# Appendix — Connecticut v. Ostroski

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1982
- **Citation:** 459 U.S. 878

## Text

In The
Supreme Court Of The United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1981

STATE OF CONNECTICUT
Petitioner

RICHARD OSTROSKI

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APPENDIX A
FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT REGARDING

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INQUIRY

JUDGE DALY: Do you want him to sit on the
stand up here and you can pose those?

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MR. OSTROSKI: Yes, sir.

MR. CONNOR: You do not have to testify unless

you wish to.

MR. OSTROSKI: Correct.

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MR. CONNOR: And that you would be treated like
any other witness who has testified.

MR. OSTROSKI: Yes, sir.

MR. CONNOR: Now, what is your wish, do you
wish to testify or remain silent?

MR. OSTROSKI: I wish to testify.

MR. CONNOR: Do Your Honors have any questions
to ask him at this time?

JUDGE DALY: You have thought this over, Mr.
Ostroski, very thoroughly, have you?

MR. OSTROSKI: Yes, I have, sir.

JUDGE DALY: All right. And having thought it
over and discussed the matter thoroughly with Mr.
Connor, you have reached a decision that you have just
enunciated, that you will testify in the case?

MR. OSTROSKI: Yes.

JUDGE DALY: You may call your first witness,
Mr. Connor.

MR. CONNOR: I would call Mr. Richard Ostroski.
Transcript at 830-31.

3A

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APPENDIX C

OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

(as reported in 42 Connecticut Law
Journal, No. 51, pp. 13-16 (1981

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RICHARD OSTROSKI

BOGDANSKI, C. J., SPEZIALE, PETERS, HEALEY and
ARMENTANO, JS.

Argued April 8 — decision released June 16, 1981

Indictment charging the defendant with the
A MA N
the judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at
Hartford and tried to a three judge court, Parskey,
Daly and Foti, Js.; judgment of guilty and appeal
by the defendant. Remanded with direction.

Joette Katz, assistant public defender, with
whom, on the brief, were Jerrold H. Barnett, public
defender, and Michael Connor, Jr., assistant public
defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Ernest J. Diette, Jr., assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were John M. Bailey,
state’s attorney, and Richard Maloney, assistant
state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).

Per Cuntmm. The defendant was indicted for
the murder of a young woman in her Canton apart-

this court can properly review the admissibility of
the defendant’s incriminating statements and vari-
ous items of physical evidence.

During the night of April 11-12, 1977, a nineteen-

police barracks at Litchfield from a telephone booth
in New Milford. Because the defendant was
unfamiliar with the area, a New Milford police
officer was sent to the defendant’s location. In his
own car the defendant followed the officer to the
New Milford police station. From there the defend-
ant together with his wife and child rode in a state
police car to the Litchfield barracks with a state

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The defense counsel at trial objected to the admis-
sion of the defendant’s statements on fifth amend-

In ruling that the defendant’s Miranda rights
were not violated, the trial court orally stated that

the defendant was under “apparent custodial inter-

rogation.“

When asked- by defense counsel to

* The trial court stated: “On April 16, 1978, [sic] the Defendant

voluntarily came to the Litchfield Barracks with his wife and child,

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elaborate, the trial court described its finding of
custody in these words: “[I]t is apparent custodial
interrogation, he was given his rights, we focused
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that is what we came down to,
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that the Defendant raised, so we didn't go into
superfluous matters that didn’t seem to bear on this
particular issue.”

The ambiguity of the word “apparent” in the
phrase “apparent custodial interrogation” and the
trial court’s own explanation of its thought pro-
cesses indicate that the “finding” that the defend-
ant was in custody at the time of his April 16, 1977
interview with the state police was merely an hypo-
thesis which the trial court assumed in order to
reach the fifth amendment issue of the protection
of the defendant’s right to remain silent. Whether
and when a person is taken into custody is a ques-
tion of fact. State v. Derrico, Conn. (41 Conn.
L.J., No. 50, pp. 7, 10), cert. denied, 1
101 S. Ct. 789, 66 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1980). It is the
function of the trial court, not this court, to find
facts. Whether or not the defendant was in eustody
is a critical threshold question which must be deter-
mined before we can properly review the claims
made in this appeal. It is, therefore, necessary to
remand this case for a further articulation of the
trial court’s decision on the custody issue.

On appeal the defendant renews his fifth amend-
ment claims and for the first time also claims fourth
amendment violations. He then urges suppression
of his incriminating statements and certain phys-
ical evidence obtained after those violations. The
defendant insists that he was unreasonably seized
without probable cause at the time he left his own
car at New Milford and entered the state police car
for the ride to Litchfield, or at least at the time he

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constitutional right” branch of the exceptional cir-
cumstances doctrine of State v. Evans, 165 Conn.
61, 70, 327 A2d 576 (1973). See Practice Book

out probable cause, a police cruiser was sent to find

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consideration of the fourth amendment right to be
“secure in weir persons . . against unreasonable
searches ar -izures.” U.S. Const., amend. IV.
See United » utes v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554,
100 S. Ct. 1870, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980); Oregon v.
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S. Ct. 711, 50 L. Ed.
2d 714 (1977).

The supervision of a case on appeal is in the
Supreme Court. Practice Book § 3096; State v.
McCarthy, 167 Conn. 472, 477, 356 A.2d 165 (1975).
Where “necessary to the proper disposition of the
cause,” this court may “remand the case for a
further articulation of the basis of the trial court’s
decision.” Practice Book §3060D; Powers v.
Powers, Conn. (42 Conn. L.J., No. 33, pp. 12,
13) (1981); Robertson v. Apuzzo, 168 Conn. 671,
337 A.2d 544 (1975), on full hearing, 170 Conn. 367,
370, 365 A.2d 824, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 852, 97
S. Ct. 142, 50 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1976) ; Davis v. P. Gam-
bardella d Son Cheese Corporation, 147 Conn. 365,
367n, 161 A.2d 583 (1960). For the reasons set forth
above, sua sponte we remand this case for further
articulation.

With particular reference to the issue of custody
as it affects the defendant’s fourth and fifth amend-
ment rights, it is ordered that the trial court file a
memorandum of decision articulating the basis for
its ruling which permitted the admission of evi-
dence of the defendant’s inculpatory statements and
also permitted the admission of testimony and phys-
ical evidence resulting from the defendant’s oral
and written consent.

9A

APPENDIX D

OPINION OF TRIAL COURT AFTER REMAND
FOR FURTHER ARTICULATION

(unpublished)
ARTICULATED MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

The Supreme Court Opinion dated June 16, 1981,
has set forth the preliminary details prior to de
fendant’s arrival at the Litchfield barracks.

Defendant had contacted Captain McDonnell
pursuant to a telephone conversation with his mother.

Defendant went upstairs to a room on the second
floor of the barracks along with Captain Thomas
McDonnell of the State Police and Sgt. Stephen
Cudworth of the Canton Police Department. The
interview commenced about 8:15 P.M. on April 16, 1977.

The defendant was advised of his Miranda rights by
Captain McDonnell. Defendant was advised at least
twice that he was not under arrest. Defendant indicated
that he was fully aware of his rights. He had had prior

experience with the police.
Defendant was not handcuffed.

Defendant’s wife, Beverly, and their child were
elsewhere in the barracks.

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Defendant confessed in his wife's presence.

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497, 509 (1980).

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14A

OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

(as reported at 186 Conn. 287 (1982))
186 Conn 287 FEBRUARY, 1982 287
Btate v. Ostroski

Srate or Connecticut v. Ricnarp OsTrosxi
Brust, C. J., Perexs, Hav, Akmentawo and Bie.ucn, Js.

The test of whether one is “seized” or taken into custody within the
meaning of the fourth amendment to the United States con-

without probable cause is unreasonable and thus violative of the
fourth amendment.
This court, following the defendant's appeal to it from his conviction

15A

Indictment charging the defendant with the crime
of murder, brought to the Superior Court in the
judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hart-
ford and tried to a three-judge court, Parskey,
Daly and Foti, Js.; judgment of guilty, from which

Joette Katz, assistant public defender, with
whom, on the brief, was Jerrold H. Barnett, public
defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Ernest J. Diette, Jr., assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were John M. Bailey,
state’s attorney, and Richard E. Maloney, assistant
state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).

Sreziare, C. J. During the night of April 11-12,
1977, a nineteen-year-old woman was brutally
stabbed to death. The defendant was indicted for her
murder and after a trial before the court, consisting
of a panel of three judges of the Superior Court, he
was found guilty and sentenced to a prison term of

16A

186 Conn 287 FEBRUARY, 1982 289

State v. Ostroski

not less than twenty-five years nor more than life.
During the trial the court heard evidence and argu-
ment on the defendant's motion to suppress poten-
tial testimony or other evidence that was obtained
in violation of the constitution or laws of the United
States or the State of Connecticut.” The trial court
denied the motion and orally stated that the defend-
ant was under “apparent custodial interrogation.”
We remanded the case for further articulation of
the threshold issue of custody, so that we could
properly review the admissibility of the defendant's
incriminating statements and various items of
physical evidence. State v. Ostroski, Conn. (42
Conn. L. J., No. 51, p. 13) (1981). On remand the
trial court found that the defendant was not in
custody until his formal arrest following his con-
fession. We disagree.

After the murder the defendant was identified by
photograph as one who had been seen in the apart-
ment house of the victim a few days before the
killing. The police left messages with his family
for him to call. On April 16, 1977, when he learned
that Captain McDonnell of the state police wanted
to talk with him, the defendant called the state
police barracks at Litchfield from a telephone
booth in New Milford. Because the defendant was
unfamiliar with the area, a New Milford police
officer was sent to the defendant's location. In his
own car the defendant followed the officer to the
New Milford police station. From there the defend-
ant together with his wife and child rode in a state
police car to the Litchfield barracks with a state
trooper.

Upon arrive] at the Litchfield barracks the defend-
ant was informed that he was not under arrest.

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290 FEBRUARY, 1982 186 Conn 287
State v. Ostroski

Captain McDonnell read aloud from a form listing
the Miranda rights and the defendant read aloud
the portion of the form indicating that he under-
stood those rights and chose not to exercise them.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602,
16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). In the course of the ques-
tioning the defendant appeared to discover, and
stated, that he had done the act in a drunken,
drugged state. He made incriminating statements
and authorized an examination of his person and his
property. The interrogation, which commenced at
8:15 p.m., was tape-recorded, and the transcription
of it is a part of the record in this case. As a result
of his confession the defendant was formally
arrested at 11:34 p.m.

On appeal the defendant claims error in the
admission of his confession and various items of
physical evidence.“ Whether the confession and
physical evidence are admissible turns on the
answers to two subsidiary questions: (1) whether
the defendant was “seized” within the meaning of

Derrico, 181 Conn. 151, 157-58, 434 Ad 356, cert.

8.

Ct. 2450, 61 L. Ed. 24 39 (1979), because the instruction on intent
FFF
I ought to say that ordinarily men are presumed to intend the results
which follow their acts.” This issue has been resolved adversely
to the defendant's claim by this court in State v. Stepney, 181 Conn.
268, 435 A.2d 701 (1980), and requires no further consideration.

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186 Conn 287 FEBRUARY, 1982 291
State v. Ostroski

S. Ct. 2248, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1979).* Because the
state has conceded that there was no probable cause
to seize the defendant at the time he was taken to the
Litchfield barracks, the only question for this court
is whether the defendant was seized at the time he
was taken there. We conclude that the defendant
was seized at the time he was taken to the Litchfield
barracks and that the trial court erred in admitting
the confession and physical evidence obtained as a
result of the interrogation at the Litchfield barracks
on the night in question, which interrogation vio-
lated the defendant’s fourth amendment protection
against unreasonable seizures.

The test of whether a person has been “seized”
so as to invoke the protection of the fourth amend-
ment has been set out by the Supreme Court of the
United States: “[A] person is ‘seized’ only when by
means of physical force or a show of authority, his
freedom of movement is restrained. . . . As long
as the person to whom questions are put remains
free to disregard the questions and walk away,
there has been no intrusion upon that person’s
liberty or privacy as would under the Constitution
require some particularized and objective justifica-
tion. . We conclude that a person has been ‘seized’
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only

* It should be noted that it is also necessary that acquisition of
the evidence sought to be suppressed be causally related to the illegal
seizure. State v. Derrico, 181 Conn. 151, 157-58, 434 A.2d 356, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1064, 101 8. Ct. 780, 66 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1980). Put
another way, evidence obtained after an illegal arrest or seizure may

422 U.S. 590, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 45 L. Ed. 24 416 (1975); Wong Sun
83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 24 441 (1963).

The state has not argued that there was such an intervening act in
this case and nothing in the record before us suggests that there
was such an intervening act.

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292 FEBRUARY, 1982 186 Conn 287
State v. Ostroski

if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the

incident, a reasonable person would have believed

that he was not free to leave.” United States v.

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54, 100 S. Ct. 1870,
64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980).

Whether there has been such a seizure in an
individual case is a question of fact. State v. Ostro-
ski, Conn. (42 Conn. L. J., No. 51, pp. 13, 14)
(1981). State v. Derrico, 181 Conn. 151, 158, 434
A.2d 356 (1980); State v. Love, 169 Conn. 596,
600, 363 A.2d 1035 (1975). Courts have found
seizure: wher; a defendant “was taken from a
neighbor’s home to a police car, transported to a
police station, and . . . would have been physically
restrained if he had refused to accompany the
officers”; Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212,
99 S. Ct. 2248, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1979); where a
defendant “was separated from his two companions
and placed in one of the police cruisers with a
uniformed officer”; United States v. Blum, 614 F. 2d
537, 540 (6th Cir. 1980); and where “two officers
informed [the defendant], following an hour’s
interrogation, that he was the last person with the
murder weapon before the victim’s death and that
they believed he knew more about the crime than he
had revealed.” State v. Menne, 380 So. 2d 14, 17
(La.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833, 101 S. Ct. 104, 66
L. Ed. 2d 39 (1980).

We conclude that when the facts of this case are
measured by the above standard they constitute a
seizure protected by the fourth amendment. The
evidence is that when t“ defendant called, he asked
to go in “tomorrow” but ne trooper said he “should
come in tonight.” The defendant was not informed
that he could leave at any time. He was told, “you

186 Conn 287 FEBRUARY, 1982 293
State v. Ostroski

realize your [sic] at the State Police. Barracks
okay, it’s not a hotel or anything like that.” On
arrival at the Litchfield barracks, the defendant was
separated from his wife and child. He had no car
in which to leave because his car had been left in
New Milford.

On several occasions the defendant asked to leave.
The defendant said to Captain McDonnell, I'd
really like to get going as soon as possible, I’m
beat.” The police responded not to his request to
leave, but to his reason for asking to leave: “Okay,
doing a lot of driving... 7“ and “Did you do all the
driving or did the wife do some?” The defendant
repeatedly pressed his request to leave. He inter-
rupted his account of his drinking on the day of the
murder with, “I’m not sure, see I’m pretty tired,
you think I can go, I, I, I’m really, I'd like to
terminate this thing cuz ahh any questions I answer,
I prob . . liable to, start fuckin everything up and
telling you I was doing one thing, when I was doing
another cuz I’m tired and I don’t fee! good.” The
police again were unresponsive, addressing only his
reason for asking to leave, that he might say some-
thing incriminating, and assuring him that what he
said was not incriminating: “[T]here’s no crime
against, va know, telling me you were drunk.” Next,
the defendant said, “Can I at least get on the road
pretty soon?”, indicating that he thought his previ-
ous requests to go had been rebuffed, that another
request to go would also be rebuffed, so he would
settle for at least going “pretty soon.” That request
too was deflected with a response that he didn’t need
to go for the reason that he would have to drive
because they would drive him. In response, the
defendant tried yet again: “I want to go back to
my car and then from there I’m gonna go, I'll go

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294 FEBRUARY, 1982 186 Conn 287
State v. Ostroski

home, III go home, crimidy sakes, cuz Im so
tired,” and asked for an answer, “So, what do you
think?” The police, again instead of answering his
question, answered a different question: “I think
you killed this girl Ricky.”

Of course, what counts is not what the defendant
believed, but what a reasonable person would have
believed in view of all the circumstances. It is plain
that a reasonable person would have believed that
he was not free to leave in view of these circum-
stances: where one is summoned now, and “tomor-
row” will not do; where one is separated from one’s
ear and taken in a police car to the police barracks;
where one is dependent on one’s interrogators for
the means to leave; where one’s interrogators refuse
to honor requests to leave; where one’s interro-
gators refuse to honor a request to stop question-
ing; where the response to a request to see one’s
spouse is delayed; where the interrogation lasts
more than three hours; where one’s interrogators
ask one’s consent to search one’s car to take various
physical evidence; where one’s interrogators say,
“T think you killed this girl.” We conclude that in
view of all the circumstances surrounding the inci-
dent, a reasonable person would have believed that
he was not free to leave. United States v. Menden-
hall, supra.

Accordingly, the determination of the trial court
that the defendant was not in custody is clearly
erroneous. See Pandolphe’s Auto Parts, Inc. v. Man-
chester, 181 Conn. 217, 221-22, 435 A.2d 24 (1980);
Stelco Industries, Inc.v.Cohen, Conn. (42 Conn.
L. J., No. 26, pp. 4, 5) (1980); Practice Book § 3060D.
It was error for the court to admit the incriminating

186 Conn 295 FEBRUARY, 1982 295

statements and the physical evidence because they
were the result of an illegal detention, the interroga-
tion at the Litchfield barracks.

There is error, the judgment is set aside and a
new trial is ordered.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

IX F

EXCERPT FROM THE PETITIONER'S BRIEF

BEFORE THE CONNECTICUT SUPREME COURT

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