In this appeal, the Merchants attack
only the factor of being “a legitimate supplier” as vague
and overbroad. The relevant provision states:

App. 63

In determining whether an object is drug
paraphernalia, in addition to all other logically
relevant factors, the following may be considered:

11. Whether the owner, or anyone in control of
the object, is a legitimate supplier of like or related
items to the commodity, such as a licensed distributor
or dealer of tobacco products... .

Hollywood, Fla, Ordinance No. 0-80-15, §21-80B(11) (Feb.
20, 1980) (emphasis added); accord Fla. Stat. §893.146(10)
(Supp. 1982).

The district court upheld this provision in the
Hollywood ordinance, stating that the “legitimate
supplier” guideline “is supplemented by an example. It
is clear that this indicium attempts to distinguish ‘head
shops,’ the subject of the ordinance, from other retail
establishments which might sell objects with both innocent
and prohibited uses.” The court in Record Revolution
No. 6 wu City of Parma, nowever, deleted this same
provision from the three ordinances reviewed for creating
a danger of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
638 F.2d 916 at 933 n.24. The district court therein
stated that the reference to “legitimate suppliers” is
imprecise and misleading because the ordinance applies
to all who use, distribute, or advertise even an innocent
item with the requisite intent. 492 F.Supp. 1157, 1171
(N.D.Ohio 1980).

[15] We agree that the risk of discriminatory
enforcement inherent in this language is more than

App. 64

slight. Nevertheless, we hold that appellants may raise
this due process claim only in a post-enforcement
proceeding where they may attempt to show that the
ordinance and the statute are being enforced in an
unconstitutional manner.

B. Adequacy of Standards for Enforcement

[16] The Merchants also assert that the “designed
for use” and “reasonably should know” standards in
the definition of drug paraphernalia and the legitimate
supplier indicium are insufficiently explicit to prevent
arbitrary enforcement. This imprecision, appellants argue,
will foster selective enforcement only against “head
shops” by police and prosecutors “who claim to know
drug paraphernalia when they see it, but cannot define
it any more precisely in advance.”

[17] We hold that the ordinance and statute here
were drafted with sufficient specificity that this
speculative danger of discriminatory and arbitrary
enforcement cannot render the ordinance void for
vagueness. The Merchants have introduced no evidence
indicative of discriminatory enforcement. A facial
challenge to the constitutionality of the subject drug

enactments is not the appropriate time
for litigating claims of selective enforcement. Regardless
of the risk of discriminatory enforcement, the Merchants
may raise this claim only in a post-enforcement proceeding
when the possibility of selective enforcement has
„„ „3 Flipside. U. 8.

— uu. 21 & 22, 102 S.Ct. at 1196 nn. 21 & 22. Such
. oes ae cm
due process implications only when bolstered by specific
applications of the drug paraphernalia laws.

App. 65

VI. CONCLUSION

We hold that these drug paraphernalia laws enacted
by the State of Florida and the City of Hollywood are
neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad.

We now dissolve all injunctions entered in these
consolidated cases.

AFFIRMED.
APPENDIX A
Fla. Stat. §§ 893.145-.147 (Supp.1982)

893.145 “Drug Paraphernalia” defined

The term “drug paraphernalia” means all equipment,
products and materials of any kind which are used,
intended for use, or designed for use in planting,
propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting,

concealing
ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing into the
human body a controlled substance in violation of this
chapter. Drug paraphernalia is deemed to be contraband
which shall be subject to civil forfeiture. The term
includes, but is not limited to:

(1) Kits used, intended for use, or designed for
use in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, or
harvesting of any species of plant which is a controlled
substance or from which a controlled substance can be
derived.

App. 66

(2) Kits used, intended for use, or designed for
use in manufacturing, compounding, converting,

producing, processing, or preparing controlled substances.

(3) Isomerization devices used, intended for use,

or designed for use in increasing the potency of any
species of plant which is a controlled substance.

(4) Testing equipment used, intended for use, or

designed for use in identifying, or in analyzing the
strength, effectiveness, or purity of, controlled substances.

(5) Scales and balances used, intended for use, or

designed for use in weighing or measuring controlled
substances.

(6) Diluents and adulterants, such as quinine
hydrochloride, mannitol, mannite, dextrose, and lactose,
used, intended for use, or designed for use in cutting
controlled substances.

(7) Separation gins and sifters used, intended for

use, or designed for use in removing twigs and seeds
from, or in otherwise cleaning or refining, cannabis.

(8) Blenders, bowls, containers, spoons, and mixing
devices used, intended for use, or designed for use in
compounding controlled substances.

(9) Capsules, balloons, envelopes and other
containers used, intended for use, or designed for use
in packaging small quantities of controlled substances.

App. 67

(10) Containers and other objects used, intended
for use, or designed for use in storing or concealing
controlled substances.

(11) Hypodermic syringes, needles, and other
objects used, intended for use, or designed for use in
parenterally injecting controlled substances into the
human body.

(12) Objects used, intended for use, or designed
for use in ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing
cannabis, cocaine, hashish, or hashish oil into the human
body, such as:

(a) Metal, wooden, acrylic, glass, stone, plastic,
or ceramic pipes, with or without screens, permanent
screens, hashish heads, or punctured metal bowls.

(b) Water pipes.

le) Carburetion tubes and devices.

(d) Smoking and carburetion masks.

(e) Roach clips: meaning objects used to holding
burning material, such as a cannabis cigarette, that has
become too small or too short to be held in the hand.

(f) Miniature cocaine spoons, and cocaine vials.

(g) Chamber pipes.

(h) Carburetor pipes.

(i) Electric pipes.

App. 68

(j) Air-driven pipes.
*) Chillums.
(l) Bongs.
(m) Ice pipes or chillers.
893.146 Determination of paraphernalia

In determining whether an object is drug
paraphernalia, a court or other authority or jury shall
consider, in addition to all other logically relevant factors,
the following:

(1) Statements by an owner or by anyone in contro!
of the object concerning its use.

(2) The proximity of the object, in time and space,
to a direct violation of this act.

(3) The proximity of the object to controlled
substances.

(4) The existence of any residue of controlled
substances on the object.

(5) Direct or circumstantial evidence of the intent
of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object, to
deliver it to persons who he knows, or should reasonably
know, intend to use the object to facilitate a violation
of this act. The innocence of an owner, or of anyone in
control of the object, as a direct violation of this act
shall not prevent a finding that the object is intended
for use, or designed for use, as drug paraphernalia.

App. 69

(6) Instructions, oral or written, provided with
the object concerning its use.

(7) Descriptive materials accompanying the object
which explain or depict its use.

(8) Any advertising concerning its use.

(9) The manner in which the object is displayed
for sale.

(10) Whether the owner, or anyone in control of
the object, is a legitimate supplier of like or related
items to the community, such as a licensed distributor
of or dealer of tobacco products.

(11) Direct or circumstantial evidence of the ratio
of sales of the object or objects to the total sales of the
business enterprise.

(12) The existence and scope of legitimate uses
for the object in the community.

(13) Expert testimony concerning its use.

893.147 Use, possession, manufacture, delivery, or
advertisement of drug paraphernalia

(1) Use or possession of drug paraphernalia. —It
is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with

intent to use, drug paraphernalia:
(a) To plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest,

manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process,
prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, or

App. 70

conceal, a controlled substance in violation of this chapter;
or

(b) To inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce
into the human body a controlled substance in violation
of this chapter.

Any person who violates this section is guilty of a
misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided
in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(2) Manufacture or delivery of drug paraphernalia.
—It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with
intent to deliver, or manufacture with intent to deliver,
drug paraphernalia, knowing, or under circumstances
where one reasonably should know, that it will be used:

(a) To plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest,
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process,
prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, or
conceal a controlled substance in violation of this act;
or

(b) To inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce
into the human body a controlled subst. nce in violation
of this act.

Any person who violates this section is guilty of a
felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(3) Delivery of drug paraphernalia to a minor.

— Any person 18 years of age or over who violates
subsection (2) by delivering drug paraphernalia to a

App. 71

person under 18 years of age is guilty of a felony of the

second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s.
775.083, or s. 775.084.

(4) Advertisement of drug paraphernalia. —It is
unlawful for any person to place in any newspaper,
magazine, handbill, or other publication any
advertisement, knowing, or under circumstances where
one reasonably should know, that the purpose of the
advertisement, in whole or in part, is to promote the
sale of objects designed or intended for use as drug
paraphernalia. Any person who violates this section is
guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable
as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

APPENDIX B
ORDINANCE NO. 0-80-15

AN ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF HOLLYWOOD,
FLORIDA, AMENDING CHAPTER 21, CODE OF
ORDINANCES, ENTITLED, “OFFENSES,
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS”, BY CREATING
SECTIONS 21.80 THROUGH 21-84 THEREOF, TO
PROHIBIT THE DISPLAY OR SALE OF
INSTRUMENTS, SIMULATED DRUGS,
SIMULATED CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES, OR
OTHER NARCOTIC PARAPHERNALIA,
PROVIDING A SEVERABILITY CLAUSE, AND
PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE DATE

WHEREAS, the City Commission of the City of
Hollywood, Florida, has become very concerned about
the increased use of illegal drugs and controlled substances
within the City; and

App. 72

WHEREAS, the sale, advertisement and distribution
of instruments, drug paraphernalia and simulated
controlled substances, contribute to an atmosphere of
community acceptance of illegal use of controlled
substances: and

WHEREAS, the City Commission finds that it is
in the best interest of the health, safety and welfare, of
the citizens of the City to restrict access to such drug
paraphernalia;

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE
CITY COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF HOLLYWOOD,
FLORIDA:

Section 1: That Chapter 21, Code of Ordinances,
entitled “Offenses, Miscellaneous Provisions” is amended
by creating Sections 21-89 through 21-84 to read and
provide as follows:

Sec. 21-80. Definitions.

A. The term “Drug Paraphernalia” means all
equipment, products and materials of any kind which
are used, intended for use, or designed for use, in
planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting,
manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing,
processing, preparing, testing, analyzing, packaging,
repacking, storing, containing, concealing, injecting,
ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing into the
human body a controlled substance in violation of this
ordinance. It includes, but is not limited to:

1. Kits used, intended for use, or designed for
use in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing or

App. 73

harvesting of any species of plant which is a controlled
substance or from which a controlled substance can be
derived;

2. Kits used, intended for use, or designed for
use in manufacturing, compounding, converting,

producing, processit.g, or preparing controlled substances;

3. Isomerization devices used, intended for use,
or designed for use in increasing the potency of any
species of plant which is a controlled substance.

4. Testing equipment used, intended for use, or
designed for use in identifying, or in analyzing the
strength, effectivevess or purity of controlled substances;

5. Scales and balances used, intended for use, or
designed for use in weighing or measuring controlled
substances;

6. Diluents and adulterants, such as quinine
hydrochloride, mannitol, mannite, dextrose and lactose,
used, intended for use, or designed for use in cutting
controlled substances;

7. Separation gins and sifters used, intended for
use, or designed for use in removing twigs and seeds
from, or in otherwise cleaning or refining, marijuana;

8. Blenders, bowls, containers, spoons and mixing

devices used, intended for use, or designed for use in
compounding controlled substances;

App. 74

9. Capsules, balloons, envelopes and other
containers used, intended for use, or designed for use
in packaging small quantities of controlled substances;

10. Containers and other objects used, intended
for use, or designed for use in storing or concealing
controlled substances;

11. Hypodermic syringes, needles and other objects
used, intended for use, or designed for use in parenterally
injecting controlled substances into the human body;

12. Objects used, intended for use, or designed
for use in ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing
marijuana, cocaine, hashish, or hashish oil into the human
body, such as:

(a) Metal, wooden, acrylic, glass, stone, plastic,
or ceramic pipes with or without screens, permanent
screens, hashish heads, or punctured metal bowls;

(b) Water pipes;

(c) Carburetion tubes and devices;

(d) Smoking and carburetion masks;

(e) Roach clips: meaning objecis used to holding
burning material, such as a marijuana cigarette,
that has become too small or too short to be held in
the hand;

(f) Miniature cocaine spoons, and cocaine vials;
(g) Chamber pipes;

App. 75

(h) Carburetor pipes;

(i) Electric pipes;

Air driven pipes;

(k) Chillums;

) Bongs;

(m) lee pipes or chillers.

B. In determining whether an object is drug
in addition to all other logically relevant

factors, the following may be considered:

1. Statements by an owner or by anyone in control
of the object concerning its use;

2. Prior convictions, if any, of an owner, or of
anyone in control of the object, under any State or
Federal law relating to any controlled substance;

3. The proximity of the object, in time and space,
to a direct violation of this ordinance;

4. The proximity of the object to controlled
substances;

5. The existence of any residue of controlled
substances on the object;

6. Direct or circumstantial evidence of the intent
of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object, to

App. 76

deliver it to persons whom he knows, or should reasonably
know, intend to use the object to facilitate a violation
of this ordinance; the innocence of an owner, or of
anyone in control of the object, as to a direct violation
of this ordinance shall not prevent a finding that the
object is intended for use, or designed for use as drug

paraphernalia;

7. Instructions, oral or written, provided with
the object concerning its use;

9. National and local advertising concerning its
use;

10. The manner in which the object is displayed
for sale;

11. Whether the owner, or anyone in control of
the object, is a legitimate supplier of like or related
items to the community, such as a licensed distributor
or dealer of tobacco products;

12. Direct or circumstantial evidence of the ratio
of sales of the object(s) to the total sales of the business

enterprise;

13. The existence and scope of legitimate uses
for the object in the community;

14. Expert testimony concerning its use.

Sec. 21-81. Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.

It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess
with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate,

App. 77

cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert,
store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise
introduce ‘ato the human body a controlled substance
in violat... of this ordinance.

Sec. 21-82. Manufacture or Delivery of Drug
Paraphernalia.

It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess
with intent to deliver, or manufacture with intent to
deliver, drug paraphernalia, knowing, or under
circumstances where one reasonably should know, that

it will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow,
harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce,

Sec. 21-83. Advertisement of Drug Paraphernalia
It is unlawful for any person to place in any

the advertisement, in whole or in part, is to promote
the sale of objects designed or intended for use as drug
paraphernalia.

Sec. 21-84. Penalty

Any person who violates any term, condition, or
provision of Secs. 21-81 through 21-83 shall be liable,

App. 78

upon conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction, to
a fine not to exceed Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00), or
by imprisonment not to exceed ninety (90) days, or
both, at the discretion of the court. Each day of violation
of any term, provision, or condition of Secs. 21-81 through
21-83 shall constitute a separate and distinct offense.

Section 2: lt is the intention of the City Commission
and it is hereby ordained that the provisions of this
ordinance shall become and be made a part of the Code
of Ordinances of the City of Hollywood, Florida, and
the sections of this ordinance may be renumbered to
accomplish such intention.

Section 3: If any word, phrase, clause, subsection
or section of this ordinance is for any reason held
unconstitutional or invalid, the invalidity thereof shall
not affect the validity of any remaining portions of this
ordinance.

Section 4: That all sections or parts of sections of
the Code of Ordinances, all ordinances or parts of
ordinances, and all resolutions or parts of resolutions,
in conflict herewith, be and the same are hereby repeaied
to the extent of such conflict.

Section 5: That this ordinance shall be in full

iorce and effect immediately upon its passage and
adoption.

App. 79

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

NO. 81-5701
Non-Argument Calendar

FLORIDA BUSINESSMEN FOR FREE ENTERPRISE,
an unincorporated association, and
MERLIN’S MUSIC, INC., a Florida Corporation,

Plaintiffs-A ppellants,

versus
THE CITY OF HOMESTEAD, FLORIDA,
A Florida Municipal Corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida

June 10, 1982
Before HILL, VANCE and HATCHETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

AFFIRMED. See Florida Businessmen for Free
Enterprise, Inc. v. Florida, No. 80-5813 (11th Cir. Apr.
23, 1982); Florida Businessmen for Free Enterprise,

Inc. v. City of Hollywood, No. 80-5769 (11th Cir. Apr. 23,
1982).

App. 80

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_0992%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
