# Petition — Randolph v. Illinois

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1982
- **Citation:** 459 U.S. 857

## Text

In the
Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroper Term, 1981

ALPHONSO RANDOLPH,

Petitioner,
vs.

PEOPLE OF THF STATE OF ILLINOIS,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, FOR THE
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

STEVEN B. MUSLIN
IRA A. MOLTZ
Attorneys at Law

100 N. LaSalle Street
Suite 900

Chicago, Illinois 60602
(312) 263-7249

EDWARD M. GENSON
134 N. LaSalle Street
Suite 306
Chicago, Illinois 60602
(312) 726-9015

Of Counsel

UNITED STATES LAW PRINTING co., CHICAGO, Mois 60618 (312) 525-6581

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether the Petitioner was denied due process of law
where the State waited 43 months to file its petition to
revoke his probation, and where said petition was filed
subsequent to the expiration of said term of probation.

PARTIES

All parties are named in the caption.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
Question Presented for Revier i
RES RE OES © i
Table of Contents . iii
. iv
Reported Decisions 2
rere © SL RE 2
Constitutional Provisionn- sss 2
Statement of the Case 3
Argument and Reasons for Allowing the Writ of
Certiorari 8
Conclusion „
Appendix
Opinion of the Illinois Appellate Court, July 28,
1981 App. 1
Order of the Illinois Supreme Court denyi
leave to appeal January 12, 1982 App. 11

Order of the Illinois Supreme Court granting
motion for stay of mandate, February 17,
1982 App. 12

iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PAGE
Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 46 L. Ed. 2d
205 (1975) ~
Gagon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656
(1973) ~
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 30 L. Ed. 2d 468
(1971) Se ae 8
Constitution
United States Constitution, Amendment ein ae
United States Constitution, Amendment v 3, 8

United States Constitution, Amendment XIV. 3, 8

In the
Supreme Court of the United States

Octroper Term, 1981

Petitioner,

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, FOR THE
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Alphonso Randolph, Petitioner, respectfully asks that
a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the
Appellate Court of the State of Illinois, First Judicial
District, in People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-A ppel-
lee v. Alphonso Randolph, Defendant-Appellant, No. 80-
240, which affirmed the finding of violation of probation
and subsequent three-year penitentiary sentence on the
original theft conviction.

REPORTED DECISIONS

The opinion of the Appellate Court, People v. Randolph,
appears at 98 Ill. App. 3d 696, 424 N.E.2d 893 (1981). A
copy of the opinion appears as an appendix to this peti-
tion. The order of the Supreme Court of Illinois denying
leave to appeal is not yet reported. A copy of that order
likewise appears in the appendix to this petition.

JURISDICTION

1. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed petitioner’s
convictions by decision filed July 28, 1981. Petitioner then
sought leave to appeal by petition to the Supreme Court
of Illinois filed on October 15, 1981. The Illinois Supreme
Court denied leave to appeal by order dated January 12,
1982. On February 17, 1982, Justice Simon of the Illinois
Supreme Court entered an order staying issuance of the
mandate of that court pending resolution of this petition
for writ of certiorari. No extension of time within which
to petition for certiorari has been sought or allowed.

2. Jurisdiction lies to this cour: under 28 U.S.C.
1257 (3).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Constitution of the United States
Amendment V

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land of naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.

——

the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
Amendment XIV

Sec. 1 All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State de-

prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction equal protection of the laws.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On June 18, 1975, Alphonso Randolph pleaded guilty to
an information numbered 75 I 1645 charging him with
theft, and pursuant thereto was sentenced to four years
probation, by his Honor Judge Paul F. Gerrity.

Six months later, on December 31, 1975 while patrolling
an area near Deel Ford, in Posen, Illinois, Sergeant Ran-
dall E. Wolfe observed an automobile stop and let an un-
known individual out, then continued on in an easterly
direction. As he followed the moving vehicle, he passed
Deel Ford’s parking lot, where he observed, from a dis-
tance of about ten feet, the individual whom he believed
to be the same one that had gotten out of said moving
vehicle, alighting from a black Ford truck parked in Deel’s
lot.

4

Admittedly his attention was focused on the moving
vehicle, not said individual and he continued in pursuit
without stopping, until he overtook said vehicle, and placed
the driver under arrest. Upon completion of said arrest,
he returned to his squad and radioed what he believed to
be a description of the unknown individual he had ob-
served in Deel Ferd’s parking lot. This description con-
sisted of the following: male, black, stocky build. After
putting out the radio message he returned to the Deel
Ford lot and made an inspection of the aforementioned
black Ford truck. As a result of his inspection he recovered
a lock pulley, and screwdriver which he placed on the front
seat of his squad car, without making any identifying
marks thereon, at this, or any other time. Shortly there-
after in response to a dispatch indicating that a subject
matching his earlier radio description had been appre-
hended by a Dixmoor Police officer, named Hollaway,
at a Texaco gas station in the near vicinity, he went to
said Texaco gas station where he met with officer Joseph
Underwood, a security guard for Deel Ford, Officer Hol-
laway of Dixmoor Police Department, and the subject in
custody, Alphonso Randolph. Upon his arrival at the
Texaco station he identified Alphonso Randolph as being
the unknown individual whom he had seen earlier in Deel
Ford’s parking lot, taking him to the Posen Police De-
partment.

On the same date, Joseph Underwood was working as
a security guard for Deel Ford. At approximately 2:45
a.m., while he was at the north end of Deel’s 3½ acre lot,
he heard officer Wolfe’s radio broadcast regarding a sub-
ject in a black Ford pick-up truck. As he could not see
the truck in question from his vantage point, he went to
the south end of the lot, where the truck was parked. When
he was approximately 200-300 feet away from the black

truck he observed an unknown individual running away
from him. In order to pursue this subject Underwood
went back to his auto, thereafter heading in the direction
of the Texaco gas station. Upon his arrival at said Texaco
station Alphonso Randolph was in the custody of Officer
Hollaway.

As a result of his arrest of December 31, 1975, the Peti-
tioner’s said cause was continued to April 27, 1976. On
April 27, 1976, pursuant to the charge of attempt theft,
Alphonso Randolph again appeared in court, before his
Honor Judge Dwight McKay, without counsel. On this
date the information numbered 75-I-6-137 file was present,
the state made mention of a petition for violation of Mr.
Randolph’s probation; however, the ‘‘memorandum of
orders (half sheet) of this date does not indicate the
same was ever filed with the clerk of the court, nor was
a warrant or summons issued or a bond set to secure Mr.
Randolph’s appearance, or to toll his probationary period.
In fact the charge of attempt theft was merely continued
to a future date.

On February 16, 1978, Alphonso Randolph was arrested
at approximately 7:00 p.m., while a passenger in a parked
vehicle, in front of 15019 Artesian, Markham, Illinois. At
the time of his arrest, he was not in violation of any city,
state, or federal law. This arrest was made by Douglas
Newton, an officer of the Harvey Police Department.
Earlier that date, while off duty, Officer Newton observed
four individuals near a garage behind 15019 Artesian,
Markham, Illinois loading automobile parts into a Budget
Rental van. As Officer Newton approached the garage to
get a better look, the individuals went inside, closing the
door behind them. Based upon this information Officer
Newton obtained a warrant to search the aforesaid garage.

Armed with the warrant Officer Newton returned to the
garage, conducted a search therein, determined that the
vehicles contained therein had been stolen from Chicago,
Illinois and were the property of Alvin Edwards, and
Arthur James. Later that same evening, Officer Newton
arrested Bill Bruton, owner of the premises at 15019
Artesian, Markham, Illinois, and Greg Davis, driver of
the Budget rental van. After said arrests, the auto parts
found in the Budget Rental van, were not matched to the
two vehicles found earlier in the aforesaid garage. Al-
phonso Randolph’s arrest occurred approximately four
hours after the arrest of Bruton and Davis.

On November 13, 1979 the State filed a document en-
titled Supplemental Petition for Violation of Probatica’’
in the case of People of the State of Illinois v. Alphonso
Randolph, numbered 75 I-6-137. This Supplemental Peti-
tion for Violation of Probation, was based upon Mr.
Randolph’s arrest of February 16, 1978.

On December 19, 1979, Alphonso Randolph appeared
before his Honor Judge Paul Gerrity, in the Circuit Court
of Cook County, in Markham, Illinois, pursuant to pro-
ceedings to violate the probation imposed under 75 I-6-137.
A motion was then made by Mr. Randolph, to terminate
said proceedings, in that Mr. Randolph’s probation had
expired as matter of law on June 15, 1979, and as such
the court lacked jurisdiction over the probationer. After
said motion was heard and denied, a hearing to determine
whether or not Mr. Randolph had violated the probation
imposed on 75 I-6-137 was held. At said hearing, testi-
mony was heard from Officer Randall E. Wolfe, Joseph
Underwood, Alvin C. Edwards, Arthur James, Officer
Douglas Newton, Kevin Kelly, and Alphonso Randolph.
The testimony of Officer Wolfe, Underwood, James, and

7

Edwards, was substantially as summarized above. Kevin
Kelly testified that he was present at the premises lo-
cated at 15019 Artesian, Markham, Illinois, on February
16, 1978, during the afternoon hours, and did not see Al-
phonso Randolph at anytime that date.

Alphonso Randolph testified among other things that
on December 31, 1975, he was visiting his sister, and had
walked across the street to a Texaco gas station to buy a
pop and make a phone call, when he was arrested by a
Dixmoor Police officer Hollaway, in connection with a
recently attempted theft at Deel Ford. He further testified
that on February 16, 1978, he had not been in or at the
premises of 15019 N. Artesian, Markham, Illinois, but had
just arrived as a passenger in a friends auto, when he
was arrested by Officer Newton in the front of a said prem-
ises. At the conclusion of all evidence, the court found
Mr. Randolph in violation of probation, ordered a pre-
sentence investigation, and continued the cause for sen-
tencing to January 22, 1980.

On January 22, 1980, as a result of the Violation of
Probation, Alphonso Randolph was sentenced to a period
of 3 years in the Illinois Department of Correction. He
was not given credit for time served on probation prior
to the alleged violation. The speedy hearing and due pro-
cess arguments were represented to the Illinois Appellate
Court, First District, which rejected said contentions in
affirming the trial court’s judgment.

ARGUMENT AND REASONS FOR ALLOWING
THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI

This case presents a substantial question of federal
constitutional law pertaining to the question of the appli-
cation of the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial to
probation revocation proceedings. It also raises the issue
of at what point, if any, an individual’s Fourteenth
Amendment guarantee of due process is violated by an
extraordinary delay in the filing and hearing of a proba-
tion revocation petition.

In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656
(1973) this Court held that a probationer prior to revoca-
tion is entitled to a preliminary hearing to determine
whether there is probable cause to believe that he has
violated probation. He is also entitled to a final hearing
which must include at a minimum:

Written notice of claimed violations; disclosure of
evidence against him; opportunity to be heard and
present witnesses ; right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses; neutral and detached hearing body; and
written statement of evidence relied on for revoking
probation.

In United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 30 L. Ed. 2d
468 (1971), the Supreme Court noted that the Due Process
Clause may require dismissal of an indictment if it were
shown at trial that pre-indictment delay caused substan-
tial, actual prejudice to the defendant. In Dillingham v.
United States, 423 U.S. 64, 46 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1975), the
Court extended its prior holding by ruling that the pro-
tection of the Sixth Amendment is activated when a erimi-
nal prosecution has begun. At the point of defendant’s
arrest, the speedy trial provision went into effect.

In the instant cause, the petition was brought before the
Cireuit Court of Cook County, Illinois on April 27, 1976.
While the State indicated a desire to file a Petition for
Violation of Probation, there is no indication on the face
of that document that said petition was ever filed. (Tr.
234) In addition the ‘‘Memorandum of Orders’’ does not
indicate the filing of any such petition. (Tr. 222-223)

On November 13, 1979—43 months later—the State filed
what it euphemistically referred to as a ‘‘Supplemental
Petition For Violation of Probation. A hearing on said
Petition was held on December 19, 1979 at which time peti-
tioner’s probation was revoked. This all occurred despite
the fact that petitioner’s four year probationary term
ended on June 18, 1979—prior to the filing of the ‘‘Sup-
plemental Petition’’ and the subsequent hearing.

The Illinois Appellate Court Opinion acknowledges that
unless probation had been tolled or revocation proceed-
ings had begun by June 18, 1979, defendant's probationary
term expired and the court was prevented from entertain-
ing a revocation hearing thereafter.’’ (Appellate Court
Opinion, page 4) The Court accepted the State’s claim
that probation had been tolled by the filing of a revocation
petition on April 27, 1976. This is despite the fact that
both the Appellate Court and the State concede that the
common law record reveals that no such petition was filed
on that date and in fact, that the State waited 43 months
until November, 1979 to file what it cryptically labelled a
‘*supplemental’’ revocation petition.

In examining the record as a whole, it is clear that the
State’s contention that its petition was timely filed does
not logically jibe with the facts of this case. From April
27, 1976—the date the State maintains it filed its Petition
—until February 16, 1978, when the defendant was ar-

10

rested on an unrelated charge, the State took no action
to prosecute or make any other disposition on a revocation
petition. Mr. Randolph was at large in society and if, in
fact, such a revocation petition actually existed, it is
thoroughly unexplainable why the State took no action on
said petition. The only logical answer for the State’s lack
of its usual diligence is that everyone operated under the
assumption that no such revocation petition existed. Per-
haps, as the report of proceedings appears to indicate,
the State intended to file and prosecute such a petition but
the subsequent case history reveals that no such action
was ever taken.

The record thus clearly reveals that Mr. Randolph’s
term of probation was never tolled in accordance with the
statutory requirements and, therefore, his four year pro-
bationary period expired on June 18, 1979. This was six
months prior to the revocation hearing held on December
19, 1979 and five months prior to the filing of the State’s
revocation petition on November 13, 1979. Accordingly, it
is evident that the appellant was beyond the court’s juris-
diction when the revocation hearing was held, and that
the Appellate Court’s ruling to the contrary should be
reviewed and, ultimately, reversed.

11

CONCLUSION

Wuererore, petitioner Alphonso Randolph respectfully
asks that a writ of certiorari issue to the Appellate Court
of Illinois, First Judicial District, to review the judgment
in People v. Randolph, No. 80-240, and that upon review
by this court that the finding of violation of probation and
the subsequent sentence imposed as a result thereof be
reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

AupHonso Ranpoipn, Petitioner

By: /s/ Ira A. Molte
Ina A. Morra, his attorney

Sreven B. Musi
Attorney at Law

100 N. LaSalle
Suite 900
Chicago, Illinois 60602
(312) 263-7249
Ina A. Motz
20 North Clark
Suite 2300
Chicago, Illinois 60602
(312) 236-3709

Of Counsel

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_0356%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
