# Amicus Brief — Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_0054%3A07

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1984
- **Citation:** 464 U.S. 238

## Text

4 No. 81-2159

< IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1981

BILL M. SILKWOOD, Administrator of the Estate
of KAREN G. SILKWOOD, Deceased

Appellant

Vv.

KERR -MCGEE CORPORATION and KERR~-MCGEE NUCLEAR
CORPORATION,

Appellees

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

MOTION OF THE STATE OF WISCONSIN AND ACCOMPANYING
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE IN OPPOSITION TO
BRIEF OF SOLICITOR GENERAL

For the State of Wyoming For the State of Wisconsin
HON. A.G. MCCLINTOCK HON. BRONSON C. LAFOLLETTE*
Attorney General Attorney General

MR. BRUCE SALZBURG MR. CARL SINDERBRAND
Dpty. Atty. General Asst. Attorney General
Off. of Atty. Gen. Department of Justice
State Capitol 123 W.Washington Ave.
Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002 Madison, Wisconsin 53702

(608) 266-1221

Por the State of North Carolina

HON. RUFUS EDMISTEN
Attorney General

MS. JO ANNE SANFORD

Spec. + Atty. General

off. of Attorney General

P.O. Bon 629

Raleigh, Werth Carolina 27602 *Counsel of Record

No. 81-2159

IN THE
SUPKEME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1981

BILL M. SILKWOOD, Administrator of the
Estate of Karen G. Silkwood, Deceased

Appellant

Vv.

KERR-MCGEE CORPORATION, a Delaware
Corporation and KERR-McGEE NUCLEAR
CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation

Appellees

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE STATE AMICUS
CURIAE BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO BRIEF OF
SOLICITOR GENERAL

Pursuant to Rule 36 of the Rules of the
Supreme Court, movant respectfully re-
quests leave to file the accompanying
brief amicus curiae in opposition to the
brief of the Solicitor General herein.

The brief of the Solicitor General
raises substantial questions concerning
the power of the states to enforce laws of

general application pursuant to trad-
itional police powers, for protection of
public health and safety. The States
amici on the acompanying brief seek to
present for the consideration of the court
views responsive to the points made by the
Solicitor General on the profoundly
important questions of federalism raised

in this matter.

Respectfully submitted,

For the State of Wisconsin
HON. BRONSON C. LAFOLLETTE*
Attorney General

MR. CARL SINDERBRAND

Asst. Attorney General
Department of Justice
123 W.Washington Ave.
Madison, Wisconsin 53702
(608) 266-1221

* Counsel of Record

No. 81-2159

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1981

BILL M. SILKWOOD, Administrator of the
Estate of Karen G. Silkwood, Deceased

Appellant

Vv.

KERR-MCGEE CORPORATION, a Delaware
Corporation and KERR-MCGEE NUCLEAR
CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation

Appellees

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE IN OPPOSITION
TO BRIEF OF SOLICITOR GENERAL

SUMMARY AND INTEREST OF AMICI

In response to this Court's Order of
October 4, 1982, the Solictor General of
the United States filed herein an amicus
curiae brief dated November, 1982 present-
ing the views of the United States regard-
ing the federal preemption of state law
ordered by the court below, Silkwood v.

Rerr-MeGee Corporation, 667 F.2d 908

—

2
(10th Cir. 1981). The Solicitor General's
brief, which supports the 10th Circuit's
decision to reverse a jury's award of puni-
tive damages under Oklahoma's exemplary
damages statute, 23 Okla. Stat. 9,
represents an endorsement by the U.S. Jus-
tice Department of a major and
unprecedented undermining of traditional
states’ rights. Few decisions have so
seriously encroached upon the authority of
state and local governments to provide
health and safety protection for their
citizens. The decision below, if not
reversed, will leave states powerless to
meaningfully protect their citizens
against reckless and life threatening
mishandling of radioactive materials. The
States joined herein submit this brief
pursuant to Rule 36 of the Rules of the
Supreme Court, in response to the too
facile arguments and analysis of the

Solicitor General. Amici consider this

case to frame important issues of
federalism in which each of the states is
interested. Amici support appellant's
request that this case be given plenary
review so that the decision of the Court

of Appeals may be reversed.

ARGUMENT

Contrary to the assertions of the
Solicitor General at pages 12 and 13 of
his brief, Congress has never expressly
precluded state regulation of hazardous
radioactive materials, nor expressly with-
held any authority from the states pur-
suant to Section 274(k) of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 2021(k).
This view was confirmed by the Eighth

Circuit in Northern States Power Co. v.

Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (1971) aff'd

mem. 405 U.S. 1035 (1972), which held,

4
"no provision of the Atomic Energy Act
expressly declares that the federal
government shall have the sole and exclu-
sive authority to reguiate radiation
emissions from nuclear power plants.” 447

F.2d at 1147.

In evaluating the preemptive effect of

Section 274(k), the Northern States

Power court applied several detailed cri-
teria, 447 F.2d at 1146-1167. On the
basis of these criteria, the court deter-
mined that a state regulation which limit-
ed the release to the environment of radio-
active wastes from nuclear power plants by
setting emissions standards lower than
those fixed by the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission (NRC) had been implicitly preempt-
ed by Congress.

The conclusion of the Northern States
Power court is not questioned here. What

is questioned, however, is the expansion

5

by the court below of the Northern States

Power holding beyond anything ever envis-
ioned by Congress- specifically, its con-
Clusion that the Atomic Energy Act pre-
empts the very narrow authority tradition-
ally vested in the states to provide
health and safety protections for their
citizens through common law or statutory
tort remedies. As conclusively shown by
the State amici in their brief filed on
July 17, 1982 in support of appellant's
jurisdictional statement ("States'
Brief"), Congress did not expressly or

impliedly intend such broad preemptive

effect, nor does there exist an unavoid-
able conflict between the state and fed-
eral law to force a conclusion that the
two laws cannot constitutionally stand to-
gether.

Both the Court of Appeals and the Soli-
citor General rely heavily on Northern

States Power to support preemption of the

- _~ —

6
Oklahoma punitive damages statute at issue
here. This reliance is entirely mis-
placed.

To begin with, federal policy toward
nuclear power has changed dramatically

since this Court reviewed Northern States

Power in 1972. Congress has in fact
substantially overruled the case by pas-
sing the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977,
42 U.S.C. 7401 et seg, which explicit-
ly returns to state and local governments
the power to regulate radiation hazards as-
sociated with radioactive air emissions.

Moreover, since Northern States Power,

Congress has significantly changed the
federal government's policy toward nuclear
power, eliminating one of the Eighth
Circuit's principle justifications for
preempting the Minnesota statute.
Specifically, Congress has now articulated
a policy not to promote nuclear power or
favor it over other energy forms. See,

7

States’ Brief at 14-15. In 1974 Congress
abolished the Atomic Energy Commission and
created the NRC to focus exclusively on
regulating nuclear power for the purpose
of protecting the public health and
safety. The development and promotional
functions of the AEC were shifted to an en-
tirely new governmental body created under
an entirely new act of Congress. Under the
new statutory scheme, nuclear power is not
to be favored over other forms of energy.
Thus, the court below is plainly wrong to
advance the theory, perhaps valid at one
time, that a “strong federal interest in
atomic energy development," 667 F.2d at
922, now requires preemption of the state
tort remedy at issue in this case.

Additionally, the facts of Northern
States Power are explicitly distinguish-
able from those in the instant case. Most
importantly, the Minnesota statute at
issue in MSP regulated conduct related

:
7

—

8
to the operation of a nuclear power plant.
It was precisely this type of state law

-one regulating operation of a plant-

which was found by the court to trigger
the implicit preemptive effect of Section
274(k). It is one thing for a court to
find implicit preemption under Section
274(k) of a state statute which directly
regulates the operation of nuclear power
plants - a function broadly served by a
federal agency, the NRC. It is quite an-
other thing, however, for a court to pre-
clude a state from enforcing its own gener-
ally-applicable exemplary damages statute
merely because it is applied to conduct
which is also subject to federal regula-
tion. A tort remedy is plainly not equi-
valent to a “regulation.” It is invoked
only to remedy actual injury, not to pre-
vent predicted harm. indeed, even in in-

9
tion is less clear, this Court has always
accorded special deference to state tort
laws in protecting them from federal pre-
emption. See, States" Brief at 43-50.

Notably, Congress has never expressed an
intent that the Atomic Energy Act preempt
state tort remedies, particularly where in-
dividuals are injured by intentional or
reckless handling of radioactive materials
by a company licensed under the Act. Nor
does the overall statutory scheme of the
Act mandate such a conclusion. Section
274(k) itself is merely a "servings clause”
which by its language preserves no exclu-
sive authority to the federal government,
but rather limits encroachment on state
authority, if any, which the regulatory
scheme may otherwise suggest. Moreover,
other portions of the Act contain language

indicating that Congress did not intend
the federal government's authority to be
exclusive in the regulation of nuclear

———ee

10
energy, or in the provision of remedies
for radiation injuries. See, 42 U.S.C.
2021(a)(1)&(2), (g), (i).

When the issue of state tort remedies
arose during Congress' consideration of
the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. 2210,
Congress stated categorically that it
intended states to apply their owr tort
laws in determining liability in nuclear
litigation. See, H.R. Rep. No. 2043 and
S. Rep. No. 1605, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9
(1966). Further, Congress made no distinc-
tion between the particular form of dam-
ages which were to be available to a liti-
gant seeking relief under state tort law
for radiation injuries. But as noted in
the States' Brief at 28, Price-Anderson
lacks materiality to resolution of issues
in this case, since an “extraordinary
nuclear occurrence" (ENO) is a prerequi-

site for coverage. State tort law rela-

ll
ting to radiation injuries from "“iesser
events," or non-ENO's such as the instant
case clearly is, was intended by Congress
to remain entirely unaffected by Price-And-
erson. H.R. Rep. No. 2043, supra, at ll.

Both the Court of Appeals and the Solic-
itor General make curious use of this seem-
ingly clear expression of Congressional in-
tent to support their conclusion. that
first, Price-Anderson's statutory ceiling
on damages recoverable by private lLiti-
gants against a private nuclear facility
liable for causing an ENO is somehow incon-
sistent with the allowance of punitive dam-
ages, and second, that the same is true
for lesser events entirely outside the pur-
view of the Act. See, Solicitor Gener-
al's Brief, at 15; 667 F.2d at 922. Both
suggest that Congress’ failure to discuss
punitive damages in the legislative his-
tory necessarily evidences its belief that

such damages are inappropriate remedies

Py

12
under Price-Anderson. Id. This is not
only wrong, but it conflicts with a long
line of Supreme Court rulings that have
erected a strong presumption against pre-
emption of state laws enacted pursuant to
the states' police powers, particularly
those laws that protect public health and
safety. See, States' Brief at 40-43.
The issue here is not whether Congress ex-

pressly authorized the application of

punitive damages, a: the Solicitor General
suggests, but whether it expressly or im-

pliedly preempted them.

To arrive at the derivative conclusion
that Congress did not intend the use of
punitive damages for non-ENO events out-
side the purview of Price-Anderson, the So-
licitor General first simply registers sup-
port for a distorted reading by the court
below of the word “compensating,” used in

Duke Power Co. v. Environmental Study

Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 93 (1978). The

13
court below incorrectly interpreted the Su-
preme Court's mere observation in Duke

Power that Price-Anderson compensated

victims of ENO's, to be a declaration on

its part that only compensatory and not

punitive damages were to be available

for such incidents. The Solicitor General
then baldly asserts that punitive damages
should be unavailable for non-ENO's as
well. See, States" Brief at 27-29.
This conclusion lacks any reasoned basis
whatsoever, and is in fact inconsistent
with the express intent of Congress to
retain all state tort remedies as a basis
for liability in radiation claims not
declared to be ENO's.

The Solicitor General also suggests that
Congress’ "rejection of an Atomic Energy
Commission: proposal that the government
{insurance fund] not be liable ‘for loss
or damage caused by bad faith, willful

misconduct or gross negligence‘ on

14
the part of the [insured] licensee,"
cannot be considered evidence that
Congress affirmatively contemplated the
availability of punitive damages’ since
that rejection was meant “not in order to
allow punitive damages, but in order to
assure compensation in all cases."
Solicitor General's Brief at 15. Clearly,
the more logical interpretation is that
the proposal was rejected to insure full
recovery of damages in all cases. by

specifically allowing for insurance

coverage of punitive damages. The
legislative history of the Act clearly
shows that Congress contemplated the avail-
ability of “willful” damages, which equal-
ly clearly implies that Congress did not
intend preemption of punitive damages.
See, S. Rep. 2298, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.
8 (1956); States’ Brief 27.

The Solicitor General's use of Dean

Cavers’ statement to buttress his argument

15
is particularly odd since both of Dean
Cavers’ suggestions were rejected by Con-
gress. Solicitor General's Brief at 15-16,
footnote 19. The Solicitor General's
final comment, id., that somehow the NRC
itself assumes that punitive damages are
unavailable remedies because NRC licensees
can raise "federal preemption" as a
defense against punitive damage claims,
stretches his argument to absurd propor-
tions. If the NRC believed that punitive
damages were legally prohibited, it would
have simply said so in its regulations.

The Solicitor General also alludes in
several instances to an alleged inconsis-
tency or conflict between the Atomic
Energy Act and the Oklahoma exemplary dam-
ages statute which would mandate pre-
emption of the state law. The State
amici have already conclusively shown
this not to be the case. States' Brief at

9-22. Both state and federal efforts pur-

16
sue the common purpose of protecting
public health and safety by deterring harm-
ful conduct. The Oklahoma law does not in-
terfere with accomplishment of the federal
objectives in any way. Only if the pur-
pose of NRC regulation was to promote the
private nuclear power industry by immuniz-
ing from liability its acts which reckless-
ly and willfully injure the public, could
the Oklahoma statute interfere with the
federal scheme. Needless to say, Congress
has not established such a policy.

The Solicitor Geneval presents for the
Court's consideration the hypothetical
case whereby a state agency would levy a
fine against appellees for violating state
law punishing the reckless and wanton
infliction of physical injury by means of
diverted radioactive materials. The Solic-
itor General, citing no authority in sup-
port, asserts that “there is no doubt

that its action would be preempted by the

ae

17

Atomic Energy Act." Solicitor General's
Brief at 14. He then leaps to the conclu-
sion that "[l]Jike a civil fine, the award
of ... punitive damages here directly con-
flicts with the exclusive authority given
the NRC to regulate the health and safety
hazards associated with plutonium and pro-
duction facilities.” Id.

As to his first premise, which has never
been considered by this or any other
court, there is of course considerable
doubt whether such a state enforcement
action would be preempted. If a state
chose to prosecute for manslaughter and
sought a sizable fine against a corpora-
tion for recklessly causing the fatal con-
tamination of one of its citizens by radio-
active materials, or alternatively imposed
a civil fine in similar circumstances,
only by some vast expansion of preemption
doctrine heretofore contemplated only by

the Solicitor General and certainly not by

al

18
Congress, could such an exercise of tradi-
tional state power be held impliedly or ex-
pressly preempted by Congress. As to his
derivative conclusion, the Solicitor Gener-
al ignores entirely the distinction which
Congress and the courts have historically
made between regulation on the one hand,
and tort remedies on the other, to which
they have always accorded special defer-
ence. See , States’ Brief at 43-50. In
short, the Solicitor General is simply
wrong both in his general premise and in
his derivative conclusion.

As the Solicitor General demonstrates,
the NRC has promulgated a number of feder-
al regulations aimed at advancing the in-
terests of the public health and safety.
Solicitor General's Brief at 12-13.:+ The
fact remains, however, that these regula-
tions do not even purport to be comprehen-
sive. They provide no tort remedies
because the Atomic Energy Act does not

19
create a private damages action for radia-
tion injuries. Far from expressing any
desire that federal regulation be the ex-
clusive means of meeting tort liability
problems, Congress has indicated just the
opposite intent. Certainly where the fed-
eral government has failed to effectively
exercise its powers to protect the public,
such as by providing adequate remedies to
those injured by NRC licensees, the states
must be able to exercise their own concur-
rent police powers to provide such effec-
tive remedies. In this case, the jury
found, upon listening to the evidence,
that Oklahoma's exemplary damages statute
appropriately remedied an injury which the

federal government did not.

Nowhere in the Atomic Energy Act or its
legislative history has Congress ever

20
suggested an intent that the Oklahoma
statute should not be enforced. For the
courts to rule this statute preempted in
the absence of some clear indication from
Congress would amount to an unwarranted
attack on the traditional rights of the
states to protect the health and safety of

their citizens.

Respectfully submitted,

For the State of Wisconsin
HON. BRONSON C. LAFOLLETTE*
Attorney General

MR. CARL SINDERBRAND

Asst. Attorney General
Department of Justice
123 W.Washington Ave.
Madison, Wisconsin 53702
(608) 266-1221

Por the State of North Carolina
HON. RUFUS EDMISTEN
Attorney General

MS. JO ANNE SANFORD

Spec. Dpty. Atty. General

Off. of the Attorney General
P.O. Box 629

Raleigh, North Carolina 27602

*Counsel of Record

For the State of Wyomi ng
HON. A.G. McCLINTOCK
Attorney General

Cheyenne , Wyoming 82002

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_0054%3A07. Public record. Not legal advice.
