# Appendix — Hecht v. Securities & Exchange Commission

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1982
- **Citation:** 459 U.S. 1086

## Text

*

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For tHe Szeconp Cmcurr
No. 1116—August Term, 1981

(Argued May 4, 1982 Decided June 10, 1982)
Docket No. 81-6231
— — . —
Securities anp Excuance Commission,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.

Aqua-Sonic Propucts Conr., Urrasonic DentaL Propvets,

Inc., Lon Scmexren, Josovua M. Annan, Martin Hor,

Dewrasonic, N. V., Isvenre. Conr., Metviw Henson,
Defendants,

Margtms E. Hecutr and Iyvenre Corp.,
Defendants-Appellants.

Before:
Faewviy, Kavrman and Pierce, Circuit Judges.

Farenvxy, Circuit Judge:

Defendants Martin Hecht and Inventel Corporation
appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York, Sweet, J., 524 F.
Supp. 866 (1981), declaring that they had violated §§ 5(a),
5(c), and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S. 0.
§§ 77e(a), T7e(c) and 77g(a) ; 5 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78j(b); and Rule 10b-5
under the latter act, and enjoining them against future

2a
Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

violations. Defendants concede that if the licenses they
were promoting were ‘‘investment contracts’’, and there-
fore ‘‘securities’’ within the meaning of § 2(1) of the 1933
Act and § 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act, the securities laws were
violated in that no registration was effected and the pro-
motional materials omitted material information and con-
tained material misrepresentations. We affirm the district
court’s holding that the licensing scheme was an investment
contract and therefore a security within the 1933 and 1934
Acts.

I. Background

This case concerns a plan to manufacture and distribute
new dental devices termed Steri Products. Inventor Ar-
thur Kuris conceived of an improvement of the Cavii en
—a device that employs ultrasonic waves to dislodge plaque
in the vourse of dental prophylaxis—which would use
sterile water in place of tap water in order to reduce the
risk of contamination. Kuris had discussions with one of
his friends, M. Joshua Aber, a lawyer, and two of Aber’s
partners, Leon Schekter and defendant Hecht. The latter
three formed a professional corporation called Schekter,
Aber and Hecht, P.C. (SAH), and together the group es-
tablished four corporations: Aqua-Sonic and Ultrasonic,
New York corporations; Dentasonic, a Netherlands An-
tilles corporation; and Inventel, a Delaware corporation.
Aqua-Sonic and Ultrasonic were each wholly owned by
their respective principal officers ; Dentasonic was owned by
the three attorneys until November, 1978, when Kuris ac-
quired a 19% interest; Inventel was owned by the three
attorneys until February, 1979, at which time it redeemed

i a
ems

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Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

Schekter’s and Aber’s shares, leaving Hecht as the sole
owner.

Upon incorporation, Dentasonic purchased from Kuris
the patent and related rights to Steri Products for the
United States and Canada for $406,500, payable in in-
stallments. Dentasonic in turn sold the United States
manufacturing and marketing rights to Aqua-Sonic for
$26 million, to be paid from a percentage of the proceeds
from the sale by Aqua-Sonic of distribution licenses and
from a percentage of the proceeds from the sale of Steri
Products by Aqua-Sonic licensees. Until payment of the
$26 million, Dentasonic retained numerous rights vis a vis
Aqua-Sonic, including certain voting rights to all of Aqua-
Sonic’s stock.

The proposed method of operation was that Aqua-Sonic
would sell licensees the right to sell Steri Products in cer-
tain geographical regions. Ultrasonic was described to
potential licensees as an optional sales agent. Inventel
entered into agreements with Aqua-Sonic wherein Inventel
was to be paid $2.2 million, purportedly a finder’s fee, for
bringing about the arrangement between Dentasonic and
Aqua-Sonic and for consulting services; Inventel was also
to receive a portion of the proceeds from the sale of the
licenses and from the sale of Steri products and related
patents or trademarks.

The promotional materials used in discussion with po-
tential licensees or their representatives varied over the
course of the offering. From May through August of 1978,
the package included:

(a) an Information Memorandum describing the Steri
Products and the nature of the offering, with exhibits

4a
Opinion of the United Siates Court of Appeals

attached thereto including a tax opinion letter pre-
pared by SAH and financial illustrations projecting
sales of the products and revenues.

(b) the Aqua-Sonic license and security agreement
and notes payable to Aqua-Sonie (prior to inclusion of
the so-called Advertising Fund to be discussed below),
and related instructions.

(c) a document entitled ‘‘An Offer to Act as Sales
Agent.“

(d) the Ultrasonic sales agency agreement, security
agreements, and notes payable to Ultrasonic (prior to

inelusion of the Advertising Fund), and related in-
structions.

(e) a reprint of [an] article .. . from the Journal of
Periodontology [concerning the contamination of ul-
trasonic dental units].

(f) a four-page document entitled ‘‘Confidential for
Professional Use Only.’’

524 F.Supp. at 869. Over the next two months, the offering
package was quite similar. The Information Memorandum
noted in item (a) was updated. Added to the package were
„two large professional photographs of what appeared to
be [completed Steri Products units,]... a copy of a letter
. . concerning the commercial production of the Steri Prod-
ucts’’, and a cop, of a letter from a dental authority that
was used as an endorsement for Steri Products. Id. at

870. After November 1, 1978, the following documents
were added:

(a) a letter dated November 1, 1978 signed by defend-
ant Hersch with attachments relating to the creation
of the Steri Products, Advertising Fund and supple-
mental tax opinion by SAH.

5a
Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
(b) a package of revised closing documents relating

to the license, sales agency and Advertising Fund, and
(e) a revised summary of the offering entitled Con-
fidential for Professional Use Only—Summary of Re-
vised License for Steri Products.’’
Id. The E. formation Memorandum specified the numerous
obligations of the licensees, which are set out in the mar gin.“

censor; and (e) use of forms designed by and
(f) adherence to certain standards for advertising materials used
in connection with the business.

pore a eters ene Mgr alg gate yt Syn
275 — 9 Tim Licensor Site tes pocition om thle matter,
(footnote continued on next page)

6a
Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

The license was indicated to be available ‘‘only to a person
who has considerable knowledge and experience in financial
and business matters, [and] appreciates and understands
the merits and economic risks of this business.’’

If a licensee accepted the Offer to Act as Sales Agent“,
Ultrasonic would be responsible for all sales of Steri Prod-
ucts for the benefit of that licensee. Under the Ultrasonic
sales agency agreement, the licensee retained the right to
cancel at any time upon ninety days written notice, ultimate
control over pricing and other conditions relating to orders,
and the right to inspect the relevant records of Ultrasonic.
However, Ultrasonic was authorized to perform all signifi-
cant marketing functions, such as finding customers, taking
orders, collecting proceeds, and paying expenses and taxes.
Additionally, Ultrasonic was authorized to reduce the sales
price unilaterally so long as its commission on the sale was
reduced in the same amount. Prospective licensees were
informed that ‘‘by entering into the proposed Sales Agency
Agreement. . . you will derive substantial tax advantages
in connection with your acquisition of a license.

Franchises for over one hundred territories were avail-
able. The fee for a typical territory was $159,500: $9,150

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Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

to be paid in cash upon the granting of the license; $9,150
in the form of a 7% negotiable promissory note due Janu-
ary 15, 1979; and $141,200 by a 6% non-recourse promissory
note due January 1, 1985, but requiring pre-payment based
apon a portion of the proceeds from the sale of Steri Prod-
ucts. A typical licensee entering into the sales agency
agreement paid a $16,600 fee to defendant Ultrasonic: $500
in cash upon acceptance of the offer; $500 by a recourse
promissory note payable on January 15, 1979; and $15,600
by a non-recourse promissory note due December 1, 1984,
requiring pre-payment based upon a portion of the sales
proceeds.“ In addition, defendant Ultrasonic was entitled
to a commission of 20% of the gross proceeds from sales of
Steri Products.

After the offering had been available for some time,
SAH created the Advertising Fund to promote the product.
This purportedly increased the tax benefits available to
investors. Investors in the licenses were required to con-
tribute $400 in cash, $400 due on January 15, 1979, and
$13,200 by a non-recourse promissory note due December 1,
1984, requiring pre-payment based upon a portion of the
proceeds from the sales of Steri Products. The require-
ment of this mandatory payment did not increase the price
of the overall package to a licensee choosing to accept the
Ultrasonic sales agency offer because the amount payable
to Ultrasonic under that agreement was correspondingly
reduced. Payments made by investors prior to creation of
the Advertising Fund were transferred from Ultrasonic to

2. Originally, the total fee was $30,600. The figures in text

reflect the reduction to contributions to the Advertising Fund,
— 2 —

>

Ae

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Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

the Fund.“ After November 1, 1978, the Aqua-Sonic, Ultra-
materials were physically bound together and offered to
licensees in a single package.

The tax opinion letter and supplementary statements
indicated that all the payments covering the license fee,
ineluding the non-recourse notes, could be included in the
licensee’s basis for amortization over the eight year initial
period of the license. In addition, licensees were advised
that they could deduct the full price of the sales agency
agreement and Advertising Fund during 1978 and 1979.
Thus, a typical investor was personally liable for approxi-
mately $20,000 but could deduct $38,000 in 1978 and $20,000
in 1979, assuming that there were not yet any sales of the
product. Investors were informed that the tax benefits were
greater if they retained the sales agency. In addition, two
letters were sent by Aqua-Sonic advising licensees how to
treat their investment on their federal tax returns.

The Aqua-Sonic licenses were marketed throughout the
United States. Hecht contacted attorneys, accountants and
financial planners and recruited people to sell Aqua-Sonie
licenses on commission. Some of these individuals were
financial consultants for some of the investors who ulti-
mately purchased the licenses. Between May 1 and Decem-
ber 31, 1978, Aqua-Sonic investments were sold to 50 licen-
sees for approximately $12,100,000, of which $900,000 was
in cash and recourse notes.

oe oe 2 Se a

ment could not have been .
fact that all licensees up until time had accepted the Ultrasonic

9a
Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

All 50 licensees entered into Ultrasonic sales agency
agreement. None of these licensees had any exeprience
selling dental products. In most cases, the territories of
the licenses were not close to the licensee’s residence. The
promotional materials did not offer or advise of the ex-
istence of any sales agent other than Ultrasonic. —

The possible applicability of the federal securities laws
was brought to defendants’ attention from the beginning.
In the course of preparing he promotional materials, SAH
sought an independent legal opinion with respect to the
applicability of the securities laws to the proposed licensing
scheme. SAH was advised that the arrangement might be
eonsidered an investment contract. SAH then directed
one of its associates to research the issue and, after dis-
cussion, conchaded otherwise. David Glasser, Aqua-Sonic’s
rst president and sole shareholder, resigned in or about
August 1978 efter having been advised by his attorney that
the offering might be a security under the federal securities
laws and might violate other laws including antitrust and
federal food and drug statutes. Leonard Suroff, who was
recruited to be Ultrasonic’s first president and sole share-
holder and who never issued a check on behalf of Ultra-
sonic that was not co-signed by either Hecht or one of
Hecht’s partners, resigned in December 1978 because of
the SEC’s investigation.

The venture ultimately collapsed when mechanical dif-
ficulties prevented the timely manufacture of Steri Prod-
acts. fhe SEC then brought this action against Aqua-
Sonic, Ultrasonic, Dentasonic, Hersch, Hecht, Aber,
Schekter and Inventel, seeking an injunction against future
violations of the registration and antifraud provisions of

10a
Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

the securities laws. All the defendants except Hecht and
Inventel consented to such injunctions. Judge Sweet di-
rected, 524 F.Supp. at 867, 879-80, a similar injunction
against Hecht and Inventel which we now affirm.

IL Di :

As described above, and set out in greater detail in the
district court’s opinion, see 524 F.Supp. at 875, Hecht was
deeply involved in virtually every aspect of the enterprise.
Hecht and Inventel concede that if the licenses just de-
scribed were investment contracts, the securities laws were
violated in a number of ways. There was no registration
of the securities. Material information was omitted from
the promotional documents, including the interests of
various defendants, the role of SAH, financial information
relating to the use of the proceeds, and the reduced price
at which licenses were offered to insiders. In addition, the
market report upon vhich the tax opinion was based was
produced in 24 hours using unverified information and was
superficial with respect to key factors relevant to the tax
opinion. The highly optimistic financial projections were
lacking in objective support, and the product was not ready
to be marketed as indicated. There had been no clinical
testing, and the research materials gathered were insuffi-
cient to support the claim of the assertedly ‘‘definite causal
relationship’’ between the use of tap water and various
infections.

We thus must determine whether the enterprise de-
scribed above constitutes the offering of an investment
contract under the rule established in the leading case of

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Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). As was
there said, 328 U.S. at 298, [t Ihe term investment con-
tract’ is undefined by the Securities Act or by relevant

legislative reports.’’ However,

the term was common in many state ‘‘blue sky’’ laws
in existence prior to the adoption of the federal statute
and, although the term was also undefined by the state
laws, it had been broadly construed by state courts so
as to afford the investing public a full measure of pro-
tection. Form was disregarded for substance and
emphasis was placed upon economic reality. An in-
vestment contract thus came to mean a contract or
scheme for ‘‘the placing of capital or laying out of
money in a way intended to secure income or profit
from its employment. State v. Gopher Tire d Rubber
Co., 146 Minn. 52, 56, 177 N.W. 937, 938. This defini-
tion was uniformly applied by state courts to a variety
of situations where individuale were led to invest
money in a common enterprise with the expectation
that they would earn a profit solely through the efforts
of the promoter or of some one other than themselves.
By including an investment contract within the
scope of §2(1) of the Securities Act, Congress was
using a term the meaning of which had been crystalized
by this prior judicial interpretation. It is therefore
reasonable to attach that meaning to the term as used
by Congress, especially since such a definition is con-
sistent with the statutory aims. In other words, an
investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act
mears a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a
person invests his money in a common enterprise and
is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the
promoter or a third party. .. .

328 U.S. at 298-99 (footnote 4 omitted).

12a

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

It is not contested that the scheme here at issue involves
“an investment of money in a common enterprise with
the expectation of profit. Rather, defendants claim that
the licensees undertook important obligations, that the sales
agency agreement was optional, and that even under that
agreement the licensees retained significant rights, such
that it cannot be said that they expected profits to be de-
rived solely from the efforts of others.

The Commission argues that the Court’s use of the
term solely in Howey is not to be taken literally. The
Ninth Circuit ruled some years ago that the the word
‘solely’ should not be read as a strict or literal limitation
on the definition of an investment contract [since] ... [i]t
would be easy to evadel, for example,] by adding a require-
ment that the buyer contribute a modicum of effort.“ SEC
v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482,
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). This was shortly fol-
lowed by the Fifth Cireuit in SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary,
Inc., 497 F. 2d 473, 479-84 (1974), where Judge Gewin made
a comprehensive survey of the cases in the courts of appeals
and the district courts, pointed out that in the Gopher Tire
Rubber case cited by Justice Murphy in Howey the in-
vestors were required to make some efforts, and referred
to one of the state cases cited in fn. 4 to the Howey opinion,
Stevens v. Liberty Packing Corp., N.J. Eq. 61, 161 A. 193
(1932), as having envisioned even more substantial in-
vestor participation. The Fifth Circuit has -ecently said:

4, . KK

. D

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Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals -

the Supreme Court has altogether omitted the word
„solely in its most recent formulation of the invest-

ment contract definition. In United Housing Founda

tion, Inc. v. Forman, supra , the Conrt quoted the

investment contract definitiua trom Howey and re-

stated it as an investment in a common venture prem-

‘sed on & reasonable expectation of profits to be derived

from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts cf

others. 421 U.S. at 852....

Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 418-19, cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 396 (1981). If this was intended to mean that
the Supreme Court had already performed the necessary
‘surgery on the Howey opinion, it would read too much into
Forman since the Court there explicitly reserved the ques-
tion whether ‘‘solely’’ should be taken literally, 421 U.S. at
852 n.16 (quoting SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises,
Inc., supra, 474 F. 2d 476). However, given the Court’s re-
peated directions to consider investment schemes in light
of their economic realities and the ease of circumvention
of the solely“ language in Howey were to be taken lit-
erally, as well as the history summarized in Koscot, supra,
we think that if faced with the question the Court would
not insist on applying that language literally but would
consider whether, under all the circumstances, the scheme
was being promoted primarily as an investment or as a
means whereby participants could pool their own activities,
their money and the promoter’s contribution in a mean-
ingful way.

As a first step in the analysis it is useful to consider
whether the allegedly optional nature of the sales agency
‘agreements removes them from the concept of investment
‘ontracts. It has long been understood that the mere ex-

l4a
Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

istence of such an option is not inconsistent with the entire
scheme’s being an investment contract. Howey, supra, 328
U.S. 293. Defendants assert that a major difference be-
tween their offering and that in Howey is that in the latter
it was not economically feasible for an investor to refuse
the option. Although the Court noted this, id. at 300, it
must be remembered that 15% of the acreage sold in the
scheme in that case was not covered by the optional service
contracts, id. at 295. Thus it appears that the Court fo-
cused not on whether it was somehow possible for an in-
vestor to profit without accepting the option, or whether
the investor had a bare theoretical right to reject the option,
but rather on whether the typical investor who was being
solicited would be expected under all the circumstances to
accept the option, thus remaining passive and deriving
profit from the efforts of others.

Similarly, in the instant case, while it cannot be said
with certainty that prospective licensees would be wholly
unable to benefit without taking advantage of the sales
agency agreement, it can hardly be said that realistically
the agency agreement was a mere option. In SEC v. C. M.
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 352-53 (1943), the
Supreme Court indicated that the relevant factors include
not only the terms of the offer but also ‘‘the plan of distri-
bution, and the economic inducements beld out to the pros-
pect.’’ On both counts, the Aqua-Sonic offering appears to
be an investment contract. The offering materials pre-
sented the license and agency agreements as a package,
although within the package each was described separately
and each required separate signatures. Moreover, the pro-
motional materials indicated that additional tax benefits

15a
Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

would accrue to investors taking advantage of the option.
This is particularly important when the license agreement
itself was promoted largely for the tax advantages it of-
fered, suggesting that the prospective licensees who could
be expected to be attracted to the offering in the first in-
stance would be ones that would find the agency agreement
desirable for the same reasons. Defendants seek to re-
spond to all this by indicating that the projected cash flow
for the license without the sales agency option was substan-
tially higher than the package of the two. This statement
is quite misleading, and its obvious deficiency was not lost
on the fifty licensees, all of whom opted for the package.
The reason for the higher cash flows without the sales
agency is that the projections for the package (i.e., with the
agency agreement) deduct the price of the agency option
and the commissions that would be owed to the agent,
whereas the projections for the license alone assume equal
sales penetration with no deductions whatever for the costs
of distribution. In other words, the defendants’ argument
implicitly assumes that an investor could duplicate the re-
sults of the sales agent and could do this without any cost.
More realistically, an investor who contemplated doing his
own selling would have considered the likelihood that the

5. Defendants cite Forman, supra, 421 U.S. at 854-55 & n.20, to

their argument that the tax aspects of the transaction are
as a matter of law. However, in that context the Supreme

Court was considering what constitutes an expectation of profits.

not have been predicted to have an expectation of profits. The

16a
Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

sales projections could have been achieved without using
the agent, and what costs would have been entailed.

Of course, it is possible that there would be a prospective
licensee who would feel capable of doing as well or better
than Ultrasonic and, becanse of being retired or otherwise,
would have had minimal costs. In Howey, 15% of the
acreage was sold to such purchasers. In weighing ‘this
argument it is useful to consider Whether the offering was
directed in large part to prospective licensees who could be
expected to operate their own distribution system or wheth-
er the plan of distribution, Joiner, quoted supra, was
aimed primarily at investors who could not reasonably be
believed to be desirous and eapable of undertaking distribu-
tion on theirown. For the former, the target of the offering
would be individuals or corporations with experience in
selling dental products.“ However, none of the 50 licensees
had any such experience. This was not mere coincidence.
The record does not indicate that any attempts were made
to locate such purchasers. Hecht’s leading salesman was
an insurance agent and financial and tax consultant; other
salesmen included a salesman in investment opportunities
and an accountant. Thus, the defendants recruited sales-
men would could be expected to and did contact typical
passive investors, not persons with experience in the dis-
tribution of dental supplies. While it is true that in deter-
mining whether the offering is an investment contract
courts are to examine the offering from an objective per-
„77

6. This aiford an i Mr. Steak,
Inc. v. River City Steak, nen 60 F 24 666 (10 Cir 1972), see par-
ticularly p. 670, n cases on which defendants rely.

17a
Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

option by all 50 licensees is not decisive, this result is pre-
cisely what the defendants must have expected from their
behavior.

Defendants’ other major argument relies heavily upon
the Fifth Circuit’s dicta in Williamson, supra, 645 F. 2d at
421:

In each case the actual control exercised by the pur-
chaser is irrelevant. So long as the investor has the
right to control the asset he has purchased, he is not
dependent on the promoter or on a third party for
„those essential managerial efforts which affect the
failure or success of the enterprise.’’

See also id. at 423-25 (discussing circumstances in which
sufficient dependence might nevertheless exist). We do not
consider this, standing alone, to be an accurate statement
of the law. While it is true that in Howey, the service
contracts were generally for a 10-year duration without
option of cancellation, and other rights of the investors
were limited in some respects, 328 U.S. at 296, the Court
did not directly rely upon these factors in reaching its
conclusion, see id. at 299-300. Moreover, it would be incon-
gruous to attach decisive significance to mere legal formal-
ity when the Court explicitly refused to be bound by ‘‘the
legal terminology in which such contracts are clothed’’, id.
at 300, and preceded its conclusion with a discussion of the
purposes of the securities laws, which require disregarding
form for substance and placing emphasis upon economic
reality, id. at 298-99. Finally, if it would circumvent the
purposes of the securities laws to exonerate defendants who
had the guile to insert the requirement that the buyer

18a
Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

contribute a modicum of effort, see p. 11, supra (quoting
SEC v. Glenn F. Turner Enterprises, Inc., supra, 474 F.2d
476), it would be an even greater affront to the policies of
these laws to exempt schemes that preserved the mere right
to provide some effort.

This is not to suggest that if it was reasonable to expect
investors to exercise their retained rights under the sales
agency agreement in a nontrivial manner the scheme would
still be an investment contract. However, in the case of the
Aqua-Sonic offering, this simply was not the case. All of
the preceding analysis indicating that licensees would have
been expected to take the sales agency option equally sug-
gests that they would not be likely to terminate the option
and take over distribution for themselves shortly thereafter.
Adding to the implausibility of such an expectation is the
fact that licensees were obligated for the full price of the
8-year sales agency agreement upon acceptance; none of
this fee was refundable upon termination. While it is not
inconceivable that there might have been some licensees
who would have made some efforts at some point in time,
this is insufficient to defeat the conclusion that the scheme
was an investment contract.’

We recognize that to write a rule precisely defining the
line between contracts such as those here at issue and the
typical franchise agreement, whether for Cadillacs, Coca-
Cola or Kentucky Fried Chicken, may be impossible. Deci-
sion will necessarily turn on the totality of the cireum-
stances, not on any single one. This is a situation where,
in the words of Justice Holmes, lines are pricked out by

7. Recall once again that in Howey 15% of the acreage was sold
to purchasers not taking advantage of the service option.

—
|

19a
Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

the gradual approach and contact of decisions on the oppos-
ing sides. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 112
(1911). But we have not the slightest doubt on which side
of the line this case falls. Defendants sought to attract the
passive investor for whose benefit the securities laws were
enacted. His retention of some legal rights over distribu-
tion does not render it unnecessary for him to have the
benefits of the disclosures provided in resgistration state-
ments or the protection of the antifraud provisions. If, by
contrast, the reasonable expectation was one of significant
investor control, a reasonable purchaser could be expected
to make his own investigation of the new business he
planned to undertake and the protection of the 1933 and
1934 Acts would be unnecesary. We thus conclude that in
light of the economic realities of this case and the prece-
dents in the Supreme Court, in the state courts prior to
adoption of the 1933 Act, and in the courts of appeals
thereafter, the Aqua-Sonic scheme was an investment con-
tract and therefore a ‘‘security’’.®
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

Opinion of the United States District Court
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Sovurnzrn Disraict or New Yorx
80 Civ. 5513 (RWS)

—— — oO

Securities anp Excuancs Commission,

against
Aqua-Somtc Propucts Conr, Urrasonic DenwtaL Propvcts,

Ixc., Lon Scnexren, M. Josuva Aus, Martin Heonr,
Dentasonic, N. V., Invewre. Cosporation and Mam

10 Defendants

Plaintiff,

APPEARANCES:

Dowatp N. Muawskr, Regional Administrator
Attorney for Plaintiff
26 Federal Plaza
New York, New York 10278
By: Marcaret M. McQueensy, Eso.
RAR A. Sicomiano, Esq.
Exizasera A. Banyes, Eso.
La Brenna Jonzs, Esq.
Mink D. Powsnrs, Eso.
Of Counsel

Litman, Frmpman, Kavrman & Aso, Esgs.
Attorneys for Defendants
Inventel Corp. and Martin E. Hecht
120 Broadway
New York, New York 10271

1

21a
Opinion of the United States District Court

Sweet, D.J.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (‘‘SEC’’)
seeks a declaration that defendants Martin Hecht
(„Hecht“) and Inventel Corporation (‘‘Inventel’’) have
violated Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act of
1938 (‘‘the Securities Act’’), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a) and 77e
(e) (“the registration provisions’’), and Sections 17(a)
of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a), Section 10b of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (‘‘the Exchange Act’’),
15 U.S.C. §78j(b), and Rule 10b-5, 17 C. F. R. § 240.10b-5,
promulgated thereunder (‘‘the antifraud provisions’’).
The SEC also seeks a permanent injunction barring the
offering and sale of securities in the form of investment
contracts. The declaration will be entered in the form of
a judgment and the injunction will be granted as set forth
below.

PretimumnaBy PRoceepines

This action was commenced on September 30, 1980 by
the filing of a complaint, and a motion for preliminary in-
junction was filed on December 19, 1980. The SEC sought
to restrain the defendants, Aqua-Sonic Products Corp.
(‘‘Aqua-Sonic’’), Ultrasonic Dental Products, Ine. (Ul-
trasonic’’), Leon Schekter (‘‘Schekter’’), M. Joshua Aber
(‘‘Aber’’), Dentasonic, N.V. (‘‘Dentasonic’’), Melvin
Herseh (‘‘Hersch’’), Hecht and Inventel from certain con-
duct about to be described. Discovery was expedited, the
preliminary injunction motion was adjourned, and the de-
fendants’ motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal
of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction was denied on June
3, 1981. Thereafter, all defendants except Hecht and In-

22a
Opinion of the United States District Court

ventel entered into consent decrees and the SEC discon-
tinued its action against them.“ From June 10 to June 17,
1981 the SEC motion for preliminary injunction against
Hecht and Inventel, the remaining defendants, was tried to
the court and consolidated with the trial on the merits pur-
suant to F.R.Civ.P. 65(a). What follows are the court’s
findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Fixprves or Facr
The Enterprise

Arthur Kuris (‘‘Kuris’’) and Aber were neighbors and
friends, the former being an inventor and patent holder
and the latter an attorney. Kuris had obtained patents
applying the principles of ultrasonic wave propagation to
various fields, one of which was dentistry. A device under
the trade name of Cavitron was developed and marketed.
The Cavitron gained wide acceptability among dentists and
employed ultrasonic waves to dislodge plaque in the course
of dental prophylaxis. The operation of the Cavitron re-
quired a coolant which was provided by a spray of water
originating from the customary sources.“ Kuris conceived

1. Final Judgments of Permanent Injunction Consent
1 Aqua- Sonic, — . an

entered defendants Schekter and
Aber on June 15, 1981, enjoining them from further violations of the
istration and anti-fraud provisions in connection with any securi-

ders“) were entered as to defendants Hersch and Ultrasonic, also on
June 15, 1981, in which said defendants, under penalty of contempt,
agreed not to violate the registration and anti-fraud isions as to
any securities in the future. Pursuant to said ers, the action

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230
Opinion of the United States District Court

of an improvement of the Cavitron which would employ
sterile water as the coolant for the ultrasonic process and
would thereby reduce the risk of any contamination result-
ing from micro-organisms which might be found in tap
water.
These new products for which Kuris held patent rights
were termed Steri Products. One of the products, known
as the Steri Prophy Unit, was designed as a complete, self-
contained ultrasonic prophylaxis unit utilizing pre-pack-
aged sterile water. The other Steri Product, called the
Steri Satellite Unit, was designed to be affixed to existing
dental equipment to supply pre-packaged sterile water.

After discussions with Aber, in early 1978 Kuris met
with Aber’s partners Hecht and Schekter to develop a plan
to market and distribute these Steri Products. The lawyers
had formed a professional corporation then called Schekter,
Aber and Hecht, P.C. („SAH“). As a consequence of
these discussions, four corporations were established by
Schekter, Aber and Hecht: Aqua-Sonie and Ultrasonic,
New York corporations; Dentasonic, a Netherlands Antilles
corporation ; and Inventel, a Delaware corporation. Schek-
ter, Aber and Hecht were the original shareholders of
Dentasonic until November, 1978 when Kuris acquired a
19% interest. The shares in both Aqua-Sonic and Ultra-
sonic were held by sole shareholders, their respective prin-
cipal officers. The original shareholders of Inventel were
Schekter, Aber and Hecht until February of 1979, at which
time the corporation redeemed the shares of Schekter and
Aber, leaving Hecht the sole shareholder.

Immediately after incorporation, Dentasonic purchased
from Kuris the patent and other related rights to the Steri

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24a
Opinion of the United States District Court

Products for the United States and Canada for $406,500
payable in installments. Kuris rc ained a security interest
in the patent and other rights conveyed to Dentasonic.
Dentasonic sold only the United States marketing and man-
ufacturing rights to the Steri Products to Aqua-Sonic,
which had been incorporated in April 1978, for $26 mifion
pursuant to an agreement dated June 1, 1978, this sum to
be paid not only from a percentage of the proceeds from
the sale by Aqua-Sonic of licenses to sell the Steri Products,
but also from a percentage of the profits received by Aqua-
Sonic from actual product sales. Until payment of the $26
million Dentasonic retained a security interest in the rights
conveyed to Aqua-Sonic, held certain voting rights to all
of Aqua-Sonic’s stock and was given a security interest in
certain accounts receivable and contract rights, certain
inventory and inventory records, equipment, inventions,
patent rights and trademarks in all products and proceeds
of Aqua-Sonic.

SAH developed certain materials for Aqua-Sonic de-
scribing its proposed method of doing business (‘‘the pro-
motional materials’’) to be set forth more fully below. In
short, Aqua-Sonic proposed to sell to licensees the right to
sell Steri Products in certain specified geographical areas.
Ultrasonic was described as an optional sales agent for the
licensees. Inventel, which was not described, entered into
a letter agreement with Aqua-Sonie by which Aqua-Sonic
agreed to pay Inventel $2.2 million, ostensibly as a finder’s
fee for bringing about the sale of the rights in the Steri
Products from Dentasonie to Aqua-Sonie and for past and
future consulting services. Under the letter agreemert,
Aqua-Sonic agreed to pay Inventel a portion of the pro-

25a
Opitton of the United States District Court

ceéds from the sale of licenses and the sale of the Steri
Products and related patents or trademarks.

The Promotional Materials

After the corporations were organized, in the course of
the preparation of the promotional materials, SAH sought
an Opinion of another law firm, Messrs. Baer, Marks &
Upham, with respect to the applicability of the securities
law to the proposéd enterprise. SAH received a memo-
randum in or about May, 1978 from an associate of that
firm, Barry Mandel, a prescient lawyer as things have
turned out, to the effect that the liccnse arrangement might
be considered an investment contract. The partners at
SAH directed one of their associates to research the issue
in the summer of 1978, and after considerable discussion
concluded otherwise. The promotional materials were mod-
ified as set forth below and the enterprise proceeded.

A market consultant was retained and for $500 provided
an analysis of the available market based primarily on the
use of Cavitron, and the marketing practices in the indus-
try which included the use of so-called dental depots, in
effect, wholesale houses offering dental supplies to all kinds
of dentists, a focal element in the licensing plan. Also,
Kuris obtained and passed on to Hecht a letter from a Dr.
Henry Goldman, an apparently well-regarded dental au-
thority, which could be construed as an endorsement of the
Steri Products. The letter was described succinctly by
Heeht in his investigative testimony, who realized the need
to overcome the resistance of dentists who were going to
be told that their present machines were unhygenic. Hecht

26a
Opinion of the United States District Court

likened their attitudes to those of the 19th century surgeons
who would say to Pasteur Get out of here Louis.“ In
addition, an article in the Journal of Periodontology en-
titled ‘‘Microbial Contamination of Dental Units and Ul-
trasonic Sealers’’ was obtained.

Prototype models had been developed, and Logical Tech-
nie d Services (‘‘LTS’’), an engineering firm specializing
in electronic applications, was retained in late 1978 to con-
vert them into finished marketable products.

With these preparations in hand or in contemplation,
certain documents were prepared to be used in the enter-
prise. During the period from on or about May 1, 1978
through August 31, 1978, these promotional materials were
developed and used in discussions with potential licensees
or their representatives. These included:

(a) an Information Memorandum describing the Steri
Products and the nature of the offering, with ex-
hibits attached thereto including a tax opinion let-
ter prepared by SAH and financial illustrations
projecting sales of the products and revenues.

(b) the Aqua-Sonic license and security agreement and
notes payable to Aqua-Sonic (prior to inclusion of
the so-called Advertising Fund to be discussed
below), and related instructions.

(e) a documer: entitled An Offer to Act as Sales
Agent.

(d) the Ultrasonic sales agency agreement, security
agreement, and notes payable to Ultrasonic (prior
to inclusion of the Advertising Fund), and related
instructions.

7

4

N 3
so at 4

27a
Opinion of the United States District Court

(e) a reprint of the aforementioned article by Arthur
Gross (and others) from the Journal of Perio-
dontology.

(f) a four-page document entitled ‘‘Confidential for
Professional Use Only.“

During the period from on or about September 1, 1978
through October 31, 1978, the following documents were
used in a two-pocketed packet, the second version of the

offering package.

(a) a new Information Memorandum Relating to Ex-
clusive Rights revised to reflect, among other
things, certain management changes at Aqua-
Sonic, the tax opinion letter and financial illustra-
tions.

(b) the Aqua-Sonic license and security agreement and
notes payable to Aqua-Sonic and related instruc-
tions.

(c) a document entitled ‘‘An Offer to Act as Sales
Agen I

(d) the Ultrasonic sales agency agreement, security
agreements, and notes payable to Ultrasonic and
related instructions.

(e) two large professional photographs of what ap-
peared to be a completed Steri Prophy Unit and
Steri Satellite Unit such as would be sold.

(f) The Journal of Periodontology article.

_(g) a copy of a letter dated September 12, 1978, to
Aqua-Sonic from E. A. Greenlee, President of
LTS, concerning the commercial production of the
Steri Products.

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28a
Opinion of the United States District Court

(h) acopy of the letter dated August 22, 1978, to Kuris
from Dr. Henry Goldman.

A third and final version of the materials in use after
November 1, 1978, consistea of the documents contained in
the second version plus the following documents:

(a) a letter dated November 1, 1978 signed by defend-
ant Hersch with attachments relating to the cre-
ation of the Steri Products, Advertising Fund and
supplemental tax opinion by SAH.

(b) a package of revised closing documents relating to
the license, sales agency and Advertising Fund,
and

(e) a revised summery of the offering entitled Confi-

dential for Professional Use Only—Summary of
Revised License for Steri Products.“

Licensees who had entered into the notes and agreements
contained in the first two versions of the offering materials
were asked to sign revised agreements and notes which
conformed to the third offering package.

The Information Memorandum summarized the obliga-
tions of the licensees in the licensing agreement as follows:

The License Agreement delineates the relationship be-

tween the parties and imposes specific duties and obli-

gations on the Licensee. These duties include, but ure
not limited to: (a) vigorous promotion of the distribu-

tion and sale of the Products Parts and Supplies; (b)

maintenance and employment of sufficient working cap-

ital and net worth to enable Licensee to fulfill all of his

duties, obligations and responsibilities under the Li-

cense Agreement; (c) employment of such agents, rep-

29a
Opinion of the United States District Court

resentatives and employees as Licensee in his sole
discretion, may deem to be necessary to assist him in
the performance of some or all of his duties and obliga-
tions as Licensee; (d) use and maintenance of an ac-
counting and reporting system as may be required by
Licensor; and (e) use of order forms designed by Li-
eensor and (f) adherence to certain standards for ad-
vertising materials used in connection with the busi-
ness.

Licensee will be an independent contractor and be solely
responsible for all expenses and costs incurred by him
in the conduct and promotion of his business. In addi-
tion, Licensee will be required to and be responsible for
the vigorous and satisfactory promotion, distribution
and sale of the Products, Parts and Supplies for use in
his Territory so as to obtain a reasonable share of the
market... In the event that a Licensee does not sat-
isfactorily fulfill his duties and responsibilities as set
forth in the License Agreement, Licensor may elect to
terminate his License.

Although the Information Memorandum did net mention
an offer by anyone to act as a sales agent, it did state that
a licensee may retain ‘‘agents, representatives or employ-
ees’’ to assist in marketing the Steri Products, and added:

The choice as to whether to deal with Dental Depots
and/or to retain agents, representatives, employees or
others is solely that of the Licensees. The Licensor
takes no position on this matter, for the most effective
means of achieving satisfactory market penetration
will vary according to the prior experience of the Li-
censee, the amount of time and effort the Licensee is

30a
Opinion of the United States District Court

willing to expend to exploit the License, and the nature
of Licensee’s Territory.
Annexed to the Information Memorandum as Exhibit
H is a set of financial illustrations designed to demonstrate
the potential profitability of the licenses. These illustra-
tions assume that a potential licensee does not retain the
sales agent. (A similar set of illustrations annexed to the
offer by Ultrasonic to act as sales agent makes the opposite
assumption.)
The Information Memorandum stated further:

In the event that a Licensee, in his sole discretion,
elects to retain and/or employ anyone to assist him in
the performance of some or all of his duties, obliga-
tions and responsibilities under the License, Licensee
must undertake to actively supervise their activities on
his behalf to ensure that they perform their activities
in a manner which will be consistent with Licensee’s
activities and responsibilities to Licensor.

In the event that a Licensee does not satisfactorily
fulfill his duties and responsibilities as set forth in the
License Agreement, Licensor may elect to terminate
his License.

The Information Memorandum and the license appli-
cation indicate that the license is available to a limited
class of persons who are capable of performing all their
obligations and exercising their rights under the license
agreement, and if they so chose, the sales agency agree-
ment. Under the heading ‘‘Who Should Apply for a Li-
cense,’’ the Memorandum stated:

31a
Opinion of the United States District Court

A License will be granted only to a person who has
considerable knowledge and experience in financial and
business matters, appreciates and understands the
merits and economic risks of this business. Experience
has shown that this type of business is not suitable for
and should not be pursued by persons who lack sub-
stantial assets

A License will be granted only to an Applicant in re-
liance on his representations and warranties that he
has himself, or together with any business and finan-
cial advisor with who he may consult, knowledge and
experience in financial and business matters, that he
is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of this
transaction, and that he is able to bear the economic
risks of this transaction.
The license application provided:

Applicant hereby represents and warrants as follows:

4. Applicant and/or his designated representative has
such knowledge and experience in financial and business
matters, and investments in particular, that he is ca-
pable of evaluating the merits and risks of the Appli-
cant’s acquisition of a License and has obtained, in
Applicant’s judgment, sufficient information from Li-
censor relating to the License to evaluate the merits
and risks of the contemplated transaction.

The Offer to Act as Sales Agent,“ if accepted by the
potential licensee, placed the responsibility for all sales of
Steri Products for the benefit of a particular licensee in
Ultrasonic. Certain rights, however, were retained by the
licensee.

32a
Opinion of the United States District Court

The Ultrasonic sales agency agreement provided that
the licensee has the absolute right to cancel this Agree-

ment at any time upon ninety days’ written notice and
that the agent:

will uniformly maintain the prices established from
time to time by Principal [licensee] for the Products,
and conform to such terms of sale and other selling
and ordering conditions as may be determined and re-
quired from time to time as herein provided.

It further provided that:

All orders shall be subject to approval of items, price
and credit by Principal and shall be confirmed by cus-
tomers. All quotations for sales made by Agent to
customers, or prospective customers, must be made
expressly subject to the approval and confirmation of
Principal and shall not be binding until such approval
is given by Principal. All Products shall remain the
property of Principal until sold.

and that:

[Books, records and copies of invoices shall be open
at all times during business hours to the inspection of
any duly authorized representative of Principal.

The Aqua-Sonic documents described over 100 geo-
graphical territories in the United States, and each stand-
ard territory was designed to contain approximately the
same number of dentists, although there were larger terri-
tories available. The fee for a typical license under the
Lieense Agreement was $159,500 payable as follows: $9,150
in cash upon the granting of the license; $9,150 in the form

leew
Fe

33a
Opinion of the United States District Court

of a negotiable promissory note, bearing interest at 7% per
annum and due January 15, 1979; and, $141,900 by a non-
recourse promissory note, bearing interest at 6% per an-
num and due January 1, 1985, but requiring pre-payment
based on a portion of the proceeds from the sale of the
Steri Products. The initial term of the license expires on
December 31, 1985; however, an option was included to
extend the license for an additional five-year period. Un-
der the license agreement Aqua-Sonic was solely responsible
for the development and manufacture of the Steri
Products.

The typical licensee under the sales agency agreement
paid a $16,600 fee to defendant Ultrasonic, as follows: $500
in cash upon acceptance of the offer; $500 by recourse
promissory note payable on January 15, 1979, and $15,600
by non-recourse promissory note due December 1, 1984,
but requiring pre-payment based on a portion of the pro-
ceeds from sales of the Steri Products. In addition, de-
fendant Ultrasonic was entitled to a commission of 20% of
gross sales of Steri Products under the terms of the sales
agency agreement.

During a later stage of the offering, SAH created the
Advertising Fund to promote the Steri Products for in-
vestors and to increase the tax benefits available to them.
The Fund was a joint venture to be administered by two
clients of SAH, Hanson Fassler Associates, Inc. and Mor-
ris Baumstein Associates, Inc. Investors were required
to make the following contribution to the Advertising
Fund: $400 in cash upon obtaining the license; a $400
negotiable promissory note due on January 15, 1979; and a

eal ip st a eee

34a
Opinion of the United Siates District Court

$13,200 non-recourse promissory note due December 1,
1984, but requiring pre-payment based on a portion of the
proceeds from sales of Steri Products. The addition of this
mandatory contribution did not increase the overall price
of a typical investment because the amount payable to de-
fendant Ultrasonic under the sales agency agreement was
correspondingly reduced by the amount payable to the
Fund. Moreover, monies paid by investors prior to the
creation of the Advertising Fund were reallocated from
Ultrasonic to the Fund apparently at the direction of SAH
through Aqua-Sonic.

After November 1, 1978 the Aqua-Sonic, Ultrasonic and
Advertising Fund Agreements, and the notes relating
thereto, were physically bound together and offered to
licensees in a single package. The entire cost of the Aqua-
Sonic enterprise for the typical licensee, including the
Aqua-Sonic license agreement, the Ultrasonic sales agency
agreement and the Advertising Fund was: $10,050 in cash;
$10,050 in recourse promissory notes due January 15, 1979;
and $170,000 in non-recourse notes due December, 1984 and
January, 1985.

The tax opinion letter and supplementary materials
stated that licensees could include the non-recourse notes,
the cash payments and the recourse notes in their basis for
amortization and that the licensee fee could be amortized
over eight years. Licensees were further advised that they
could deduct the full contract price of the sales agency
agreement and Advertising Fund contributions during
1978 and 1979. Thus, a typical investor who was personally
liable for $20,100 on his investment was advised that, as-

ix

35a
Opinion of the United States District Court

suming no sales of the products, he could take tax deduc-
tions of $38,400 in 1978 and $20,000 in 1979. Investors were
iuformed that they would reecive additional tax benefits by
retaining the sales agency. In addition to the described
materials two letters were sent by Aqua-Sonic to all licen-
sees instructing them how to treat their investment on their
1978 and 1979 federal income tax returns.

When an investor retained U!trasonic, the sales agency
agreements authorized Ultrasunic to perform all significant
marketing functions, including finding customers, taking
orders, collecting proceeds, and paying expenses and taxes.
Additionally, the selling price of the products was to be
agreed upon between Ultrasonic and the investor; however,
Ultrasonic was authorized to reduce the sales price uni-
laterally so long as its commission on the sale was corre-

spondingly reduced.

The Selling

The Aqua-Sonic licenses were offered and sold to in-
vestors throughout the United States. Hecht contacted
financial planners, accountants, and attorneys throughout
the country and recruited a number of individuals as com-
missioned salesmen, and with varying, not always success-
ful, results. These individuals, some of whom were finan-
cial consultants for some of the licensees, received commis-
sions for telling potential licensees about Aqua-Sonic, sign-
ing up licensees and transmitting properly executed agree-
ments to Aqua-Sonic.

Many offering packages were distributed to salesmen
and purchasers of the Aqua-Sonic offering from the South-

or
*

36a
Opinion of the United States District Court.

ern District of New York by making use of the means,
instruments and instrumentalities of interstate commerce
and of the mails. Generally, interstate commerce, the mails
and telephones were used in connection with the Aqua-
Sonic offering.

Hecht arranged sales meetings in various cities includ-
ing Phoenix, Portland, Los Angeles, Denver, New York
and San Francisco to recruit salesmen and svlicit licensees
and to describe the license and sales agency agreements
and the tax consequences of the Aqua-Sonic offering. Kuris
demonstrated the prototypes of Steri Products. In total,
between May 1 and December 31, 1978, Aqua-Sonic invest-
ments were purchased by 50 licensees for approximately
$12,100,000 of which $11,200,000 was in the form of non-
recourse promissory notes and $900,000 in cash and re-
course notes.

The testimony of eleven Aqua-Sonic licensees was taken

through depositions outside the jurisdiction, one of whom,,

Rex Zimmerman, was also a salesman of the offering. Two
licensees testified at trial. These individuals were, for the
most part, well established in full-time caree:s and business
endeavors or were retired and, with two or three exceptions,
all possessing some knowledge of finance and investment
and sufficient funds to employ that knowledge. Pursuant

to the promotional materials the licensees were required

to represent that each possessed net assets in excess of
$100,000 and incom in the 50% bracket.

The licensees included members of SAH, the wife of one
of the principals of the firm handling the advertising and

promotion for Steri Products, and a number of people who

be
= Sa

Na
Opinion of the United States District Court.

had engaged in over ten years of business transactions, a
vice-president of a substantial public corporation with ex-
tensive business experience, the president of businesses re-
lated to the sale, production and use of asphalt products,
a partner in the restaurant business, a shareholder of a
small manufacturing corporation, the vice-president .of a
public service corporation, and a petroleum jobber, a den-
tist, a farmer, a computer analyst, a builder and sell r of
private homes, a corporate vice-president of employee rela-
tions, a retired schoolteacher, a school principal, a full-time
physical therapist, the president of a data processing com-
pany, and retirees. None had any experience selling dental
products and for the most part the territories. of the
licenses were not close to the residences of the licensees.
Two or three of the licensees, Dorothy Baxa, Leonore Haas,
and possibly Edward Abrahamson, did not read the de-
scribed documente.

Most licensees testified they were primarily interested
in an income-producing investment and a tax shelter and
did not intend to become actively involved in the business.
Moreover, some licensees were told or otherwise led to be-
lieve that, after making the initial payments in 1978 and
1979, they would have no further responsibilities and that
no additional monies would be required. The availability
of the sales agency to market the product was an important
factor in certain of the licensees’ decision to purchase the
Aqua-Sonic license. Some investors did not distinguish
between Aqua-Sonic and Ultrasonic and viewed the offer-
ing as a single package.

The promotional materials, neither offered nox advised
of the existence of any sales agent other than Ultrasonic

lena

38a
Opinion of the United States District Court

and in fact, although acceptance of Ultrasonic’s offer to
act as sales agent was purportedly an optional feature of
the Aqua-Sonic offering, all Aqua-Sonic licensees executed
the sales agency agreement. A fair construction of the pro-
motional materials and the depositions indicate that Aqua-
Sonic was responsible for the development and production
of the products and Aqua-Sonic, Ultrasonic and the Adver-
tising Fund for the marketing and promotion of the
products.

The Operation of the Enterprise

David Glasser (‘‘Glasser’’) became Aqua-Sonic’s first
president and sole shareholder primarily at the suggestion
of Kuris and his advisors. Glasser resigned in or about
August 1978 because, among other reasons, he was advised
in an opinion letter written by his attorney that the offer-
ing might be a security under the federal securities laws
and might involve violations of other laws, including anti-
trust and federal food and drug statutes. Glasser had also
become concerned when he was asked to sign, on behalf of
Aqua-Sonic a series of documents, including a note for over
$25 million with Dentasonic. Following Glasser’s resig-
nation, Hecht in the summer of 1978 recruited a friend,
defendant Melvin Hersch, to be president and sole share-
holder of Aqua-Sonic.

Leonard Suroff (‘‘Suroff’’) was recruited to be Ultra-
sonic’s president and sole shareholder. Suroff was a prac-
ticing patent attorney who was recommended by Kuris and
who had had some experience dealing with the dental sup-
ply depots. During the time Suroff was associated with

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89a
Opinion of the United States District Court

Ultrasonic, all checks were signed by Hecht or one of his
law partners as well as by Suroff. Suroff never executed
any sales agency agreements. Following Suroff’s resigna-
tion in December 1978, as a consequence of the SEC investi-
gation, Hecht recruited Melvin Ehrlich, a professor of
physics, to be president of Ultrasonic. Ehrlich has been
president and sole shareholder since that time.

At the time the Aqua-Sonic licenses were sold to in-
vestors, the Steri Products were in the prototype stage
and required further development before they could be
manufactured and sold. Aqua-Sonic had retained LTS to
convert them into finished marketable products, and evi-
dence was presented that in the summer of 1978 production
early in 1979 did not seem unreasonable. However, the
models viven to LTS in late 1978 were incapable of deliv-
ering sterile fluid and required significant redesign.

LTS did developmental work on the early models which
resulted in the creation of its first prototype model in late
1979 after the encountering of difficulties in obtaining cer-
tain of the ultrasonic components. However, the model
was incapable of delivering sterile water. Various corre-
spondence and reports from ITS advised Aqua-Sonic of
the progress and problems in the development of the Steri
Products. At about the time Hecht severed his relationship
with Aqua-Sonic and became of counsel to SAH, in March
1979, Aqua-Sonie bad a bank balance exceeding $250,000.

As of June, 1981 the units were still not ready for sale,
since final production models had not been produced and
for a period of one year until the spring of 1981 no work

had been performed due to Aqua-Sonic’s instruction that

it would no longer pay LTS. Testimony at trial established

99

40a.
Opinion of the United States District Court

that additional changes are required to produce the Steri |

Satellite at an estimated cost of $8,00C to $10,000 plus the
$36,000.and $78,000. required for hard tooling. The design
and twoling will take an estimated 24 to 32 weeks. Soft

tooling would cost less than hard tooling but the end prod- .

uct would be of much lower quality and the life of the tool

itself would be short. In order to make the Steri Prophyy

Units into commercially marketable products, additional

design changes would take approximately three months to
make at an estimated cost of $15,000 to $20,000 and $61,000: -

to $118,000 for hard tooling. No clinical testing has ever.

been performed on either unit, The tooling for production

has not yet begun and approximately $1,200 remained in
Aqua-Sonie's bank account as of June 16, 1981. Further-

more, Aqua-Sonie’s two-year agreement with Kuris’ Cre-

ative Ultrasonics Corp. has expired and Kuris is no longer

obligated to perform any more consulting services in con-

nection with his inventions.

Misrepresentations and Omissions
Hecht and Inventel.concede that if the licenses are held

to be investment contracts, the securities laws were vio-
lated, initially, of course, by the failure to register the

securities. It is also conceded that other information which
would have been required was left out of the promotional

materials, namely the interests of the named defendants,
the role of SAH, and financial information relating to the

corporations involved including the use of proceeds, com- .

mitment, working capital and the reduced price at which
the licenses were offered to insiders. Of course, given the
view of the license adopted by the defendants, no financial

Ala

Opinion of the United States District Court

information was supplied, and thus the categories of infor-
mation just described; required to be included in offering
materials, were omitted.
The market report upon which the tax opinion was based
was produced within 24 hours on unverified information
und was sufficiently superficial with respect to market fac-
tors, prices and amortization to make the tax opinion on
which it was based misleading. The financial projections
were similarly empty of objective support, and the product
was not ready for market as represented. The absence of
‘any clinical testing of the Steri Products was not set forth,
nor ‘was the research adequate to permit reference to the
underlying definite casual relationship“ claimed between
the use of unsterile water and various infections. The pho-
tographs of the Steri Products carried the implication that
th were the finished product when in fact they were pro-
totypes incapable of performing their professed prophylac-
tic function. All these matters constituted misrepresenta-
tions or omissions of material facts required if the licenses
are considered to be securities.

The Role of Hecht and Inventel

Hecht participated in the discussions which led to the
formation and structure of the enterprise and the prepara-
tion of the described materials by the law firm of which he
was a member. He attended meetings at which the enter-
prise was discussed in order to explain the transactions,
both to those who would seek to interest licensees and licen-

sees themselves. He assisted in the recruiting of officers
of Aqua-Sonic and Ultrasonic. For services in organizing
the selling effort, Inventel, of which Hecht had been the sole

42a
Opinion of the United States District Court

shareholder since February, 1979, received $200 and has
rights to substantial additional funds to be divided among
Hecht, Schekter and Aber, if the enterprise goes forward
based upon Hecht’s efforts.

In Hecht’s own words, ‘‘I was trying to sell the sellers.
He did so in significant ways, including the dissemination
of the SAH opinion letter concerning the application of the
securities laws to the enterprise. He also participated not
only in the selling and the structuring of the transaction
but SAH, during the time he was a member, initially served
virtually all administrative functions for Ultrasonic and
Aqua-Sonic, kept the books, bank accounts and prepared
correspondence. Although Hecht was not an officer, director
or employee of those corporate defendants, as a partner of
SAH he participated in the administrative activities just
described in addition to his selling and personnel activities.

The Role of the SEC

In 1978 the SEC initiated inquiries concerning the enter-
prise, requested information and received by September,
1978 certain of the requested documents. In 1979 investi-
gative examinations were conducted. Hecht’s for example,
took place on August 29, 1979. This action was commenced

in August, 1980 and the motion for preliminary injunction
was made in December, 1980.

Tue Issues

From the outset of this proc ding, Hecht’s skilled coun-
sel has urged that but two issues have been presented: (1)
wehther the court has jurisdiction, and if so, (2) what re-
lief is appropriate. Both parties have concentrated primar-

ae

43a
Opinion of the United States District Court

ily on the first issue, whether or not the Aqua-Sonic offer-
ing of a license, coupled with an offer by Ultrasonic to act
as a sales agent, constituted the offering and sale of an
„investment contract under the rules laid down in SEC
v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). According to
Hecht and Inventel, this is a case of first impression. At
the least, it is one more of a long line of cases presenting
the difficulties of determining the essential elements of an
investment contract.“

Since the described materials were drafted to avoid the
very issue now raised by the SEC, an additional threshold
issue is presented by the claim of the SEC that the evidence
relevant to the jurisdiction issue includes not only the
knowledge and intent of the defendants but also the state
of mind and capacity of the licensees beyond that which is
proclaimed in the described materials and reflected in the
licensee’s answers to the Aqua-Sonic questionaires. There
lies in this issue the troublesome taint of an ex post facto
determination, a revisionist view of the transaction, result-
ing from attitudes contrary to those expressed on paper at
the time the transactions at issue took place.

Concivusions or Law

The Relevant Evidence

It is already the law of this case by virtue of the denial
of defendant’s motion for summary judgment that the
economic realities of the transaction are controlling, not
simply the documents which constitute the formalities of
the transaction involved. The authorities for that propo-
sition were cited in the court’s opinion of June 5 and need
not be reiterated.

N g

4
Opinion of the United States District Court

The enterprise and the described materials, by the very
nature of the operation of the securities laws, must be ex-
amined as of the time that the transaction took place, to-
gether with the knowledge and the objective intentions and
expectations of the parties at that time. United Housing
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852-53 (1975);
Piambino v. Bailey, 610 F.2d 1306, 1320 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 568 (1980); SEC v. Int'l Scanning
Devices, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fed.Sec.L.Rep. (CCH)
96,147 at 92,171-175 (W.D.N.Y. 1977). The subj
intentions or motivations of the investors are irrelevant.
Piambino v. Bailey, supra. To the extent that subsequent
events give rise to inferences that are relevant to the eco-
nomic reality of the transactions at the time they occurred,
they were considered, but only to that extent. The LTS
discussions, correspondence and projections in 1980 and
1981 do not give rise to such inferences though they may be
relevant to the question of relief.“ Similarly, the SEC’s
proposed findings relative to the operation of the dental
supply depots is disregarded beyond that which was con-
tained in the described materials. No probative evidence
was offered in this connection, nor could any findings be
made concerning the ability of the licensees to conduct their
proposed business in the absence of actual experience which
was precluded by the march of events.

In fact, no sales of the products occurred and no opinion
evidence was offered that such sales could or could not
have occurred in the contemplated manner even if the prod-

3. Even for that purpose, the testimony is of doubtful use, given
er ee ee
preclude Aqua-Sonic’s resumption of business.

Opinion of the United States District Court

© ucts had been available. Although Mi. Abrahamson might
have intended to retire to Maine where his franchise is
located, and although Mrs. Baxa and others had purchased
‘(franchises across the country from their home, there was
‘insufficient evidence upon which it could be found, as op-
posed to surmised, that the licensees were not capable of
vigorously promoting the sale of Steri Products as they had
warranted to do. It is significant, however, both in terms
of relief and in terms of contemporaneous construction, to
note that after the defendants received the Mandel memo,
indicating the possi’le applicability of the securities laws,
the language casting responsibility on the licensee was
further strengthened and reinforeed while none of the op-
erative feature of the enterprise was altered.
Finally, perhaps the most significant determination in
terms of evidence of economic reality is the definition of
the enterprise. Hecht and Iuventel seek to limit the evi-
dence—and consequently the court’s consideration—to the
promotional materials, the license to se!) the patented prod-
ucts and the offer of Ultrasonic to perform that task, sub-
ject to the. licensees’ control, right to know, and capacity
to cancel the services of Ultrasonic on stated terms and con-
ditions. In the felicitous example of counsel for the de-
fendants, the license is likened to the independent dealer-
ship for the sale of automobiles which has yet to be termed
by the SEC, or anyone else, an investment contract. Were
the inquiry and the evidence so limited, perhaps the defense
would prevail, but if all the facts relevant to the enterprise
as it operated in 1978 and early 1979 are considered, inelud-
ing the capitalization, stage of development of the Steri
Products, tax consequence, and method of operation, the

46a
Opinion of the United States District Court

economic reality differs materially from the exemplary au-
tomobile dealership. It is those facts, pressed forward by
the SEC under the criteria set forth in the authorities that
compel the declaration that the L.cense agreement and sales
agency executed by the licensees constituted an investment
contract.

The Relevant Criteria

Howey is the obvious starting place, and its three eri-
teria for determining an investment contract are easily
stated: (1) an investment of money, (2) in a common en-
terprise, (3) on an expectation of profit to be derived solely
from the efforts of the promoter or third parties. Here
the input of money and the common enterprise are con-
ceded and the profit element is only slightly in conflict. The
principal field of battle between the parties has been in
their contentions concerning the efforts of others. The
defendants place their chief reliance on the promotional
materials, which clearly state that the licensee has the right
to sell the Steri Products without using Ultrasonic as a
sales agent, without reliance upon sole efforts of the pro-
moter or third parties. They urge further that, even hav-
ing contracted for the services of Ultrasonic, the Aqua-
Sonic licensees retained substantial rights, powers and
duties. The SEC contends to the contrary, claiming that
the economic reality dictated sole or very substantial re-
liance on others.

Early on in the development of this line of vases, the
requirement that the profits be the result of the sole effort
of the promoter or a third party was modified to unde-
niably significant’’ efforts of others. SEC v. Glenn W.

47a
Opinion of the United States District Court

Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F. 2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). The Court of Appeals for our
circuit has cited Turner with approval in Glen-Arden Com-
modities, Inc. v. Costanino, 493 F. 2d 1027, 1035 (2d Cir.
1974) and affirmed Judge Neaher when he employed the
Turner modification in SEC v. Galaxy Foods, Inc., 417 F.
Supp. 1225, 1239 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), af d mem. 556 F. 2d 559
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 895 (1977). Sce also Wil-
liamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 418-19 (5th Cir. 1981). I
conclude therefore that Hecht and Inventel do not escape
the ‘‘efforts of others’’ criterion by reliance on the word
„solely. It is the significance of the efforts of others to
produce the profits that must be established.

Even under the narrow interpretation of the enterprise
urged by defendants, namely, the conduct of the business
of the licenses to sell Steri Products, viewed realistically,
any profits would have resulted from the efforts of others.
All licensees signed the Ultrasonic sales agency agreement
and all thus retained Ultrasonic to sell the Steri Products.
Whether or not certain licensees might also have exerted
efforts to sell will never be known, given the terms of the
consent decrees. The sales agency agreement itself, and
the showing as to its actual centrality to the entire scheme,
constitutes significant evidence, in the absence of contrary
testimony, that the efforts of others would be ‘‘undeniably
significant.’’ However, the enterprise in its totality con-
sisted of far more than the sales agency. No sales could
be achieved absent the product to be sold, and for that—
the development of the Steri Products from the rough pro-
totype stage—the licensees were entirely dependent on
Aqua-Sonic, a dependence which could not be relieved from

~ 48a
Opinion of the United States District Court

any other source. See Galaxy Foods, supra, 417 F. Supp.
at 1241-42.

There is a series of cases cited by the SEC where the
sale of a franchise or a comniodity with the offer of services
have been held to be investment contracts. Gen- Arden
ODommodities v. Costantino, supra; Continental Marketing
Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,

391 U.S. 905 (1968) ; SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distributors,

Ine., 388 F. Supp. 1288 (S. D. N. V. 1975); SEC v. Galaxy
PFoods, supra; see also SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., supra.
Hecht and Inventel cite cases where a sale of a franchise

or land together with the offer of services has heen held not

to constitute an investment contract where purchasers have
retained non-illusory rights or powers, Schulte v. Dain
' Corp., 568 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1978); Fargo Partners v. Dain
Corp., 540 F. 2d 912 (8th Cir. 1976); Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River
' ‘City Steak, Inc., 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972), affirming

324 F. Supp. 640 (D. Colo. 1970) ; Chapman v. Rudd Paint
t Varnish Co., 409 F. 2d 635, 641 (9th Cir. 1969) ; Wieboldt

v. Metz, 355 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); see generally
‘ Williamson v. Tucker; supra, 419-21, 424-25.

The criterion by which these two lines of cases can be
reconciled has been stated to be passivity, Galary Foods,
“supra, 417 F. Sapp. at 1241, dependence, or latent investor
-eontrol, Williamson, supra at 421. Because of the nature
of the products being offered, the character of the sales
‘agency and the nature of the industry to be served, the

Aqua-Sonie licensees were dependent, passive and incapable
of latent investor control, or, in other words, unable to ex-
erxeise ‘whatever powers over the enterprise they formally

>» -

49a
Opinion of the United States District Court

Another criterion has been advanced by the SEC, then
tentatively withdrawn, the so-called risk capital“ basis
which has evolved under the California and Hawaii Se-
cutities laws, see Stanley v. Commercial Courier Service,
Iac., 411 F. Supp. 818, 821-22 (D. Ore. 1975); Wiebolt v.
Metz, supra, at 259-62; Mr. Steak, supra, 324 F. Supp. at
646; and has been the subject of considerable commentary,
see Forman, supra, 421 U.S. at 857 n.24. While this ap-
proach has not been accepted in the federal courts as a sub-
stitute for the classic Howey test, nor is it so embraced
here, in my view such a theory can be subsumed under the
efforts of others test of Howey, or as an extension or
further definition of passivity or dependence. See Stanley,
supra, at 823; Wiebolt v. Metz, supra, at 260-61. What is
really at issue in this formulation is whether the enterprise
more closely resembles a traditional offer to invest, to put
money at risk dependent on the efforts of others, or the
purchase of a right to conduct a business hose resources
are or practically can be controlled by the purchaser, not
by the seller. Here, the cash used to purchase the license,
some $900,000, was, on the basis of this record, the only
cash in the enterprise. True, Aqua-Sonic possessed some
know-how and patent rights, but the only operating capital,
as the term is commonly understood, came from the pay-
ments of licensees. There were no bank loans, stock issues,
notes or any other financing made available to Aqua-Sonic.
On this tecord I am not reluctant to conclude that a risk
capital approach is helpful, and that under such a criterion,
the deseribed materials constituted an investment contract.

However, such a conclusion merely buttresses the conclu-

sions already set forth; perhaps consideration of the risk

50a
Opinion of the United States District Court

capital concept merely casts the criteria of passivity and
dependence in somewhat more traditional terms, traditional
at least in the commercial, if not the legal, world.

The economic reality here is that the fuel which drove
this enterprise as far as it went was the concept character-
ized by Hecht as a TABA:

‘I don’t like to use the term ‘investment’: This year
[1979] I call what I do a TABA which is a tax ad-
vantage business acquisition, because, literally, the in-
dividual is still acquiring a business and it is only
through the method of his acquisition that he obtains
tax benefits. In this particular case [Pool Patrol] the
structure of the acquisition of the license gives tax
benefits (Hecht Investigative Transcript at 102).

The defendants offered a tax shelter and sought to make
it possible for the licensees to take advantage of the tax
provisions described in the tax opinion contained in the de-
scribed material. This tax treatment was the emphasis of
the selling effort and the questionnaire, and apparently the
underlying motivation of the licensees. The year-end dis-
cussions between Mr. Abrahamson, on the way to the opera,
and his accountart, placed in clear outline the principal
feature of the enterprise—its tax effect. The defendants
sought by the form of the transaction to make the enter-
prise a business and not an investment contract, a TABA
and not a security. The economic reality was otherwise.

The defendants, perhaps perceiving the drift of the au-
thorities, urged this case be treated as one of first impres-
sion with unique facts. When pressed for the authorities
closest on the facts defendants cited Williamson and Mr.
Steak. To the same inquiry, the SEC responded Galazy

.

5la

Opinion of the United States District Court

Foods. The difference in the factual setting of eacn of the
cases cited seems to this court to reinforce the conclusions
reached above. A restaurant franchise or an undivided
interest in realty could be managed as an independent
business and possessed features other than those identified
with a traditional investment. The franchised sale of
groceries depended much more heavily on the ability of
others to obtain and deliver the goods. Here, as it in fact
turned out, the licensees were totally dependent on defend-
ants not only for the merchandising of Steri Products, in
which arguably the licensees could have been involved,
either practically or as a matter of right, but also upon
Aqua-Sonic for the products to be sold. Finally, the only
source for funds for such production was the payment by
the licensees. Although structured as a TABA, it turned
out to be an investment in which the licensees were at risk
and where in reality there was no latent investor control
of the enterprise nor any evidence of the existence or exer-
cise of such control other than the nominal right to sell the
products without Ultrasonic, a right which I conclude failed
to constitute control.

The Relief

Defendants have urged that the relief to be granted, if
any, for the violations—conceded and found—must meet
the strictures of SEC v. Commonwealth Chemical Secur-
ities, Inc., 574 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978), affirming 410 F. Supp.
1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), a proposition not seriously chal-
lenged by the SEC. In determining whether or not to issue

a permanent injunction the Honorable Lloyd F. MacMahon
in Commonwealth listed the factors to be considered. 410

52a
Opinion of the United States District Court

F. Supp. at 1020, a listing which was quoted with approval
by the Court of Appeals, 594 F.2d at 100. Thee included
a finding of liability for illegal conduct, the degree of scien-
ter, whether the occurrence was an isolated one or not, con-
trition, and whether, because of his professional occupation,
the defendant might be in a position where future violations
could be anticipated.

Obviously, the liability has been found although Hecht
and Inventel are expected to continue their assertions that
the licenses were not investment contracts.“ At the same
time, the defendants throughout have been straightforward
and candid in their acknowledgment that no attempt was
made to comply with the securities law and have consist-
ently conceded a violation of those laws by way of a failure
to register, for example, if it is concluded, contrary to their
contention, that the enterprise involved an investment con-
tract. Of course, that concentrates the issue on the heart
of Judge Friendly’s opinion in Commonwealth, scienter
and the likelihood of similar future conduct.

On three occasions Hecht was made aware that other
members of the bar viewed the enterprise as one that might
be required to comply with the securities laws. The memo
of the associate of the Baer Marks firm was rendered to
SAH specifically with respect to this issue. Glasser and
Suroff, the first presidents of Aqua-Sonie and Ultrasonic,
resigned, stating that their counsel had raised questions
concerning the applicability of the securities laws and a
letter was shown to Hecht to that effect. Finally, of course,
the inquiries of the SEC itself constituted notice of the

4. bin tha wg Pade Sats cog tee i Shag Poe

held ing by the Honorable Neaher in Galary Foods,
but rather closely related scienter and future intent.

<i tae

53a
Opinion of the United States District Court

possibility of the impending litigation. However, the un-
favorable memorandum by the Baer Marks associate was
reviewed by a SAH associate, the authorities were appar-
ently discussed and the SAH partners reached a different
con ‘usion. Whatever their secret convictions may have
been, there is no direct evidence of a knowing violation.

Nevertheless, in the context of this case, under the law
of this circuit, recklessness Would amount to scienter. See
Oleck v. Fischer, $23 F. 2d 791, 794 (2d Cir. 1980). Here two
outside firms rendered opinions contrary to the final SAH
conclusion. The SAH conclusion was bottomed on research
and analysis by an associate who, it must be inferred, knew
the details of the enterprise including the financial interests
of his employer partners. Not to have obtained another
outside opinion and to rely on the opinion of financially in-
terested attorneys must be considered reckless under these
cireumstances, so reckless as to constitute scienter.

What then remains is the most significant af the factors,
the likelihood of fature violations by Hecht, who through
his counsel, professes an abandonment of the practice of
law. (As far as his relationship with SAH, this has been
established.) Hecht seems equally adamant in his intent
to continue the offering of TABA’s, whether those known
to tie SEC as a consequence of this investigation—the sale
of the pool alarm system or the ultrasonic toothbrush—or
other similar enterprises. A reading of Hecht’s investi-
gative transcript reveals a man who has obtained new
knowledge of an area of opportunity—the TABA—includ-
ing an identification of others who participate in the mer-
chandising of such acquisitions. The blurring of definitions
of these acquisitions and investment contracts is amply

54a
Opinion of the United States District Court

demonstrated by this litigation. It can therefore be in-
ferred that there is a likelihood that Hecht could again ere,
to view it charitably, in the same fashion as he has done
here. Therefore the requirements of Commonwealth have
been met and a permanent injunction will issue.

What really is at stake, one suspects, is not the oppro-
brium attached to District Court determination of a se-
curities act violation in a difficult and evolving area of the
law but rather the procedural consequences which would
flow from a permanent injunction and a contempt citation
which might flow from the injunction, were the SEC and
Hecht to differ in the future on the essential character of
a TABA which he might seek to sell. Obviously, every
effort should be made to fit the terms of any injunctive
relief to the violation found to have been committed. par-
ticularly here, where the argument has been advanced with
some force that even the SEC took over a yoar, or almost
two, depending on when one starts counting, to conclude
that Hecht and the other defendants had acted in violation
of the securities acts. It is to be hoped that the SEC will
help the court to clarify, or at least characterize, the con-
duct to be enjoined, by a description of the prohibited con-
duct in specific rather than general terms.

A judgment will be submitted on notice within ten (10)
days.

Ir Is So Onpenep.

Dated: New York, N.Y.
August 7, 1981

Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For tHe Ssconn Cmcurr

At a stated Term of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
United States Courthouse in the City of New
York, on the tenth day of June one thousand
nine hundred and eighty-two.

Present:

How. Henry J. Farewpiy
How. Irvine R. Kavur.man
How. Lawrence W. Prerce

Cireuit Judges
#81-6231

——_-

Securities AN Excuance ComMiIssion,
Plaintiff-Avpellee,
v.

Aqua-Sontc Prepucts, Corp., U:rrasontc DENTAL Propvcts,
Inc., et al.,
Defendants,

Martin E. Hecur and Invenret Corp.,
Defendants-A ppellants.

— 82 —

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York.

PR *

56a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of
record from the United States District Court for the South-
n District of New York, and was argued by counsei.

Ox Constpenation Wuentor, it is now hereby ordered,
adjudged, and desreed that the judgment of said District
Court be and it hereby is affirmed in accordance with the
opinion of this court with costs to be taxed against the
appellants.

A. Daniel Fusaro, Clerk
by /s/ Epwarp J. Guarparo

Edward J. Guardaro,
Deputy Clerk

b

57a

Statutes and Rules Involved

Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. 77b(1)

§ 77). Definitions

When used in this subchapter, unless the context
otherwise requires—

(1) The term security“ means any note, stock,
treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebt-
edness, certificate of interest or participation in any
profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription, transfer-
able share, investment contract, voting-trust cer-
tificate, certificate of deposit for a security, frac-
tional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral
rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument com-
monly known as a security“, or any certificate of
interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant
or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing.

Sections 5(a) & (c) of the Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. 77e(a) & (e)

§ Ne. Prohibitions relating to interstate commerce and
the mails

(a) Sale or delivery after sale of unregistered securities

Unless a registration statement is in offect as to a

security, it shall be unlawful for any person, directly
or indirectly—

(1) to make use of any means or instruments of

transportation or communication in interstate com-

58a
Statutes and Rules Involved

merce or of the mails to sell such security throngh
the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise; or

(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the
mails or in interstate commerce, by any means or in-
struments of transportation, any such security for
the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale.

(c) Necessity of filing registration statement

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or in-
directly, to make use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate com-
merce or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy
through the use or medium of any prospectus or other-
wise any security, unless a registration statement has
been filed as to such security, or while the registration
statement is the subject of a refusal order or stop order
or prior to the effective date of the registration state-
ment) any publie proceeding or examination under sec-
tion 77h of this title.

Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. 77q(a)

§77q. Fraudulent interstate transactions

(a) Use of interstate commerce for purpose of fraud
or deceit

It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or
sale of any securities by the use of any means or instru-
ments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or in-
directly

59a
Statutes and Rules Involved

(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
det raud, or a

(2) to obtain money or property by means of any
untrue statement of a material fact or any omission
to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or

(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.

Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78c(10)

§ 78c. Definitions and application
(a) Definitions

When used in this chapter, unless the context othe: -
wise requires—

(10) The term ‘‘security’” means any note, stock,
treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of interest
or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in
any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any
collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate
or subscription, transferable share, investment con-
tract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for
a security, or in general, any instrument commonly
known as a ‘‘security’’; or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for,
receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or pur-
chase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include cur-
rency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker’s

60a
Statutes and Rules Involved

acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issu-
ance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of
grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is
likewise limited.

Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b)

§ 78j. Manipulative and deceptive devices

It shall be unlawful for a::y person, directly or in-
directly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange—

(b) To use or emplay, in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Com-
mission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.

Commission Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR 240.10b-5

§ 240.10b-5 Employment of manipulative and decep-
tive devices.

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or in-
directly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,

(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud,

7 1

61a
Statutes and Rules Involved

(b) To make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading, or

(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person, in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of any security.

2

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_0751%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
