# Record and brief — Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States Department of Energy

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Record and brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1981
- **Citation:** 454 U.S. 1110

## Text

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Office Supreme Court, US.
ik iL&ED

81- 499 SEP 11 1981

ALEXAN® STEVAS,
IN THE | CLK ad

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1981

Mosit O1 CorRPORATION,
Petitioner,
Vv.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY,
James B. E>warps, SECRETARY OF ENERGY,
AND Tosco CORPORATION,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES TEMPORARY
EMERGENCY COURT OF APPEALS

Of Counsel: R. Bruce MCLEAN
Cuarces S. LinpBerG Daniet JosEPH
WILLIAM C. STREETS (Counse! of Record)
Gait F. ScHutz Harry R. SILVER
Mosit Oi. Corporation Josepn T. Casey, Jr.
3225 Gallows Road Davip A. HoLzwortH

Fairfax , Virginia 22037 AKIN, Gump, STRAUSS, HAvER & FELD
1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 887-4000

Counsel for Petitioner
Mobil Oil Corporation

rr
PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS PRINTING, INC., WASHINGTON, D.C.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether it is proper for a federal court of appeals to
ignore findings and conclusions made by a district court in
granting a preliminary injunction and to fail to limit its scope
of review to assessing whether the district court's action was a
clear abuse of its discretion.

2. Whether a federal court of appeals can, in conflict
with other federal courts of appeals, require a party seeking a
preliminary injunction to satisfy a standard that imposes a
burden of showing conclusively that irreparable injury will
occur and that additionally ignores, rather than balances,
other factors, particularly the applicant’s likelihood of
ultimately prevailing upon the merits.

iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS

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A. Regulatory Background ..... shiekavaednnaunens
B. The District Court's Opinion ...................
C. The Court of Appeals’ Decision .................

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ................006.

1. The Court Of Appeals Failed To Limit The Scope Of
lis Review To Determining Whether The District
Court Had Abused Its Discretion ................ 8

ll. The Decision Below Conflicts With Decisions Of
Other Circuits In Ruling That An Applicant Must
Make A “‘Clear Showing”’ Of Irreparable Harm In
Order To Obtain A Preliminary Injunction And
Theat The Applicant’s Likelihood Of Success On The
ED no 66 eccctecsescbseseansessc 11

Er. (Eee te to Oe eo eee wea bales 21

CoN DW NON NHN — e district court found, this “‘disappearance”’ of price-
controlled crude oil had serious consequences for the integrity
of the regulatory scheme, the consumer, the refining indus-
try, and refiners, including Mobil, that had not caused the dis-
appearance. App. B (24a-26a). Because not all price-controlled
crude oil was reported, the Entithements Program could not
and did not achieve its purpose of equitably distributing access
to all price-controlled crude oil. This effect was felt concretely
and massively. The fewer barrels of price-controlled crude oil
reported, the lower the national average of price-controlled
crude oil available for sharing, which resulted in the issuance
of fewer entitlements to all refiners and, consequently, higher
crude oil acquisition costs for all. These higher crude oil costs
could be passed on to the consumer. App. B (24a). The district
court found that in 1979 and 1980, refine’s’ crude oil costs
had been wrongly increased by $5.6 billion to the great injury
of those refiners, like Mobil, that had not manipulated in-
ventories. App. B (24a).

The impact on Mobil provided a dramatic example. When
the average volume of price-controlled crude oil declined, due
to “‘disappearing”’ crude oil, Mobil had to buy more entitle-
ments to make up for the increasing gap between the artificial-
ly decreased industry average and Mobil’s refinery receipts.
The district court found that in 1979 and 1980, Mobil was
forced to pay $284 million for additional entitlements because
of disappearing price-controlled crude oil. App. B (26a). The
district court also found that if the final regular entitlements
notice requiring the purchase and sale of entitlements is is-
sued, Mobil will be forced to buy an additional $50 million
worth of entitlements. App. B (77a).

B. The District Court's Opinion

In an exhaustive 80-page opinion the district court
preliminarily enjoined the Department of Energy from termi-
naling the program by issuing final entitlements notices. The
final regular notice, which reflects transactions for the first 27
days of January, 1981,’ would require Mobil to buy an addi-
tional approximately $50 million worth of entithkements. App.
B (77a). The court made extensive findings based on live tes-
limony, public data compiled by the Department of Energy,
and a repoit prepared by an independent consultant for the
agency.

The district court found that Mobil was likely to prevail on
the merits. App. B (6Sa-75a). In short, the district court found
that substantial quantities of price-controlled crude oil had
“disappeared,” that the disappearance materially distorted
the Entitlements Program and subverted its purpose, that the
cause of the disappearance was regulatory loopholes that per-
mitted some companies to avoid reporting receipt of price-
controlled crude oil, and that the Department of Energy had
been aware of the problem for four years and had refused to
do anything about it.

The distric! court also found that Mobil would suffer ir-
reparable injury if the final entithkements notice was issued
without corrective action by the agency. App. B (7Sa-80a).
The court found that there was no remedy available to Mobil
that could provide return of the $50 million it would be re-
quired to pay, let alone return of the $284 million Mobil has
already lost, should Mobil prevail on the merits.

‘ Entitlements notices were issued two months after the applicable
transactions occurred. See 10 C.F.R. § 211.66. After oral argument in
the court of appeals, the Department of Energy issued final so-called
“clean-up” regulations specifically designed to end the agency's role
in the program. The proposed *‘clean-up"’ regulations, discussed by
the district court, did not deal with the problem of disappearing crude

oil, App. B (78a-79a)_ and the court of appeals did not conclude to
the contrary.

The district court also found that the public interest would
be best served by terminating the Entitlements Program only
after all price-controlled oi! has been accounted for. App. B
(80a). The court further found that the Department of Energy
as administrator of the program would not be injured by the
issuance of an injunction. App. B (80a). Finally, the district
court found that all refiners that did not cause crude oil to
*“disappear’’ would benefit from the issuance of an injunction
that required the agency to take corrective action. Conversely,
the only refiners that would benefit from the failure to issue
an injunction are those companies that are responsible for the
problem and that unjustly benefited from disappearing price-
controlled crude oil. 4

C. The Court of Appeals’ Decision

The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals reversed the
district court in a terse seven-page opinion that does not even
mention that the district court wrote an opinion. App. A (la-
7a). The court of appeals did not address the merits, except to
quote language from a decision by the Department of
Energy's Office of Hearings and Appeals agreeing with
Mobil’s position on the merits. Indeed, the court of appeals
did not discuss or even mention any of the findings made by
the district court. The court of appeais reversed the district
court on the sole ground that Mobil had “‘failed to make a
clear showing that it will suffer irreparable harm if an injunc-
tion does not issue.” App. A (4a). The court of appeals
reasoned that Mobil had not shown irreparable injury because
three purported avenues of relief were said to be available: (1)
court challenge of the determination of the Department of
Energy's Office of Hearings and Appeals that it lacked jurisdic-
tion over Mobil’s claim, (2) Mobil’s Petition for Emergency
Rulemaking that had been pending since February 10; and (3)
the right to appeal administratively from the issuance of a final

‘ App. B (81a). Significantly, no evidence was presented to the dis-
trict court concerning harm to any company in the event an injunc-
tion was issued.

rule that does not address the problem raised by Mobil — /.e.,
the right to ask the agency to change its mind.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. The Court Of Appeals Failed To Limit The Scope Of Its Re-
view To Determining Whether The District Court Had
Abused Its Discretion.

This Court has repeaicdly ruled that the scope of appellate
review of the grant or denial of preliminary injunctive relief is
to be confined solely to the abuse-of-discretion standard. F.x.,
Doran v. Salem Inn, 422 U.S. 922, 931-32 (1975); Brown v.
Chote, 411 U.S. 452, 457 (1973). This standard has been uni-
formly mandated by this Court for many years. E.g¢., Alabama
v. United States, 279 U.S. 229. 230-31 (1929); Meccano, Lid.
v. Wanamaker, 253 U.S. 136, 141 (1920).

The court of appeals here simply ignored this limitation on
its scope of review. The court did not acknowledge that the
standard applied, and in reversing it did not deal with or even
mention any finding or conclusion that the district court had
made in the course of its exhaustive 80-page opinion. In fact,
the court of appeals did not even mention that the district
court had written an opinion.°

‘A number of statements in the text of the court of appeals’ opin-
ion also make it clear that that court effectively considered de novo,
rather than on the basis of the district court's decision, the question
of whether Mobil was entitled to a preliminary injunction. The court
of appeals siated, for example, that it found it “unnecessary to re-
view the merits of Mobil’s explanations of how it sustained the con-
tentions it advances.”’ App. A (4a) (emphasis added). It also held.
** this court finds that Mobil has failed to make a clear showing that it will
suffer irreparable harm if an injunction does not issue.”’ /bid. (em-
phasis added). The court later stated, ** with the finding that Mobil has
Jailed to show irreparable harm, we need not reach the question of the
construction of section 211 of the Economic Stabilization Act... .”
App. A (7a) (emphasis added).

All of these statements reflect the court's error. What it should
have been reviewing was not **Mobil’s explanations,”’ but the dis-
trict court's findings of fact and conclusion, reached after a lengthy

9

The court of appeals’ failure to treat the grant of preliminary
relief as being within the district court’s discretion and to
defer to — much tess to mention — the district court’s opin-
ion is egregious error that warrants correction by this Court.

A motion for preliminary injunction, coming at an inter-
locutory stage of litigation, must be decided on the basis of an
incomplete record. At such an interlocutory stage, the district
court's day-to-day familiarity with the case is of unique value.°
That is particularly so where, as here, the district court's deci-
sion, even though preliminary, is based upon substantial vol.
umes of evidence, here there were both live testimony and
hundreds of pages of exhibits (by volume, most of the docu-
mentary evidence being DOE’s own material offered by
Mobil). Even on the issue of irreparable injury — the only is-
sue thought to be relevant by the court of appeals — the dis-
trict court’s opinion contains an extended factual and legal
discussion. App. B (75a-80a). Not even this section of the dis-
trict court’s opinion was referred to by the court of appeals.

Thus, this case represents a serious departure from the
long-established and frequently repeated standard of review
set by this Court. This Court should correct that error.

discussion of the evidence and the law, that Mobil had an over-
whelming chance of success on the merits. App. B (6Sa-7Sa).
Similarly, it was not appropriate for the court of appeals to “‘find”
that Mobil had failed to show irreparable injury, rather its task was to
assess whether the district court's findings and conclusions on that
question (App. B (75a-80a)) were an abuse of discretion.

* Even in the short time the case was before him, Judge Munson
had entertained, heard argument, and ruled upon a large number of
matters — motions by the government to dismiss and to quash a sub-
poena for documents, a motion for a temporary restraining order, the
separate question of the court's jurisdiction to grant relief (not ai is-
sue here), and supplemental briefing on the significance of a massive
DOE study, which Mobil argued, and the court found, supported
Mobil’s other evidence. Aside from his 80-page opinion granting a
preliminary injunction, issued on June 3, 1981, the district court also
issued a ten-page decision on May 15 partially granting and partially
denying the government's motion to quash a subpoena and an opin-
ion On its grant of a temporary restraining order on April 29.

10

There is a second reason for this Court to act on this ques-
tion. Not only did the court of appeals disregard its own lim-
ited review function, but it did so in circumstances that will
particularly discourage district courts from pursuing their ap-
propriate functions. Here the district court undertook to pre-
pare in a matter of 22 days (the time between hearing and
decision on preliminary relief) a massive and comprehensive
opinion assessing the legal background and the evidence and
setting out its findings and conclusions on every issue raised
by the parties. This labor musi have been performed at great
inconvenience to the district court, but it no doubt repre-
sented that court's desire to fulfill its obligation to explain its
decision in an important case. By ignoring this exemplary
effort the court of appeals effectively told the district court that
it had been wasting its time in expressing its views. That
message creates an unfortunate precedent that this Court
should erase.

This Court has granted certiorari and received briefs on the
merits, but not yet heard oral argument, on a similar issue. In
United Steelworkers v. Swint, No. 80-1193, 49 U.S.L.W. 3788
(April 20, 1981), the Court agreed to consider whether the
courts of appeals are always bound by the clearly erroneous
standard of Rule 52(a), Fed. R. Civ. P., in reviewing a district
court's factfindings. The Fifth Circuit had there held that that
standard does not apply where findings are made under an.
erroneous view of the law. In the present case the court of ap-
peals has effectively held that there are circumstances, not
defined, in which a court of appeals may dispense with the
abuse-of-discretion standard, which covers both matters of
fact and legal issues,’ that normally applies on review of a dis-
trict court’s disposition of a motion for preliminary injunction.
We submit that the issues are related and are of equal impor-
tance, and the Court should consider and dispose of the two
cases together.

’ E.g., Texas Traction Co. v. Barron G. Collier, Inc., 195 F. 65, 66
(Sth Cir. 1912); Rahley v. Columbia Phonograph Co., 122 F. 623,
625 (4th Cir. 1903); both cited by this Court with approval in Mec-
cano, Lid. v. Wanamaker, 253 U.S. at 141.

Il. The Decision Below Conflicts With Decisions Of Other
Circuits In Ruling That An Applicant Must Make A
“Clear Showing” Of irreparable Harm In Order To Ob-
tain A Preliminary Injunction And That The Applicant's
Likelihood Of Success On The Merits Is Irrelevant.

The court of appeals’ decision reversing the district court's
grant of a preliminary injunction is in direct conflict with the
decisions of at least three and, more likely, five other courts of
appeals. lt furthermore enlarges the disagreement and confu-
sion already existing among the courts of appeals as to the
proper standard to apply in determining whether a preliminary
injunction should issue. This Court should rule upun this sig-
nificant issue.

The court of appeals held that the preliminary injunction
was wrongly granted solely because *‘Mobil has not shown
that issuance of the [entitlements] notice will place it in a posi-
tion which precludes ultimate recovery. ...° App. A (4a).
The court held that it was ‘“‘unnecessary”’ for it to consider
Mobil’s likelihood of success on the merits because “‘this
court finds that Mobil has failed to make a clear showing that
it will suffer irreparable harm if an injunction does not issue.”
Id. Specifically, the court of appeals relied on Mobil’s opportu-
nity to try again to convince the Department of Energy to
change its position and to provide an administrative means for
Mobil to obtain relief. The court reached this conclusion
despite the Department of Energy’s repeated statements that
it intends to terminate the Entitlements Program without ac-
tion on, or further investigation of, its mismanagement of the
Entitlements Program, as soon as it is no longer enjoined
from doing so. The court of appeals did not disturb or even
address the finding by the district court that Mobil would be
without a remedy for wrongful payments if the Department of
Energy refused to modify its position.

The rule so expressed is in conflict with the rules estab-
lished by at least the Second, Ninth, and District of Columbia
Circuits. While those circuits do not entirely agree among
themselves, they do agree that it is not necessary for a party

12

that irreparable injury will inevitably occur in the absence of
interlocutory relief. Rather, in those courts the movant need
show only a “‘possibility’’ of irreparable injury, and that
possibility is then one factor to be weighed with others, most
particularly the likelihood of ultimate success on the merits
and the effect of grant or denial of relief on other persons.
Charlie's Girls, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 483 F.2d 953, 954 (2d Cir.
1973) (per curiam), Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Comm'n v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 843 (D.C. Cir.
1977). Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National
Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1980). The
Ninth Circuit is quite explicit about the balancing effect (id. at
1201):
In this circuit the moving party may meet its burden by
demonstrating either (1) a combination of probable suc-
cess on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury
or (2) that serious questions are raised and the balance of
hardships tips sharply in its favor. [Citation omitted.]
These are no’ separate tests but the outer reaches ‘‘of a
single continuum.” [Citation omitted.]

The test in two other circuits, the Seventh and Tenth, is
more rigid, but still appears to conflict with the holding in the
present case. The Tenth Circuit has held that a movant must
demonstrate that there is a ‘‘prob. ole danger” of irreparable
injury, apparently without any balancing. Lundgrin v. Claytor,
619 F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir. 1980). The Seventh Circuit requires
a “*balanc[ing of] the probability of ultimate success at the fi-
nal hearing with the consequences of immediate irreparable
injury possibly stemming from denial of the injunction.”
Citizens for a Better Environment v. City of Park Ridge, 567 F.2d
689, 690-91 (7th Cir. 1975) (Emphasis added).

In contrast, the Third, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits, most
similarly to the court of appeals in the present case, impose an
absolute requirement that the movant establish that it ‘‘will
suffer” irreparable injury if preliminary relief is denied. Conti-
nental Group, Inc. v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., 614 F.2d 351,
359 (3d Cir. 1980) (*This Court has heid that more than a
risk of irreparable harm must be demonstrated. The requisite

13

for injunctive relief has been characterized as a ‘clear showing
of immediate irreparable injury’. ...°); Foley v. Alabama
State Bar, 648 F.2d 355, 358 (Sth Cir. 1981); Gilley v. United
States, 649 F.2d 449, 454 (6th Cir. 1981).

Thus, there is very substantial conflict and confusion
among the courts of appeals as to the proper standard to ap-
ply.* One author has referred to the preliminary injunction
standards employed by the federal courts as a ‘dizzying diver-
sity of formulations, unaccompanied by any explanation for
choosing one instead of another... ..’ Leubsdorf, The Stand-
ard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 525, 526
(1978). While this Court has not to our knowledge ruled
directly on the issue, it has stated its approval of a standard
clearly at variance with that used by the court of appeals here.
In Brown v. Chote, 411 U.S. at 456, this Court said in part
(emphasis added):

The issuance of the requested preliminary injunction was
the only action taken by the District Court. In determin-
ing whether such relief was required, that court properly
addressed itself to two relevant factors: first, the ap-
pellee’s possibilities of success on the merits; and second,
the possibility that irreparable injury would have resulted,
absent interlocutory relief.

In addition to the fact that it extended the conflict among
the courts of appeals, the decision in the present case further
merits review because it is incorrect and exacts an unreasona-
bly stringent standard for preliminary relief.

* The Eighth Circuit, for example, recently was required to con-
_ sider the issue en banc in order to clarify the standard to be applied by
the district courts of that circuit in Dataphase Systems, Inc. v. C L
Systems, Inc., 640 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc). That court
noted, **[wJe apprehend that in recent years some misunderstanding
of that standard has developed. We recognize that language in some
of our recent opinions may have contributed to uncertainty as to the
appropriate test or tests.”’ /d. at 112. See also Blackwelder Furn. Co.
of Statesville, Inc. v. Seilig Manufacturing Co., 550 F.2d 189 (4th
Cir. 1977) (reversing a district court’s denial of a preliminary injunc-
tion because the lower court mistakenly applied an appellate court
standard not a trial court standard. /d. at 193-94).

14

It is the essence of preliminary relief that it is sought early in
litigation, usually to preserve the status quo, when there is
need for rapid decision and the parties’ factual and legal pre-
sentations are incomplete. For that reason, a movant is not re-
quired to prove his case in full at a preliminary injunction
hearing. University of Texas v. Camenisch, 101 S. Ct. 1830,
1833 (1981). It is universally recognized and each of the court
of appeals’ decisions cited above (at 172-13) states that a
movant for preliminary relief need show only a likcithood of
success on the merits.

It is utterly inconsistent with this rationale to require, as did
the court of appeals here, a movant to show in every case that
in no conceivable circumstances would he not suffer irrepara-
ble injury if relief is denied.” At least two courts have specifi-
cally recognized that any showing — including irreparability of
injury — required for a preliminary injunction cannot be

*There would appear to be two possible explanations why some
courts might have required a clear showing of irreparable injury
First, as a practical matter in many cases there is no question of the
irreparability of the harm that will be suffered if relief is denied.
Some courts may have become accustomed to the ease with which a
significant number of parties have been able to make the showing. In
many cases, however, the irreparability of injury may not be clear at
the preliminary injunction stage. As we have urged, it is illogical in
such cases to require the movant to show irreparable injury to a cer-
tainty at an early stage.

Second, there appears to be at least some confusion arising from
the fact that irreparable injury — or, more correctly put, an injury
without an adequate remedy at law — was a jurisdictional prere-
quisite of equity relief. See Laycock, Book Review, “‘Injunctions and
the Irreparable Injury Rule,’ 57 Tex. L. Rev. 1065, 1070-71 (1979).
But that should not be a problem with invocation of preliminary
equitable relief. In any event, the court of appeals has not suggested
here that Mobil could obtain any reliel at law; all the remedies sug-
gested as not impossible by the court of appeals are equitable and ad-
ministrative. The sole importance of a showing of the likelihood of
irreparable injury in the present case is the weighing of equitable fac-
tors to determine whether in the district court's proper exercise of
discretion preliminary relief was warranted.

15

absolute because of the interlocutory stage at which the ques-
tion must be decided. Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch
Co., 206 F.2d 738, 742-43 (2d Cir. 1953) (Frank, J.). Perry v.
Perry, 190 F.2d 601, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (Bazelon, J.).

This case shows how the lack of a consistent standard
among the courts of appeals permits individual courts to pick
one of the existing formulations and to pursue it to an illogical
conclusion. Here the district court held, and the court of ap-
peals did not disagree, that if the Department of Energy were
to end the Entithements Program as it now plans by simply
issuing the final lists as soon as it is free to, Mobil will have no
mechanism to invoke in order to seek a remedy. Nor did the
court of appeals disagree with the district court’s conclusion
that the DOE has failed to act over the four years that it has
known of the distortion of the program by “disappearing”
price-controlled crude oil, and that it is unlikely to act. Indeed,
the court of appeals joined in the criticism of DOE for its inac-
tion. App. A (6a-7a). Instead, the court of appeals held that
Mobil had not shown irreparable injury because the DOE
might act to create a mechanism by which relief could be
sought. App. A (4a). Thus, the reversal of the district court's
grant of a preliminary injunction was based on a holding not
that Mobil had a route to pursue to obtain relief, but rather
that the DOE might give it one. This holding, we submit, is far
more severe than those of other courts, because the future
availability of any of these avenues is not known and cannot
be known now, and at this preliminary stage of the litigation it
is decidedly unfair to deny Mobil relief pendente lite on the
possibility that one may become available.

That is particularly so because Mobil has made a strong
showing on the other factors that should be weighed with its
showing on irrevarable injury. The district court concluded
(without question from the court of appeals) that Mobil has a
strong likelihood «of success on the merits. The district court
held that DOE hau mismanaged the Entitlements Program
and refused to correct that mismanagement, that a number of
refiners had been able to take advantage of the flaws in the

16

program by manipulating their inventories to avoid reporting
their receipts of price-controlled crude oil, that these acts had
already cost thos. refiners who had not manipulated invento-
ries $5.6 billion. Both the district court and the court of ap-
peals criticized the DOE in unusually strong terms for its inac-
tion in the face of a serious problem. The district court found
that Mobil has already been wrongly forced to pay $284 mil-
lion into the program and that publication of the final entitle-
ments list, as DOE intends to publish it, would wrongly re-
quire Mobil to pay an additional $50 million. The district court
also held (again without any question from the court of ap-
peals) that preliminary relief would not injure the DOE or
third parties. '”

" The DOE introduced no evidence before the district court on
this or any other point.

In an unusual development, the Tosco Corporation, without even
attempting to appear before the district court, asked the court of ap-
peals for a writ of mandamus that would have forbidden the district
court to grant preliminary relief. Tosco submitted an affidavit in sup-
port of that petition. The court of appeals dismissed the petition on
June 9, 1981, although it permitted Tosco to intervene in the appeal.
App. D (89a). It is unclear whether Tosco’s affidavit, which was filed
as part of the mandamus action that was dismissed, is in the record of
this case, but in any event it should not be considered since it was not
submitted to the district court first. In a companion case dismissing a
similar writ simultaneously sought by Tosco, the court of appeals
faulted Tosco for not first appearing and presenting its claims before
the district court, Tosco v. Eubanks, No. 10-35 (TECA August 14,
1981), slip op. at 3, and it would obviously be irregular and wrong to
judge the correctness of the district cos s action on the basis of the
evidence that was intentionally not submitted to it. In any event, the
Tosco affidavit shows no more than temporary loss of money, which
does not amount to irreparable injury. Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S
61 (1974).

We also submit that Tosco should not be permitted to participate
in this Court. The court of appeals seriously erred in permitting
Tosco to intervene, since us the court of appeals itself later held in
Tosco v. Eubanks, Tosco had no excuse for its failure to appear in the
district court. Thus, its intervention in the court of appeals was em-
phatically untimely. C/. Rule 24(a) and (b), Fed. R. Civ. P. It will en-
courage evasion of parties’ responsibilities to raise their claims as

17

With respect to irreparable injury, the district court noted
that the monthly entitlements lists are the only means the De-
partment of Energy had to correct errors made in its prior ad-
ministration of the program, and that apart from issuance of
such lists, there exists no means to redress such errors. App.
B (78a). The Department of Energy neither pays nor receives
funds under the Entithements Program, rather, it orders
refiners to pay huge sums to other refiners. There is no DOE
regulation that permits, and no precedent for, one refiner to
make any judicial claim against another for over- or underpay-
ment of entitlements obligations. The district court also held
— and the DOE’s attempts to defeat stay of the court of ap-
peals’ mandate underscore — that the DOE will issue the final
list or lists (see note 13, infra) as soon as possible if the
preliminary injunction is lifted. This will permit those refiners
who have manipulated their inventories to increase and con-
solidate the improper advantage they have taken. It will also
leave Mobil without any mechanism of redress to regain its
losses even assuming that Mobil’s claim of injury is sustained.

The three routes suggested by the court of appeals as possi-
bly providing courses through which Mobil could obtain relief
are, to put it mildly, weak reeds. DOE may unilaterally defeat
all of them.'' The court of appeals held: first, that DOE might

soon as possible if Tosco, which disdained to appear in district court,
is permitted to appear as a party in this Court arguing that the district
court was wrong.

With respect to the effect of the injunction on third parties, there
were also a number of briefs amicus curiae filed by smail refiners in
the court of appeals containing statements of counsel which are of
course non-evidentiary. Moreover, most of the amici supported
Mobil’s position.

'' For this reason the court of appeals’ reliance on Sampson v.
Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974), was entirely misplaced. There this
Court held that adequate relief could be had without an injunction
because the Pay Administration Act, as amended, § U.S.C. § 5596
(1980), provided a means of compensation for temporary loss of em-
ployment. 415 U.S. at 90-91. Here, by contrast, no such route to ob-
tain relief will exist after the final lists, now enjoined, are issued. The
court of appeals has held that Mobil’s injury is not irreparable be-
cause it is possible that DOE will create a remedy.

18

still rule on an emergency petition for rulemaking filed by
Mobil seven months ago, on February 10, and concerning
which DOE has done absolutely nothing, second, that Mobil
might sue to overturn the decision in which the DOE’s Office
of Hearings and Appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction to or-
der relief;'’ and third, that Mobil might administratively “‘ap-
peal’’ the publication of final regulations governing the so-
called **clean-up” entitlements list. App. A (Sa).

None of these possibilities provides any assurance that a
mechanism to obtain ultimate recovery would exist to provide
relief shouid Mobil prevail on the merits. It is DOE’s official
position (although Mobil would not agree) that the Office of
Hearings and Appeals lacked jurisdiction over the merits of
Mobil’s claim. The court of appeals offered only the possibility
that Mobil might initiate a judicial challenge of that position,
the court did not comment on Mobil’s chance of success in
overcoming DOE's interpretation of its own internal dele-
gations of decision-making power. In any event, DOE could
formally change those delegations to defeat OHA’s jurisdic-
tion definitively. The first and third of the court’s suggestions
amount to nothing more than the possibility that DOE may
yet change its mind. '' Given the fact that the district court and

'? Since DOE itself appeared and argued before the Office of Hear-
ings and Appeals that OHA lacked jurisdiction, it will not lie in the
government's mouth to suggest that such a suit might be successful.

'* After oral argument in the court of appeals, DOE promulgated in
final form the “‘clean-up™ regulations discussed by the district court
at App. B (78a-79a). Under these regulations, after a so-called clean-
up list that will reflect some corrections to prior reports (which DOE
now Says that it will publish very shortly after the mandate issues),
DOE as an agency would no longer act on entitlements disputes but
would leave them to the courts to settle. DOE then argued by letter
to the court of appeals that these new regulations did provide the av-
enue for relief that Mobil was seeking. Mobil responded by letter (see
App. G (129a-134a)), arguing that the constitutionality of the mech-
anism set up by the new regulations was highly doubtful at best be-
cause it sought to have litigation between a complaining party and
DOE be binding on all refiners regardiess of whether they were or
could have been parties, and also because the regulations assumed

19

the DOE’s own quasi-independent hearing authority, the Of-
fice of Hearings and Appeals, in a passage quoted with ap-
proval by the court of appeals itself, have strongly criticized
DOE for its inaction and its self-fostered ignorance about the
disappearing price-controlled crude oil, the possibility that
DOE will finally do something voluntarily to create a route for
relief must be regarded as remote. Clearly, if the agency does
not change its stated intention to terminate the Entitlements
Program us soon as possible, Mobil will suffer irreparable in-
jury that could not be rectified even if Mobil ultimately pre-
vails on the merits. '*

the existence of (or tried to establish) the right of private federal
court actions between refiners to settle entitlements disputes — a
cause of action for which there is no precedent and which the district
court found (App. B (78a)) did not exist. Mobil also showed that
even if such lawsuits could be maintained, there would be thousands
of such actions over this dispute alone as those refiners that had been
injured sought to find and fasien liability on those refiners that had
unfairly profited by inventory manipulation. There are about 300
refiners in the United States.

The court of appeals did not agree with DOE that this *‘clean-up”
mechanism provides a remedy for Mobil. Rather, the court in a brief
phrase summarized the content of the rule and told Mobil that it
could *‘appeal”* the issuance of the final regulations under 5 U.S.C.
$553. App. A (6a). (The DOE regulation cited in the court’s opin-
ion, 10 C.F.R. §$ 205.160, merely provides that 5 U.S.C. § 553 ap-
plies.) Of course, section 553 does not provide for an appeal in the
commonly understood sense of asking a higher authority to review
the decision of a lower. All it provides, in section 553(e), is the right
to petition an agency to “issue, amend, or repeal a rule.’ Since
Mobil has had a petition for rulemaking seeking the identical result
pending since February 10, it is unlikely in the extreme that the “‘ap-
peal” of the “‘clean-up”’ regulations will bring Mobil anything more
than the DOE inaction that its February 10 petition for rulemaking |
has brought.

'4 In the court of appeals, the government took as its primary posi-
iion that the courts lack the power to require an agency to issue any
change in its regulations that the agency in its discretion refuses to is-

20

None of these aliernatives amount to more than an incho-
ate and bare chance that DOE will change its position and de-
cide to provide a route to obtain relief. There is a high likeli-
hood that DOE will continue to refuse to act and that,
therefore, the injury that Mobil will suffer if the preliminary
injunction is vacated will be in fact irreparable. It is most
likely, morcover, that when weighed under a different, and,
we believe, more appropriate standard, the decision of the dis-
trict court granting preliminary relief would be affirmed.

sue. Brief of Appellants, TECA No. 2-35, filed June 12, 1981, at 9-
16. The government stated in part (id. at 11):

If there kas been manipulation [by some refiners] of the
{Entitlements Preeram] regulations, the loopholes can be closed
only by issuing a regulation, and the authority to write regula-
tions was given solely to the Secretary in §4(a) of the
[Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act]. 15 U.S.C. § 753(a).

The court of appeals apparently accepted (and at least did not contra-
dict) this view. Thus, for all that appears, if the DOE continues to fail
and refuse to modify its regulations to provide an avenue for relief,
Mobil will be left without any remedy at all.

21

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the petition for a writ of certiorari should
be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Akin, Gump, STRAUSS, HAVER & FELD

Of Counsel: By:

CHarces S. LInpBERG R. Bruck MCLEAN
WittiaM C. STREETS Daniet JoserH

Gai F. Scuutz (Counsel of Record)
Mosit O1t CORPORATION Harry R. SILVER
3225 Gallows Road Joseru T. Casey, Jr.
Fairfax, Virginia 22037 Davip A. HOLZwWoRTH

1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Counsel for Petitioner
Mobil Oil Corporation

Dated: September I1, 1981

22

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

| hereby certify that copies of the foregoing Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari to the United Stetes Temporary Emergency
Court of Appeals were served this 11th day of September,
1981, on each of the following by hand:

THe Honor ast Rex Lee

Solicitor Gencral

U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Kennetu L. BACHMAN, Jr., Esquire
Cieary, Gorriies, STEEN & HAMILTON
1250 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Suite 400

Washington, D.C. 20036

Nancy C. CRIsMAN, Esquire

Office of General Counsel

U.S. Department of Energy

1000 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Room 6H-025

Washington, D.C. 20585

Daniel Joseph

4

IN THE —-_
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1981

Moasit O1r CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
We
UNiTED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY,
James B. Epwarps, SECRETARY OF ENERGY,
AND Tosco CORPORATION,
Respondents.

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES TEMPORARY
EMERGENCY COURT OF APPEALS

Of Counsel: R. Bruce MCLEAN
Cuarces S. LinpBerG Daniet Josern
WiittaM C. STREETS (Counsel of Record)
Galt F. Scuutz Harry R. SILVER

Mobil Oil Corporation Josern T. Casey, JR.

3225 Gallows Road Davip A. HoLzZwortH

Fairfax, Virginia 22037 Akin, Gump, Strauss, Haver & Fecp
1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 887-4000
Counsel for Petitioner
Mobil Oil Corporation

PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS PRINTING, INC., WASHINGTON, D.C.

la

APPENDIXA

TEMPORARY EMERGENCY COURT OF APPEALS
oF THE UNITED STATES

No. 2-35

Monit Ou CorPoRATION, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
—against—
UNitrep STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
AND JAMES B. Epwarps, SECRETARY, ’
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of New York

(No. 81 Civ. 340).
Argued: June 17, 1981 Decided: August 7, 1981
Judgment entered: August 14, 1981
APPEARANCES

Daniet Joserpn, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, Wash-
ington, D.C. (R. Bruce McLean, Harry R. Silver, Joseph T.
Casey, Jr. and David A. Holzworth, Charles S. Lindberg,
William C. Streets and Gail F. Schultz, Mobil Oil Corporation,
Fairfax, Virginia, on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellee Mobil
Oil Corporation.

Kenneth L. Bachman, Jr., Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen &
Hamilton, Washington, D.C. with whom Sara D. Schotland,
Eugene M. Goott and Mark N. Duvall, were on the brief for
Intervenor Tosco Corporation.

David W. Caruthers, Of Counsel, on the brief for Amicus
Curiae Crown Central Petroleum Corporation, Baltimore,
Maryland, Richard P. Noland and Robert R. Morrow, Suther-
land, Ashbiil & Brennan, Washington, D.C., on the brief for
Amicus Curiae Texas City Refining, Inc., Karen S. Bedell and
Jamie Replogle, Shank, Irwin, Conant, Williamson & Greve-
lle, Washington, D.C., on the brief for Amicus Curiae Hunt Oil

2a

Company, and Edwin Jason Dryer and “iichael R. Bromwich,
Foley, Lardner, Hollabaugh & Jacobs, Washington, D.C., on
the brief for Amicus Curiae Independent Refiners Association
of America.

Nancy C. CrisMAn, United States Department of Energy,
Washington, D.C. (Thomas H. Kemp, Samuel Soopper, Mar-
cia Sowles and Robert C. Powers, on the brief), for Defend-
ants- Appellants.

Before Metzner, MAxwect and Lacey, Judges.
Metzner, Judge.

The Department of Energy (DOE) appeals from an order of
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
New York (Munson, J.), granting Mobil Oil Corporation
(Mobil) a preliminary injunction enjoining DOE from issuing
any further Entitlements Notices and from requiring Mobil to
comply with any such notices.

The court found that Mobil would suffer irreparable harm if
DOE is permitted to issue their Entitlements Notice covering
the period January 1-28, 1981.

The Entitlements Notices which were enjoined are an inte-
gral part of the Entitlements Program (Program). That Pro-
gram was created to maintain equitable distribution of price-
controlled crude oil throughout the petroleum industry. The
Program was a necessary procedure to cure imbalances re-
sulting from the imposition of price and allocation controls on
petroleum products under the Emergency Petroleum Alloca-
tion Act (EPAA).

For a detailed discussion of the Program, see Cities Service
Co. v. Federal Energy Administration, 529 F.2d 1016 (TECA
1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 947 (1976), and Pasco, Inc. v.
Federal Energy Administration, 525 F.2d 1391 (TECA 1975).

As the extreme energy crisis passed, many aspects of the
price and allocation regulations were put on standby status. Fi-
nally, on January 28, 1981, President Reagan signed an
Exccutive Order directing immedizte decontrol of all remain-

3a

ing crude oil and refined petroleum products, and revoking all
regulations governing those products. Executive Order 12287,
46 Fed. Reg. 9909 (1/30/81).

However, that order specifically provided that the Secretary
of Energy “‘may . . . adopt such regulations and take such ac-
tions as he deems necessary to implement this Order, includ-
ing the promulgation of entitlements notices for periods prior
to this Order and the establishment of a mechanism for en-
titlements adjustments for periods prior to this Order.”

As of the date of the Executive Order, entitlements notices
for December 1980 and January 1-28, 1980, had not yet been
issued.

Mobil offers data gleaned from reports furnished to DOE
(10 C.F.R. § 211.66) to argue that large quantities of price-
controlled crude oil have ‘“‘disappeared”’ from the Entitle-
ments Program due to refiners’ manipulation of these regula-
tions. Mobil asks that DOE be prevented from finalizing the
obligations of the participating refiners under the program
until all price-controlled crude oil is accounted for.

An “entitlement” in essence is a license to refine a barrel of
price-controlled crude oil. Each month each refiner is given a
number of entitlements equal to the National Domestic Crude
Oil Supply Ratio {DOSR) multiplied by the volume of crude
oil runs-to-stills reported by the refiner in that month. 10
C.F.R. §211.67(a)(1). The DOSR is computed, also on a
monthly basis, as the ratio of all refiners’ reported receipts of
price-controlled crude oil to all refiners’ crude oil runs-to-
stilis. 10 C.F.R. § 211.62. If a refiner’s reported receipts of
price-controlled crude oil exceed the number of entitlements
received under the above formula, a sufficient number of en-
titlements must be purchased by the refiner to cover the ex-
cess. If a refiner’s reported receipts of price-controlled crude
are less than the number of entitlements designated to the
refiner by DOE, then that refiner must sell the excess entitle-
ments. 10 C.F.R. § 211.67(b) (ec).

4a

DOE also sets the price of the entitlements to be purchased
and sold. It does not match up buyers with sellers. The agency
merely assigns the obligation to buy or sell entithements and
leaves it to the refiners to comply. Historic trading relation-
ships have arisen between refiners who are traditionally in the
position of buying entitlements and those who must tradi-
tionally sell entitlements.

The notices are published within about two months of the
subject month, and may include adjustments for errors,
exception relief or recertification as determined by DOE.

It is unnecessary to review the merits of Mobil’s explana-
tions of how it sustains the contentions it advances. This court
finds that Mobil has failed to make a clear showing that it will
suffer irreparable harm if an injunction does not issue. Trieb-
wasser & Katz v. American Telephone & Telegraph Company,
535 F.2d 1356, 1359 (2d Cir. 1976).

Mobil has not shown that issuance of the notice will place it
in a position which precludes ultimate recovery, through ju-
dicial or administrative proceedings, of losses allegedly traced
to previous erroneous entitlements notices.

The standard for determining whether a party has shown tr-
reparable injury is founded upon the court's ability to
ultimately grant an effective remedy. The traditional standard
is set forth in Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Association v. Federal
Power Commission, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1921), where
the court said:

**Mere injuries, however substantial, in terms of mon-
cy, time and energy necessarily expended in the absence
of a stay, are not enough. The possibility that adequate
compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at
a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation, weighs
heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.”

Temporary loss of income, recoverable upon successful ter-

mination of the litigation, will not usually constitute irrepara-
ble injury. Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974).

Sa

There are at least three avenues of administrative relief
available to Mobil. On February 10, 1981, Mobil petitioned
DOE’s Economic Regulatory Administration (ERA) to insti-
tute a rulemaking proceeding to amend the entitlements regu-
lations to account for all price-controlled crude oil. ERA has
not yet acted on this petition.

On March 12, 1981, Mobil appealed its obligations under
the Entitlements Notice covering December 1980 to the Of-
fice of Hearings and Appeals (OHA), alleging the same
defects as claimed in the instant litigation, and asking that the
December Notice be remanded to ERA for recalculation. An
interlocutory order issued on June 4, 1981 (46 Fed. Reg.
32661 (June 24, 1981)), proposed that ERA be required to
gather information from each refiner to ascertain how much
price-controlled crude oil has disappeared from the program.
However, on July 8, 1981, subsequent to the argument of the
appeal before this court, OHA determined that it lacked
jurisdiction to hear the appeal because Mobil in effect was
seeking an amendment to the rules. This order of OHA is a fi-
nal order subject to judicial review.

Subsequent to the argument of this appeal, ERA issued a
Final Rule to comply with the suggestion of the Executive Or-
der that a mechanism be established to adjust entitlements
obligations for periods prior to decontrol. 10 C.F.R. § 211.69,
added July 9, 1981, 46 Fed. Reg. 36092, July 13, 1981. The
rule provided for a final *‘clean-up” list, effectively ending the
Entitlements Program, and for a self-executing mechanism
intended to account for judicial and administrative determina-
tions made after the August 15, 1981 reporting date for the fi-
nal list. If Mobil is dissatisfied with this Final Rule, it is free to
file an administrative appeal from this rule making. 10 C.F_R.
§ 205.160(b), 5 U.S.C. § $53.

Thus it is clear at this writing that Mobil has remedies which
will give it an opportunity to have its claims reviewed and
adjudicated. There is no conceivable reason why established
and orderly procedures should be bypassed. Furthermore, the

6a

nature of the claim and the proof are more appropriately con-
sidered in the first instance by the administrative agency.

There is, of course, a time problem in view of the expiration
on September 30, 1981, of the statutory authority for the con-
trol program. 15 U.S.C. § 760g. The court is mindful of the
savings clause in that statute. However, at this point we are
not prepared to discuss the scope of that clause.

The court is aware of prior situations in which the agency
seems to have been slow in discharging its functions. F.z.,
Marathon Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 642 F.2d 436, 439
(TECA 1981). We express the hope that this matter will be
expeditiously disposed of because of the nature of the claims
made by Mobil.

The important nature of the problem raised by Mobil is
attested to by OHA, a division within DOE, with expertise in
this area. In its opinion of July 8, 1981, referred to above, it
made the following observations:

‘**Based upon our review of the entire record in this
proceeding we conclude that the problems and issues pre-
sented by Mobil are matters of great significance to the
Entitlements Program aad should be carefully considered
by the appropriate officials of the Department of Energy
(DOE).”* (p. 1)

**Although we have in essence no jurisdiction to grant
Mobil’s appeal, we do find that Mobil has raised serious
questions concerning ERA’s administration of the En-
titlements Program.” (p. 19)

* al * * al

*... we are particularly disturbed that such a dispute
exists nearly one-half year after decontrol. . . . Although
ERA has attempted to discredit Mobil’s method of quan-
titative analysis of the evidence, the ERA apparenily
lacks knowledge of the degree to which upstream
stockpiling of crude oil and the use of time exchanges in-

Ta

creased towards the end of the program as Mobil alleges.
Moreover, as far as we know, ERA has shown no inclina-
tion to obtain such knowledge.” (pp. 19-20)

**. . . we believe it incumbent upon ERA to attempt to
exercise its broad rulemaking discretion in an informed
and rational manner consistent with the President's Or-
der and the relevant statutory objectives.”’ (p. 20) (Foot-
notes omitted.)

With the finding that Mobil has failed to show irreparable
harm, we need not reach the question of the construction of
Section 211 of the Economic Stabilization Act as to the per-
missible scope of the injuction.

The order is reversed and the motion for a preliminary in-
junction is denied.

9a
APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

81-CV-340

Mosit Oit CorPoRATION,
Plaintiff.
VS.

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND
James B. EDWARDS, SECRETARY,
Defendants.

Appearances For The Plaintiff: Of Counsel:

Bono, ScHoeNneck & KING THomas E. Myers, Esq.
One Lincoln Center
Syracuse, New York 13202
AKIN, Gump, STRAUSS, HAvuER & FeELp R. Bruce McLean, Esa.
1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. Daniet Josepn, Esa.
Washington, D.C. 20036 Harry SILVER, Esq.
WitiiaM C. Streets, Eso. Joseru T. Casey, Eso.
Gai F. Scuuttz, Esa.
Mosit Ow CorPORATION
3225 Gallows Road
Fairfax, Virginia 22037

Appearances For The Defendants: Of Counsel:
Georce H. Lowe PAULA Ryan, Esa.
Unites STATES ATTORNEY Assistant U.S. Attorney

Nor THERN District or New York
100 S. Clinton Street
Syracuse, New York 13260
Tuomas H. Kemp., Esa.
SAMUEL Sooper, Esa.
1000 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20585
Howarp G. Munson, C.J.

10a

Memorandum- Decision

FILED
JUNE 3, 1981

Presently before the Court are two motions — the first has
been made by the plaintiff Mobil Oil Corporation (Mobil) to
enjoin the issuance by the defendants Department of Energy
and Secretary James B. Edwards (hereinafter collectively
referred to as DOE) of the “January entitlements notice.”’ See
10 C.F.R. §211.67() (1980). The second motion has been
made by the defendants to dismiss plaintiffs complaint.
Briefly, the entitlements notice is an essential component of
the DOE’s entitlements program, which is designed to
equalize the access of domestic refiners to price-controlled do-
mestic crude oil. See Pasco, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Admin., 525
F.2d 1391, 1395 (TECA 1975). This is accomplished by re-
quiring cash transfers (entitlements) to be made from those
domestic refiners with a proportionately greater access to
price-controlled crude, to those refiners less fortunately situ-
ated. A corresponding “‘entitlements notice’ is then pub-
lished every month reflecting each refiners’ entitlements obli-
gation under the program.

To function properly, the entitlements program depends in
no small measure on the accurate report of a refiner’s
e-controlled crude oil. The instant suit
Mobil’s claim that there are in fact
porting such “‘receipts’’ by refiners.
sult of this misreporting, it has had
share of entitlements obligations.
Accordingly,. Mobil moved for temporary and preliminary in-
juctive relief to prevent the DOE from issuing its **January
entitlements notice,’ which allegedly would have immediate-
ly required Mobil to shoulder an inequitable share of entitle-
ments obligations. This Court granted Mobil’s request for a
temporary restraining order on April 21, 1981, and enjoined
the DOE “‘from issuing any further entitlements notices and

widespread abuses in
Mobil contends that as

lla

from requiring Mobil to comply with such notices.” The tem-
porary restraining order was to remain in effect for twenty
days. See Memorandum-Decision and Order, dated April 21,
1981, at p. 6.

In the meantime, the DOE moved to dismiss plaintiffs
complaint. The DOE maintains that pursuant to the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction, this Court should defer consideration
of the instant case, until the DOE has had an opportunity to
complete its own investigation of the merits of Mobil’s claims.
The Court is informed by the DOE that it is currently investi-
gating the probiem of misreporting, but has not as yet com-
pleted this investigation. For similar reasons the DOE addi-
tionally argues that plaintiff has failed to exhaust administra-
tive remedies, and that the instant dispute is not ripe for ju-
dicial resolution. Furthermore, the DOE asserts that even
assuming arguendo that plaintiff has satisfied these legal
doctrines, it has neither stated a claim nor demonstrated that
it will suffer irreparable injury, should the DOE issue the
‘January Entitlements notice.”

A hearing on plaintiffs preliminary injunction motion was
held on May 12, 1981 and live testimony was taken on the is-
sues of misreporting in the DOE’s entitlements program, and
the likelihood that plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if the
“January entitlements notice” is released. That same day the
Court also heard the parties’ arguments with regard to the
DOE’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint. To fully under-
stand the merits of both pending motions, a more detailed ex-
amination of the entitlements program is in order.

Constrained by the Arab oil embargo and dwindling domes-
tic production, the supplies of crude oil in the United States
decreased dramatically in 1973. The combined affect of these
factors caused severe increases in the price of oil and related
products. See 39 Fed. Reg. 31650 (August 30, 1974). To
soften the economic hardships associated with reduced sup-
plies and higher prices, the Cost of Living Council created a

means, when certified in accor-
dance with the provisions of § 211.67(a)(S5) of this Part, any of
the following: (a)(1) a liquid produced from domestic oil
shale, (2) ethyl alcohol derived from domestic biomass when
mixed with gasoline, (3) domestically found municipal solid
waste or a solid derivative thereof, or (4) methane derived
from domestic municipal sewage or landfills; or (b), as desig-

100a

nated in orders issued by ERA following review of applica-
tions submitted under Subpart G of Part 205 of this Chapter.
(1) any other fuel derived from domestically found solid-
waste materials; or (2) any other fuel in a liquid form which is
derived from domestic biomass, coal, or tar sands. Designa-
tion as a petroleum substitute may be denied with respect to
any fuel eligible for review under section (b)(1) or (b)(2) of
this definition, if ERA determines that the fuel in question
does not result in a net gain of energy, considering the fuel
consumption involved in its production, or requires the con-
sumption of substantial quantities of a relatively scarce fuel
for its production.

‘**Plant condensate’’ means a natural gas plant product,
mostly pentanes and heavier hydrocarbons, recovered and
separated as a liquid at gas inlet separators or scrubbers in
processing plants or field facilities and which is not suitable for
blending with natural gasoline or refinery gasoline.

**Processing agreement’’ means any agreement pursuant to
which an owner of crude oil agrees to have that crude oil proc-
essed or refined by another person and retains ownership in
some or all of the petroleum products so processed or refined
from the crude oil.

**Refiner’’ means a firm which owns, operates or controls
the operations of one or more refineries.

**Refiner-buyer’’ means any small refiner which is deter-
mined to be eligible for an allocation of crude oil pursuant to
$211.65 of this subpart.

**Refiner-seller’’ means a refiner which is not a small
refiner or independent refiner as defined in this section; pro-
vided, that a refiner which is not a small refiner or an indepen-
dent refiner, and all of the refining capacity of which has been
constructed after January |, 1974, shall not be classified as a
refiner-seller, and provided further, that, for the allocation
period commencing October |, 1977, the refiners considered
to be refiner-sellers for purposes of § 211.65 of this subpart

Ola

shall include only those firms classified as refiner-sellers in the
allocation quarter commencing June |, 1977. Refiner-seller
shall aiso mean the United States Government when SPR
crude oil is allocated pursuant to § 211.65 of this subpart.
except that, unless expressly provided, the provisions of
§ 211.65(e)-(j) shall not apply to the United States Govern-
ment.

‘**Refinery’’ means an industrial plant, regardless of capac-
ity, processing crude oil feedstock and manufacturing refined
petroleum products, residual fuel oil or petrochemicals, and
shall include a petrochemical plant.

**Refining capacity’’ means, for each refinery, the capacity
thereof as certified by the FEA. Any capacity of a refinery
which has ceased to be operated continuously in the normal
course of business shall be deducted from refining capacity.

**Small refiner’’ means a refiner, the sum of the capacity of
the refineries of which (including the capacity of any person
who controls, or is controlled by, or is under common control
with such refiner) does not exceed 175,000 barrels per day.

“Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR)** means the program
for the storage of crude oil and/or petroleum products au-
thorized by Title 1, Part B of the Energy Policy and Conserva-
tion Act (EPCA), 42 U.S.C. section 6231 et seq.

*“SPR crude oil’* means crude oil stored in or acquired for
storage in the SPR, or for the distribution thereof. For the
purposes of this subpart, such crude oil shall be considered as
imported crude oil.

**Upper tier crude oil’’ means, (i) for the period February |
through August 31, 1976, new crude oil as defined in
§$§ 212.72 and 212.75 of this chapter and crude oil produced
and sold from a stripper well lease as defined in § 212.74 of this
chapter, and (ii) effective September 1, 1976, new crude oil as
defined in §§ 212.72 and 212.75 of this chapter, except that
upper tier crude oil included in a refiner’s adjusted crude oil
receipts shall not include condensate recovered at the inlet
side of a gas processing plant.

om a: *

102a

Sec. 211.66 Reporting Requirements.

(a) All matters pertaining to the allocation of crude oil
and the refinery yield control program shall be addressed to
the FEA in accordance with § 205.12, unless otherwise pro-
vided.

(b) A monthly report shall be required from refiners on
forms and instructions issued by the FEO as to crude oil runs
and products produced.

(c) Reserved.

(d) Refiner-buyers' semiannual report. Not later than the
tenth (10th) day of the fifth (Sth) month of each allocation
period (February 10, 1978 for the allocation period commenc-
ing October 1, 1977) each refiner-buyer shall file with the
FEA a report containing the following information as to the
six-month period ending with the last full month prior to
which the report is filed:

(i) The volume of the crude oil runs to stills for each of
its eligible refineries, by month, identifying the volumes of
domestic, imported and allocated crude oils so processed.

(ii) The volume by month of crude oil processed for the
account of other refiners in each such refinery, identifying
such refiners and the volume processed.

(iii) The volume by month of crude oil processed for
the account of non-refiners in each such refinery, identifying
such non-refiners and the volume processed.

(iv) The volume of crude oil by month processed for
the account of that refinery-buyer by other refiners, identify-
ing such other refiners and the volume processed.

(v) Any change in refinery capacity since the previous
report.

(vi) Purchases of allocated crude oil for each eligible
refinery, separately stating the volumes of SPR crude oil pur-
chased from the Government.

103a

(vii) Deliveries of allocated crude oil made by refiner-
sellers to each eligible refinery.

(e) Refiner-sellers’ monthly report. Not later than the
tenth (10th) day of each month, each refiner-seller shall file
with the FEA a report containing the following information
with respect to any crude oil delivered to a refiner-buyer
under § 211.65 in the month prior to the filing of the report:

(i) The volume of crude oil delivered under § 211.65.

(ii) The name of the refiner-buyer for which and the
refinery to which the crude oil was delivered.

(iii) The type of crude oil delivered by name, API gra-
vity, and sulfur content.

(iv) The allocation period for which the crude oil was
sold.

(f) Reserved.

(g) Any refiner whose refinery capacity exceeds
175,000 barrels per day and who does not report as provided
in paragraph (f) of this section will be deemed a refiner-seller.

(h) Monthly report. On or prior to the fifth day of each
month, commencing with the month of August 1978, each
refiner shall file with the ERA a report certifying the following
information as to the second month prior to the month in
which the report is filed:

(1) The estimated volume (to the best of the
knowledge of the certifying officer) of old oil included in the
crude oil receipts of that refiner.

(2) The estimaied volumes (to the best of the
knowledge of the certifying officer) of (i) ANS upper tier
crude oil and (ii) upper tier crude oil, respectively, included in
the crude oil receipts of that refiner.

(3) Any permitted or required adjustments to the esti-
mated volumes of old and upper tier crude oil included in the
crude oil receipts of that refiner.

104a

(4) The volume of crude oil runs to stills of that refiner,
taking into account, and specifying the amount of, the adjust-
ments provided for in § 211.67(d).

(5) The weighted average costs for that refiner (includ-
ing transportation costs to the refinery) of old oil, upper tier
crude oil, ANS crude oil, stripper well crude oil (as defined in
Part 212 of this chapter), incremental tertiary crude oil (as
determined pursuant to § 212.78), tertiary incentive crude oil
(as determined pursuant to § 212.78), SPR crude oil pur-
chased from the Government, other domestic cgude oils the
first sale of which is exempt from the provisions of Part 212 of
this chapter, and imported crude oil included in that refiner’s
crude oil receipts. For refiners required to file transfer pricing
report forms under $212.84 of this chapter, the weighted
average cost of imported crude oil reported under this sub-
paragraph should be derived from the landed costs set forth in
such reports.

(6) The estimated volume (to the best of the
knowledge of the certifying officer) of California lower tier
crude oil included in the crude oil receipts of that refiner, and
the weighted average gravity (calculated as a single figure for
the entire month) of such California lower tier crude oil in-
cluded in such crude oil receipts.

(7) The estimated volume (to the best of the
knowledge of the certifying officer) of California upper tier
crude oil included in the crude oil receipts of that refiner, and
the weighted average gravity (calculated as a single figure for
the entire month) of such California upper tier crude oil in-
cluded in such crude oil receipts.

(8) Such other information as the ERA may request.

(i) Monthly transaction report. On or prior to the tenth
day of each month, commencing with the month of February,
1975, each refiner and eligible firm that was required to pur-
chase or sell entitlements for the third month prior to the
month in which the report is filed shall file with the FEA a re-

105a

port certifying its purchases or sales of entitlements for that
prior month.

(j) Monthly report by eligible firms. On or prior to the fifth
day of each month, commencing with the month of April
1976, each eligible firm that has imported an eligible product
in the second month preceding that month shall file with the
ERA a report certifying the following:

(1) The identity, volumes and ports of origin and entry
of any eligible products imported by the eligible firm in that
preceding month.

(2) That the eligible product was imported for sale or
use in the eligible market.

(3) Such other information as the ERA may request.

$211.67 Allocation of Domestic Crude Oil.

(a) /ssuance of entitlements. (1) For each month, com-
mencing with the month of June 1978, each refiner shall be is-
sued a number of entitlements by the ERA equal to the num-
ber of barrels of crude oil included in the total volume of that
refiner’s crude oil runs to stills for that month multiplied by
the national domestic crude oil supply ratio for that month,
subject to the entitlement adjustment for small refiners set
forth in paragraph (e) of this section and the entitlement ad-
justments in subparagraph (a) (4) of this section.

(2) Refiners to which entitlements shall be issued
under this section shall include all refiners classified as refiner-
buyers or refiner-sellers as of December |, 1974 for purposes
of § 211.65. Any refiner that is not so classified, or the refinery
capacity of which is not certified by the FEA for purposes of
§ 211.65, shall apply to the FEA tor certification of its refinery
capacity for purposes of qualifying to receive entitlements
under this section. With respect to the granting of any such
application for certification, the FEA shall consider the factors
set forth in §211.65(b)(v) and (vi).

106a

(3) For each month in the period July 1, 1979 through
September 30, 1981, each eligible firm that has imported an
eligible product in that month shall be issued a number of en-
titlements equivalent to fifty percent (50%) of the number of
entitlements that would be received by a refiner (without giv-
ing effect to the provisions of § 211.67(e)) in that month with
respect to inclusion of a number of barrels of crude oil in that
refiner’s crude oil runs to stills equal to a number of barrels of
that eligible product imported by that eligible firm. An eligible
product is imported for purposes of this paragraph (a)(3) in
the month, as specified on Customs Forms 7501 and 7505, as
appropriate, in which importation takes place.

(4) For each month, commencing with the month of
June 1978, the number of entitlements issued under para-
graph (a)(1) of this section to each refiner shall be increased
by: (i) the number of barrels of California lower tier crude oil
included in its adjusted crude oil receipts in that month mullti-
plied by a fraction, the numerator of which is $2.38 plus or
minus $.09 for each degree API gravity (or fraction thereof)
by which the weighted average gravity of all California lower
tier crude oil included in that refiner’s adjusted crude oil
receipts in that month either falls below or exceeds, respec-
tively, 18 degrees API, and the denominator of which is the
entitlement price for that month, and (ii) the number of bar-
rels of California upper tier crude oil included in its adjusted
crude oil receipts in that month multiplied by a fraction, the
numerator of which is $1.45 plus or minus $.09 for each
degree API gravity (or fraction thereof) by which the
weighted average gravity of all California upper tier crude oil
included in that refiner’s adjusted crude oil receipts in that
month either falls below or exceeds, respectively, 18 degrees
API, and the denominator of which is the entitlement price
for that month, provided that the dollar value of additional en-
titlements issued under this subparagraph (4) shall not exceed
the dollar value of the obligation (as calculated under para-
graph (b) of this section) for the crude oil with respect to
which such additional entithements are issued. The refiner

107a

shall calculate and report the weighted average gravity of Cali-
fornia lower tier crude oil and California upper tier crude oi!
separately, and in calculating such weighted average gravilies
shall (A) determine the gravity of such crude oil for each
receipt of such crude oil in that month on the basis of the gra-
vity of such crude oil at the time it becomes a receipt, and (B)
determine a single monthly weighted average gravity for such
crude oil by weight averaging (on a volumetric basis) all of
such individual receipts in that month.

(5)(i) For each month, commencing with the month of
June 1979, entitlements shall be issued with respect to a pe-
troleum substitute as follows:

(A) In the case of a shale oil used as a feedstock or fuel
in a domestic refinery, the refiner shall be issued, upon certifi-
cation to ERA that the shale oil has been used as a feedstock
or fuel in a domestic refinery, that number of entitlements
that would be received by the refiner if each barrel of the shale
oil were a barrel of crude oil;

(B) In the case of a shale oil used or sold for use domes-
tically as fuel other than in a refinery, the producer of the
shale oil shall be issued, upon certification to ERA that the
shale oil has been used or sold for use domestically as fuel
other than in a refinery, that number of entitlements that
would be received by a refiner if each barrel of the shale oil
were a barrel of crude oil.

(C) In the case of ethyl alcohol derived from domestic
biomass and mixed with gasoline, the producer of the ethy!
alcohol shall be issued that number of entitlements that would
be received by a refiner if a barrel of ethyl alcohol were equa!
to 0.6189 barrels of crude oil; provided, that, entitlements will
be issuable to a producer of ethyl alcohol only upon written
certification by the producer to ERA that (1) the producer has
actually mixed the ethyl alcohol with gasoline and used the re-
sulting mixture domestically as fuel or sold the mixture for
domestic use as fuel; or (2), in any case where the producer
sells the ethyl alcohol prior to mixing with gasoline, the pro-

108a

ducer has received written certification from a subsequent
purchaser that such person (i) has been the first person to ac-
tually mix the ethyl alcohol with gasoline, (ii) has used the re-
sulting mixture domestically as fuel or sold the mixture for
domestic use as fuel; (iii) has based certification as to such use
or sale upon documentation, and (iv) will maintain such
documentation in a manner so as to be available for inspection
at any time by the ERA within five years.

(D) In the case of municipal solid waste, the person
who first processes the municipal solid waste to produce a
solid fuel shall be issued that number of entitlements that
would be received by a refiner if each ton of municipal solid
waste processed were equal to |.40 barrels of crude oil; pro-
vided, that, entitlements will be issuable to the processor of the
municipal solid waste only upon written certification by the
processor to ERA that the processor has (1) actually used the
solid waste or solid derivative thereof domestically to produce
useful energy and that the energy thus produced has actually
been used as fuel; or (2) sold the solid waste or solid deriva-
tive thereof or useful energy produced from either the solid
waste or its derivative for domestic use as fuel.

(E) In the case of methane derived from municipal
sewage or domestic landfills, the collector of the methane
shall be issued, upon certification to ERA that the methane
has been used or sold for use domestically as fuel, that num-
ber of entitlements that would be received by a refiner if each
unit of methane having a gross heating value of 5.7 million
BTU’s were a barrel of crude oil.

(F) In the case of solid waste or a solid or gaseous deriv-
ative thereof which has been designated as a petroleum sub-
stitute by ERA in an order issued pursuant to § 205.95 of Part
205 of this Chapter, that person designated by ERA as eligible
to participate in the entitlements program with respect to such
petroleum substitute shall be issued that number of entitle-
ments that would be received by a refiner if the unit of
measurement established by ERA for that petroleum sub-
Stitute were a barrel of crude oil.

109a

(G) In the case of a liquid petroleum substitute which
has been designated as a petroleum substitute by FRA in an
order issued pursuant to § 205.95 of Part 205 of this Chapter
and which has a gross heating value of 5.7 million or more
BTU’s per barrel, that person designated by ERA as eligible to
participate in the entitlements program with respect to the pe-
troleum substitute shall be issued that number of entitle-
ments that would be received by a refiner if a barrel of the pe-
troleum substitute were a barre! of crude oil.

(H) In the case of a liquid petroleum substitute which
has been designated as a petroleum substitute by ERA in an
order issued pursuant to § 205.95 of Part 205 of this Chapter
and which has a gross heating value of less than 5.7 million
BTU’s per barrel, that person designated by ERA as eligible to
participate in the entitlements program with respect to the pe-
troleum substitute shall be issued that number of entitle-
ments that would be received by a refiner if a barrel of the pe-
troleum substitute were equal to a fraction of a barrel of crude
oil, the numerator of which would be the gross heating value
in BTU’s per barrel of the petroleum substitute, and the
denominator of which would be 5.7 million BTU’s. An order
issued by ERA to designate a petroleum substitute shall also
designate the firm to which entitlements will be issued and the
manner in which the use of the petroleum substitute by that

firm shall result in entitlement issuances.

(ii) Each firm shall in its initial report to ERA for pur-
poses of receiving entitlements pursuant to the provisions of
subparagraph (a) (5) (i) of this section submit written certifica-
tion that all local, state, or federal permits or licenses required
with respect to the production, distribution or any other use of
the petroleum substitute have been obtained and provide cop-
ies of such permits and licenses and, as required by ERA, any
information submitted to a governmental body for the pur-
pose of obtaining any applicable permit or license. Each such
firm shall in its initial report and each month thereafter sub-
mit any information required by ERA to be submitted by such
firm on forms adopted by ERA for purposes of determining

110a

the entitlements issuable to such firm. A firm shall provide
written certification in any submission that the information
set forth therein is accurate and based upon documentation,
and, further, that such firm will maintain such records in a
manner so as to be available for inspection at any time by the
ERA within five years. Records required to be kept under this
subparagraph shall be made available for inspection at any
time upon the request of a representative of ERA.

(6)(i) For each month in the period May 1, 1979 through
October 31, 1979, each firm that imports “‘distillate fuel oil,
less No. 4°" and ‘*‘kerosene”’ as those terms are defined in the
instructions to ERA Form ERA-60, that is the importer of
record under a license issued pursuant to Part 213 of this
chapter, and that owns the product at the time of importation
thereof pursuant to that license shall be issued a number of
entitlements equal to the number of barrels of distillate fuel
oil, less No. 4, and kerosene imported in that month by that
firm multiplied by a fraction, the numerator of which is $5,
and the denominator of which is the entitlement price for that
month.

(ii) For purposes of Paragraph (a)(6), the time of
importation shall be the earliest of the following dates as
specified on the Customs Form 7501 or 7505: (A) the
‘**release date’; (B) the “‘entry date’; (C) the ‘“‘validation
date’’; (D) the ““‘PAID’ stamp date’; (E) the “‘date of
importation’’; or (F) the ‘‘withdrawal date.”

(7)(4i) For each month commencing with the month of
August 1980, the United States Government shall be issued
entitlements for crude oil purchased for, delivered to, and ac-
cepted for delivery to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve in the
following month. The number of entitlements issued shall be
calculated in accordance with the provisions of subparagraphs
(iii) through (vi) of this paragraph (a)(7).

(ii) In any case where the United States Government
acquires from a refiner or other firm crude oil for storage in
the Strategic Petroleum Reserve pursuant to an exchange or

Ihla

matching purchase and sale transaction, no domestic crude oil
shall be deemed to have been transferred by that refiner or
other firm in that exchange or transaction and such volume of
domestic crude oil deemed to have been retained shall be in-
cluded in a refiner’s crude oil receipts in the month in which
such domestic crude oil is delivered to and accepted for de-
livery to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, and the United
States Government shall be issued entitlements for the
month prior to the month in which such domestic crude oil is
delivered to and accepted for delivery to the Strategic Petro-
leum Reserve. The number of entitlements issued shall be
calculated in accordance with the provisions of subparagraphs
(iii) through (vi) of this paragraph (a)(7) on the basis of the
volume of crude oil given up by the Government in any such
exchange or transaction.

Notwithstanding anything to the contrary to 10 CFR Part
212, in any matching purchase and sale transaction subject to
this subparagraph, the United States Government may pay
and the seller may receive any price for the crude oil pur-
chased by the United States Government for the Strategic Pe-
troleum Reserve.

(iii) One entitlement shall be issued for each barrel of
imported crude oil and each barrel of domestic crude oil the
first sale of which is not subject to the ceiling price limitations
of Subpart C of Part 212 of this chapter.

(iv) A fraction of an entitlement shall be issued for each
barrel of upper tier crude oil other than ANS upper tier crude
oil, the numerator of which is the difference between the re-
ported weighted average cost per barrel to refiners of upper
tier crude oil other than ANS upper tier crude and the re-
ported weighted average cost per barrel to refiners of lower
tier crude oil, and the denominator of which is the entitlement
price.

(v) A fraction of an entitlement shall be issued for each
barrel of ANS upper tier crude oil, the numerator of which is
the difference between the reported weighted average cost per

112a

barrel to refiners of lower tier crude oil, and the demoninator
of which is the entitlement price.

(vi) The calculations in paragraphs (a)(7)(iv) and
(a)(7)(v) of this section shall be based on the entitlement
price fixed for, and the weighted average costs reported for,
the month prior to the month in which the crude oil is de-
livered to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve.

(b) Required purchase of entitlements by refiners. (1) For
each month, commencing with the month of February 1976,
each refiner that has been issued fewer entitlements for that
month than the number of barrels of deemed old oil (as calcu-
lated under paragraph (b)(2) of this section) included in its
adjusted crude oil receipts shall purchase a number of entitle-
ments effective for that month equal to the difference be-
tween the number of barrels of deemed old oil (as so calcu-
lated) included in that refiner’s adjusted crude oil receipts for
that month and the number of entitlements issued to and
retained by that refiner. Entithkement purchases required under
this paragraph (b) with respect to a particular month shall be
effected by the close of the second month following that
month.

(2) Tocalculate the number of barrels of deemed old oil
included in a refiner’s adjusted crude oil receipts for purposes
of the definition of national domestic crude oil supply ration in
§ 211.62 of this subpart, paragraph (b)(1) of this section, and
paragraph (c) of this section shall be calculated as follows: (i)
Each barrel of old oil shall be equal to one barrel of deemed
old oil, (ii) Each barrel of upper tier crude oil (except ANS
upper tier crude oil) shall constitute that fraction of a barrel of
deemed old oil, the numerator of which is equal to the re-
ported weighted average cost per barrel to refiners of
imported crude oil, stripper well crude oil (as defined in Part
212 of this chapter), incremental tertiary crude oil (as deter-
mined pursuant to § 212.78), tertiary incertive crude oil (as
determined pursuant to § 212.78), heavy crude oil (as deter-
mined pursuant to § 212.59), newly discovered crude oil (as

Ii3a

determined pursuant to § 212.79), market level new crude oil
(as determined pursuant to § 212.74), and other domestic
crude oils the first sale of which is exempt from the provisions
of Part 212 of this chapter for that month, less such weighted
average cost per barrel to refiners of upper tier crude oil
(except ANS upper tier crude oil), and the denominator of
which is the entitlement price for that month, (iii) Each barrel
of ANS upper tier crude oil shall constitute that fraction of a
barrel of deemed old oil the numerator of which is equal to the
reported weighted average cost per barrel to refiners of
imported crude oil, stripper well crude oil (as defined in Part
212 of this chapter), incremental tertiary crude oil (as deter-
mined pursuant to § 212.78), tertiary incentive crude oil (as
determined pursuant to § 212.78), heavy crude oil (as deter-
mined pursuant to § 212.59), newly discovered crude oil (as
determined pursuant to § 212.79), market level new crude oil
(as determined pursuant to § 212.74), and other domestic
cryde oils the first sale of which is exempt from the provisions
of Part 212 of this chapter for that month, less such weighted
average cost per barrel to refiners of ANS upper tier crude oil,
and the denominator of which is the entitlement price for that
month.

(c) Required sale of excess entitlements. For each month,
commencing with the month of February 1976, each refiner
that has been issued a greater number of entitlements for that
month than the number of barrels of deemed old oil (as calcu-
lated under paragraph (b)(2) of this section) included in its
adjusted crude oil receipts shall sell such excess entitlements,
and the United States Government and any eligible firm
(other than a refiner) that has been issued entitlements shall
sell such entitlements.

(d) Adjustmenis to volume of crude oil runs to stills. 1) A
refiner’s volume of crude oil runs to stills shall (i) include (A)
the volume of crude oil processed by another refiner for that
refiner pursuant to a processing agreement and (B) the vol-
ume of crude oil processed by that refiner for a person other
than a refiner pursuant to a processing agreement, and (ii) ex-

ll4a

clude the volume of crude oil processed by that refiner for an-
other refiner pursuant to a processing agreement.

(2) The volume of a refiner’s crude oil runs to stills in a
particular month for purposes of the calculations in paragraph
(a) (1) of this section and the calculations for the national do-
mestic crude oil supply ratio shall be reduced by that refiner’s
volume of export sales under § 212.53 of Part 212 of this
chapter in that month of refined petroleum products (includ-
ing aviation fuels as defined in § 211.142 of this part, but
excluding refined lubricating oils) and residual fuel oil, includ-
ing sales to a domestic purchaser which certifies the product is
for export: provided. however, that the volume of a refiner’s
crude oil runs to stills for a month shall not be reduced by that
refiner’s volume of export sales of Bunker C and Navy Special
fuel oils and No. 4 diesel, which are sold for use as a marine
fuel on a voyage departing from a United States port.

(3) The volume of refiner’s crude oil runs to stills in a
particular month for purposes of the calculations in paragraph
(a) (1) of this section and the calculations for the national do-
mestic crude oil supply ratio shall include the total number of
barrels of plant condensate and the total number of barrels of
synthetic crude oil made from tar sands which are imported
from Canada and are utilized in that month as inputs to dis-
tillation units by a refiner, measured in accordance with the
Bureau of Mines Form 6-1300-M. Neither plant condensate
nor synthetic — oil made from tar sands which are
imported from Cafiada shall be eligible for inclusion in the
volume of a refiner’s crude oil runs to stills under this para-
graph (3) unless payment has been made in accordance with
Presidential Proclamation No. 3279, as amended, of any
import license fees applicable to crude oil as defined for pur-
poses of this section, which is imported for refining.

(4) For the period July 1, 1979 through September 30,
1981, for purposes of the calculations in paragraph (a)(1) of
this section and the calculations for the national domestic
crude oil supply ratio (but not for purposes of paragraph (e) of

11Sa

this section), the volume of crude oil runs to stills of any do-
mestic refiner atrributable to productions of residual fuel oil
transported in foreign flag tankers for sale (whether directly
for consumption or for resale) or use in the eligible market (as
defined in § 211.62) shall be reduced by ‘ifty percent (50%).
Any export sales of residual fuel oil giving rise to a deduction
under paragraph (d)(2) above shall not be considered as re-
sidual fuel oil production for puirposes of this paragraph
(d)(4).

(5)(i) The volume of a refiner’s crude oil runs to stills
beginning with the month of January, 1981 in a particular
month for purposes of the calculations in subparagraph (1) of
paragraph (a) of this section and the calculations for the
national domestic crude oil supply ratio shall include the num-
ber of barrels of naphthas which are imported into Puerto
Rico (other than imports from the U.S. Virgin Islands and
other than naphthas imported into Puerto Rico which are
acquired pursuant to an exchange or similar matching pur-
chase and sale transaction for naphthas produced by a refinery
located in the United States) and are utilized in that month as
a petrochemical feedstock at a petrochemical plant owned or
operated by that refiner in Puerto Rico, as reduced in subdivi-
sion (ii) of this subparagraph. The number of eligible barrels
of naphthas for a particular month further shall be multiplied
by a fraction the numerator of which is equal to the weighted
average per barrel cost of all naphthas imported into Puerio
Rico for that month as to which entitlement issuances are
sought less the imputed per barrel cost of domestically pro-
duced naphthas for that month, and the denominator of
which is the entitlement value for a barrel of crude oil in-
cluded in the volume of a refiner’s crude oil runs to stills for
that month. For purposes of this subdivision (5)(i), the
imputed per barrel cost of domestically produced naphthas for
a particular month, commencing with January, 1981 shall be
equal to 117 percent of the weighted average per barrel cost of
all the crude oil receipts for all domestic refiners for that
month.

loa

(ii) The volume of naphthas eligible for inclusion in the
volume of a refiner’s crude oil runs to stills in a particular
month under subdivision (i) of this subparagraph shall be
reduced by the volume of export sales (under § 212.53 of Part
212 of this chapter, including sales to a purchaser which cer-
tifies it or an entity affiliated with that purchaser will export
the product so purchased), for that month of products pro-
duced at the petrochemical plant that has processed the
imported naphthas.

(iii) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this sec-
tion, a firm other than a refiner that owns a petrochemical
plant in Puerto Rico shall be eligible to receive entitlements
with respect to naphthas processed at such a plant on the same
basis as is provided for refiners in subdivisions (i) through (ii)
of this subparagraph, except that such a firm shall not be eligi-
ble for any additional entitlements under the provisions of
paragraph (e) of this section. Any such firm shall file reports
under § 211.66 on the same basis as a refiner.

(iv) Any firm that is eligible for entitkement issuances
under this subparagraph shall obtain appropriate certifications
from any other firm to which it sells products produced at a
petrochemical plant located in Puerto Rico. Such certification
shall set forth whether or to what extent the products so pur-
chased will be sold (whether directly by that other firm or in-
directly through any firm affiliated with that other firm) in
transactions that constitute export sales under § 212.53 of Part
212 of this chapter. Any firm purchasing products produced at
a petrochemical plant located in Puerto Rico shall, upon the
request of the owner or operator of that facility, certify to that
owner or operator as to whether or what extent the further
sale of those products by that firm (or any affiliate thereof)
will constitute export sales under § 212.53.

(6) [Reserved]
(7) [Reserved]

(8) Commencing with the month of July 1978, the vol-
ume of a refiner’s crude oil runs to stills in a particular month

17a

for purposes of the calculations in subparagraph (1) of para-
graph (a) of this section and the calculations for the national
domestic crude oil supply ratio shall include the total number
of barrels of the liquid produced from oil shale that is found in
the United States and used as a refining feedstock, blending
feedstock or fuel in a domestic refinery in that month by a
refiner.

(9) Commencing with the month of January 1979, the
volume of crude oil runs to stills of a refiner in a particular
month as to any of its refineries located in the State of Alaska,
for purposes of the calculations in subparagraph (a)(1) of this
section and the calculations for the national domestic crude oil
supply ratio, shall not include the number of barrels of
unfinished oils or partially-refined petroleum products
injected or reinjected by that refinery into the Trans- Alaska
Pipeline System in tha: month.

(e) Small refiner bias. (1) In addition to the number of
entitlements issuable under paragraph (a) of this section, sub-
ject to the limitations set forth in subparagraphs (2), (3) and
(4) below, effective for refiners’ volumes of crude oil runs to
stills for June 1979, each small refiner shall be issued the fol-
lowing number of additional entitlements for each day of a
particular month: (i) For each small refiner with respect to its
refineries with a daily average volume of crude oil runs to
stills of 0 to 10,000 barrels in that month, each such refinery
shall receive a number of entitlements equal to the number of
barrels of such refinery’s daily average volume of crude oil
runs to stills for that month multiplied by a fraction, the nu-
merator of which is $.96, and the denominator of which is the
entitlement price for that month, (ii) for each small refiner
with respect to its refineries with a daily average volume of
icrude oil runs te stills of 10,000 to 30,000 barrels in that
month, each such refinery shail receive a number of entitle-
ments equal to a fraction, the numerator of which is $9,600
plus $.315 for each barrel by which such refinery’s daily aver-
age volume of crude oil runs to stills exceeds 10,000 barrels
for that month, and the denominator of which is the entitle-

118a

ment price for that month, (iii) for each small refiner with re-
spect to its refineries with a daily average volume of crude oil
runs to stills of 30,000 to 50,000 barrels in that month, each
such refinery shall receive a number of entitlements equal to a
fraction, the numerator of which is $15,900 minus $.095 for
each barrel by which such refinery’s daily average volume of
crude oil runs to stills exceeds 30,000 barrels for that month,
and the denominator of which is the entitlement price for that
month, (iv) for each small refiner with respect to its refineries
with a daily average volume of crude oil runs to stills of 50,000
to 100,000 barrels in that month, each such refinery shall re-
ceive a number of entitlements equal to a fraction, the nu-
merator of which is $14,000 minus $.10 for each barrel by
which such refinery’s daily average volume of crude oil runs
to stills exceed 50,000 barrels for that month, and the
denominator of which is the entitlement price for that month,
(v) for each small refiner with respect to its refineries with a
daily average volume of crude oil runs to stills of 100,000 to
175,000 barrels in that month, each such refinery shall receive
a number of entitlements equal to a fraction, the numerator of
which is $9,000 minus $.12 for each barrel by which such
refinery’s daily average volume of crude oil runs to stills ex-
ceeds 100,000 barrels for th «t month, and the denominator of
which is the entitiement price for that month.

(2) Effective for refiners’ volumes of crude oil runs to
stills for June 1977, no entitlements shall be issuable under
paragraph (e)(1) of this section with respect to any volume of
a small refiner’s crude oil runs to stills attributable to a proc-
essing agreement for the account of that small refiner with an-
other refiner.

(3) Each small refiner shall separately identify in its re-
ports filed pursuant to § 211.66(h) of this subpart any volumes
of its crude oil runs to stills not eligible (under the provisions
of paragraph (e)(2) of this section) for small refiner bias en-
titlements.

(4) For purposes of the calculations in subparagraph
(e)(1) above, the daily average volume of a particular small .

119a

refinery’s crude oil runs to stills shall be computed as follows:
The daily average volume of a small refiner’s crude oil runs to
stills (with respect to all of its refineries) shall be multiplied by
a fraction, the numerator of which is the capacity of that par-
ticular small refinery as certified pursuant to subparagraph
(a)(2) of this section, and the denominator of which is the ca-
pacity of that small refiner (with respect to all of its refineries)
as certified pursuant to subparagraph (a)(2) of this section.

(f) Transactions under § 211.65. (1) Effective for sales
for the allocation quarter commencing March |, 1976 under
$211.65 of this subpart, no sale by a refiner-seller under
§ 211.65 of shall be deemed for purposes of this section to in-
clude any volume of domestic crude oil. If a refiner-seller sells
actual volumes of domestic crude oil under § 211.65, the
related volumes of old oil and upper tier crude oil shall be in-
cluded in that refiner-seller’s crude oil receipts in the month
in which the sale is made. For purposes of the adjustments set
forth in paragraph (a)(4) of this section, a refiner-buyer’s
receipts of imported crude oil and Alaska North Slope crtde
oil shall include volumes of crude oil sold under § 211.65 to
that refiner-buyer.

(2) For sales allocation quarters prior to the allocation
quarter commencing March |, 1976, each sale by a refiner-
seller under § 211.65 shall be deemed to include volumes of
old oil (and upper tier crude oil, if any) proportionate to the
volumes thereof included in the deliveries of crude oil to that
refiner-seller that determine the price at which the sale is
made under § 212.94 of Part 212. Any volumes of domestic
crude oil so deemed to be included in any sale under § 212.65
shall be reflected in the crude oil receipts of the refiner-buyer
concerned. As to each sale for any such prior allocation
quarter, each refiner-seller shall certify to the refiner-buyer
the volume of old oil (and upper tier crude oil, if any) in-
cluded in the volume of crude oil sold within twenty-eight
(28) days following the month in which the crude oil is de-
livered to or for the account of the refiner-buyer in accordance
with th provisions of § 212.131 of Part 212.

120a

(3) In determining the weighted average landed cost of
crude oil delivered to a refiner-seller in a month pursuant to
§ 212.94 of Part 212, the cost of any required purchases or rev-
enues from any sales of entitlements by that refiner-seller
shall not be taken into account.

(g) Exchanges of crude oil. (1) Subject to the provisions
of paragraph (a)(3) below, in any exchange of crude oil in
which only quality and location differentials are given effect in
the calculation of the exchange ratio, or in any matching pur-
chase and sale transaction which has the same effect as such
an. exchange, no volumes of domestic crude oil shall be
deemed to have been transferred. Any volumes of domestic
crude oil exchanged away or sold pursuant to any such ex-
change or matching purchase and sale transaction shall be
considered as having been retained by the refiner or other
firm that has so exchanged away or sold such volumes,
regardless of the volume of crude oil received or purchased by
that refiner or other firm in such exchange or transaction.

(2) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (g)(3) below,
volumes of domestic crude oil deemed to be retained by a
refiner under the provisions of paragraph (g)(1) above shall
be (i) included in that refiner’s crude oil receipts at the time
the crude oil acquired pursuant to the related exchange or
purchase and sale transaction constitutes a crude oil receipt
under § 211.62 of this subpart to that refiner, or (ii) certified as
old oil, upper tier crude oil, ANS crude oil, stripper well crude
oil (as defined in Part 212 of this chapter), heavy crude oil, (as
determined pursuant to § 212.59), incremental tertiary crude
oil (as determined pursuant to § 212.78), tertiary incentive
crude oil (as determined pursuant to § 212.78), newly dis-
covered crude oil (as determined pursuant to § 212.78), newly
discovered crude oil (as determined pursuant to § 212.79),
market level new crude oil (as determined pursuant to
$212.74), or any other domestic crude oil the first sale of
which is exempt from Part 212 of this chapter, as the case may
be, under the provisions of § 212.131 of Part 212 when the
crude oil acquired pursuant to the related exchange or pur-
chase and sale transactions is sold to another firm.

I2la

(3) Where a refiner exchanges away or sells volumes of
domestic crude oil in an exchange or matching purchase and
sale transaction of the type described in paragraph (g)(1)
above and receives in exchange or purchases in the trans-
action foreign crude oil that is delivered and processed outside
the United States, that refiner shall include any domestic
crude oil so exchanged away or sold by it in its crude oil
receipts as of the date that domestic crude oil is so exchanged
away or sold.

(4) The provisions of paragraph (g)(1) above shall not
apply to transactions involving domestic crude oil which is ex-
changed away by a firm other than a refiner for foreign crude
oil that is not processed in a refinery located in the United
States. Any firm other than a refiner that has exchanged away
or sold domestic crude oil within the United States pursuant
to an exchange transaction in which other crude oil is also
transferred outside the United States shall comply with the
certification requirements of § 212.131 of Part 212 as to any
volumes of old oil or upper tier crude oil, as the case may be,
so exchanged away or sold. Any domestic crude oil delivered
to a refiner in the United States pursuant to a transaction of
the type described in this paragraph (g)(4) shall be included in
the crude oil receipts of the refiner that receives, directly or
indirectly through further sales or exchanges, the volumes of
domestic crude oil that are the subject of the transaction, as
provided in § 211.62 of this subpart.

(5) For purposes of this paragraph (g), “‘refiner™
means any firm that owns, operates or controls the operations
of one or more refineries, and includes any entity that is a part
of or affiliated with, or that controls or is controlled by
(whether directly or indirectly), a refiner.

(h) Averaging of crude oil receipts. Upon application by a
refiner in accordance with the procedures. established under
Subpart G of Part 205 of this chapter within thirty (30) days
following the close of a month, the FEA may adjust the crude
oil receipts of that refiner for that month to permit the portion

122a

of such crude oil receipts specified by the FEA to be included
in the crude oil receipts of that refiner for one or more subse-
quent months, if the volume of crude oil receipts in that
month is significantly disproportionate to the volume of that
refiner’s crude oil runs to stills for that month due to a shut-
down (by reason of either a mechanical failure or normal
maintenance procedures) resulting in a fifty (SO%) percent or
greater portion of that refiner’s refinery capacity not having
been operable for the duration of that month.

(i) dssuance and transfer of entitlements. (1) The FEA
shall issue entitlements for each month (effective for the
month of February 1976 and subsequent months) pursuant to
a notice issued on the fifteenth day of the second month fol-
lowing that month.

(2) Each notice published by the FEA evidencing the
issuance of entitlements under this section shall specify as to a
particular month the national domestic crude oil supply ratio,
the name of each refiner and other eligible firm to which en-
titlements have been issued, the number of barrels of deemed
old oil included in each refiner’s adjusted crude oil receipts,
the number of entitlements issued to each such refiner or
other firm, the number of entitlements required to be pur-
chased or sold by each such refiner or other firm, and the
price at which entitlements shall be purchased and sold.

(3) No transfer of an entitlement shall be effective if
made to any firm that is not purchasing such entitlement to
fulfill such firm’s obligations under this section.

(4) The price at which entitlements shall be sold and
purchased shall be fixed by the ERA for each month and shall
be the exact differential between the weighted average cost
per barrel to refiners of old oil and such weighted average cost
of imported crude oil, stripper well crude oil (as defined in
Part 212 of this chapter), heavy crude oil (as determined pur-
suant to § 212.59), incremental tertiary crude oil (as deter-
mined pursuant to § 212.78), tertiary incentive crude oil (as
determined pursuant to § 212.78), newly discovered crude oil

123a

(as determined pursuant to § 212.79), market level new crude
oil (as determined pursuant to § 212.74), and other domestic
crude oils the first sale of which is exempt from the provisions
of Part 212 of this chapier, such costs to be equivalent to the
delivered costs to the refinery.

(j) Reporting errors. (1) Refiners and eligible firms shall
correct any errors contained in reports filed pursuant to
$ 211.66 by filing an amended report for the particular month.
Based on any reporting errors so corrected, the FEA in its dis-
cretion may adjust entitlement issuances to the refiner or
eligible firm in one or more months subsequent to the month
in which the amended report is filed with the FEA, by issuing
fewer entitlements that the number otherwise issuable, by re-
quiring the refiner or eligible firm to purchase entitlements in
order to correct for excess entitlements issued in a prior
month or by issuing entitlements over and above the number
otherwise issuable to compensate for too few entitlements
having been issued in such prior month. All entitlement
issuances or purchase requirements under this subparagraph
shall give effect to any differential between the entitlement
price for the month in which any correction is reflected as
compared with the entitlement price for the month as to
which the reporting error was made (except with respect to
corrections to volumes of crude oil runs to stills where a cor-
responding adjustment to crude wil receipts was made as con-
templated by the term ‘‘adjusted crude oil receipts’ in
$211.62) and such other factors as the FEA deems appropri-
ate.

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (j) (1)
of this section, corrections of reporting errors for the months
November 1974 through August 1975 shall be made as fol-
lows. FEA shall recalculate for those months the purchase and
sale obligations (giving effect to any applicable relief under
decisions and orders issued by FEA’s Office of Exceptions and
Appeals and to the provisions of Special Rule No. 3 for Sub-
part C) of all refiners and eligible firms based on inclusion in
each month of each refiner’s and eligible firm's corrected vol-

124a

ume (as reported to the FEA) of crude oil runs to stills, vol-
ume of old oil included in its crude oil receipts (other than ad-
justments effected as contemplated by the term ‘‘adjusted
crude oil receipts” in § 211.62) and eligible product imports.
No entitlement price adjustment as contemplated by para-
graph (j)(1) of this section shall be made in the calculations
under this paragraph (j)(2). FEA shall then aggregate for each
refiner and eligible firm its net purchase or sale amount (in
dollars) for these months (giving effect to the published pur-
chase and sale obligations for these months) and apply these
amounts in substantially equal portions (translated into cur-
rent entitlement values) to that refiner’s or eligible firm's en-
titlement purchase or sale obligations for the months of July
1976 through February 1977.

(3) For purposes of this paragraph, errors required to
be corrected by the filing of amended reports include (i) cleri-
cal errors, and (ii) inaccurate estimates as to the domestic
crude oil pricing composition of a particular volume of crude
oil where the refiner had no basis, in prior experience or
otherwise, on which to make that estimate.

(k) Failure to consummate transactions. The FEA may
direct refiners or eligible firms that have not purchased the re-
quired number of entitlements under this section for a par-
ticular month to purchase such required number of entitle-
ments at a price specified by the FEA from any refiner or cligi-
ble firm that has entitlements for such month available for
sale, The FEA may direct refiners or eligible firms that have
entitlements available for sale to sell such entitlements at a
price specified by the FEA to refiners or eligible firms that
have not purchased their required number of entitlements
under this section.

(1) Certification by non-refiners. Within twenty-eight
(28) days following each month, commencing with the month
of January 1978, each firm other than a refiner that has de-
livered crude oil to a refiner for processing for the account of
such firm pursuant to a processing agreement in that month

125a

shall certify to that refiner the respective volumes of and that
firm's costs for old oil (separately identifying any California
lower tier crude oil), ANS crude oil, stripper well crude oil (as
defined in Part 212 of this chapter), incremental tertiary crude
oil (as determined pursuant to § 212.78), tertiary incentive
crude oil (as determined pursuant to § 212.78), other domes-
tic crude oils the first sale of which is exempt from Part 212 of
this chapter, and imported crude oil contained in the crude oil
so delivered to that refiner.

(m) Adjustments to crude oil and product costs. (1)
Refiners. (i) Entitlements purchased. (A) The cost of entitle-
ments purchased in a particular month pursuant to this sec-
tion by refiners, which shall be calculated exclusive of any
reduction in such costs in a particular month because of en-
titlements issued for the importation of eligible producis, and
exclusive of the cost of entitlements purchased in a particular
month pursuant to adjustments to a refiner’s crude oil runs to
stills under paragraph (d)(4) of this section, shall be added to
the cost of crude oil purchased or landed in that month (which
is the period *‘t’’ (the month of measurement), for purposes
of calculating the increased cost to be applied to product prices
in the following month under the “*A'” factor of the general
formulae of § 212.83(c)(2) of this chapter); provided, that, to
the extent that the obligation of a refiner to purchase entitle-
ments is reduced by volumes of crude oil processed by a
refiner for a firm other than that refiner pursuant to a proc-
essing agreement, and that the monetary value of that
reduced purchase obligation is used to reduce the processing
fee otherwise payable by that firm under the processing agree-
ment, or is otherwise passed on to that firm under the proc-
essing agreement, or is otherwise passed on to that firm such
monetary value may also be added by that refiner to its cost of
crude oi! purchased or landed in that month by the firm to
which the monetary value of the reduced purchase obligation
is passed on pursuant to this paragraph.

(B) The reduction in the cost of entithkements purchased
in a particular month because of entitlements issued for the

126a

importation of eligible products shall be subtracted from the
total cost of the product concerned, purchased or landed in
that month (which is the period “‘t’’ (the month of measure-
ment), for purposes of calculating the increased costs to be ap-
plied to prices of that product under the **B;t"* factor of the ap-
propriate formula for that product of §212.83(c) of this
chapter.)

{C) The cost of entitlements purchased in a particular
month pursuant to the adjustments to a refiner’s crude oil
runs to stills under paragraph (d)(4) of this section shall be a
cost of crude oil purchased or landed in that month which
shall not be applied to product prices pursuant to the **A”’ fac-
tor of the general formulae of § 212.83(c)(2) of this chapter,
but which shall instead be applied only to prices for residual
fuel oil sold in or into the East Coast market.

(ii) Entitlements sold. (A) The sales revenues from en-
titlements sold in a particular month pursuant to this section
by refiners, which shall be calculated exclusive of any reduc-
tion in such sales revenues in a particular month pursuant to
adjustments to a refiner’s crude oil runs to stills under para-
graph (d)(4) of this section, and exclusive of any sales reve-
nues from the sale of entitlements issued for the importation
of eligible products, shall be subtracted from the cost of crude
oil purchased or landed in that month (which is the period **t””
(the month of measurement), for purposes of calculating the
increased costs to be applied to all product prices in the follow-
ing month under the **A”* factor of the general formulae of
§ 212.83(c)(2) of this chapter), provided, that, to the extent
that the sales revenues from entitlements which are issued for
volumes of crude oil processed by a refiner for a firm other
than that refiner pursuant to a processing agreement are used
to reduce the processing fee otherwise payable by that firm
under the processing agreement, or are otherwise passed on
to that firm, such sales revenues shall not be subtracted by
that refiner from its cost of crude oil purchased or landed in
that month, but shall be subtracted from the cost of crude oil
purchased or landed in that month by the firm to which the

127a

entitlement sales revenues are passed on pursuant to this par-
agraph.

(B) The sales revenues from entitlements issued for the
importation of eligible products which are sold in a particular
month shall be subtracted from the total cost of the product
concerned, purchased or landed in that month (which is the
period “‘t’’ (the month of measurement), for purposes of
caiculating the increased costs to be applied to prices of that
product under the **B;t’’factor of the appropriate formula for
that product of § 212.83(a)(2) of this chapter).

(C) The reduction in sales revenues from entitlements
sold in a particular month pursuant to the adjustments to a
refiner’s crude oil runs to stills under paragraph (d)(4) of this
section shall be a cost of crude oil purchased or landed in that
month which shall not be applied to product prices pursuant to
the **A” factor of the general formulae of § 212.83(a)(2) of
this chapter, but shall instead be applied only to prices for re-
sidual fuel oil sold in or into the East Coast market.

(2) Resellers and retailers. The sales revenues from en-
titlements sold pursuant to this section by resellers or retailers
shall be subtracted from the cost of the product in inventory
for which the entitlements were issued, so as to reduce the
weighted average unit cost of that product in inventory com-
puted pursuant to § 212.92 of this chapter.

(3) Sales of eligible products to eligible firms. The total
amount of any reductions in the cost of eligible products to
the seller because of entitlements issued for the importation
of such products, which are required by paragraphs (m)(1)
and (m)(2) of this section, shall be applied exclusively to the
determination of maximum lawful prices charged in sales in
which the purchaser does not receive entitlements for the
importation of an eligible product. Separate price calculations
shall be made for sales of eligible products in which the pur-
chaser receives entitlements for the importation of eligible
products, which shall comply in all respects with the regula-
tions of Subparts E or F of Part 212 of this chapter, except that

128a

the amount of increased product cost used to compute such
prices shall not be reduced because of entitlements issued for
the importation of eligible products.

(4) Timing. The date of purchase or sale of entitlements
for purposes of determining the date on which a cost or a cost
reduction is incurred under § 212.83(c) or § 212.93 of this
chapter shall be the date on which the transaction is reported
to have taxen place on the monthly transaction report filed
with the FEA under paragraph (i) of § 211.66.

129a

APPENDIX G

AKIN, GUMP, STRAUSS, HAUER & FELD
July 12, 1981

Ms. Ruth Jacobson
Clerk
Temporary Emergency Court
of Appeals
United States Courthouse
Room 2400
3rd & Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001

Re: Mobil Oil Corp. vy. DOR, No. 2-35

Dear Ms. Jacobson:

This letter is intended to present Mobil’s brief comments
on Tosco’s letter to this Court of July 10, 1981 regarding the
Department of Energy’s “clean-up” regulations relating to
the entitlements program. In essence, Mobil submits that
these clean-up regulations do not and cannot possibly provide
Mobil with a real or adequate mechanism for obtaining relief.
Contrary to Tosco’s misleading assertion, therefore, these
regulations do not justify the lifting of Judge Munson’s
preliminary injunction. Indeed, the issuance of the regulations
serves only to underscore the propriety of and absolute need
for the relief that Judge Munson entered in this case.

Before addressing the deficiencies of the DOE's clean-up
regulations, however, Mobil wishes to emphasize thal the
comments set forth below are, of necessity, brief and less than
exhaustive. Mobil respectfully requests that if this Court
questions whether the clean-up regulations will actually pro-
vide Mobil with the relief to which it may be entitled, the par-
ties should be permitted to address this complex matter fully
— either in this Court or in the district court. '

| The issue of whether or not a party seeking preliminary injunc-
tive relief has demonstrated irreparable injury sufficient to warrant
such relief is, of course, one committed to the discretion of the dis-
trict court.

130a

1. The DOE admits in the Preamble to its clean-up reg-
ulations that the regulations are not in any way designed to
deal with the root problems of the disappearance of price-con-
trolled oil from the entitlements program. After claiming once
more that it has purportedly been “investigating” this prob-
lem, the agency then declares that “‘any regulatory action in
this regard would be beyond the scope of this rulemaking.”
Establishment of a Mechanism for Entitlements Adjustments
for Periods Prior to Decontrol of Crude Oil, Dkt. No. ERA-4-
81-01 at 7 (‘Clean-up Preamble”). Thus, the agency is in
effeci conceding once and for all, especially in lighi of its Office
of Hearings and Appeals’ recent decision to turn its back on
the problem as well, that it intends to abdicate its administra-
live responsibility to correci the serious flaws in the entitle-
ments program — which both Judge Munson and the Office of
Hearings and Appeals agreed that DOE had caused — and to
transfer the burden of grappling with the problem to federal
judiciary. Indeed, although it has claimed both before Judge
Munson and in this Court that the agency was hard at work on
the problem and the courts were not competent to remedy the
problem, and, accordingly, should not interfere, the overall
theme running throughout the DOE’s Preamble is that the
agency wants to wash its hands of the situation it has caused,
leaving the judiciary to sort it out. See, e.g., Clean-up Pream-
ble at 27.

2. More importantly, although Tosco asserts in its July
10, 1981 letter to this Court that the DOE's clean-up regula-
tions ensure that Mobil will be provided with relief in the
event that it prevails in this litigation, Tosco letter at 2, the let-
ter itself is noticeably silen. about the actual content of these
regulations. The reason for this silence is not surprising: the
very terms of these regulations

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385008_0338%3A0. Public record. Not legal advice.
