# Record and brief — Dowdle v. Wright

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Record and brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1982
- **Citation:** 456 U.S. 995

## Text

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Office Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
81-1512 |. >
No. ALEXANDER \ STEVAS.
CLERK

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1981

EARL B. DOWDLE, Superintendent,
Safford Conservation Center; and

Attorney General, State of
Arizona,
Petitioners,
VS.

EMIL THOMPSON WRIGHT,

Respondent.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit

ROBERT K. CORBIN BRUCE M. FERG
The Attorney General Assistant Attorney General

315 State Government Bldg.
WILLIAM J. SCHAFER, III 402 West Congress
Chief Counsel Tucson, Arizona
Criminal Division 85701-1367

Telephone: (602) 628-5501

Counsel of Record

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

I. Did the Court of Appeals violate
U.S. v. Timmreck in granting relief when the
habeas corpus petitioner never alleged that
he did not know what he was giving up by
pleading guilty, or that he would not have
pleaded guilty had he been properly instructed
by the trial judge?

II. Did the Court of Appeals err in
putting the burden on the State to prove
that Wright's guilty plea was valid when it
was Wright's own dilatory conduct which both
created the doubt about the plea and hampered
the State in reconstructing what had occurred
at the change of plea hearing?

III. Did the Court of Appeals arrive at an
erroneous assessment of the case through
wilfull disregard of pertinent evidence and
refusal to give due deference to the findings
of the state court?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Cases and Authorities,

Opinions Below, ...

Jurisdictional Statement,

Constitutional and Statutory

Provisions Involved ,

Statement of the Case

Reasons for Granting the Writ:,

I.

II.

Iift.

The Court of Appeals has granted
relief in circumstances which
clearly do not constitute grounds
cognizable in habeas corpus,
thereby rejecting the plain teach-
ing of the habeas corpus statutes,
its own precedents, decisions in
other federal courts of appeals,
and this Court's decision in U.S.

v. Timmreck. .

It was Wright's dilatory conduct
in causelessly waiting six years
to attack his conviction which
allowed the reporter's notes to
become lost, and which rendered
it virtually impossible for the
State to prove the validity of
the plea, so the Court of Appeals
should not have placed the burden
of proof on the State.

The Court of Appeals plainly erred
in its assessment of the case by
disregarding presumptions favoring
the state, ignoring evidence sup-
porting the state's position,
affording no deference to the
findings of the state court, and

i-

13

engaging in groundless speculation

about what Wright might have be-
lieved about his change of plea.

ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee
Appendices:
1. Affidavit of Emil Wright.

2. Minute Entry of March 6, 1979
(Pima County Superior Court).

3. District Court Order Denying
Petition for Habeas Corpus.

4. Memorandum of Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, Reversing
the District Court.

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES

Alessi v. United States,
628 F.2d 1133 (2nd Cir. 1980) ...

Bellew v. Gunn,
532 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1976) cert.
denied 426 U.S. 953 . . 17, 21, 22,

Bouchillon v. Estelle,
628 F.2d 926 (5th Cir. 1980) ...

Boykin v. Alabama,

a walls. Gee Gee oo eo ote SGy
Brady v. United States,

oe a wee See «6 «6 é& Se
Brady v. United States,

164 F.2d 601 (10th Cir. 1968)

QEE°G Ber U.B. 4B «© we eo eo eee

California v. Prysock,
U.S. , LOI S.ct. 2806 (1981) .

o £8 «

13
31

22

25

22

30

21

25

30

Clayton v. Blackburn,
org F.2d 11? (5th Cir. 1978) ...

Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963) .....

Galleges v. Cox,
8 F. (10th Cir. 1966) cert.
denied 385 U.S. 869. ....-e«-.-

Grantling v. Balkcom,
F. th Cir. 1980). . .
Honeycutt v. Ward,
etD F.20 36 (2nd Cir. 1979). ...

Hutto v. Davis,

16,

~ 50 U.S.L.W. 3540 (U.S., Jan. 11, 1982)

In re Johnson,
53 Cal. Rptr. 1 (App. 1966)... .

Mayola v. Alabama,
623 F.2d 992 (Sth Cir. 1980) ...

McIntyre v. Balkcon,
339 Ga. 81, 189 S.E.2d 445 (1972).

McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759, 773-774 (1970) ...

Mi randa . . * * . . . . . . . . 7. . dl

Norvell v. Illinois,

373 U.S. 420, 423 (1963) - . 7 . .

Parker v. North Carolina,
U.S. 790 * .* * i _ . . * bal . .

Pasley v. Overholser,
LY. F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1960)...

14,

17

13

17

21

16

23

16

23

21

17

21

16

People v. Coultas,
Fs T1l.App.3d 137,. 394 N.E.2d 26 (1979)12

People v. Wright,
96 Cal. App.3d Supp. 17, 158 Cal. Rptr.

Sew UR. & GCEPTOR we woe eee 8
- iii -

12

Roddy v. Black,
SiG F.2d 1380 (6th Cir. 1975)....

State v. Rouse,
Neb. 371, 293 N.W.2d 83 (1980)

Stinson v. Turner,

473 F.2d 913 (10th Cir. 1973),

Sumner v. Mata,
U.S. 101 S.ct. 764 (1981). ..

U.S. v. Ackerman,

PF. couG@ Gar. 1900) w cece
U.S. v. Crook,

PF. 70 (5th Cir. 1979)

U.S. v. Horsley,
599 F.2d 1355 (3rd Cir. 1979).

U.S. v. Salas,

602 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1979) ll,

United States v. MacCollom,
U. . -

United States v. Pricepaul,
540 F.2d 417 (9th aE 1976) ...

United States v. Timmreck,
Dole « « ofe Be Sho Bee

United States ex rel. Black v. Russell,
F. 9 3rd Cir. :

United States ex rel. Crosby v. Brierly,
—~“T04 F.2d 790 (3rd Cir. 1568) Sa

United States ex rel. Darrah v. Brierly,
PF. rd Cir. 1969)

United States ex rel. Grays v. Rundle,
° rd Cir. 1970),

- iv -

18

12

30

25

ll

1l

1l

12

17

18

23

21

25

16

Wacht v. Cardwell,
F. (9th Cir. 1979)...

Wade v. Coiner,
F. 59 (4th Cir. 1972)...

Walker v. Caldwell,
F. em Cis. 1973) «. « «

Webster v. Estelle,

505 F.2d 926 (5th Cir. 1974) cert.
Gee Wells OEce © © © 0 6 eo et

Wilkins v. Erickson,
F. th Cir. 1974) ...

Wilson v. State,
-E. 82 (So. Car. 1968) ..

Wilson v. Wiman,
e (6th Cir. 1967) cert.
nr rr i. DO . 2 6 6 6 6 6

Winford v. Swenson,

8th Cir. 1975) cert.

denied 423 U.S. 1023.......
Statutes:

96 U.8.C. § 1284... 11 ee ew
ee
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) ......
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). .......

28 U.S.C.

§
§
§

28 U.S.C. § 2254 . 2. «© «© «© 2 © ©
5
§ 2254(@). . « «© « © « @
§

28 U.S.C.

2255 . . . . . . . 7 .

- Veo

22,

12

30

25

22

30

23

23

21

xi

25

RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES:
ee a a a a a ee
ee ee . & ©. oe): 6 @e © 6 ee

FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
Male 406 . wc ccc eceveses

SUPREME COURT RULES
eS ee ae ee a

A. BISHOP, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
IN STATE GUILTY PLEAS

71 F.R.D. 235, 272 (1976) ...

ARIZONA RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

- vi -

22

19

21

OPINIONS BELOW

The decisions of all the courts considering
this case, both state and federal, have been
by minute entry, order, or Memorandum, rather
than by formal Opinion. Therefore, there are
no published reports. The decisional documents
are reproduced in the Appendices to this
Petition.

JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT

A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals filed its Memorandum decision,
reversing and remanding the District Court's
denial of a petition for habeas corpus relief,
on August 19, 1981. A Petition for Rehearing
and request for rehearing en banc was timely
filed by mailing it on August 31, 1981. The
Petition for Rehearing was denied by an Order
filed December 8, 1981, no judge having re-
quested a vote on the suggested hearing en
banc. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

- vii -

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED

AMENDMENT V.

No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, wiless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the iand
or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public dan-
ger; nor shall any person be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against him-
self, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.

AMENDMENT VI.

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defense.

AMENDMENT XIV.

Section 1. All persons born or natural-
ized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or en-
force any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.

- viii -

28 U.S.C. § 2241,

(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not
extend to a prisoner unless --

(1) He is in custody under or by
color of the authority of the
United States or is committed for
trial before some court thereof; or

(2) He is in custody for an act
done or omitted in pursuance of an
Act of Congress, or an order, pro-
cess, judgment or decree of a court
or judge of the United States; or

(3) He is in custody in violation
of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States; or

(4) He, being a citizen of a for-
eign state and domiciled therein
is in custody for an act done or
omitted under any alleged right,
title, authority, privilege, pro-
tection, or exemption claimed
under the commission, order or
sanction of any foreign state, or
under color thereof, the validity
and effect of which depend upon
the law of nations; or

(5) It is necessary to bring him
into court to testify or for trial.

28 U.S.C. § 2254.
State custody; remedies in Federal courts

(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof,
a circuit judge, or a district court shall
entertain an application for a writ of habeas
corpus in behalf of a person in custody pur-
suant to the judgment of a State court only
on the ground that he is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States.

* * *

(ad) In any proceeding instituted
in a Federal court by an application for a
writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court,
a determination after a hearing on the merits
of a factual issue, made by a State court of
competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to
which the applicant for the writ and the
State or an officer or agent thereof were
parties, evidenced by a written finding,
written opinion, or other reliable and
adequate written indicia, shall be presumed
to be correct, unless the applicant shall
establish or it shall otherwise appear, or
the respondent shall admit --

(1) that the merits of the
factual dispute were not re-
solved in the State court
hearing;

(2) that the factfinding pro-
cedure employed by the State
court was not adequate to afford
a full and fair hearing;

(3) that the material facts
were not adequately developed
at the State court hearing;

(4) that the State court lacked
jurisdiction of the subject mat-
ter or over the person of the

applicant in the State court pro-

ceeding;

(5) that the applicant was an
indigent and the State court, in
deprivation of his constitutional
right, failed to appoint counsel
to represent him in the State
court proceeding;

- x . . . 7 ° . 6

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

Rules 17.1 - 17.4 Se @«¢ + 42 6 © © @ 6 -@ 5

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Rule 1 1 ad ° . +. 7. . ° o o 7 . . 7. 7 . 5

~iii-

REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENTS

I. THE STATE IS NOT FORECLOSED FROM
ARGUING EITHER UNITED STATES v.
TIMMRECK OR THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES
IN THIS COURT, BECAUSE BOTH MATTERS
WERE RAISED IN THE COURT OF APPEALS.

Respondent's Opposition repeatedly urges that
the state may not argue the applicability of

United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 789 (1979),

because that case was not cited either in the
state's response to the original petition for
habeas corpus, or its answering brief before
the Court of Appeals. While it is true that

the state did not cite Timmreck on those

occasions, this Court should not be misled

into believing that the question of Timmreck's

applicability was never placed before the

Court of Appeals. Timmreck was repeatedly

cited in Respondent's opening brief before
the Ninth Circuit, in frantic efforts to dis-
tinguish it away. Moreover, as counsel for
Respondent well knows, the applicability of

Timmreck was one of the topics of oral argument

before the Court of Appeals. There can be,

=

therefore, no question that the issue has been
adequately raised below.

The situation is similar with the doctrine
of laches. Subsequent to the filing of the
briefs in the Court of Appeals but before oral
argument, counsel for the state filed
(pursuant to the Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure) a list of eight additional pertinent
cases. (See Appendix 1 hereto.) Three of

those eight (Norvell v. Illinois, Mayola v.

Alabama, and Clayton v. Blackburn) were

specifically identified as pertaining to
the effect of delay on the necessity of
providing transcripts. Again, the issue
was touched upon during the oral arguments.
Hence, these matters are not being raised
for the first time in this Court, and are
legitimate grounds for decision./+

This conclusion is not changed by the

state's concession that the Federal District
/l I the Court is truly concemed about matters
not being raised below, it should ignore the repeated
attempts to suggest a conflict of interest on the part
of the lawyer who represented Mr. Wright in his state
post-conviction relief proceedings or the judge who
presided over them. (See Brief in Oppostiion at 2, ll,
17.) That really is a question never raised before.

nin

Court had jurisdiction over the original habeas
petition and that state remedies had been ex-
hausted. (See Brief in Opposition at 7-8.)

An admission of a court's power to decide a
case certainly does not imply any concession
that it can either legally or equitably grant
the relief requested, and Respondent's attempts
to telescope these two very different questions
into one can only be categorized as sophistry
of the first water.

II. UNITED STATES v. TIMMRECK IS PROPERLY
APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE.

Respondent seeks to eviscerate Timmreck

by narrowly focusing on its reference to a
"formal violation of Rule 11" while ignoring
the total impact of the case. This Court
effectively defined what it meant by a
"formal" or "technical" violation by the
very structure of the decision:

Nor can any claim reasonably be made
that the error here resulted in a
“complete miscarriage of justice” or
in a proceeding "inconsistent with
the rudimentary demands of fair
“. Respondent does not

that he was actually unaware

° special parole term or that,

=3-

if he had been properly advised by the
SS He a eI ie or

claim is of a tech-
real polation Of the vale

441 U.S. at 783 (emphasis added).
Thus, the Court seems to have defined a “merely
technical” violation as one so slight that if
the defendant had been properly advised it
would not have affected his decision to plead

guilty. This case is precisely like Timmreck

in that Respondent has never argued "that he
was actually unaware of [his Boykin rights] or
that, if he had been properly advised by the
trial judge, he would not have pleaded guilty."
His stance from the very beginning has only

been that he was not informed by the judge,

not that he did not actually know. (See his
affidavit, reproduced as Appendix I to the
Petition for Writ of Certiorari.) He clearly
was willing to plead under almost any circum-
stances in order to obtain a life sentence.
Therefore, he has presented at most only a
"technical violation”, insufficient to warrant
any relief.

It should perhaps be reemphasized that

~4-

(contrary to the Brief in Opposition at 10) the
state believes the record does contain evidence
that Respondent had been informed of the rights
he was waiving, by his own counsel if not by the
trial judge. (See the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 2-6, 25-30.) The former defense
lawyer's question about "which are the Boykin
rights?" does not indicate ignorance of them
(See Brief in Opposition at 3, 10); much like
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 1l, the
Arizona rules now require discussion of sub-
stantially more than the naked triad of Boykin
rights. See 17 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann., Rules
of Criminal Procedure, Rules 17.1 -- 17.4. It
is not, therefore, surprising that a simple
reference to Boykin did not raise instant recall
of the specific contents of that decision.

III. THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES IS PROPERLY

APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE.

As noted in Section I., supra, the doctrine
of laches was raised in the Court of Appeals,
so it can be considered by this Court, and the
facts indicate that the doctrine should be

af

applied to preclude Respondent's claim. Contrary
to the Brief in Opposition at 12, n.5, the time
for appeal under Arizona law when Respondent
pleaded guilty was 60 days, not the current
20 days. (1956 Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Rule 348.) More importantly, the record is
clear that Respondent was informed of his
appeal rights. (See Appendices 2 and 3
hereto.) Besides, he was represented by
counsel. Therefore, he is without excuse for
his failure to do something about his claim of
error.

Finally, despite Respondent's efforts to
obfuscate the situation (Brief in Opposition
at 13), the fact remains that the overwhelming
bulk of the time which elapsed between Respon-
dent's conviction and the hearing to reconstruct
the record is directly chargeable to him alone.
He simply sat and did nothing for more than six
years. (May 21, 1971 to July 21, 1977.) The
record shows no response to his July 1977
letter about transcripts, but there may well
have been one, because his state habeas corpus

petition states quite emphatically that he
af

"now finds that there is no transcript..." In
any event, that state petition was not filed
until August 8, 1978, over a year after his
letter of inquiry, which hardly indicates a
burning sense of urgency on Respondent's part.
Once that petition was filed, matters moved
along with reasonable speed: counsel was
appointed, a second search for the hearing
notes was made, memoranda were exchanged (one
from Respondent's counsel being two weeks late),
a change of judge effected, and an evidentiary
hearing held, all within eight months (the
hearing being held on February 16, 1979).
After seven years of delay by Respondent, the
eight months of rather normal proceedings re-
quired to get to the evidentiary hearing (not
all of which is itself ascribable to the
state) fades into insignificance. The bottom
line is that Wright himself caused whatever
prejudice might have been engendered by the
lapse of time, and the Ninth Circuit was wrong

to put the burden onthe state,

CONCLUSION

Both the state court and the District Court
found that Respondent did know the rights he
was waiving and that the guilty plea was

valid. This Court demands a reasoned basis

for rejecting such factual conclusions. Sumner
v. Mata, U.S. _, 101 S.Ct. 764, 770 (1981)

(Sumner I.) However, as appears to be the

wont of the Ninth Circuit (see Sumer II,.,

No. 81-844, 30 Crim.L.Rep. 4253, (U.S. March

22, 1982)), a wholly unreasonable standard was

applied in order to reject the findings of
the lower courts. . The Court of Appeals
should be reversed and its abuse of its
authority corrected.

Respectfully submitted, ,

ROBERT K, CORBIN
The Attorney General

Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Petit:oners

- xipuaddy

ATTORNEY GENERAL
Southern Arizona Office
403 W. Congress
Tucson, Arizona 85701

Robert K. Corbin
February 27, 1981

Clerk

U.S. Court of Appeais for the Ninth Circuit
P.O. Box 547

San Francisco, California 94101

RE: Supplemental authorities pertaining to
Wright v. Dowdle, CA-CIV 80-5285
(DC CIV 79-270 TUC MAR)

Dear Sir:

In accordance with the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, Rule 28 (j), Respondents-
Appellees submit the following list of perti-
nent and significant authorities which have
come to the attention of counsel undersigned
Since the filing of the Answering Brief.

This case is set for oral argument on March 10,
1981.

1. Sumner v. Mata; No. 79-1601, (U.S.
Supreme Court, January 21; 1981) - pertains
to degree of deference to he paid to findings
of fact by a state court (see Answering Rrief
at 2; Reply Brief at 1).

2. Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420,
83 S.Ct. 1366 (1963) — pertains to constitu-
tional requirement for provision of trial
transcript to petitioner, especially where
request delayed.

3. Grantling v. Balkcom, 632 F.2d 1261
(5th Cir. 1980) - pertains to deference to be
paid to state court finding that guilty plea

Appendix 1

was knowing and yoluntary (see Answering Brief
at 2; Reply Brief at 1).

4. Rawls v. Mabry, 630 F.2d 654 (8th
Cir. 1980) - pertains to correctness of find-
ing that guilty plea here was voluntary (see
Answering Brief, Argument II), especially with
regard to extent of discussion of charge (see
Opening Brief at 15).

5. Bouchillon v. Estelle, 628 F.2d 926
(5th Cir. 1980) - pertains to evidence admiss-
ible to show proper advisement of rights (see
Opening Brief at 11-12, Reply Brief at 6-7).

6. Alessi v. United States, 628 F.2d
1133 (2d Cir. 1980) -— same pertinence as
Bouchillon.

7. Mayola v. Alabama, 623 F.2d 992
(5th Cir. 1980) - pertinent to necessity to
provide transcript after unreasonable delay
in request by petitioner.

8. Clayton v. Blackburn, 578 F.2d 117
(5th Cir. 1978) — pertains to necessity to
provide transcript after unreasonable delay in
request, voluntariness of counselled guilty
plea, and deference to state court findings.

Sincerely,

"/s/ Bruce M. Ferg"

Bruce M. Ferg

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

BMF /rm

Copy mailed this

27th day of February, 1981

to: Fredric F. Kay
Asst. Federal Public Defender
P.O. Box 2710
Tucson; Arizona 85702
(Counsel for Petitioner)

IN THE SUPFRIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF ARIZONA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIMA

JOHN P. COLLINS NO. A-18997

JUDGE, Of the

Superior Court DATE May 21, 1971

STATE OF ARIZONA, James W. Cochran
PLAINTIFF PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY

FMIL THOMPSON WRIGHT,

aka Lawrence Wright, Gilbert Veliz
DEFENDANTS DEFENDANTS ATTORNEYS

MINUTE ENTRY
CHANGE OF PLFA & SENTENCING:

Neft. present.

James Bouley reporting.

The State moves to amend Count One of
the Information to read "Murder; First Degree."

The Court questions Deft.

There being no objection,

IT IS ORDERED that the motion is
granted and that Count One of the Information
be amended to charge Neft. with "Murder,
First Degree."

Deft. moves to withdraw his plea of
"Not Guilty" previously entered to the
original open charge of murder in Count One
of the Information.

The Court questions Deft.

IT IS ORDERED that the motion is
granted and that Deft's plea of "Not Guilty”
previously entered to Count One of the Infor-
mation be withdrawn.

Appendix ?

Deft. enters a plea of "Guilty" to
"Murder, First Degree,” as charged in Count
One of the Information as amended.

The Court finds that the plea is made
freely and voluntarily.

Deft. waives the statutory time for
sentencing.

B. CHADWICK, Deputy Clerk

FILED
May 21, 1971
FRANCES C. GIBBONS, CLERK
By “/s/ B. Chadwick"
Deputy

IN THE SUPERTOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF ARIZONA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIMA
THE STATE OF ARIZONA, ) No. A-18997
Plaintiff, )
) JUDGMENT AND
vs. ) COMMITMENT
) Plea of Guilty to;
EMIL THOMPSON WRIGHT, )
aka Lawrence Wright, )
Defendant. )
ay }

MURDER, FIRST DEGREE,
Count One

On this 21st day of May, 1971, the
defendant being present in open court, in
person and by counsel, Gilbert Veliz, and the
deputy county attorney, James W. Cochran,
being present’ on the part of the State, and
this being the time heretofore fixed for
passing judgment on the defendant, the defen-
dant was informed by the Court of the nature
of the Information/filed charging the crime of

as amended
MURDER, FIRST DEGREE, Count One
committed on or ahout the 22nd day of —
January, 1970; also of the arraignment and
plea = "Guilty" as charged in the
Tnformation/on the 21st day of May; 1971.
as amended

The defendant being asked to show legal
cause why judgment shculd not be pronounced at
this time, and no sufficient cause heing shown
or appearing to the Court, thereupon the Court
renders its judgment, that, WHEREAS, you
EMIL THOMPSON WRIGHT, aka Lawrence Wright,
having pled guilty in this Court to the charge
of MURDER, FIRST DEGREE, Count One it is found

Appendix 3

by the Court that you are guilty of said
crime. Therefore,

IT IS ORDFRED, ADJUDGED AND DECREFD,
and the judgment and sentence of the Court is
that you EMIL THOMPSON WRIGHT, aka Lawrence
Wright be punished by imprisonment in the
State Prison at Florence, Arizona, for axkexm
afxnakxiessy kkanxxxxxxxXXXXXRAES¥XARGXHSEXMSER
kHaNYxXxX¥xXxxxx life Keaxs, to date from May 21,
1971, and defendant is remanded to the custody
of the Sheriff of Pima County, Arizona, to he
by him delivered into the custody of the proper
officers of said State Prison.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a certified
copy of this Judgment shall be a sufficient
warrant for said Sheriff to take; keep and
sately deliver the said EMIL THOMPSON WRIGHT,
aka Lawrence Wright into the custody of the
proper officers of said State Prison, and a
sufficient warrant for the officers of said
State Prison to keep and imprison the said
EMTL THOMPSON WRIGHT, aka Lawrence Wright in
accordance herewith.

Thereupon, the defendant, in open
court, was advised by the Court of the right
to appeal, of the time in which notice of
appeal may be filed and of the right to have
counsel to prosecute the appeal, and, if
indigent, of the right to appointed counsel
and the right tc be furnished, without cost,

a copy of the record and reporter's transcript
for appeal purposes.

"/s/ John P. Collins"
JUDGE

BOOK 1004 PAGF 447

(Prison) 16-1

MINUTE ENTRY

Page No. 2. Mate May 21, 1971 Case No. A-18997

The Court sets this as the time for
sentencing.

This being the time set for sentencing,
and no legal cause having been shown why
sentence should not be passed at this time,
and Deft. having pled guilty to "Murder, First
Degree," as charged in Count One of the Infor-
mation as amended,

IT IS THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT that the
Deft. is guilty of that charge.

IT IS THE FURTHER JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE
OF THE COURT that the Deft. be sentenced to
the Arizona State Prison for life, commencing
today, May 21; 1971.

The Court advises the Deft. of his
appeal rights.

On motion of the State, and there being
no objection;

IT IS ORDERED that Cownts Two and Three
of the Information are dismissed.

cc: County Attorney
Public Defender

B. CHADWICK, Deputy Clerk

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385008_1252%3A0. Public record. Not legal advice.