# Petitioners Brief — Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petitioners Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1983
- **Citation:** 463 U.S. 29

## Text

In the Supreme Court of the

OCTOBER TERM, 1982

MOTOR VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION OF THE
UNITED STATES, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE Co., ET AL.

CONSUMER ALERT AND PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION,
PETITIONERS

v.

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE Co., ET AL.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
ET AL., PETITIONERS

UV.

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE Co., ET AL.

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL PARTIES

i»
‘i a¥ A

y, —*

Rex E. LEE
Solicitor General

J. Paul. MCGRATH
Assistant Attorney General
KENNETH S. GELLER
Deputy Solicitor General
EDWIN S. KNEEDLER
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
Rosert E. Kopp
MICHAEL F. HERTZ
Attorneys ©
Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 633-2217

4

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether an agency acts arbitrarily and capri-
ciously in rescinding a rule that has not yet taken effect,
when changed circumstances leave substantial uncertainty
that the rule will produce the benefits on which its initial
promuigation was premised, and such uncertainty would
have permitted the agency to decline to issue the rule in
the first instance.

2. Whether the National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
ministration (NHTSA) acted arbitrarily and capri-
ciously in rescinding the particular requirement in Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard 208 that new vehicies produced
after September 182 be equipped with passive restraints
for occupants, based on NHTSA’s inability te find that
the requirement would satisfy the statutory criteria for
a motor vehicle safety standard, without first considering
whether other versions of a passive restraint standard
would be appropriate.

3. Whether, even if the passive restraint requirement
of Standerd 208 was not validly rescinded, the court of
appeals exceeded the proper limits on judicial review by
ordering that requirement into effect on September 1,
1983, without first affording NHTSA an opportunity to
conduct further proceedings on remand or to exercise the
authority conferred on the Secretary by 15 U.S.C.
1392(c) and (e) to establish a new effective date for the
Standard.

(1)

LIST OF PARTIES BELOW

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., Kent
Mason, Patricia Warren, Leorlin Boyd, National Associa-
tion of Independent Insurers, Automobile Owners Action
Council, and Eugene J. Meyung were petitioners in the
proceedings below. The Department of Transportation,
Secretary of Transportation Drew Lewis, the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, and NHTSA Ad-
ministrator Raymond A. Peck, Jr. were respondents be-
low. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the
United States, Inc., American Motors Corporation, Checker
Motors Corporation, Chrysler Motors Corporation, Ford
Motor Company, Genera! Motors Corporation, Volks-
wagen of America, Inc., Automobile Importers of Amer-
ica, Inc., Consumer Alert, Pacific Legal Foundation, and
Albert B. Lewis, Superintendent of Insurance for the
State of New York, were intervenors below.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

— —G—V—V —R—ãũã— PP ——7œ6ũẽũVæ᷑I᷑ 43 ãßnã3ͤðV

Introduction and summary of argument

Argument:

I. The rescission of the passive restraint require-
ment of Modified Standard 208 was not arbi-
trary and CAPTICIOUS ...................--cccceeeeceeeseeeseees

A.

The arbitrary and capricious standard of
judicial review reflects the deference Con-
gress intended to be accorded agency policy
choices within a statutorily prescribed range
and is consistent with the legislative nature
of agency rulemaking ......................................

The court of appeals erred in concluding that
it was arbitrary and capricious for NHTSA
to rescind the passive restraint requirement
on the basis of substantial uncertainty that
it would produce significant safety benefits

C. The decision to rescind the passive restraint

requirement in Modified Standard 208 was
not rendered arbitrary and capricious simply
because the agency did not first consider
whether some other version of a passive re-
straint requirement would satisfy the statu-
——— 3 Sc

The court of appeals erred in coneluding that
“legislative reaction” to the passive restraint
issue, short of the enactment of positive law,
narrowed the scope of NHTSA’s discretion
to rescind the passive restraint requirement

(

„

Argument—Continued : Page
II. Even if NHTSA’s rescission of the passive re-
straint requirement were invalid, the court of
appeals exceeded its authority by setting an
effective date for that requirement pending fur-
e 47
ZE 50
— la
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. United
F .. 26
American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Atchison,
FTA & BSS eee 33
Associated Industries of New York State, Ine. v.
United States Department of Labor, 487 F. 2d
JJ ² ˙·wÄA A Oe 17-18
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Wichita Board of Trade,
. q eee 34
Automotive Parts & Accessories Association v.
r .... .... 17
B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Department of Transporta-
I i te 17
Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Pitcairn Coal Co., 215
r 26
Batterton v. Francis, 482 U.S. 410 26
„ Industry Association v. Boyd, 409 F. 2d
:.. — 88 17
* Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best
Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 21 salah 18, 19, 27
Burlington Northern, Inc. v. United States, No. 81-
1008 (Dec. 18, 1982) . . . 49
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371
Z 19
Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 1 17
CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 468 U.S. 37 22
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 2 24, 26

Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transportation,

- 4. 18. 33. 42

Vv

Cases—Continued : Page
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401
. 18, 32, 38-39, 40
Crawford v. Board of Education of Los Angeles,
No. 81-38 (June 30, 198 28, 29, 34
Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 US.
406 ....... C 28
Dayton Board of Education v. — 443 US.
Eli Lilly Co. v. Cootle, 444 US. 1096 — 37
FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broad-
e 17, 18, 27, 33
FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134. 38
FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 27ũ 992 38
FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582 33
FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223 22
Ford Motor Co. v. National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 473 F.2d 1211mi111!1 4, 42
FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp.,
r 33
FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 423
ccc 32, 49
H & H Tire Co. v. United States Department of
Transportation, 471 F.2d 350 3 19
Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 111141 27
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Association, 452 U.S. 26 ~ 27
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 36 28
ICC v. Illinois Central R.R., 215 U.S. 452 ............. 25, 26
ICC v. Union Pacific R.R., 222 U.S. 51 25-26
Industrial Union Department v. American Petro-
leum Institute, 448 U.S. 67 26
Kansas City Southern Ry. v. United ‘States, 231
eee 26
Kollett v. Harris, 619 F. ad 134 n 37
NAACP v. FCC, 682 F.2d 9933 33
National Association of Demolition Contractors v.
r 32
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319
rn nae nee Ae 33

National Tire Dealers and Retreaders Association,
Inc. v. Brinegar, 491 F.2d 11111 17

VI

Cases—Continued : Page
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC,
] .. 31
New York and Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 245 U.S
EI A ˙ ] 00 26

PACCAR, Inc. v. National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 573 F.2d 632, cert. denied, 439
r 17. 33-34

Pacific Legal Foundation v. Department of Trans-
portation, 593 F.2d 1338, cert. denied, 444 U.S.

P es A Ae. Pe em. 7,17
Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S.

111 ˙ A ˙ 1 SnD 26
Palmer v. Thompson, 408 U.S. 217 29
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 33
Pillai v. CAB, 485 F.2d 1s 39, 40
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 1 28
Rodway v. United States Department of Agricul-

r ..
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. F PC.

354 F. 2d 608, cert. denied, 384 U.S. 9114 39, 40
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 212 27
Udall v. Tallman, 880 U.S. 46
United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp.,

406 U.S. 742 17
Vermont Yankee ‘Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC,

485 U.S. 51 1 21, 24, 38, 39, 40, 49
Wagner Electric Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013 37
WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 870 13, 31

Constitution, statutes and regulations:

United States Constitution:

ESTER en re 46
Article I, Section 7 ......... eb eRe OR eae 46
444 0 46
Fifth Amendment (Due Process Clause) 23, 26
Fourteenth Amendment 3 Process

vil
Constitution, statutes and regulations—Continued : Page
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. (& Supp.

V) 551, et seq.:
r 17
D 17, 39
D 38
5 U.S.C. (& Supp. V) 556 n 17
r 17
(CG — 39
4 2, 22, 23, 26, 2a

5 U.S.C. 706 (2)
5 U.S.C. 706 (2) (A) .

17. 20, 28, 25, 27, 2a

5 U.S.C. 706(2)(B)-(D) ......... — N 18

BD TR, FR GID ccccccccceccceccceccecsecsccsccess 25

. Ra 25
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of

1966, 15 U.S.C. (& Supp. V) 1381 et % 2, 16

I 2, 16

J r 2, la

r . 3, 10, 16, 1a

D 17, la

15 U.S.C. 1892 % 3 48

15 U.S.C. 1892 (e) 3, 16, 27, 28, 48, la

15 U.S.C. 1892(f) .. * 16, 1a

15 U.S.C. 1392(f) (1) . 6 32

15 U.S.C. 1392 (f) () —— 3, 16

16 U.S.C. 1892 (f) (4) 3

15 U.S.C. 1892 (i) 3 1 46

D , .... 3

15 U.S.C. 1410b .. 1 42

15 U.S.C. 1410b (b) (i 5, 6, 11

15 U.S.C. 1410b(b)- (dd)) 5

Pub. L. No. 95-335, Section 317, 92 Stat. 450 44

Pub. L. No. 96-131, Section 317, 93 Stat. 1039 44

e ...... 5 34

15 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 119306 34

15 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 2056 (a) 34

.... 39

21 U.S.C. 360d (a) (2) (a 34

———

Vill
Constitution, statutes and regulations—Continued : Page

30 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 81108) ....cccccccccccccccccceccneeens 34

RR .. 39

IIe . 3

49 C. F. R. 571.208 / 84. 1.2.1. . 35
Miscellaneous:

Administrative Procedure in Government Agen-
cies, Report of the Committee on Administrative
Procedure Appointed by the Attorney General,

S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. (1941) 24, 27
Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative
Procedure Act (19477) 24
Commerce Business Daily (Oct. 25, 1982) ............ 12
112 Cong. Rec. (1966) :
. cc 19
1 —=, . 19
99. ——ꝗ½ é 17
120 Cong. Rec. (1974)
K W AA 42
. . 42
8 42
9% —— 42
5. 42
J TKP 42
Jͤ§ — 5
r...... ole 43
.. 42
XK ccc 42
PP. 80836-308860e ccccccceceeereeereees 42
K- a ů·ů ů 43
1J...— 5
99 KK — ˖—— 42-43
123 Cong. Rec. (1977)
r ene 43
SS Fe me 43
124 Cong. Rec. (1978)
X xe — ——— —ůnͤuA 43, 44
K . 44

p. 17199 D

p. HSOo66 * ———————————— 2 —
125 Cong. Rec. 12285-12287 (1979) 1
126 Cong. Rec. (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1980) 112120
126 Cong. Rec. (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1980) H10194-
.
126 Cong. Rec. (daily ed. Dec. 4, 1980) H11912-
EE /
126 Cong. Rec. 813506 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1980)
Exec. Order 12991, 46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (1981)
32 Fed. Reg. (1967):

55

Reg. 11148 (1969) Lee —
Reg. (1970) :

4 *
zz

5
~
—
2

Ne

3
a

>?
— —

3 ——
(1973) :

2 8
zee Tk

(1974) : e

7

——— : Re „öh „ „7

* * a 2 4 > & — — 8 2 0 8 a 88 82 22122 1

Miscellaneous—Continued : Page
OG i —— ͤ 5

42 Fed. Reg. (1977):
p. 5071 6
. — 6
43 Fed. Reg. 52493 (197) 7

46 Fed. Reg. (1981):

11— 7
— 7
— 7
H.R. Conf, Rep. No. 1871, 96th Cong. 2d Sess.
(1980) . 45

H.R. Rep. No. 1776, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. (1966) 17, 19
Senate Judiciary Committee Print (June 1945), as

reproduced in Legislative History, Admini. tra-

tive Procedure Act, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong.,

1 ——K . 24
S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. (1945) 24. 27, 31
S. Rep. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) 17, 19
Wall Street Journal (Dec. 15, 1982) — 12
Webeter's Third International Dictionary (1976) 23

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1982

No. 82-354

MoTor VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION OF THE
UNITED STATES, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS

*.

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE Co., ET AL.

No. 82-355

CONSUMER ALERT AND PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION,
PETITIONERS

*.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE Co., ET AL.

No. 82-398

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
ET AL., PETITIONERS

.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE Co., ET AL.

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL PARTIES

(1)

2
OPINIONS BELOW

The June 1, 1982 opinion of the court of appeals ( Pet.
App. la-76a)' is reported at 680 F.2d 206. The August
4, 1982 supplemental order and memorandum of the
court of appeals (Pet. App. 79a-82a) are not reported.

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of the court of appeals rested on 15
U.S.C. 1394(a) (1). The judgment of the court of appeals
(Pet. App. 160a-16la) was entered on June 1, 1982, and
the supplemental order of the court of appeals (Pet.
App. 79a-80a) was entered on August 4, 1982. The peti-
tions for a writ of certiorari in Nos. 82-354 and 82-355
were filed on August 30, 1982. On August 24, 1982, the
Chief Justice extended the time for filing a petition for a
writ of certiorari in No. 82-398 to and including Septem-
ber 8, 1982, and the petition was filed on that date. The
petitions for a writ of certiorari were granted on Novem-
ber 8, 1982. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1) and 15 U.S.C. 1394 (a) (4).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Section 103 of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. 1392, and Section 10(e) of
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706, are set
forth in pertinent part in the Appendix, infra, la-2a.

STATEMENT

1. In 1966 Congress enacted the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. (& Supp. V) 1381
et seq. (hereinafter Safety Act”), for the purpose of
“reduc([ing] traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to
persons resulting from traffic accidents.” 15 U.S.C. 1381.
To accomplish this goal, the Act directs the Secretary of

1 “Pet. App.” refers to the appendix to the petition for a writ of
certiorari filed in No. 82-354.

Transportation? to issue appropriate federal motor vehi-
cie safety standards (15 U.S.C. 1392(a)) and prohibits
the manufacture, sale, or delivery into commerce of any
motor vehicle that is not in conformity with such
standards. 15 U.S.C. 1397.

The Act provides that each motor vehicle safety stan-
dard “shall be practicable, shall meet the need for motor
vehicle safety, and shall be stated in objective terms.” 15
U.S.C. 1392 (a). In addition, the Secretary must consider
whether any proposed standard “is reasonable, practicable
and appropriate” for the particular type of motor vehicle
and “the extent to which such standards will contribute
to carrying out the purposes of [the Act].” 15 U.S.C.
1392(f) (3) and (4). The Act also grants the Secretary
authority to “amend or revoke any Federal motor vehicle
safety standard” (15 U.S.C. 1392 (e); see also 15 U.S.C.
1407).

2. a. In 1967, the Secretary promulgated Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208, which required the
installation of seat belts in all cars. 32 Fed. Reg. 2408,
2415. In 1969, the Department of Transportation an-
nounced that it was considering the initiation of rulemak-
ing proceedings to require installation of inflatable airbags
or other “passive occupant restraint systems“ devices
that do not depend for their effectiveness upon any action
taken by the occupant except that necessary to operate
the vehicle. 34 Fed. Reg. 11148. The Department form-
ally proposed such a standard in 1970. 35 Fed. Reg. 7187.

Between 1970 and 1972, after lengthy administrative
proceedings, the Secretary issued a series of orders cul-
minating in an amendment to Standard 208 requiring full
passive protection for all front seat occupants of vehicles
manufactured after August 15, 1975. The Standard per-
mitted optional means of compliance for vehicles built be-
tween August 1973 and August 15, 1975. Such vehicles

2 The Secretary’s general authority under the Safety Act has
been delegated to the Administrator of the National Highway Traf-
fic Safety Administration (hereinafter “NHTSA”). 49 C. F. R.
1.50(a).

1

could have (i) full passive protection; (ii) partial passive
protection, with lap belts for front seat occupants; or
(iii) manual lap and shoulder belts coupled with an igni-
tion interlock to prevent the car from starting unless the
occupants’ belts were fastened. See 35 Fed. Reg. 16927
(1970) ; 36 Fed. Reg. 4600 (1971); id. at 19254; id. at
19266; 37 Fed. Reg. 3911 (1972); Pet. App. Ga-Sa.“

On petitions for review, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the agency’s decision
to require passive restraints as a “proper exercise of its
administrative discretion.” Chrysler Corp. v. Department
of Transportation, 472 F.2d 659, 674 (6th Cir. 1972).*
The court concluded, however, that the testing procedures
required for passive restraints did not satisfy the Act’s
requirement that a standard be “objective.”

The Sixth Circuit’s decision did not invalidate the man-
ual belt and interlock option.“ However, public irritation

* Full passive protection required the meeting of performance
criteria for frontal, side, and rollover crashes without instrument-
measured injury to a test dummy, while partial passive protection
required the meeting of the same performance criteria for frontal
crashes only. 37 Fed. Reg. 3911 (1972).

*The Sixth Circuit stressed that if it appeared as the time for
implementation approached that further testing or development was
necessary, the agency was free to consider “whether to extend the
time for implementation or to alter, or even to abandon, the project.”
472 F.2d at 673.

5 The interlock option was added after adoption of the version of
the Standard that was under review in Chrysler. However, in a
subsequent decision, the Sixth Circuit held the crash test and in-
jury criteria invalid for the manual belt and interlock option as
well. Ford Motor Co. v. National Highway Traffic Safety Adminis-
tration, 473 F.2d 1241 (1973). As contemplated by the Ford Motor
decision (473 F.2d at 1244), NHTSA then deleted the crash test
and injury criteria from the manual belt and interlock option,
thereby effectively requiring installation of manual belts and igni-
tion interlocks beginning on August 15, 1975. 38 Fed. Reg. 16072
(1973).

In August 1973, the agency corrected the test dummy specifica-
tions “for the limited purpose of evaluating vehicles with passive
restraint systems manufactured under the first and second re-

with interlock systems led Congress in 1974 tu amend the
Safety Act to prohibit any motor vehicle safety standard
from requiring or permitting compliance by means of an
ignition interlock or a continuous buzzer designed to indi-
cate that safety belts are not in use. 15 U.S.C. 1410b(b)
(1); see Pet. App. 8a; 120 Cong. Rec. 27815-27823, 35036
(1974). The 1974 statutory amendment also provided
that any safety standard requiring compliance by means
of an occupant restraint system other than a belt system,
such as inflatable airbags, would be subject to a two
House legislative veto. 15 U.S.C. 1410b(b)-(d).

NHTSA had concluded the previous April that to per-
mit emergency egress after an accident, passive belts—
belts that move into place automatically when the occu-
pant closes the door—should have a release mechanism
in the form of a conventional latch, accompanied by an
ignition interlock and warning buzzer to encourage re-
attachment. 39 Fed. Reg. 14593 (1974). In view of the
1974 statutory amendment, however, NHTSA eliminated
the ignition interlock and buzzer aspect of the emergency
detachment requirement. Pet. App. 9a-10a; 39 Fed. Reg.
38380 (1974). In addition, in response to the Chrysler
decision and the 1974 legislation, NHTSA extended the
optional alternatives for compliance with Standard 208
until August 31, 1976. 40 Fed. Reg. 16217, 33977
(1975).

b. On June 9, 1976, Secretary Coleman initiated a new
rulemaking proceeding on the passive restraint issue. 41
Fed. Reg. 24070 (1976). After hearing testimony and
reviewing written comments, Secretary Coleman extended
the optional alternatives indefinitely, because of his ex-
pectation that there would be widespread public resist-

straint options between August 15, 1973 and August 15, 1975.”
38 Fed. Reg. 20449. The notice stated that the question of restraint
requirements after August 15, 1975 was still open and would be
addressed in future rulemaking (ibid.). Only a very limited number
of vehicles were expected to be fitted with full or partial passive
protection during this interim period (ibid.).

6

ance to mandatory passive restraints. 42 Fed. Reg. 5071
(1977) ; C. A. App. 2002.“ He instead proposed a demon-
stration project involving up to 500,000 cars installed
with passive restraints, in order to smooth the way for
public acceptance of any mandatory passive restraint
standard at a later date. Pet. App. 10a; C.A. App. 2061,
2073-2074.

e. In July 1977, Secretary Adams decided to dispense
with the demonstration project developed by Secretary
Coleman and instead adopted Modified Standard 208, at
issue here. The Modified Standard mandated the phasing
in of passive restraints beginning with large cars in
model year 1982 and extending to all cars by model year
1984. The two principal systems that would satisfy the
Standard were airbags and passive belts,’ leaving to the
manufacturers the choice of which system to install. 42
Fed. Reg. 34296 (1977).“ On petitions for review, the

C. A. App.” refers to the Joint Appendix in the court of ap-
peals, which contains the periinent materials from the voluminous
administrative record, as designated by the parties. The parties
have lodged with the Clerk of this Court 15 copies of the Joint
Appendix in the court of appeals.

7 Two manufacturers have offered automatic belt systems as
options on their vehicles for some time. In model years 1975-1981,
Volkswagen sold more than 300,000 Rabbits equipped with detach-
able automatic belts having an ignition interlock and a continuous
buzzer to discourage detachment. Pet. App. 18a n.12. (Installation
of these use-compelling features was permissible under 15 U.S.C.
1410b(b)(1) because the devices were not installed as a means of
compliance with Standard 208). Between 1978 and 1980, General
Motors sold approximately 20,000 Chevettes with automatic belts.
For the 1978 and 1979 model years, the belts were coupled with in-
terlock devices similar to those in the Volkswagen Rabbits; for the
1980 model year, the vehicles had a nondetachable continuous belt
system, which permitted the belt to “play out” from a spool to permit
emergency egress. Only 13,000 of 415,000 Chevettes purchased in
model year 1980 were equipped with these belts, even though the
option was made available at no charge to purchasers and dealers
received bonuses for selling them (C.A. App. 403).

8 At the time of Secretary Adams’ decision, the passive seat belt
option continued to include the requirement that the belt be detach-
able to permit emergency release. In November 1978, however,

7

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit sustained the validity of Modified Stan-
dard 208. The court of appeals found Secretary Adams’
decision that airbags would be effective “rational,” recog-
nized that public resistance to passive restraints was a
factor that had to be considered and presented a “matter
of judgment” for the Secretary, and held that the Secre-
tary had not “abused his discretion” in assessing the
tradeoffs between the expected benefits and potential dan-
gers of airbags. Pacific Legal Foundation v. Department
of Transportation, 593 F.2d 1338, 1344, 1346-1347 (D.C.
Cir.) , cert. denied, 444 U.S. 830 (1979).

d. In February 1981, Secretary Lewis proposed a one-
year postponement of the effective date of Modified
Standard 208 to permit further study in light of changed
circumstances since it was promulgated in 1977. 46 Fed.
Reg. 12033; C.A. App. 1622. Two months later, NHTSA
issued a final rule ordering a one-year delay, until Sep-
tember 1982, in the application of the Modified Standard
to large cars. 46 Fed. Reg. 21172; C.A. App. 1272. In
a notice published the same day, the Secretary proposed
and requested comment on four possible revisions of the
Standard: (1) reversal of the phase-in sequence to re-
quire compliance by small cars first; (2) simultaneous
compliance by all cars; (3) rescission of the passive re-
straint requirement; and (4) deletion of a requirement
for passive restraints in the front center seating posi-
tion. 46 Fed. Reg. 21205; Pet. App. 147a-159a; C.A.
App. 12-15.

After receiving written comments and holding public
hearings, NHTSA issued a final rule on October 23, 1981
amending Modified Standard 208 to delete the require-
ment that passive restraints be installed, while permitting
their installation as an optional means of compliance (see

NHTSA amended the Standard to afford manufacturers for the
first time the option of making automatic belts either detachable or
nondetachable. 43 Fed. Reg. 52493; C.A. App. 1705. As explained
in footnote 7, supra, General Motors made the nondetachable, or
“continuous,” belt option available in the 1980 model year Chevettes,
with only limited success.

note 29, infra). NHTSA explained that it had a duty
under the Act “to review the automatic restraint require-
ments in light of changing events and to ensure that the
requirements continue to meet the criteria which each
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard must satisfy”
(Pet. App. 93a).° On the basis of its thorough review,
NHTSA determined that it was “incapable of finding
now, as it was able to do in 1977, that the automatic
restraint requirements would meet all of the applicable
criteria in the Vehicle Safety Act” ( ibid.) :

i. NHTSA noted that its determination in 1977 that
the Standard would produce significant safety benefits
depended on several “critical assumptions” (Pet. App.
94a-95a), the validity of which had been “substantially if
not wholly undermined by drastic changes in the types
of automatic restraints that would have been installed
under the automatic restraint requirements” (id. at 96a).
First, although the agency had assumed in 1977 that air-
bags would be installed in 60% of all new cars and auto-
matic seat belts in 40%, it concluded that because of the
change to small cars, manufacturers planned to install
automatic seat belts in approximately 99% of the new
cars. “Thus, the assumed life-saving potential of air bags
would not have been realized” (ibid.).

Second, the agency determined that the automatic belts
installed in the “overwhelming majority of new cars”
would have been detachable. This design choice stemmed
in part from the manufacturers’ desire not to impede
emergency exit and in part from their concern that a
significant number of people would resist belts not hav-
ing this feature because of a fear of being trapped ( Pet.
App. 97a, 99a, lla; see C.A. App. 305, 363, 431, 435,
595, 653, 1220, 2549). NHTSA concluded that detachable
belts “would be like today’s manual lap and shoulder belts
in that they can be easily detached and left that way
permanently” and that their use “thereafter requires the

o NHTSA also stated that the review was undertaken to ensure
that the Standard met the requirements of cost-effectiveness pro-
vided by Exec. Order No. 12991, 46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (1981).

same type of affirmative action that is the stumbling
block to obtaining high usage levels of manual belts”
(Pet. App. 97a-98a; see C.A. App. 406, 431, 806, 1253).

Third, NHTSA found that although surveys of the use
of automatic belts in Volkswagen Rabbits and Chevrolet
Chevettes (see note 7, supra), conducted since Modified
Standard 208 was promulgated in 1977, indicated usage
rates as high as 70% or 80%, these studies suffered
from a number of limitations that rendered them unreli-
able as bases for predicting the usage of the detachable
belts that would be installed to comply with Modified
Standard 208 if it went into effect: (1) the belts sur-
veyed either had an ignition interlock or were continuous
nondetachable belts and thus were dissimilar to detach-
able belts; (2) the cars that were the subjects of the
studies were not typical of the Nation’s automobile fleet
generally, because a combination of owner demographics
and driver risk perception ordinarily results in higher
usage rates in smaller cars; (3) most purchasers of the
cars surveyed voluntarily invested in the passive re-
straints; and (4) crash data for Rabbits revealed a sig-
nificantly lower actual usage rate than that indicated by
the surveys (Pet. App. 97a-104a; see C.A. App. 405-406,
555, 1220).

Recognizing that extrapolation from these “extremely
sparse factual data * necessarily involve[s] exer-
cises of discretion and informed judgment” (Pet. App.
103a), the agency concluded that the manufacturers’
plans to satisfy Modified Standard 208 by installing de-
tachable belts that so closely resembled the manual belts
then in use had left it without a basis for reliably pre-
dicting the likelihood that the Standard would lead to any
significant increased usage of restraints at all (id. at
99a, 104a). NHTSA observed in this regard that none of
the participants in the rulemaking proceedings had pre-
sented any new factual data to reduce the “substantial
uncertainty” confronting the agency (id. at 10la). In
view of this uncertainty regarding the incremental safety
benefits of detachable automatic belts, NHTSA could not

10

find that the automatic restraint requirement of Modified
Standard 208 would meet the need for safety (id. at
104a), one of the criteria a safety standard must satisfy.
See 15 U.S.C. 1392(a).

ii. NHTSA also concluded that in view of the possibly
minimal safety benefits and the substantial cost of im-
plementation, the automatic restraint requirement did
not satisfy the statutory mandates that a standard be
“reasonable” and “practicable” (Pet. App. 88a, 105a).
The agency found that imposition of the passive restraint
requirement would produce an annual nationwide price
effect of approximately $1 billion, without any assurance
that consumers would receive offsetting discounts on in-
surance premiums in the foreseeable future (id. at 105a,
106a, 117a; see C.A. App. 190, 1241-1242, 1349, 2550-
2552).

The agency [did] not believe that it would be reason-
able to require car manufacturers or consumers to bear
such substantial costs without more adequate assurance
that they will produce benefits” (Pet. App. 106a). Those
costs were “particularly unreasonable,’ NHTSA ex-
plained, given the likelihood that other alternatives, such
as its planned educational campaign to increase usage of
manual belts, could accomplish the goal of increased
usage at “greatly reduced costs” (id. at 107a; see id. at
111a-112a). An educational effort, NHTSA reasoned,
has the advantage of reaching not only those purchasers
of new cars who are likely to utilize passive restraints,
but also persons driving in cars already on the road (id.
at 111a-112a).“

% In addition, NHTSA estimated that Modified Standard 208
would entail additional fuel costs of up to $150 million annually
(Pet. App. 106a, 117a; C.A. App. 208).

11 A related factor was equity in the distribution of costs: “The
automatic restraint requirements of the standard would have re-
quired the current regular user of manual belts not only to pay
himself for a system that affords him no additional safety protec-
tion, bu. in part to subsidize the current nonuser of belts who may

11

iii. In addition, NHTSA concluded that the automatic
restraint requirement might have an adverse effect on
the public’s attitude toward safety—an element of the
statutory mandates that a standard be “practicable”
(Pet. App. 93a) and “meet the need for motor vehicle
safety” (id. at 1l4a). Given the obtrusiveness, relative
expense, and potentially limited benefits of detachable
belts, NHTSA feared that many consumers would regard
the automatic restraint requirement as an expensive
example of ineffective regulation (id. at 108a). These
factors, NHTSA reasoned, could lead to a “poisoning of
popular sentiment toward efforts to improve occupant
restraint systems in the future” (ibid., quoting Secretary
Coleman’s 1976 Decision, C.A. App. 2073) and adversely
affect public attitudes toward safety measures in general
(ibid.). Moreover, NHTSA observed that some dissatis-
fied consumers might even “cut the automatic belts out
of their cars, thus depriving subsequent owners of the
cars of the protection of any occupant restraint system.”
In NHTSA’s view, these were “serious concerns for an
agency charged by statute with taking steps appropriate
for addressing safety problems that arise not only in
the short term but also the long term” (id. at 108a-
109a). See also id. at 114a-115a.

iv. The agency also rejected the option of requiring
that all automatic belts have some use-compelling fea-
ture—e.g., an ignition interlock to compel refastening of
a detachable belt or installation of nondetachable passive
belts. NHTSA noted that it lacked statutory authority to
require ignition interlocks (see 15 U.S.C. 1410b(b) (1))
and that the history of congressional reaction to inter-
locks suggested “that Congress would look with some dis-
favor upon any similar attempt to impose a use-
compelling feature on a belt system” (Pet. App. 109a-
110a). NHTSA further explained that a use-compelling
feature could actually be counterproductive because of a
“widespread, latent and irrational fear in many members

or may not be induced by the automatic restraints to commence
regular restraint usage” (Pet. App. 109a).

12

of the public that they could be trapped by the seat belt
after a crash” (id. at 110a), a fear that might con-
tribute to the decision of many persons not to wear a
seat belt at all (ibid.). In the agency’s view, it would be
“highly inappropriste” to impose a technology that might
aggravate that fear without first attempting a thorough
education of the public (ibid.). In addition, NHTSA
was “unable to find the cause of safety served by impos-
ing any requirement which would further complicate the
extrication of any occupant from his or her car, as some
use-compelling features would” (ibid.).

v. NHTSA stressed that its rescission of the passive
restraint requirement at this time did not foreclose the
option of reopening rulemaking in the future, depending
upon further experience in the usage of manual and auto-
matic belts and the degree of increased public under-
standing and acceptance of the neea for use-inducing or
automatic protection alternatives (Pet. App. 115a-116a).
NHTSA also noted its regret that Secretary Coleman’s
proposed demonstration project and accompanying edu-
cational campaign had never been placed into effect, so
that the experience of those efforts would now be avail-
able (id. at 110a-llla). Accordingly, the agency ex-
pressed its intention to undertake an educational cam-
paign in cooperation with the States and private sector
and to initiate efforts with automobile manufacturers to
ensure that potential developments in automatic crash
protection technology would not be lost (id. at 107a,
111a-112a, 115a-116a, 117a-118a)."

3. On petitions for review, e United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that
NHTSA’s rescission of the automatic restraint require-

120n October 25, 1982, NHTSA published a request for pro-
posals for an airbag demonstration project to design, fabricate, and
evaluate a kit for retrofitting the automobiles of one or more state
police fleets with airbags. Commerce Business Daily, Oct. 25, 1982,
at 1, col. 2. In addition, NHTSA has entered into an agreement
with the General Services Administration for the purchase by the
federal government of 5,000 1985 model year vehicles equipped with
airbags. Wall Street Journal, Dec. 15, 1982, at 17.

13

ment was arbitrary and capricious. The court of appeals
remarked that “rescission more resembles agency refusal
to act than an agency decision to act” and that it is
“only in the rarest and most compelling circumstances
that courts overturn an agency’s ‘ “expert” determination
not to pursue a particular program or policy at a given
time’” (Pet. App. 25a, quoting WWHT, Inc. v. FCC,
656 F.2d 807, 818-819 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). In this case,
however, the court concluded that NHTSA’s discretion
to rescind the passive restraint requirement had been
restricted by congressional “reaction” to the passive re-
straint issue, even though the court acknowledged that
in none of the instances upon which it relied did that
reaction take the form of “positive law” (Pet. App. 46a).
The court found that NHTSA’s action within this nar-
rowed ambit of discretion was arbitrary and capricious
for two general reasons:

a. The court found insufficient as a basis for rescission
NHTSA’s conclusion that it could not reliably predict an
increase in usage under the Standard as written (Pet.
App. 50a-54a). The Court expressly accepted as reason-
able the first two of the three findings upon which
NHTSA relied in reaching this conclusion: that most
manufacturers planned to install detachable belts and
that a detachable belt, once detached, is “functionally
equivalent” to a manual belt (id. at 50a-5la). With
respect to the third of NHTSA’s findings, the court simi-
larly conceded that there may well be “substantial un-
certainty” about the increase in seatbelt usage rates that
can be predicted if detachable belts are widely used
(id. at 51a). But the court did not find this uncertainty
to be a sufficient basis for NHTSA’s action. The appro-
priate question in the court’s view was not whether there
was evidence showing that usage rates actually would
increase by an amount necessary to justify the Standard,
but rather whether NHTSA could point to evidence
affirmatively showing that usage rates would not increase
by such an amount (ibid.).

14

The court found that the evidence in the record did
not sustain what it held to be NHTSA’s burden on this
issue. Moreover, the court reasoned that if experience
with passive belts now in use could not be the basis for
predicting usage rates under the Standard, “then only
a well justified refusal to seek more evidence could render
rescission non-arbitrary” (Pet. App. 52a-53a).

b. A majority of the panel also concluded that the
rescission of the passive restraint requirement was arbi-
trary and capricious because NHTSA did not sufficiently
consider certain alternatives to rescission (Pet. 54a-
68a). The court stressed that NHTSA was “impres-
sively thorough and careful” in reviewing the three al-
ternatives to rescission that it had set forth in its April
1981 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: reversing the
sequence of compliance, ordering simultaneous compli-
ance, and exempting the front center seating position
(Pet. App. 55a). But the court believed that other alter-
natives should have been considered as well.

The court first faulted NHTSA’s consideration of the
possibility of requiring manufacturers to instal] non-
detachable rather than detachable, automatic belts. The
court questioned whether detachable belts are “passive”
restraints if, upon detachment, they resemble manual
belts (Pet. App. 57a). In addition, the court found in-
sufficient the reasons given by the agency for declining
to permit only nondetachable continuous belts—the con-
gressional reaction in 1974 to ignition interlocks, another
use-compelling feature; the fear of many members of the
public of being trapped; and NHTSA’s determination
that the cause of safety would not be advanced by a de-
vice that might make it more difficult to extricate the
occupant after an accident (id. at 60a-62a).

The court also held that NHTSA should have con-
sidered whether to require the installation of airbags
(Pet. App. 62a-65a). The court acknowledged, however,

18 Judge Edwards did not accept the majority’s discussion of
possible alternative courses of action as a basis for decision in this
case (Pet. App. 75a).

15

that the cost of airbags ranged from $200 to $1000 per
unit, depending upon economies of scale, and that
NHTSA had considered these costs in its regulatory im-
pact analysis (id. at 65a-66a).

e. Although the court of appeals invalidated NHTSA’s
rescission of the automatic restraint provisions of Modi-
fied Standard 208, the court expressly declined the sug-
gestion of respondents State Farm and NAll that the
standard take effect by September 1982 or September
1983 (Pet. App. 72a). The court noted that manufac-
turers needed sufficient lead time to implement the pas-
sive restraint requirement and that its decision did not
foreclose NHTSA from rescinding, suspending, or delay-
ing the requirement in the future (id. at 53a-54a, 72a-
74a). The court allowed NHTSA 30 days “in which to
submit a schedule for resolving the questions raised in
[the] opinion, leading either to the rescission or suspen-
sion of the standard or to a judicially approved schedule
for the effective implementation of * * * [Modified
Standard 208] or an amended standard” (id. at 74a; see
also id. at 72a).

On July 1, 1982, NHTSA filed with the court of appeals
a suggested Notice of Proposed Supplemental Rulemak-
ing setting forth a schedule for seeking comments from
interested parties on questions raised by the court’s opin-
ion and for issuing a supplemental decision on those ques-
tions (Pet. App. 132a-146a). In a memorandum issued
on August 4, 1982, the court stated that NHTSA’s pro-
posal was “not inconsistent with the Court’s order” (id.
at 82a). Nonetheless, the court, sua sponte, issued an
order on August 4, 1982, staying the compliance date for
the passive restraint requirement only until September 1,
1983. The order permitted NHTSA until October 1, 1982
to advise the court whether that compliance date was
achievable or whether a longer period was required, “set-
ting forth adequate reasons therefor” (id. at 79a-80a).

NHTSA informed the court on October 1, 1982 that,
based on representations by manufacturers, it did not ap-

16

pear that practicable compliance could be achieved before
September 1985 (82-354 Pet. Br. App. 44). The court of
appeals has not acted in response to NHTSA’s filing.
However, on November 18, 1982, after this Court granted
the petitions for a writ of certiorari, the court of appeals
entered an order recalling its mandate (J.A. 16-17).

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of
1966, 15 U.S.C. (& Supp. V) 1381 et seg., empowers the
Secretary of Transportation to establish motor vehicle
safety standards to accomplish the Act’s purposes of
reducing traffic accidents and deaths and injuries result-
ing from such accidents. 15 U.S.C. 1381 and 1392(a).
Congress provided, however, that any such standard must
satisfy certain criteria: it must be “appropriate,” “prac-
ticable,” and “stated in objective terms” and “meet the
need for motor vehicle safety,” 15 U.S.C. 1392(a), and it
must be “reasonable, practicable and appropriate” for
each type of vehicle to which it applies. 15 U.S.C.
1392(f) (3).

The Act does not contemplate that a standard once
found to satisfy the statutory criteria must remain in
effect permanently. To the contrary, 15 U.S.C. 1392(e)
expressly provides that the Secretary “may by order
amend or revoke any Federal motor vehicle safety stan-
dard established under this section.” It is evident from
the structure and purposes of the Act as a whole that the
same statutory criteria that govern the promulgation of a
standard in the first instance must inform the Secretary’s
determination whether the standard should remain in
effect or should instead be amended or revoked. 15 U.S.C.
1392(a) and (f). Neither the court of appeals nor re-
spondents have suggested otherwise. NHTSA adhered to
these principles in rescinding the passive restraint re-
quirement of Modified Standard 208, concluding that it
could no longer find that the Standard would satisfy the

17

requirements that a standard “meet the need for motor
vehicle safety” and be “reasonable” and “practicable.”

Under 15 U.S.C. 1392 (b), the provisions of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act apply to judicial review of all
orders issued by the Secretary establishing, amending, or
revoking a safety standard. Because the Safety Act does
not require that motor vehicle safety standards or rules
amending or revoking such standards “be made on the
record after opportunity for an agency hearing” (5
U.S.C. 553(c)), NHTSA is free to follow the notice ard
comment procedures for informal rulemaking under the
APA, 5 U.S.C. 553, as it did in this case, rather than the
formal rulemaking procedures prescribed by 5 U.S.C. (&
Supp. V) 556 and 5 U.S.C. 557.“ Accordingly, as the
court of appeals held (Pet. App. 25a-26a), and as
respondents concede (State Farm Br. in Opp. 9-10; NAII
Br. in Opp. 5-6), an order establishing, amending, or
revoking a motor vehicle safety standard is subject to
judicial review under the APA only to the extent of
ensuring that NHTSA’s action was not “arbitrary, capri-
cious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accord-
ance with law.” 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A). See FCC v.
National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S.
775, 802-803 (1978); Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 140-
141 (1973).

H.R. Rep. No. 1776, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1966); S. Rep.
No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1966): 112 Cong. Rec. 21487
(1966) (remarks of Sen. Magnuson); Automotive Parts & Acces-
sories Association v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 332-337 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
Compare United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S.
742, 757 (1972).

13 See Pacific Legal Foundation v. Department of Transportation,
supra, 593 F.2d at 1342; National Tire Dealers & Retreaders Asso-
ciation, Inc. v. Brinegar, 491 F.2d 31, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Auto-
motive Parts & Accessories Association v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 337
(D.C. Cir. 1968) ; B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Department of Transporta-
tion, 541 F.2d 1178, 1181-1182 (6th Cir. 1976); Boating Industry
Association v. Boyd, 409 F.2d 408, 411 (7th Cir. 1969) ; cf. PACCAR,
Inc. v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 573 F.2d
632, 636 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1978); Associated

18

This Court has stressed that the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard of judicial review is “a narrow one” and
that t Ihe court is not empowered to substitute its judg-
ment for that of the agency.” Citizens to Preserve Over-
ton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). Agency
rules subject to review under this standard may be set
aside only “if they are not rational and based on con-
sideration of the relevant factors.” FCC v. National Citi-
zens Committee for Broadcasting, supra, 436 U.S. at 803;
see also id. at 805, 814; Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park v. Volpe, supra, 401 U.S. at 413-416; Bowman
Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System,
Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974). NHTSA’s rescission of
the passive restraint requirement plainly was not arbi-
trary or capricious under these principles.

The agency’s explanation of its reasons for rescission
contained an extensive “consideration of the relevant fac-
tors” Congress specified in the Act itself as prerequisites
for the imposition of a motor vehicle safety standard.
f . —

The ageney's consideration of these factors also plainly
was rational.“ The court of appeals itself sustained as
reasonable the first two of the three factual determina-
tions that led NHTSA to conclude that it could no longer
find that the passive restraint requirement would meet
the need for motor vehicle safety: (i) that most automo-
bile manufacturers intended to comply with the Standard
by installing detachable passive belts, and (ii) that such
a belt, once detached, becomes identical to a manual belt
(Pet. App. 50a, 96a, 98a). With respect to NHTSA’s
third finding, the court of appeals similarly conceded that
“(t]here may well be substantial uncertainty’ about the

Industries of New York State, Inc. v. Uniied States Department of
Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 348 (2d Cir. 1973); but see Chrysler Corp. v.
Department of Transportation, supra, 472 F.2d at 667-670. Under 5
U.S.C, 706(2)(B)-(D), rules promulgated following informal rule-
making procedures also may be set aside if they are contrary to the
Constitution, in excess of statutory authority or short of statutory
right, or without observance of procedure required by law. These
bases of judicial review under the APA are not at issue here.

19

seatbelt usage rates that can be predicted if detachable
belts are widely used” (id. at 51a). The court of appeals
also did not question NHTSA’s estimate that the costs of
implementing Modified Standard 208 would exceed $1 bil-
lion annually (id. at 16a-17a, 105a) or NHTSA’s inter-
pretation of the Act as requiring that any potential safety
benefit be weighed against these costs in determining
whether the Standard satisfies the statutory requirements
that a safety standard be “reasonable” and “practicable”
(id. at 16a-17a, 88a, 93, 105a)."*

Given the acknowledged uncertainty regarding whether
any significant increase in usage rates of seatbelts could
be expected under Modified Standard 208, it manifestly
was reasonable for NHTSA to withdraw the passive
restraint requirement before it took effect, rather than to
impose its substantial costs and burdens on the motoring
public and automobile manufacturers. There was thus a
rational connection between the facts found and the
choice made’” (Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Ar-
kansas-Best Freight System, Inc., supra, 419 U.S. at 285,
quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States,
371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). Because the court of appeals
sustained NHTSA’s findings in the relevant respects, it
should have sustained NHTSA’s rescission of Modified
Standard 208 as well.“

16 See also S. Rep. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966); H.R.
Rep. No. 1776, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1966); 112 Cong. Rec.
14245 (1966) (remarks of Sen. Lausche) ; id. at 19648 (remarks of
Reps. Dingell & Staggers); H & H Tire Co. v. United States De-
partment of Transportation, 471 F.2d 350, 353-354 (7th Cir. 1972);
id. at 356-357 (Stevens, J., concurring).

17 Because the court of appeals sustained NHTSA's findings in
the relevant respects and because its holding rested on other
grounds, we will not set forth here an extensive discussion of
NHTSA's consideration of the statutory criteria and the rationality
of its actions in light of those criteria. For present purposes, the
validity of NHTSA’s action has been sufficiently summarized here
and in the Statement. See pages 7-12, supra.

20

The court of appeals nevertheless held that NHTSA’s
rescission of the passive restraint requirement was arbi-
trary and capricious. In doing so, it not only misappre-
hended the role of a reviewing court under the arbitrary
and capricious standard; it fashioned in the process no
less than three unprecedented and erroneous principles of
administrative law.

I.

A. As an initial matter, the court of appeals miscon-
ceived the nature of the arbitrary and capricious standard
of judicial review. That standard was intended to permit
a reviewing court to set aside administrative action only
where the agency has acted irrationally or exercised its
power in such an unreasonable manner that it must be
deemed to be unauthorized and therefore “not in accord-
ance with law.” 5 U.S.C. 706(2) (A).

B. Ignoring these limitations, the court of appeals held
that in order for an agency to rescind a rule—even one
that has yet to take effect—it is not sufficient that the
agency has developed substantial uncertainty that the
rule will in fact produce the benefits on which its initial
promulgation was premised. The agency instead must af-
firmatively establish to the satisfaction of the reviewing
court that the rule in fact will not produce such benefits
before it may be revoked. In other words, evidentiary
doubts that would have allowed, indeed perhaps required,
an agency not to issue a regulation in the first instance
are insufficient to permit that agency, on further reflec-
tion, te withdraw the regulation.

This unprecedented result disregards the explicit statu-
tory limitations on judicial review contained in the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act. It cannot be arbitrary or
capricious for an agency to conclude that there should be
some firm indication that a regulation will serve a useful
purpose before imposing its costs and burdens, especially
those of the magnitude involved here, upon the public.
The court of appeals’ ruling also is inconsistent with the
decisions of this Court recognizing that administrative

21

agencies must retain maximum flexibility to adapt their
regulatory policies to changing circumstances.

C. It was equally erroneous for the court of appeals to
hold NHTSA’s action arbitrary and capricious because
the agency did not, in the court’s view, sufficiently con-
sider certain alternative courses of action. NHTSA of
course did thoroughly consider the alternatives set forth
in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, as well as the pos-
sibility of requiring that all passive belts be nondetach-
able. But in addition, nothing in the Safety Act or the
APA prohibited NHTSA from rescinding the particular
passive restraint standard that previously had been pro-
mulgated before considering whether some other passive
restraint requirement would satisfy the statutory criteria.
Rescission was especially prudent in view of the acknowl-
edged defects of Modified Standard 208 as it then read
and its imminent effective date of September 1982, which
would have required expensive compliance efforts by
automobile manufacturers. The court of appeals’ insist-
ence that the alternatives it cited be considered in the
rescission proceedings themselves, rather than at a later
date, is inconsistent with the teaching of Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), that
courts may not impose additional procedural requirements
on administrative agencies.

D. The court of appeals also erred in its reliance upon
what it termed the “legislative reaction” to the passive
restraint issue. The court acknowledged that in none of
the instances upon which it relied had Congress enacted
positive law requiring NHTSA to promulgate a passive
restraint standard, and that Congress had merely failed
to prohibit NHTSA from doing so and had failed to exer-
cise a legislative veto of Modified Standard 208 when it
was promulgated in 1977. Such congressional inaction,
and the debates surrounding it, did not abrogate
NHTSA’s preexisting statutory authority and responsibil-
ity to determine whether Modified Standard 208 satisfied
the statutory requirements. In any event, the legislative

activities relating to NHTSA’s consideration of passive
restraints, far from indicating a firm endorsement,
demonstrate an abiding congressional concern and indeed
ambivalence regarding mandatory passive restraints.

II.

Even if the court of appeals were correct that
NHTSA’s rescission of the passive restraint requirement
was arbitrary and capricious, the court should have re-
manded to the agency to afford it the opportunity to
remedy the defects identified by the court and to permit
the agency to consider an appropriate effective date.

ARGUMENT

I. THE RESCISSION OF THE PASSIVE RESTRAINT
REQUIREMENT OF MODIFIED STANDARD 208
WAS NOT ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS

A. The Arbitrary And Capricious Standard Of Judi-
cial Review Reflects The Deference Congress In-
tended To Be Accorded Agency Policy Choices
Within A Statutorily Prescribed Range And Is
Consistent With The Legislative Nature Of Agency
Rulemaking

1. The text and origins of Section 10e) of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706, make clear that the
arbitrary and capricious standard of judicial review was
not intended to permit a court to interfere with an
agency’s expert judgment as to how statutory policy
should be implemented within the limits established by
Congress. [TIhe fact that [a court] might not have
made the same determination on the same facts does not
warrant a substitution of judicial for administrative dis-
cretion since Congress has confided the problem to the
latter.“ CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 394 (1981), quot-
ing FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223, 229 (1946). The
arbitrary and capricious standard of review represents,
rather, an outer limit on the exercise of administrative

23

discretion. It was intended for those rare situations in
which the action in question may literally fall within the
scope of the agency’s power, but in which the power was
exercised in a manner that so far departs from what
must reasonably have been in the contemplation of Con-
gress (or from the restraints on arbitrary governmental
action imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment) as to be, in substance if not in form, beyond
the agency’s authority.

This understanding of the applicable scope of judicial
review is reflected in the language of 5 U.S.C. 706(2)
(A), which provides that a reviewing court may set
aside agency action found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law.” The words “arbitrary,” “capricious” and “abuse of
discretion” are recited with such regularity in the domain
of administrative law that their very familiarity may
have come to mask their intended meaning. Given their
ordinary meaning, however, these terms in fact connote a
willful irrationality, randomness, whim, or impropriety
in the exercise of congressionally delegated power.!“ Simi-
larly, the use of the word “otherwise” in introducing the
concluding phrase in 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A) underscores
that a court is authorized by that provision to set aside
agency action challenged as arbi‘®ary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion only in those situations in which it is
of a type that must be deemed “not in accordance with
law” and therefore not authorized by Congress. The re-
viewing court’s own view that the agency action was
unwise or erroneous is insufficient.

The legislative history of the APA confirms this inter-
pretation of 5 U.S.C. 706 (2) (A). Section 10(e) of the
APA, 5 U.S.C. 706, was not intended to establish broad
new standards for judicial review of administrative

is See Webster’s Third International Dictionary (1976), at 8
(“abuse”), 110 (“arbitrary”), and 333 (“capricious”).

24

action. Rather, the APA largely restated prevailing prin-

ciples of judicial review.“ As the Senate Judiciary Com-

mittee explained:
It is not possible to specify all instances in which
judicial review may operate. Subsection (e), there-
fore, seeks merely to restate the several categories of
questions of law subject to judicial review. Each
category has been recognized (see Final Report, At-
torney General’s Committee, pp. 87 et seg. I). The
several categories, constantly repeated by courts in
the course of judicial decisions or opinions, were first
established by the Supreme Court as the minimum
requisite under the Constitution (Interstate Com-
merce Commission v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 215 U.S.
452, 470 (1910); Interstate Commerce Commission
v. Union Pac. R. Co., 222 U.S. 541, 547 (1912 and
have also been carried into State practice, in part at
least, as the result of the identical due process
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, applicable to
the States, and the Fifth Amendment, applicable to
the Federal Government (New York & Queens Gas
Co. v. McCall, 245 U.S. 345, 348 (1917)). The fifth
category necessarily limits the substantial evidence
rule to cases in which Congress has required an ad-
ministrative hearing in which the administratve rec-
ord may be made.

Senate Judiciary Committee Print (June 1945), as repro-
duced in Legislative History, Adminstratve Procedure
Act, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1946).

19 See S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. 38, 43-44 (1945);
Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act
93, 108 (1947). This Court has given weight to the Attorney Gen-
eral’s contemporaneous interpretation of the APA, since the Justice
Department was heavily involved in the legislative process that
resulted in its enactment. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441
U.S. 281, 302 n.31 (1979); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
v. NRDC, supra, 435 U.S. at 546.

20 Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, Report of
the Committee on Administrative Procedure Appointed by the At-
torney General, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. (1941) (here-
inafter “Final Report’).

25

This description of the judicial review provisions of the

APA is especially instructive here for several reasons.
First, in JCC v. Illinois Central R.R., 215 U.S. 452, 470

(1910), cited by the Committee, the Court stated:

Beyond controversy, in determining whether an
order of the commission shall be suspended or set
aside, we must consider, a, all relevant questions of
constitutional power or right; b, all pertinent ques-
tions as to whether the administrative order is
within the scope of the delegated authority under
which it purports to have been made; and, c, a prop-
osition which we state independently, although in its
essence it may be contained in the previous one, viz.,
whether, even although the order be in form within
the delegated power, nevertheless it must be treated
as not embraced therein, because the exertion of au-
thority which is questioned has been manifested in
such an unreasonable manner as to cause it, in truth,
to be within the elementary rule that the substance,
and not the shadow, determines the validity of the
exercise of the power.

These three bases of judicial review find direct analogs in
the first three subsections of 5 U.S.C. 706(2).

The first and second factors described by the Court in
Illinois Central R.R. are reflected in 5 U.S.C. 706(2) (B)
and (C), which authorize a reviewing court to set aside
agency action found to be “contrary to constitutional
right, power, privilege, or immunity” or “in excess of
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short
of statutory right.” The third basis for setting aside
agency action identified by the Court is, in turn, reflected
in the arbitrary and capricious standard of review in 5
U.S.C. 706(2)(A). This direct parallel thus confirms
that the arbitrary and capricious standard was intended
to permit a reviewing court to set aside agency action
only where power is exercised in such an unreasonable
manner as to be, in effect, the equivalent of action that is
outside of the scope of the authority delegated to the
agency. The formulations employed by the Court in JCC

26

v. Union Pacific R.R., 222 U.S. 541, 547 (1912), and New
York & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 245 U.S. 345, 348
(1917), also cited by the Senate Committee, are similar.“

It also is instructive that in its explanation of Section
10(e) of the APA, the Senate Judiciary Committee com-
pared the standards of review under the APA to the
minimum standards thought to be necessary to satisfy
the requirements of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. This
suggests that where the validity of an agency rule is con-
cerned, a reviewing court charged with the task of deter-
mining whether the rule is authorized by the governing
statute performs a function akin to determining whether
a statute is authorized by the Constitution. This analogy
is, of course, reinforced by decisions of this Court rec-
ognizing that agency regulations of general applicability
that have the force and effect of law are much like leg-
islation and, indeed, are characterized as “legislative”
rules. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,
302-303 (1979); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425
n.9 (1977); see also Industrial Union Department v.
American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 663 (1980)

21 In language presaging its later decisions under the APA, the
Court stressed in Illinois Central R. R. that it could not, “under the
guise of exerting judicial power, usurp merely administrative func-
tion by setting aside a lawful administrative order upon [the
Court's] conception as to whether the administrative power has been
wisely exercised.” 215 U.S. at 470. Under the pre-APA cases, then, it
was not sufficient for a court to set aside administrative action that
it “shall appear to be unwise or burdensome or inferior to another,”
since [error or unwisdom is not equivalent to abuse.” American
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232, 236
(1936) ; see also id. at 237 (regulations could be invalidated if they
were “the expression of a whim rather than an exercise of judg-
ment“); Pacific States Bor & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 186
(1935); and Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Pitcairn Coal Co., 215 U.S.
481, 494 (1910), and Kansas City Southern Ry. v. United States,
231 U.S. 423, 443-444 (1913), cited in New York & Queens Gas Co.
v. McCall, supra, 245 U.S. at 348.

27

(Burger, C.J., concurring) .” In much the same way as a
legislature, albeit within the narrower limits defined by
Congress itself, administrative agencies are charged with
the duty to assess relevant factual and policy considera-
tions and to “weigh the competing interests and arrive at
a balance that is deemed ‘the public convenience and
necessity.T Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-
Best Freight System, Inc., supra, 419 U.S. at 293.

Except where an Act of Congress contravenes a specific
constitutional limitation, a court may strike down the
statute only if it is not rationally related to a legitimate
governmental purpose. See, e. g., Hodel v. Virginia Sur-
face Mining & Reclamation Association, 452 U.S. 264,
276 (1981); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323-324
(1981) ; Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981).
This Court’s formulation of the test for assessing the
validity of agency regulations under the arbitrary and
capricious test is quite similar: such rules may be set
aside only “if they are not rational and based on a con-
sideration of the relevant factors.” FCC v. National Citi-
zens Committee for Broadcasting, supra, 436 U.S. at 803.

2. The foregoing discussion of the text and background
of 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A) demonstrates that NHTSA’s ac-
tion in this case was not arbitrary or capricious. Rescis-
sion of the passive restraint requirement plainly was
within the limits prescribed by Congress, for the Safety
Act expressly authorizes the Secretary to “amend or
revoke any Federal motor vehicle safety standard” (15
U.S.C. 1892(e)). Nor is there anything to suggest that

2 The Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee on
Administrative Procedure states (at 27), for example, that “sub-
stantive regulations have many of the attributes of statutes them-
selves and are well described as subordinate legislation.” See also
S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. 39 (1945).

The Final Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on
Administrative Procedure proposed a similar standard (at 117):
whether there is “a rational relationship between a regulation and
the governing statute.”

NHTSA exercised its conceded power in such an unrea-
sonable manner that it must be deemed “not in accordance
with law” and hence, in substance, outside of the limits of
authority conferred by Congress. To the contrary, the
agency’s exercise of its power under 15 U.S.C. 1392(e)
was strictly “in accordance with law”: the decision to
rescind was based on the agency’s conclusion that it could
not affirmatively find that the criteria set forth in the law
itself were satisfied, in view of the substantial uncer-
tainty, acknowledged by the court below, that any signifi-
cant safety benefits would accrue. A decision so directly
related to the statutory criteria, taken pursuant to an ex-
press grant of authority to amend or revoke a safety
standard, cannot be thought to have so far departed from
what may reasonably have been within the contemplation
of Congress as to be deemed unauthorized.

The parallel between the statutory arbitrary and capri-
cious standard and constitutional restraints further rein-
forces this conclusion. Applying the usual constitutional
test, NHTSA’s order rescinding the passive restraint
requirement plainly is rationally related to the purposes
and limitations of the Safety Act. But in addition, it is
significant that absent invidious purpose or classification,
the Constitution imposes no restrictions on the authority
of a legislature to repeal a statute—even though a
rational basis would have been necessary to support en-
actment of the statute. Crawford v. Board of Education
of Los Angeles, No. 81-38 (June 30, 1982), slip op. 7,
10-11; Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 390 n.5 (1969) ;
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 375 (1967). This
suggests that a court must be extremely reluctant under
the APA to set aside an agency’s decision to rescind a

regulation that was not required by its authorizing
statute, irrespective of whatever standard of reasonable-

24 The Constitution likewise affords an administrative body broad
latitude to rescind prior action. Dayton Board of Education v.
Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 531 n.5 (1979) ; Dayton Board of Education
v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 414 (1977).

ness is applicable to the promulgation of the regulation.
A rule of administrative law that tends to “lock in” an
agency so that action taken cannot be undone, like a con-
stitutional rule to the same effect, would in the long run
deter valuable experimentation. Crawford v. Board of
Education of Los Angeles, supra, slip op. 7, 10-11 & n.22;
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 228 (1971) (Burger,
C.J., concurring) .

B. The Court Of Appeals Erred In Concluding That It
Was Arbitrary And Capricious For NHTSA To
Rescind The Passive Pestraint Requirement On The
Basis Of Substantiai Uncertainty That It Would
Produce Significant Safety Benefits

Despite NHTSA’s thorough and reasoned assessment of
Modified Standard 208 in light of the relevant statutory
criteria, the court of appeals held that NHTSA acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in rescinding the passive
restraint requirement. In the court’s view, it was not
sufficient, in order for NHTSA to rescind the require-
ment, that there was “substantial uncertainty” whether
usage rates would increase with the installation of de-
tachable passive belts and therefore whether the require-
ment would actually produce significant safety benefits.
Rather, the court held, NHTSA must affirmatively demon-
strate to the satisfaction of the reviewing court that
Modified Standard 208 will not produce the benefits on
which its promulgation in 1977 was premised before it
may amend the Standard (Pet. App. 51a). This unprece-
dented holding is flatly inconsistent with the limited role
of a reviewing court under the arbitrary and capricious
standard.

The court pointed to nothing in the language or legis-
lative history of either the APA or the Safety Act to sup-
port its holding. Nor did it cite any judicial precedent.
The best the court could do was to state the point in
reverse: it would be unreasonable, the court explained,
for an agency to promulgate a regulation in the first

instance simply because of “substantial uncertainty” that
the status quo—i.e., the absence of a regulation—was any
better (Pet. App. 51a). Conversely, the court apparently
believed, an agency cannot alter the status quo by rescind-
ing a regulation on the basis of substantial uncertainty”
that the regulation will accomplish its intended purpose
in an efficient manner. This reasoning is both illogical
and contrary to the text and structure of the Safety Act.

The court of appeals is quite correct that the Secretary
would be justified in declining to promulgate a safety
standard in the first instance if he were uncertain that
the standard would be better than no standard at all,
because in that event the Secretary might well be unable
to make an affirmative finding that the proposal satisfied
the statutory requirements that a standard be appropri-
ate, reasonable, practicable, and meet the need for motor
vehicle safety. But the court of appeals drew the wrong
conclusion from its initial premise. It is precisely because
the Secretary reasonably may decline to isswe a safety
standard in the first instance if he has substantial doubts
about its efficacy that the Secretary also may decline to
retain such a standard if he has developed similar doubts.
For in the latter situation, no less than the former, the
Secretary may be unable to make the affirmative finding
that the standard satisfies the statutory criteria for a
safety standard to be in effect.”

* The court of appeals itself appeared to recognize this point,
conceding that “[i]mplicitly, the perpetuation of a regulation also
involves a decision that its continuation is worthwhile, and reason-
able decisionmaking requires that this too be supported by rea-
sons” (Pet. App. 54a). The court stated that if NHTSA was un-
certain that usage rates would increase under the Standard as
written, it reasonably could have suspended the Standard (ibid.).
The court failed to explain why, if the agency would be free to
suspend the Standard (presumably for as long as the uncertainty
persisted), the agency was not free to rescind it. Whether the
Standard were suspended or rescinded, the agency would be free to
reinstate the Standard at a later date if evidence indicated that it
would fulfill the statutory purposes.

31

Nor is the court of appeals’ holding defensible on the
theory that an agency is required to make an affirmative
showing whenever it departs from the status quo, whether
the movement is from the absence to the existence of a
regulation on a particular subject, or the reverse. The
pertinent inquiry is not whether the agency has altered
the status quo or maintained it, but rather what limits
the governing statute places on the agency action in
question. In this case, although the Safety Act requires
the Secretary to make an affirmative finding that a stand-
ard satisfies the statutory criteria before he may place
the standard into effect, the Act requires no affirmative
finding that the statutory criteria will not be satisfied for
there to be an adsence of a safety standard in a partic-
ular area. The court of appeals therefore was without
authority to insist that NHTSA affirmatively estabiish to
the court’s satisfaction that the passive restraint require-
ment would not produce the requisite safety benefits
before it could rescind that requirement.“

As the court of appeals recognized, then, “rescission
more resembles agency refusal] to act than an agency deci-
sion to act” (Pet. App. 25a), because the effect of rescis-
sion is that the agency has refused to supply a regulation
on the subject in question. And as the court of appeals
further acknowledged, “it is only in the rarest and most
compelling circumstances that courts overturn an agency’s
expert“ determination not to pursue a particular pro-
gram or policy at a given time’” (ibid., citing WWHT,
Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807, 818-819 (D.C. Cir. 1981), and
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d
1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ) ; see also S. Rep. No. 752, supra,
at 44. No such compelling circumstances are present
here. The responsibility of the court below was limited to

26 The Safety Act essentially embodies a congressional presump-
tion against regulation, which may only be overcome in specifically
defined circumstances. The court of appeals’ opinion, in contrast,
embodies the opposite presumption in any area in which a safety
standard has been promulgated.

determining whether NHTSA rationally could have be-
lieved in the circumstances presented that sufficient un-
certainty existed to counsel rescission of the rule. FSC v.
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 423 U.S. 326, 331
(1976); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,
supra, 401 U.S. at 416. Once the court of appeals con-
cluded that NHTSA was reasonable in its assessment of
the uncertainty regarding usage rates (Pet. App. 5la),
its role in reviewing NHTSA’s action was at an end.“
Agency action is not rendered invalid because the rec-
ord does not contain firm proof that the eventualities on

27 The court of appeals stated that if NHTSA believed that passive
belts now in use cannot be the basis for predicting usage rates under
Modified Standard 208, “then only a well justified refusal to seek
more evidence could render rescission non-arbitrary” (Pet. App.
53a). The only authority the court cited for this proposition was
its own prior decision in National Association of Demolition Con-
tractors v. Costle, 505 F.2d 748, 751-752 (1977). But the court
there sustained E.’A’s decision not to conduct the test in question.
In any event, that case involved a challenge to EPA’s failure to
conduct a test before adopting a regulation, and it therefore
presented the question whether further evidence was neccssary to
sustain an agency’s action imposing a regulatory burden. That
decision does not support the imposition of a requirement that an
agency obtain additional evidence before rescinding a regulation.

Even if the court of appeals were correct that generation of fur-
ther data on usage rates might be desirable, it clearly exceeded its
authority in requiring that Modified Standard 208 remain in effect
until those data were obtained. The question whether manufacturers
and consumers should be required to devote their scarce resources
to compliance with the Standard pending further study is a matter
uniquely within the competence and discretion of the expert agency
to which Congress has entrusted these difficult issues of statutory
policy. Cf. FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., supra,
423 U.S. at 329-331. Moreover, 15 U.S.C. 1392(f)(1) provides that
in prescribing standards, the Secretary shall “consider relevant
available motor vehicle safety data (emphasis added). This lan-
guage suggests that a safety standard should re’ be in effect if the
data thought necessary to support it are not available. If this Court
sustains the rescission of the passive restraint requirement, NHTSA
will of course remain free to reinstate such a requirement in the
future if further experience or studies show that it would satisfy the
statutory criteria.

which the action is premised will actually occur, where
the agency’s determinations : primarily of a judg-
menial or predictive nature. “in such circumstances com-
plete factual support in the record for the [agency’s]
judgment or prediction is not possible or required; ‘a
forecast of the direction in which future public interest
lies necessarily involves deductions based on the expert
knowledge of the agency.“ FCC v. National Citizens
Committee for Broadcasting, supra, 436 U.S. at 814, quot-
ing FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365
U.S. 1, 29 (1961). See also FCC v. WNCN Listeners
Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 594-595 (1981). It likewise is not
“possible or required” in this case that NHTSA point to
concrete data on the probable use of detachable passive
belts under a safety standard that has not yet gone into
effect. Especially where, as here, an agency seeks merely
to withdraw a burdensome rule that was premised on a
prior forecast of benefits that has since been found to be
of doubtful validity, rather than to impose new burdens
in the face of uncertain conditions, the agency cannot be
precluded from acting because it has been unable to go
further and develop evidence to prove that the forecast
was actually wrong. Cf. NAACP v. FCC, 682 F.2d 993,
1000-1001 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

Moreover, this Court has stressed that an administra-
tive agency must remain free to reassess its regulatory
policies and adapt them to changing circumstances. FCC
v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, supra,
436 U.S. at 811; Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390
U.S. 747, 784 (1968); American Trucking Associations,
Inc. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 387 U.S. 397, 416 (1967).
An agency “should be alert to the consequences of its
policies and should stand ready to alter its rule if neces-
sary to serve the public interest more fully.” FCC v.
WNCN Listeners Guild, supra, 450 U.S. at 603, citing
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,
225 (1943). See Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Trans-
portation, supra, 472 F.2d at 673; PACCAR, Ine. v.

34

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 573
F.2d 632, 642 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862
(1978). The decision of the court of appeals conflicts
with these principles of administrative discretion and
flexibility by erecting a judicial barrier to the revision of
regulatory policy, in the form of a requirement that the
agency first convince the reviewing court that any pre-
viously promulgated rule will not serve the statutory pur-
poses. The long term effect under this and like statutes **
may be not only to freeze existing regulations that have
become outmoded, but to chill experimentation in the
future for fear that what is done cannot later be readily
undone f it proves unwise or ineffective. Cf. Crawford v.
Board of Education of Los Angeles, supra, slip op. 7,
10-11 & n.22.

To be sure, where an agency changes from a “settled
course,” it may have some duty to explain that change.
Atchison, T & S. F. Ry. v. Wichita Board of Trade, 412
U.S. 800, 807-808 (1973). But this procedural require-
ment does not alter an agency’s substantive authority to
“flatly repudiate [prior] norms, deciding, for example,
that changed circumstances mean that they are no longer
required in order to effectuate congressional policy.” Jd.
at 808. Here, as explained above (see pages 7-11, supra),
NHTSA fully explained its decision to rescind the
passive restraint requirement in light of such changed
circumstances.

In any event, there hardly has been a “settled course”
by NHTSA over the years regarding the mandating of
passive restraints. Although NHTSA has considered the
issue of automatic restraints since 1969, no requirement
that such devices be installed has ever gone into effect.
With the exception of the periods from 1970 to 1972 and
from 1977 to 1981, when a mandatory passive restraint
requirement was in place for the future, the issue has at
most only been under consideration by the agency or, as

28 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 77sss(a) ; 15 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1193(j); 15
U.S.C. (Supp. V) 2056(a); 21 U.S.C. 360d(a)(2)(A); 30 U.S.C.
(Supp. V) 811(a).

35

in the period following Secretary Coleman’s decision and
now, subject to an affirmative judgment that automatic
restraints should not be mandated under prevailing con-
ditions. See pages 3-8, supra.“ Indeed, Secretary Adams’
promulgation of Modified Standard 208 was itself a sharp
break with Secretary Coleman’s decision just four months
earlier, and that break occurred in the absence of an
intervening change of circumstances of the kind that
warranted reexamination of the rule in 1981.

C. The Decision To Rescind The Passive Restraint Re-
quirement In Modified Standard 208 Was Not Ren-
dered Arbitrary And Capricious Simply Because
The Agency Did Not First Consider Whether Some
Other Version Of A Passive Restraint Requirement
Would Satisfy The Statutory Criteria

The court of appeals also held that, even if NHTSA
had correctly concluded that Modified Standard 208 is
“unjustified as written” (Pet. App. 49a), its rescission of
the passive restraint requirement of Modified Standard
208 was arbitrary and capricious because the agency
“artificially foreclosed attempts to further the purpose of
the Safety Act” by not considering certain other alterna-
tive courses of action (ibid.; see id. at 54a-66a). This
holding is clearly wrong, because NHTSA’s rescission of
one particular version of a passive restraint requirement
in no way foreclosed the consideration of other options.

As an initial matter, the court of appeals itself
acknowledged that the agency adequately considered the
three alternatives to rescission that were set forth in the
April 9, 1981 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: reversing
the sequence of compliance; requiring simultaneous com-
pliance; and amending the Standard to exempt the front

20 Nor has NHTSA abandoned its support of passive restraints.
Such restraints remain one means of compliance with Modified
Standard 208 (49 C. F. R. 571.208/S4.1.2.1), and NHTSA could rein-
state a mandatory passive restraint requirement at some point in
the future if further developments warrant. See also note 27, supra.

center seating position. The court found NHTSA’s anal-
ysis of these alternatives to be “impressively thorough
and careful” (Pet. App. 55a & n.32). But the court con-
cluded that NHTSA also should have considered whether
to amend the passive restraint requirement to permit
compliance by airbags or by belts only if they are
nondetachable.

Moreover, NHTSA in fact did consider whether it
should mandate some kind of use-compelling device, such
as continuous belts. NHTSA concluded that it should not,
based on past congressional reaction to use-compelling
devices, public fears about being trapped, and the possible
complications of extrication after an accident (Pet. App.
109a-112a). These reasons, tied directly to the statutory
criteria of practicability and the need for safety, fully
supported rejection of this alternative. In addition, the
court acknowledged that the cost of airbags ranged from
$200 to $1000 per unit, depending upon economies of
scale, and that NHTSA had considered those costs in its
regulatory impact analysis (id. at 65a-66a; see C.A. App.
172).

In any event, the court’s insistence that NHTSA con-
sider the airbag and continuous belt alternatives as a
condition precedent to rescission of the passive restraint
requirement of Modified Standard 208 represents another
wholly unwarranted judicial intrusion into the adminis-
trative process. The principal and pressing issue before
the agency was whether the particular version of a pas-
sive restraint standard that had already been promul-
gated and was scheduled to go into effect in the near
future could be found to satisfy the statutory criteria for
a motor vehicle safety standard, not whether some other
version of a passive restraint standard that had not yet
even been proposed for public comment would satisfy
those criteria. Once NHTSA determined that it was
incapable of funding that the passive restraint require-
ment as written met the statutory cirteria, it manifestly
was reasonable for the agency to move expeditiously to

37

withdraw that requirement. Otherwise, manufacturers
would have had to devote their scarce resources to com-
plying with a safety initiative that posed a considerable
risk of being ineffective or even counterproductive.

It is significant in this regard that ever since the
Department of Transportation issued its original Stan-
dard 208 in 1967, even minor adjustments to the Standard
have been identified in notices of proposed rulemaking
before adoption. The two alternatives the court identified
in this case, however, would have required a major revi-
sion of Modified Standard 208 and would have imposed
substantial burdens on manufacturers and the public. In
these circumstances, had NHTSA actually adopted one of
the alternatives suggested by the court, it might have
faced challenges from the manufacturers and others on
the ground that its notice of proposed rulemaking did not
give adequate warning that such a rule might be adopted.
See, e.g., Kollett v. Harris, 619 F.2d 134, 144 (Ist Cir.
1980) ; Rodway v. United States Department of Agricul-
ture, 514 F.2d 809, 814-815 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Wagner
Electric Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013, 1019 (3d Cir.
1972); see also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Costle, 444 U.S. 1096,
1097-1098 (1980) (Rehnquist and Powell, JJ., dissenting
from the denial of certiorari).

The prospect of procedural challenges to one side,
principles of fairness, sound administration, and feasibil-
ity almost certainly would have required NHTSA to pub-
lish yet another notice of proposed rulemaking specifically
addressing the continuous belt and airbag options, and
this step would have been taken ony after NHTSA had
first developed proposed technical performance criteria
calculated to satisfy the statutory requirement that a
safety standard be stated in objective terms. Rulemaking
proceedings of such a complex and controversial nature
might well have taken some time for the agency to com-
plete. There is no reason in law, policy, or common sense
why NHTSA was required to retain on the books the one
passive restraint requirement that it already had evalu-

ated and found wanting while it searched for some other
standard that satisfied the statutory requirements. Only
the court of appeals’ apparent presumption in favor of
a passive restraint standard in some form can explain
its insistence that some version of such a standard remain
on the books until mandatory passive restraints were
affirmatively shown to be unworkable in all respects.
Moreover, contrary to the court of appeals’ observation,
NHTSA’s rescission of a passive restraint requirement
that was expected tu be satisfied by installation of detach-
able belts did not “foreclose” NHTSA from considering in
the future other forms of a passive restraint standard or
other options for improving occupant protection (Pet.
App. 49a). The agency remains free to conduct research
and collect data about these alternatives and to consider
them more formally in a new rulemaking proceeding
initiated by NHTSA itself or requested in a rulemaking
petition filed by an interested party pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
553(e). But nothing in the APA or the Safety Act
required that other possible courses of action be con-
sidered in the rescission proceeding rather than in an
independent proceeding focusing more directly on the
alternatives. This Court has only recently reiterated the
“very basic tenet of administrative law that agencies
should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure”
(Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, supra,
435 U.S. at 544), thereby leaving them free “ ‘to pursue
methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to dis-
charge their multitudinous duties’” (id. at 543, quoting
FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290 (1965), and FCC v.
Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 154, 143 (1940)).
The court of appeals’ imposition of its own preferred
order of proceeding is inconsistent with this admonition.
It is instructive in this regard that when Congress
intends that an agency consider alternative csurses of
action before reaching a particular decision, it has ex-
pressly so provided. For example, the highway statutes
involved in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe

39

explicitly required the Secretary to consider whether there
was a “feasible and prudent alternative” to locating a
highway in parkland. 401 U.S. at 411. Similarly, the
National Environmental Policy Act, which was the basis
of the Court’s discussion of the consideration of alterna-
tives in Vermont Yankee (435 U.S. at 549-555), explic-
itly requires that all federal agencies include in every
report of major federal action significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment “a detailed statement
by the responsible official on * * * alternatives to the
proposed action.” 42 U.S.C. 4332 (C) (iii). In Pillai v.
CAB, 485 F.2d 1018, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cited by the
court of appeals (Pet. App. 49a), Congress had enacted
a statute for the purpose of conferring a regulatory
option on the CAB to be employed in the context of
international negotiations such as those at issue in that
case, yet the CAB had failed to address that alternative.
485 F.2d at 1027-1029. And in Scenic Hudson Preserva-
tion Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966), also cited by the court
below (Pet. App. 56a), the FPC had conceded that under
the applicable statute, 16 U.S.C. 803(a), it was required
to consider alternatives to licensing that might better pro-
tect recreational values. 354 F.2d at 614, 617.

The Safety Act, on the other hand, contains no com-
parable requirement that alternatives be considered. Nor
does the APA. Indeed, in contrast to the detailed con-
sideration of environmental factors required under
NEPA, the informal rulemaking provisions of the APA
require only the publication of a notice of proposed rule-
making, an opportunity for comment, and the incorpora-
tion in the rules adopted of “a concise genera] statement
of their basis and purpose.” 5 U.S.C. 553(c). There is no
explicit requirement to discuss or consider other possible
rules that were not ultimately adopted.” Given Congress’

%© Compare 5 U.S.C. 557(c)(A), which requires a statement of
“findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefor, on all

40

mandate in one statute of government-wide application—
NEPA—that alternatives be considered, courts should be
reluctant to read such a requirement into another statute
of government-wide application—the APA—that does not
expressly so provide.

It is significant, moreover, that Overton Park, Vermont
Yankee, Pillai, and Scenic Hudson all involved the con-
sideration of alternatives before the agency took action.
Even if we assume that the Safety Act and the APA
might likewise require NHTSA, before adopting a motor
vehicle safety standard, to address alternative standards
or other courses suggested by interested parties or by
NHTSA itself—in order to provide some assurance that
the standard ultimately selected is sufficiently “appropri-
ate,” “practicable” and “reasonable” and will “meet the
need for motor vehicle safety” when compared to others—
NHTSA would have no such obligation before rescinding
a safety standard. There is no requirement that the
quoted statutory criteria be satisfied for there to be an
absence of a safety standard, and there accordingly is no
basis for requiring consideration of alternative means by
which the statutory criteria might be met.“

the material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the
record.”

31 The court of appeals also suggested (Pet. App. 57a-58a) that
NHTSA’s doubts about the effectiveness of detachable automatic
belts in increasing belt usage over the rates experienced for manual
belts means that detachable automatic belts might not be “passive
restraints” at all. In the court’s view, it would be irrational for
NHTSA to rescind the passive restraint requirement based on indus-
try plans to install detachable belts that do not even comply with
the Standard. This reasoning is erroneous.

It always has been understood that detachable automatic belts
comply with Standard 208. Indeed, until 1978, if belts rather than
airbags were to be installed to comply with the Standard, such belts
were required to be detachable by means of a latch mechanism, in
order to permit emergency exit. See note 8, supra. When at-
tached, a detachable belt provides complete passive protection, be-

41

D. The Court Of Appeals Erred In Concluding That
“Legislative Reaction” To The Passive Restraint
Of The

Issue, Short Enactment Of Positive Law,
Narrowed The Scope Of NHTSA’s Discretion To
Rescind The Passive Restraint Requirement

Underlying the court of appeals’ other holdings, dis-
cussed in Parts B and C, supra, was its view that
NHTSA’s discretion under the Safety Act to amend or
revoke the mandatory passive restraint provisions of
Modified Standard 208 had been restricted by various
episodes of “legislative reaction” to the passive restraint
issue. The court’s reading of the legislative record as
reflecting a firm and consistent congressional commitment
to mandatory passive restraints is erroneous. But aside
from this misreading of the legislative materials, the
court’s unprecedented suggestion that congressional inac-
tion and the consideration of bills never enacted can some-
how narrow an agency’s discretion under previously
enacted law is inconsistent with the explicit constitutional

cause no action by the occupant is necessary for the belt to be
placed in position around him when the door is closed. That mem-
bers of the public might use the emergency latch mechanism to
detach the belt permanently, as NHTSA predicted, does not
undermine the belts’ passive nature. The court of appeals’ sugges-
tion that such belts do not satisfy Standard 208 therefore is wholly
unfounded.

In any event, the court of appeals’ speculation about the “passive”
nature of detachable belts is a bootstrap. The issue before the
court of appeals was not whether a detachable belt satisfies the
“passive restraint” requirements of the Standard, because NHTSA,
in the very action under review here, has rescinded that require-
ment. A standard expressed in “passive restraint” terms is not
compelled by the Act, and the appropriateness of NHTSA's action
therefore is not to be measured in those terms. The court instead
was required to review NHTSA’s decision under the explicit statu-
tory criteria of practicability, reasonableness, and the need for
safety, on which NHTSA had relied, irrespective of the court’s own
view of whether detachable belts are “active” or “passive” restraints
as a theoretica matter.

42

prerequisites for according legally binding effect to the
actions of Congress.

1. a. The first episode upon which the court of appeals
relied was Congress’ enactment in 1974 of the prohibition
against an ignition interlock standard and of the provi-
sion for a legislative veto of any standard requiring or
permitting compliance by means of airbags. Pet. App.
33a-36a; see 15 U.S.C. 1410b. As the court of appeals
acknowledged (id. at 34a), these amendments had their
origins in a floor amendment, adopted by the House by an
overwhelming vote of 339-49 (120 Cong. Rec. 27822-
27823 (1974)), that would have barred NHTSA from
requiring ignition interlocks or passive restraints (id. at
27815). The debates were replete with objections that the
interlock standard then in effect interfered with the occu-
pant’s freedom of choice and would impose excessive costs
(id. at 11789, 11969, 16326, 18221, 27815-27822) .*

The Conference Committee proposed and Congress
enacted the compromise embodied in 15 U.S.C. 1410b,
which bars ignition interlocks and provides for a legisla-
tive veto of any future imposition of a nonbelt passive
restraint standard. The Conference Committee substitute
reflected the fact that a standard mandating passive
restraints had not yet been adopted by NHTSA following
the Sixth Circuit’s decisions in Chrysler Corp. and Ford
Motor (see pages 4-5, supra) and that the Members
“(did] not know what lies ahead in the field of passive
restraints” in view of questions about the adaptability of
airbags to smaller cars, indications that the utility of air-
bags is limited primarily to head-on collisions, and
uncertainty about the cost of airbags. 120 Cong. Rec.

32 For the same reasons, the Senate also had gone on record, by
passing an amendment to a pending highway aid bill by a vote of
64-21, as opposing the ignition interlock requirement and favoring
congressional review of any mandatory passive restraint standard.
120 Cong. Rec. 30558, 30836-30850 (1974).

35637 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Wyman) ; see also id. at
27819-27820, 30849 (letters from Department of Trans-
portation stating that no final decision had yet been made
with respect to mandating passive restraints). Congress’
restricting of NHTSA’s freedom even to adopt occupant
restraint standards in these circumstances scarcely can be
viewed as an endorsement of passive restraints, much less
as an expression of intent to restrict NHTSA’s freedom
to rescind whatever passive restraint standard might be
adopted in the future because of doubts about its
effectiveness.

b. The second “legislative reaction” upon which the
court of appeals relied was Congress’ failure to exercise
a legislative veto of Modified Standard 208 when it was
promulgated in 1977. Pet. App. 36a-37a. The court of
appeals noted that the Senate voted 65-31 to table a reso-
lution of disapproval, following a debate during which a
number of Senators spoke favorably about the Standard,
and that the responsible House Committee voted to table a
resolution of disapproval. From this, the court leaves the
misleading impression of pervasive congressional ap-
proval of Secretary Adams’ decision. Ibid., 123 Cong.
Rec. 33318-33332 (1977). What the court fails to note,
however, is the substantial hostility to the Standard in
the House of Representatives. The resolution of disap-
proval had 160 sponsors in the House, and it was tabled
in committee by the narrow vote of 16-14. 124 Cong. Rec.
17186 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Shuster); id. at 17189
(remarks of Rep. Broomfield).

Indeed, because the full House was deprived of an
opportunity to vote on the passive restraint issue in 1977,
Representative Shuster offered a floor amendment in 1978
to NHTSA’s Fiscal Year 1979 appropriations bill barring
the use of funds to implement or enforce any standard
that required any motor vehicle to be equipped with an
occupant restraint system other than a belt system. Al-
though the Members recognized that the amendment to

11

the appropriations bill would have limited practical
importance because Modified Standard 208 was not sched-
uled to go into effect until well after the end of Fiscal
Year 1979, the rider was touted as the “only vehicle left
for Members to express themselves” on the passive
restraint issue (124 Cong. Rec. 17186 (1978) (remarks
of Rep. Shuster) ; see also id. at 17189 (remarks of Rep.
Daniel) ; id. at 17191 (remarks of Rep. Devine); id. at
17194 (remarks of Rep. Dingell) ; id. at 17197 (remarks
of Rep. Broyhill)). The amendment was adopted by a
vote of 237-143 (id. at 17199), following an extensive
debate during which the Standard was attacked on the
grounds that it would be expensive and ineffective and
would constitute an irritating and unwarranted expansion
of the regulatory role of government at the expense of
personal freedom in the same manner as the interlock
requirement overturned in 1974. Id. at 17186-17199.

Thus, the expression of sentiment by the House of
Representatives that was most contemporaneous to the
promulgation of Modified Standard 208 was strongly
against implementation of the passive restraint require-
ment. The rider was enacted into law, Pub. L. No.
95-335, Section 317, 92 Stat. 450, and it was reenacted in
the appropriations act for Fiscal Year 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-131, Section 317, 93 Stat. 1039, following similar
debate in the House of Representatives. 125 Cong. Rec.
H8055, H8066 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1979).

e. The final episode upon which the court of appeals
relied was Congress’ consideration in 1979 and 1980 of
proposals, never enacted into law, that would have either
overturned or amended Modified Standard 208. Pet. App.
38a-46a. As before, the congressional reaction began with
an overwhelming vote of the House of Representatives
against mandatory passive restraints—this time, a vote
of 320 to 73 in favor of an amendment to a pending au-
thorization bill to bar NHTSA from spending funds to

45

administer an occupant restraint standard unless the
standard permitted the purchaser of the vehicle to select
manual rather than passive restraints. 125 Cong. Rec.
12285-12287 (1979).

The Conference Committee reported a substitute meas-
ure that would have required NHTSA to amend Standard
208 to postpone the initial compliance date by one year, to
reverse the compliance schedule, and to mandate that
each of the five largest manufacturers make airbags
available in one vehicle line for three years. H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 1371, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-17 (1980). If
the Conference Committee’s proposal had been enacted
into law, it presumably would have constituted a ratifica-
tion of Modified Standard 208 to the extent that Congress
did not order amendment of the Standard.“ But the pro-
posal was not enacted. It passed the Senate, 126 Cong.
Rec. 813506 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1980), but failed in the
House because it did not garner the votes necessary to be
passed under a suspension or waiver of the House Rules
that barred House conferees from agreeing to new mat-
ter. 126 Cong. Rec. H10194-H10198 (dai ed. Oct. 1,
1980), 126 Cong. Rec. H11912-H11918 (daily ed. Dec. 4,
1980) .*

2. The court of appeals plainly erred in viewing this
history as reflecting a congressional commitment to man-

Even that ratification of the Standard as promulgated in 1977
presumably would not have barred NHTSA from amending the
Standard in light of changed circumstances, as it did here. See
126 Cong. Rec. H12120 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1980) (remarks of Rep.
Dingell).

% It is ironic that the court of appeals should rely on the 1980
Conference Committee proposal, since that proposal undermines
the court’s conclusion that NHTSA’s action was arbitrary and
capricious because it did not first consider the alternatives of re-
quiring automatic belts to be nondetachable and mandating the
installation of airbags in all vehicles. The Conference Committee
proposal would have required that all automatic belts be detachable
and that airbags be offered as an option only by the five largest
manufacturers and only in one line, rather than mandating that
they be installed in all vehicles.

46

datory passive restraints. To the contrary, it reflects at
most an ambivalence and political sensitivity on the sub-
ject that underscores the impropriety of the court of
appeals’ substitution of its judgment for that of the
expert agency Congress has charged with administering
the Safety Act.

However, even assuming that the court of appeals were
correct that sentiment in Congress at one time or another
has favored passive restraints, the court’s reliance on the
episodes described above nevertheless was misplaced. Con-
gress has never enacted a Jaw mandating the promulga-
tion of a passive restraint standard, as it has, for exam-
ple, in mandating certain school bus standards. See 15
U.S.C. 1392 (i). The court’s opinion instead gives legally
binding effect to congressional debates, resolutions, and
failures to act that fall short of duly enacted law, con-
cluding that such “legislative reaction” requires a more
demanding standard of judicial review and has thereby
effectively withdrawn a large measure of the discretion
NHTSA was accorded under the Safety Act to amend or
revoke the passive restraint requirement. This result
violates the bicameralism and presentation requirements
of Article I, Sections1, 7, and 8 of the Constitution and
conflicts with the doctrine of separation of powers. See
Brief for the Immigration and Naturalization Service at
17-40, 44-56, INS v. Chadha (Nos. 80-1832, 80-2170 and
80-2171, 1981 Term).

This is not a case, like Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1,
17-18 (1965), upon which the court of appeals relied
(Pet. App. 47a), in which legislative acquiescence in an
administrative interpretation of a statute may be cited as
evidence of the correctness of that interpretation.
NHTSA has not disputed that the Safety Act may be in-
terpreted to authorize the promulgation of a passive re-
straint standard—if NHTSA determines that such a
standard satisfies the criteria set forth in the Safety
Act. Here, the court of appeals relied upon the legisla-

47

tive activity not as a guide to the meaning of the Safety
Act as originally enacted, but rather as effectively cir-
cumscribing the power conferred on NHTSA by that Act
to determine whether to issue a motor vehicle safety
standard and whether the proposed standard satisfies the
statutory criteria.

II. EVEN IF NHTSA’S RESCISSION OF THE PASSIVE
RESTRAINT REQUIREMENT WERE INVALID,
THE COURT OF APPEALS EXCEEDED ITS AU-
THORITY BY SETTING AN EFFECTIVE DATE
FOR THAT REQUIREMENT PENDING FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS

Although the court of appeals, in its June 1, 1982 opin-
ion, set aside NHTSA’s rescission of the passive restraint
requirement, the court expressly denied the request by
respondents State Farm and NAII that Modified Stand-
ard 208 take full effect on September 1, 1982 or 1983
(Pet. App. 72a). The court explained that its opinion did
not foreclose rescission or suspension of the Standard
after further administrative proceedings and that auto-
mobile manufacturers “would justifiably feel uncertain”
about the technology that would satisfy the Standard
because of the possibility that it would be revised after
those proceedings (ibid.). The court therefore ordered a
“remand” to NHTSA with directions to submit to the
court within 30 days a schedule for resolving the ques-
tions raised by the court’s opinion, leading either to a
rescission or suspension of the Standard or to a judicially
approved schedule for the effective implementation of that
or an amended standard (id. at 72a, 74a, 161a).

In its August 4, 1982 memorandum, the court of ap-
peals found that NHTSA’s proposal for further proceed-
ings to resolve the questions raised by the June 1 opin-
ion was consistent with the court’s directions (Pet. App.

48

82a). Nevertheless, in a reversal of its previous refusal
to set an effective date, the court on August 4 ordered
that Modified Standard 208 go into effect as written
on September 1, 1983 unless NHTSA demonstrated to
the court’s satisfaction by October 1, 1982 that this
effective date was not “achievable” (id. at 80a)." This
action constituted a wholly unwarranted interference
with the administrative process.

Given the acknowledged possibility that NHTSA might
validly rescind the passive restraint requirement, it was
inappropriate for this reason alone for the court of ap-
peals to order compliance with the Standard by a date
certain. Moreover, even if it is assumed that a passive
restraint requirement ultimately would be retained in
Standard 208 in some form, the cowrt itself recognized
that that requirement might be revised in a number of
significant respects—e.g., to prohibit the use of detach-
able belts, to require installation of airbags, or to delete
the requirement for automatic restraints in the front
center seating position (Pet. App. 55a & n.32, 72a). It
thus was improper for the court to order con liance
with the particular version of a passive restraint require-
ment that was embodied in Modified Standard 208. This
is especially so in view of the inability of the agency
charged with administering the Safety Act to find that
the Standard with which the manufacturers would be
forced to comply even satisfies the statutory criteria of
reasonableness and practicability or meets the need for
safety.

In addition, the court of appeals’ August 4 order im-
permissibly usurped to that court authority that Con-
gress has conferred on the Secretary. Under 15 U.S.C.
1392(c) and (e), an order establishing, amending or
revoking a safety standard shall take effect no later

The court of appeals has not taken action following NHTSA’s
filing of October 1, 1982. See pages 15-16, supra.

49

than one year from the date of the order “unless the
Secretary finds, for good cause shown, that [a] * * *
later effective date is in the lie interest, and publishes
his reasons for such finding” (emphasis added). It there-
fore was for the Secretary, not the court, to determine
in the first instance whether and when Modified Standard
208 should go into effect in its present form, taking into
account further proceedings on remand. Cf. Burlington
Northern, Inc. v. United States, No. 81-1008 (Dec. 13,
1982). This determination then would be subject to
judicial scrutiny under the arbitrary and capricious
standard of review in the same manner as any other
amendment to a safety standard. Thus, once the court
of appeals identified errors in NHTSA’s decision, the
court was barred from further “dictating to the agency
the methods, procedures, and time dimension of the
needed inquiry and ordering the results to be reported to
the court without opportunity for further consideration
on the basis of the new evidence by the agency.” Ver-
mont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, supra, 435
U.S. at 544-545, quoting FPC v. Transcontinental Gas
Pipe Line Corp., 423 U.S. 326, 333 (1976). The court
instead should have remanded for further proceedings
on the effective date issue.

The immediate practical significance of the August 4
order was diminished by the court of appeals’ recall
of its mandate on November 18, 1982, which had the
effect of reinstating NHTSA’s rescission of the manda-
tory passive restraint standard pending review by this
Court. However, if this Court were to affirm the court of
appeals’ holding that NHTSA had not validly rescinded
the passive restraint requirement, the eifective date issue
might be raised again in the court of appeals. For this
reason, if the Court affirms the court of appeals’ June 1,
1982 judgment and order, it should remand to the court
of appeals with instructions to remand the case to
NHTSA for further proceedings on the effective date
issue as well as on the merits.

50

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be re-
versed.

Respectfully submitted.

REX E. LEE
Solicitor General

J. PAUL McGRATH
Assistant Attorney General

KENNETH S. GELLER
Deputy Solicitor General

EDWIN S. KNEEDLER
Assistant to the Solicitor General

ROBERT E. Kopp
MICHAEL F. HERTZ
Attorneys
FRANK BERNDT
Chief Counsel

STEPHEN P. Woop

Davm W. ALLEN
Assistant Chief Counsels

EN m RUBENSTEIN

Hud F. OATEs

EILEEN T. LEAHY

SHIRLEY RANSOM
Attorneys
National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration

Department of Transportation

JANUARY 1983

la
APPENDIX

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

1. Section 103 of the National Traffic and Motor Vehi-
cle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. 1392, provides in
pertinent part:

(a) Establishment

The Secretary shall establish by order appropriate
Federal motor vehicle safety standards. Each such
Federal motor vehicle safety standard shall be prac-
ticable, shall meet the need for motor vehicle safety,
and shall he stated in objective terms.

(b) Applicability of administrative procedure provi-
sions

Subchapter II of chapter 5, and chapter 7, of title
5 shall apply to all orders establishing, amending, or
revoking a Federal motor vehicle safety standard
under this subchapter.

aa * * * *

(e) Amendment and revocation of standards

The Secretary may by order amend or revoke any
Federal motor vehicle safety standard established
under this section. Such order shall specify the date
on which such amendment or revocation is to take
effect which shall not be sooner than one hundred and
eighty days or later than one year from the date the
order is issued, unless the Secretary finds, for good
cause shown, that an earlier or later effective date is
in the public interest, and publishes his reasons for
such finding.

(f) Factors to be considered ‘in prescribing stand-
ards

In prescribing standards under this section, the
Secretary shall—

(1) consider relevant, available motor vehi-
cle safety data, including the results of re-

2a

search, development, testing and evaluation ac-
tivities conducted pursuant to this chapter;

(2) consult with the Vehicle Equipment
Safety Commission, and such other State or
interstate agencies (including legislative com-
mittees) as he deems appropriate;

(3) consider whether any such proposed
standard is reasonable, practicable and appro-
priate for the particular type of motor vehicle
or item of motor vehicle equipment for which it
is prescribed ; and

(4) consider the extent to which such stand-
ards v contribute to carrying out the pur-
poses of this chapter.

2. Section 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. 706, provides in pertinent part:

To the extent necessary to decision and when
presented, the reviewing court shall decide all rele-
vant questions of law, interpret constitutional and
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or
applicability of the terms of an agency action. The
reviewing court shall—

(1) compel agency action unlawfully with-
held or unreasonably delayed; and

(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency ac-
tion, findings, and conclusions found to be—

(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law;

* * * * *

K ». . coveenment cle orrice; 1962 395732 1243

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_0696%3A13. Public record. Not legal advice.
