# Opposition — Rasky v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_0523%3A4

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition
- **Published:** January 1, 1982
- **Citation:** 459 U.S. 864

## Text

No. 82-180

In the
Supreme Court of the Ani

Ocrosper Term, 1982

ALEXAND:

BENJAMIN A. RASKY,
Petitioner.
vs.

COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC., a/k/a
CBS-WBBM, a corporation, SUSAN AN DERSON, EL-
LIS B. LEVIN, EDGEWATER COMMUNITY COUN-
SEL, ORGANIZATION OF THE NORTHEAST, EDGE-
WATER RESIDENTS TOGETHER IN ACTION, 5600
BLOCK CLUB OF WINTHROP, corporations, MARION
VOLINI, LEROY BLOMMAERT, DALE BURTON,
GLORIA AITTNER (a/k/a BITNER), DAVID WAL-
KER, FAb.0 RINCON, KELLY SANDERS, ALBERT
GRIFFIN, and unknown officers and directors of the fore-
going community organizations, CHICAGO READER,
INCORPORATED, a corporation, and DON ROSE,
Respondents.
—————————————oq**K€{*_*{]_j]]]{]{=[$$]SS=S=S=S=S=S=S=S>S>S>S>>S>>>SS=======
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS CHICAGO READER,
INCORPORATED AND DON ROSE IN OPPOSITION

Sreven B. Berorape

Roan & GrossMAN

55 West Monroe Street

Suite 800

Yhicago, Illinois 60603

(312) 263-3600

(Counsel of Record for Respondents)

Office - Supreme
ILED

ER 1 STEvas.

Court, U.S.

1962

i
QUESTION PRESENTED

1. Whether the Appellate Court of Illinois, in applying
well-established principles of Illinois defamation law to
determine that Count VII of petitioner’s complaint failed

to allege a cause of action for libel, denied petitioner due
process of law.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

TABL OF AUTHORITIES ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. ————: 2
Introduction 2
The Decisions Below 3
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT 4

I. The Appellate Court Of Illinois Correctly Ap-
plied The Well Established Law of Illinois In
Defamation Actions And Properly Concluded
That Petitioner Had Not Stated A Cause Of
J Te Te ieerthdinseicctntincecmeinnnnnnes 5

A. The Respondents’ Article Is Capable Of An
Innocent Construction... 6

B. The Respondents’ Article Is Not Libelous
— . 9

1. The Article Does Not Accuse Petitioner
Of The Commission Of A Serious Crime 9

2. The Article Does Not Accuse Petitioner
of Professional Unfitness As An Attor-

— —„—ͤ —¾' 10
CONCLUSION . 1 — 12
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

Abbott v. National Bank of Commerce, 175 U.S. 409
(1899) 5

Anderson v. Matz, 67 a 175, 384 N.E.2d 759
1878) . 8

iii

Andreani v. Hansen, 80 Ill.App.3d 726, 400 N.E.2d
679 (1980)
Archibald v. Belleville * Democrat, 54 III App. 2d
38, 203 N. E. 2d 281 (1964)
Ashe v. Hatfield, 13 — 214, 300 N. E. 2d 545
(1973)
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 US. 11 ä
Bougadis v. Lange field, 69 III. App. 3d 1010, 387 N. E.
2d 965 (1979)
Bravo Realty, Inc. v. Columbia — Sutin,
Inc., 84 III. App. 3d 862, 406 N.E.2d 61 (1980)
Bruck v. Cincotta, 56 III. App.3d 260, 371 N. E. 2d 874
(1970) ... * 0
Conrad v. Logan, 4 II App. 3d 981, 283 N. E. 2d 54
1

Cooper v. Rockford Newspapers, Inc., 50 IIl. App. 3d
247, 365 N.E.2d 744 (1977)

Daww v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 78 Ill.App.3d 67, 397
N.E.2d 41 (1979)

Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Brown, 187 U.S.
Sy,

Hambric v. Field Enterprises, 8 40 III App. 2d 355
196 N. E. 2d 489 (1964)

Jacobs v. Gasoline Retailers Association, 28 III. App.
3d 7, 328 N. E. 2d 187 (1975)
John v. Tribune, 24 III. 2d 437, 181 N. E. 2d 105, cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 877 (198227——————.ꝙ;?ſ᷑“Pͤ—ͤ—eꝙſꝗ[.ů—.
Kakuris v. Klein, 88 III. App. 3d 597, 410 N. E. 2d 984
(1980)
Krass v. Froio, 24 III. App. 3d 924, 322 N. E. 2d 67
(1975)
LaGrange Press v. Citizens Publishing Co., 252 III.
App. 482 (1929)

11

iv

Lorillard v. Field Enterprises, 65 II. App. 2d 65, 213

N.E.2d 1 (1965) 8
Millingar v. Hartwpee, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 258 (1867) 5
Mitchell v. Peoria Journal-Star, Inc., 76 III. App. 2d

154, 221 N. E. 2d 516 (1966) m 9, 10
Proesel v. Myers Publishing Co., 24 II App. 2d 501,

165 N. E. 2d 352 (1960) 8
Reed v. Albanese, 78 III. App. 2d 53, 223 N. E. 2d 419

(1966) 9
Roemer v. Zurich Insurance Company, 25 M App 3d

606, 323 N. E. 2d 582 (1975) 7
Nice v. Sioux City Memorial Park — 349 U.S.

70 (1955) 5
Sloan v. Hatton, 66 III App. 3d 41, 383 N. E. 2d 259

(1978) mm ©
Tunnel v. Edwardsville Intelligencer, Inc., 43 III. 2d

239, 252 N. E. 2d 538, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1021

ee 7
Valentine v. North American Company, 60 III. 2d 168,

328 N. E.2d 265 (1974) 6, 7
Van See Construction Company, Inc. v. Jensen & Hal-

sted, Ltd., 79 III. App. 3d 1084. 399 N. E. 2d 278

(1979) ii gt
Watson v. Southwest Messenger Press, Inc., 12 > mn.

App.3d 968, 299 N.E.2d 409 (1973) 7
Wealer v. Chicago Tribune Company, 69 III. App. 3d

610, 387 N. E. 2d 892 (1979) 6
Young v. Richardson, 4 III. App. 364 (1879) 6
Zeinfeld v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 41 III. 2d 345,

243 N. E. 2d 217 (1968) 7
Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922) 5

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Ocroser Term, 1982

No. 82-180

BENJAMIN A. RASKY,
Petitioner,

vs.

COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC., a/k/a
CBS-WBBM, a corporation, SUSAN ANDERSON, EL-
LIS B. LEVIN, EDGEWATER COMMUNITY COUN-
SEL, ORGANIZATION OF THE NORTHEAST, EDGE-
WATER RESIDENTS TOGETHER IN ACTION, 5600
BLOCK CLUB OF WINTHROP, corporations, MARLON
VOLINI, LEROY BLOMMAERT, DALE BURTON,
GLORIA BITTNER (a/k/a BITNER), DAVID WAL-
KER, FABIO RINCON, KELLY SANDERS, ALBERT
GRIFFIN, and unknown officers and directors of the fore-
going community organizations, CHICAGO READER,
INCORPORATED, a corporation, and DON ROSE,

Respondents.
EEE

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS CHICAGO READER,
INCORPORATED AND DON ROSE IN OPPOSITION

=

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction

This cause was initiated by the filing of a five count
complaint, supplemented by a two count amended com-
plaint, against respondents in the Cireuit Court of Cook
County, Illinois. Count VII of the amended complaint
sought damages for defamation against respondents
Chicago Reader, Incorporated (the Reader“) and Don
Rose (“Rose”), based on a newspaper article written
by Rose and published in the Reader newspaper on
November 11, 1977. The article, entitled “Why Ellis Levin
Is A Marked Man,” discussed various community issues
and problems in Levin’s legislative district. After Levin
noted the importance of staying in touch with community
problems and providing a resource through government
to resolve them, the article stated:

One agency he [Ellis Levin] recently got to do its
job is the Illinois Department of Registration and
Education, which licenses real estate operators but
never saw fit to crack down on slum landlords until
Levin lit the fuse. The result: for the first time in
history a slum landlord operating in Uptown, Benja-
min A. Rasky, is under the gun to fix up his places
or lose his license.

Petitioner alleged that this statement constituted libel
per se.

The basis for the two sentence reference to petitioner
was a complaint filed by the Department of Registration
and Education of the State of Illinois (“DRE”) against
petitioner for numerous building code violations on
properties which he owned and operated. Following a
hearing, the DRE revoked petitioner’s real estate license.
The DRE’s decision was affirmed by the Appellate Court

of Illinois in Rasky v. Department of Registration and
Education, 87 III App.3d 580, 410 N. E. 2d 69 (1980). This
Court subsequently dismissed the petitioner’s appeal for
want of a substantial federal question. 102 S.Ct. 78
(1981).

The Decisions Below

In the present action, respondents Reader and Rose
filed their motion to dismiss Count VII. Based upon its
review of petitioner’s complaint, respondents’ motion and
the briefs and oral arguments of all the parties, the
trial court dismissed Count VII, with prejudice, holding
that it failed to state a cause of action. The court applied
the well-established Illinois “rule of innocent construc-
tion” and held that the allegedly defamatory statement
was not libelous. On November 23, 1981, the Appellate
Court of Illinois affirmed the trial court’s dismissal,
concluding

that a proper application of the rule of innocent
construction necessitates a finding that the term
‘slumlord’ or ‘slum landlord’ as used in the several
publications, is suseeptibie of an innocent con-
struction.

Rasky v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 103 III.
App.3d 577, 582, 431 N.E.2d 1055, 1059 (1981).

On February 1, 1981, the Appellate Court of Illinois
denied petitioner’s request for rehearing. On May 28,
1982, the Supreme Court of Illinois denied petitioner’s
request for leave to appeal the decision of the Appellate
Court.

*
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

This case is wholly unremarkable in every respect.
It is totally devoid of any unusual, novel, or significant
issues of state or federal law. Petitioner’s arguments
are a mere rehash of points thoroughly considered, and
properly rejected, by both the Illinois trial and appellate
courts. Petitioner now seeks to have this Court review
the allegations of his complaint to determine whether
the allegations of Count VII state a cause of action
under the Illinois law of defamation. However, this is a
wholly insufficient basis upon which to invoke the cer-
tiorari jurisdiction of this Court.

The Petition satisfies none of the standards of Supreme
Court Rule 17 for the granting of a writ of certiorari
to review a state court judgment. The Illinois courts
have not decided a federal question in a way which
conflicts with the decision of another state or federal
court. Nor have these courts decided an important ques-
tion of federal law which has not been, but should be,
settled by this Court.

In essence, petitioner makes the bare assertion that
the decision of the Appellate Court is erroneous in its
application of well-settled Illinois law and, therefore,
the dismissal of Count VII deprives him of his constitu-
tional rights. But, as will be demonstrated below, Illinois
law is clear, and the decision of the Appellate Court in
this case was correct. Under these circumstances, review
by this Court is plainly unwarranted.

Moreover, it is a long-established principle that this
Court will not review the decision of a state court which

presents no substautial federal question. Rice v. Sioux
City Memorial Park Cemetery, 349 US. 70 (1955);
Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922); Millingar v. Hartupee,
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 258 (1867). It is equally well settled
that the bare assertion of a constitutional claim utterly
without foundation, or one so clearly and conclusively
settled by prior decisions of this court so as to admit of
no further argument, presents no substantial federal
question. Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Brown, 187
U.S. 508, 314 (1902). Petitioner’s assertion here that a
due process question is raised by the action of the
Illinois courts is groundless and unsupportable, being
merely an attempt to seek this Court’s review of ques-
tions of state law. See Abbott v. National Bank of Com-
merce, 175 US. 409 (1899), where this Court declared
that the dismissal of a libel action on grounds of privilege
raised no Fourteenth Amendment issue. See also Boddie
v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 381, 378 (1971) (no deprivation
of due process to enter default judgment for failure to
appear or failure to comply with procedural rules).
Accordingly, this Court should deny this petition for a
writ of certiorari.

I. The Appellate Court of Illinois Correctly Applied The
Well Established Law of [linois In Defamation
Actions and Properly Concluded That Petitioner Had
Not Stated A Cause Of Action In Libel.

The Appellate Court’s holdings that petitioner failed
to state a cause of action because the purportedly defama-
tory language could be innocently construed and was not
libel per se is entirely consistent with established Illinois
law enunciated decades ago.

*
A. The Respondents’ Article Is Capable Of An Innocent
Construction.

The principles of Illinois defamation law relied upon
by the Appellate Court in affirming the dismissal of
the allegedly libelous statement are long-standing. Illinois
courts have consistently held that if an allegedly libelous
article can be innocently construed upon any reasonable
reading, it must be dismissed as nonactionable. Valentine
v. North American Co., 60 Tll.2d 168, 171, 328 N.E.2d
265, 267 (1974); John v. Tribune Co., 24 III. 2d 437, 442,
181 N.E.2d 105, 108, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 877 (1962);
LaGrange Press v. Citizens Publishing Co., 252 III App.
482 (1929); Young v. Richardson, 4 III. App. 364 (1879).
In John, the court stated:

We further believe the language of defendant’s article
is not libelous of plaintiff when the innocent construc-
tion rule is consulted. That rule holds that the
article is to be read as a whole and the words given
their natural and obvious meaning, and requires that
words allegedly libelous that are capable of being
read innocently must be so read and declared non-
actionable as a matter of law.

The meaning of the statement must be gathered not
only from the words singled out, but from the context.
Bravo Realty, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,
84 III. App.3d 862, 406 N.E.2d 61 (1980); Sloan v. Hatton,
66 Ill.App.3d 41, 383 N.E.2d 259 (1978). Moreover, the
words must be read in their best possible sense. Wezler
v. Chicago Tribune Co., 69 III App.3d 610, 387 N.E.2d
892 (1979); Daww v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 78 III App. 3d
67, 397 N. E.2d 41 (1979). This rule applies irrespective
of whether the plaintiff or anyone else can suggest
other interpretations of the statement which might be

—

***

defamatory. Only if no possible innocent understanding
of an article is reasonably conceivable may the court
declare its words to be actionable. Zeinfeld v. Hayes
Freight Lines, Inc., 41 III 2d 345, 347-48, 243 N.E.2d 217,
227 (1968).

Applications of th innocent construction rule are
legion. It has consistently been invoked by Illinois courts
to uphold the dismissal of libel actions. See, e. g., Valen-
tine v. North American Co., 60 III. 2d 168, 328 N. E. 2d 265
(1974) (statement that an insurance company was dis-
charging plaintiff because “He was a lousy agent”);
Tunnell v. Edwardsville Intelligencer, Inc., 43 III. 2d 239,
252 N. E. 2d 538, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1021 (1970) (state-
ment that a city attorney “was working to break the
law”); Cooper v. Rockford Newspapers, Inc., 50 III App.
3d 247, 365 N. E. 2d 744 (1977) (statement that a deputy
clerk of the court was a “political hack,” “hired in lieu
of modernization and data processing”); Jacobs v.
Gasoline Retailers Association, 28 Tl.App.3d 7, 328 N. E.
2d 187 (1975) (statement that reported a judgment of
$4,435 against plaintiff, a business manager, in which
he was pictured on a “wanted” poster); Roemer v.
Zurich Insurance Co., 25 Til.App.3d 606, 323 N.E.2d 582
(1975) (statement that plaintiff made “sexual advances”) ;
Krass v. Froio, 24 III App.3d 924, 322 N.E.2d 67 (1975)
(statement that the unknown powers in a trust will do
anything to influence the outcome of an election and
that people should ask plaintiff about the new home
offered to a trustee just after his election); Ashe v. Hat-
field, 13 III App.3d 214, 300 N. E. 2d 545 (1973) (statement
that criticized plaintiff’s ork as a journalist); Watson
v. Southwest Messenge Press, Inc., 12 Til.App.3d 968,
299 N.E.2d 409 (1975) (statement that plaintiff “fixed

parking tickets”); Conrad v. Logan, 4 III App.3d 981,
283 N. E.2d 54 (1972) (statement that plaintiffs took
money out of the company); Lorillard v. Field Euter-
prises, Inc., 65 III App. 2d 65, 213 N.E.2d 1 (1965) (state-
ment that plaintiff had obtained a “quickie divoree”) ;
Archibald v. Belleville News Democrat, 54 III. App.2d 38,
203 N.E.2d 281 (1964) (statement expressing disgust at see-
ing a fourteen year old girl viding in a convertible “half.
naked”); Proesel v. Meyers Publishing Co., 24 III. App. 2d
501, 165 N.E.2d 352 (1960) (statement that a public
official was “diverting” funds from one project to an-
other); Kakuris v. Klein, 88 Ill.App.3d 597, 410 N. . 2d
984 (1980) (statement that plaintiff executive, termi-
nated from his job, had a lack of achievement in basic
goals, did not have the qualifications needed to achieve
professional objectives, and that sources “refused to
comment” as to plaintiff’s “honesty and integrity”);
Bravo Realty, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,
84 III. App.3d 862, 406 N.E.2d 61 (1980) (juxtaposition
of plaintiff-realtor’s advertising signs in midst of tele-
vised report on “panic peddling” and “blockbusting”
in changing Chicago neighborhoods); Andreani v. Han-
sen, 80 III. App.3d 726, 400 N. E. 2d 679 (1980) (statement
that plaintiff land developers were greedy and that their
conduct in refusing to sell land to village for badly
needed park, thereby forcing condemnation proceedings,
was disgraceful); Van See Construction Company, Inc.
v. Jensen d Halstead, Ltd., 79 III. App.3d 1084, 399 N. E.
2d 278 (1979) (statement that plaintiff, the general con-
tractor on a publie school renovation project, was not
painting the building properly); Anderson v. Matz, 67
III. App.3d 175, 384 N.E.2d 759 (1978) (statement that
plaintiff-physician’s diagnosis of personal injury victim’s
condition was not worthy of consideration by insurance

company evaluating merits of personal injury lawsuit) ;
Bougadis v. Langefeld, 69 Il.App.3d 1010, 387 N. E. 2d
965 (1979) (statement that plaintiff, the building com-
missioner for the Village of Berkely, had solicited con-
tributions for Little League baseball from a local mer-
chant in terms that sounded like “extortion”).

As the Appellate Court recognized in this case, the
Reader article accusing petitioner of being a “slum land-
lord” is unquestionably capable of an innocent construc-
tion. As properly reasoned by the court, “the terms
‘slam landlord’ and ‘slumlord’ can be construed to mean
that plaintiff owned buildings in a poor and dirty
neighborhood or, simply stated, that plaintiff was a land-
lord in a slum.” The Appellate Court, in making this
determination, correctly applied well-established Illinois
law and review by this Court is simply unwarranted.

B. The Respondents’ Article Is Not Libelous Per Se.

The Appellate Court aleo properly held that petition-
er’s claim was fatally defective because the two-sentence
reference to petitioner simply did not constitute libel
per se. Nothing in respondents’ publication charges peti-
tioner with either a serious crime involving moral turpi-
tude or of unfitness in his profession as an attorney.

1. The Article Does Not Accuse Petitioner Of
The Commission Of A Serious Crime.

For a publication to be libelous per se, the crime im-
puted must be either “infamous” or an indictable offense,
involve moral turpitude, and be punishable by death or
by imprisonment rather than by a fine. Mitchell v. Peoria
Journal Star, Inc., 76 Til.App.2d 154, 160, 221 N.E.2d
516, 520 (1966); Reed v. Albanese, 78 Tll.App.2d 53, 60,
223 N.E.2d 419, 423 (1966).

=~ =

Petitioner contends that the Reader article, referring
to him as a “slum landlord,” accuses him of engaging
in criminal housing management under Illinois law. Peti-
tioner is factually and legally wrong. At most, the state-
ment in question does no more than imply generally
that petitioner may have violated the building code, and
later states that he may lose his real estate license
because of such violations. Since violations of the build-
ing code are only punishable by fine, do not involve
moral turpitude and do not constitute infamous crimes,
respondents’ statements are not libelous per se for im-
puting the commission of a crime. See, e.g., Bruck v.
Cincotta, 56 III. App.3d 260, 264, 371 N.E.2d 874, 878
(1977) (charges of Chicago Municipal Code violations
are not defamatory per se for imputing to plaintiffs
the commission of a crime since violators are subject
only to fine and have not committed an indictable offense
involving moral turpitude) and Mitchell v. Peoria Journal
Star, Inc., 76 III. App. 2d 154, 160, 221 N.E.2d 516, 519 (1966)
(charge of violations of a municipal liquor ordinance
for which a fine was imposed is not libelous per se).
Again, the Appellate Court relied on well-settled Illinois
law to conclude that respondents’ article did not charge
petitioner with either an infamous crime or one of moral
turpitude and, therefore, could not support a claim for
libel per se.

2. The Article Does Not Accuse Petitioner
of Professional Unfitness As An Attorney.
Petitioner’s claim of libel per se based upon the con-
tention that respondents’ publication accused him of
professional unfitness as an attorney was also properly
rejected by the Appellate Court.

= jj

It is well-established under Illinois law that in order
for a statement to constitute libel per se for imputing
professional incompetence, it must refer to the plaintiff
in relation to his particular occupation. See, e.g., Hambric
v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 46 III. App. 2d 355, 196 N. E. 2d
489 (1964). In a license revocation hearing before the
DRE, petitioner filed an affidavit in which he stated that
the practice of law was his sole vocation from 1929
and that he has never entered into the real estate
brokers business. Respondents’ two sentence reference to
petitioner is silent with respect to petitioner’s competence
as an attorney. In fact, it does not even suggest or imply
that petitioner is an attorney. Therefore, based again
upon established Illinois precedents, the Appellate Court
properly concluded that

Since none of defendants’ statements alluded to
piaintiff’s qualifications or competence as a lawyer,
we must reject plaintiff’s contention that his pro-
fessional fitness as a lawyer was attacked. See gen-
erally Reed v. Albanese (1966), 78 Ill.App.2d 53, 223
N.E.2d 419; Hambric v. Field Enterprises, Inc., (1964)
46 Ill.App.2d 355, 196 N. E. 2d 489.

In summary, petitioner clearly failed to state a claim
for libel per se and review by this Court is simply not
justified.

~~ =
CONCLUSION

The petitioner suggests no valid reason why this
Court should review the dismissal of his complaint. Peti-
tioner’s status as an aggrieved litigant whose claim
has been rejected on the basis of settled legal rules is no
different than that of numerous other disappointed
suitors. Petitioner’s unfounded assertions of error by
the Appellate Court of Illino.s do not suffice to invoke
this Court’s jurisdiction or to impese yet another round
of appellate review upon these respondents. The Supreme
Court of Illinois did not accept petitioner’s appeal. This
Court should similarly refuse petitioner’s request for
review. The well considered opinion of the Appellate
Court of Illinois should be allowed to stand as the final
disposition of this action. For all of the foregoing
reasons, the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should
be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Sreven B. Bevorape

Roan & GrossMAN

55 West Monroe Street

Suite 800

(312) 263-3600

Chicago, Illinois 60603

(Counsel of Record for Respondents)

Darm W. Anpicn
Roan & Grossman

55 West Monroe Street
Suite 800

Chicago, Illinois 60603
(312) 263-3600

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_0523%3A4. Public record. Not legal advice.