# Amicus Brief — Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1983
- **Citation:** 463 U.S. 29

## Text

Office Supreme Court, U.S,
FILED

FEB.) 1963

Nos. 82-354, 82-355, 82-398 een
IN THE K Bea

Supreme Court of the United States
OcTOBER TERM, 1982

Moror Venice MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION OF THE
Unrrep Srares, Inc., et al., Petitioners,

V.

Srate Farm Mutua. Avtromosi.e Insurance Company, et al.,

Respondents.

Cowsumer ALERT AND Paciric Lecat Founpation, Petitioners,

V.
Srate Fanu Murua Auro nom Insura? ce Company, et al.,

Respondents.

Unrrep States DerparTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, et al.,
Petitioners,

V.

Sratre Farm Mutua. Avromosite Insurance Company, et al.,

Respondents.

On Writs Of Certiorari To The United States Court
Of Appeals For The District Of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF FOR THE AMERICAN INSURANCE
ASSOCIATION, AMICUS CURIAE IN
SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

NATHAN LEWIN

(Counsel of Record)

ANNE SHERE WALLWORK

Mun, Cassipy, Larroca & Lewin
2555 M Street, N.W., Suite 500

maa 20037

Attorneys for the American Insurance Association,
Amicus Curiae

PRESS OF BYRON 8. ADAMS PRINTING, INC., WASHINGTON, D.C.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
1 cccccnsucsoccecesescccscccess iii
OUUREST OF THB AMICUS e eee eee l
eee 6666660 60 2
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ........... 2

I. NHTSA’s Rescission or SAFETY STANDARD 208 Was
UNLAWFUL Because It Restep Upon EARLIER OFFI.
CIAL ACTIONS PROMPTED By THE AGENCY'S IMPERMIS-
SIBLE CONCERN OVER THE DEPRESSED Economic
STATE OF THE Domestic AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY. .. 5

A. NHTSA Explicitly Cited The Automobile In-
dustry’s Economie Difficulties As The Principal
Reason For Dela And Proposing to Amend
The Passive Restraint Requirements. 6

(1) — proposes delay to help the indus-

(3) NHTSA proposes rescission because of
the industry's “economic difficulties." .. 8

(4) NHTSA's steps are described as “Actions
to Help the U.S. Auto Industry.“ 8

P B. In The Absence Of An Explicit Repudiation
NHTSA Should Be Presumed To Have Iss
Its Final Rule In Accordance With The Primary
Considerations It Expressed At Earlier Stages
113. 9

C. Consideration Of The Economie Condition Of
The Automobile Industry Is Beyond NHTSA's
Statutory Authorit̃““)ꝰ . . 12

(1) The legislative history indicates that the
economic welfare of the automobile indus-
try is not to be considered by NHTSA. . 13

II. NHTSA AcTED IRRATIONALLY AND ARBITRARILY IN
FaILinc To RETAIN THE PASSIVE RESTRAINT
REQUIREMENT WITHOUT THE ALLEGEDLY INEFFEC-
* AUrouarie BELT Option By ReQuIRING AIR- 2

U eee

Table of Contents Continued
Page

III. Tur Case SHoutp Be REMANDED To THE CouRT oF
AppeaLs Errurx To Direct NHTSA To Enrorce
THE AIR-BAG REQUIREMENT OR, IF PETITIONERS PRE.
vaiL, To Have Tuat Court ApPLy THE CoRRECT
D 26

A. The Court Of Appeals Should Order NHTSA
To Issue An Amended Safety Standard. 27

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES: Page
Adams v. Richardson, 480 F. 2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) 27

American Federation of Government Employees v. De-
vine, 525 F. Supp. 250 (D. D. C. 1981) 12

American Iron & Steel Institute v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 568 F.2d 284 (3d Cir, 1977) .. 25

American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan,
452 U.S. 490 (1981) ..... cc cece eee eees 12, 15, 18, 19

Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Witchita
Board of Trade, 412 U.S. 800 (1973) ............ 12

Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight
System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281 (1974) .......... tr 13, 26

Burli Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S.
ES INET: LPNS ie RR I 12, 26

Chrysler Corp . Department of Transportation, 472
2d 659 59 (th Gb BEUED ccccvccscccocéscececes 17, 18

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
eee ess sees ese 86080000 13

n Federal Maritime Commission, 383 U.S. 607

Davis v. Romney, 490 F.2d 1360 (3d Cir. 1974) 27, 28
Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1979) 28
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439
Ps GE GOED eee eee ee eee ee 28
Federal Trade Commission v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S, 380
Fenn 12
Forester v. Consumer Product Safety Comm., 559 F. 2d
r A Eee: 25
H & H Tire Co. v. Department of Transportation, 471
F.2d 350 (Stn Cir, 1973) * eee 18
Industrial Union rtment v. American Petroleum
Institute, 488 U.S. 607 (198177) 10, 11, 12
Industrial Union Department v. Hodgson, 499 F. 2d 467
(D.C, Cir. — ae pidubabestswese 19

2 Harvester v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F. 2d 615

Jacob Siegel Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 327 U.S.
608 (1946) 23

iv

Table of Authorities Continued
Page
Lead Industries Association, Inc. v. Donovan, 453 U.S.
DD ere 19

McCulloch Gas Processing Corp. v. Department of Ener-
gy, 650 F.2d 1216 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1981) . 25

Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ....... 29
National Labor Relations Board v. Walton Manufactur-
ing Co., 360 U.S. 404 (1962)... . cece cccceeees
National Tire Dealers & Retread Association, Inc. v.
Brinegar, 491 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1974) .......... 18

National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Associa-
tion of Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974) 28-29

Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 102 S. Ct. 1781 (1982) . 29, 30
Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F. 2d 567 (9th Cir. 1971) .... 28

318 U.S. 80 (194))))) . 11-12

United Sveelworkers of America v. Marshall, 647 F. 2d
1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Lead
Industries Association, Inc. v. Donovan, 435 U.S.
r c 19

Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 340 U.S. 4751 D ’˙˖§öṼ . eae

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., U.S. 519 (1978) 29

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS:

2 ccc cccccscccccccccccccevcces 3. 13
15 U.S.C. § 1892 (197) )) 13
29 U.S.C. 68 481 et seq. (1976) 28
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (17%) 27
49 U.S.C. § 1652(a) (1976) ) 5
Pub. L. 89-670, 88 Stat. 1533 (1966) ))) 5
82 Fed. Reg. 8225 (1967 q . 5
42 Fed. Reg. 34289 (190 - . 22

43 Fed. Reg. 8628 (19780 ))) q 5

Vv

Table of Authorities Continued

Page
46 Fed. Reg. 12033 (1981777 6, 7
46 Fed. Reg. 21172 (1981777777) 7, 8, 16
46 Fed. Reg. 21205 (198·nʒůuůu „ 8, 24
46 Fed. Reg. 53418 (19817 9, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25
47 Fed. Reg. 21280 (1982))))) : 6
40 C. F. R. 1. So) (11) ccc reecccevvceveecvens 5
III 5
112 Cong. Rec. 14245 (19660)))⸗:: cece ees 15, 16
112 Cong. Rec. 14246 (1966)0))))))) 14
112 Cong. Rec. 19647 (1966) ᷣ 77 14
112 Cong. Rec. 19648 (19660) 17
112 Cong. Rec. 19649 (1966 U 17
112 Cong. Rec. 19654 (1966) · PP „„ 14

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS:
H.R. Rep. No. 1776, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) ... 13, 17

„56946 6 6 6 66660 13, 14, 15, 16, 17

MISCELLANEOUS:

Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative
Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1669 (1975)

Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private
Rights, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1198 (1982) ...........

Transcript of remarks of Raymond Peck. Administrator ,
sy 2 Highway Traffic Administration (October *

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
OcTOBER TERM, 1982

Nos. 82-354, 82-355, 82-398

Motor VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION OF THE
Unitep Srates, Inc., et al., Petitioners,

V.

State Farm Mutvat Avutomosi_e Insurance Company, et al.,
Respondents.

ConsumMER ALERT AND Paciric Lecat Founpation, Petitioners,
V.

State Farm Mutvuat Avutomosite Insurance Company, et al.,
Respondents.

Unrvep States DeparRTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, ef ul.,
Petitioners,
V.
State Farm Mutua AuronostlkE Insurance Company, et al.,
Respondents.

On Writs Of Certiorari To The United States Court
Of Appeals For The District Of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF FOR THE AMERICAN INSURANCE
ASSOCIATION, AMICUS CURIAE IN
SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS

The American Insurance Association is an unincorporated
trade association of 168 publicly-owned property and casualty
insurers who write substantial amounts of private passenger
and commercial automobile insurance in the United States. In
1981, the Association’s members wrote a total of $5.3 billion in

2

private passenger automobile insurance premiums, accounting
for more than fifteen percent of the market for such insurance.
The Association has long been committed to promoting high-
way safety. It has a substantial interest in the implementation
of the automatie erash proteetion requirements of Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208, and in any clarification or
modification of Standard 208, because its members are certain
that mandatory installation of passive restraint systems will
significantly improve the safety of automobiles driven on the
country’s highways and will, consequently, affect the in-
surance market.

Accordingly, the American Insurance Association, as ami-
cus curiae, supports the implementation of Safety Standard
208 and believes that the Department of Transportation,
through the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(“NHTSA”), acted unlawfully in rescinding the passive re-
straint requirement. Consent to file this brief has been
obtained from all parties pursuant to Rule 36.2 of the Rules of
this Court.

ARGUMENT
Introduction And Summary Of Argument

This amicus brief is being submitted not to restate or add to

any argument made by the respondents but to present, for the
Court’s consideration, three discrete and relatively simple

propositions:

First, although this case, in its present posture, involves the
validity of a final rule issued by an Executive Department in
Octeber 1981 with an accompanying statement of reasons, a
reviewing court should not blind itself to the history of admin-
istrative decision-making on this subject—and particularly to
official public explanations made by the Executive Depart-
ment less than nine months before issuing its final rule. It is
patent from the complete record of administrative action that
the decision by NHTSA to rescind the passive restraint regula-
tion in October 1981 was influenced in large measure by the

3

same economic considerations that (1) had induced NHTSA in
February 1981 to delay the imposition of the identical passive
restraint requirements and (2) had caused it in April 1981 to
propose amendments to the Safety Standard imposing those
requirements. The primary economic consideration expressly
invoked by NHTSA in its earlier rulings—the depressed state
of the domestic automobile industry—is a totally impermissi-
ble factor for NHTSA to evaluate and utilize under the Nation-
al Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C.
$§ 1381 et seg. (1976). By the time its final ruling was issued,
NHTSA realized that it could not lawfully base its decision to
withdraw the automatic safety requirement explicitly on the
economic difficulties of the automobile industry. Consequent-
ly, the published explanation that accompanies NHTSA’s
October 1981 decision strikingly omits a justification on which
NHTSA depended heavily in its earlier public pronounce-
ments. Such calculated silence at the eleventh hour should not
bar a reviewing court from considering the realities proved by
earlier official pronouncements.

Second, NHTSA's stated reason for rescinding in toto the
passive restraint requirement suffers from so obvious a logical
flaw that it calls to mind the fairy tale of the Emperor’s New
Clothes: It must be obvious to a child that just as the Emperor
truly had no clothes, NHTSA, notwithstanding its flurry of
words, has no rational basis for doing what it has done.
NHTSA invoked the 1966 Safety Act through several
Administrations to develop a safety standard for a goal that
has been uniformly found to be necessary and desirable—a
protective system not dependent on action by a vehicle’s occu-
pants. In order to provide the greatest latitude to each auto-
mobile manufacturer to achieve this objective within its own
financial and technological capabilities, NHTSA gave its offi-
cial blessing to two forms of passive restraint. NHTSA has
now found fault with one of the two officially approved options
that most automobile manufacturers would have unilaterally
chosen, and on this basis NHTSA has discarded the entire
Safety Standard—including the unquestioned safety goal and
the remaining effective option. No principle of law or rational

4

regulatory policy permits an agency entrusted with the lives
and safety of millions of Americans so arbitrarily to flush away
a live and vigorous baby with what it finds to be dirty bath-
water. We do not agree with NHTSA’s poorly reasoned and
unjustified rejection of automatic belts as a passive restraint
option. But in any event, i: was arbitrary and capricious for
NHTSA not to adjust its safety standard to its new findings by
simply eliminating the alternative which it now finds inade-
quate to achieve the desired safety objective, and requiring
use of air-bags, a form of passive restraint that NHTSA does
not question at all.

Third, we turn to the relief which should be granted here. If
this Court agrees that the Safety Standard should have been
amended by NHTSA to retain whatever alternative is effec-
tive, the court of appeals should be directed to order NHTSA
promptly to implement such an amended standard. Judicial
decisions have approved the entry of such orders. If, on the
other hand, the petitioners’ positions are sustained and this
Court decides that the court below applied a review standard
that exceeded its statutory authority, the question of the valid-
ity of NHTSA’s rescission of Safety Standard 208 should be
returned to the court of appeals for decision in light of the
correct standard of review. This Court has had occasion re-
cently to apply this principle in the analogous context where a
court of appeals, in reviewing a district court’s judgment,
concluded that the district court had utilized an erroneous legal
standard. The appellate court’s proper function is then to re-
mand the case to the district court for it to apply the correct
legal standard to the facts. By the same token, if the petition-
ers prevail, the court of appeals should be directed in this case
to evaluate the bulky administrative record by the correct
standard of review. It is not this Court’s duty to announce that
standard and, at the same appellate juncture, to apply itself
the correct yardstick to the particular facts.

5

NHTSA’'S RESCISSION OF SAFETY STANDARD 208 WAS
UNLAWFUL BECAUSE IT RESTED UPON EARLIER
OFFICIAL ACTIONS PROMPTED BY THE AGENCY'S
IMPERMISSIBLE CONCERN OVER THE DEPRESSED
ECONOMIC STATE OF THE DOMESTIC AUTOMOBILE
INDUSTRY.

The Safety Act established a regulatory structure under
which the Secretary of Transportation or his designee’ was
directed to issue objective motor vehicle safety standards to
carry out the Act’s purposes. Like other legislation, the Act
enumerated those considerations that the Executive Branch
officer or his designee—in this case, NHTSA (see 49 C. F. R.
$§ 1.50(a), 501.2 (1981))}—may evaluate. Plainly, NHTSA is
not authorized to import into its determinations of safety
standards a host of factors that are within the areas and ex-
pertise of other federal agencies. It would, for example, be
improper for NHTSA to consider federal tax policy in deciding
when and how to impose federal auto safety regulations. By
the same token, it would be impermissible for NHTSA to
determine its safety standards weighing issues of labor
relations, foreign policy, or antitrust law. Consequently, had
NHTSA stated on October 23, 1981, that it was rescinding the
passive restraint requirement of Safety Standard 208 because
of the depressed state of the domestic automobile industry—a
subject that should be of no concern to the agency—that action
would have been patently unlawful. It would have been an
instance of an agency exceeding its authority by rendering a
decision based on factors that Congress had not committed to
its appraisal.

When the Safety Act was passed, the Department of Transporta-
tion did not exist, and the statutory function was assigned to the
Department of Commerce. Shortly thereafter, in October 1966, the

of Transportation was created by Pub. L. 89-670, 88
Stat. 1533 (1966) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1652(a) (1976)), and in 1967
NHTSA’s precursor, the National Highway Safety Bureau, was
formed. See 32 Fed. Reg. 8225 (1967). NHTSA came into existence
and assumed responsibility for federal motor vehicle safety stand-
ards in 1978. See 43 Fed. Reg. 8525 (1978).

6

NHTSA did not, in fact, explicitly rest its October 23, 1981,
ruling on the de, ressed state of the automobile industry. But
several formal steps leading to rescission, which were taken in
the same year that rescission was announced, were explicitly
based on the economic ills of the domestic automobile industry.
After relying upon that impermissible consideration as it
moved towards rescission, NHTSA cannot avoid the con-
sequences by merely omitting any mention of this economic
factor when the final step is taken.

A. NHTSA Explicitly Cited The Automobile Industry's Eco-
nomic Difficulties As The Principal Reason For Delaying
And Proposing to Amend The Passive Restraint Require-
mer ts.

(1) NHTSA proposes delay to help the industry.

On February 12, 1981, less than seven months before imple-
mentation of the first phase of compliance with the passive
restraint requirements, and barely three weeks after Secreta-
ry of Transportation Drew Lewis took office, NHTSA pro-
posed a one-year delay, from September 1, 1982, until Septem-
ber 1, 1983, in the effective date of the automatic restraint
requirements for large cars.“ 46 Fed. Reg. 12033 (1981) (R.
1622).° One stated reason for the proposed delay was the

This came soon after the automobile manufacturers sent Presi-
dent Reagan a long letter asking for a number of Executive Branch
concessions to aid the industry. As reported in a February 9, 1981,
issue of Automotive News (reproduced as Appendix A to this brief),
the letter asked the Department of Transportation “to reevaluate the
need for the passive-restraint standards” as well as to establish “a
reduced bumper standard—from 5 MPH to 2.5 MPH for longitudinal
forces and a reduction in corner requirements to 1.5 MPH.” The
passive restraint requirements were delayed on April 9, 1981, and
rescinded on October 23, 1981. The bumper standard was reduced,
precisely as requested by the automobile industry, on May 20, 1982.
47 Fed. Reg. 21820.

References to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in the Court
of Appeals are cited as R. References to the Appendix to the
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari filed by the Motor Vehicle Manufac-
turers Association are cited as “Pet. App. —..”

7

“changed economic circumstances since the schedule was
adopted in 1977.” Jd. Explaining the basis for the proposed
delay, NHTSA emphasized the well-known “difficulties of the
automobile industry and some of its members.“

(2) NHTSA grants delay to maintain sales and profits in
the industry.

Two months later, in April 1981, the agency adopted the
one-year delay (46 Fed. Reg. 21172 (R. 1272)), despite the fact
that all of the professional economists’ cost-benefit analyses
indicated that the economic costs of the delay greatly exceeded
its benefits. See R. 511, 606, 714. The “current poor economic
condition of the automobile industry” was again a crucial factor
underlying the agency’s action. 46 Fed. Reg. at 21173 (R.
1273). The final notice announcing the one-year delay declared
(46 Fed. Reg. 21174 (R. 1274) (emphasis added)):

On the basis of the record herein, the Department has
concluded that — 12 of FMVSS 208 in MY 1982
to Roque cars W icable and — 4

uiring such compliance — reduce sales and prof-
its, ite ond imcrease unemployment, for the manufacturers
of such vehicles.

‘NHTSA stated (46 Fed. Reg. 12033-34 (R. 1622-23)):

Sales continue at a very depressed level. . Losses — even the
largest of the domestic manufacturers have been reported
These losses come at a time when the domestic manufacturers
must continue to spend unprecedented sums to meet the con-
tinuing demand for ever more fuel efficient cars and to meet the
challenge of foreign car manufacturers.

soon tation now shift some demand from
cars to mid-size cars at a time when large car sales are y
slumping badly
* * *
D PSD
provide monufacturers with a
resources to devote toward . —.——

. Ifthe Department should decide together so
tp at cars, — and Ford
up to $37 million in investments, .

8

NHTSA asserted at the time that the Safety Act authorized
it to consider the “general economic health of the automobile
industry,” not only in deciding whether to delay implementa-
tion but also in deciding whether to rescind or retain a safety
standard (46 Fed. Reg. 21175 (R. 1275)). This reasoning was
explained as follows (id.):

What is reasonable and practicable for a healthy firm or
industry may not be for an ailing one. . . Vehicle sales
remain at depressed levels and unemployment in the
domestic industry is extremely high. . . .

The Department concludes . . . that economic hardship
to the affected industry and individual companies must be
balanced with all other considerations in determining the
“reasonableness” and “practicability” of a particular safe-
ty standard.

(3) NHTSA proposes rescission because of the industry's
“economic difficulties.”

When it adopted the one-year delay, NHTSA also proposed,
as one of several alternatives, the rescission of the Safety
Standard’s passive restraint requirements. 46 Fed. Reg. 21205
(1981) (Pet. App. 147a). In so doing, it again emphasized the
poor economic condition of the domestic automobile industry.
NHTSA said that the “same factors” set forth in the initial
notice and final rule for the one-year delay had also led it to
propose totally rescinding the automatic restraint require-
ments. 46 Fed. Reg. 21206-07 (Pet. App. 152a). NHTSA said it
was considering rescission partly because of (46 Fed. Reg.
21206 (Pet. App. 15la) (emphasis added)):

the substantial impact of automatic restraints on manufac-
ooh — consumer yf the — — of ene
manufacturer impacts economic difficulties of the
automobile industry.
(4) NHTSA's steps are described as “Actions to Help the
U.S. Auto Industry.”

A telling indication of the primacy given to the economic
condition of the automobile industry in NHTSA’s April 1981
actions was the title of the public announcement made by the
White House Press Office. Both the final order adopting the

9

one-year delay and the notice proposing possible rescission
were included in a package distributed to the press under the
title “Actions to Help the U.S. Auto Industry” (R. 1281, 1285,
1318-1321).

B. In The Absence Of An Explicit Renudiation, NHTSA
Should Be Presumed To Have Issued Its Final Rule In
Accordance With The Primary Considerations It Ex-
pressed At Earlier Stages In Its Process.

Having emphasized the difficult straits of the automobile
industry at the stages leading up to the final rule issued on
October 23, 1981, NHTSA cannot simply omit reference to that
important consideration at the most critical point and thereby
remove it from the sight of a reviewing court. The agency's
published explanation of its final rule rescinding the passive
restraint requirement, 46 Fed. Reg. 53418 (1981) (Pet. App.
88a), did not highlight or even cite explicitly the misfortunes of
the automobile industry. There were, to be sure, several pass-
ing references in the final rule and accompanying Regulatory
Impact Analysis (“RIA”) to the possibility of reduced auto-
mobile sales.“ These were ambiguous enough that they could

Also announced as part of the “Actions to Help the U.S. Auto
Industry” was a proposed amendment of the uniform tire quality
grading standards (R. 1322). On February 2, 1983, NHTSA sus-
pended the tire grading system. See New York Times, February 3,
1983, p. Al (reproduced as Appendix B to this brief).

See, e. g., 46 Fed. Reg. at 53423 (Pet. App. 105a), where NHTSA
explained that automatic restraint requirements were not “reason-
able” and “practicable” partly because

while the car manufacturers might be able to pass along some or
all of their costs [of complying with the with the safety standard] to
consumers, the necessary price increases reduce sales.

sales losses would cause net employment losses.
Additional sales losses might occur due to consumer uncertain-
y one or antipathy toward the detachable automatic belts

See oie 46 Fed. Reg. 53426 (Pet. App. 117a), where NHTSA said
that rescinding the automatic restraint requirement would enable
“the car manufacturers to reallocate $400 million in capital invest-
ment that they would have had to allocate for the purpose of complet-
ing their (compliance) efforts.”

10

not be said to relate unequivocally to the economic ills of the
industry. In addition, at a press conference held on the day that
the rescission was issued, the NHTSA Administrator claimed
that he placed no reliance “whatsoever” in his “personal deci-
sion” on “the current economic slump in the automotive indus-
try.

But NHTSA’s published explanation contained no explicit
repudiation or rejection of the assertion that had theretofore
been made by NHTSA that the economic condition of the
automobile industry required amelioration of the passive re-
straint requirement. While that previously important factor
was not, at the ultimate stage, explicitly reaffirmed, it was also
not rejected or explicitly disclaimed.

This state of the record is similar to what this Court con-
fronted in Industrial Union Department v. American Pet-
roleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980). That case involved the
validity of the Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion’s (“OSHA's”) benzene standard. When it initially pro-

Transcript of remarks of Raymond Peck, Administrator, Nation-
al Highway Traffic Safety Administration, at a news conference on
October 23, 1981, at 8.

In answer to the question which immediately followed, however,
he said, “It is, of course, a fact that the industry is in distress; but that
fact alone cannot ever be a determinative question on the issue of a
safety standard. It was certainly not determinative in this case.” The
use of the words “alone” and “determinative” implies that the state of
distress was one factor that was considered, even if not the determi-
native one. This is consistent with a statement that the Administra-
tor made when opening the press conference. He said (id. at 2):

Other factors, e since 1977, have also been taken into
account. These , of course, estimates of the cost to the
consumer of the that would be used, and the econom-

ie circumstances of this injury [sic]. No one factor has been

determinative. My overwhelming concern has been safety.
The word “injury” makes little sense in the context of the full para-
graph. The word “industry” fits the context more than any other
word with similar sound.

11

posed its standard - hich barred benzene in even very minute
quantities such as one part per million parts of air—OSHA had
indicated that it was placing the burden of proving safety on
industry representatives because it viewed benzene as a carci-
nogen. This Court's plurality opinion, per Justice Stevens,
assumed that in its final decision OSHA had applied the stand-
ard it had originally announced in its proposed ruling. See 448
U.S. at 623-25, 635-36. In dissent, Justice Marshall noted that
OSHA did not have to rely on its “Draconian carcinogen ‘poli-
ey (448 U.S. at 695), and that it had, in fact, conducted
seventeen days of hearings and heard from ninety-five witnes-
ses (448 U.S. at 696) on the dangers of benzene in even minute
quantities. Justice Marshall then observed that OSHA issued
“an extensive statement of reasons summarizing and evaluat-
ing the results of the hearings” (448 U.S. at 697), so that its
decision was not explicitly based on its “carcinogen policy.”

The Court’s plurality in the benzene standard case looked,
however, not alone at what OSHA had said," but at the stand-
ards and principles on which it had relied in its earlier proposed
rulemaking. Finding an impermissible standard at that junc-
ture, it carried that standard over to the final ruling and
invalidated the ruling, over the dissent of four Justices, be-
cause of it. By the same token, the final rule NHTSA issued
should be invalidated because the agency never repudiated the
judgment that special administrative actions, including delay
and amendment of passive restraint requirements, should be
taken to accommodate automobile manufacturers because of
the economic difficulties of the industry.

It is true, of course, that a reviewing court ordinarily judges
an administrative action by the explanation the agency has
given. See Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery

The Court said that “discussion . . must, of course, begin with
the Agency’s rationale. 448 U.S. at 631. It did not say that
published rationale was the last word on the subject—only that
discussion must “begin” with it.

12

Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943); Federal Trade Commission v.
Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 397 (1974). There are, however,
times when, within the four corners of a particular agency
statement, one cannot find the true considerations that led to
the agency action. When such considerations have been articu-
lated in earlier public pronouncements, a court should assume
that they have influenced the finai action taken by the agency.’
If an agency has specifically reconsidered its earlier published
views and determined to repudiate them, it should formalize
this determination in the agency’s published statement of
reasons. If the agency fails to make any such statement, a
reviewing court should conclude that notwithstanding the
omission of the prior consideration from the final published
statement, it continues to have a significant impact on the
agency's determination—as this Court held in the benzene
standard case.

C. Consideration Of The Economic Condition Of The Auto-
mobile Industry ls Beyond NHTSA’s Statutory Authority.

It is a fundamental tenet of administrative law that an agen-
cy must act within its statutory mandate. See, e.g., American
Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490,
540 (1981); Industrial Union Department v. American Pet-
roleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 659 (1981); Atchison, Topeka
and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Wichita Board of Trade, 412
U.S. 800, 806 (1973) (plurality opinion); Burlington Truck
Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167-69 (1962).
Agency decisions must be “based on a consideration of the

*Compare American Federation of Government Employees v.
Devine, 525 F. Supp. 250, 253 (D. D. C. 1981), where a District Judge
rejected reasons stated by the Office of Personnel and Management
for taking certain actions and concluded that the motivation was
“prompted primarily by ideological considerations.” See also Amer-
ican Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 540
n.74 (1981), where this Court refused to accept a “boilerplate” state-
ment as the true reason for agency action and an impermissible
consideration had been weighed and expressed by OSHA.

13

relevant factors” under the authorizing statute. Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)
(emphasis added). Accord, Bowman Transportation, Inc. v.
Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974).

The Safety Act directs NHTSA to issue “appropriate” motor
vehicle safety standards that “shall be practicable, shall meet
the need for motor vehicle safety, and shall be stated in objec-
tive terms.” 15 U.S.C. § 139 c). The agency is also directed to
consider whether a proposed standard “is reasonable, practic-
able and appropriate for the particular type of motor vehicle
for which it is prescribed,” and “the extent to which such
standards will contribute to carrying out the purposes” of the
Safety Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(f)(3),(4). The Safety Act specifi-
cally instructs the agency to consider “relevant available motor
vehicle safety data“ (15 U.S.C. § 1392(f)(1)), but it does not tell
the agency to consider the economic health of the automobile
industry. The Act’s legislative history and judicial decisions
interpreting the Act clearly establish that NHTSA has no
authority to consider the general economic condition of the
automobile industry in deciding when and whether to imple-
ment passive restraint requirements.

(1) The legislative history indicates that the economic
welfare of the automobile industry is not to be con-
sidered by NHTSA.

The purpose of the Safety Act is “to reduce traffic accidents,
deaths and injuries to persons resulting from traffic acci-
dents.” 15 U.S.C. § 1381. Congress intended “safety . . . [to]
be the overriding consideration in the issuance of standards.”
S. Rep. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966) (hereinafter
“Sen. Rep.“). See also H. R. Rep. No. 1776, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. 16 (1966) (hereinafter “H. R. Rep.”) (“Motor vehicle
safety is the paramount purpose of this bill and each standard
must be related thereto.”)

In enacting the Safety Act, Congress was well aware of the
automobile industry's conviction that “safety doesn't sell.“
Sen. Rep. 2. The Report expressed its concern over “the auto-

14

mobile industry's chronic subordination of safe design to prom-
otional styling and ... [its] overriding stress on power,
acceleration, speed, and ‘ride’ to the relative neglect of safe
performance or collision protection.” Sen. Rep. 2. While Con-
gress did not foresee the current industry slump, it plainly
intended to impose safety standards without capitulating to
industry claims that compliance would reduce automobile
sales. Senator Mondale, who was heavily involved in drafting
the Safety Act, accorded minimal weight to charges that the
Safety Act “is unfair to the automobile industry . . and that
the threat of its passage has affected the volume of sales which
in turn has influenced the economy.” 112 Cong. Rec. 14246. He
acknowledged that “the obvious objective of any businessman”
was to “attract customers,” but emphasized that “there is well
documented... evidence showing that [the automobile] could
be so designed and so constructed as to protect the driver and
passengers from death and injury in most kinds of accidents.”
Id.

Representative Ryan noted that auto “industry spokesmen
have wailed that this legislation will be damaging to both the
industry and the national economy.” His answer was that
Congress’ “primary concern must be. . the pain, the grief,
the permanent disabilities, and the thousands of deaths motor
vehicles cause every year. . . The lives of American citizens
must come first.” 112 Cong. Rec. 19647. See 112 Cong. Rec.
19654 (Rep. Tenzer) (rejecting automobile industry’s argu-
ment that Safety Act “will have an adverse impact on auto-
mobile sales” as invalid “especially when weighed against the
purpose of the legislation—the saving of human lives”). These
statements all show that Congress did not intend to let the
sales curve for the industry determine the death and injury
curve on the Nation’s highways.

The terms “practicable,” “reasonable,” and “appropriate,”
as used in the Safety Act, were not intended by Congress to
permit the general economic condition of the automobile indus-
try to enter into decisions to issue or revoke particular safety
standards. The Senate Report explained that by requiring that

15

safety standards be “reasonable” and “practicable,” Congress
meant that the Secretary was to issue standards covering
“only . . . those vehicle characteristics that have a significant
bearing on safety,” rather than “every component and function
of a motor vehicle.” Sen. Rep. 6. The Senate Report added that
“tests of reasonableness of cost, feasibility’ and adequate lead
time should be included among the factors considered in the
development of safety standards under the Act. /d.

Floor debates on the bill show that the Senate Report's
references to “reasonableness of cost” and “practicability” are
to the direct costs of the safety device itself, and do not autho-
rize consideration of the general economic condition of the
regulated industry. Senator Lausche stated (112 Cong. Rec.
14245 (emphasis added)):

In the committee, an extensive discussion took place

the right of the Secretary to consider the costs

that be entailed in promulgating the adoption of

certain types of equipment. It was argued by some that

the language did not allow the Secre to consider the
cost that would be added to the a ile.

10 The Senate Report uses “feasibility” in its ordinary meaning, and
clearly intended that the agency was to consider whether the safety
requirements mandated by a standard were “capable of being done.”
See American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan, 452 U.S.
at 508-09 (defining “feasibility” as “capable of being done, executed or
effected”).

The Senate Report also indicates that economic factors relating
to lead time may be considered under the Act. It stated that in
deciding whether to specify an effective date later than the normal
one-year maximum for compliance, the agency could consider
whether requiring across-the-board compliance within one year is “a
practical economic and engineering impossibility, as well as a source
of great hardship and unnecessary additional cost.” Sen. Rep. 7. Like
the references to the economic realities of lead time in the House (see
pp. 16-17 & n.12, infra), nothing in this Senate Report statement
indicated that the general economic condition of the industry, caused
by a sales slump and unrelated to lead time considerations, was
meant to be a relevant factor in deciding whether to impose a particu-
lar safety standard.

16

1 agreed to write into the report a
in 33— eee

— — the language used
The — ethene, It related to the
Seeretary's authority to consider the costs added to the auto-
mobile by virtue of a safety standard. Senator Magnuson, the
floor manager and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Com-
merce, quoted the Senate Report's instruction that
“reasonableness of cost, feasibility, and adequate lead time
should be included among those factors which the Secretary
could consider in making his total judgment.” 112 Cong. Rec.
14245.

House floor discussion of the term “practicability” also fails
to provide support for NHTSA’s consideration of the general
economic condition of the industry. The House Report relates
the Act’s practicability requirement to “consideration of all
relevant factors, including technological ability to achieve the
goal of a particular standard as well as consideration of eco-
nomic factors.” H. R. Rep. 16. NHTSA relied on this reference
to “economic factors” for its published position that the eco-
nomic condition of the auto industry is a permissible factor in
issuing or rescinding the passive restraint requirements. See
46 Fed. Reg. 21175 (R. 1275). But the House debates demon-
strate that in making “economic factors” relevant under the
Act’s practicability requirement, Congress intended the agen-
cy to consider costs associated with the adequacy of lead time
for implementing a particular safety standard, not the general
economic health of the automobile industry.”

Representative Dingell, a member of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce who was actively involved in the
drafting and passage of the Safety Act, explained that “a standard is
not practicable or reasonable if it cannot be met by the best efforts of
manufacturers within the constraints of time and technology. To
assure practicability, lalmong those economic factors which the
Secretary will have to consider is the matter of adequate lead time.”
The agency was to consider whether the normal compliance period
would cause cause “exorbitant cost or . . severe economic disloca-

17

Nor does the Act’s “appropriateness” criterion authorize
NHTSA’s consideration of the sales prospects of the depressed
auto industry. The Senate Report indicates that the require-
ment that safety standards be “appropriate for the particular
type of motor vehicle” was included so the Secretary could
“consider the desirability of affording consumers continuc4
wide range of choices in the selection of motor vehicles” 1.
that he would not eliminate particular types of cars by applying
to them standards that were unsuitable. Sen. Rep. 6. The
House interpreted the “appropriateness” directive the same
way. H.R. Rep. 18; 112 Cong. Rec. 19649 (Rep. Dingell). See
also Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transportation, 472
F. 2d 659, 679 (6th Cir. 1972).

In summary, none of the broad terms used in the Safety Act
to define the Secretary’s authority was intended by Congress
to empower him to grant general reprieves based on economic
appraisals of the automobile industry. Just as the Federal
Trade Commission may not permit manufacturers to engage in
unfair and deceptive practices simply because they are in eco-
nomic difficulties and the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion may not allow the sale of unregistered securities whenev-
er it believes the stock markets are experiencing a slump,
NHTSA may not approve the manufacture of unsafe cars
merely because automobile manufacturers are expenencing an

unprofitable period.

tion,” such as would occur if “the cost of compliance on a crash basis
. . . [was] so great as to price vehicles out of the mass market.” 112
Cong. Rec. 19648. The Act’s practicability criterion authorized con-
sideration of “economic factors” to determine whether it would be “a
physical or economic impossibility” for manufacturers to comply with
a standard within the normal statutory compliance period. To meet
this problem the Secretary was authorized to “make the standard
effective later than one year from its issuance if he finds that this is in
the public interest . . . .” 112 Cong. Rec. 19648.

18
(2) No judicial precedent authorizes consideration of this
factor.

In light of the clear legislative history, none of the cases
construing the Safety Act even discusses the possibility that
the general economic condition of the regulated industry can be
a relevant factor for safety standard decisions. The cases hold
only that the agency may consider whether a standard is so
onerous that it cannot be performed by those subject to it. In
Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transportation, 472 F. 2d
659, 672-73 (6th Cir. 1972), which endorsed NHTSA’s author-
ity to issue the prior 1972 restraint standard requiring devel-
opment of new technology, the court stated that the Act’s
mandate did not “suggest that the Agency might impose stand-
ards so demanding as to require a manufacturer to perform the
impossible, or impose standards so imperative as to put a
manufacturer out of business.” In H & H Tire Co. v. Depart-
ment of Transportation, 471 F. 2d 350, 354-55 (8th Cir. 1973),
the court agreed “that ‘the fact that a government regulation
may cause economic hardship to a party does not make such
regulation unreasonable.’ See also, National Tire Dealers &
Retread Association, Inc. v. Brinegar, 491 F. 2d 31, 33, 37-38
& n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1974). These cases do not suggest that
NHTSA may properly consider the auto industry’s short-term
economic interests in making a safety-standard decision.

In like vein, nothing in the discussion of economic feasibility
in American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan, 452
U.S. 490 (1981), suggests that an agency may consider the
current economic distress of an industry, as distinguished from
an inquiry into its basic economic viability under the particular
regulation. That case held that a regulation is economically
feasible if it permits the affected industry to “maintain long-
term profitability and competitiveness.” 452 U.S. at 530-31
n.55. It cited with approval two cases that stand for the
proposition that a statute’s feasibility qualification

— 1 Oe. geneen S eante Waa paneat

employers or industries ma 3 reforms con-
templated by the Act. be economically

19

feasible even though, from the standpoint of employers,

- AOA be

adversely. Nor does the concept of economic feasi vity

— 2 —2 id-
Industrial Union Department v. Hodgson, 499 F. 2d 467, 478
(D.C. Cir. 1974); accord, United Steelworkers of America v.
Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied
sub nom. Lead Industries Association, Inc. v. Donovan, 435
U.S. 913 (1981).

Under American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Dono-
van, when a regulation issued under a statute with a feasibility
requirement threatens to put the affected industry out of busi-
ness or to cause massive economic disruption, it is appropriate
for an agency to examine the rule’s impact on production,
employment, competition, and prices in order to determine
whether compliance is “within the financial capability of the
covered industry.” 452 U.S. at 530-31 n. 55. But that is not what
NHTSA did. No claim was nor could have been made that the
average incremental cost of the passive restraints would drive
auto manufacturers out of business by pricing cars out of the
reach of ordinary consumers, or that compliance would require
exorbitant capital expenditures by the industry, or that the
standard would otherwise catastrophically disrupt the indus-
try. Rather, NHTSA considered the economic condition of the
industry out of a desire to improve auto sales and profits. That
consideration conflicts with the feasibility analysis con-
templated by American Textile Manufacturers Institute v.
Donovan, or by any other case of which we are aware.
NHTSA’s appraisal of the economic health of the auto industry
was as fully outside its statutory authority as was OSHA's
wish “to repair general unfairness to employees. . unrelated
to achievement of health and safety goals” when it issued a
wage guarantee provision in its Cotton Dust Standard. Amer-
ican Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan, 452 U.S. at
540. Consequently, NHTSA's rescission of the passive re-
straint requirement, affected by this consideration, must be
set aside.

20

NHTSA ACTED IRRATIONALLY AND ARBITRARILY IN
FAILING TO RETAIN THE PASSIVE RESTRAINT
REQUIREMENT WITHOUT THE ALLEGEDLY
INEFFECTIVE AUTOMATIC BELT OPTION BY
REQUIRING AIR-BAGS.

In the first portion of this amicus brief we have argued that
NHTSA's expressed reasons for rescinding the passive re-
straint requirement should not be taken as the total rationale
for its decision. A reviewing court should determine the valid-
ity of the rescission in light of the agency’s previously
expressed—and still unrepudiated—policies on the same sub-
ject, which laid great stress on the poor economic condition of
the industry. We turn now to an alternative argument that
takes NHTSA’s explanation at face value. Even if the Court
were to ignore the various public statements indicating that
NHTSA accommodated automobile safety to the economic
needs of the automobile industry and were to look no further
than the final rule ard RIA of October 23, 1981, it is patent that
the agency’s explanation is illogical and irrational. The con-
clusion reached by the agency—that the safety standard
should be rescinded in toto—does not follow from the findings
and policies announced by NHTSA.

We begin with a proposition that NHTSA does not question
at any point in its statements of October 23, 1981—that auto-
matic or “passive” crash protection is a highly desirable goal.
Commitment to that objective is expressed at the beginning of
NHTSA’s explanations of the rescission and is even more
firmly repeated in the concluding paragraph of the “Summary
of Agency Conclusion“ (46 Fed. Reg. 53426 (Pet. App. 116a)
(emphasis added)):

After 12 years of rulemaking, NHTSA has not yet suc-
ceeded in its original intent, the widespread offering of
automatic crash protection that will produce —~ parame
benefits. The agency is still committed to this goal.

Safety Standard 208 sought to implement this objective *
automobile manufacturers to use either of two

21

passive restraint devices—(1) an air cushion restraint (“air-
bag”) or (2) an automatic belt (which does not require buckling
by the occupant). There was no suggestion in the history of the
development of Safety Standard 208 that if only one of these
two options had been technologically feasible, no passive re-
straint system would have been initiated. In other words, the
availability of equally effective alternative technologies was
not a precondition of NHTSA’s institution of the safety stand-
ard. If only air-bags had been technologically developed by
1977, it is clear that a passive restraint standard requiring the
use of air-bags would have been issued at that time. Indeed, in
1977 it had been estimated that more than sixty percent of new
cars would be equipped with air-bags, and less than forty
percent with automatic belts. 46 Fed. Reg. 53420 (Pet. App.
95a). Automatic belts were added to the safety standard as an
alternative only because it was then thought that automatic
belts were as effective as air-bags in achieving the safety goal.
It would have been unfair to automobile manufacturers to bar
use of an alternative passive restraint that was no less protec-
tive.

NHTSA has now determined that detachable automatic
belts will not achieve the desired result. We disagree with this
conclusion, which was rejected by the court of appeals and is
forcefully challenged ir the respondents’ briefs. Respondent
State Farm demonstrates cogently in its brief that nondetach-
able automatic belts do not share the problems of detachable
automatic belts which led the agency to its conclusion. But
even resolution of the detachable/nondetachable debate in
favor of petitioners would not justify acceptance of NHTSA's
rescission of the entire passive restraint standard. No rational
decision-maker could conclude from any finding made by
NHTSA that air-bags should no longer be required.

This is the point at which there is an unbridgeable chasm
between NHTSA’s new finding and the conclusion that no
passive restraints should now be required. Rather than revert-
ing, as reason requires, to the remaining uncontestedly effec-
tive passive restraint (which was initially to be the primary

technology used by the industry), NHTSA has, without a
single word critical of air-bags, discarded totally the passive
restraint obligation it initially imposed on automobile manufac-
turers and thereby sacrificed the lives of thousands of Amer-
icans.

Absolutely no reason was given in NHTSA's published
statements of October 23, 1981, for the rejection of air-bags as
an obligatory form of passive restraint. It appears that the
only reason for refusing to consider air-bags was that the
automobile manufacturers had previously determined to
comply with Safety Standard 208, if it was to be enforced, by
installing automatic belts rather than air- bags. This industry
decision—which was doubtless based on the anticipated grea-
ter costs of air-bags than belts—effectively controlled

8 Petitioner MVMA asserts that “the existing record abounds with
references to the difficulties that an airbags-only standard would
raise, including questions about the installation of airbags in small
cars... MVMA Brief at 39 n.71. This assertion has not, however,
been made by the responsible agency, and it cannot, therefore, be a
basis for sustaining the agency's decision. Moreover, when NHTSA
promulgated the 1977 passive restraint requirements, it said (42
Fed. Reg. 34289, 34295 (1977) (R. 1740)):

more stringent limits on air r — yment time. thers ave are
no insuperable difficulties in the... rw quirements of
Standard 208 in cars as small as 2, pounds Wich existing

In addition, NHTSA continues to find that air-bags are techuically
sound. See, ¢.g., RIA at XI1-4-5 (R. 264-65).

See RIA at XI-6 (R.226):

— ot gy — tor {in
tp ape air Sages, Ce N their decision. fine
not be to comply 352 — the
must focus on automatic seat be
See also RIA at XI-5(R. te ar eae vara is not in fact
squarely before the Agency at this time. . . . Manufacturers’ plans
for compliance, at least in the short run, do not include air bags.

23

NHTSA’s judgment. On the premise that only one percent of
new cars would be equipped with air-bags, NHTSA did not
even discuss the effectiveness of air-bags in achieving the
still-desired safety goal.

Here, again, NHTSA’s reasoning was hopelessly illogical.
Obviously, if automatic belts were eliminated as a permissible
alternative because they are ineffective in achieving the de-
sired safety result, 100 percent of new cars, rather than one
percent, would be equipped with air-bags.

NHTSA does not appear to question in the slightest the
effectiveness of air-bags. Indeed, its “Summary of Agency
Conclusion” refers to the “almost certain benefits that had
been anticipated as a result of the use of air bag technology.” 46
Fed. Reg. 53425 (Pet. App. 112a)."* NHTSA has also referred
to the added economic incentives for air-bag use provided by
“premium reductions generally . . available only to owners of
cars equipped with air bags. 46 Fed. Reg. 53423 (Pet.
App. 106a). There are, therefore, significant and unrebutted
benefits in the use of air-bags, which, by any rational standard,
should remain as required safety features in new automo-
biles.“

NHTSA's total failure to consider and implement the
remaining effective and technologically sound passive re-
straint is the same kind of error that caused this Court to direct
that an agency’s determination be vacated in Jacob Siegel Co.
v. Federal Trade Commission, 327 U.S. 608 (1946). The
Federal Trade Commission had totally prohibited use of the
name “Alpacuna” on coats because it believed that the name
was misleading and deceptive. This Court held it to have been

Air-bag technology has continued to improve, and air-bags are
being used as options in highly desirable automobiles. See New York
Times, February 3, 1983, p. D2, reproduced as Appendix C to this
brief.

Although air-bags do cost more than automatic belts, they are
still cost-effective. See Nordhaus Comment, May 1981, at 15(R. 525).

24

error for the Commission “not to have considered” whether
qualifying language accompanying the name “would eliminate
the deception which it found lurking in the word Alpacuna.”
327 U.S. at 613. The Court said (id.):

[T]he Commission seems not to have considered whether
in that way the ends of the Act could be satisfied and the
trade name at the same time saved are left in the
dark whether some 22 of name short of excision would
in the judgment of ommission be adequate.

By the same token, NHTSA failed to consider how the
consistently approved safety goal of requiring an effective
passive restraint could be reconciled with its recent conclusion
that automatic belts cannot do the job. That was the agency's
responsibility, and, as was true in Siegel, a reviewing court is
“left in the dark” whether action short of rescission—
particularly implementation of an air-bag requirement—would
not satisfy both objectives. Indeed, by any rational measure,
that is the way both objectives could and should be achieved.

Nor was there any procedural obstacle to NHTSA’s amend-
ment of Safety Standard 208 to prescribe the use of air-bags
only. NHTSA had authority to amend Standard 208, and as the
government concedes, “NHTSA in fact did consider” amend-
ing the standard to mandate compliance by belts with a use-
compelling feature. Brief for the Federal Parties at 36; see 46
Fed. Reg. 53424 (Pet. App. 109a-110a). It is therefore difficult
to understand how the government can now contend that if
NHTSA had amended Standard 208 to require compliance by
air-bags “it might have faced challenges from the manufactur-
ers and others on the ground that its notice of proposed rule-

making did not give adequate warning that such a rule might be
adopted.” Brief for the Federal Parties at 37.

In any event, the notice of rulemaking was adequate to have
permitted NHTSA to amend Standard 208 to bar detachable
belts and require compliance by air-bags or nondetachable
belts, since it identified one of the issues as “the most effective

and reasonable approach to addressing the safety problems
posed by the low rate of safety belt use.” 46 Fed. Reg. 21206

25

(R. 13). Commentators responding to the notice understood
that the scope of the rulemaking encompassed possible amend-
ments to Standard 208, and several commentators suggested
on the record that detachable belts be barred. See 46 Fed. Reg.
53424 (Pet. App. 109a). It is well established that Jan agency
need not publish in advance every precise proposal it may
ultimately promulgate as a rule.” McCulloch Gas Processing
Corp. v. Department of Energy, 650 F. 2d 1216 (Temp. Emer.
Ct. App. 1981). Notice is sufficient if it apprises interested
persons of the “subject and issues” before the agency and
therefore affords a reasonable and meaningful opportunity to
participate in the rulemaking process. McCulloch Gas
Processing Corp. v. Department of Energy, 650 F. 2d at 1221;
Forester v. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 559 F. 2d
774, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1977); International Harvester v. Ruckels-
haus, 478 F. 2d 615, 632 n.51 (1973). So long as the agency
furnishes such notice of the subject and issues, the final regula-
tions actually adopted may be “substantially more stringent”
than the proposals outlined in the notice of rulemaking. Amer-
ican Iron & Steel Institute v. Environmental Protection Agen-
cy, 568 F. 2d 284, 293 (3d Cir. 1977); International Harvester v.
Ruckelshaus, 478 F. Ad at 632 n.51; McCulloch Gas Processing
Corp. v. Department of Energy, 650 F. 2d at 1221.

In summary, NHTSA arbitrarily and irrationally refused to
direct use of air-bags or even to evaluate their cost-
effectiveness simply because the auto industry was not plan-
ning to install thern. In this way it allowed an anticipated
industry preference for allegedly ineffective technology to de-
fine the agency's inquiry into the reasonableness and practica-
bility of the safety standard. NHTSA thus failed to discharge
its statutory duty independently to promulgate reasonable and
practicable safety standards to protect the American public
from unnecessary injury and death on the nation’s highways.
Precisely because NHTSA lost sight of this statutory duty, no
“rational connection exists between the facts found” by
NHTSA—that automobile manufacturers intended to install
detachable automatic belts aid that such belts were functional-

ly equivalent to manual belts—and the decision NHTSA made
to rescind the entire passive restraint standard without con-
sidering whether compliance with air-bags would render it
reasonable and practicable. See Bowman Transportation, Inc.
v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285
(1974); Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156,
168 (1962). For this reason, NHTSA’s rescission order is
arbitrary and capricious, and must be set aside.

THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS EITHER TO DIRECT NHTSA TO ENFORCE THE
AIR-BAG REQUIREMENT OR, IF PETITIONERS
PREVAIL, ', HAVE THAT COURT APPLY THE CORRECT
STANDARD

Our final point relates to the matter of remedy. We submit
that in any event, whether petitioners or respondents prevail,
the court of appeals must be called upon to make substantive
judgments beyond those it has already made. If the respon-
dents are upheld in their contention that NHTSA erred in
failing simply to strike the detachable automatic belt alterna-
tive, or if the Court agrees with us that at least the air-bag
option should have been imposed, the court of appeals should
be instructed to direct the agency promptly to amend Safety
Standard 208 in accordance with this Court's conclusion. As we
demonstrate below, it is well within the authority of reviewing
courts to take such direct measures.

If, on the other hand, petitioners prevail in their argument
that the court of appeals “misapprehended or grossly misap-
plied” the correct standard of review, the case must be reman-
ded to the court of appeals for that court to apply the correct
standard. This Court’s decisions clearly establish that this is a
task that ist be assigned to the court having the primary
reviewing function and should not be assumed by the court
which has only an appellate role.

27

A. The Court Of Appeals Should Order NHTSA To Issue An
Amended Safety Standard.

The court of appeals was not prepared to issue an order
directing implementation of an amended Safety Standard 208.
It gave NHTSA time to submit a proposal for “resolving the
questions raised” in its opinion, and thereafter directed that
the standard be implemented for the 1984 Model Year. If this
Court were now to conclude that it was irrational for NHTSA
to rescind rather than amend Safety Standard 208, the appro-
priate remedy would be to direct the agency to issue the
amendment. That direction should be given, of course, by the
court of appeals on remand of the case from this Court.

If an agency fails to implement and enforce its organic
regulatory statute, courts may order the administrative action
that the agency itself should have undertaken. In the leading
case of Adams v. Richardson, 480 F. 2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(en banc), the court of appeals agreed with the district court's
conclusion that the then-Department of Health, Education and
Welfare had failed to enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). It then upheld with minor
modifications, the district court’s order directing che agency to
enforce Title VI by, inter alia, commencing administrative
enforcement proceedings against certain segregated school
districts, demanding explanations of racial disproportion from
other school districts, and monitoring districts under court
desegregation orders. 480 F. 2d at 1161. This judicial action
Was a fitting exercise of the judiciary’s responsibility “to
assure that the agency properly construes its statutory obliga-
tions, and that the policies it adopts and implements are con-
sistent with those duties and not a negation of them.” 480 F. 2d
at 1163-64 (emphasis added).

In Davis v. Romney, 490 F. 2d 1360 (3d Cir. 1974), the Third
Circuit found that the National Housing Act imposed a duty on
the Federal Housing Administration to “make reasonable
efforts to ascertain that the homes securing FHA-insured
mortgages meet Housing Code standards” (490 F. 2d at 1368),
and held that a reviewing court could order injunctive relief

tailored to remedy the harm to the plaintiffs inflicted by the
agency’s failure to conform to the requirements of its regulato-
ry statute. 490 F. 2d at 1370. See also Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F. 2d 584, 593-95 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F. 2d 567, 569-70 (9th Cir.
1971).

These cases establish that even in areas generally left to
agency discretion, courts may order agencies to take particular
administrative action necessary to effectuate the con-
gressional intent expressed in the agency’s organic statute.
See Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights,
95 Harv. L. Rev. 1195, 1197-98 & n.13 (1982); Stewart, The
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L.
Rev. 1669, 1755 (1975) (“When the agency has clearly failed to
protect the beneficiaries of the administrative scheme, courts
have gone so far as to mandate appropriate enforcement
measures.“ In this case NHTSA may and should be promptly

Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975), is not to the contrary.
The Court observed in Dunlop v. Bachowski that the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. 66 481
et ge., “relie{(d) upon the special knowledge and discretion” of the
Secretary of Labor to determine whether to bring suit to set aside
union elections. 421 U.S. at 576. Accordingly, the Court directed that
generally “the court’s review should be confined to examination of
the [Secretary's] ‘reasons’ statement, and the determination [of]
whether . the decision. . . [was) arbitrary and capricious . . .
[without an adjudicatory hearing on the complainant's} challenges to
the factual bases for the Secretary's conclusion. 421 U.S. at
572-73. Dunlop v. Bachowski specifically left open the possibility
that the reviewing court could find the Secretary's decision to be
arbitrary and capricious and would then be “empowered to order the
Secretary to bring a civil suit against the union to set aside the
election.” 421 U.S. at 575. The Court recognized that compelling the
Secretary to bring suit “obviously presents some difficulty in light of
the strong evidence that Congress deliberately gave exclusive
enforcement authority to the Secretary,” but it then suggested, by
citing National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Assoc. of R. NR.

ordered to issue an amended Safety Standard incorporating
the technologically suitable means for achieving automatic or
passive restraint in cases of automobile crashes.

B. The Court Of Appeals Has The Primary Duty To Apply
The Correct Legal Standard To The Record.

We turn now to a second possibility—i.e., that this Court
may hold that petitioners are correct in their challenge to the
standard of review actually applied by the court of appeals. If
this Court were to uphold that argument, it would be inappro-
priate for this Court to rule directly on the validity of NHTSA’s
rescission of Safety Standard 208. This Court should, rather,
remand the case to the court of appeals so that court could
apply the correct standard to the voluminous administrative
record.

This Court has said frequently that it intervenes in the
review of agency decisions by courts of appeal “only when the
standard [of judicial review) appears to have been mis-
apprehended or grossly misapplied.” When that happens, this
Court traditionally remands the case to the court of appeals for
its consideration in light of the correct standard. National
Labor Relations Board v. Walton Manufacturing Co., 369
U.S. 404, 408 (1962). See Universal Camera Corp. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 491, 497 (1951); Co
v. Federal Maritime Commission, 383 U.S. 607, 621 (190
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 547, 549 (1978).

This limited role is consistent with the course this Court has
recently instructed courts of appeal to take in reviewing dis-
trict court judgments. In Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 102
S.Ct. 1781 (1982), this Court reversed a decision of a court of

Passengers, 414 U.S. 453. 465 (1974) (Brennan, J., concurring), and
Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F. 2d 676, 679-80 n. 19 (D.C. Cir. 1974), that even
in situations involving prosecutorial discretion, a court may order the
agency to pursue judicial action if its refusal to do so “ ‘went [beyond]
any rational exercise of discretion. National R.R. Passenger
Corp., 414 U.S. at 465.

appeals which had not only vacated a district court’s factual
conclusion but had entered its own contrary finding. This
Court said (102 S.Ct. at 1791-92):

When an appeilate court discerns that a district court
neo teiied te tathe — ——
of the law, the usual rule is that there should be a remand
for further proceedings to it the trial court to make

the missing findings. . wise, where findings are

I.. A a aremand is

the course unless the record permits only one
of the factual issue.

In this analogous situation, this Court should, if petitioners
prevail, remand this case to the court of appeals so that it may
review the administrative record by the correct legal stand-
ard.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, as well as those stated by respon-
dents and amici supporting their position, the decision of the
court of appeals invalidating NHTSA's rescission of Safety
Standard 208 should be affirmed or the case remanded to the
court of appeals with instructions to direct NHTSA to issue
promptly an amended Safety Standard requiring installation of
effective passive restraints in new automobiles.

Respectfully submitted,

NATHAN LEWIN

(Counsel of Record)

ANNE SHERE WALLWORK

MILLER, Cassipy, Larroca & LEWIN

2555 M Street, N.W., Suite 500

Washington, D.C. 20037

(202) 293-6400

Attorneys for the

American Insurance Association,
February 7, 1983 Amicus Curiae

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_0696%3A23. Public record. Not legal advice.
