# Appendix — Temora Trading Co. v. Perry > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_0832%3A2 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Appendix - **Published:** January 1, 1982 - **Citation:** 459 U.S. 1070 ## Text WALLACE PERRY, as Trustee of the Estate of Boyd James O'Donnell and Joan O'Donnell, Bankrupts, Respondent. No. 13531 FILED MAY 27 1982 C.R. DAVENPORT Clerk of Supreme Court By /s ith Fountain Deputy Cler Appeal from order striking defen- dant's answer, entering a default judg- ment, and awarding summary judgment. Pourth Judicial District Court, Elko County; Joseph 0. McDaniel, Judge. Affirmed. A-l . Wilson, Wilson and Barrows, Ltd., Las Vegas; Moneymaker & Morrison, Los Angeles, California, for Appellant. Goicoechea, DiGrazia & Marvel, Elko; Russell Piccoli, Phoenix Arizona, for Respondent. Respondent Wallace Perry, as Trustee of the Estate of Boyd James O'Donnell and Joan O'Donnell, Bankrupts, commenced this action in the district court to quiet title to certain property located in Elko County. The District judge, after finding that appellant-defendant Temora Trading Company, Ltd. had willfully failed to comply with the court's discovery orders, struck Temora's answer. NRCP A-2. 37(b). Summary judgment was entered in favor of the Trustee. This appeal fol- lowed: THE FACTS O'Donnell filed for bankruptcy in Arizona. Respondent Perry was named trustee in the bankruptcy proceedings. Although O'Donnell was adjudicated bank- rupt, he was denied a bankruptcy dis- charge. Just prior to filing his peti- tion for bankruptcy, O'Donrell transfer- red valuable real estate holdings to a James Gleason, who allegedly transferre’ the property to Temora. Discovery was protracted and bitterly fought. Eventually, Perry noticed the depositions of three of Temora's offi- cers in the Bahamas. At the time set A-3. for their depositions their local attor- ney appeared and stated that they would not be deposed without an order from a Bahamian court. Perry obtained an order from c-18 . discovery. That as TEMORA's attorney- in-fact he has given false information in answering Interrogatories in respect to O'DONNELL's association and connec- tion with TEMORA. 5. That for the willful and deliber- ate refusal to make discovery, the Defendants' Answer should be stricken and Summary Judgment entered for the Plaintiff and against the Defendants on Plaintiff's Third and Sixth Causes of Action in the Fourth Amended Complaint. Skeen v. Valley Bank of Wevada, 89 Nev. 301, 511 P.2d@ 1053 (Nev. 1973). The conveyances from O'DONNELL or his enti- ties to JAMES GLEASON were fraudulent conveyances, and the title to all of the subject property vested in the Plaintiff Trustee in Bankruptcy upon the filing of the Petition in Bankruptcy on March 13, c-19. 1970, as provided by Sec. 70 of the Bankruptcy Act as Amended to 1968 (11 U.S.C. 110). 6. In further support of Summary Judgment, TEMORA's Board of Director's refusal to make discovery raises a pre- sumption that, had they appeared for their Depositions, the evidence present- ed would have supported the allegation of the Plaintiff's Third and Sixth Causes of Action. See NRS 47.250(3). 7. Badges of fraud are recognized as proof of a fraudulent conveyance. Leo- nardo v. Leonardo, 251 F.2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1958), Smith v. Popham, 266 Ore. 625, 513 P.2d 1172 (1973), Pirst Wation- al Bank of Omaha v. First Cadco Corpora- tion, 189 Neb. 743, 205 N.W.2d 115 (1973), and Payne v. Gilmore, 382 P.2d 140 (Okla. 1963). Hibernia Bank v. La. C-20. Ave. Realty Co., 79 S. 554 (La. 1918); Estate of Cleo B. Reed v. Butcher, 566 P.2d 587 (Wyo. 1877); U.S. v. Leggett, 292 F.2€ 423 (6th Circuit) states the general rule at pages 426-247: The issue of fraud is commonly determined by certain recognized indicia, denominated "badges of fraud," which are circumstances so frequently at- tending fraudulent transfers than an inference of fraud arises from then. Pergrem v. Smith, Ky., supra, 255 S.W.2d 42, 44; Leo- mardo v. Leonardo, 251 F.2d 22, 27; Bentley v. Caille, 289 Mich. 74, 78, 286 N.W. 163, 164. Inadequacy of consideration, secret or hurried transactions not in the usual mode of doing business, and the use of dummies or fictitious parties are common examples of “badges of fraud." As said in the Bentley case, supra: "No effort to hinder or delay creditors is more severely condemned by the law than an attempt by a debtor to place his property where he can still enjoy it and at the same time require his creditors to remain unsatis- fied." Although “badges of fraud" are not conclusive and are more or less strong or weak according to their nature and the C-21. number occurring in the same case, “a concurrence of several badges will always make out a strong case." 8. Plaintif€ should recover his costs of suit. DATED this 13th day of July, 1981. /s/ Jos. O. McDaniel DISTRICT JUDGE C-22. Ho. 14762 COMPANY, LTD., a Bahamian corporation, MICHAEL W. MOGAN, BURTON BERGERC ’ EUGENE FOX, TED IVY, JAMES GLEASON, a fictitious person, NUOVO ANSTALT, a Liechtensteinian trust, and DOES I through 100, inclusive, Defendants. FILED: 1981 JUL 13 PM 2:50 Clerk R.L. Kane /s/ Deputy DECREE QUIETING TITLE AND JUDGMENT Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Make Discovery and in the C-23. Alternative for Summary Judgment having come on for hearing May 12, 1981, and the Court after examining the affidavits and other documentation produced by the parties and considering the memoranda and oral arguments of counsel, and the Court having filed its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 1. Plaintiff is the owner in fee simple and entitled to the possession of certain real property situated in the County of Elko, State of Nevada, des- cribed in Exhibit A attached hereto. Together with the funds received from MICHAEL W. MOGAN, BURTON BERGERON, EUGENE FOX AND TED IVY (purchasers in good faith under Contracts with O'DON- NELL). C-24. 2. The claims of Defendants BOYD JAMES O'DONNELL, JOAN O'DONNELL, NUOVO ANSTALT, JAMES GLEASON, and TEMORA TRAD- ING COMPANY, its officers, directors, agents, attorneys at law and attorney- in-fact, and all who may claim title under them as to said real property are without any right whatever, and said persons and corporation have no estate, right, title, lien, or interest whatever in or to said real property or any part thereof, or said funds, and are all permanently enjoined from claiming or asserting any estate, right, title, lien, or interest in or to said real property of funds or any part thereof; 3. Defencant TEMORA TRADING COMPANY and Richard M. Moneymaker, as attorney- in-fact, their officers, agents, repre- sentatives, employees, attorneys, and C-25. all other persons in active concert and participation with them are hereby ordered to execute a Deed to Plaintiff, with thirty (30) days, to the following real properties in the State of Califor- nia: (a) Lot 60 in Tract 21360, in the County of Los Angeles, State of California, as per map recorded in Book 587, Pages 59 to 63 of Maps, in the office of the County Recorder of said County, commonly known as 1065 North Hillcrest Road, Beverly Hills, Califor- nia. (b) The easterly 82.5 feet of the westerly 165 feet of Lot 511 of Tract 1000, in the County of Los Ange- les, State of California, as per map recorded in Book 19, Pages 1 to 34, inclusive, of Maps in the office of the C-26. Recorder of said County, except the South 250 feet thereof, commonly known as the R-4 Lot on Sherman Way, Van Nuys, California. (c) 57 Arcola Avenue, North Hollywood, being Lot 1 of Tract No. 11,650 as per map recorded in Book 2420 Page 25 in official records of said County Recorder of Los Angeles County. (4) Lot 253 of Tract 323 as per map recorded in Book 14, Page 85 of maps in the office of the County Recorder of Los Angeles County. (e) That certain real property situate in the County of San Bernardino, State of California, subject to various contracts of sale, commonly known as the "Hesperia Lands” described as: Tract 4725, Lots 213 and 231, as per map recorded in Book 59, Pages 72-75, C-27. inclusive of Maps; Tract 4840, Lots 673, 2, 502, and 629, as per map recorded in Book 61, Pages 57-59 of Maps; Tract 4724, Lots 177 and 138, as per map recorded in Book 60, Pages 58-62 of Maps; Tract 4725, Lot 37, as per map recorded in Book 59, Pages 72-75, inclu- sive of Maps, all in the office of the County Recorder of San Bernardino Coun- ty, California. 4. In the event of the properties listed in paragraph 3 have been sold, Defendant TEMORA TRADING COMPANY and Richard M. Moneymaker, as attorney-in- fact, their officers, agents, represen- tatives, employees, attorneys and all persons in active concert and participa- tion with them are hereby ordered to pay over to the Plaintiff any and all pro- ceeds received from said sale or sales, C-28. as well as any documentation pertaining to said sale, all within thirty (30) Gays from the date hereof. 5. The Court hereby specifically reserves jurisdiction to enter all necessary additional orders to effect the enforcement of the above Judgment. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff recover his costs of suit. ISSUED at Elko, WNevada, July 13, 1981. /s/Jos. O. McDaniel DISTRICT JUDGE CERTIFICATE OF MAILING The undersigned employee of the Fourth Judicial District Court hereby certifies that on the 13th day of July, 1981, one copy of the foregoing Decree Quieting Title and Judgment, and one C-29. copy of Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Make Discover, and Summary Judgment were mailed to each of the following-named attorneys: 1. Richard M. Moneymaker, Esq., Money- maker & Morrison, 700 S. Flower Street, Suite 1702, Los Angeles, California 90017 2. Richard G. Barrows, Esq., Wilson, Wilson & Barrows, Ltd., P. O. Box 389, Elko, Nevada 89801 3. Russell Piccoli, Esq., Goldstein & Kingsley, 1110 E. McDowell Road, Phoenix, Arizona 85006 4. Robert B. Goicoechea, Esq., Goicoe- chea, DiGrazia & Marvel, P. 0. Box 1358, Elko, Nevada 89801 /s/Beryl L. Jenkins Beryl L. Jenkins C-30. The following real property situate in the County of Elko, State of Nevada: TOWNSHIP 36 NORTH, RANGE 58 EAST, —s=—“Section?: WN 1/2 SE 1/4 Section 29: NE 1/4 NW 1/4 TOWNSHIP 37 NORTH, RANGE 58 EAST, Section 1l: SW 1/4 SE 1/4; NW 1/4 SE 1/4 Section 25: SW 1/4 Section 35: NE 1/4 eee 38 NORTH, RANGE 58 EAST, Section 25: NW 1/4 SW 1/4 TOWNSHIP 37 NORTH, RANGE 59 EAST, M.D.B.&M. ection 17: SE 1/4 TOWNSHIP 37 NORTH, RANGE 59 EAST, ection 31: NE 1/4; Ww 1/2 SE 1/4; W 1/2 E1/2 SE 1/4 TOWNSHIP 38 NORTH, RANGE 59 EAST, M. -B.&M. ection 29: WN 1/2 NW 1/4 SE 1/4; SW 1/4 TOWNSHIP 35 NORTH, RANGE 57 EAST, * 7 -& * Section l: WN 1/2 SE 1/4 C-31. DO NOT PUBLISH#H UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT IN THE MATTER OF BOYD O'DONNELL and JOAN O'DONNELL, Bankrupts. TEMORA TRADING CO., Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. WALLACE PERRY, Trustee. NO. 76-1837 PILED JAN 26, 1979 Emil E. Melfi, Jr. Clerk U.S. Court of Appeals Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central _District of California D-1. Before: ELY and TRASK, Circuit Judges, and FITZGERALD, * District Judge. Upon the filing of voluntary peti- tions for bankruptcy in Arizona, bank- ruptcy proceedings were commenced against Boyd and Joan O'Donnell, and pursuant thereto, a trustee, Wallace Perry, was duly appointed. Thereafter the trustee, learning of properties previously owned by the bankrupts and located in Southern California and Nevada, instituted ancillary proceedings in the District Court for the Central District of California. The trustee contended in those ancillary proceedings that the disposition of the properties to various persons, including one James * Honorable James M. Fitzgerald, United States District Judge, District of Alaska, sitting by designation. D-2. Gleason, constituted a fraud upon the bankrupts’ creditors and accordingly, the trustee sought and secured personal injunctions against further disposition of the properties by the transferees. However, prior to the issuance of these injunctions, Mr. Gleason had transferred all his interests in the subject proper- ties to Temora Trading Co., a Bahamian corporation, in return for a beneficial interest in the shares of Temora. Three years after issuance of the requested injunctions appellant, Gleason's succes- sor-in-interest, brought this collateral proceeding in the bankruptcy court for the Central District of California, seeking to set aside the Gleason injunc- tions as void for want of jurisdiction over the person. The bankruptcy judge refused to vacate the injunctions and D-3. the district court affirmed without opinivn. The sole issue we address here relates to the validity of those injunc- tions. Our appellate jurisdiction is confer- red by 28 U.S.C. §1292(a)(1), an appeal from an order of the district court refusing to dissolve an injunction. Although the trustee failed to file a brief, he sent a brief communication to the clerk of court suggesting that the appeal was moot on the ground that Temora had succeeded in disposing of the properties despite the existence of the injunctions. However, at oral argument the issue of mootness was conceded to be without merit. This compels us to address the issue in this case: whether the bankruptcy court in the ancillary D-4. proceedings had personal jurisdiction to issue the injunctions against Gleason. The issue of lack of jurisdiction over the person was not raised before the original bankruptcy judge prior to issuance of the injunctions, presumably because Gleason never made an appearance before the court, personally or other- wise. The basis for the ancillary pro- ceeding, as alleged by the trustee, was that Gleason was an alter ego of the bankrupts and that signatures of Glea- son's name were actually executed by the bankrupts. At the time, although urging the “alter ego" theory, the trustee did not go so far as to allege that Gleason was a fictitious person. Instead, the trustee sought personal service of the moving papers on Gleason. D-5. Appellant Temora Trading Co., having acquired title from Gleason prior to the issuance of the injunctions, challenged the validity of the injunctions in col- lateral proceedings brought in the Cent- ral District of California. + this was lf It is clear from all the aut- horities that a collateral attack may be brought by any party, at any time, against a judgment void for want of subject matter jurisdiction or of juris- diction over the person. Due to its jurisdictional nature such an attack is always timely and must be ruled upon by the court. See Bookout v. Beck, 354 F.2d 823, 825 (Sth Cir. 1965). See also Hanley v. Four Corners Vacation Prop., Inc., 480 F.2d 536, 538 (10th Cir. 1973); Berry v. Allen, 411 F.2d 1142, 1146 (6th Cir. 1969); Davis v. St. Paul- Mercury Indemnity Co., 294 F.2d 641, 643 (4th Cir. 1961); United States v. Sotis, 131 F.2d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 1942); United States v. Milana, 148 F.Supp. 152, 154 (E.D. Mich. 1957). According- ly, the referee's ruling that Rule 60(b) barred appellant's complaint was error. See Bookout, supra, at 825. See also Comprehensive Merchandising Catalogs, Inc. v. Madison Sales Cocp., 521 F.2d 1210, 1211 n. 1 (7th Cir. 1975); Graci- ette v. Star Guidance, Inc., 66 F.R.D (continued) D-6. the first time the jurisdictional issue was raised. At that time the trustee conceded in the pre-trial order that service had been improper, but, somewhat inconsistently from his original posi- tion in the ancillary proceeding, argued that Gleason was a fictitious person and that appellant had acquired its title through fraud. In the proceedings that followed, testimony offered by Temora Trading Co. showing that Gleason, in fact, did exist. The bankruptcy judge accordingly found Gleason was not a fictitious person. Nevertheless, on 424, 426 (S.D.N.Y¥Y. 1975); Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 60(b), cl. 43; J. Moore, 7 Federal Practice, 9460.25 [1] and 2 Federal Prac- tice, 44.02[3], at 4-46 (2d ed. 1973); Wright and Miller, 11 Federal Practice and Procedure, §2862 at 197, 200 (1973). D-7. other grounds, judgment was entered against Temora. 2/ Appellant Temora Trading subsequently appealed to the district court. At that time, the trustee shifted ground, con- tending service had been perfected by way of substituted service. It thus appears that the trustee is now prepared to concede the existence of Gleason. The district judge denied the appeal without opinion. The following facts, elicited in the bankruptcy court below, reveal the basis 2/ see note 1, supra. Despite the evidence that Gleason Indeed existed (thus calling into question the adequacy of service), the bankruptcy judge con- Cluded that plaintiff lacked standin below to contest the injunctions. We find that inasmuch, as the injunctions against its predecessor-in-interest clouded appellant's title to the subject properties, appellant had sufficient standing to contest their validity on jurisdictional grounds. D-8. upon which we conclude that there was no perfected service of process on Gleason. The evidence squarely established while one Opal DeShong had been personally served (or served by mail) with the injunction papers intended for Gleason, Ms. DeShong had never been authorized by Gleason to receive service of process. Since Gleason himself was never served, we conclude that compliance with the service requirements of Rule 4(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was never accomplished. Nor does the evidence reveal that substituted service was made under the terms of Rule 4(d)(7). That subsection permits service to proceed in the "man- ner prescribed by the law of the state" in which the district court sits. Although California Code of Civil D-9. Procedure §415.20 allows for substituted service, such service is limited to delivery of copies to specific loca- tions, including the person's “usual Place of business." While the testimony revealed that Ms. DeShong had on at least one occasion met Gleason and notarized his signature on certain docu- ments, the record is devoid of any sup- port for the position that Wilden Realty (Ms. DeShong's place of employment) was Gleason's “usual place of business." Accordingly, we conclude that substi- tuted service under the provisions of Rule 4(d)(7) was also never perfected. As a result, the personal injunctions issued by the ancillary bankruptcy pro- ceedings in 1971 and 1972, having never been accompanied by acquisition of per- sonal jurisdiction over Gleason through D-10. personal appearance, service, waiver or otherwise, were improperlv issued. We conclude that the bankruptcy court never acquired jurisdiction over the person of James Gleason, a necessary prerequisite to issuance of any personal injunction enjoining his disposition of certain properties, and, accordingly, find that the injunctions were void ab initio. See cases cited in note l, supra. The order below dismissing the appeal is reversed and the cause remand- ed with instructions to vacate the injunctions. D-11l. JOAN O'DONNELL, Bankrupts. TEMORA TRADING CO., Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. WALLACE PERRY, Trustee. NO. 76-1837 FILED DEC 3 1979 Richard H. Deane Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals ORDER MODIFYING MEMORANDUM OF DECISION Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California D-12. Before: ELY and TRASK, Circuit Judges, and FITZGERALD, * District Judge. The third full sentence on page 3 of the Court's memorandum of decision of January 26, 1979 is modified to read: The Bankruptcy Court found it unnecessary to rule as to the existence of James Gleason and accordingly made no finding of fact in that regard. This sentence replaces the sentence currently reading: "The bankruptcy judge accordingly refused to find that Gleason was a fictitious person." * Honorable James M. Fitzgerald, United States District Judge, District of Alaska, sitting by designation. D-13. Ho. 3 of 1980 An Act to amend the Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Act, 1965. (Assented to: 24th March, 1980) Commencement: 24th March, 1980) Enacted by the Parliament of The Baha- mas. l. This Act may be cited as the Banks and Trust Companies Regulation (Amendment) Act, 1980. 2. Section 10 of the Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Act, 1965 is repealed and the following section sub- stituted -- 10. -=- .(1) No person who has acquired information in his capa- city as -- (a) director, officer, enm- ployee or agent of any licen- see or former licensee; (b) counsel and attorney, consultant or auditor of the Central Bank of The Bahamas, established under section 3 of the Centril Bank of The Bahamas Act, 1974, or as an E-.. employee or agent of such counsel and attorney, consul- tant or auditor; (c) counsel and attorney, consultant, auditor, account- ant, receiver or liquidator of any licensee or former licensee or as an employee or agent of such counsel and attorney, consultant, audi- tor, accountant, receiver or liquidator; (4) auditor of any customer of any licensee or former licensee or as an employee or agent of such auditor; (e) the Inspector under the provisions of this Act, shall, without the express or implied consent of the customer concerned, disclose to any person any such information relating to the identity, assets, liabili- ties, transactions, accounts of a customer of a licensee or relat- ing to any application by any person under the provisions of this Act, as the case may be, except -- (i) for the purpose of the performance of his dwties or the exercise of his fwnctions under this Act, if amy; or (2) (3) (ii) for the ‘‘ e of the performance o is duties within the scope of his employment; or (iii) when a licensee is lawfully required to make disclosure by any court of competent jurisdiction within The Bahamas, or under the provisions of any law of The Bahamas. Nothing contained in this section shall -- (a) prejudice or derogate from the rights and duties subsisting at common law between a licensee and its customer; or (b) prevent a licensee from oviding upon a legitimate siness request in the nor- mal course of business a general credit rating with respect to a customer. Every person who contravenes the provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall be guilty of an offence against this Act and shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding fifteen thousand dollars or to a term of imprisonment not exceeding two vears or to both such fine and imprisonment." E-3. Section ll(e) of the Federal Bank- ruptcy Act of 1938 (11 U.S.C. Sec. 29 (e)) provides: e. A receiver or trustee may, within two years subsequent to the date of adjudication or with- in such further period of time as the Federal or State law may permit, institute proceedings in behalf of the estate upon rr claim against which the period limitation fixed by Federal or State law had not expired at the time of the filing of the peti- tion in bankruptcy. Where, by any agreement, a period of limit- ation is fixed for instituting a suit or proceeding upon any claim, or for presenting or fil- ing any claim, proof of claim, proof of loss, demand, notice, or the like, or where in any pro- ceeding, judicial or otherwise, a period of limitation is fixed, either in such proceeding or by applicable Federal or State law, for taking any action, filing any Claim or pleading, or doing any act, and where in any such case such period had not expired at the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, the F-l. receiver or trustee of the bank- rupt may, for the benefit of the estate, take any such action or Go any such act, required of or permitted to the bankrupt, within a period of sixty days subsequent to the date of adjudication or within such further period as may be permitted by the agreement or in the proceeding or by appli- cable Federal or State law as the case may be. Section 70(a) of the Federal Bank- ruptcy Act of 1938 (11 U.S.C. Sec. 110(a)) provides: SECTION SEVENTY (11 U.S.C. § 110) § 70. Title to Property. a. The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt and his successor or successors, if any, upon his or their appointment and qualifica- tion, shall in turn be vested by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt as of the date of the filing of the petition initi- ating a proceeding under this Act, except insofar as it is to property which is held to be exempt, to all of the following kinds of property wherever locat- ed (1) documents relating to his property; (2) interests in patents, patent rights, copy- rights, and trade-marks, and in applications therefor: Provided, That in case the trustee, within thirty days after appointment and qualification, does not notify the applicant for a patent, copy- right, or trademark of his elec- tion to prosecute the application to allowance or rejection, the bankrupt may apply to the court for an order revesting him with the title thereto, which petition shall be granted unless for cause shown by the trustee the court grants further time to the trust- ee for making such election; and such applicant may, in any event, at any time petition the court to be revested with such title in case the trustee shall fail to prosecute such application with reasonable diligence; and _ the court, upon revesting the bank- rupt with such title, shall direct the trustee to execute proper instruments of transfer to make the same effective in law and upon the records: (3) powers which he might have exercised for his own benefit, but not those which he might have exercised solely for some other person; (4) property transferred by him in fraud of his creditors; (5) pro- perty, including rights of ac ton, which prior to the filing of the petition he could by any means have transferred or which might have been levied upon and F-3. sold under judicial process against him, or otherwise seized, impounded, or sequestered: Pro- vided, That rights of action ex elicto for libel, slander, injuries to the person of the bankrupt or of a relative, whether or not resulting in death, seduction, and criminal conversation shall not vest in the trustee unless by the law of the State such rights of action are subject to attachment, execu- tion, garnishment, sequestration, or other judicial process: And provided further, That when any ankrupt, w S a natural per- son, shall have any insurance policy which has a cash surrender value payable to himself, his estate, or personal representa- tives he may, within thirty days after the cash surrender value has been ascertained and stated to the trustee by the company issuing the same, pay or secure to the trustee the sum so ascer- tained and stated, and continue to hold, own, and carry such policy free from the claims of the creditors participating in the distribution of his estate under the bankruptcy proceedings, otherwise the policy shall pass to the trustee as assets; (6) rights of action arising upon contracts, or usury, or the un- lawful taking or detention of or injury to his pro, erty; (7) con- tingent remainders, executory F-4. devises and limitations, rights of entry for condition broken, rights or possibilities of rever- ter, and like interests in real property, which were nonassign- able prior to bankruptcy and which, within six months there- after, become assignable inter- ests or estates or give rise to powers in the bankrupt to acquire assignable interests or estates; and (8) property held by an assignee for the benefit of cred- itors appointed under an assign- ment which constituted an act of bankruptcy, which property shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be held by the assignee as the agent of the bankrupt and shall be subject to the summary jurisdiction of the court. All property, wherever locat- ed, except insofar as it is pro- perty which is held to be exempt, which vests in the bankrupt with- in six months after bankruptcy by bequest, devise or inheritance shall vest in the trustee and his successor or successors, if any, upon his or their appointment and qualification, as of the date when it vested in the bankrupt, and shall be free and discharged from any transfer made or suffer- ed by the bankrupt after bank- ruptcy. All property, wherever locat- ed, except insofar as it is F-5. property which is held to be exempt, in which the bankrupt has at the date of bankruptcy an estate or interest by the entire- ty and which within six months after bankruptcy becomes trans- ferable in whole or in part solely by the bankrupt shall, to the extent it becomes so trans- ferable, vest in the trustee and his successor or successors, if any, upon his or their appoint- ment and qualification, as of the date of bankruptcy. The title of the trustee shall not be affected by the prior possession of a receiver or other officer an any court. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_0832%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.