# Record and brief — Michigan v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Record and brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1981
- **Citation:** 454 U.S. 1124

## Text

UONNed

81-549

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ALEXANDER L. sTeyar

October Term, 1981 CLERK

STATE OF MICHIGAN, MICHIGAN NATURAL
RESOURCES COMMISSION and its agents DR. HOWARD
A. TANNER, DR. HENRY VONDETT and GEORGE
DAHL in their official capacities,

Petitioners,
Vv

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, BAY MILLS INDIAN
COMMUNITY, SAULT STE. MARIE TRIBE OF
CHIPPEWA INDIANS, GRAND TRAVERSE AREA
SPORT FISHING ASSOCIATION, 13th JUDICIAL
CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT PRIOR TO JUDGMENT

) RANK J. KELLEY
Attorney General

Robert A. Derengoski
Solicitor General

Thomas L. Casey

Assistant Attorney General
525 West Ottawa Street
762 Law Building
Lansing, Michigan 48913
(517) 373-1124

——__ +
PRINTED BY SPEAKER-HINES AND THOMAS, INC.. LANSING, MICHIGAN—1981

>

— em

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW
I.

DO RESPONDENT INDIAN TRIBES POSSESS FISHING
RIGHTS IN GREAT LAKES WATERS CEDED BY
TREATIES OF 1836 AND 1855?

IF RESPONDENT TRIBES POSSESS SUCH FISHING
RIGHTS, DO THE STATE OF MICHIGAN AND STATE
COURTS NEVERTHELESS POSSESS AUTHORITY AND
JURISDICTION TO EXERCISE REASONABLE REG-
ULATION IN THE INTEREST OF CONSERVATION?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW .....................4.. i
= Gs eer rr iii
rE ie isos cccsndandehhusaegenetasne 1
iinet cetauaasapedauueseeu nes 2
I nr ere 3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............cccccssess 3

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I.

Il.

Ill.

THE COURT OF APPEALS “HAS SO FAR DE-
PARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL
COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS ... AS
TO CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THIS
COURT'S POWER OF SUPERVISION ........

THE ISSUE OF WHETHER INDIAN TRIBES
POSSESS FISHING RIGHTS IN GREAT LAKES
WATERS CEDED UNDER TREATIES OF 1836
AND 1855 PRESENTS “AN IMPORTANT QUES-
TION OF FEDERAL LAW WHICH HAS NOT
BEEN, BUT SHOULD BE, SETTLED IN THIS
REE. Sc eGutideas (0s 04 cttnnksentdteutenacs

IN PLACING LIMITATIONS UPON THE
STATE’S AUTHORITY TO REGULATE INDIAN
FISHING, THE LOWER COURTS HAVE DE-
CIDED A FEDERAL QUESTION IN A WAY IN
CONFLICT WITH THE MICHIGAN SUPREME
COURT AND IN CONFLICT WITH APPLI-
CABLE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT ........

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT ............

10

15

iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Pages
Antoine v Washington, 420 US 194 (1975) .......... 19

Bay Mills Indian Community, et al v United States of
America, (docket nos. 18E, 58) 7 Indian Claims Com-
mission 576 (1959); 20 ICC 137 (1968); 26 ICC 538

Bu ohana 6 3 Meee eo 17
Department of Game of Washington v Puyallup Tribe
(Puyallup Il), 414 US 44 (1973) ...............04- 19

Mescalaro Apache Tribe v Jones, 411 US 145 (1973) .. 19
Organized Village of Kake v Egan, 369 US 60 (1962) .. 19
Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v United States,

42 Court of Claims 240 (1007) ..............esee0. 17
People v LeBlanc, 399 Mich 31; 248 NW2d 199

CRED Nk ccndpenvecevevessccccaccoesneseens 6, 9, 12, 15
Puyallup Tribe v Department of Game of Washington

(Puyallup I), 391 US 392 (1968) .................. 19
Puyallup Tribe v Washington Game Department

(Puyallup II), 433 US 165 (1977) ...............55. 19
State of Montana v United States, .... US ....;

SPEEDS cise cccscscccccssssetecscene 20

State of Washington v Washington State Commercial
Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn, 443 US 658 (1979) .. 19

United States of America v State of Michigan,

471 F Supp 192 (WD Mich, 1979) ................ 1,5
United States of America v State of Michigan,
505 F Supp 467 (WD Mich, 1980) ................ 2,8

United States of America v State of Michigan,
GD POE GOB (CAG, BOG) 2... cc ccccccvccccccccees 2,8

iv

Pages
Statutes
ee CE cd inedd bck es sbagenwgseeedeeases 3
ee EE hiecddn Se bendecs 4 senuduN sued oetesya 3
Si ekind db ciehe ever eunderssecsaved 3
eevee lech iadsvdicasiekbwesteses 3
ETE TTT TT TTT eT TTT ee 3
EE. Sb e dds eencecccseedcipadevisheons 8
Be ee GO Se MED 0 onc cccccccvcensevseesstce 3
Other Source

25 CFR part 256, subpart D, 44 Fed Reg 65747
(immediately effective November 16, 1979), revised
45 Fed Reg 28100 (April 28, 1980) ................ 7

ff EPPPPPTTTT TTITLELIT TTT TTT Teri rire 3
i f BPPTTTTOTTITITITILITETI TTT 3

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1981

STATE OF MICHIGAN, MICHIGAN NATURAL
RESOURCES COMMISSION and its agents DR. HOWARD
A. TANNER, DR. HENRY VONDETT and GEORGE
DAHL in their official capacities,

Petitioners,
v

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, BAY MILLS INDIAN
COMMUNITY, SAULT STE. MARIE TRIBE OF
CHIPPEWA INDIANS, GRAND TRAVERSE AREA
SPORT FISHING ASSOCIATION, 13th JUDICIAL
CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT PRIOR TO JUDGMENT

OPINIONS BELOW

The judgment of the United States District Court for the
Western District of Michigan declaring that the Plaintiff tribes
pursuant to treaty possess fishing rights in portions of the
Great Lakes and that any State laws or regulations inconsistent
therewith are void ab initio is included in the appendix to
this Petition, App. 18a, and is reported at United States of
America v State of Michigan, 471 F Supp 192 (WD Mich,
1979). In a subsequent reported opinion the District Court

= =

denied the State’s request for a stay pending appeal. United
States of America v State of Michigan, 505 F Supp 467 (WD
Mich, 1980) App. 229a.

Beginning in late 1979 the Court of Appeals issued a series
of unreported orders which stayed various injunctive orders
entered by the District Court and discussed issues relevant
to the instant case: App. 204a (order dated September 20,
1979); App. 223a (order dated October 19, 1979); App. 226a
(order dated November 28, 1979). On May 28, 1980, the
Court of Appeals entered an opinion remanding the case to
the District Court for consideration of three specified pre-
emption questions, but retaining jurisdiction, App. 292a
United States of America v State of Michigan, 623 F2d 448
(CA 6, 1980). Two days later, on May 30, 1980, the District
Court's denial of a stay was overturned by the unreported
Court of Appeals order granting a stay, App. 302a. This stay
order was modified in subsequent unreported orders of July
16, 1980 (App. 306a) and July 10, 1981 (App. 3lla). No
judgment was entered on any of these orders, but on August
11, 1981, the Court of Appeals issued its July 10, 1981 order
as the Court’s mandate, App. 3lla. One week later, on
August 18, 1981 the District Court issued an opinion and
order (App. 316a) concluding that the Court of Appeals
remand order entered May 28, 1981 (App 292a; 623 F2d
440) and modified and continued in effect on July 16, 1980
(App. 306a) and July 10, 1981 (App. 3lla) is moot.

JURISDICTION

The District Court Judgment was entered May 7, 1979 and
a timely notice of appeal was filed on July 2, 1979. Although
the Court of Appeals has not entered a judgment in this case
pursuant to Fed R App P 36, the order of July 10, 1981 ( App.
3lla) was issued as the mandate on August 11, 1981 (App.
315a), apparently indicating the Court's position that the

=

July 10, 1981 order is a final judgment. It is unclear whether
judgment has been rendered, but the jurisdiction of this Court
to review the entire case is invoked under 28 USC § 1254(1).

TREATIES INVOLVED

This case involves interpretation of the 1936 treaty with
the Ottawa, etc., 7 Stat 491, and the treaty with the Ottawa
and Chippewa of 1855, 11 Stat 621, both of which are re-
produced in full in App. la, 94. The following articles are

of particular importance:
Treaty with the Ottawa, etc., 1836, Art. 13:

“The Indians stipulate for the right of hunting on the
lands ceded, with the other usual privileges of occupancy,
until the land is required for settlement.”

Treaty with the Ottawa and Chippewa, 1855, Art. 3:

“The Ottawa and Chippewa Indians hereby release
and discharge the United States from all liability on ac-
count of former treaty stipulations, it being distinctly
understood and agreed that the grants and payments here-
inbefore provided for are in lieu and satisfaction of all
claims, legal and equitable on the part of said Indians
jointly and severally against the United States, for land,
money or other thing guaranteed to said tribes or either
of them by the stipulations of any former treaty or
treaties; ....”

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action for declaratory and injuuctive relief brought

under 28 U5C §§ 1331, 1337, 1345, 1362, 2201, and 2202 by
the United States on its own behalf and on behalf of two

—_

Indian tribes and by the two tribes themselves against the
State of Michigan, its Natural Resources Commission, and
certain named State officials seeking a determination as to
whether certain alleged aboriginal and treaty fishing rights
exist in waters of the upper Great Lakes and whether the State
of Michigan has authority to regulate Indian fishing.

It is difficult to determine who made the first overtures to
sell Indian land in Michigan. It is known that by late 1835
both the Ottawa and Chippewa Indians in northern Michigan
were interested in selling their lands in order to obtain finan-
cial annuities and services such as blacksmiths and that the
United States was interested in obtaining land cessions from
the Indians. In the fall of 1835, a small group of Indians made
their way to Washington, D.C. to talk to government officials
about a treaty. The United States was interested in obtaining
larger land cessions than were available from this group of
Indians and so a larger treaty meeting was proposed. Instruc-
tions were sent to Indian agents in Michigan to arrange for a
larger delegation of Indian chiefs in order to negotiate a
treaty. In March, 1836, a group of approximately 25 Indian
chiefs from various bands of Michigan Indians arrived in
Washington, D.C., accompanied by escorts consisting of
traders and others known to the Indians. A guideline for the
treaty meeting itself included the following directive from
Lewis Cass, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to Henry
Schoolcraft, the principal negotiator of the treaty: “The great
object will be to do full justice to the Indians, and, at the
same time, to procure the land upon proper and reasonable
terms for the United States.” The treaty negotiations com-
menced on March 14, 1836 and concluded on March 28, 1836
at which time all of the chiefs and lelegates signed the treaty
document. The treaty was subsequently amended in part
by the United States Senate and Indian chiefs were later
assembled at Mackinac Island in order to obtain their assent
to the amendments. By July 16, 1836, the signatures of 96

=

chiefs were received assenting to the amendments. A copy
of the treaty as amended is set forth at App. la.

The treaty of 1836 provides for the sale and cession by the
Indians to the "sited States government of a tract of land
described in A::. 1 of the treaty. See the map, App. 194a.
Other articles of the treaty provided for certain reservations
to be held by the Indians for five years for the payment of
certain annuities and the provision of services, for the pay-
ment of certain debts of the Indians, for payments to certain
half-breed relatives of the Indians, and for investigation of
the removal of the Indians from Michigan to areas west of the
Mississippi River.

The treaty of 1855 (App. 9a) was the result of a desire
on the part of the Indians and the government that disputes
arising from several previous treaties be resolved and a desire
on the p. . of the Indians to hold individual title to land.
Among t! principal reasons for the 1855 treaty was the desire
to settle other debts and the desire for the Indians to obtain
money in exchange for releasing the United States from former
treaty obligations.

The original complaint in this case was filed in 1973,
amended complaints and answers were filed in 1975 and 1976
and trial was conducted between February 1978 and February
1979. In an opinion (App. 18a), United States of America v
State of Michigan, 471 F Supp 192 (WD, Mich 1979), and
Declaratory Judgment and Decree ( App. 195a), 471 F Supp at
278, the District Court declared that the Plaintiff Indian tribes
were the successors in interest to the signatories of the treaties
in question, that they possessed fishing rights in the waters
of the Great Lakes included in the territory ceded by the
treaties, and that any State statutes and regulations incon-
sistent with such rights were void ab initio. Petitioners filed

aillinn

a timely notice of appeal which was docketed in the Court
of Appeals as case no. 79-1414.

In August 1979 a lawsuit was instituted in a Michigan
Circuit Court by a group of sports fishermen and an injunc-
tion was obtained prohibiting all fishing with gill nets in
Grand Traverse Bay in the northwest portion of Michigan's
Lower Peninsula. In September 1979 Respondents obtained
a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction from
‘the United States District Court for the Western District of
Michigan enjoining further proceedings in the state court
litigation. The Plaintiffs in the State court action and the
State court judges filed appeals which were docketed in the
Sixth Circuit as cases no. 79-1527, 79-1528, and which were
subsequently consolidated with the pending appeal filed by
the State of Michigan. On September 20, 1979 and October
19, 1979 the Sixth Circuit entered orders granting a stay of
the District Court’s injunction pending appeal, App. 204a,
223a. In its order of October 19, 1979 the Court of Appeals
concluded that unregulated gill net fishing by members of
the Respondent tribes posed a strong possibility of irreparable
damage, App. 224a.

“We find on the basis of the record now before us that
unless the order is stayed there is a strong possibility
that the fishery, the fish supply and spawning grounds
in Grand Traverse Bay will be irreparably damaged or
destroyed by continued intensive gill net fishing.”

The Court of Appeals also concluded that the reasoning of a
Michigan Supreme Court opinion, People v LeBlanc, 399
Mich 31; 248 NW2d 199 (1976) (which had previously been
rejected by the District Court) was more persuasive than the
reasoning of the District Court, App. 225a.

On October 26, 1979 the District Court entered an order
prohibiting the State from enforcing fishing regulations against

aniline

a group claiming treaty fishing rights who were not a party
to the lawsuit. T 22 State of Michigan appealed that order and
sought a stay which was granted by the Court of Appeals on
November 23, 1979, App. 226a. In sts order of November 28,
1979 the Court of Appeals concluded that continued intensive
gill net fishing by members of Plaintiff tribes posed a strong
possibility of irreparable damage throughout the Great Lakes
as well as in Grand Traverse Bay, App. 228a:

“Judge Fox's order of October 26, 1979 is hereby
stayed pending disposition of the appeals in nos. 79-1414
and 79-1527 for the reasons stated in our order of October
19, 1979 and for the further reason that, based on the
record now before us, it appears that the same considera-
tions apply in other areas of the Great Lakes as apply in
Grand Traverse Bay, which was the subject of our stay of
October 19, 1979. On the basis of the record now before
us, there is a strong possibility that fisheries, fish supplies
and spawning grounds in other areas of the Great Lakes
will be irreparably damaged or destroyed by continued
intensive gill net fishing.”

Not long after the Court of Appeals issued these orders
which first indicated disapproval of the rationale and rulings
of the District Court, but many months after entry of the
District Court's judgment, 471 F Supp 192, so-called “emer-
gency” federal regulations were promulgated by Respondent
United States of America which purported to govern fishing
by Respondent tribes. 25 CFR part 256, subpart D, 44 Fed
Reg 65747 (immediately effective November 16, 1979), re-
vised 45 Fed Reg 28100 ‘April 28, 1980). At oral argument
in the Court of Appeals on February 15, 1980 the United
States and the tribes relied heavily on the existence of these
post-judgment regulations as a separate and alternative basis
(in addition to the treaty interpretation issue raised by the

= =

State's appeal) for their contention that the State was without
authority to regulate fishing by Respondent tribes.

On May 9, 1980 the District Court entered an opinion and
order (United States of America v State of M ichigan, 505 F
Supp 467 (WD Mich, 1980), App. 229a) cenying the State’s
motion for stay of judgment pending appeal. A few weeks
later, on May 28, 1980, the Court of Appeals entered an
opinion remanding the case to the District Court for considera-
tion of the preemptive effect of Respondents’ so-called “emer-
gency” post-judgment federal regulations. United States of
America v State of Michigan, 623 F2d 448 (CA 6, 1980), App.
292a. Two days later the Court of Appeals entered an order
overruling the District Court's May 9 order and granting a
stay of the judgment pending final disposition of the appeal,
App. 302a. In a subsequent order dated July 16, 1980 the
Sixth Circuit modified its stay order to incorporate the terms
of Respondents’ post-judgment regulations, App. 306a. The
State filed a motion pursuant to 28 USC § 1651(a) in this
Court to vacate the Court of Appeals order, but the motion
was denied by Mr. Justice White on August 4, 1980. Michigan,
et al v United States, docket no. A-84. Hearings on the re-
manded issues were conducted in the District Court between
September and December, 1980.

On April 21, 1981 the Secretary of the Interior notified
Petitioners and Respondent tribes that the federal regulations
would not be extended beyond their May 11, 1981 expiration
date because evaluation by the Fish and Wildlife Service in-
dicated that the regulations “. . . may be failing to protect the
fisheries which are vital to Indians and non-Indians alike.”
App. 309a. The State of Michigan then filed emergency mo-
tions in the Court of Appeals seeking to set aside its remand
order since the preemption questions were moot and no longer
justiciable and to modify the stay to permit State regulation
consistent with the principles enunciated by the Michigan

—

Supreme Court in People v LeBlanc, supra, the reasoning of
which had been held “persuasive” by the Court of Appeals in
its order of October 19, 1979, App. 225a.

Following briefing and oral argument the Court of Appeals
entered an order on July 10, 1981 which, in effect, denied the
State’s motions and modified and continued in effect the
earlier remand opinion and orders of the Court, App. 314a,
315:

“The remand opinion and orders of the Court dated
May 28, 1980, and July 16, 1980 remain in effect except
as modified by this order.

“Accordingly the remand order of this Court embodied
in our opinion at 623 F2d 448 (6th Cir. 1980) is continued
in effect as modified by this order.”

The remand order to which the Court referred, 623 F2d at 450,
says as follows in pertinent part, App. 296a, 297a.

“For these reasons, we remand the case to the District
Court for consideration of the preemptive effect of the
new federal regulations. * * °

“Accordingly, the case is remanded to the District Court
for consideration of this question. This Court retains
jurisdiction of the other questions presented by the case
pursuant to 28 USC § 2106 and continues in effect the
stay heretofore entered.”

Thus in its July 10, 1981 order, which was simply the most
recent in a long series of orders dealing with stays and remands,
the Court of Appeals incorporated the terms of the expired
federal regulations as the terms of the stay pending final dis-

-_ =

position of the case based upon Respondents’ representations
that those terms had been adopted and would be carefully
enforced as a regime of tribal self-regulation.

No judgment was entered pursuant to Fed R App P 36, but
on August 11, 1981 the Court of Appeals purported to issue its
July 10, 1981 order as the mandate, App. 315a.

One week later, on August 18, 1981, the District Court
entered an opinion and order concluding that the Court of
Appeals remand was moot, App. 316a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS “HAS SO FAR DEPARTED
FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS . .. AS TO CALL FOR AN
EXERCISE OF THIS COURT'S POWER OF SUPERVI-
SION.”

Supreme Court Rule 17.1(a)

Perhaps the best example of the Court of Appeals’ departure
from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings
is the fact it is impossible to determine whether there has
been a judgment and, if there has, the extent to which the
District Court has been affirmed, modified or reversed. For
six years this case has been vigorously litigated in the District
Court, culminating in hundreds of exhibits, thousands of pages
of transcript, and two opinions comprising more than 120
published pages in the Federal Supplement. After two years
in the Court of Appeals, hundreds of pages of briefs have been
filed, two oral arguments have been held, stays and remands

have been entered and modified and a mandate has issued.
However, the Court of Appeals has not discussed any of the
evidence adduced at trial, none of the Court of Appeals’ orders
contain any meaningful discussion of the facts of the case or
the legal theories raised in the appeal, and no judgment has
been entered pursuant to Fed R App P 36. Nevertheless, the
Court of Appeals apparently considers the case closed and
the District Court appears to have assumed perpetual juris-
diction to regulate fishing in the Great Lakes, App. 329a.

Determination of this case without a ruling on the merits
is merely the most recent action by the Court of Appeals in
derogation of the accepted and usual course of judicial pro-
ceedings. For example, this case was tried in the District
Court and brought to the Court of Appeals solely on a question
of treaty interpretation. After the District Court judgment
and after the Court of Appeals issued interlocutory orders
expressing disagreement with the District Court’s rationale,
Respondents manufactured so-called “emergency” interim reg-
ulations purporting to regulate Indian fishing and asserted
them as an alternate independent basis for arguing that Peti-
tioner State of Michigan was without authority to regulate
Indian fishing. Not only did the Court of Appeals defer deter-
mination of the State’s appeal until the District Court could
hold hearings on the validity of the newly-manufactured reg-
ulations, it ordered them to be implemented while their
validity was being litigated. After having been in force for
15 months, Respondent United States concluded that the reg-
ulations may not be adequate to protect the fishery and so
declined to extend them, but the Court of Appeals nevertheless
ordered the regulations to remain in effect while the litigation
was pending, App. 314a.

In its most recent order of July 10, 1981 the Court of
Appeals has again departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings. For example, in the first num-

= Ss

bered paragraph of the order (App. 312a) the Court refers
to treaty guaranteed fishing rights, aboriginal rights and fed-
erally-created and federally-protected rights. This confusing
amalgam of different legal theories leaves the State of Michi-
gan totally at a loss to understand the basis for the Court's
ruling. The absence of discussion of the facts of this case
and controlling legal principles makes it impossible to deter-
mine to what extent the District Court judgment has been
affirmed, modified or reversed. In paragraph numbered two
of the July 10th order the Court refers to the Michigan Su-
preme Court decision in People v LeBlanc, supra, and purports
merely to follow it, but even a cursory comparison of the
LeBlanc decision with the Court of Appeals order indicates
that the Court of Appeals has far exceeded LeBlanc and
applied a much stricter standard. The Michigan Supreme
Court in LeBlanc said, 399 Mich at 64:

“In the lig’ t of these cases, we conclude that on remand,
the district court should uphold defendant's conviction
for fishing with an illegal device only if:

“1) The prohibition of the gill net is necessary for the
preservation of the fish protected by the regulation;

“2) The application of this prohibition to the Chip-
pewas is necessary for the preservation of the fish pro-
tected;

“3) And the regulation does not discriminate against
the Chippewas.”

The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, while stating that
the LeBlanc decision “accurately states the rule of reason and
the principles of federal law applicable to this case” applied
a much stricter standard, App. 313a:

~~ =

“As provided in LeBlanc, any such state regulations
restricting Indian fishing rights under the 1836 treaty,
including gill net fishing, (a) must be 2 necessary con-
servation measure, (b) must be the least restrictive
alternative method available for preserving fisheries in
the Great Lakes from irreparable harm, and (c) must
not discriminatorily harm Indian fishing or favor other
classes of fishermen.”

Petitioners submit that the stricter standard applied by the
Court of Appeals is not supported by the LeBlanc decision,
is not supported by previous decisions of this Court and,
indeed, is supported only by principles espoused in Respon-
dents’ briefs and the erroneous judgment of the District Court.
If this new standard is to be extrapolated from prior cases,
surely an analysis and explanation should be given.

The Court of Appeals July 10, 1981 order says that the
State of Michigan may not regulate Indian fishing if such
fishing is not likely to cause irreparable harm and further
says that the parties have not introduced proof on this subject,
App. 313a-314a. Such a statement contradicts the Court of
Appeals own orders of October 19, 1979 ( App. 223a); Novem-
ber 28, 1979 ( App. 226a); May 30, 1980 ( App. 302a); and July
16, 1980 (App. 306a) in which it granted stays because the
State of Michigan had in fact demonstrated the likelihood of

irreparable injury.

The District Court in its Opinion and Order of August 18,
1981 also appears to have disregarded the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings by issuing an order declaring
that the Court of Appeals remand order was moot ( App. 328a)
despite the fact that the Court of Appeals had rejected that
very argument when propounded by the State of Michigan.
In its July 10, 1981 order the Court of Appeals refused to set
aside its remand order and said, App. 314a:

a ' oe

“The remand opinion and orders of this Court dated
May 28, 1980 and July 16, 1980 remain in effect except
as modified by this order.”

The effect of the Court of Appeals interpretation of its
July 10, 1981 order, and the District Court's August 18, 1981
opinion and order, is that without deciding the merits of the
issues raised by Petitioner's appeal, the Court of Appeals has
remanded the case to the District Court solely for consideration
of three specified preemption questions, has issued a mandate
and considers the appeal concluded while the District Court
has ordered that the remanded issues are moot and purports
to assume perpetual jurisdiction over regulation of fishing
throughout Michigan’s territorial waters in the Great Lakes.
The termination of an appeal in such a manner is an avoidance
of the Court of Appeals’ duty to decide appeals in a reasoned
manner consistent with the Federal Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure which this Court has issued.

In the event that the July 10, 1981 order of the Court of
Appeals is not a judgment, even though the Court of Appeals
has purported to issue a mandate upon that order, it is ap-
parent that the instant case satisfies the criteria of Supreme
Court Rule 18 for certiorari to review a case pending in a
Court of Appeals before judgment is given. The issues raised
in this case—whether there is an Indian treaty fishing right
and whether the State has any authority to regulate the ex-
ercise of that right—are of paramount public importance, and
the erroneous nature of the District Court judgment and the
failure of the Court of Appeals to render a judgment justify
the deviation from normal appellate practice and require im-
mediate settlement in this Court. The questions involved are
of imperative public importance not only to the instant parties,
but to all of the citizens of Michigan, the citizens of the entire
Great Lakes region (the Great Lakes are bordered by eight
states lying within five separate federal circuits), and indeed

=

to the nation as a whole. The Great Lakes and the fishery
resource they contain are a national treasure without equal
anywhere in the world. The decision in this case will determine
the authority to control utilization of that resource and thus
presents issues of vast importance. Are the Great Lakes
fishery resources to be controlled by the District Court, Indian
tribes, the State of Michigan (and other Great Lakes states),
the federal government, or some sort of consortium of these
entities? The erroneous nature of the District Court judgment
and the failure of the Court of Appeals to issue a reasoned
judgment affirming, modifying or reversing the District Court
has resulted in extraordinary confusion regarding the authority
to enforce fishing regulations in the Great Lakes, and with no
effective regulation, the fishery resource is threatened with
immediate irreparable harm and complete depletion soon.

In summary, this Court should grant certiorari to review
the entire case to correct the lower courts’ failure to follow the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings and in order
to render final judgment on the important legal issues pre-
sented.

Il.

THE ISSUE OF WHETHER INDIAN TRIBES POSSESS
FISHING RIGHTS IN GREAT LAKES WATERS CEDED
UNDER TREATIES OF 1836 AND 1855 PRESENTS “AN
IMPORTANT QUESTION OF FEDERAL LAW WHICH
HAS NOT BEEN, BUT SHOULD BE, SETTLED BY
THIS COURT.”

Supreme Court Rule 17.1(c)

By the terms of the treaty of 1836, large portions of territory
were ceded to the United States and ultimately became part
of the State of Michigan which entered the Union the next
year in 1837. Article 13 of the 1836 treaty included a provision

=

by which the Indians stipulated “for the right of hunting on the
lands ceded with the other usual privileges of occupancy until
the land is required for settlement.” It is not disputed that the
phrase “usual privileges of occupancy” encompasses fishing,
but Petitioners submit that the interpretation of the treaty
presents an important question of federal law which was
wrongly decided by the District Court, has not been addressed
by the Court of Appeals and which has not been, but should
be, settled by this Court.

The treaty interpretation questions are important because
of the geographic scope and economic significance of the pur-
ported fishing rights. Respondents claim a fishing right, free
from State regulaticn, throughout vast portions of the Great
Lakes, far beyond the bounds of any reservation. The pur-
ported right is worth hundreds of thousands of dollars annually
to Respondeni tribal members and the exercise of that pur-
ported right by Respondents has had a significant deleterious
impact upon the resource itself and upon the multi-million
dollar commercial and recreational fishing programs of the
State of Michigan. The State maintains that Respondents ex-
ercising purported treaty rights engage in indiscriminate fish-
ing operations, particularly with lethal non-selective gill nets,
which, if continued unchecked by State regulation, will lead
to irreparable depletion of the fishery resource throughout the
Great Lakes.

Interpretation of Indian treaties is, of course, a federal ques-
tion which, in an individual case, may depend to a great extent
on the intent of the signatories. The State submits that the
District Court disregarded properly admitted evidence, relied
on inadmissible material, and engaged in a wide-ranging attack
on the non-indian participants to the treaty negotiation process
v vich is completely without support in the record and which
resulted in erioneous factual findings and incorrect conclusions
of law. When the treaty language is analyzed under correct

oii

legal principles according to the true intent of the parties as
disclosed by the record, it is clear that none of the parties con-
templated the unlimited and perpetual fishing right which
the District Court declared to exist. The State submits that
any fishing right retained or created by the 1836 treaty ex-
pired shortly thereafter when “the land [was] required for
settlement.” Alternatively, the Petitioners submit that the
treaty of 1855 operated to extinguish any fishing right which
survived until that time. Alternatively, the State submits that
by virtue of prior litigation in the United States Court of
Claims and the Indian Claims Commission, Respondents may
not argue that they retain any enforceable fishing rights. See
Bay Mills Indian Community, et al v United States of America,
(docket nos. 18SE, 58) 7 Indian Claims Commission 576 (1959);
20 ICC 137 (1968); 26 ICC 538 (1971) and Ottawa and
Chippewa Indians v United States, 42 Court of Claims 240
(1907). While the existence of the specific fishing right
claimed in the instant case was not technically at issue in that
prior litigation, Petitioners submit that the arguinents made by
the tribes and the adjudications rendered in those cases compel
rejection of Respondents’ purported right in the instant case.

Even if a fishing right is deemed to exist, the State submits
that the District Court improperly concluded that the instant
Respondents may enforce the right. In an order entered July
30, 1976 the District Court limited the issues to be tried to
the question of the existence of a treaty right and the jurisdic-
tion of the State to regulate the exercise of those rights. The
State was prohibited from discovery and adducing evidence
on the question of which Indians, if any, were entitled to assert
the purported treaty right. Despite the District Court's limita-
tion of the issues and prohibition against Petitioners adducing
evidence on the question, the Court nevertheless erroneously
concluded that Respondents could assert the treaty rights.

=

Ill.

IN PLACING LIMITATIONS UPON THE STATE’S AU-
THORITY TO REGULATE INDIAN FISHING, THE
LOWER COURTS HAVE DECIDED A FEDERAL QUES-
TION IN A WAY IN CONFLICT WITH THE MICHIGAN
SUPREME COURT AND IN CONFLICT WITH APPLI-
CABLE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT.

Supreme Court Rules 17.1(a), 17.1(c)

In 1976 the Michigan Supreme Court in People v LeBlanc,
supra, 399 Mich at 64, cited numerous decisions of this Court
and concluded that State regulations banning the use of gill

nets could be applied to a member of one of Respondent
tribes if:

“(1) The prohibition of the gill net is necessary for the
preservation of the fish protected by the regulation; (2)
the application of this prohibition to the Chippewas is
necessary for the preservation of the fish protected; (3)
and the regulation does not discriminate against the

Chippewas.”

Three years later the District Court declared the existence
of a fishing right and concluded that all State statutes and
regulations which interfered with the right were void ab initio.
471 F Supp at 281; App. 202a. Most recently, in its order of
July 10, 1981, the Court of Appeals purported to adopt the
standard enunciated in People v LeBlanc, supra, but in reality
imposed a much harsher burden upon the State:

“The State bears the burden of persuasion to show by
clear and convincing evidence that it is highly probable
that irreparable harm will occur and that the need for

—19—

regulation exists. In the absence of such a showing, the
State may not restrict Indian treaty fishing, including
gill net fishing,” App. 313a.

“Only upon a finding ¢f necessity, irreparable harm
and the absence of effective Indian tribal self-regulation
should the District Court sanction and permit State regu-
lation of gill net fishing,” App. 314a.

“As provided in [People vy LeBlanc, supra] any such
State regulations restricting Indian fishing rights under
the 183€ treaty, including gill net fishing, (a) must be a
necessary conservation measure, (b) must be the least
restrictive alternative method available for preserving
fisheries in the Great Lakes from irreparable harm, and (c)
must not discriminatorily harm Indian fishing or favor
other classes of fishermen.” App. 313a.

Assuming that an Indian fishing right exists, the extent to
which that right may be regulated by the State in the Courts
of Michigan presents a federal question which, the State sub-
mits, the lower courts have decided in a way in conflict with
the Michigan Supreme Court and applicable decisions of this
Court. In a long line of cases this Court has held that even
where Indian treaty fishing rights exist, the State may never-
theless regulate in the interest of conservation particularly
when the activity to be regulated occurs off-reservation. See
Puyallup Tribe vy Department of Game of Washington (Puy-
allup I), 391 US 392 (1968); Department of Game of Washing-
ton v Puyallup Tribe (Puyallup II), 414 US 44 (1973); An-
toine v Washington, 420 US 194 (1975); Puyallup Tribe v
Washington Game Department (Puyallup III), 433 US 165
(1977); State of Washington vy Washington State Commercial
Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn, 443 US 658 (1979); Organized
Village of Kake v Egan, 369 US 60 (1962); Mescalaro Apache

= =

Tribe v Jones, 411 US 145 (1973); State of Montana vy United
States, US , 67 L Ed 2d 498 (1918).

The District Court rejected any State authority to regulate
and the Court of Appeals misconstrued decisions from this
Court and applied an unduly restrictive burden of proof before
State regulation can occur. The State of Michigan maintains
that tribal self-regulation and regulation under the now-ex-
pired federal regulations are inadequate to protect the fishery
resource. Under the incorrect legal standards enunciated by
the courts beiu-v, it is virtually impossible for the State to
make the required showing in order to enforce State fishing
regulations. It is therefore necessary for this Court to grant
certiorari in order to correct the lower courts and enunciate

the appropriate standards for State regulation of Indian treaty
fishing.

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT

Because of the importance of the issues presented, the er-
roneous nature of the decisions below, and the lower courts’
departure from the accepted and usual course of judicial pro-
ceedings, a writ of certiorari should issue to review this case.

Respectfully submitted,

FRANK J. KELLEY
Attorney General

Robert A. Derengoski
Solicitor General

Thomas L. Casey
Assistant Attorney General
525 West Ottawa Street
762 Law Building
Lansing, Michigan 48913
(517) 373-1124

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

1. 1836 Treaty with the Ottawa, etc.,

7 Stat 491 (Signatures, schedule and

supplemental Article omitted.) .............. la
2. 1855 Treaty with the Ottawa and Chippewa

(Signatures omitted.) ........................ 9a
3. District Court Judgment, United States of

America v State of Michigan, 471 F Supp 192

PE UU Siccetcag ce 18a
4. Court of Appeals Stay Order, Opinion and

Exhibits, September 20, 1979 .............__. 204a
5. Court of Appezls Stay Order, October 19, 1979... 293
6. Court of Appeals Stay Order, November 28, 1979 226a
7. District Court Opinion Denying Stay, United

States of America v State of Michigan, 505

F Supp 467 (W.D. Mich, DE eddedebescl.. 229a
&. Court of Appeals Remand Opinion, United

States of America v State of Michigan, 623 F2d

Re We ibe ov edkncinaciiccés,c,2. 292a
9. Court of Appeals Order Denying Stay,

RN WE MU ios vewanicucevnscecdces. 298a
10. Court of Appeals Order Denying Stay,

December 14, 1979 .......................... 300a
11. Court of Appeals Order Granting Stay,

SE ME Shah cnkbupcdiilccecacexé....22 302a
12. Court of Appeals Order Modifying Stay,

NE Ghiiwhinneiccebetehndden soc. cva: 306a
13. Secretary of Interior Letter, April 21, 1981 |... 309a
14. Court of Appeals Order Continuing

15.

Remand, July 10, 1981 (Issued as
Mandate, August 11, 1981) ............ 3lla

District Court Opinion and Order on Remand,
(1832), and
stand in relation to the United States as “domestic dependent nations.”
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 8 L.Ed. 25 (1837).

District Court Opinion Denying Stay, 505 F Supp 467 =. 269a

As a consequence, they have many attributes of sovereignty. For
instance, they possess immunity from suits to which they do not con-
sent in federal and state courts. See United States vy. U. S. F. ¢> G.
Co., 309 U.S. 506, 60 S.Ct. 653, 84 L.Ed. 894 (1940); Thebo v.
Choctaw Nation, 66 F. 372, 375 (8th Cir. 1895).

The legislative history of 28 U.S.C. § 1362 shows that it was in-
tended to permit Indian tribes to litigate issues in federal court on the
same basis as if the government had instituted the action. See
H.R.Rep.No. 2040, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) quoted in part in
Moses v. Kinnear, 490 F.2d 21, 25 n.9 (9th Cir. 1973).

Recognizing this status of Indian tribes, the courts have applied the
so-called “co-plaintiff”

[505 F Supp 487]
Note 5—Continued

rule to allow the tribes to stand in the shoes of the government for
various purposes if they preperly might have been co-plaintiffs with
the United States. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has applied
this rule to allow suits by Indian tribes to enjoin assessment of state
taxes which are prohibited from being brought by private parties under
28 U.S.C. § 1341, on the same basis that such suits are permitted when
the United States is plaintiff. Moses v. Kinnear, supra; Agua Caliente
Band of Mission Indians v. County of Riverside, 442 F.2d 1184, 1186
(9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied 405 U.S. 933, 92 S.Ct. 930, 30 L.Ed.2d
809 (1972). See also, Walker v. River Paiute Tribe v. Sheehan, 370
F. Supp. 816, 821 (D.Nev.1973). Cf. United States v. Ahtanum Irrig.
Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 988, 77
S.Ct. 386, 1 L.Ed.2d 367, 330 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1964), 338 F.2d
307 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 924, 85 S.Ct. 1558, 14
L.Ed.2d 683, in which the court found that Indian property rights
could not be lost through laches or estoppel.

Because Indian tribes possess the essential aspects of sovereignty,
normal consideration of comity applicable to private litigants do not
apply to such tribes As such, the co-plaintiff rule should apply and
the federal anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, should be no bar
to the requested injunctive relief. See National Labor Relations Board
v. Nash-Finch Co., supra; Leiter Minerals v. United States, supra,
352 U.S. at 220-225, 77 S.Ct. 287.

270a_ _—District Court Opinion Denying Stay, 505 F Supp 467

— — eee

The matter of this court's power to act under the circumstances as
well as the need for such action are beyond question. The only issue
is how best to exercise the court's authority to protect the federal
judgment with a minimum of friction.

[6] It is clear beyond reasonable question that the three state court
injunctions referred to above have to some extent prevented defendants
from complying with this court's order to make “significant reductions”
in the non-Indian fishery in order to make available to treaty-right
fishermen a sufficient portion of the harvestable resource to guarantee
an opportunity for them to harvest 50% of said resource. Interference
with the exercise of Indian treaty fishing rights indisputably is within
the jurisdiction of this federal court, and state court proceedings in-
stituted by nonparties to this lawsuit cannot be allowed to frustrate
either final determinations based on exhaustive research and evidence
or the jurisdiction of this federal court.

Data submitted by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service,
which includes Department of Fisheries statistics, indicate that through
August 1974, with the exception of the Nisqually River chum harvest
in January which, for management purposes would be considered part
of the 1973 run, Indian fishermen in the case area in 1974 have caught
less salmon of each species than they caught in 1973, both in terms of
total numbers of fish caught and in terms of the percentages of Indian
harvest as contrasted with total non-Indian commercial salmon, or
3.5% of the total as compared with 3,404,710 salmon harvested by non-
Indian commercial interests; through August of 1974, Indians have
harvested 89,402 salmon or 2.4% of the total as compared with
3,628,513 salmon harvested by non-Indian commercial fishermen; when
the sport catch through August of 1974 of 837,099 salmon is included,
the Indian share of the total harvest is 2.0%.

These figures illustrate in the most startling manner the gross in-
equities between Indian and non-Indian harvest, and the complete fail-
ure and inability of defendants to comply with this court's orders to
make significant reductions in non-Indian fishing and to afford to
Indians an opportunity to catch approximately 50% of the harvestable
resource at their usual and accustomed grounds and stations. Because
by their nature substantial fish resources will be lost for 1974 to
plaintiff tribes if not harvested during the currently ongoing seasons,
the immediate threat of substantial economic harm and serious hard-
ship to many treaty-right fishermen convinces this court that prompt
action is required to protect federal treaty rights that this court has

District Court Opinion Denying Stay, 505 F Supp 467 =— 27a

found are constitutionally guaranteed as the law of the land and to
assure the viability of this court’s Final Decision # 1, unless and until
it be modified or reversed.

In all court litigation in which the United States has an interest,
including cases involving the interpretation and application of treaties
duly enacted as required by federal law and the national Constitution,
the Attorney General of the United States, acting through the Justice
Department and United States Attorneys, is the official authorized to
speak and act for the people of the Nation in such matters. In this
instance, the United States Attorney, presumptively in the national
interest, has requested that this court enjoin enforcement of the in-
junctions issued in all three of the above-referred to state court pro-
ceedings. Plaintiff tribes, as descendants of signatories to treaties with
the United States, have joined in that request.

Rather than consider the state court proceedings in toto, upon the
record now presented this court finds it necessary to consider the
injunctions separately and therefore will discuss each of them in the
order of issuance. It must be recognized, however, that each of the
three state court proceedings was instituted by litigants none of whom
was a party to this federal court action. Additionally, none of those
state court proceedings joined the United States or the plaintiff tribes,
the real parties in interest who could be, if not irreparably, at a minimum
grievously, injured by state court injunctions preventing enforcement of
the Department of Fisheries regulations promulgated for the express
purpose of making more fish
Note 5—Continued

available to treaty-right fishermen. Finally, at none of the state court
hearings were witnesses interrogated nor was any of the hearings a full
scale evidentiary hearing; only affidavits of the litigants were presented,
not subject to cross-examination, and the state court judges could only
act upon the materials presented to them.

Beyond question, the state court judges who issued the restraining
orders involved herein performed their judicial functions in accordance
with established law and practice in the state courts, and in an able
and responsible manner beyond criticism in any particular whatever.
However, it is clear from the cited authorities that the circumstances
above recited can and should be considered by this court together
with the full record before it, significant portions of which were not
available to the state courts, in determining what action, if any, to
take with regard to these state court proceedings.

459 F.Supp. 1028-33 (W.D.Wash.1978).

272a _— District Court Opinion Denying Stay, 505 F Supp 467
[505 F Supp 488]

That the treaty catch was incremental upon the sports
catch is not cognizable in these proceedings. This condition
is wholly within the State’s control. It is discriminatory to
regulate the Indians but not the sportsmen, and unnecessary
to stop Indian fishing until after the sportsmen have been

stopped.

Although continued fishing at the rate evidenced this sum-
mer in Zone MM-4 might well . pp 467
[505 F Supp 489]

pounds, and MM-7, 151,780 pounds. These 1979 figures dup-
licate the 1978 catch figures. Witness Kutkuhn, relying upon
the Ad Hoc technical report off Lake Michigan, revealed that
in Zone MM-6, 55,000 pounds would be the maximum take
allowing for sustainability and a 121,000 pound withdrawal
would amount to a put/grow/take fishery, a fishery sustained
solely by planting. In Zone MM-7 a 35,000 pound catch
would allow a self-sustaining population. A catch of 84,000
pounds would rende® the fishery put, grow and take. The
sports catch exceeds even this. The State calls this fishery
fully regulated. Zone MM-5 also exceeds the self-sustaining

figures.

It would appear that the State of Michigan is fully willing
to permit withdrawal of lake trout which prevents natural
reproduction so long as that withdrawal is performed by non-
Indians and so long as there is sufficient economic return.

(v) Zone MH-1.

Zone MH-1 covers the Michigan waters of northern Lake
Huron south to a line drawn perpendicular to the International
Boundary from Rogers City.

The State began stocking Zone MH-1l in 1973. The area
was the focus of an intensive Indian fishery in the fall of 1978
and the spring of 1979, a time when the Indians, as a result
of political pressure, had a self-imposed ban on fishing in
Lake Michigan below Cross Village, and before allowable
catch determinations had been established for the area. After
this catch, the Ad Hoc Working Group determined that 3,000
pounds of trout were available under the put, grow and take
option. Nevertheless, the Secretary and the tribes closed this
area to all Indian fishing indefinitely, and the ban is expected

District Court Opinion Denying Stay, 505 F Supp 467 =. 275a

to be permanent. The State has not closed this area to sports
fishermen, and estimates their catch for 1979 at 25,180 pounds.
Dr. Kutkuhn testified that the State is managing this area
on a put, grow and take basis. Despite this, during these pro-
ceedings, the State attempted to hold the Indian fishermen
to the self-sustaining stock standard and to take the size of
their catch as inconsistent with the State's goals.

State licensed commercial fishermen took 405,550 pounds
of whitefish from this zone by September 30, 1979. Indian
catch reports reveal a take of 178,948 pounds. The State's
proposal offers the Indians 100,000 pounds of whitefish. The
total allowable catch determined by the Ad Hoc Working
Group is 550,000 pounds.

(vi) Zone MH-2.

Zone MH-2 covers Michigan waters of Lake Huron between
lines drawn perpendicular to the International Boundary from
Rogers City to Black River.

Little Indian fishing is taking place in Zone MH-2. Indian
fishermen took 1,100 pounds of lake trout and 5 pounds of
whitefish in 1979. Non-Indian fishermen took 80,384 pounds
of whitefish and sportsmen took 22,545 pounds of lake trout.
All totals are well within allowable catches. Lake trout are
available here: 84,000 pounds to permit a self-sustaining stock
and 123,000 pounds for a put, grow and take fishery. However,
the State’s proposal would ban the Indians from any take
of lake trout and allocate them 100,000 pounds of whitefish.

(vii) Zones MS-4 and -5.
Zone MS-4 covers the Michigan waters of Lake Superior

from a line running from Salmon Trout Point out to the Inter-
national Boundary to a line drawn north from Beaver Lake.

276a _— District Court Opinion Denying Stay, 505 F Supp 467

Zone MS-5 is made up of the Michigan waters from Lake
Superior between lines drawn north from Crisp Point and from
Beaver Lake.

Indian fishing for lake trout and whitefish in Zones MS-4
and MS-5 is negligible. However, the state commercial white-
fish take from MS-5 appears to be excessive.

Indian fishermen took 35,102 pounds of trout from MS-4
and 90 pounds from MS-5 in 1979. Sustained yield in MS-4
would permit a 118,00 pound take and MS-5 a 29,000 pound
take. State-authorized fishermen took 8,363 pounds of lake
trout from MS-5.

[505 F Supp 490]

In MS-4 Indian fishermen took 22,064 pounds of whitefish;
non-Indians 37,829 pounds. The allowable catch is 10,000
pounds. In MS-5 Indians took 138,176 pounds; non-Indians
54,143 pounds. The allowable catch is 200,000 pounds.

The State proposes to protect these stocks by permitting
the Indian fishermen to take 100,000 pounds of lake trout
from MS-5. The only other catch permitted would be herring
and chubs. Here the Indians would not even be allowed to
fish for whitefish.

(viii) Zone MS-6,

Zone MS-6 is roughly equivalent to the Michigan waters
of Whitefish Bay, although it extends west to a line drawn
north from Crisp Point to the International border.

The State claimed that lake trout in MS-6 are in a state of
depletion because of intensive Indian gill netting which began
in the fall of 1974.

District Court Opinion Denying Stay, 505 F Supp 467 = 277a

Planting of lake trout began in MS-6 in 1962. Until 1973
plantings reportedly averaged 200,000 in Whitefish Bay alone.
After that, the plantings were reduced to 100,000 in 1974,
and then to less than 30,000 for the following th.ce years.

The State’s case ag: st Indian gill netting is based upon
a decline in the assessment fishing index, the C.P.E., from
1974 to 1975, and a decline in the total catch by licensed
commercial fishermen.

The declining catch reports are of little help in evaluating
the lake trout stocks. These catch reports are provided, Schorf-
aar's affidavit says, by assessment fishing by licensed com-
mercial fishermen. Yet, the Department of Natural Resources
began making the assessments itself in 1976. Full catch reports
apparently are not provided, since in 1979 a C.P.E. of 1.66
is reported, but the catch report is zero. Either failure to
report the catch ~ changes in assessment procedures are re-
flected for the ye rs 1973-74. In 1973 a catch of 5,152 pounds
is reported, with a C.P.E. of 32.30. In 1974, the reported catch
is 3,278 pounds, with a C.P.E. of 53.27, significantly higher
than the year before.

The fact is, the saiapling effort has varied radically over the
years. In 1973, 48,000 feet of net were set; in 1974 only 15,000.
But, this limited effort is used to establish a peak on the
C.P.E. graph, which is then shown to decline precipitously.
The bias is also reflected in the extraordinary 1974 catch from
a single year class, the 1968 class, with other year classes al-
ready—before extensive gill netting—showing the decline
which is reflected in subsequent years of sampling. Only
the 1968 class continues to appear in high numbers, until
1978, when it too has nearly disappeared.

The 1974 sampling is critical to determine the cause of the
reduced catches in subsequent years, yet it is inadequate. It

278a _—dDistrict Court Opiaion Denying Stay, 505 F Supp 467

suggests some independent factor operated to lower the stocks
in MS-6 in that year, the commercial assessment fisherman
focusing his efforts so as to maximize his catch and then aban-
doning his task.

One possible cause of the decline is a drop in the natural
reproduction rates. This would leave fewer fish available
for recruitment into the fisheries. The 1978 catch does not
appear to eliminate this hypothesis with respect to MS-6.

The decline in lake trout in Whitefish Bay appears to reflect
a general decline in the population across the southeastern
shore of Lake Superior, whatever might be the cause. The
Ad Hoc Working Group provides a table exhibiting the C.P.E.
for lake trout age seven and older for various years. In 1971
this C.P.E. was 37 for MS-5, and 2.4 for MS-6. By 1978, the
MS-5 C.P.E. is down to 10 and the MS-6 C.P.E. is down to .8.
The relative decline in MS-6 is lower than in MS-5.

Fishing pressure in MS-6 has relaxed this year as a result of
the opening of other waters to treaty fishermen. If wholesale
reports are presumed accurate, 23,088 pounds of lake trout
were taken from Whitefish Bay in 1978, but only 11,000 pounds
had been taken from Zone MS-6 by August 31, 1979. This
direction makes it unnecessary for this court to intervene.

[505 F Supp 491]

The Ad Hoc Working Group suggested that any withdrawal
of lake trout from Whitefish Bay would be incompatible with
the goal of restoring a self-sustaining population in the zone.
It proclaims its own data indicating a total allowable catch
from Zone MS-6 of 3,100 pounds of jake trout over 21 inches,
if wholly sustained by planting, unuseful as a management
guide. This estimate apparently was based on a hypothesis
of an admittedly high mortality rate. In fact, the report's

District Court Opinion Denying Stay, 505 F Supp 467 =. 279a

conclusion regarding the standing stock would make reported
catches impossible. It appears that the 3,100 pounds estimate
also assumes continued pl!» ting at present, token rates. It is
also based upon a population reduced by state policy decisions
to make only such token plantings.

In its proposed Indian fishin allotment, the State allows
20,000 pounds of lake trout to be taken from Zone MS-6, the
allotment being based on a native population of fat lake trout
in the western end of the zone. The Ad Hoc report does not
appear to take this population into account, for it does not
authorize any such withdrawal from anywhere in the zone.
The present levels of catch do not exceed this estimate of the
available catch, nor did the evidence establish that no part
of the present catch comes from this native stock.

Although the present levels of withdrawal of lake trout
from Zone MS-6 may be excessive the evidence presented
does not adequately establish this at the present time, and
Indian catches are declining significantly. The evidence did
not establish that the gill netting beginning in 1974 is the
only cause of the decline in the stocks in Whitefish Bay.
Greater effort by the State in restocking the Bay would permit
harvest at present rates and even permit the harvest to in-
crease. State withdrawal from the lake trout stocks by re-
duction of plantings has exceeded the reduction brought about
by the Indian catch. Unknows factors brought about the
decline even before Indian treaty fishing pressure began in
1974.

The State estimates that the sustained yield for whitefish
in Whitefish Bay is 200,000 pounds per year. The State has
not shown regulation of the Treaty fishermen is necessary.
The treaty fishery has never exceede’ this amount. The state
licensed fishery has often exceeded it. The State can avoid

280a District Court Opinion Denying Stay, 505 F Supp 467

any excessive pressure on the whitefish resource by setting
quotas for its licensed fishermen, a step which it has yet to take.

D. The State's Showing of Irreparable Harm.

The State’s evidence for each of the statistical zones reveals
that it has utterly failed to show that Indian fishing has irrep-
arably harmed lake trout, whitefish and other targeted species
in the Michigan waters of the Great Lakes. Only in the case
of lake trout was there any serious effort to establish this
contention.

The State’s basic objective here is to hold the Indians to
the standards of its preferred management plan. Depletion
is initially understood as a condition which harms the State’s
policy of fostering recreational fishing. The State knows politi-
cally and economically that it must allow a substantial harvest
of lake trout by state licensed recreational fishers. State regu-
lators like the recreational fisher, find him or her easier to
regulate and more willing to accept Department of Natural
Resources rules and requirements. Department of Natural Re-
sources officials believe the motives of the angler—relaxation
and recreation-—more worthy and to their liking than the
Indians who are motivated by a desize to feed their families.

The State also attempted to hold the Indian plaintiffs to
standards which would apply if the lake trout stock were
self-sustaining. Yet, depletion as a biological condition was
not made out. When Indian fishing is measured against stand-
ards set out by the Ad Hoc Working Group, standards which
would allow for a suitably sized population of potentially
spawning fish, the Indian fishermen more frequently fish at
rates which permit such a population than

District Court Opinion Denying Stay, 505 F Supp 467 =. 28la
[505 F Supp 492]

do state licensed fishermen. indian withdrawals exceeded
the total allowable catch for a self-sustaining lake trout popu-
lation in Zones MH-1, MM-3, MM-4 and MS-S. Even in MM-
3 and MH-1 the Indian take was well below the take which
would render the fishery put, grow and take. The tribes
have now closed MH-1 to all fishing. There is a problem
about the statistics for MS-6. Avoidance of clustering would
overcome the problems. The state licensed sport fishery
greatly exceeds the take permitting even a put, grow and take
lake trout fishery in Zones MM-6 and MM-7. State sports fish-
ermen alone exceed the self-sustaining allocation in MM-5,
almost exactly doubling it. In addition, the State continues
to authorize lake trout fishing in MH-1, and when their take
is added to the Indian take, it exceeds even the put, grow
and take option.

There is no zone where the Indian whitefish catch exceeds
the allowable catch. However, the State sometimes permits
its licensed fishermen to withdraw totals which, when added
to those of the Indians, exceed the allowable catch.

Indian fishing may very well interfere with the sports fish-
ery. However, the State’s managemen’ plan is rooted in
economics. A strong recreational fishery enhances the State’s
economy. But, the State may not simply carry out this policy.
The State did not challenge the fact that the Indian tribes
have treaty-protected and aboriginal rights to fish in the Great
Lakes. When these rights are acknowledged, the present levels
of Indian take are generally within acceptable levels.

While it appears that Indian fishing pressure may have been
over-intense in certain areas of the Great Lakes, it is clear
that the Indian tribes, together with the Secretary are actively

282a _— District Court Opinion Denying Stay, 505 F Supp 467

engaged in regulating the fishery in such a way that this will
be prevented in the future, without interfering with the In-
dian’s right of self-regulation.

INDIAN TRIBAL REGULATION

The State maintained that the Indians’ use of the gill net
is unlimited, and that this will ultimately lead to the collapse
of the fisheries resources, and that the conservation codes of
the tribes and the Secretary's regulations are nothing more
than licenses allowing slaughter of lake trout, whitefish, coho
salmon, and other species. The above review makes clear
that this has not happened at the present time. The issue now
considered is whether this will inevitably occur.

This court rejects the various curves submitted by the de-
fendants to describe the Great Lakes fishery. These curves are
based on unregulated, international fisheries and fisheries of
the late 19th and early 20th centuries. There is no reason
to believe that they represent the Indian fisheries of our time,
where national and tribal governments limit individual effort,
and these governments are no longer blinded by the myth of
limitless resources. Nor are the curves helpful in describing
present conditions in the Great Lakes, since, until the fish
begin naturally reproducing, State planting efforts can be so
manipulated as to duplicate the arch of these curves.

Berg testified about tribal fishing regulations and the Sec-
retary’s regulations of November 15, 1979, found in 25 C.F.R.
Sub-part D (Ex. P-301). The Secretary's regulations were for-
mulated pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding reached
between him and the tribes. (Ex. P-308.) Draft regulations
were prepared by the tribal chairmen, their attorneys, and
Fish and Wildlife officials (9 Tr. 1575). The draft regulations
were commented on by State officials who attended at least
one drafting meeting (9 Tr. 1575). Thereafter, the tribes met,

District Court Opinion Denying Stay, 505 F Supp 467 =. 83a

discussed and adopted the regulations which were then sent
to the Secretary of the Interior for his consideration (9 Tr.
1575). He in turn made some changes and published the
regulations in the Federal Register (9 Tr. 1576-77).

The purpose for these regulations is to protect the fishery
resource during the 1980 season (9 Tr. 1578). They are subject
to change, as the need requires.

The pertinent provisions of the Secretary's regulations were

summarized by

[505 F Supp 493]

Berg beginning at 9 Tr. 1579. Treaty fishermen are identified
by cards issued by the tribes and the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(9 Tr. 1580; 25 C.F.R. § 256.44). Catch reports showing fishing
locations, total catch, type of gear and the like are required
under 25 C.F.R. § 256.45 (9 Tr. 1581). Limitations on fishing
activities are found in 25 C.F.R. § 256.46. Zone MH-1 is
closed to all tribal fishers (9 Tr. 1583). Grand Traverse Bay
south of the 45th parallel is also closed (9 Tr. 1584). Most of
Little Traverse Bay is closed (9 Tr. 1584). The Lower St.
Mary’s River is closed to treaty fishers, as well (9 Tr. 1584).
The regulations also contain restrictions on the size gill nets
that permissibly may be used in areas of Lake Michigan (9 Tr.
1584). Target fishing for sport species and species listed by
the Secretary as threatened and endangered is prohibited
(9 Tr. 1586). Although lake trout is not defined as a sport
species, there are harvest restrictions. If the catch of lake
trout in any lift exceeds 20 percent of the total catch by weight,
the individual making the lift shall not set nets in the same
grid area for a period of ten days (9 Tr. 1588).

284a_ _— District Court Opinion Denying Stay, 505 F Supp 467

Spawning closures in Lakes Huron, Michigan and Superior
are provided for in 25 C.F.R. § 256.46(d) (5 Tr. 1588). Further,
nets may not be set within one half mile of the mouth of any
rivers suitable for spawning (9 Tr. 1585).

In order to deal with emergency situations that arise during
the fishing season, a joint emergency regulatory committee
has been provided for (9 Tr. 1589). The committee consists
of tribal chairpersons, conservation committee chairpersons
and one licensed commercial fisher from each tribe. 25 C.F.R.
§ 256.47(a). If the committee does not take suitable action
when required, the area director of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs is authorized to do so in the committee’s stead (25
C.F.R. § 256.57(b), 9 Tr. 1590).

Berg testified that in his opinion as an expert biologist,
the Secretary's regulations were adequate to protect the fish-
ery resource in tie Great Lakes, at least for the immediate
future (9 Tr. 1591). The regulations were designed to be
modified from one fishing season to the next. Further, Berg
wanted to see them strengthened so as to close the entire
St. Mary’s River, not just the lower portion and to require
some type of catch reports from subsistence fishermen (9 Tr.
1591-94). Only commercial fishermen had to submit catch
reports to the tribes. Berg’s conclusion that the regulations
adequately protect the resource was based in part on the fact
that the State manages the lake trout fishery on a put and
take basis in several areas in the Great Lakes (9 Tr. 1594).
Since there is no significant natural reproduction of lake trout
from planted fish, it makes little difference to the resource
who harvests the fish (9 Tr. 1594).

On April 28, 1980, these regulations were updated further,
the tribes and the Secretary taking significant new steps for
protection of the resource. 45 Fed. Reg. 28100. These regula-
tions authorize seizure of equipment and gear for violations

District Court Opinion Denying Stay, 505 F Supp 467 —- 85a

of the regulations, require catch reports 10 days after the
close of the month, and require subsistence fishers to submit
catch reports; the arrest power is expanded; all of the St. Mary’s
River is closed; a sanctuary is created below Fox Islands; no
whitefish below 17 inches in length can be kept; depth re-
strictions on small mesh gill nets are adopted; the spawning
closure of Lake Superior is expanded to include all of Novem-
ber; and, in a step which the State has shown unwillingness
to adopt, treaty takes of whitefish and bloater chubs are limited
in terms of the total allowable catch and lake trout takes are
limited by the management option allowing sustained yield.

Berg took an informal survey on the number of tugs used
by all tribal fishermen and concluded the number was approx-
imately ten (10 Tr. 1630). However, of this total number,
only four or five are operational at any particular time due
to the delapidated condition of the tugs and their constant
state of disrepair (10 Tr. 1630-31).

With regard to gill net selectivity, Berg testified, contrary
to the testimony of state witnesses, that there is a significant
differ-

[505 F Supp 494]

ence between length frequencies of lake trout taken by 3.5
inch versus 4.5 inch gill nets (10 Tr. 1613). Similarly, there is
a statistically significant difference between length frequen-
cies of lake trout taken by a 4.5 inch versus 5.5 inch gill net
(10 Tr. 1613).

A. [Mr. Richard Berg] I simply feel that there is no real
solid evidence in this [Haas] report that lake trout
are vulnerable to all sizes of mesh with regard to their

life [sic] [length].

286a _— District Court Opinion Denying Stay, 505 F Supp 467

Q. [Mr. Bruce R. Greene] So that you are saying that a
gill net will be somewhat selective even with respect
to lake trout?

A. Significantly so, yes.

Q. But, you are also saying, I gather, that it would be more
selective for whitefish because of the bony structure of
lake trout in comparison to whitefish. Is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Testimony of Richard E. Berg (Direct), (10 Tr. 1613). Further,
according to Berg, a 5.5 inch gill net is sufficiently selective
to allow lake trout and whitefish to reach first year spawning
maturity. (10 Tr. 1615).

It is clear from the above that the Indian fishery is not
“unregulated” and that Indian regulations compare favorably
with State regulations. To mention just a few of the matters
brought up by the State: the Indian fishermen supply catch
reports just as do state licensed fishermen. The State, to-
gether with the federal government, has most of the data
regarding the stocks. Director Tanner, despite his acknowl-
edgment that it is theoretically possible for the State and the
tribes to regulate side by side, declared that he was opposed
to releasing State data to the tribes, even if it is indispensible
to them if they are to set reasonable catch quotas. There is no
obvious reason why the Indians should be required to dupli-
cate these State and federal efforts.

Neither the State nor the Indians generally employ quotas.
The State sets quotas only for certain experimental commercial
operations. It claims that its creel limit on sports fishermen
has a similar effect on total catch. The Indians impose similar
restrictions on their fishermen, limiting the total incidental
catch of lake trout, when targeting for whitefish, to 20%.

District Court Opinion Denying Stay, 505 F Supp 467 = 287a

The Indians have a quota of zero pounds for targeted lake
trout. The United States, the tribes, and the State have au-
thority to set quotas for fishermen under their jurisdiction.
The State has more of the information needed to set respon-
sible quotas, but appears to find quotas unnecessary at the
present time or to consider its data inadequate. The State has
not set general quotas and asked the tribes to adopt them.

Although the State indicated that selective gear may be
absolutely necessary to protect endangered species, it did not
proceed to demonstrate that gill nets cannot be so regulated
as to provide the necessary protection. The evidence showed
that the gill nets used by the Indians do result in an incidental
catch of non-targeted species, with lake trout the principle
victim. The tribes regulate the net mesh size, a factor which
controls the frequency of catch of various sizes of lake trout
and can exclude other species.

Entry into the Indian fishery is limited to members of the
Indian tribes. About 200 tribal members have been licensed,
compared to 130 state fishermen. I do not find it unreason-
able that the tribes have not yet imposed a limitation on the
number of licenses available and only indirectly limit them
by the imposition of a sizeable fee. Given the part-time nature
of the Indian fishery, it appears that the State and tribes
similarly evaluate the carrying capacity of the lakes.

The tribes have begun radical zoning, declaring entire
statistical zones off limits and excluding vast areas. The
seasons adopted by the tribes coincide with those of the State.

288a _— District Court Opinion Denying Stay, 505 F Supp 467

STATE PROPOSAL FOR REGULATION OF
INDIAN FISHING

The proposal submitted by the State to show the court
its concept of State regulation of Indian fishermen conclu-
sively demonstrates its inability to comprehend its responsi-
bility to its Indian citizens. Even if

(505 F Supp 495]

the State had made out that the stocks had been irreparably
harmed, that the fishery is unregulated and that gill net
fishing necessarily leads to biological depletion, this court
could not authorize the State to regulate according to this
plan.

Under the plan, allocations are made to Indians from avail-
able fish supplies after the demands of the State’s 130 licensed
commercial fishermen are satisfied, the stocks are generally
protected for sportsmen and all lake trout, with the exception
of a few in Lake Superior, are delivered to the sportsmen.
Other than the chub fishery, which has been closed to state
licensed commercial fishers for several years and which is
unsuitable for the type of gear possessed by Indian fishermen,
the indians have been allocated species that no one else wants,
has previously caught, or is currently catching. (Tr. 1455).
According to Tanner and Scott, the State’s largess is limited
to providing the Indians with “left overs.” Notwithstanding
the Indians’ prior and paramount aboriginal federally pro-
tected right to fish in the Great Lakes, the State adheres
steadfastly to the view that the tribes are interlopers, inter-
fering with its perceived mandate to manage the resource for
the principal be%efit of state recreational fishers, for the sec-
ondary benefit of state licensed commercial fishers, and last
and least, for treaty right fishers, provided however that State
fishers are not disrupted. Indian fishermen would be obliged

District Court Opinion Denying Stay, 505 F Supp 467 =. 289a

to provide for a self-sustaining stock of lake trout, even though
the State does not require this of its sportsmen. They could
not engage in any fishing, except for chubs and Lake Superior
lake trout, until after they had found the capital and acquired
the training necessary to operate sophisticated equipment
which would replace their gill nets and make it impossible
for them to continue fishing in small crews.

The State initially seeks to limit the number of Indian
fishermen who can exercise the tribal rights, as it has limited
the number of licenses which it offers its own commercial
fishermen. The State objective is to foster the fishery by
drastically limiting the number of fishermen and making it
“extremely profitable” for those who remain. This goal is
mandated by this hardnosed view that the fishery is made
up of fishermen out to make a “killing,” to become wealthy,
at the expense of the fishery. This model is in turn adopted
from laizze faire economics—from the motivations it supposes,
to the hypothesis of no government regulation on which it
depends. Such dogmatics are of little use here. The Indian
fishery reveals a tradition of part-time fishermen who pool
limited capital so as to get a favorable return from small
individual takes. Regulation, whether exercised by the tribes,
the State or the federal government, modifies the behavior of
men, even if it is supposed that their only motivation is eco-
nomic gain.

The State attempted to justify its proposed regulations on
the grounds that they would provide a moderate standard of
living for perhaps 40 fishermen fishing with the State’s pre-
ferred, expensive and non-traditional gear. When it came to
demonstrate how even these 40 could make a living, it became
clear that it would be necessary to ignore even basic expenses.
No witness attempted to state a dollar amount each of the 40

2902 _— District Court Opinion Denying Stay, 505 F Supp 467

could expect, or what a moderate standard of living is. They
were nevertheless quite able to declare that these fishermen
could have one.

The proposed regulations are grossly discriminatory against
the Indians in denying them their traditional gear, even with-
out a showing that the stocks cannot sustain the take which
these nets would capture. Puyallup II. It is discriminatory in
allocating the lake trout to sportsmen and demanding of the
Indian that he fish in such manner that he will not take any
of the lake trout which the State acknowledges are available
for harvest. Puyallup II. It is not necesary to regulate Indian
fishermen when those without treaty rights are still permitted
to withdraw vast amounts of fish from the same waters and
the Indians are deprived of them. Even under an allocation
system, where treaty fishers are required to contribute to

preser-

[505 F Supp 496]

vation of the species in the first instance, Indian fishermen
are granted some initial proportion of available fish and non-
treaty fishers are obliged to limit their catch accordingly.
In Washington rivers and waters, where Indians explicitly
hold their right in common with all other citizens in the
territory, the Indians are entitled to no less than 45-50% of
the available take. The State of Michigan seeks all of the
fish its non-treaty fishermen want and presently take. It then
graciously offers the remainder to the Indians. A more effec-
tive denial of treaty rights can hardly be imagined. It must
not be forgotten that the Indians preserved unabridged one
hundred percent of their aboriginal right to take fish, while
the State fishermen have only a privilege. This is the law of
the Constitution.

District Court Opinion Denying Stay, 505 F Supp 467 =. 29a
CONCLUSION

The State’s application for a stay is denied. The State has
failed to show likelihood that it will succeed in establishing
that it can regulate its Indian fishermen like any of the other
of its citizens. The State must acknowledge that the Indians
of Michigan have aboriginal and treaty-secured rights to fish
in the waters of Michigan, and it cannot exclude those Indians
from their livelihood or prevent them from taking available
fish by their traditional fishing methods. Once the standards
defining the treaty rights of Michigan Indians are set forth,
it is clear that the State has not made out that Indian fishing
must now be extra-tribally regulated lest it be irreparably
harmed during the appeal of this action. State regulation
now would undermine the constitutionally authorized con-
gressional policy of fostering Indian sovereignty just when
the tribes are expending their control over their own fisher-
men. A stay pending appeal would alter the status quo, which
is that Indian fishing is not regulated by the State at the
present time. The regulations which the State proposed are
wholly inconsistent with the Indian treaty right, discriminating
against them, denying them the use of traditional gear, ex-
cluding them from most of the fishery so that it may be pre-
served for sportsmen and other state licensees. The gill net,
properly regulated, was not shown to be inconsistent with
the restoration of lake trout, for the State contends some of
the trout can be taken. Its principal objection is that it would
rather have these fish caught by sportsmen.

Motions by all parties for admission of exhibits into evidence
are granted.

292a Court of Appeal Remand Opinion 623 F2d 448
[623 F2d 448]

UNITED STATES of America,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Bay Mills Indian Community,
Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellee,

Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians,
Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellee,

Vv.

STATE OF MICHIGAN, Michigan Natural Resources Com-
mission and its agents, Dr. Howard A. Tanner, Director of
the Department of Natural Resources; Dr. Henry Vondett,
Chief, Fisheries Division, Department of Natural Resources;
and George Dahl, Chief, Law Enforcement Division, De-
partment of Natural Resources, (No. 79-1414), Defendants-
Appellants.

UNITED STATES of America,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Bay Mills Indian Community, Sault Ste.
Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians,
Plaintiffs-Intervenors-Appellees,

v.

STATE OF MICHIGAN, Michigan Natural Resources Com-
mission and its agents Dr. Howard A. Tanner, John A. Scott
and Frank P. Opolka, Defendants,

Court of Appeal Remand Opinion 623 F2d 448 293a

Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Court
of the State of Michigan,
Intervenor-Appellant,

Grand Traverse Area Sport Fishing Association,
(Nos, 79-1527 & 79-1528),
Intervenor-Appellant.

Nos. 79-1414, 79-1527 and 79-1528.

United States Court of Appeals,
Sixth Circuit.

Argued Feb. 15, 1980.

Decided May 28, 1980.

[623 F2d 449]

Before MERRITT and BOYCE F. MARTIN, Jr., Circuit
Judges, and PECK, Senior Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM.

On May 7, 1979, District Judge Noel Fox issued an opinion
and a declaratory judgment, United States vy. Michigan, 471
F.Supp. 192 (W.D.Mich.1979), in an action brought by the
United States and two Indian tribes in Michigan, the Chip-
pewa and the Ottawa tribes (represented by the Bay Mills
Indian Cominunity and the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa
Indians) against the State of Michigan and certain state offi-
cials. That case is now pending before us as appeal No. 79-
1414. The District Court held that under treaties entered into
between the United States and the Chippewa and Ottawa

294a Court of Appeal Remand Opinion 623 F2d 448

tribes in 1836 and 1855, 7 Stat. 491 (1836), 11 Stat. 621 (1856),
these tribes have unique, exclusive, off-reservation rights to
engage in gill net fishing in waters of Lake Michigan, despite
Michigan laws to the contrary. The District Court held that
these treaties grant the Indians an absolute right to engage
in gill net fishing in these waters free from any regulation by
the State of Michigan or any limitations of time, place or
manner generally applicable to other citizens, even if such
gill net fishing completely destroys fisheries, fish supplies and
spawning grounds in Lake Michigan.

Having found in case No. 79-1414 that the state has no
power to limit Indian fishing rights in any way, District Judge
Fox in two other cases designated here as appeals Nos. 79-1527
and 79-1528, (consolidated for argument before us with case
No. 79-1414) enjoined certain Michigan officials from inter-
fering with Indian gill net fishing and enjoined certain Michi-
gan state judges from proceeding any further in a state court
action to determine the right of Indians to engage in gill net
fishing in Grand Traverse Bay and from issuing a temporary
restraining order against such pending disposition of the state
action.

On September 26, 1979, Judge Albert Engel of this Court
stayed Judge Fox's order against the state judges until October
25, 1979, pending consideration of the stay by a full panel of
this Court under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure. For the reasons stated by Judge Engel in his order
of September 26, 1979, we continued in effect the stay of
District Judge Fox's order pending disposition of the appeals
in these cases. We found on the basis of the record before us
that unless the order is stayed there is a strong possibility
that the fishery, the fish supply and spawning grounds in Grand
Traverse Bay will be irreparably damaged or destroyed by
continued intensive gill net fishing. We further concluded,
tentatively, in assessing the likelihood of appellant's success

Court of Appeal Remand Opinion 623 F2d 448 295a

on the merits, that the reasoning of the Supreme Court of
Michigan in People v. LeBlanc, 399 Mich. 31, 248 N.W.2d
199 (1976) appears to correctly state the law applicable to gill
net treaty fishing by Indians in the Great Lakes. That case
held that the State may regulate gill net fishing if necessary
to preserve fish from extinction or prevent irreparable damage
to fish supplies or destruction of fisheries.

Since the decisions of the District Court in these cases and
after this Court stayed the injunctive orders of the District
Court, the Secretary of the Interior issued comprehensive
regulations governing Indian fishing in the Great Lakes, in-
cluding gill net fishing, under treaties entered into between
the United States and Indian tribes. The regulations are
comprehensive. 25 C.F.R. Part 256 (subpart 1), 44 Fed. Reg.
65747. They ban or restrict treaty fishing in certain areas,
regulate net mesh size, prohibit

[623 F2d 450]

harvest of threatened or endangered species and designated
sport species, prohibit fishing during the spawning season,
prohibit the setting of nets in certain locations at certain
times of year, and provide for emergency regulatory adjust-
ments in the regulations.

Both the Indian tribes and the government argue that,
even assuming that state law would otherwise govern Indian
fishing rights, these new regulations occupy the field with
respect to treaty fishing and make general state fishing laws
no longer applicable. The District Court has not addressed
or decided this preemption issue or the effect of the new
federal regulations on the responsibility, authority and juris-
diction of state officials and state courts in the enforcement
of the new federal regulations and state laws relating to the
subject.

296a Court of Appeal Remand Opinion 623 F2d 448

Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution provides that Con-
gress shall have the power “to regulate Commerce . . . among
the several States and with the Indian Tribes.” Section 2 of
Title 25, U.S.C. gives the Secretary of the Interior “the
management of all Indian affairs and of all matters arising out
of Indian relations” and Section 9 of Title 25 authorizes the
President to “prescribe such regulations as he may think fit
for carrying into effect the various provisions of any act
relating to Indian affairs.” The new regulations were issued
under the authority of these statutes. Since Congress adopted
in 1836 and 1855 acts in the form of the treaties with the
Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, the government's preemption
argument has a firm constitutional and statutory basis.

This Court cannot, however, intelligently consider and
decide the preemption question and its effect on state jurisdic-
tion (an extremely important issue that may make a decision
unnecessary on the other issues presented in this appeal) in
the absence of a decision by the District Court on three ques-
tions concerning the meaning and effect of the new federal
regulations: (1) Were the new regulations intended to have,
and do they have, the effect of preempting all state regulation
of treaty fishing? (2) If so, do the new regulations prohibit
enforcement by state officials? (3) If so, do the new regula-
tions oust the state court of jurisdiction to control Indian fish-
ing rights or does the state court retain concurrent jurisdic-
tion with the federal court? The parties have not briefed the
second and third questions. The answer to these questions
may depend in part on the existence of viable tribal councils
capable of enforcement. The taking of proof may be neces-

sary.

For these reasons, we remand the case to the District Court
for consideration of the preemptive effect of the new federal
regulations. The District Court should consider this question
on the assumption that the case of People v. LeBlanc, 399 Mich.

Court of Appeal Remand Opinion 623 F2d 448 297a

31, 248 N.W.2d 199 (1976) correctly states the applicable law
in the absence of preemptive federal regulations. Although
this Court has not finally decided the issue, it is presently
inclined to the view, as it was when it issued the stay in these
cases, that, in the absence of federal regulations occupying
the field, the Supreme Court of Michigan in People v. LeBlanc,
supra, has correctly stated the applicable standard governing
state regulation of gill net fishing. ,

Accordingly, the case is remanded to the District Court for
consideration of this question. This Court retains jurisdiction
of the other questions presented by the case pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2106 and continues in effect the stay heretofore
entered.

298a Court of Appeals Order Denying Stay,
December 5, 1979

FILED DEC. 5, 1979
JOHN P. HEHMAN, Clerk
No. 79-1414

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, et al,
Plaintiffs-Appellees
v.
STATE OF MICHIGAN, et al,
Defendants-Appellants

Before: MERRITT, Circuit Judge.

ORDER

This case is before a single judge of the court pursuant to
the application of the State of Michigan under Rule 8, Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure, for a partial stay of the judg-
ment entered in this case May 7, 1979. The State of Michigan
requests the stay pending consideration of the appeal on the
merits. The same application for a stay is before the Dis-
trict Court, and the Court is informed that the District Court
will conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue beginning
December 6, 1979.

Rule 8 of Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides
that application for a stay of the judgment or order of a Dis-
trict Court “must ordinarily be made in the first instance in
the District Court.” The rule continues:

Court of Appeals Order Denying Stay, 299a
December 5, 1979

A motion for such relief may be made to the Court
of Appeals or to a judge thereof, but the motion shall
show that application to a District Court for the relief
sought is not practicable, or that the District Court has
denied the application, or has failed to attend the relief
which the applicant requested, with the reasons given by
the District Court for its action.

‘In light of the language of this rule, together with the fact
that the District Court is presently considering the same ques-
tion, we believe that it would be inappropriate for this Court
to enter a stay of the District Court’s judgment of May 7, 1979,
at this time. There is no showing that the relief sought in the
District Court is “not practicable” or that the District Court
has “denied an application” for the same relief.

Therefore, the application for stay of the District Court's
declaratory judgment of May 7, 1979, is hereby denied with-
out prejudice tv the rights of the parties to apply to this
Court after the District Court has ruled on the application
for stay.

ENTERED BY ORDER
OF THE COURT

John P. Hehman /s/

John P. Hehman
Clerk

300a Court of Appeals Order Denying Stay,
December 14, 1979
FILED DEC. 14, 1979
JOHN P. HEHMAN, Clerk

No. 79-1414
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

BAY MILLS INDIAN
COMMUNITY; SAULT ST. MARIE
TRIBE OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS,

Plaintiffs-Intervenors-Appellees,

v.

STATE OF MICHIGAN,
MICHIGAN NATURAL
RESOURCES COMMISSION AND
ITS AGENTS, DR. HOWARD A.
TANNER, DR. HENRY VONDETT
AND GEORGE DAHL IN THEIR
OFFICIAL CAPACITIES,
Defendants-Appellants.

ORDER

Upon consideration of the defendants-appellants’ application
for partial stay of judgment pending appeal and request for
immediate consideration,

Court of Appeals Order Denying Stay, 30la
December 14, 1979

And it appearing that these matters are presently pending
before the district court,

It is ORDERED that the application be denied.

ENTERED BY ORDER
OF THE COURT

John P. Hehman /s/
John P. Hehman, Clerk

302a Court of Appeals Order Granting Stay,
. May 30, 1980
FILED MAY 30, 1980
JOHN P. HEHMAN, Clerk

No. 79-1414
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

BAY MILLS INDIAN
COMMUNITY,
Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellee,

SAULT STE. MARIE TRIBE OF
CHIPPEWA INDIANS,
Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellee,
v.

STATE OF MICHIGAN,
MICHIGAN NATURAL
RESOURCES COMMISSION and
its agents, DR. HOWARD A.
LANNER, Director of the
Department of Natural Resources;
DR. HENRY VONDETT, Chief,
Fisheries Division, Department of
Natural Resources; and GEORGE
DAHL, Chief Law Enforcement
Division, Department of Natural
Resources

Defendants-Appellants.

Court of Appeals Order Granting Stay, 3032
May 30, 1980

ORDER
Before: MERRITT, Circuit Judge.

The state of Michigan and its agents have applied for a
stay of the District Court judgment in this case pending
appeal. The District Court ruled, in a decision issued on
May 7, 1979, that the state of Michigan lacked authority to
regulate fishing by the Bay Mills Indian community and the
Sault Ste. Marie tribe of Chippewa Indians in the territorial
waters of the state. This Court on May 28, 1980, remanded
the case to the District Court for a decision on the question of
federal regulatory preemption. We retained jurisdiction over
the other issues presented. For the reasons set forth below,
the judgment of the District Court is stayed pending final
disposition of this appeal.

This is the third time that an application for a stay in this
case has been presented to this Court. On the two previous
occasions, the motions were denied because the state and its
agents had not first pursued the motion to the fullest practic-
able extent in the District Court, as Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 8(a) requires: See Orders of December 5, 1979, and
December 14, 1979. Although a motion to stay had been pend-
ing below in both prior instances, the District Court had not
yet acted. On May 9, 1980, the District Court after prolonged
consideration denied the application for a stay. The District
Court having acted, this Court now is prepared to entertain
the motion for a stay in case 79-1414.

In three companion cases, we have stayed the judgment of
the District Court pending appeal. In cases 79-1527 and

304a Court of Appeals Order Granting Stay,
May 30, 1980

79-1528, Judge Engel of this Court stayed the permanent in-
junction that the District Court had issued against the
Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Court of Michigan. See Order of
September 26, 1979. A three-judge panel of this Court on
October 19, 1979, continued the effectiveness of the stay pend-
ing disposition of the appeal. What we stayed in cases 79-1527
and 79-1528 was the District Court decree that forbade the
state court to proceed any further with a state injunctive
action brought by the Grand Traverse Area Sport Fishing
Association against gill net fishing in the Grand Traverse Bay
area of Lake Michigan.

In case 79-1635, a three-judge panel of this Court on Novem-
ber 28, 1979, likewise granted a stay pending appeal. The stay
in 79-1635 suspended a temporary restraining order issued by
the District Court. The TRO had applied the principles of the
decision in the present case—No. 79-1414—to the Grand
Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, in addition
to the Indian plaintiffs herein. Our stay in 79-1635 tempo-
rarily barred the extension of the May 7, 1979, District Court
decision to the Grand Traverse Band.

We granted the stay in cases 79-1527 and 79-1528 in order
to avert the strong possibility that intensive gill net fishing
by the Bay Mills Indian community and the Sault Ste. Marie

Court of Appeals Order Granting Stay, 305a
May 30, 1980

tribe of Chippewa Indians would irreparably damage the
piscatorial ecosystem of Grand Traverse Bay. The stay in 79-
1635 was a product of our concern that excessive gill net
fishing by the Grand Traverse Band could work similar ir-
reparable damage throughout Michigan’s territorial waters.
Our apprehensions are no less warranted in the present case,
which leaves fishing by the Bay Mills Indian community and
Sault Ste. Marie tribe of Chippewa Indians unfettered by state
regulation throughout the territorial waters of the state of
Michigan.

Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is stayed
pending final disposition of the appeal of case 79-1414.
ENTERED BY ORDER
OF THE COURT
John P. Hehman, Clerk

By Grace Keller /s/
Deputy Clerk

306a Court of Appeals Order Modifying Stay, July 16, 1980

Filed July 16, 1980, John P. Hehman, Clerk.
Nos. 79-1414, 79-1527, 79-1528
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
BAY MILLS INDIAN COMMUNITY,
Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellee,
SAULT STE. MARIE TRIBE OF
CHIPPEWA INDIANS,
Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellee,
v

STATE OF MICHIGAN, MICHIGAN
NATURAL RESOURCES COMMISSION
and its agents, DR. HOWARD A.
TANNER, Director of the Department of
Natural Réso ; DR. HENRY
VONDETT, Chief, Fisheries Division,
Department of Natural Resources; and
GEORGE DAHL, Chief, Law Enforcement
Division, Department of Natural Resources,

(No. 79-1414),
Defendants-Appellants.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
BAY MILLS INDIAN COMMUNITY,
SAULT STE. MARIE TRIBE OF
CHIPPEWA INDIANS,
Plaintiffs-Intervenors-Appellees.
v

STATE OF MICHIGAN, MICHIGAN
NATURAL RESOURCES COMMISSION
and its agents, DR. HOWARD A.
TANNER, JOHN A. SCOTT and
FRANK P. OPOLKA,
Defendants,

THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
COURT OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Intervenor-Appellant,

GRAND TRAVERSE AREA SPORT

FISHING ASSOCIATION, °

(Nos. 79-1527 & 79-1528),
Intervenor-Appellant.

Court of Appeals Order Modifying Stay, July 16, 1950 307a

Before: MERRITT and MARTIN, Circuit Judges;
PECK, Senior Circuit Judge.

The United States and the Bay Mills Indian Community
and the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians have
moved the Court to vacate and set aside its stay heretofore
entered pursuant to the Court's opinion of May 28, 1980,
and in the alternative to modify the stay. The Grand Traverse
Area Sport Fishing Association has also moved the Court to
clarify the opinion so as to insure that the Association may
participate as a party in the proceeding on remand to District
Judge Fox.

I.

This Court declines to vacate or set aside its stay heretofore
entered. The Court does, however, modify the stay as follows:
Indian treaty fishing, including gill net fishing, in that portion
of the Great Lakes over which the State of Michigan claims
jurisdiction to enforce its fishing laws shall be governed
during the pendency of this litigation in the District Court
and in this Court by the comprehensive regulations issued on
this subject by the Secretary of the Interior contained in
25 C.F.R. part 256, 44 Fed Reg. 65747 (November 15, 1979),
as amended, 45 Fed. Reg. 28100 (April 28, 1980) and as such
regulations may hereafter be amended by the Secretary of
the Interior, provided, however, that “enforcement officer,”
as defined in § 256.4l(e) thereof, 45 Fed Reg. 28102, shall
include conservation officers of the State of Michigan and
such other law enforcement officers of the State of Michigan
as are authorized under state law to enforce the fishing laws
of the State of Michigan.

This Court’s modification of its stay heretofore entered is
based on the standard outlined in Reed v. Rhodes, 549 F.2d
1046 (6th Cir. 1976), after considering the recent Supreme

308a Court of Appeals Order Modifying Stay, July 16, 1980

Court decisions in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,
48 U.S.L.W. 4897 (No. 78-1177, decided June 27, 1980) and
Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 48
U.S.L.W. 4904 (No. 78-1604, decided June 27, 1980).

Il.

The Court has also considered the motion of the Grand
Traverse Area Sport Fishing Association to clarify its status
as a party in the proceedings on remand together with the
order of the District Court on this subject entered July 9,
1980. This Court finds that the Association is a party to this
litigation and has a direct interest in the outcome thereof.
The District Court should allow the Association to participate
as a party in the proceeding in the District Court on remand
and allow the Association to conduct discovery on the same
basis as other parties.

Accordingly, it is so ordered.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

JOHN P. HEHMAN /s/
Clerk

Secretary of Interior Letter, April 21, 1981 309a
RECEIVED APR24 12:01 PM’81

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
United States Department of the Interior
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20240

Honorable William G. Milliken
Governor of Michigan
Lansing, Michigan 48901

Dear Gevernor Milliken:

The decline of the carefully restored fisheries of the Great
Lakes is a matter of vital concern to this Department and it
is clear that the tremendous pressures brought to bear by com-
mercial, sport, and Indian fishermen on those fisheries are
the principal cause of the decline. As a result of these pres-
sures, various species, particularly Lake Trout, are suffering
serious declines. The continued decline of these important
species will reduce them to levels where another extremely
costly, long-term restoration program will be necessary. To
permit such a decline following years of costly restoration
would be an unprecedented violation of the Department's
fish and wildlife conservation mission, our responsibility for
tribal treaty rights, and our stewardship of the Nation's
natural resources.

The continued necessity for the the current treaty fishing
regulations issued in 1979, and subsequently extended on
December 31, 1980, should, in view of these circumstances, be
reevaluated. Evaluation by the Fish and Wildlife Service
indicates that the program provided by the regulations may
be failing to protect these fisheries which are vital to Indians
and non-Indians alike. Consequently, I do not intend to ex-

310a Secretary of Interior Letter, April 21, 1981

tend these regulations beyond the May 11, 1981, expiration
date.

In the absence of federal regulations and during the period
in which the courts proceed with a resolution of the legal
aspects of the matter, conservation of the fishery must be
ensured. Accordingly, I invite you or your designated repre-
sentative to attend a meeting in Washington, D.C. It is my
hope that a program acceptable to all parties, which will ensure
the safety of valuable fish stock and the Tribes’ treaty fishery,
can he created. Upon completion of a consensus manage-
ment program, I propose that it be carried out by the parties
in a manner which recognizes the concurrent responsibilities
and duties of the State of Michigan, the Tribes, and the De-
partment of the Interior.

During the period between the expiration of the current
regulations and development of a consensus program, I believe
--in accordance with the stated inclinations of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Court—the rea-
soning of the Supreme Court of Michigan in People v. LeBlanc
appears to correctly state the law applicable to fishing by
Indians in the Great Lakes. Again, my primary concern is
that the fishery not be permitted to decline while we await a
definitive resolution of the legal issues.

I trust that our meeting will be the first step toward achiev-
ing an equitable resolution to the problems now threatening
the rights of the respective parties and a nationally recognized
natural resource—the Great Lakes Fishery.

Sincerely,

Jim Watt /s/

Jim Watt
SECRETARY

Court of Appeals Order Continuing Remand,

July 10, 1981

Filed July 10, 1981, John P. Hehman, Clerk.

No. 79-1414
No. 79-1527
No. 79-1528

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

3lla

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

BAY MILLS INDIAN |
COMMUNITY, SAULT STE.
MARIE TRIBE OF CHIPPEWA
INDIANS,

Plaintiffs-Interv: aors-Appellees,

Vv.

STATE OF MICHIGAN,
MICHIGAN NATURAL
RESOURCES COMMISSION and
its agents, Dr. Howard A Tanner,
Dr. Henry Vondett and George Dahl
in their official capacities,
Defendants-Appellants,

GRAND TRAVERSE AREA SPORT

FISHING ASSOCIATION,

13th JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT

OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Intervenor Defendant-Appellant.

Before: MERRITT, MARTIN and JONES, Circuit Judges.

312a Court of Appeals Order Continuing Remand,
July 10, 1981

ORDER

The procedural history of this Indian treaty fishing rights
case is recited in our opinion reported at 623 F.2d 448 (1980),
remanding the case to the District Court to determine whether
federal regulations governing gill net fishing preempt state
regulation. After the remand of the case to the District Court
last summer pursuant to that opinion, the following significant
steps have occurred: (1) The District Court began taking
proof on the preemptive effect of the regulations of the Sec-
retary of the Interior governing gill net fishing in the Great
Lakes issued last year during the pendency of the original
appeal in this case, but the District Court has not ruled as
yet on the questions referred to it in our opinion. (2) The
Secretary of the Interior allowed the regulations in questio#
to expire on May 11 of this year, apparently on grounds that
he and the Bureau of Indian Affairs should defer to the states
in connection with the regulation of Indian treaty fishing in
the Great Lakes. (3) The State of Michigan has issued emer-
gency regulations governing gill net fishing which appear to
be less protective of Indian rights than the federal regulations.
(4) The State of Michigan has moved that the order of remand
be vacated and that the original judgment of the District
Court be reversed. (5) This Court heard reargument of the
case on June 19, 1981.

In light of these events, this Court concludes as follows:

1. The treaty-guaranteed fishing rights preserved to the
indians in the 1836 treaty, including the aboriginal rights to
engage in gill net fishing, continue to the present day as
federally created and federally protected rights. The protec-
tion of those rights is the solemn obligation of the federal
government, and no principle of federalism requires the fed-
eral government to defer to the states in connection with the

Court of Appeals Order Continuing Remand, 313a
July 10, 1981

protection of those rights. The responsibility of the federal
government to protect Indian treaty rights from encroach-
ment by state and local governments is an ancient and well-
established responsibility of the national government.

2. The right of the Indians to engage in gill net fishing is
not absolute, however. It is subject to a rule of reason. In
the absence of fede..l regulation, that right is subject to the
type of state regulation outlined by the Michigan Supreme
Court in People v. LeBlanc, 248 N.W.2d 199 (1976), a deci-
sion which we believe accurately states the rule of reason and
the principles of federal law applicable to this case. As pro-
vided in LeBlanc, any such state regulations restricting Indian
fishing rights under the 1836 treaty, including gill net fishing,
(a) must be a necessary conservation measure, (b) must be the
least restrictive alternative method available for preserving
fisheries in the Great Lakes from irreparable harm, and (c)
must not discriminatorily harm Indian fishing or favor other
classes of fishermen.

3. Thus if Indian fishing is not likely to cause irreparable
harm to fisheries within the territorial jurisdiction of the State
of Michigan, the state may not regulate it. The state bears
the burden of persuasion to show by clear and convincing
evidence that it is highly probable that irreparable harm will
occur and that the need for regulation exists. In the absence
of such a showing, the state may not restrict Indian treaty
fishing, including gill net fishing. Since the new Secretary of
the Interior has now withdrawn the regulations issued by
his predecessor, the essential question is now whether these
standards have been satisfied.

4. The parties have not introduced proof on this subject,
and the state has not carried the burden described in the
paragraph immediately preceding. Accordingly, this Court

3l4a Court of Appeals Order Continuing Remand,
July 10, 1981

is not in position at this time to determine whether the state's
new regulations meet federal standards. We therefore decline
to approve and put into effect on an interim basis the more
restrictive emergency regulations of Indian treaty fishing
recently adopted by the State of Michigan.

5. The United States and the Indian tribes represent to the
Court that the tribes have adopted and will carefully enforce
as a regime of tribal self-regulation the comprehensive rules
regarding gill net fishing previously enacted by the Secretary
of the Interior which were allowed to expire on May 11, 1981.
Until modified by the District Court upon remand, the com-
prehensive rules regarding gill net fishing previously en-
acted by the Secretary of Interior and referred to in our opinion
reported at 623 F.2d 448 (1980) and our order of July 16,
1980, will remain in effect as the interim rules regarding gill
net fishing. The District Court may modify these rules on an
interim basis under Rule 65, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

6. The remand opinion and orders of this Court dated May
28, 1980, and July 16, 1980, remain in effect except as modified
by this order. The District Court shall consider and decide in
accordance with the principles outlined herein and in People
v. LeBlanc, 248 N.W.2d 199 (1976), the questions of necessity
and irreparable harm. Only upon a finding of necessity, ir-
reparable harm and the absence of effective Indian tribal
self-regulation should the District Court sanction and permit
state regulation of gill net fishing. If the District Court should
find after hearing evidence that state regulation and control
of Indian treaty fishing is necessary to preserve the fish of
Lake Michigan as a resource, then the District Court should
sanction state regulation. In that event, the District Court
should permit those state regulations necessary to prevent ir-
reparable harm as heretofore stated.

Court of Appeals Order Continuing Remand, 315a
July 10, 1981

7. With respect to state court jurisdiction over cases in-
volving Indian treaty fishing, we agree with the arguments
and position of the United States presented on June 19, 1981.
While these questions concerning Indian treaty rights and the
degree of permissible state regulation are pending in this Court
and in the District Court, it is improper under the supremacy
clause of the United States Constitution for the state courts
to make orders inconsistent with those of the federal courts.
Thus, the District Court's injunctions in cases No. 79-1527 and
79-1528 continue to be appropriate. Those orders were issued
by the District Court in aid of its jurisdiction to determine
the rights of the parties under treaties of the United States.
The state cases were brought after the federal case was pending
and under consideration, and the orders of the state courts in
those cases had the effect of interfering with and obstructing
the orderly adjudication of the federal questions in the Dis-
trict Court. The doctrine of abstention therefore does not

apply.
Accordingiy, the remand order of this court embodied in

our opinion reported at 623 F.2d 448 (6th Cir. 1980) is con-
tinued in effect as modified by this order.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF
THE COURT

John P. Hehman /s/
Clerk

ISSUED AS MANDATE: AUGUST LI, 1981
COSTS: NONE

A TRUE COPY

Attest:

JOHN P. HEHMAN, Clerk

By Audrey Crockett /s/
Deputy Clerk

316a District Court Opinion On Remand, August 18, 1981
Filed, August 18, 1981 Clerk John P. Hehman.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
et al.,
Plaintiffs,

e M26-73 C.A.

STATE OF MICHIGAN, et al.,
Defendants.

OPINION

On May 28, 1980, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit issued an Order which remanded this case
to the district court to consider the meaning and effect of
new federal regulations on this Indian treaty fishing dispute.
Since this court’s opinion of May 7, 1979, the Secretary of the
Interior had issued comprehensive regulations governing In-
dian fishing in the Great Lakes, including gill net fishing.(1)
The Indian tribes and the government argued before the
Circuit Court that, even assuming that state law would other-
wise govern Indian fishing rights, these new regulations oc-
cupied the field with respect to treaty fishing and made
general state fishing laws no longer applicable. Since this
court had not addressed or decided the effect of these regula-

11)

The Secretary of Interior's regulations are contained in 25 ©. F.R.
part 258, 44 Fed. Reg. 65747 (Noveinber 15, 1979), as amended, 45
Fed. Reg. 28100 (April 28, 1980).

District Court Opinion On Remand, August 18, 1981 317a

tions on the power and authority of the state, the matter was
remanded to this court to consider and answer the following
‘questions:

(1) Were the new regulations intended to have, and
do they have, the effect of preeempting all state regula-
tion of treaty fishing?

(2) If so, do the new regulations prohibit enforcement
by state officials?

(3) If so, do the new regulations oust the state court
of jurisdiction to control Indian fishing rights or does
the state court retain concurrent jurisdiction with the
federal court?

The Sixth Circuit Court stated that the answer to these ques-
tions may depend in part on the existence of viable tribal
councils capable of enforcement, and the taking of proofs
may be necessary. United States v. Michigan, 623 F.2d 448,
450 (6th Cir. 1980).

Several telephone conferences were held in an attempt to
expedite the discovery process. The State originally proposed
taking depositions of twenty-one Interior officials. Subse-
quently, this list was narrowed down, and ultimately no depo-
sitions took place.

On July 16, 1980, the Sixth Circuit Court issued an Order
which clarified Grand Traverse Area Sport Fishing Associa-
tion’s (GTASFA) status in the remanded proceedings. In addi-
tion, that Order modified a previously entered stay, and
allowed treaty fishing under the Secretary of Interior's regu-
lations. The State then filed a petition under the All Writs
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, with the U.S. Supreme Court, requesting
the July 16th Order be lifted and the May 30th stay Order

318a District Court Opinion On Remand, August 18, 1981

reimposed. Associate Justice Byron R. White refused this
extraordinary request, and left undisturbed the three-judge
panel's Order of July 16, 1980.

Trial on the remanded proceedings began on September
30, 1980 in Marquette. Nine days of testimony were heard.
Various tribal witnesses testified concerning the existence of
enforcement mechanisms. Evidence regarding tribal conser-
vation codes, tribal enforcement efforts, and tribal courts was
received. While many spoke about past difficulties in working
with the State, the general feeling of the tribal witnesses was
that the regulations were working, were effective, and had
reduced the tension that had often existed when the State
was regulating.

Eric Jankel, Special Assistant te Secretary Andrus, testified
about the facts, circumstances, and history surrounding the
issuance of treaty fishing regulations. Mr. Jankel was in court
and cross-examined on September 30th, October 16th, 17th
and 24th. On November 3, 1980, with all counsel present in
chambers, this court wanted to clarify a few points Mr. Jankel
had made by asking him some questions during a telephone
conference. Despite the fact that all counsel had four dif-
ferent occasions to view Mr. Jankel’s demeanor, substantial
amounts of time and money would be saved, and telephone
conferences have been used successfully in other courts, see:
Gottschalk, Courts Calling on Telephones to Economize, The
Wall Street Journal, June 1, 1981, at 29, col. 3, the State
threatened to appeal. To avoid further prolonging the pro-
ceedings, additional questioning of Mr. Jankel was not under-
taken.

In late October, a treaty Indian fisherman was found in
contempt of state court for engaging in activity that the Circuit
Court had authorized in its July 16, 1980 Order. The State’s.
Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, in GTASFA v. Maudrie, et al.,

District Court Opinion On Remand, August 18, 1981 319a

File No. 79-7510 C.E., found Patrick G. Kinney in criminal
contempt for fishing under the federal regulations in viola-
tion of a fourteen-month old ex-parte restraining order. This
district court was petitioned to enjoin the state court charge,
and on November 13, 1980 a preliminary injunction was en-

tered.I?]

The regulations contained in 25 C.F.R. part 256, 44 Fed.
Reg. 65747 (November 15, 1979), as amended, 45 Fed Reg.
28100 ( April 28, 1980), were interim rules promulgated by the
Secretary of Interior and were scheduled to expire on their
own terms on January 1, 1981. By that time, it was anticipated
that permanent rules would be in place. With the election
and upcoming change of Administrations, however, tremend-
ous political pressure was brought to bear on the situation.
Rather than adopting permanent rules, the Carter Administra-
tion, through Secretary Andrus, extended the regulations to
May 11, 1981. 46 Fed. Reg. 33 (January 2, 1981). This ex-
tension maintained the status quo pending the beginning of
the 1981 fishing season. The Notice in the Federal Register
stated that it was anticipated that regulations governing treaty
fishing would be published in April.

With the change of Administrations, political pressure was
again applied to end the federal regulatory scheme and give
the State control over treaty fishing. On April 20, 1981, Mich-
igan Congressman Guy Vander Jagt’s office revealed the
Secretary's decision to let the regulations lapse. By identical
letters sent to the Chairmen of the Tribes and the Governor,
Secretary Watt announced his decision not to renew the fed-

[2]

A similar fact pattern was presented to this court in March 1981.
At the hearing for a preliminary injunction held on March 19, 1981,
counsel for the state court judge and GTASFA threatened to pros-
ecute other treaty fishers for obeying the Sixth Circuit Court Order
of July 16th. (Transcript of Proceedings, March 19, 1981, p. 11, 41).
As in the Kinney matter, a preliminary injunction was issued.

320a District Court Opinion On Remand, August 18, 1981

eral regulations. Despite eight years of the government's
urgings to the contrary,!3} the Secretary stated that the rea-
soning of People v. LeBlanc accurately states the law appli-
cable to treaty fishing. The Secretary invited the parties to
meet in an attempt to work out a “consensus management
program,” which would recognize the concurrent responsibil-
ities and duties of the State, the Tribes, and the Department
of the Interior. .

In light of these developments, the State filed an emergency
motion with the Sixth Circuit Court to set aside the remand
order, and to put in place the State’s “emergency regulations”
as an interim measure to replace the lapsed federal regulations.
Rather than petitio

[Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.]

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385008_0387%3A0. Public record. Not legal advice.
