# Appendix — Jadair, Inc. v. Walt Keeler Co.

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_0672%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1982
- **Citation:** 459 U.S. 944

## Text

>

INDEX TO APPENDIX

Page
Opinion of Court of Appeals ...... 1
Memorandum and Order of

District court 9

Judgment of Court of Appeals ..... 22

SUBMITTED JANUARY 11, 1982°—Decipep May 26. 1982

Before CumMINGS, Chief Judge, SPRECHER** and Woop,
Circuit Judges.
Cummines, Chief Judge. Jadair, Inc. (“Jadair”), a Wis-

consin brought a declaratory judgment ac-
tion in state court against the Walt Keeler
Company, Inc. (“Keeler”), a Kansas Keeler
removed the suit to federal court under 28 U.S.C

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No. 81-1380

place of business is located there is entitled to invoke

Teste:

The judgment appealed from is affirmed. Costs to
appellee.

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USCA 5730—Midwest Law Printing Co. Ine. Chicago—6-26-82—400

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

JADAIR, INC.,

Plaintiff,
vs. Case No. 79-C-971
THE WALT KEELER
COMPANY, INC., Entered February
23, 1981
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

The plaintiff in this action is
Jadair, Inc., a Wisconsin corporation
which manufactures Redi-Wash equipment
at its plant in Port Washington,
Wisconsin. A Redi-Wash machine is a
device used to clean out cement trucks
after they have hauled a load of
cement. The defendant, The Walt

10
Keeler Co., is a Kansas corporation
which purchased a Redi-Wash machine
from plaintiff. The plaintiff brought
this action seeking a declaratory
judgment that it is not indebted to
the defendant for any damage due to
difficulties defendant experienced
with plaintiff's machine. The defen-
dant has filed a motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction. After
substantial discovery on the issue,
the plaintiff responded and the issue
is now ripe for resolution.

The following facts are undisputed.
On October 25, 1978, plaintiff's sales
manager, William Sarring, met with
defendant's president, Earl Callison,
at defendant's facility in Wichita,
Kansas to discuss the selling of a
Redi-Wash machine to defendant.

11
During this meeting, Mr. Sarring
informed Mr. Callison that if Walt
Keeler purchased a Redi-Wash machine,
it would be produced at the Jadair
facility in Port Washington, Wisconsin
and that was the only place where the
machine could be built.

On November 1, 1978, the parties
entered into a contract for the pur-
chase and sale of a Redi-Wash machine.
The contract was signed at defendant's
facilities in Wichita, Kansas. It
provided for the purchase of one
Redi-Wash machine F. O. B. seller's
plant, Port Washington, Wisconsin.

Defendant's officers and employees
never came to Wisconsin in connection
with this purchase. Furthermore,
defendant has no offices, bank accounts

or listing in Wisconsin and transacts

12
no business in the state.

Wisconsin Statutes section
801.05(5)(d) provides that the courts of
the state have jurisdiction over a person
in any action which:

(ad) Relates to goods, documents

of titls, or other things of

value shipped from this state

by the plaintiff to the defendant

on his order or direction.

This provision of the Wisconsin long-arm
statute is, however, subject to the
caveat that the legislature intended that
the statute would "reach only so far as
permitted by the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and no further.”
Lakeside Bridge & Steel v. Mountain

State Construction Co., 597 F.2d 596, 599

(7th Cir. 1979) citing Flambeau
Plastics Corp. v. Kin Mfg.
Co., 24 Ms. 2d 459, 129 N.W.2d 237

13

(1964). Therefore, in interpreting
the statute, the Court must determine
whether the defendant has "purposefully
availfed] itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum
state, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws.” Hanson x.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct.
1228, 1240, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958).
This standard must be applied on a
case-by-case basis. Id.

Recently, the seventh circuit has
demonstrated how enigmatic the concept
of personal jurisdiction is given the

various factors the courts must con-

sider. In Lakeside Bridge Steel v.

Mountain State Construction, the court
held that a foreign corporation was

not subject to jurisdiction in Wisconsin

when the sole basis for the assertion

14

of jurisdiction was the unilateral
activity of the resident plaintiff. 597
F.2d at 603. In reaching its decision,
the court applied the factors set out in

The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws, § 37 comment a. Comment a states

that when an out-of-state

may not have been done with
intention of causing effects

i ® state but could reasonably
hi: een expected to do so
It state's power to exercise

jud al jurisdiction] depends
upon a variety of factors,
including the extent of the
relationship of the state to
the defendant and to the plain-
tiff-the nature and quality of
the effects resulting from the
act, and the degree of inconven-
ience which would result to the
defendant from being forced to
stand suit in the state on the
particular cause of action.

15
Because the defendant in Lakeside had
no other contacts with Wisconsin and
because the activity it caused in
Wisconsin - the productivr. of goods
was not highly dangerous, the court
held that it lacked significant contact
with Wisconsin to subject it to juris-
diction in the state. The court,
however, expressly declined to decide
if the result would be different had
the contract specifically required
production in Wisconsin or if the
nature of the plaintiff's contractual
obligations made performance in the
forum state necessary. Id. at 603
n.13. The seventh circuit in ruling
as it did in Lakeside Bridge & Steel
aligned itself with a number of other
circuits that have held that perfor-

mance of a contract in the forum state

16
by plaintiff is not enous by itself
to establish jurisdiction over a
non-resident defendant without any
other contacts with the forum state.
Id. at 601 and cases cited therein.
Many read the seventh circuit's
decision in Lakeside as a retrenchment
by the court on the issue of personal
jurisdiction. Yet, a few months after
Lakeside, the court distinguished its
Lakeside opinion in holding that
personal jurisdiction did exist over a
non-resident defendant whose officers
had made two trips to Wisconsin for
purposes related to the contracts.
Wisconsin Electric Manufacturing Co. v.
Pennant Products, 619 F.2d 676 (7th
Cir. 1980). The court found that the
two visits to Wisconsin by officials

of Pen. nt Products were significant

17
to the formation and performance of
the contract and thus defendant had
conducted avtivities [sic] in the
forum state sufficient to satisfy due
process. Id. at 678. Absent these
two contacts, the defendant lacked any
connection with the state.

The decisiou in Pennant Products
appeared to cast doubt on the reasoning
of the Lakeside court because the
seventh circuit failed to explain why
face-to-face negotiations in Wisconsin
differed from negotiations by mail or
phone with regard to the issue of
jurisdiction. This is especially true
given the court's expressed disavowal
that it was deciding the issue based
on the defendant's presence in the
state. 619 F.2d at 678 n.8.

18
The seventh circuit further
muddled the issue in its most recent

opinion in Koster v. Automark Indus-

tries, Inc., No. 80-1765 slip op.

(7th Cir. Feb. 3, 1981). There the
court cited with approval and expressly
relied on its opinion in Lakeside to
hold that a corporation which had done
business with a citizen of the Nether-
lands, but not in the Netherlands, was
not amenable to jurisdiction in the
Netheriands. In further explaining

the Lakeside opinion, the court noted
that it assumed thac the defendant in
Lakeside believed the contract would
be performed in Wisconsin. Slip Op.

at 4. This, however, wan not enough
for a successful assertion of jurisdic-

tion under the circumstances.

19

In light of the Koster case, the
Court finds that the reasoning in
Lakeside has continuing viability.
Furthermore, the Court finds that
under the reasoning of Lakeside,
defendant does not have sufficient
contacts with the state of Wisconsin
to subject it to the jurisdiction of
the state without violating due process.
As stated earlier, defendant had no
other contacts with Wisconsin, its
officials never came into the state,
and the contract did not require that
the plaintiff perform a particularly
dangerous activity in the state.
Furthermore, contrary to plaintiff's
suggestion, that the defendant knew
the contract would be performed in

Wisconsin is not a significant factor.

Koster v. Automark Industries, Inc.,

20
Slip Op. at 4. The contract itself
did not require performance in Wiscon-
sin, nor did the nature of plaintiff's
performance make performance in the
state a necessity. That the only
plant that could produce the product
was located in Wisconsin did not make
performance necessary in Wisconsin.
It did, however, make it inevitable.
Finally, the Court concurs with

the practical reasoning of the first

circuit in Whittaker Corporation v.

United Aircraft Corporation, 482 F.2d
1079, 1085 (lst Cir. 1973) that the

"interest of the forum [state] in not
discouraging foreign purchasers from
dealing with resident sellers for fear
ef having to engage in litigation in

distant courts undercuts an expanrive

1

21
interpretation" of Wisconsin's long-arm
statute.

On the basis of the foregoing,
the Court finds that the defendant's
motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction must be and is hereby
granted.

SO ORDERED this 23rd day of
February, 1981, at Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

/s/ Rogert W. Warren
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

—

22

Opinion by Judge Cummings

JUDGMENT -- WITHOUT ORAL ARGUMENT
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
May 26, 1982
Before
Hon. WALTER J. CUMMINGS, Chief Judge
Hon. ROBERT A. SPRECHER, Circuit Judge*
Hon. HARLINGTON WOOD, JR., Circuit Judge

JADAIR, INC., Appeal from the
United States
Plaintiff- District Court for
Appellant the Eastern District

of Wisconsin

No. 81-1380 vs.

THE WALT KEELER No. 79-C-791

COMPANY, INC., Judge Robert .
Defendant- Warren
Appellee.

* Circuit Judge Robert A. Sprecher
read the briefs, participated in the
conference and voted to affirm.
However, he died without reviewing
this opinion.

23

This cause came before the Court
for decision on the record from the
United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin.

On consideration whereof, IT IS
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED by this Court
that the judgment of the said District
Court in this cause appealed from be,
and the same is hereby, AFFIRMED,
costs on appeal to appellee, in accor-
dance with the opinion of this Court
filed this date.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_0672%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
