# Petition — American Laundry Press Co. v. Rexrode

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1982
- **Citation:** 459 U.S. 862

## Text

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1982

No.

AMERICAN LAUNDRY PRESS CO.
and its successor corporation,
McGRAW-EDISON COMPANY,

Petitioners,
vs.

OK NYO REXRODE,

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

Byron L. GREGORY
Counsel for Petitioner

Of Counsel:

STEVEN H. Hoerr

Rocer W. WENTHE

McDermott, WiLL & EMERY
111 West Monroe Street
Chicago, Illinois 60603
(312) 372-2000

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

The petitioners, American Laundry Press Co. and its suc-
cessor corporation, McGraw-Edison Company, respectfully
pray that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the judgment
and opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit entered in this proceeding on March 12, 1982,
as modified on April 22, 1982 on the following issues:

1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred by determining
the admissibility of evidence in this diversity action under
state law, rather than under the Federal Rules of Evidence.

2. Whether evidence of the compliance of the petitioners’
product with an industry standard was properly excluded by
the Court of Appeals from this strict products liability
action.

3. Whether the prejudicial impact on the jury of the
respondent’s counsel’s repeated references to irrelevant per-
sonal injury claims against the petitioners was merely a
harmless error as the Court of Appeals concluded.

ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS

D i:...
r .

al., Order of J ent on Jury Verdict, No.
78-4207 (D.Kan. June 30, 1980) .............
Rexzrode, et al., v. American Laundry Press Co., et
al., Slip Opinion, No. 80-2217 (10th Cir. Mar.
12, 1982) PEI OT Pe RO RSS «AERC ER ae er
Rexrode, et al. v. American Laundry Press Co., et
al., 674 F.2d 826 (10th Cir. Apr. 22, 1 Pua
r

r oon mg ned
— June 24, 1 United States Distriet

Court for the Distriet of Kansas: Cross-
examination of Mr. Hanson by Mr. Levy ......

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CasEs PAGE
American Employers Insurance Co. v. Carney, 391
ee 10

Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) 9, 12
Fabian v. E. W. Bliss Co., 582 F.2d 1257 (10th Cir.

1 A naar 7
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965): 9, 13
In re Air Crash Disaster, 526 F.Supp. 226 (N. D. III.

c 9

Johnson v. William ©. Ellis & Sons Iron Works, Inc.,
604 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1979), modified, 609 F.2d

, K 8, 9
Jones v. Hittle Service, Inc., 219 Kan. 627, 549 P. 2d 1383
% ˙ F! daa cous comedies tae 4, 10, 12

McKinnon v. Skil Corp., 638 F. 2d 270 (Ist Cir. 1981) 7, 9
Murphy v. L@J Press Corp., 558 F.2d 407 (8th Cir.

8 v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 598 F. 2d
1284 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 917 (1979) 8, 9
Rabon v. Automatic Fasteners, Inc., 672 F. 2d 1231

D ͤéb
Stonehocker v. General Motors Curp., 587 F.2d 151 (4th
..... 7, 8, 9
CONSTITUTION
r Savi edeanwedscvess 5
r . 5
STATUTES
, ͤ cee
r ˙Äu..... Scale sites eee
, A 10
r . 10

2
2

are.
Pub. L. No. 93-959, 88 Stat. 192ᷣ%2
OTHER AUTHORITIES

Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
Annual Report 218 (1975) ᷑ FF

Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
Annual Report 67 (19811777777

F. Frankfurter, The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti: A
Critical Analysis, in The Law as Literature 118
London ed. 1900:

10 Moore’s Federal Practice §§ 35, 575.

In The

Supreme Court of the Anited States

October Term, 1982

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

OPINIONS BELOW

The judgment of the District Court on the jury’s verdict is
reproduced in the Appendix at A-l. The original opinion of
the Court of Appeals is reproduced in the Appendix at A-2;
the modified opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at
674 F.2d 826 and is reproduced in the Appendix at A-17.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth

Circuit was entered on March 12, 1982. A timely petition for

was denied on April 22, 1982. This petition is

being timely filed. This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (1976).

4
‘

2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an action arising out of injuries suffered by the
respondent while she was operating a laundry press which
had been manufactured by the petitioner American Laundry
Press Company. While this petitioner had sold the laundry
press to the United States government in 1959 and it had
been operated without incident from 1959 to 1977, the re-
spondent nevertheless claimed that some unknown defect of
the press caused the head of the press to close on her hand
while she was operating it in 1977. She brought this action
against the petitioners to recover for her injuries based on
theories of negligence, strict products liability and breach of
warranty.

Through pretrial discovery, the respondent's counsel was
informed of the identity of other individuals who had made
claims that they were injured while operating other laundry
or dry cleaning presses which the petitioners had manufac-
tured. Since many of these claims involved presses which
were substantially dissimilar to the subject laundry press,
the petitioners sought through an in limine motion to bar the
respondent’s counsel from making any reference to these
irrelevant claims before the jury. The district court granted
that motion, in part, and limited the respondent’s counsel to
cross-examination of witnesses about claims against the peti-
tioner of which they had personal knowledge relating to
presses similar to that which respondent had operated.
Nevertheless, throughout the trial, the respondent’s counsel
intentionally referred to these irrelevant claims during his
cross-examination of the petitioners’ witnesses with state-

‘In addition to the parties listed in the caption to this
petition, the United States participated in the district court
as an intervenor to recover on the statutory subrogation
rights ing from its payment of plaintiff’s medical fees.
The United did not participate in the appeal. Peti-
tioner American Laundry Press Co. no longer exists, and
petitioner McGraw-Edison Co. has no domestic affiliates other
than wholly-owned subsidiaries.

0

ments as graphie as the press head was caused suddenly
and without warning to close upon the left hand of the
plaintiff, thereby causing severe and permanent injuries to
his person, including and not limited to the partial amputa-
tion of his left hand.” (A-33).

At trial the respondent offered no reasonable explanation
about why the press head closed on her hand. Her claim
rested principally on her contention that the laundry press
was defective because its design did not conform to prevail-
ing industry standards and government regulations. To sup-
port that contention, the respondent offered as evidence a
standard for laundry presses which had been adopted in 1941
by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and
an Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) regulation
regarding laundry presses, which had been proposed in 1972
but was never adopted, to which the subject press allegedly
failed to conform. The district court admitted both the 1941
ANSI standard and the 1972 OSHA proposal into evidence.

However, the district court excluded from evidence the
ANSI standard for laundry presses which had been adopte
in 1972 to which the subject press conformed, even thou, .
this standard was the successor to the 1941 ANSI standard
upon which the respondent relied. This excluded ANSI
standard had been offered by the petitioners to demonstrate
that the respondent’s interpretation of the 1941 ANSI
standard was incorrect and to show that the subject press
complied with industry standards at the time of the
occurrence.

On June 30, 1980, a verdict in the amount of $750,000 was
returned in favor of the respondent and judgment was en-
tered accordingly. The petitioners’ alternative motions for a
new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict were
denied. The petitioners appealed the entry of the judgment
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

On March 12, 1982, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment in favor of the respondent. With respect to the

4
exclusion from evidence of the 1972 ANSI standard, the
of Appeals first held that state law, not the Federal
ce, governed the admissibility of the
standard. (A-11 n.17). The Court of Appeals next decided

Hittle Service, Inc., 219 Kan. 627, 549 P.2d 1383 (1976), that
conformance to industry standards was prima facie evidence
that a product was not defective. (A-12). The Court of
Appeals alternatively concluded that the 1972 ANSI
standard nad been properly excluded on the issue of feasibili-
ty of alternate designs because it was irrelevant and possibly
confusing. (A-14).

With respect to the effect of the respondent’s counsel’s
repeated reference to irrelevant personal injury claims
against the petitioners, the Court of Appeals held that these
were harmless errors which were cured by the trial court’s
instruction to the jury that the remarks of counsel are not
evidence.

The petitioners petitioned for a rehearing because, among
other reasons, the Court of Appeals mischaracterized the
Kansas Supreme Gourt’s decision in Jones v. Hittle, supra, as
involving simply a negligence case, not a strict product
liability case. The Court of Appeals denied the petition but
modified its opinion with a cosmetic change in its character-
ization of Jones v. Hittle. (A-27).

4 3 — *
ren ves Le” = * * n

I. THERE IS A CONFLICT AMONG THE CIRCUITS AS TO
WHETHER THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE OR
STATE LAW CONTROLS THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
EVIDENCE IN A DIVERSITY ACTION.

The Court of Appeals concluded that the 1972 ANSI
standard was properly excluded from evidence nder Kanses
law. The Court of Appeals’ misinterpretation of Kansas law
is discussed below. However, regardless of the admissibility
of industry standards under the law of Kansas, the 1972
ANSI standard should have been admitted into evidence
under the governing Federal Rules of Evidence. The Court
of Appeals’ unwillingness to apply the Federal Rules to this
evidentiary issue is contrary to the supremacy clause, U.S.
Const. art. VI. The holding that the admissibility of such
evidence is controlled by state law also conflicts with deci-
sions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third,
Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Circuits holding that the Federal
Rules of Evidence, not the law of the state in which the
federal court sits, control the admissibility of relevant
evidence in a diversity action.

The Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted by Congres-
sional statute, Pub.L. No. 93-959, 88 Stat. 1926, rather than
being issued under the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072 (1976), the authority under which this Court promul-
gated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 10 Moore's
Federal Practice § 35. The authority for the Rules of
Evidence is Article III of the United States Constitution,
which empowers Congress to “ordain and establish” the
lower federal courts and procedures governing them. 10
Moore’s Federal Practice § 57. The applicability and scope of
the Federal Rules of Evidence in a diversity action are
governed by wholly different considerations than those that
apply to rules issued under the Rules Enabling Act. The
reasonable exercise of Congress’ power by the adoption of the
Rules of Evidence supersedes any inconsistent rule of
evidence under state law, without regard to whether it is

>

2

“substantive” or “procedural.” The boundaries of this power,
which have not yet been addressed by this Court, must
encompass at the least the area of admissibility in the federal
courts of evidence that is undisputedly relevant. Therefore,
the Court of Appeals in this case committed reversible error
when it applied the rule it presumed the Kansas courts
would follow rather than following the mandate of Section
402 of the Federal Rules cf Evidence that all relevant
evidence not excluded by other statutes or rules is admissible.

An industry standard which was in effect at the time of
the occurrence and which was the successor to the industry
standard in effect at the time the product was manufactured
is certainly relevant under Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence to the respondent’s claim that the product was
defective and unreasonably dangerous. See Murphy v. LG.
Press Corp., 558 F.2d 407 (8th Cir. 1977). Since compliance
with the standard was relevant and not otherwise excluded
by a special statute or rule, the standard and evidence of
compliance with it were also admissible under Rule 402 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Thus, if the Federal Rules of
Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence in a diversity
action, then the 1972 ANSI standard was improperly ex-
cluded by the courts below.

The improper exclusion of the 1972 ANSI standard had
two significant adverse effects on the petitioners. First, the
petitioners were denied the opportunity to refute the respon-
dent’s interpretation of the 1941 ANSI standard with the
most persuasive evidence available: the successor standard.
Second, the evidence before the jury conveyed the erroneous
impression that the petitioners’ product did not comply with
industry standards when, in fact, the laundry press did
comply with the industry standard in effect at the time of
the occurrence.

In making the significant determination that the 1972
ANSI standard was not admissible, the Court of Appeals did
not critically evaluate the impact of the Federal Rules of
Evidence in its choice of law. Rather, the Court of Appeals

7

supported its selection of state law solely by reference to its
own decision in Fabian v. E. W. Bliss Co., 582 F.2d 1257 (10th
Cir. 1978). The Fabian decision is noteworthy only because it
is as devoid of supremacy clause analysis as is the Court of
Appeals’ opinion in the instant case. In neither opinion did
the court below explain why it had chosen to ignore the
Federal Rules of Evidence in a diversity action.“

On the other hand, the circuit courts which have acknowl-
edged the existence and validity of the Federal Rules of
Evidence have held ihat the admissibility of evidence in a
diversity action must be determined by those rules. In
Stonehocker v. General Motors Corp., 587 F.2d 151 (4th Cir.
1978), the district court had excluded from evidence federal
safety standards regarding automobile design because the
standards were adopted after both the manufacture of the
subject automobile and the occurrence. The Court of Appeals
reversed that ruling and held that the federal safety stand-
ards were admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
The Fourth Circuit first noted the possible tension between
the Federal Rules of Evidence and this Court’s decision in
Erie, supra, but concluded that it did not have to resolve that
tension because it found no state law which controlled the
admissibility of such a government regulation. In the ab-
sence of state law, the Court of Appeals tested the admis-
sibility of the safety standards under the Federal Rules of
Evidence and found them to be admissible, even though the
safety standards were adopted after the occurrence in
question.

The decision of the Fourth Circuit in Stonehocker, supra,
conflicts with the decision of the court below on two impor-

*The court below is not alone in this regard. The Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit held in McKinnon v. Skil Corp.,
638 F.2d 270 (Ist Cir. 1981), that the admissibility of an
OSHA safety regulation is to be determined under state law
in a products liability action. As in this case, the court in
McKinnon simply ignored the Federal Rules of Evidence
without explanation.

tant points. First, in the absence of controlling state law, the
court in Stonehocker measured the admissibility of the stand-
ards against the Federal Rules of Evidence, whereas the
court below measured the admissibility of the standards
against what it thought state law would be. Second, the court
in Stonehocker found standards adopted after the occurrence
to be relevant and admissible, whereas the ecurt below found
standards adopted before the occurrence to be irrelevant and
inadmissible.

The supremacy of the Federal Rules of Evidence was also
addressed by the Fifth Cireuit's decision in Johnson v. Wil-
liam C. Ellis d Sons Iron Works, Ind., 604 F.2d 950 (5th Cir.
1979), modified, 609 F.2d 820, 821 (5th Cir. 1980), wherein the
court held that in diversity cases the Federal Rules of
Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence in the federal
courts.” The plaintiff in Johnson sought to have numerous
government codes and industry standards admitted into
evidence. The district court excluded the evidence based
upon the applicable state law. The Court of Appeals found
the district court’s reliance on state law to be improper and
held that the Federal Rules of Evidence, not state law,
controlled the admissibility of those codes and standards.
The Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its decision in Rabon v. Automat-
ic Fasteners, Inc., 627 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir, 1982), wherein it
held that the Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admis-
sibility of OSHA regulations in a diversity action.

Similarly, in Murphy v. LA Press Corp., 558 F.2d 407 (8th
Cir. 1977), the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held
in a strict products liability diversity action involving a
punch press that the admissibility of ANSI standards and
OSHA regulations were to be determined under Rule 402 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. In Pollard v. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co., 598 F.2d 1284 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 917
(1979), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that
in a diversity action to recover benefits under a life insurance
policy, the Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility
of a decedent’s death certificate, coroner’s certificate, and

pathologist’s report. See also In re Air Crash Disaster, 526 F.
Supp. 226 (N. D. III. 1981). The rulings of the circuit éourts in
Stonehocker, Johnson, Murphy, and Pollard are in conflici with
the First and Tenth Circuits’ decisions holding that the
admissibility of evidence of compliance with industry stand-
ards in a diversity action is to be determined under state
law.“

The rulings of the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Cir-
cuits discussed above are based on those courts’ interpretation
of the Court’s decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938). As we have shown above, analysis under Erie
appears to be unnecessary in light of the effect of the
supremacy clause on the applicability of the statutory Rules
of Evidence. Even if the analysis followed by the Court in
Erie and in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 US. 460 (1965), were
applicable to whether the Federal Rules of Evidence govern
the admissibility of evidence of a product’s compliance with
industry standards, the same result would obtain. The issue
as to whether such evidence is admissible can only be classi-
fied as one of “procedure.” 10 Moore’s Federal Practice § 57,
at 88. Accordingly, even if the distinction drawn by the
Rules Enabling Act of 1934 were germane, the Federal Rules
of Evidence would govern the admissibility of this type of
evidence.

The conflict between the circuits reflected in Stonehocker,
Johnson, Murphy, and Pollard on one side and the decision of
the court below and Skil on the other side as to the role to be
played by the Federal Rules of Evidence in a diversity action
requires that a writ of certiorari issue to resolve the conflict.
Although the Federal Rules of Evidence expressly left

To the extent the Court of Appeals’ decision is based on its
alternative ground that the 1972 ANSI standard was exclud-
able under Fed. R. Evid. 403 on the issue of feasibility of
alternate designs, it is in further conflict with the decisions
in Stonehocker, Johnson, and Murphy and with its own ruling
that a 1972 OSHA standard that was proposed but never
adopted was admissible.

10

certain evidentiary questions to be resolved under state law
(ag., the existence of a privilege, sc. Fed. R. Evid. 500),
Congress certainly intended that the Federal Rules of
Evidence would be controlling in all other instances. See
Rule 1101 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The plain
objective of the statute is to create a uniform code of evidence
to be used in the federal courts. The extent to which that
uniform code can be enforced should be defined by this Court
so that evidentiary questions such as the one presented here
are not decided inconsistently by the district and circuit
courts.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ INTERPRETATION OF
KANSAS LAW DISREGARDS THE CONTROLLING
DECISION OF THE KANSAS SUPREME COURT

Assuming, arguendo, that the Court of Appeals correctly
concluded that the admissibility of the 1972 ANSI standard
was governed entirely by reference to state law, the court
was then obligated under Erie to apply the !aw of Kansas,
even if it disagreed with the result. American Employers
Insurance Co. v. Carney, 391 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1968). The
Court of Appeals disregarded that obligation here.

The issue of the admissibility of industry standards in a
strict products liability action was addressed by the Kansas
Supreme Court in Jones v. Hittle Service, Inc., 219 Kan. 627,
549 P.2d 1383 (1976). The subject of Jones v. Hittle was a gas
explosion. The plaintiffs in Jones v. Hittle asserted liability
against the defendant on four separate theories; negligence,
strict liability in tort, breach of implied warranty, and ab-
solute liability.

Under the strict products liability claim, the plaintiffs
claimed the product, propane gas, was not sufficiently
odorized and that the absence of odorization “constitutes a
defect in the product so as to impose strict liability in
tort....” Id. at 630, 549 P.2d at 1388. The defendants
showed that the gas had been odorized to the level required
by a state regulation. The Kansas Supreme Court was thus

11

required to determine the relevance of defendants’ products’
compliance with a state regulation to the plaintiffs’ strict
products liability claim.

The Kansas Supreme Court began its analysis of this issue
by stating:

“Although this court has not dealt with compliance
with statutes and regulations as showing due care (or
lack of defect), we have recently considered compliance
with industry standards as bearing on the same
elements.”

Id. at 632, 549 P.2d at 1389 (emphasis added). After review-
ing its prior decision establishing that compliance with in-
dustry standards is evidence of due care in a design
negligence case, the Kansas Supreme Court held:

“We think the same rule should apply to the standard
set by the legislature (or by regulations having the effect
of law) as to those set by an industry. Compliance is
evidence of due care and that the conforming product is not
defective, and may be conclusive in the absence of a
showing of special circumstances.”

Id. at 632, 549 P.2d 1390 (emphasis added). The Kansas
Supreme Court then affirmed the summary judgment entered
against the plaintiff on the strict liability theory.

Despite this holding by the Kansas Supreme Court of the
relevance of a product’s compliance with industry standards
and government regulations to a strict products liability
claim, the Court of Appeals stated in its first opinion that “no
Kansas Court to date has addressed this issue [of the admis-
sibility of industry standards in a strict liability case“ (A-
11 n.17). Because it apparently found no state law on point,
the Court of Appeals conducted its own analysis of the law of
products liability and concluded that “the issu. of manufac-
turer compliance with industry standards is irrelevant to
strict liability analysis.” (A-12).

12

The Court of Appeals attempted to distinguish the Kansas
Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. Hittle by stating that the
claims raised therein “were founded on negligence and not
strict liability.” (A-12) (emphasis in original). That distinction
is spurious. In Jones v. Hittle, the plaintiff had asserted a
strict products liability claim, the Kansas Supreme Court
affirmed the entry of summary judgment on thai claim, and
the Kansas Supreme Court expressly held: “Compliance
{with industry or government standards] is evidence . . that
the conforming product is not defective, and may be conclu-
sive in the absence of a showing of special circumstances.”
219 Kan. at 632, 549 P.2d at 1390. Thus, in its first opinion,
the court below misconstrued Jones v. Hittle; the only ques-
tion remaining was whether the misconstruction was in-
advertent or intentional.

When the misconstruction was noted in the petition for
rehearing, the Court of Appeals modified its opinion and
acknowledged that Jones v. Hitile involved a strict products
liability claim. However, the Court of Appeals did not alter
its holding that compliance with industry standards is irrele-
vant to a strict products liability claim under Kansas law.
(A-27). This superficial response to the petition for hearing
makes it obvious that the Court of Appeals intentionally
misconstrued Jones v. Hittle.

There is only one plausible explanation for the in-
transigence of the Court of Appeals on this issue: it does not
agree with the willingness of the Kansas Supreme Court to
admit evidence of a product’s compliance with industry
standards. Yet, under Erie, a federal court has no right to
judge the wisdom of state law. It must apply the state law as
it exists. Evidence of the compliance of petitioner’s product
with the 1972 ANSI standard was admissible under Kansas
law as expressed in Jones v. Hitile and the court below
violated Erie by ignoring that state supreme court decision.

This Court’s decision in Erie had two principal objectives:

“discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequi-
table administration of the laws.” Hanna v. Plumer, supra,

13

380 U.S. at 468. The decision below, if it is permitted to
stand, will thwart both objectives. It encourages forum shop-
ping because a plaintiff who is claiming that a product is
defective will file in federal court if the product complies
with an industry standard but will file in state court if the
product does not comply, so as to benefit from the different
interpretations of the state law evidentiary standard that
will be applied. It leads to the inequitable administration of
the laws because in light of the Court of Appeals’ disdain for
both the Federal Rules of Evidence and Kansas law, the
evidence of compliance of a product with industry standards
is admissible in other federal courts and in Kansas state
courts, but not in a federal court in Kansas. There is no
rational basis for such disparate treatment.

The Court of Appeals’ misconstruction of state law and the
conflict among the lower federal courts about the ad-
missibility of evidence in a strict products liability action
reflects the burgeoning products liability litigation in the
federal court system. According to the Annual Reports of
the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, the number of product liability suits filed in the
district courts has mushroomed from 1,579 in 1974 to 9,071 in
the year ending June 30, 1981. Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, Annual Report 218 (1975); Administra-
tive Office of the United States Courts, Annual Report 67
(1981). This growth has been fueled, in part, by opinions
such as the decision of the Court of Appeals which induce
plaintiffs to file suit in a district court in an attempt to obtain
a more favorable construction of state law than they would
receive in state court.

In light of the volume of products liability litigation in the
federal courts and the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, it is important for this Court to define the role of
the federal courts in such litigation. If there is to be a
federal common law of products liability, as the Court of
Appeals’ decision implies, then this Court should establish
the elements of that tort. If stave iaw provides the rules of

14

evidence for such claims, as the decision states, then the
lower federal courts must be reminded of their obligation to
adhere to state law as expressed by the state’s highest appel-
late panel. Finally, if the Federal Rules of Evidence are
applicable to such claims, then this Court must establish the
evidentiary guidelines for those claims.

III. THE DECISION BELOW IS ANTITHETICAL TO THE
FAIR AND ORDERLY ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE.

This case centered on an occurrence for which there was no
plausible explanation, other than the routine activation of
the press, which the respondent denied. Consequently, the
jury was presented with two seemingly innocent par-
ties—the injured respondent and the corporate manufac-
turer. The respondent’s counsel upset this delicate balance
by referring in the presence of the jury during cross-examina-
tion to other claims for serious personal injuries which had
been made against the petitioners. While these other claims
were irrelevant, a fact of which the respondent’s counsel was
aware before he made the comments, the jury was left with
the understanding that the instant case was simply one of a
series of such occurrences. The presumption of innocence to
which the petitioners were entitled had been levelled.

The Court of Appeals held that the remarks by the re-
spondent’s counsel were, at most, harmless error. That hold-
ing was premised on the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that
the respondent’s counsel acted in good faith and its belief
that the district court’s instruction to the jury that the
remarks of counsel were not evidence cured any error. How-
ever, the respondent’s counsel did not act in good faith; even
the respondent conceded that several of the claims to which
her counsel referred during trial were irrelevant. Moreover,
the good faith of the respondent’s counsel is irrelevant be-
cause the prejudicial impact of his remarks on the jury
remains unchanged regardless of his motives.

15

The district court’s instruction to the jury was equally
unavailing. As the court recognized in O’Rear v. Fruehauf
Corp., 554 F.2d 1304, 1309 (5th Cir. 1977):

The cleansing effect of the cautionary instructions in
this case is dubious for, as the trial judge himself ob-
served during the trial, [you can throw a skunk into the
jury box and instruct the jurors not to smell it, but it
doesn’t do any good.“

This candid acknowledgment of the limited usefulness of an
instruction to disregard counsel’s comments parallels an ob-
servation made by Justice Frankfurter:

“Unfortunately the passion and prejudice systematical-
ly instilled during the course of a trial cannot be ex-
oreised by the general, placid language of a charge after
the mischief is done. (Every experienced lawyer knows
that it is idle to ask jurors to dismiss from their memory
what has been deposited in their feelings.)”

F. Frankfurter, The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti: A Critical
Analysis, in The Law as Literature 118 (E. London ed. 1960).
Where, as here, there is a distinct pattern of improper con-
duct which prejudices a jury, the simple instruction that
remarks of counsel are not evidence offers no relief to the

disadvantaged party.

Thus, neither counsel’s intent nor the jury instruction
could negate the feelings aroused by counsel's remarks. The
petitioners were victimized by those feelings. It is funda-
mentally unfair to permit such conduct to taint the delibera-
tions of a jury. The unwillingness of the court below to
remedy the problem was inexcusable.

16

For these reasons, a writ of certiorari should issue to
review the judgment and opinion of the Tenth Cireuit Court

of Appeals.
Respectfully submitted,

Byron L. GREGORY
Counsel for Petitioners

OF COUNSEL:

Sreven H. Hoerr

Rocer W. WENTHE
McDermort, Witt & Emery
111 West Monroe Street
Chicago, I'linois 60603

(312) 372-2000

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_0462%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
