# Record and brief — Berger v. North American Co. for Life & Health Insurance

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Record and brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1981
- **Citation:** 454 U.S. 1084

## Text

uOnned

81-640 faa

No.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Bnited States

OctTosBer TERM, 1981

MERTON B. BERGER, M_D.,
Petitioner,

VS.

NORTH AMERICAN COMPANY FOR
LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

SIDNEY F. WHEELER
Attorney for Petitioner

Of Counsel:

LONG, WEINBERG, ANSLEY & WHEELER
2500 The Equitable Building
100 Peachtree Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
(404) 688-7900

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Can a Physician Be Sued for Malpractice by the
Insurance Carrier of His Patient When the Doctor Gratuitously
Completes an Insurance Claim Form Stating a Diagnosis and
the Insurance Company, But not the Patient, Feels the Diag-
nosis Was Incorrect?

2. In the Absence of Authoritative State Law, Did the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Err In Refusing to Certify
the Within Matter to the Supreme Court of the State of
Georgia?

3. As a Matter of Policy, Should a Physician be Amenable
to a Suit by a Patient’s Insuror in the Absence of Any
Relationship Between the Doctor and Insurance Company?

*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ........10.ccccccscoscscscsscssenessscsenees i
ee ee eiitinceictticiiinseahinsicaiesiininiaiaanaaniidgainy il
TA Gr ATT EIS onsesnssccccesseorsessscesesncsceesessvens iil
SUIT acisnsatatpncisctechiddensesinscsimdibidniiinineininianiiaeba l
SR TITITIITE The Supreme Court of Georgia recog-
nized in Bodin that:

[T]he law imposes upon persons performing archi-
tectural, engineering, and other professional and
skilled services an obligation to exercise a reasonable
degree of care, skill and ability, which generally is
taken and considered to be such a degree of care and
skill as, under the circumstances, is ordinarily em-
ployed by their respective professions.

Id. at 472, 117 S.E.2d at 330.

The court thus identified a legal duty of care independent of
privity.

[1,2] The factual similarities between Alexander Hamilton
and the instant case are striking. The plaintiffs are both
insurance companies that relied on certifications made by
professionals before they took certain financial action. In
Alexander Hamilton, the architect certified completion directly
to the plaintiff. In the instant case, Berger, using the plaintiff's
forms, certified disability directly to the insurance company.
The relationship approaches that of privity.© At the very least,

5 Two other significant Georgia cases rely upon Bodin. In Covil v. Robert
& Co. Assocs., 112 Ga.App. 163, 144 S.E.2d 450 (1965). the court allowed
landowners to maintain an action against an architectural and engineering
firm that designed a nearby water pumping station that caused plaintiffs’
property to flood. In Dresco Mech. Contrs. Inc. v. Todd—CEA, §3\ F.2d
1292 (Sth Cir. 1976), although the plaintiff did not prevail on the merits of
the case, the court applied Georgia law and found that the defendant
engineer owed a duty imposed by law to a co-defendant manufacturer with
whom he was not in privity. The manufacturer had filed a third-party
complaint against the engineer. accusing him of negligently designing a
aeating plant which the manufacturer was under contract to build.

6 Appellant argues that doctors qualify as “other professionals” under
the Bodin rationale. especially in light of Ga.Code § 84-924, which states:

(footnote cov inues)

6a

the relationship was so close that Berger knew exactly who
would rely on his certification and for what purpose.’

Berger was under a duty to exercise reasonable care in
performing medical services, making diagnoses, and trans-
mitting them to «.ppellant. Summary judgment on the issue of
negligence was improper for this reason, and because it is
apparent that genuine issues of fact remain to be resolved. Our
resolution of the issue of privity makes a consideration of
appellant’s third-party-beneficiary agreement unnecessary.

(footnote continued)

A person professing to practice surgery or the administering of
medicine for compensation must bring to the exercise of his
profession a reasonable degree of care and skill. Any injury
resulting from a want of such care and skill shall be a tort for
which a recovery may be had.

Appellant emphasizes the language “any injury” in the statute. While
appellant's reading of the statute, i.e. that it confers a mght to sue for
monetary injury upon a third party, is rather ingenious, it is not persuasive.
More compelling is appellee's analysis of the statute's history. Its first
codification was in 1863 under the article entitled “Physical Injury.” It is
possible, however, to read the “other professionals” language in Bodin to
include doctors without resorting to the Georgia statute.

? Appellant cites Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as
further support for the argument that Dr. Berger had a duty to North
American. That section states:

(1) One who, in the course of his business. profession. or
employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a
pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of
others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for
pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon
the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or com-
Petence in obtaining or communicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in
Subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for
whose benefit and guidance he intends to supply the infor-
mation or knows that the recipient intends to supply it; and

(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends
the information to influence or knows that the recipient so
intends or in a substa stially similar transaction.

(footnote continues)

7a

REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Tuomas A. CLarK, Circuit Judge. dissenting:

In dissenting I have two non-reasons and two reasons. The
non-reasons are the lack of precedent and my view that we
should certify this case to the Supreme Court of Georgia. A
decision can be made without the aid of precedent when there
is none. However, when our certification rule permits Georgia’s
highest court to settle the issue, I look with disfavor upon
establishing a precedent for Georgia federal courts in a diver-
sity case when it is obvious that the decision will spawn many

progeny.

The two reasons for dissenting are: (1 ) the complaint does
not seek the relief granted by the decision and opinion of the
majority; and, (2) the law of negligence and the relationship of
the parties give no basis in reason or logic for imposing this
liability on a doctor.

Turning to the complaint, it is my conclusion that in its
complaint the appellant failed to state a claim against Dr.
Berger for simple negligence or medical malpractice. If any-
thing, North American’s complaint states a claim against Dr.
Berger for the intentional tort of fraudulent misrepresentation.
North American in its complaint alleges that Dr. Berger is a
psychiatrist who disagreed with the FAA’s treatment of its air
traffic controllers and their emotional problems. He is charged
with conspiring with the controllers to cause them to fail to
report for work on the basis of a nervous condition and then
diagnose them as disabled because of their working conditions
and resulting nevousness. The complaint goes on to allege that
Dr. Berger’s wife is a lawyer with an office next to Dr. Berger's.
She is said to handle some of the legal problems of the air
traffic controllers, including their claims for workmen’s com-
pensation and private insurance disability benefits. One comes

(footnote continued)

The facts of this case fit very neatly into this section of the Restatement.
Appellee points out. however, that every illustration following the section
concerns commercial transactions. Appellant retorts that the filling out of
insurance disability forms and the payment of insurance proceeds are
commercial transactions. We agree with appellant.

8a

away from the complaint with the reaction that North Ameri-
can is accusing Dr. Berger of having a feud with the FAA and
profiting from his fees charged the air traffic controllers. The
complaint supports a claim for fraud, for intentional mis-
representation, for gross negligence—it does not support a
claim for simple negligence. At no place in the complaint is
there a count averring simple negligence in the manner sug-
gested by Form 9 in Appendix attached to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The appeal does not come to us on a motion
to dismiss, but on the district court’s grant of Dr. Berger’s
motion for summary judgment on the issue of his negligence vel
non vis a vis North American. Intuitively, one realizes that this
motion was advanced by Berger’s malpractice insurance carrier
so its role in the litigation could be determined. Since I find
that neither the allegations nor the affidavits against Berger
establish a claim for simple negligence, I would affirm.

Even if the allegations were sufficient, I would affirm. The
majority relies primarily on Georgia cases which hold architects
liable to third parties. Of course, it is logical to hold architects
liabile for injury to the public or an adjoining landowner when
such injury is the direct result of negligent design by the
architect of a structure. That is simple tort law of one party
owing reasonable care to another party and extending privity to
those who foreseeably might be injured if such care is not
taken.

The majority opinion permits every doctor to become
potentially liable for payments made by an insurance company
to its policy holder, the doctor’s patient, whenever, the doctor
compietes a form describing the patient’s condition, and the
doctor has made a mistake in diagnosing the condition. This
act of the doctor is done at the request of the company and is
done without consideration. The majority opinion imposes a
duty on doctors neither foreseeable nor contemplated by the
parties or their relationship.

Insurance companies insure persons against such risks as
death and disability. It is common knowledge that they pay
doctors to conduct examinations when issuing such policies.

9a

The policies, in case of a disability claim, require the policyhol-
der to submit to an examination at the request of the company
by a doctor hired by the company. Obviously, if a doctor
employed by an insurance company misses a diagnosis which
results in unwarranted liability of the company. the doctor may
be liable to the company for his negligent performance of the
contract.

The majority opinion creates privity without any just cause
or reason. In the disability policy the insured individual
authorizes the insurance company to secure information from
any doctor treating him or her in the event of a claim for
disability. The company, upon receiving a claim, conducts an
investigation of the alleged disability by sending a medical
form to doctors treating the claimant, as Berger in this case, by
writing the policyholder’s employer, by conducting surveillance.
by interviewing neighbors, and by seeking other relevant
information. Anyone furnishing information to the company
does so gratuitously for the purpose of assisting the company in
its assessment of the claim for disability benefits. None of these
persons, including a doctor, such as Berger here, is required to
cooperate. Most doctors do accommodate their patients by
giving the insurance company the same information furnished
the patient.

The doctor has a duty to the patient to make a correct
diagnosis of his illness, if he has one. Doctors. being human,
sometimes err. When they do. they are legally liable to the
patient for any damages sustained by the patient as the result of
the negligence. The employment contract and the relationship
create the duty to be careful.

Here our court creates a potential financial liability when
there is no contract and no relationship other than a gratuitous
one, when the doctor, at the request of the company, puts in
writing information about the patient’s condition as he sees it.’
If the doctor knowingly furnishes false information, he may be

‘Does the majority opinion permit a disability imsurance company to
recover from the claimant's employer or neighbor who furnishes erroneous
information supportive of the claim but negligently arrived at”

10a

held liable. If one lies to another, knowing the other will act to
his detriment based on the lie, responsibility for such an
intentional misrepresentation under certain circumstances may
ensue. Furnishing information derived through error. in-
nocently and gratuitiously, does not create such a responsibility.
Thus, I dissent.

Ib

IN THE

United States Court of Appeals

For THE FirTH Circuit
Unit B

No. 79-3541

NORTH AMERICAN COMPANY FOR LIFE
AND HEALTH INSURANCE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus

MERTON B. BERGER, ET AL..
Defendants,
MERTON B. BERGER,
Defendant-Appellee.

Filed August 10, 1981

Appeal From the United States
District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND
PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

(Opinion June 18, 1981, 5 Cir., 198 , F.2d

(August 10, 1981)

2b

Before KRAVITCH and THomas A. CLarkK, Circuit Judges, and
LYNNE", District Judge.

Per CURIAM:

(y ) The Petition for Rehearing is DENIED and no member of
this panel nor Judge of this Administrative Unit in regular
active service having requested that the Court be polled on
rehearing en banc (Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure; Local Fifth Circuit Rule 16; Fifth Circuit Judicial
Council Resolution of January 14, 1981), the suggestion for
Rehearing En Banc is DENIED.

( ) The Petition for Rehearing is DENIED and the judges in
regular active service of this Administrative Unit having been
polled at the request of one of said judges and a majority of
said judges not having voted in favor of it (Rule 35, Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure; Local Fifth Circuit Rule 16;
Fifth Circuit Judicial Council Resolution of January 14, 1981),
the suggestion for Rehearing En Banc is also DENIED.

( ) A member of this Administrative Unit in active service
having requested a poll on the reconsideration in this cause en
banc, and a majority of the judges in active service of said unit
not having voted in favor of it, rehearing en banc is DENIED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT:

PHYLLIS KRAVITCH

United States Circuit Judge

* U.S. District Judge from the Northern District of Alabama, sitting by
designation.

Ic

United States District Court
Northern District of Georgia
Atlanta Division

NORTH AMERICAN COMPANY FOR

LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE
Civil Action File
versus No. C77-119A

MERTON B. BERGER, ef a/

ORDER
(Filed June 25, 1979)

Presently pending in the above styled action are the
motions of the defendants, Sidney B. Warner and Merton B.
Berger, for summary judgment.

Warner’s motion is based entirely on a clause of the
underlying insurance contract which reads:

2. Incontestable: (a) After this policy has been in
force for a period of two years during the lifetime of
the Insured (excluding any period during which the
Insured is disabled ), it shall become incontestable as
to the statements contained in the application.

(b) No claim for loss incurred or disability (as
defined in the policy) commencing after two years
from the date of issue of this policy shall be reduced
or denied on the ground that a disease or physical
condition not excluded from coverage by name or
specific description effective on the date of loss had
existed prior to the effective date of coverage of this

policy.
Subparagraph 2(b)’s language can be interpreted in two
ways. First, it could be construed to create, as a prerequisite to

2c

incontestability, a requirement that the insured’s disability did
not, in fact, “commence” until two years after the date of the
issuance of the policy. However, this would make the clause
meaningless because such a reading would always permit the
insurer to attempt to prove that the disability’s commencement
predated the second anniversary of the policy and perhaps the
date of the policy’s issue as well. If the insurer could prove that
disability began before the second anniversary then Subpara-
graph 2(b) would allow proof of the disability’s onset before
the date of issue.

The alternative construction interprets Subparagraph 2(b)
as rendering incontestable on the ground of pre-issue onset any
claim by the insured for disability supposedly occurring after
the second anniversary. Thus, any time an insured, such as
Warner, claimed that disability commenced after the second
year, the insurer would automatically be precluded from trying
to prove that disability began before the policy’s date of issue.
In effect the policy states that if the insurer cannot or does not
ascertain within the first"two, years that the insured is disabled
then it is forever barred from trying to prove that the disability
in fact preceded the policy’s issurance. This reasoning comports
with the Georgia courts’ philosophy concerning the purpose of
incontestability clauses. See Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Childs, 65 Ga. App. 468, 476-77 (1941).

Even so, the plaintiff is not precluded from showing, for
the purpose of avoiding incontestability under Subparagraph
2(a), that disability commenced after the date of the policy.
Subparagraph 2(a) is not inconsistent with itself under this
interpretation because the proof of post-issue disability affects
only the time limitations of the clause and is not necessarily
related to the ground of incontestability, namely, statements
contained in the application. Consequently, the plaintiff is
entitled to prove that Warner was disabled after the date of the
policy’s issue but only for the purpose of showing that the
policy was not in force for two full years excluding periods of
disability. To the extent the plaintiff proves pre-claim disability
precluding the policy from having been “in force” for two years

3c

within the meaning of the incontestability clause, the insurer
may also attempt to prove that statements contained in the
application voided the insurer’s contractual obligations.

Disability prior to the date of the policy might be relevant
to showing disability thereafter since the jury may infer that a
mental condition once started may continue. However, because
of Subparagraph 2(b) the plaintiff may not offer evidence of
pre-issue disability solely for the purpose of voiding the policy.
Instead, pre-issue disability is only relevant to the question of
tolling the two-year period in Subparagraph 2(a) and, even
then, the plaintiff must also establish that Warner was aware of
the incorrectness of statements made in the application.

Warner asserts in his sworn affidavit that he was not
disabled from September 13, 1973, the date of the policy, until
after its second anniversary. The plaintiff argues that such a
statement is insufficient to prove lack of disability but cites no
authority for this proposition. To the contrary, it must be
concluded that a person is normally one of the best sources of
information as to the state of his mental health at particular
times. Neither side maintains that Warner has ever been so
disabled as to not be capable of recognizing his problem.
Therefore, his own assertion of lack of disability until after the
policy’s second anniversary is a sufficient basis for requiring the
plaintiff to demonstrate the contrary.

The plaintiff has attempted to do so. However, Exhibits |
and 3 attached to the plaintiffs response under Rule 91.72,
Local Rules for the Northern District of Georgia, are useless in
that the copies are illegible. Exhibits 4 and 5 contain nothing
indicating disability prior to September 13, 1975. Finally,
Exhibit 6 is relevant to the fraud issue and has no conceivable
relation to actual disability before the second anniversary unless
the plaintiff is contending that Warner’s illness manifested itself
in attempts to defraud insurance companies.

According to the plaintiff, Exhibit 2 indicates that on
February 25, 1974 Warner admitted to symptoms which he
claimed at his deposition were demonstrative of his disability.

de

But Warner’s deposition has not been filed. Whether there is
evidence of disability prior to September 13, 1975 must await
supplementation of the record by the plaintiff.

Berger’s motion for summary judgment involves the plain-
tiff's claims of malpractice and fraud. He urges that no action
for negligent performance of medical practice can be brought
except by the patient or one who is in privity with the doctor.
The plaintiff in this case had not contractual relationship with
Berger.

Howard v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 136 Ga. App. 221
(1975), held that a financial reporting firm could not be liable
to someone not in privity with it for negligently advising that a
particular business was solvent when the reverse was true. In
view of the longstanding philosophy against extending negli-
gence in professional matters on which the Court of Appeals
relied, there appears no good reason why the Howard ruling
should not apply to the medical profession as well.

The plaintiff responds that there is an exception to the
requirement of privity when the alleged tortfeasor provides an
opinion with the actual or reasonable knowledge that the
injured party will rely on its accuracy. However, Howard
rejected even this extension of negligence liability:

[A]s to third parties, even those who the accountant
knew or should have known were relying on his
audit, liability can be found only upon fraudulent
conduct, and proof of mere negligence will not
suffice.

Id. at 223. The factual recitation in the opinion does not specify
whether Dun & Bradstreet was actually aware of Howard's
potential reliance on its report but apparently this point was
irrelevant for even in such a case no claim for negligence could
be stated. It seems clear that the Georgia courts are not willing
to loosen the privity requirement even when, as here, the
defendant’s knowledge of the plaintiffs reliance can be shown.

The plaintiff also claims that Ga. Code Ann. §84-924,
which reads:

Se

[a] person professing to practice surgery or the
administering of medicine for compensation must
bring to the exercise of his profession a reasonable
degree of care and skill. Any injury resulting from a
want of such care and skill shall be a tort for which a
recovery may be had[,] [emphasis added ]

provides for medicai malpractice claims by nonpatient third
parties because of the emphasized language. Insofar as can be
determined, this statute has never been interpreted by a
Georgia appellate court in the context presented in Berger’s
motion. In the absence of any authority to the contrary and on
the basis of the statute’s language this court will construe
Section 84-924 as being essentially neutral on the question of
who may be a party as distinguished from what types of injury
may be compensated. As the plaintiff concedes, “any injury”
refers to those injuries which are proximately caused by the tort.
There can be little doubt that, given its version of the facts, the
plaintiff's loss was a result of Berger's alleged negligence.
Nevertheless, the same was true in Howard and the Georgia
court, apparently for policy reasons, precluded liability to a
third party not in privity of contract. Who may recover is
distinctly different from the type of injuries for which recovery
may be had and only the latter question is answered by Section
84-294.

Although the plaintiff had no physician-patient or con-
tractual relationship with Berger it may still institute an action
for fraud against him. Howard v. Dun & Bradstreet, supra, at
223. Berger first insists that the complaint fails to plead fraud
with specificity as required by Rule 9(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. This
contention has been previously rejected. Order of July 14, 1977
at 9.

Next, Berger asserts that the plaintiff's cause of action is
based solely on his opinions of the air traffic controllers’
disability and that an opinion cannot suggest a suit alleging
fraud. Normally opinions cannot provide the basis for fraud
but there is a well-established exception as outlined by Profes-
sor Prosser:

dc

[I]t has been recognized very often that the ex-
pression of an opinion may carry with it an implied
assertion, not only that the speaker knows no facts
which would preciude such an opinion, but that he
does know facts which justify it. There is quite
general agreement that such an assertion is to be
implied where the defendant holds himself out or is
understood as having special knowledge of the mat-
ter which is not available to the plaintiff, so that his
opinion becomes in effect an assertion summarizing
his knowledge. Thus the ordinary man is free to deal
in reliance upon the opinion of an expert jeweler as to
the value of a diamond, of an attorney upon a point
of law, of a physician upon a matter of health, of a
banker upon the validity of a signature, or the owner
of land at a distance as to its worth, even though the
opinion is that of his antagonist in a bargaining
transaction. On the same basis it has been held that
statements by a seller as to the capacity of the thing
sold, or the condition of land, or other matters, which
on the part of one without special knowledge would
be regarded as mere opinion, may be relied on as
statements of fact. [footnotes omitted }.

W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, §109 at 726-27 ( 4th
ed. 1971). Apparently this rule was the implied reason for the
decision in Daugert v. Holland Furnace Co., 107 Ga. App. 566,
570 (1963), where an allegation of a false opinion based on
facts known to be untrue by a defendant holding himself out as
an expert created a cause of action. Similarly, the plaintiff here
had a right to rely on Berger’s professional medical opinion and
may recover if it can show that he knowingly misrepresented
the health of the air traffic controllers. The cases cited by
Berger with one exception’ involved opinions by a seller as to
the quality of goods for sale, a situation not present here.

‘Judge Lawrence expressly refrained from premising his decision in
United States ex rel MevA Corp. y. Northeast Construction Co. of West
Virginia, 298 F.Supp. 1135 (S.D. Ga. 1969), on the opinion rule. Id. at 1139.

Tc

Finally, whether the plaintiff exercised reasonable dili-
gence in discovering the fraud is a question for the jury. See
Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Orr, 319 F.2d 612 (Sth Cir.
1963); see also Braselton Bros. v. Better Maid Dairy Products,
Inc., 222 Ga. 472 (1966).

Accordingly, Warner’s motion for summary judgment is
granted in part and consideration is deferred in part. To the
extent the complaint asserts a claim on the premise that
Warner’s disability preexisted the date of the policy’s issue it is
dismissed. The plaintiff is directed to file a copy of the
transcript of Warner’s deposition within fifteen (15) days of the
filing of this order. The clerk shall resubmit Warner’s motion at
that time. Berger’s motion for summary judgment is granted in
part and denied in part. To the extent the complaint alleges a
claim for negligence in rendering professional services it is
dismissed.

So ordered this the 23 day of June, 1979.

/s/ ALBERT HENDERSON, Jr.

Judge, United States District
Court for the Northern
District of Georgia

Id

United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia
Atlanta Division

NORTH AMERICAN COMPANY

For Lire AND HEALTH

INSURANCE Civil Action
“. No. C-77-119-A

MERTON B. BerGer, M.D., ef ai.

ORDER
(filed August 28, 1979)

The case is presently before the court on the plainiffs
motion for oral argument and reconsideration of this court’s
order of June 25, 1979, and also on the court’s deferred ruling
on defendant Warner’s motion for summary judgment.

In the June 25 order, this court dismissed the plaintiff's
negligence claim against Dr. Berger, holding that a suit for
negligent performance of medical practice cannot be brought
by anyone except the patient or one who is in privity with the
doctor. The plaintiff, despite its earlier assertions that Berger
“had no contractual or physician-patient relationship with
North American,” now seeks to have the court find that North
American was a third-party beneficiary of the agreement
between Berger and Warner to furnish opinions to North
American regarding Warner’s disability. This argument was
raised for the first time by the plaintiff in its motion for
reconsideration.

The plaintiff has failed to show that Berger and Warner
intended to benefit North American by agreeing to furnish
Berger’s opinions to North American. See Continental Casualty
Co. v. Continental Rent-A-Car of Georgia, Inc., 349 F.Supp.
666 (N.D. Ga. 1972). This court adheres to its former ruling
that the holding in Howard v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 136 Ga.
App. 221 (1975) should apply to the medical profession and

2d

finds no privity. The plaintiffs motion for reconsideration
insofar as it relates to the portion of the June 25 order
dismissing the plaintiffs claim of medical negligence is DE-
NIED.

The court hereby GRANTS the motion for oral argument,
specifically limiting argument to the issue of the incontestability
of Part V, Para. 2, Sub. Para. (b) in the insurance policy.

Counsel should also be prepared to argue the merits of that
portion of Warner’s motion for summary judgment on which a
ruling was deferred in this court’s June 25 order.

Oral argument will be before the court in chambers on
September 5, 1979 at 2:00 p.m., and will be limited to thirty
minutes per side.

SO ORDERED, this 27th day of August, 1979.

/s/

Robert L. Vining, Jr.
United States District Judge

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The Atlanta Journal
THE ATLANTA CONSTITUTION

VOL. 32, NO. 26 *“ * © P.O. BOX 4689
ATLANTA, GA. 30302, SATURDAY, AUGUST 29, 1981

Psychiatrist Facing Trial
In Controller-Stress Suit

By Sam Hepkins
Constitution Staff Writer

A federal appellate court, in what is thought to be a
landmark decision, has ruled that a psychiatrist may be liable to
a third party for allegedly negligent diagnosis and certification
of his patients.

The case involves an insurance company which sued
psychiatrist Merton B. Berger and 12 air traffic controllers in
Atlanta, claiming that Berger had made fraudulent or negligent
diagnoses of the controllers relating to alleged job-related
anxiety and depressive neurosis.

U.S. District Judge Robert L. Vining Jr. earlier had issued
a summary judgment dismissing the negligence allegations in
the case, but he retained the fraud allegations.

The Sth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Vining’s
ruling, which now means that both the negligence and fraud
allegations will have to be decided by a trial jury.

The suit has been pending since the North American
Company for Life and Health Insurance first filed the action on
Jan. 25, 1977.

The Illinois-based insurance company is seeking judgments
of $562,025 against Berger and a total of $179,025 against the
12 air traffic controllers. Berger, a former Atlanta-area resident,
later moved to Del Mar, Calif.

The Sth Circuit decision notes that Berger, in his capacity
as psychiatric consultant to the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration, “diagnosed as toially disabled approximately 154 air
traffic controllers.”

2e

The basis for the diagnoses was often job-related anxiety
and depressive neurosis. A number of the air traffic controllers
held disability income insurance policies issued by the North
American company.

The court noted that North American had relied on
Berger's certification of the controllers’ alleged disability in
paying claims of the FAA employees.

“Because of the large number of claims,” the appellate
court said, “North American investigated Berger and concluded
that many of his diagnoses of total disability were incorrect. . . .

“It sued Berger to recover the disability benefits paid to the
air traffic controllers because of his allegedly fraudulent or
negligent diagnoses.”

The court further noted, in reversing Vining’s ruling, that
Berger had claimed the district judge rightly dismissed the
negligence count “because a doctor is not subject to malpractice
liability unless the injured party is or was the doctor’s patient.”

Matthew H. Patton of Atlanta, who represents North
American, said his firm and other law firms over the country
had researched the third-party negligence aspect of the case
and could not find a court ruling similar to the Sth Circuit’s.

The $562,025 judgment sought against Berger includes the
$179,025 disability payments paid to the 12 other defendants
and $383,000 paid to 17 other air traffic controllers who are not
named as defendants.

The Sth Circuit h~s denied Berger’s motion for a rehearing
on its reversal decision.

Patton said that since the suit was first file¢ more than four
years ago, the insurance company and 11 of the 12 air traffic
controllers have reached out-of-court settlements.

The original suit contends that Berger used inadequate
procedures to certify the alleged neuroses, supposedly caused
by the pressures on the air traffic controllers as they work in
radar rooms to monitor the incoming and outgoing airline
passenger planes to prevent them from colliding.

{ Office - Supreme Cor
¥ FILED

¢ NOW 6 oH

ALEXANDER \. Slevas.
CLEP:

NO. 81-640
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1981

MERTON B. BERGER, M.D.,

Petitioner,

vs.

NORTH AMERICAN COMPANY FOR
LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit,

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Matthew H. Patton
Kilpatrick & Cody

3100 Equitable Building
100 Peachtree Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30043
(404) 572-6500

Attorney for Respondent

(i)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The questions presented by the Petition are more properly
stated as follows:

1. Should the Supreme Court grant certiorari to review a
court of appeals’ decision, issued in a purely diversity action, in-
terpreting and applying Georgia law with regard to a negligence
claim, the resolution of which was dependent upon the unusual
facts alleged in the complaint?

2. Where neither party sought an order certifying the ques-
tions presented to the Georgia Supreme Court, did the court of
appeals abuse its discretion in deciding the issue presented? Did
the court of appeals err in refusing to grant petitioner's motion
to certify the questions presented to the Georgia Supreme
Court, when the motion was not filed until thirteen days after
the court of appeals had entered its decision?

(ii)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE .. 2... ccc ccccccccccees 2
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REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION ....... 4

I. NO SPECIAL AND IMPORTANT
REASONS WARRANT REVIEW
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Il. THE DECISION BELOW IS NOT
IN CONFLICT WITH ANY
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Ill. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT DID NOT

ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN

DECIDING THE ISSUES

PRESENTED RATHER THAN

CERTIFYING THE MATTER TO

THE GEORGIA SUPREME COURT............. 6
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS GAVE

FULL CONSIDERATION TO THE

ISSUES PRESENTED AND

REACHED THE CORRECT

ET SoG aehauvebeuveedd nussteckuecseeses 7

ET tec divudaéditetsgepesévecenveeeserenes 9

(iii)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
BARNES. ATLANTAG® Paci
Lire INS CO of AMERICA,

ee Ee PEPE, DOVER cod sccccevscvcvcces

Bonin vy. Gitt, 216 Ga. 67,

See EP CED cbcvvessvedeccencceccesss

BuTNER». UNITED STATES, 440

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GLANZER v. SHEPARD, 233 N.Y. 236,

Es ctodénedeek euspecvics veces

LEHMAN BROTHERS vy SCHEIN, 416

Er dekedad cage +ccéabesnesesensees

MCFARLING vy. AZAR, 519 F.2d

1075 (Sth Cir. 1075 (Sth Cir. 1976)... 0.0...

Others
C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,

SP os ccuabdudeewicaeccsevessa
RESTATEMENT OF TorTs (Second) §552 ..........
Rule 36, Supreme Court of Georgia.............

No. 81-640
IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1981

MERTON B. BERGER, M.D..,
Petitioner,
vs.

NORTH AMERICAN COMPANY FOR
LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Respondent, North American Company for Life and
Health Insurance, respectfully requests that this Court deny the
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to review the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, rendered June 18, 1981, is now published at 648
F.2d 305 (1981).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On January 15, 1977, respondent, North American Com-
pany for Life and Health Insurance (“North American”), filed a
complaint for damages in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia against petitioner, Merton B.
Berger (‘Berger’). Also named as defendants were twelve air
traffic controllers to whom North American had paid disability
insurance benefits in reliance upon certifications of their dis-
ability made to North American by Berger. The complaint al-
leged, among other things, that Berger had either negligently or
fraudulently certified to North American the alleged disability
of the twelve defendant air traffic controllers as well as seven-
teen other air traffic controllers who held disability income
policies issued by North American.

The only claims still pending in the case are North
American’s claim against one of the air traffic controllers (and
his counterclaim against North American) and North
American’s claim against Berger. This appeal concerns only the
latter and arises from the Fifth Circuit's reversal of summary
judgment entered against North American with respect to its
negligence claim against Berger.

The facts before the court below may be briefly sum-
marized as follows. Berger is a practicing psychiatrist. From
January 1, 1968, until he quit his psychiatric practice in Atlanta
in December 1977, Berger by his own admission examined and

2

diagnosed as totally disabled 154 air traffic controllers
employed by the Federal Aviation Administration. Over two
thirds of these diagnoses were made during the years 1974, 1975,
and 1976 and in most cases, Berger found the disability to be
permanent and job related.

Among the air traffic controllers whom Berger diagnosed
as being totally disabled were the other twelve defendants and
certain other air traffic controllers, all of whom held disability
income policies issued by North American and most of whom
held disability income and credit disability policies with other
companies. Berger’s determination of total disability was
typically based upon a finding of a job-related anxiety and
depressive neurosis.

After his initial examination and periodically thereafter,
Berger certified to North American that the particular air traffic
controller was totally disabled. In each instance the certification
by Berger was made solely to North American, was made on
North American's claim forms, was made for the purpose of in-
ducing North American to pay the monthly disability benefit to
the air traffic controller, and was made with the knowledge that
North American would rely thereon in paying the claim.

Relying upon Berger’s certification of their disability,
North American paid the claims of various air traffic control-
lers. When the incidence of the claims for air traffic controllers
became unusually high, North American conducted an in-
vestigation which led North American to conclude that many of
the air traffic controllers whom Berger had certified as totally
disabled had, in fact, not been disabled. Thereupon, the present
action was instituted seeking to recover from Berger, among
other things, the disability benefits paid to the air traffic con-
trollers on the basis of his negligent or fraudulent certification.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The decision below involves an issue of state tort law and is
limited to the peculiar facts of this case. Thus, the case has
limited precedential value and there are no other special and im-

3

portant reasons that would merit this Court's review of the
court of appeals’ decision. Nor is the decision in conflict with
any other reported decision.

Furthermore, the court of appeals did not err, as petitioner
contends, in deciding the issues itself instead of certifying the
matter to the Georgia Supreme Court. Whether to certify a mat-
ter depends upon the facts and circumstances of the particular
case and that decision is committed to the sound discretion of
the court of appeals. Moreover, petitioner should not be heard
to complain since he did not move, until after entry of the court
of appeals’ decision, for certification to the Georgia Supreme
Court.

Finally, certiorari should not be granted because the deci-
sion below is both correct and fair. It is consistent with Georgia
legal precedent and accords with decisions in numerous cases in
other states as well as Section 552 of the RESTATEMENT
OFTORTS (Second).

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION
I.

NO SPECIAL AND IMPORTANT REASONS
WARRANT REVIEW ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

In his petition Berger argues that this case presents “ta ques-
tion of paramount and overriding importance to the nation as a
whole.” (Petition, at 12). That is a gross exaggeration, to say the
least. The decision below involved an extremely narrow issue of
Georgia tort law, i.e., whether a person practicing a profession,
in this case psychiatry, can be held liable to an insurance com-
pany to whom the psychiatrist made specific certifications with
knowledge that the insurance company would rely thereon. The
Fifth Circuit, in resolving that issue, limited its holding to the
specific facts of the dispute and, thus, the precedential
significance of the decision is quite limited.

However, even if the court of appeals’ decision is construed

4

as broadly as Berger suggests, it would not merit certiorari
review. The 1980 revision of the Supreme Court Rules deleted
allegedly erroneous decisions of state law by a court of appeals
from its list of considerations for granting a writ of certiorari.
Thus rarely, if ever, would interpretations of state law, even if
arguably erroneous, be a sufficient ground for the grant of a
writ. This is especially true where the decision below was limited
to the peculiar facts of the controversy.

THE DECISION BELOW IS NOT IN CONFLICT
WITH ANY REPORTED DECISIONS

Petitioner’s first stated ground for granting the writ is “that
the decision of the Fifth Circuit herein is in conflict with both
prior Fifth Circuit precedent and earlier decisions of the federal
courts.” (Petition, at 7, 8.) That is not the case and, frankly, it is
difficult to understand petitioner’s reasoning.

As evidence of the alleged “conflict,” petitioner cites
MCFARLING V. AZAR, 519 F.2d 1075 (Sth Cir. 1975). Aside from
the obvious distinctions between that case and the case sub
judice,' Berger’s argument misconceives the essential nature of
the federal system, a necessary consequence of which is that the
statutes and decisions of one state will often conflict with that of
another. Thus even if the law of Florida did conflict with the
law of Georgia, that would not constitute, in any sense, a
“conflict” meriting certiorari review.

'McFarling v. Azar did not involve a physician’s liability; it involved the issue
of his insurer’s liability under a professional liability policy covering ‘‘malprac-
tice’ and “‘error and mistake”’ where there was fraud on the part of the physi-
cian. The result depended, in part, on Florida’s narrow interpretation of
malpractice which, by definition in Florida, is an injury to a patient in the
context of a physician-patient relationship. North American has never claimed
to fall within the Florida definition of ‘‘malpractice.’’ Its claim, under Georgia
law, is for negligent certification.

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN DECIDING THE ISSUES
PRESENTED RATHER THAN CERTIFYING
THE MATTER TO THE GEORGIA
SUPREME COURT

Berger also contends that the petition “should be granted
because the Fifth Circuit failed to certify the within matter to
the Supreme Court of Georgia.” (Petition, at 9.)

It is well established that the decision of whether to use the
certification procedure “rests in the sound discretion of the
federal court.” LEHMAN BROTHERS V. SCHEIN, 416 U.S. 386,
391 (1974). There is no evidence that the Fifth Circuit abused its
discretion in electing to hear and decide the issues presented.

Whether an issue is appropriate for certification depends
upon its facts and circumstances. In this case there are several
reasons why the Fifth Circuit may have decided that certifica-
tion would not have been appropriate. In the first place, cer-
tification is only authorized where there is no controlling prece-
dent. See Rule 36, Supreme Court of Georgia. For reasons
stated in the court of appeals’ opinion and in Section IV, infra,
at 7, 8, there was, in this case, controlling Georgia precedent.
Second, certification is generally most appropriate where there
are clean-cut issues of law. This case, with its peculiar facts,
would have presented a difficult problem in formulating the is-
sues to be certified. This is particularly true since the case was
on appeal from grant of summary judgment, with many facts
not yet determined.

Berger’s argument regarding certification, taken to its
logical conclusion, would require that the Court adopt a rule
making certification mandatory whenever a court of appeals is
faced with a difficult question of state law. Apart from the prac-
tical impossibility of applying such a rule (at what point does a
question become too difficult for the federal courts?), this Court
has already stated that there is no obligation on the part of the
courts of appeals to resort to certification.

6

Furthermore, while certification is a useful tool in select
cases, it should not be used as a means of avoiding every dif-
ficult issue of state law. As former Chief Judge Brown, a strong
proponent of certification, said: “We use much judgment,
restraint and discretion in certifying. We do not abdicate.“
BARNES V. ATLANTA & PACIFIC LIFE INS. CO. OF AMERICA, 514
F.2d 704, 705 (5 th Cir. 1975). The judges of the Fifth Circuit
have had by far the most experience with certification, see C.
Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, §4248, p. 530 (1978), and their decision in this case
should be respected.

This is especially so where, as here, Berger made no effort
to seek certification until after the Fifth Circuit had entered its
decision. Had Berger felt that certification was appropriate, he
should have moved the Fifth Circuit to certify the question
before that court had spent considerable time researching, hear-
ing, and deciding the issues. Having failed to do so, Berger
should not now be hea’ to complain that the court of appeals
proceeded to decide the issues presented to it.

IV.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GAVE FULL
CONSIDERATION TO THE ISSUES
PRESENTED AND REACHED THE

CORRECT DECISION

The petition presents no significant new authorities or
arguments on the issues decided by the Fifth Circuit. Inasmuch
as this Court has consistently recognized that circuit courts have
more expertise thas. the Court in applying the laws of the state
within their respective circuits, BuTNER V. UNITED STATES, 440
U.S. 48 (1979), respondent respectfully urges that the Court
defer to the decision of the court of appeals.

However, should the Court review the merits of the case,
respondent respectfully submits that it will conclude that the
decision below is correct. It is correct, first, because the Georgia
Supreme Court has held that a duty, independent of privity, is

7

imposed upon “persons performing architectural, engineering,
and other professional skilled services... .” Bopin v Git1, 216
Ga. 467, 117 S.E.2d 325 (1960). Although not specificalls
named, physicians are clearly among the persons performing
such “other professional and skilled services” and, therefore,
Berger owed a duty to North American even if privity was lack-
ing.

The decision below is correct for the additional reason that
the relationship between Berger and North American, under the
peculiar facts, is so close to privity, if not privity itself, as to give
rise to a legal duty. Writing for the majority, Judge Lynne
paraphrased Judge Cardozo’s opinion in GLANZER V
SHEPARD, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922) — the famous “-
bean weigher” case that is the seminal decision on the tort law
negligent misrepresentation. Judge Lynne stated:

In the instant case, Berger, using the plaintiff's forms, cer-
tified disability directly to the insurance company. The
relationship approaches that of privity. At the very least,
the relationship was so close that Berger knew exactly who
would rely on his certification and for what purpose.
Berger was under a duty to exercise reasonable care in per-
forming medical services, making diagnoses, and transmit-
ting them to appellant.
648 F.2d. at 308

The decision below is not only correct but fair. It accords
with Section 552 of the ResTaTEMENT OF TorTS (Second)
(titled “Information negligently supplied for the guidance of
others’’), and numerous other decisions involving negligent mis-
representation. The decision also accords with the common
sense of the matter. Berger had no obligation to make any cer-
tification to North American but once he elected to do so,
knowing that North American would rely thereon, Berger was
obliged to act with reasonable care. As Judge Cardozo said in
GLANZER V. SHEPARD, supra, “it is ancient learning that one
who assumes to act, even through gratuitously, may thereby
become subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all.”

135 N.E at 276.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the petition for writ of certiorari should
be denied.

Respectfully submitted

Matthew H. Patton
Kilpatrick & Cody
3100 Equitable Building
100 Peachtree Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
(404) 572-6500

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385008_0474%3A0. Public record. Not legal advice.
