# Petition — Rutstein v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1982
- **Citation:** 459 U.S. 1034

## Text

- ———“ —— - —-

— |

Ortice - Supreme Court, U.S.
81-2390 FILED
JUN 28 1982
| ALEXANDER L. STEVAS,
i CLERK 5
No.
Inu The
Supreme Court Of The United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1981
OSCAR RUTSTEIN,
Petitioner
Vv.
THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS

A. SUSAN PECK

Counsel of Record

51 Russ Street

Hartford, Connecticut 06106
(203) 249-6548

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the decision of the Court of Claims that
the September 25, 1972 letter to Petitioner was final for
the purpose of commencing the statute of limitations
deprived Petitioner of his rights under the Administra-
tive Procedures Act.

2. Whether the decision of the Court of Claims that
the September 25, 1972 letter to Petitioner was final for
the purpose of commencing the statute of limitations
deprived Petitioner of his right to judicial review in
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.

3. Whether the decision of the Court of Claims that
the September 25, 1972 letter to Petitioner was final for
the purpose of commencing the statute of limitations
was inconsistent with prior rulings of that court.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ..............00seeeeeeees i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. ...............ceeeee00e iv
GR Ie 6 cc cdcccdvcceccceccctecccosccosees 2
FSO 6 cen cvsccncessccccosveccessééucdocces 2
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED....... 2
STATUTES INVOLVED. ............ccccceecceeeeees 3
REGULATIONS INVOLVED .............-.00eeeeees 5
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............--2eseeee: 8
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT........... 10
Gc ccc cccnvccsccssccsescccsccccscecsiose 24

APPENDIX:
(1) - Opinion of the United States Court of

(2) - Letter to Petitioner from the Executive
Secretary of the Air Force Board for the
Correction of Military Records dated Sep-
ID Es GEE 6 Scadbeosscecescatedesseees 5A

(3) - Letter to Petitioner from the Executive
Secretary of the Air Force Board for the
Correction of Military Records dated June
ie Minéadakesabeneddenécovasebeoceeeasse 7A

(4) - Letter to Petitioner from the Executive
Secretary of the Air Force Board for the
Correction of Military Records dated

(5) - November 20, 1976, Opinion of the Air
Force Board for the Correction of Military
BREED icccécccccvcosies i SE 11A

(6) - December 20, 1976, Memorandum from the
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for

and Reserve Affairs for the

Executive Secretary. ...........s.seeeeeees 21A
(7) - Air Force Regulation 31-3 (October 21,

Pe sn cdseubeabonndecuaediatencccdvcces 26A
(8) - Lord v. United States, Ct. Cl. 50-80C (Or-

Es GE Sd ben cccccecicceccccece 43A
(9) - Air Force Regulation 31-3, paragraph 17(e),

SEE ME cadeutiiecdhssaddsceanesecs 50A

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page

Cases:
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 33 L.Ed.2d

EE ouccaccsdetvadendesasetheadceceeces 15, 16
Bruno v. United States, 214 Ct. Cl. 383, 556 F.2d

EE adebeksadece seuceseedovecseusesecedce 22
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Brinegar,

459 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1974) ..............00eee- 13
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,

401 U.S. 402, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971).............. 12
Connell v. Higgenbotham, 403 U.S. 207, 208, 29

eer TTT Te 16
Connecticut Board of Wardens v. Dumschat, _____

U.S. ____., 69 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981) ....... oowseue 16
Denton v. United States, 204 Ct. Cl. 188, 196

SEE bdcdeesedetddeosocesceesnseceeseoecsces 10, 22
Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439

F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1971) .......cccceccccccees 13, 21
Friedman v. United States, 159 Ct. Cl. 1, 310 F.2d

381 (1962), cert. denied, sub nom. Lipp v.

United States, 373 U.S. 932 (1963)............. 9, 10

Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 42 L.Ed.2d 725
ESA a eR 20

Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1979),

cert. denied, sub nom. Peer v. Griffeth, 445 U.S.
970, 64 L.Ed.2d 247 (1980). ..........cccceeeeeees 17

iv

Horn v. Schlesinger, 514 F.2d 549 (8th Cir. 1975)..... 11

Jacob Siegal Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 90 L.Ed.

GED Greve cccccccdecovvavescuntesenesieseetades 13
Lipp v. United States, 301 F.2d 674 (1962)........ 10, 23
Lord v. United States, Ct. Cl. No. 50-80C (order,

Pe RRR es, Ma Ree TS Sees 14
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 47 L.Ed.2d 18

GUE vc cccccseccceesvcotencesscouseceeseeeeshuss 19
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, “36 U.S.

D, GS ETRE SS FD BTU oc ccccccvccccccvescosesees 20
Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971) ...... 11

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 33 L.Ed.2d
GED Gee voccbvcescovcecsstceeessdnesoseecoene .16

Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 314, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950) ................005- 20

Roelofs v. Secretary of Air Force, 628 F.2d 594
GE. GE SES 0c nc cccvcsssedotansscusveebesases 13

Urban Law Institute of Antioch College, Inc. v.
Secretary of Defense, No. 76-0530 (D.D.C.,

Se, Mere 14
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 41 L.Ed.2d 935

GIOUED « occccccccccccccccccccsececesseseceeseaneas 16
Statutes:
eM ee 2
© BAG. GRRE oc cccscccncccccescccesshésncesscesucns 3

DUE Gee cccccvcccccccccccccccccccccsecococoecese 3

De UD vccccccccccccccscocccvcccccccccccccceces 4
BD eee ED ccc cccccccccccccevsceccocccccccccccece 4
BD Pele GE cccccccccccoccccccsceccccccccccecoeces 5
Administrative Procedures Act (APA, 5 U.S.C.

GRID cccccccccceccccccccccccccccccccccccccccces 11
5 U.S.C. §70G(2WA)... 6... eee c cece cece eeeeeeeenes 4,12
© EG, GOTO cc cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccces 15
Regulations:

Air Force Regulation 31-3 (October 21, 1970) ....5, 9, 18
Air Force Regulation 31-3, paragraph 17(e), (April 1,

K. Davis, Administrative Law Text 332 (3d ed. (1972)).
Law Review Articles:

Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U.Pa. L. Rev.
1267 (1975).

No.

In The
Supreme Court Of The United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1981.

PETITION FOR A- WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS

TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES:

The above-named Petitioner respectfully prays that
a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment and
opinion of the United States Court of Claims entered in

this proceeding on April 2, 1982.

OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the United States Court of Claims

appears in Petitioner's Appendix (1).

JURISDICTION
CONSTITUTION PROVISIONS INVOLVED

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BH

5 UNITED STATES CODE §702
D3

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REGIE Att 7
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or remove an injustice. Under procedures prescribed by
him, the Secretary of the Treasury may in the same
manner correct any military record of the Coast Guard.
Except when procured by fraud, a correction under this
section is final and conclusive on all officers of the

28 UNITED STATES CODE §2501
Time for filing suit
Every claim of which the Court of Claims has juris-

diction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is
filed within six years after such claim first accrues.

REGULATIONS INVOLVED

AIR FORCE REGULATION (“AFR”) 31-3
(October 21, 1970)

Pertinent portions are excerpted as follows. The
complete text of AFR 31-3 is set forth in Appendix (7):
SECTION B — APPLICATION FOR CORRECTION

8b. Denial of Application. The Board may deny an
application if it determines that insufficient relevant

evidence has been presented to demonstrate the
existence of probable material error or injustice, that the

record was made by or at the direction of the President
or the Secretary in connection with proceedings other
than proceedings of a board for correction of

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b. Communicating Decision to Applicant and
Counsel. Upon receipt of proceedings after final action
by the Secretary of the Air Force, the Board will
communicate the decision to the applicant and counsel,

if any.
AIR FORCE REGULATION 31-3,

PARAGRAPH 17(e)

(April 1, 1977)
This regulation is set forth in Appendix (9).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner was a commissioned officer in World War
II who served as a bombardier in thirty-nine combat
missions. In August, 1944, after completing 350 combat
hours, as a result of his experiences, he became unfit for
active service due to psychoneurosis, anxiety reaction,
an’| was hospitalized until September, 1945, when he
went on terminal leave until his discharge in December,
1945, in the grade of First Lieutenant. At the time of
his discharge petitioner did not appear before a
Retirement Board and was never advised of his right to
do so. He was, however, given a 50% disability rating
by the Veteran’s Administration in 1946.

After first learning in 1971 that he was eligible for
disability retirement as an officer, he applied to the Air
Force Board for the Correction of Military Records
(hereinafter ‘Correction Board”) in 1972. This applica-
tion was denied without a hearing, without a statement
of reasons and without prejudice, on the grounds
of insufficient relevant evidence. (Appendix (2)). A sub-
sequent request for reconsideration was also denied.
(Appendix (3)). In 1976, the Board finally agreed
to grant him a hearing which was held in October of
that year. On November 20, 1976, the Board issued a
unanimous opinion that petitioner's military records
should be corrected to show that on December 2, 1945,
he was retired by reason of physical disability in the
grade of Captain. (Appendix (5)). On December 20, 1976,
the Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve
Affairs rejected the recommendation of the Correction
Board. (Appendix (6)). A petition was filed in the Cour:
of Claims on September 24, 1979. Jurisdiction was
invoked pursuant to 28 United States Code §1346 and
28 United States Code §1491.

After the pleadings were closed, the Defendant
moved for summary judgment, inter alia, on the ground

the rule of Friedman v. United States, 159 Ct. Cl. 1, 310
F.2d 381 (1962), cert denied, sub nom. Lipp v. United
States, 373 U.S. 932 (1963); Air Force Regulation 31-3
(October 21, 1970) and the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.

On March 10, 1982 oral argument was presented to
the Court of Claims. In an order dated April 2, 1982, the
court granted the defendant’s motion for summary

judgment.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The decision of the Court of Claims holding that the
September 25, 1972 letter to Petitioner was final action
for statute of limitations purposes avoided without
distinction the precedent set forth in Friedman uv.
United States, 159 Ct. Cl. 1, 310 F.2d 381 (1962), cert.
denied, sub nom. Lipp v. United States, 373 U.S. 932
(1963) wherein the Court of Claims defined final action

in pertinent part as follows:

(c) A board’s action (or failure to act) is not
final if (i) the claimant has been misled, (ii) the
board's decision is tentative and invites reopen-
ing, (iii) the armed service itself reopens the
case, or (iv) there are other circumstances de-
priving the action or non-action of finality.

(d) Once a final decision is had, the claim
accrues, the limitations period begins to run,
and there is no tolling of the statute by reason
of further applications to other boards or agen-
cies (including the Correction Board).

310 F.2d at 395 (emphasis added).

By finding against the Petitioner on the issue of the
statute of limitations, the Court of Claims departed from
its own usual course of judicial proceedings as set forth
in Friedman; Lipp v. United States, 310 F.2d 674,
676 (1962) and Denton v. United States, 204 Ct. Cl. 188,
196 (1974); deprived Petitioner of the due process of law
guaranteed him by the Fifth Amendment; and sanc-
tioned a departure by the Air Force Board of Correc-
tion of Military Records from accepted adjudicative
procedure, all of which call for an exercise of this
Court’s power of supervision. In addition, the Court
of Claims sanctioned the use of Air Force regula-
tions and procedures that failed to conform to the

10

requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act,
(APA, 5 U.S.C. 555 (e)).

The important question of whether the Air Force
regulations (Appendix 7) concerning applications to the
Correction Board comport with the requirements of
due process has not been addressed by this Court, nor
has it been addressed by the lower courts. See, e.g.,
Horn v. Schlesinger, 514 F.2d 549 (8th Cir. 1975)
(constitutional issues raised by not decided). See also
Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971), where
the Court of Appeals remanded to the District Court on
constitutional and procedural issues. On remand, the
District Court avoided the constitutional issue, stating
that the plaintiff specifically waived his right to a
hearing. The District Court’s holding on remand was
affirmed on appeal. 501 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1974) (per
curiam).

For these reasons, discussed more fully below, Oscar
Rutstein petitions this Court for a writ of certiorari to
the United States Court of Claims.

THE SEPTEMBER 25, 1972 LETTER TO PETI-
TIONER, WHICH THE COURT OF CLAIMS HELD
COMMENCED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS,
WAS DEFECTIVE IN THAT IT FAILED TO CON-
FORM TO THE MINIMAL PROCEDURAL RE-
QUIREMENTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRO-
CEDURES ACT.

Section 555(e) of the APA in effect in 1972 provided
that:

Prompt notice shall be given of the denial in

whole or in part of a written application, peti-
tion, or other request of an interested person

11

made in connection with any agency proceeding.
Except in affirming a prior denial or when the
denial is self-explanatory, the notice shall be ac-

companied by a brief statement of the grounds
for denial.

Pub. L. 89-554, 80 Stat. 385 (1966) (codified at 5 USC.
§555(e)). The letter to Petitioner (Appendix (2)), con
tained no explanation, findings, reasons, or auaaas
for the Board’s decision.

The requirement that an agency issue reasons
and/or findings for its decisions is important and neces-

the decision was made. 401 U.S. at 417, 28 L.Ed.2d at
154. A reviewing court cannot determine if an agency
was arbitrary, capricious or abused its discretion by

relevant facts without knowing what facts and factors
were relied upon by the decisionmakers. Jd. at 416-17,
28 L.Ed.2d at 153-54. While the Overton Park court did
not require that formal findings be issued in connection
with the Secretary’s decision, it did remand to the
District Court with a provision that the lower court
could require “some explanation” from the Secretary.
Id. at 420-21, 28 L.Ed.2d at 155-56.

Commenting on Overton Park, Professor Davis

expressed the opinion that courts would seize upon the
requirement of “some explanation” because the courts

12

will gradually discover that a requirement of findings
and reasons, when feasible, is one of the most effective

protections against arbitrary exercise of discretionary
power. K. Davis, Administrative Law Text 332 (3d ed.
(1972)).. See also Environmental Defense Fund uv.
Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (remanded
for failure to articulate reasons).

Professor Davis identified five reasons compelling
the requirement of reasons and/or findings. First, to
facilitate judicial review; second, to prevent usurpation
of the administrative function; third, to evoke care

or

is

by the Overton Park case. On remand to the District
Court, the District Court in turn remanded to the
Secretary for reasons and findings. In the course of
preparation of the findings, the Secretary reconsidered
the agency’s position in light of statutory criteria and
the guidance of the Supreme Court and reversed the pri-
or decision. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Brinegar, 459 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1974) (affirming
decision of District Court on remand). See also Jacob
Siegal Co. v. F.T.C., 327 U.S. 608, 90 L.Ed. 888 (1946)
(agency reversed itself after remand for findings, In re
Jacob Siegel Co., 43 F.T.C. 256 (1946)).

The Air Force regulations in effect during the
pendency of Petitioner’s claim did not require that a
statement of reasons be given for denial. AFR 31-
3(BY8\\c) (Oct. 21, 1970) (Appendix (7)), a deficiency
which was in direct conflict with §555(e) of the
Administrative Procedures Act. In Roelofs v. Secretary
of Air Force, 628 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1980), the Court of
Appeals remanded to the Air Force for a statement of
the reasons supporting the Correction Board's denial of

13

Hay HERE
i ay

5 3g23 ; a [
(Gy che

Secretary of Defense, No. 76-0530 (D.D

(citing Urban Law Institute of Antioch College,

i
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re tgiye i i al : i 3 sh
5 sshedi : i vale ni ah
3x32

ine Alii

14

THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS
THAT THE SEPTEMBER 2, 1972 LETTER WAS
FINAL FOR PURPOSES OF THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS DEPRIVED PETITIONER OF HIS
RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW IN VIOLATION OF
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT.

Petitioner's Right to Judicial Review Was a Constit-
utionally Protected Interest

The right to judicial review of an administrative
decision is secured to Petitioner by the provisions of
U.S.C. §§701-706. The existence of a right to

is

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ite

unilateral expectation for in the future. Petitioner’
right to review, therefore, is an “entitlement”
standard articulated in Board of Regents v.
U.S. 564, 33 L.Ed.2d 548, (1972):

FF
$F

To have a property interest in a benefit, a per-
son clearly must have more than an abstract
need or desire for it. He must have more than a
a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead,
have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It
is a purpose of the ancient institution of prop-
erty to protect those claims upon which people
rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not
be arbitrarily undermined. It is a purpose of the

15

ei ib He raigeet aul
; artit HT Y att i
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artes iu Ale THHeH

16

there were no statutorily defined
v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118 (9th Cir.
nom. Peer v. Griffeth, 445 U.S.

yal

"|

17

of what constituted final action. AFR 31-3 (Oct. 21,
1970), Appendix 7. As a result, petitioner was denied

for Correction,” supports petitioner's view that the 1972

aad TE Eicte Eiamaties & & cemenee Gene
tion Board action on his application and request for
reconsideration were misleading. It says, inter alia:

Denial of an application on the grounds of in-
sufficient relevant evidence to demonstrate

18

3

private interest that will be affected by the admin-
istrative or official action. 424 U.S. at 334-35, 47
L.Ed.2d at 18.

19

3
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i
:
to
g
:
&
=
:
3

the procedure for resolving customer/utility disputes. /

56 L.Ed.2d at 42. (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover

part
prived of the notice which was their due.

Memphis Light, 436 U.S. at 15, 56 L.Ed.2d at 43 (foot-
note omitted). See also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 42
L.Ed.2d 725 (1975) (no burden for school system to pro-
vide student with oral notice of charges against him and
allow student opportunity to respond prior to sus-
pension action). See also generally Friendly, Some
Kind of Hearing, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267 (1978).

Furthermore, wooden applications of the statute of
limitations in connection with informal adjudications
also leave the agency unaccountable for the grossest

abuses of discretion. For example, if in petitioner's case
the Correction Board unanimousiy voted to grant him
relief, once six years had passed since the original denial
of his application, the Assistant Secretary could reject
the findings of the Board purely on whim and never
have to answer for it. Surely, this violates the spirit, if
not the letter, of the Administrative Procedures Act and
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment

The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation of a Private

tors, requirement of substantial evidence on whole
record); and §557 (form of decision and manner o

informal adjudications and the need for the “check” of
judicial review more compelling. An agency that is
allowed to include misleading language in boilerplate
notifications sent to “thousands” of applicants, (see
Opinion of Court of Claims, Appendix (%)), is able to
foreclose judicial review, thereby making itself totally
unaccountable. As Judge Bazelon stated in Environmen-
tal Defense Fund v. Ruckleshaus, 439 F.2d 584, (D.C.
Cir. 1971), we are in an era of expanding administrative
action that affects fundamental personal interests; and
“{jjudicial review must operate to insure that the
administrative process itself will confine and control the
exercise of discretion.”’ Jd. at 598.

21

THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS
THAT THE SEPTEMBER 25, 1972 LETTER TO PETI-
TIONER FROM THE CORRECTION BOARD WAS
FINAL FOR THE PURPOSE OF COMMENCING
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAS INCONSIS-
TENT WITH PRIOR RULINGS OF THAT COURT.

In its April 2, 1982 decision, the Court of Claims,
per Skelton,J. stated that the phrase in the September
25, 1972 letter (Appendix (2)) that “... no further action
on your application is contemplated,” was clear enough
to communicate to Petitioner that the action taken by
the Correction Board was final for purposes of
commencing the statute of limitations; that the clause
inviting petitioner to submit new evidence was merely
boilerplate; and, that based on the “1972 decision as a
whole” (which consisted of three short paragraphs), it
was evident the Correction Board’s decision was final.
In so holding, the Court of Claims chose to ignore not
only the plain language of the Friedman case but other

significant precedents which support petitioner’s view.

In Bruno v. United States, 214 Ct. Cl. 383, 556 F.2d
1104 (1977) the Court of Claims expanded on the
language of Friedman by saying that where the
relevant board (in that case the Physical Evalution
Board) suggests in its findings that the decision is
tentative, or withholds a final decision pending consider-
ation of some new evidence, or expressly invites the
petitioner to seek a reopening at some later time, then
“as a matter of law, the PEB decision is not final and
the statute of limitations does not begin to run.” Id,
556 F.2d at 1106.

The case of Denton v. United States, 204 Ct. Cl.
188, 196 (1974) also supports petitioner’s view of what
constituted final action under AFR 31-3 as it existed

$sg° F
7 jit Pt 832

nit TELE

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Hatt

Finally, in the case of Lipp v. United States, supra,
301 F.2d at 676, the relevant date for statute of

limitations purposes was the last date of several on

which plaintiff's request for a retiring board was denied.

For this reason, and for all the foregoing reasons, it is

the instant plaintiff's position that final action was not

taken in this case until December 20, 1976, and it is
that date from which the six year statute of limitations

begins to run.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons Petitioner respectfully re-
quests that the writ of certiorari be granted.

Respectfully submitted,
THE PETITIONER

By A. SUSAN PECK
A Member of the Bar
of the Supreme Court
of the United States

Dated: June 21, 1982

No.

3n The
Supreme Court Of The United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1981

OSCAR RUTSTEIN,
Petitioner

APPENDIX (1)

Opinion of the United States Court of Claims
April 2, 1982

1A

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS

No. 430-79C
OSCAR RUTSTEIN
Plaintiff
: Military pay; disability
v. : retirement pay; statute
: of limitations.

THE UNITED STATES,
Defendant =: April 2, 1982

F. Mac Buckley, attorney of record for plaintiff.

Heidi Debevoise, with whom was Acting Assistant
Attorney General Stuart E. Schiffer, for defendant.

Before FRIEDMAN, Chief Judge, DAVIS, Judge,
and SKELTON, Senior Judge.

ORDER

This disability retirement case comes before the
court on cross-motions for summary judgment. The de-
fendant has pleaded limitations as a defense. Upon
consideration of the pleadings and briefs, and after oral
argument, we conclude that plaintiff's claim is barred by
the six-year statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. §2501.

The plaintiff, Oscar Rutstein, served commendably
on active duty in World War II as a bombardier and
participated in 39 combat missions. Upon his return to
the United States in December, 1944, he underwent six
months of psychiatric observation and treatment at the

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BY THE COURT

/s/ Byron Skelton
Senior Judge

April 2, 1982

APPENDIX (2)

Letter to Petitioner from the Executive
Secretary of the Air Force Board for the
Correction of Military Records dated
September 25, 1972

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99 Pratt St ——
Hartford, CT.

Mr. Oscar Rutstein
c/o Bernard

APPENDIX (3)

Letter to Petitioner from the Executive
Secretary of the Air Force Board for the
Correction of Military Records dated
June 5, 1975

7A

5S June 1975

SAPCB 72-2534

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- Oscar Rutstein
it Hartford, Connecticut 06117

Lyman Road

8A

APPENDIX (4)

Letter to Petitioner from the Executive
Secretary of the Air Force Board for the
Correction of Military Records dated
December 30, 1976

9A

30 December 1976
refers te your application for correction of ailitary

Dear Mr. Rutetein:

SAFCB 72-2534

83

3

>

West Hartford, CT 06117

Mr. Oscar Rutetein
> ee Paul R. Harmel

98 Lynan 8d.

}}
: is

20036

1800 M. St., "Ww
Suite 860
Washington, D. C.

10A

APPENDIX (5)
November 20, 1976 Opinion of the

Air Force Board for the
Correction of Military Records

1lA

PROCEEDINGS OF THE
AIR FORCE BOARD FOR THE CORRECTION
OF MILITARY RECORDS

DATED 20 NOVEMBER 1976

that his records be corrected to show that on 2 Decem-
ber 1945, he was retired by reason of physical disability
The Air Force Board for the Correction of Military

Records met in Room No. 5C968, the Pentagon Building

The following documentary evidence was considered
and, by this reference, made a part of these proceedings:

EXHIBIT A. Applicant’s request for corrective

action.
EXHIBIT B. Brief of Examiner.

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EXHIBIT C. Transcript of Testimony.
EXHIBIT D. Master Personnel Records of the

Applicant.

EXHIBIT E. Letter from SGPC, dated 1 July 1972.

EXHIBIT F. Letter from SGPR, dated 11 July
1972.

EXHIBIT G. Letter from SGPS, dated 22 April
1975.

EXHIBIT H. Letter from SGMR, dated 10

September 1976.
THE BOARD FOUND THAT:

1. The applicant had exhausted all remedies provided by
law or regulations.

2. The applicant's military records are presumed to have
been destroyed by fire at the National Personnel
Records Center during July 1973. The applicant's
Veterans Administration (VA) Records are available. A
resume of the relevant facts contained in the applicant's
VA Records is set forth in the Examiner's Brief, Exhibit
B, and therefore is not set forth hereinafter, and by this
reference, it adopts the same as findings of fact in the
case.

3. A summary of the reasons the applicant believes the
record to be in error or unjust is set forth in the
Examiner's Brief, Exhibit B, and therefore is not set
forth hereinafter and by this reference, it adopts the
ee ee oe ae ee Cognizance was
taken the complete contents of the documents
oe a by the applicant, which are marked as TAB
B, the contents of which are by this reference incor-
porated as findings of fact in the case.

4. A summary of the pertinent facts in the case may be
capsuled as follows:

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a. Applicant was born 16 August 1921. He entered
on active duty as a bombardier on 7 October 1943. He

was reiterative of the information contained in his
application and supporting attachments. Applicant’s and

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THE BOARD CONCLUDES THAT:

(Exhibits E-H).

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evidence has been presented

1. Sufficient relevant

exists.

demonstrating that an injustice

have been retired by reason 0

should

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NELSON
Panel Chairman

is) THOMAS W.

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APPENDIX (6)
December 20, 1976 Memorandum from the

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
for Manpower and Reserve Affairs for

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASPNGTOM, 0.C. 26530

lemca 2+ te Ages tant Sacagvany

MEMORANDUM FOR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AIR FORCE BOARD FOR
THE CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS

SUBJECT: Oscar Rutstein, Docket No. 72-25%

I do not approve the recommendation of the Board
for the Correction of Military Records in the case of
Oscar Rutstein, forwarded for my approval on November 26,
1976. After reviewing the record herein, I am unpersuaded
that sufficient evidence has been produced to show that an
error or injustice exists in the applicant's military record.

This case was considered by the Correction Board in
1972 and, after careful consideration of the applicant's
military record and his submissions, relief was denied. —
I have, therefore, reviewed the material herein with an
eye toward det what evidence has been propounded
by the applicant to alter the Board's earlier determination.
It should be added that the 1972 consideration wes the first
attempt by the applicant to correct the error or injustice
that he alleges occurred twenty-seven years earlier.

There is no doubt that the applicant underwent severe
hardships during the Second World War and I, as much as the
Board, deeply regret the war-time circumstances into which
the applicant was thrust. It appears that his anxiety per-
taining to capture by the enemy was heightened by the fact
that he is a Jew. This, and other unfortunate incidents,
are clear from the record and are a sad commentary on the
horrors of war.

The fact remains, however, that many thousands of
American servicemen underwent similar, and even far worse,
wartime experiences than the applicant. Thousands were

killed or wounded, end countless thousands more, like the
applicant, returned to the United States with the impr int

(which states that he had made « recovery from his fatigue
and enxiety and was, at that time, fit for service) and
retroactively declare that he then deserved ea disebility
retirement.

In coming to my determination, I returned to the
eotgens Canesten ty Se ee ae found that the
applicant should be discharged rather than retired for
disability. In February 19%5, exhibiting syaptoms of
fatigue and strain, the applicant was treated for several
months at Pawling General Hospital in New York. Mis primary
physician was Dr. P. L. Bacchiani, Assistant Chief Neuro-
psychiatrist at Pawling, who spent considerable time
studying the patient's condition. Ste Sapaste and
treatment, extending over nearly eight » even included
sodium pentothal treatment to ascertain the extent of the
applicant's problem. At the end of that period of conva-

patient's confidence and security had grown end thet he had
recovered sufficiently to be returned to full sil duty.
He =. not recommend disability retirement (Exhibits 6,
31- .

It appears from the record that upon his discharge
from the hospital, the applicant went on terminal leave,
was promoted to captain, and was honorably discharged from
the service on December 2, 1945. Following discharge, the
applicant's condition did not preclude his normal assimilation

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into society -- rather, he made what appears to be an
exceptional recovery, attending and graduating from podiatry
school. He began the practice of medicine in the early
1950's and his practice continues to this day.

The evidence produced in the board proceedings to
refute the character of his discharge consists of statements
by Dr. Bacchiani and another psychiatrist, Dr. James A.
Schoettler. Dr. Bacchiani was terminally ill et the time
of the Board proceedings and therefore his written state-
ment was introduced into the record. Dr. Bacchiani now
claims that had he known the applicant would manifest today
some of the same behavioral traits he observed in 1945, he
would have recommended disability retirement. Dr. Schoettler,
a local psychiatrist, testified on the basis of a one hour
interview and review of the appliqant's medical records
that he also believed a disability retirement was justified.

The point is that the applicant's present physiological
state is not necessarily determinativa of the issue of whether
or not the 1945 discharge constituted an error or injustice.
Mental states change over time and even if the applicant
presently exhibited a debilitating psychological illness,
that would not conclusively prove that he suffered from the
same illness in 1945, or in the twenty-seven intervening
years.

Just as there is evidence in the record indicating
present manifestations of anxiety and depression, so is there
evidence in the record indicating a recovery from those malae-
dies that far exceeds the recovery made by other servicemen
who were similarly discharged.

It is well known that the disability ratiags of the
Veterans Administration and those of the military departments
are not based on identical considerations and are, therefore,
often divergent. However, it is interesting to note that

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the VA originally rated the applicant at 50% disability

from the time of his release until 1%8, dropped the rating
to 30% from 1948 to 1954, and dropped it again to 10% in
1954. While military disability ratings are not necessarily
related to VA ratings, it is clear that there has been a
steady progression downward over the years in the applicant's

Therefore, wy conclusion in this case is that although
the applicant may have suffered « hardship, « hardship is
not an errs or will contain a provision
to the effect tha: the statements submitted

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A the
tion is that of a person who is incapa
making application himself, or whose
Sate are > or
F
3

S>

a. Review. Sam cogtiaation ond tho oval
able military or naval records pertinent
the corrective action requested will be

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rected without a hearing,

plication without a hearing. i
make this determination in all cases except
those in which the application has been

file tion within three years after he
d the alleged error or injustice and
did not submit reason why the Board

b. Denial of Application. The Board may
deny an application if it determines that
insufficient relevant evidence has been pre-
sented to demonstrate the existence of prob-
able material error or injustice, that the
applicant has not exhausted other effective

tion within three years
the alleged error or injustice and insufficient
evidence has been ted to warrant a
finding that it would be in the interest of
justice to excuse the failure to file within the
pnypeyh =F oy The Board will not
an application on the sole ground that
the record was made by or at the direction of
Ge Seaman: 6 Se Santeay & equsstes
ange Sar an speeneeangs a
or correction of mili or naval

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7
fs
i

justice is without prejudice to further
on

con-
siderati new relevant evidence is sub-
mitted. The applicant will be informed of
his pri to submit newly discovered
relevant for

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will transmit to the applicant counsel, if
any, a written notice stating the time and
place of hearing. The notice will be mailed
ae Ge anaes ene oasse, © ony, o6 last

days prior date of hearing, except
that an earlier date rr 4-
plicant waives his t to such notice
writing.

b. To the Board. Upon receipt of notice of
hearing, the applicant will notify the Board
in writing at 15 days prior to the date

to
Board the counsel, if represented
counsel, and the names of such witnesses
he may intend to call in his behalf. Cases in
which the applicant notifies the Board that
he does not desire to be present at the hear

Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs under
Title United States Code, section 3402,
and other persons who, in the opinion

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beagle
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applicant may be supplied only with a sum-
anary or entwact of caasihed master.

SECTION D—HEARING

14. Convening the Board. The Board will be
convened at the call of the chairman and will
recess or adjourn at his order.

15. Conduct of Hearing:

a. By Chairman. The heari shall be
conducted by the chairman, and 1 be sub-
ect to his rulings that will be designed, inso-
ar as practicable, to accord the —- an
opportunity to make a full and fair pres-
entation of his case. The Board shall not be

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limited by legal rules of evidence but shall
maintain reasonable bounds of com

resented at % Ayt y
being duly has indicated to the
Board that he does not desire to be present or

timely
his representative fails to appear at the
time and — set for the hearing, the Board
may der the case in accordance with the
| ees ~ my b above, or will make such other
position of the case as is indicated under

d. Testimony. All testimony before the
Board shall be given under oath or affirma-
tion. The proceedings of the Board and the
testimony given before it will be recorded
verbatim.

16. Continuance of Hearing. The Board may
continue a hearing on its own motion. A
request for continuance by or in behalf of the
applicant may be granted by the Board if a

continuance appears necessary to insure a
full and fair hearing.

SECTION E—ACTION BY THE BOARD

17. Deliberations, Findings, Decisions, and
Recommendations:

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a. Deliberations. Only members of the
Board and its staff shall be present during
the deliberations of the Board.

b. Further Information. During the course
of review of the case, when it appears to the
Board's satisfaction that the facts have not
been fully and fairly disclosed by the records
or by the testimony and other evidence before
the the Board may require the appli-
cant to obtain, or the Board may obtain, such
further information as it may consider essen-
tial to a complete and impartial determina-

tion of the facts and issues.

c. Findings, and Recommenda-
tions. Following a , the Board will
make written findings, i recom-

ons, and
mendations. A majority vote of the mem
present on any matter before the Board
constitute the action of the Board and
be so recorded.

shall
d. Separate Communication. Where the
Board considers it necessary to submit com-

18. Minority Report. In case of a
meut between members of the

minority report may be submitted, either as
to the findings, decision, or the recommenda.
tions or to all, including the reasons therefor.

19. Record of Proceedings. When the Board
has completed its proceedin a@ record
thereof 1 be prepared. S record shall
indicate whether or not a quorum was

ent at the hearing and at Board's

erations. The record shall include the appli-
cation for relief, a transcript of any testi-
mony, affidavits, papers, and documents con-

sion and recommendations of the Board and
all other papers, documents, and reports

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¢
B
:
:
ie

necessary to reflect
tory of the proceedi The record $0 pre-
pared will be certified by the chairman or his
designee as being true and complete.

20. Withdrawal of Application. The Board
may permit an applicant to withdraw his
sogennen without prejudice at any time
before its proceedings are forwarded to the
Secretary of the Air Force.

21. Further Consideration by the Board.
After final adjudication, further considera-
tion by the Board wil! be granted only if the
apilicant presents newly discovered relevant
evidence not previously considered by the
Board and then only upon recommendation
of the Board and approval by the Secretary
of the Air Force.

SECTION F—ACTION BY SAFOS AND
THE AIR STAFF

22. Action by the Secretary of the Air Force.
The record of the Board's proceedings will be
forwarded to the Secretary of the Air Force
who will direct such action in each case as he
determines to be appropriate, which may in-
clude the return of the record to the Board
for further consideration when deemed ne-

cessary.
23. Action by the Air Staff:

a. Returning Case to the Board. Upon
final action by the Secretary of the Air Force,
return the complete record in each case to the
Board. The Board will transmit the Secre-
tary’s decision to the Chief of Staff USAF
for appropriate action.

cision to the applicant and counsel, if any. -

may t When Administra-
tive Action Completed. When all
necessary administrative action has been

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granted or
application is denied.

spect the Record of Proceedings and to re-
ceive a of the Board's findings, deci-
sions, recommendations, unless the
chairman considers that ting the request
would be detrimental to the public interest.

SECTION G—SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS
24. Authority To Settle Claims:

a. Claims Authorized te be Settled and
Paid. The Department of the Air Force is
authorized to pay claims in accordance with
Title 10, United States Code, section 1552,
which is quoted in paragraph 1.

b. Claims Not Authorized to be Paid. The
Department of the Air Force is not author-
ized to pay any claim heretofore compensated
by Congress through enactment of a private
law, or to pay any amount as compensation
for any benefit to which the claimant might
subsequently become entitled under the laws
and regulations administered by the Admin-
istrator of Veterans’ Affairs.

25. Application for Settlement:

a. Filing Claims. Settlement and payment
of claims shal] be made only upon a claim of
the person whose record has been corrected

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we
38
Pay
bs
z
Ey
38.
53
®

set-
tlement and payment may be filed as a sep-
arate part of the application for correction of
the record.

b. To Whom Payments Will Be Made if
Person is Deceased. In case the person whose
record has been corrected is deceased, and

no demand is presented by a duly ap-
pointed tive of the estate,
yments otherwise due shal] be made to the

t’s spouse, heir or beneficiaries, in
order of precedence as prescribed in Title 10,
United States Code, section 1552.

information to ne their status as

proper es to the claim for purposes of
and RAD ons of law. -

26. Settlement Provisions:

am ptrol-
ler of the Air Force, HQ USAF, or his

ve, according to applicable law
and regulations. In no case the amount
found due exceed the amount which would

ceived from civilian employment during any
peried for which active duty pay and allow-
ances are payable may be deducted from the
settlement. Amounts found due may be re-
duced by the amount of any existing in-
debtedness to the Government, arising from
military service.

b. Nature and Amount of Various Benefits.
Prior to or at the time of payment, the per-
son te whom payments are to be made shall

be advised by the Comptroller of the Air
Force, HQ USAF, or his sermon as
to the nature and amount of various bene-
fits represented by the total settlement, and
shall be advised further that acceptance of

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such settlement shall constitute a complete
release by the claimants involved of any
claim against the United States on account

B
g
i
g

of al] staff offices will be made available as
assist

- ye Fy fe

a cou or

by any other pereon in hie beheld, will be neld
the Government.

30. Changes in Procedures. The Board may
initiate recommendations for changes in pro-
cedures established herein that are consid-
ered necessary for the proper functioning of
the Board. Such will be subject to
the approval of the of the Air
Force and the Secretary of Defense.

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31. Publication in the Federal

Register. This
Fefulation and any amendments will be pub-
in the Federal Register.

By ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AI FORCE

OFFICIAL
JOHN F. RASH, Colonel, USAF
Director of Administration

JOHN D. RYAN, General, USAF
Chief of Stag

Summary of Revised, Deleted, or Added Material

APPENDIX (8)

Lord v. United States, Ct. Cl.
No. 50-80C (Order, April 24, 1981)

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS
No. 50-80C
WILLIAM H. LORD

EEL
Hat

pees
quite

THE UNITED STATES

i

APRIL 24, 1981

Robert N. Jensen, attorney of record, for plaintiff.
Ralph A. Simmons, Nancy M. Stiles and Peabody,
Rivlin, Lambert & Meyers, for plaintiff.

Robert E. Richardson, with whom was Acting
Assistant Attorney General Thomas S. Martin, for
defendant. Eric J. Barnett, of counsel.

Before DAVIS, Judge, Presiding, KASHIWA and
KUNZIG, Judges.

ORDER

This is a suit by a former Navy officer for disability
retirement pay. It comes before us on cross-motions for
summary judgment. Oral argument has been had and
we have also considered the written submissions. We
decide that we must remand the case for a fuil hearing
and redetermination.

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PEGG Ee EAHE EEHEU UE
ity ESBHE HEM
HEU EATER APL oe
HiHineeieds weal
i: i} falcha THOMA
Ail iitid Hanae

45A

a TH

ge i i

Putte stint
if RR AAIT UE tie He ih

aHHGT Hi WHE Hite

46A

relating to special review of disability
retirements for medical corps officers; imposing on
servicemen being processed for separation for reasons
member is fit for duty” arising from “his continued
performance of duty until he is scheduled for separation
for [such] other purposes”; and that ‘“[wjhen the
member’s referral for physical evaluation is related to
physical examinations given as a part of non-disability
retirement processing, evidence must be clear and
convincing to overcome the presumption of fitness,”
while in other cases the presumption of fitness may be
overcome by a “preponderance of the evidence.’’ The
Defense directive as to non-disability separations was
questioned in our recent order in Davidson v. United
States, Ct. Cl. No. 518-77, issued February 29, 1980,
seeking further information on its standards, and we
have similar problems if the directives were considered

other than physical disability ‘‘a presumption that the

by the Correction Board to be applicable to this

plaintiff's case.

little weight to
inations and

very

In this situation, we can give

the Correction Board's

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“T- Hare HS THE Cru
i ii mM eile bey
i H its: Ar atest hs
fe eae el pili
iy alii etait, Ha
ue TG side Hi $38, iT act |
Le sie i uli re RRS
Hi [ gitth Sfiaal Bail id °3 At

personal appearance. The Board will make adequately
detailed findings at the conclusion of its deliberations.

If the Board relies, on remand, upon the standards
set forth in the directive issued by the Secretary of
Defense in January 1973 (discussed above and in
Davidson v. United States, supra), the Board should

answer the following questions:

If the Board does rely on or use those standards in the
Defense directive, the court would also appreciate (but
does not require) any discussion the Board sees

include as to the justification for erecting more rigid
standards of proof of medical unfitness in the case of

six months. See Rule 149. Counsel for plaintiff
is designated under Rule 149(f) to advise the court by
letter to the trial judge to whom this case is assigned of
the status of proceedings on remand. See also Rule 150.

BY THE COURT

/s/ Oscar H. Davis
April 24, 1981 Judge

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APPENDIX (9)

Air Force Regulation 31-3,
paragraph 17(e) (April 1, 1977)

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SECTION E — ACTION BY THE BOARD

17. Deliberations, Findings, Decisions, and Recommen-
dations:

a. Deliberations. Only members of the Board and its
staff shall be present during the deliberations of the
Board.

b. Further Information. During the course of review
of the case, when it appears to the Board's satisfaction

vote of the members present on any matter before the
Board will constitute the action of the Board and shall
be so recorded.

d. Separate Communication. Where the Board
considers it necessary to submit comments or
recommendations to the Secretary of the Air Force as to
matters arising from but not directly related to the
issues of any case. Such comments and recommenda-
tions shall be the subject of separate communication.

Military Records is authorized to take final action on
behalf of the Secretary of the Air Force, under 10 U.S.C.
1552, in approving the correction of military records,

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standing or through no fault of the service member.

(f) Placement in a temporary or permanent
disability retired status, including appropriate percen-
tage of disability, of applicants who were clearly
physically unfit and were inad:ertently or improperly
separated.

(g) Award of variable reenlistment bonus,
proficiency pay, enlistment and/or reenlistment bonus to

applicants clearly entitled thereto.

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(2) The Executive Secretary of the Board, after
will

assuring compliance with the above condi .
announce the final action on applications processed

under this subparagraph.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_0278%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
