# Petition — United States v. RSR Corp. > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_0834%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition - **Published:** January 1, 1982 - **Citation:** 459 U.S. 1016 ## Text UNITED STATES oF AMERICA, PETITIONER ; * é v. ie RSR CoRPORATION * . „ : : 4 * 4 7 15 N * * 4 4A 9 r é: j ' N . ¥ 2 * * 7 rrnnox FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI Serge THE » 892 a oe » yy 2 _4 - 1 * 7 7 * * — = “ * ae 2 2 a= 1 al , it considered itself bound by Transportation (DOT) to regulate private motor carri- ers. The decision below strips DOT of authority to pro- mulgate mandatory regulations for almost two-thirds of the carriers that are currently subject to its jurisdic tion. The potential impact of the decision below is illustrated by the following figures: DOT’s Federal Highway Administration currently promulgates safety regulations for some 180,000 carriers, including more than 108,000 private carriers who operate approximate- ly 850,000 vehicles. Thus, DOT's ability to assure safety to vacate a two-year old criminal conviction under a companion provision of the Interstate Commerce Act. United States v. Faygo Beverages, Inc., Cr. No. recommended the prosecution of almost 40 criminal cases against private carriers. Many of those prosecu- tions could be undermined by the decision of the court of appeals in this case.“ Without the criminal penalties Congress enacted, DOT would be left without any effective means of en- forcing its safety regulations for private motor carriers. Under the decision below, those regulations would no l be mandatory but merely precatory because no orcement mechanism would remain. This is contrary to the express language and legislative history of the recodification of the Interstate Commerce Act, and is at odds with numerous decisions of this Court that hold that penal statutes are not to be construed in a manner that defeats Congress’ manifest intent. The judgment in the present case, moreover, cannot be reconciled with the recent decision of the Second Circuit in United States v. Rossetti Brothers, 671 F. 2d 718 (1982), which rejected the same arguments that prevailed in the Fifth Cireuit. Review by this Court is necessary in order to resolve this split in circuit court authorities in a manner that will allow DOT to fulfill its statutory mandate of ensuring safety on the nation’s highways. 1. Prior to 1966, the Interstate Commerce Commis- sion (ICC) was empowered to regulate aspects of trans- portation of property by motor carriers engaged in in- terstate commerce (see ch. 498, 49 Stat. 543 (49 U.S.C. 1 et geg.). While all such carriers were subject to ICC jurisdiction, the extent of regulation depended upon whether the carrier was classified as a common, con- tract, or private carrier. Section 204(a)(3) of the Inter- state Commerce Act (49 U.S.C, 304(a)(3)), gave the Commission powers to promulgate regulations gov- erning the safety of private motor carriers. And Section 222(g), 49 U.S.C. 322(g) (now codified at 49 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 1190%b)) provided criminal penalties for failure to comply with those regulations. In 1966, the Department of Transportation was cre- ated (Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 981, (codified at 49 U.S.C. 1651 et seg.) and certain functions previously performed by the ICC were transferred to DOT. Among the functions so transferred were those relating to “qualifications and maximum hours of service of em- ployees and safety of operation and equipment [under] * * * sections 204(a)(3), (Za), and (5) (49 U.S.C. 304).” 49 U.S.C. 1655(e)(6)(C). In addition, 49 U.S.C. 16550 expressly provided that DOT was vested with the same functions and administrative powers the ICC had en- joyed under 49 U.S.C. 322. Thus, plenary power to adopt regulations governing private carriers and to en- force those regulations by criminal prosecution, previously within the jurisdiction of the ICC, was transferred directly to DOT. See United States v. Youngstown Cartage Co., Fed. Carr. Cas. (CCH) 4 82,383 (N. D. Ohio Jan. 10, 1973).5 to 56,063) The powers, duties and functions of the ICC including its were transferred to DOT. One of these pow- 2 Ke — mum and . e ee BOT the e e}scribe en- ä he baht Sang ft mec ere 1 * — ox + * 10 This statutory scheme was not revisited until 1978 when Congress, recognizing that intervening amend- ments had left the substantive provisions of federal transportation law scattered among various codified and uncodified sections, undertook to restate the Inter- state Commerce Act and related laws “without sub- stantive change” and to enact those laws as subtitle IV of the 49th title of the United States Code. See 124 Cong. Rec. 30172 (1978) (remarks of Reps. Eilberg, McClory).® That this recodification was intended to ef- fect no substantive change was reflected not only in the legislative history, but also in the statutory language. To this end, Section 3(a) of the recodification statute (Pub. L. No. 95-473, 92 Stat. 1466), entitled “Legisla- tive Purpose and Construction,” states that “Sections 1 and 2 of this Act restate, without substantive change, laws enacted before May 16, 1978, that were replaced by those sections. Those sections may not be construed as making a substantive change in the laws replaced” (emphasis added). In addition, Section 3(c) provides that “[aJn order, rule, or regulation in effect under a law replaced by sections 1 and 2 of this Act continues in effect under the corresponding provision enacted by this Act until repealed, amended, or superseded” (em- phasis added). And Section 3(d) provides that offenses committed under replaced sections are “deemed to have been * * * committed under” the recodified sections. The Act also contains a significant savings provision which in substance, that whenever a power or duty is erred, reference in any other federal law to the er transferred shall be deemed to mean the party to the power, duty or function was vested. * The 1978 recodification was the first of at. ongoing leg- islative project to restate and codify federal transportation law. Future revisions and codifications will include subtitle I of title 49. See H.R. Rep. No. 1395, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978); see also United States v. Rossetti Brothers, supra, 671 F. 2d at 720 n. 6. 1 11 Among the sections of the Interstate Commerce Act thus restated “without substantive change” was 49 U.S.C. 322(g) (currently codified at 49 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 11909(b)),” which imposes criminal penalties on pri- vate carriers that, like respondent RSR, “knowingly” and “willfully” maintain false records in violation of safety regulations. The significance of these criminal sanctions in the statutory scheme can scarcely be over- stated. They are the only means Congress prescribed for enforcement of DOT safety and recordkeeping regu- lations. In the absence of criminal enforcement, the regulations covering important questions of public safe ty would be, as the Second Circuit recognized in United States v. Rossetti Brothers, supra, 671 F. 2d at 720 “re- duce{d}) * * * to precatory provisions.” In that event, the 108,000 private carriers under DOT’s jurisdiction would be subject to no effective regulation under the Interstate Commerce Act. The clear import of 49 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 1190%b), when read in the context of the recodification statute of which it was a part, is that the pre-existing criminal sanctions would continue “without substantive change” and that pre-existing regulations would continue] in effect.” Under settled rules of statutory construction, this statutory context may not be overlooked. It is well established that “a section of a statute should not be 12 tence or member of a sentence, but [should] look to the provisions of the whole law * * *.” Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962) (footnote omitted). Accord, United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587-588 n.10 (1981); United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 772-774 (1979); Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 388-390 (1980); NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, (1957); see United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122 (1850); 2A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.05 (1973). Thus, “courts should interpret a statute with an eye to the surrounding statutory landscape and an ear for harmonizing potentially discordant provisions „ „*. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 344 (1971). Indeed, even in the context of sentencing provi- sions in penal statutes, a single phrase should not be construed in isolation from the statutory scheme as a whole when to do so would result in a meaning that con- tradicts or distorts “the fair import of the whole re- maining language.” United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25-26 (1948); see, e. ., United States v. Campos- Serrano, 404 U.S. 298, 298 (1971); United States v. Bass, supra, 404 U.S. at 350-351. Rather than interpret Section 1190%b), as it should have, in the context of the statute of which it was a part, the court of appeals focused on a minor language change in the recodification (see note 7, supra). By lim- iting its scope of inquiry to the words “subject to the ju- risdiction of the Commission” (49 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 1190%(b)), the court rendered an unduly narrow inter- pretation wholly at odds with the stated objective of Congress. Thus, the court concluded that, because au- thority to regulate private carriers had been transferred from the ICC in 1966, the 1978 statutory reference to ICC jurisdiction could not have included such carriers. In so concluding, the court effectively ig- nored both the Department of :ransportation Act of 13 1966, which transferred the relevant ICC powers, and the express language of the 1978 recodification, which instructed the federal courts to construe Section 1190%(b) as “not * * making a substantive change.” Construing Section 11909%(b) as making no substantive change requires a conclusion different from that of the court of appeals—i.e., that once the “jurisdiction of the Commission” was transferred to DOT, DOT was in- vested with full power to assure private carrier safety by promulgating regulations enforced by criminal sanctions. 2. The court of appeals believed that the language of Section 1190%b) abolished criminal jurisdiction over private carriers for violations of safety regulations, even though it recognized that the legislative history conclusively showed that Congress intended to pre- serve that jurisdiction. App. A, infra, 10a (“this is what Congress clearly meant to say, intended to say, and wanted to say”). Yet, feeling bound by its restric- tive reading of the statute and the rule of lenity, the court held that Congress did not say it“ (ibid.). As ex- plained above, the court erred in its interpretation of the language of the statute; beyond this, however, it erred in failing to give effect to Congress’ intent as ex- pressed in the legislative history. See United States v. Rossetti Brothers, supra, 671 F.2d at 720 (“[wjhere Congress’s purpose is frustrated by a rigid application of statutory language, common sense and evident statu- tory purpose must inform a court’s construction of the statute”). Contrary to the view of the court of appeals, the rule of lenity is merely al] guide to statutory construction” (Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961), which is not applicable unless there is such a “grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the language and structure of the Act” (Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 831 (1974)) that even after [a court has] ‘seiz[ed]) every thing from which aid can be derived ** * lit is 14 still) left with an ambiguous statute.” United States Bass, supra, 404 U.S. 347, quoting United States Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 368, 386 (1805). As this Court observed in United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 125 (1975), quoting United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18 25-26 (1948): The canon in favor of strict construction [of crimi- nal statutes] is not an inexorable command to over- ride common sense and evident statutory * * * Nor does it demand that a statute be the “narrowest meaning”; it is satisfied if the words are given their fair meaning in acccrd with the manifest intent of the lawmakers. See also, e. g., United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 778-779 (1979), United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 379 (1978); Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. BAR. B77 (1977); lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 789 (1975); id. at 795 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 798 (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Moore, 613 F. 2d 1029, 1048-1045 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert denied, 446 U.S. 954 (1980). Moreover, as this Court noted in United States v. Culbert, supra, 435 U.S. at 379, the rule of lenity applies only when a statute is genuinely ambiguous, or uncertainty exists as to Congress’ intent. See also United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 121 (1979). Thus, the rule of lenity is not implicated here. As we have shown, the recodification plainly negates any sug- gestion that criminal sanctions were intended to be repealed. Moreover, the statute’s legislative history shows—without a shred of evidence to the con- trary—that Congress “intended merely to transplant [the penalty] section, renumbered into the recodified portion of the Act.” United States \ v. Rossetti Brothers, supra, 671 F. 2d at 720.® * Rossetti Brothers involved a companion provision to the one at issue in this case (49 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 11914(b)), which is 15 Since Congress’ intent is clearly expressed in the leg- islative history, as the court of appeals recognized, the court erred in failing to give weight to the legislative history in rendering its interpretation. 8. Even if the rule of lenity were relevant to this case, the court of appeals seriously erred in its applica- tion of the rule. As this Court has held (United States v. Brown, supra, 333 U.S. at 25-26), no rule of statuto- ry construction requires magnified 1 77 a single ambiguous word in order to give it Bo veh ey ambos pm to the fair import of the whole remaining . As was said in United States v. Gaskin, 320 U.S. 627, 580, the canon “does not require distortion or nulli- fication of the evident meaning and purpose of the legislation.” See United States v. Turkette, supra, 452 U.S. 587-588 n. 10 United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 145 (1975); see also Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 218 (1976); United States v. Cook, 384 U.S. 257, 262 (1966). In this case, Congress’ intent that the 1978 legislation work no substantive change is manifest. The court of appeals’ conclusion that criminal jurisdiction was “inad- vertently” stripped from the Interstate Commerce Act is precisely the kind of conclusion that Congress sought to prevent by the plain language of its savings provi- sions.* Moreover, the court’s conclusion directly 16 conflicts with the established presumption that recodifi- cations are not meant to make substantive changes in previous statutes. See Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 358 U.S. 222, 227-228 (1957); United States v. Cook, 384 U.S. 257, 262 (1966); Cass v. United States, 417 U.S. 72, 82 (19700. 1 If leg- islative intent could be thwarted by mechanical applica- tion of the “rule of lenity,” congressional attempts to restate complex legislation would be hampered and the current effort to recodify the Interstate Commerce Act would be burdened by the need for correcting amend- ments before Congress could proceed to the next stage of its recodification process. 11 Such a result is not de- manded by the “rule of lenity,” which should only be utilized when a court’s “* * * interpretation can be . .e & Gee Substantive change not intended.—Like other codifications undertaken to enact into positive law all titles of the United States Code, this bill makes no substantive changes in the law. It is sometimes feared that mere changes in ter- minology and style will result in changes in substance or impair the precedent value of earlier judicial decisions and other og Pym This fear might have some weight if this were the usual kind of amendatory legislation where it can be inferred that a of language is intended to change substance. In a statute, however, the — 44 the statute is in- tended to remain substantively unchanged. 10 Indeed, this Court's recent decision in Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 400 (1980), establishes that clearly ex- pressed legislative intent overrides inadvertent or inartful . See also Cass v. United States, supra, 417 U.S. at 81-82; Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 815-816 (1966). 17 no more than a guess as to what Congress in- v. United States, supra, 447 U.S. at 387. It should not be used to directly contradict legisla- tive intent or to reach what the Second Circuit correct- ly characterized as an “anomalous result.” United States v. Rossetti Brothers, supra, 671 F. ad at 720. Moreover, this case does not involve the factors that typically have formed the basis for this Court’s invoca- tion of the rule of lenity. First, there is no serious dispute that RSR received “fair warning” of the re- quirements of the law (United States v. Bass, supra, H admitted making, in the words of the statute, “will- the testimony at the plea hearing established the factu- al basis for the conviction (June 18, 1980 Tr. 31-36). Moreover, 49 C. F. R. 395.8 expressly states that any vi- olation “shall make * * * the carrier liable to prosecu- tion” (see note 2, supra), and RSR has never ques- tioned the application of this regulation. Thus, this is not a case involving inadvertent violations of regulatory Second, this case does not present the other basis for the holding in United States v. Bass, supra, 404 U.S. n The court of appeals noted that Ithhe parties do not information would have been proper if RSR had Hill fit ts HE 1125 1112 | | . ö at 348: “‘the instinctive distaste against men ing in unless the lawmaker has clearly said sh ” (quoting H. Friendly, Benchmarks, Mr. tice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, 196 (1967)). RSR is a corporate defendant subject only to the same penalty (a fine) traditionally imposed in civil or administrative proceedings. Third, unlike Williams v. United States, No. 80-2116 (June 29, 1982), slip op. 11, this is not a case in which the “legislative history * * * fails to evidence congres- sional awareness of the statute’s claimed scope.” As we have demonstrated, the government’s interpretation is the only one Congress considered and Congress made its intent clear in Section 3 of the recodification statute. Finally, also unlike Williams v. United States, su- pra, slip op. 11, this case does not involve “subject mat- ter that has traditionally been regulated by state law.” The enforcement powers at issue here have long been exercised by the ICC and more recently by DOT. More- over, there can be no dispute that application of safety standards to private carriers engaged in interstate com- merce is a subject properly within the purview of feder- al law. In short, no rule of statutory construction compels a court to disregard the express language and structure of a statute, or to ignore the unqualified expression of intent contained in the legislative history. Under gov- erning canons of statutory construction as often pro- nounced by this Court and as applied by the Second Circuit in United States v. Rossetti Brothers, supra, the only proper result is to read the recodification pre- cisely as Congress directed—as restating prior law “without substantive change.” CONCLUSION The petition for a writ of certiorari should be SEPTEMBER 1982 --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_0834%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.