# Record and brief — Berman Enterprises, Inc. v. Local 333, United Marine Division, International Longshoremen's Ass'n

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Record and brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1981
- **Citation:** 454 U.S. 965

## Text

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AUG 10 198!

In THE

Supreme Court of the United a4 ten ens 3,

Ocroser Term, 1981

Berman Enrerprises Inc., Stanparp Tank Cieanrne Corp.,
and GeseraL Marine Transporr Corp.,
Petitioners,
—vs.—

Locat 333, Unrrep Marve Division, [ytrernationaL LONGSHOREMEN’S
Association, Martne Towrne anp Transportation Empvorers’ As-
sociation, McAuurrer Broruers, Inxc., Diese. VesseL Operators,
Inc., Spentonsuse Transport Service, Inc., Moranta Or TANKER
Corporation, Bovcnarp Transportation Company, Inc., Moran
Tow1ne & T'ransportatTion Company, Inc., Potrnc Transportation
Corroration, ExLor Martve Corporation, Rep Star Marre Ser-
vices, Inc., Reryaver Transportation Companies, Ixc., and Ture-
camo CoastaL & Harsor Towrne Corporation,

Respondents.

————— OO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

a —————————————————————_

Jarep STAMELL
488 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10022

Attorney for Petitioners

Kevin J. McGu
Curton, Bupp, Burxe & DeMaria

Of Counsel

(LL

Questions Presented

i. Does a multiemployer collective bargaining associa-
tion and union engage in an anticumpetitive combination in
violation of Sherman Act §1, 15 U.S.C. §1, that exceeds the
scope of labor’s nonstatutory exemption from the antitrust
lews by (i) agreeing to force a non-union competitor, not
a member of the association, to become a party to and abide
by the association-union labor contract as an affiliate of a
member of the association, and (ii) agreeing not to provide
certain services to the non-union competitor unless it abides
by working conditions in the assuciation-union labor con-
tract, for the stated purpose of preventing the non-union
competitor from undercutting the prices charged by asso-
ciation members?

2. Does an agreement by a multiemployer association of
competitors and a union which requires a non-union affiliate
of an association member to recognize the union and become
party to the multiemployer labor contract against its will
exceed the scope of labor’s nonstatutory exemption from
the antitrust laws because questions of union representation
must be submitted to the National Labor Relations Board
for resolution under Section 9 of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, 29 U.S.C. §159, and cannot lawfully be resolved
through multiemployer bargaining without violating Sec-
tion 8 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 4158?

3. Is the distinction between primary and secondary
labor activity that is applicable to violations of Section
8(b) (4)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§158(b)(4)(B), also applicable to violations of Section
8(b)(4)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
$158(b)(4)(A), that involve union threats to strike with
the object of forcing an employer to join a multiemployer

organization?

ii

4. Does union pressure to restrain members of a multi-
employer collective bargaining association from providing
services to a non-union company with the object of forcing
the non-union company to abide by working conditions in
the association-union labor contract, constitute secondary
labor activity in violation of Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(4)(B),
without regard to whether or not the union’s purpose is
work preservation and maintaining union standards?

5. When the injury alleged is loss of business from an
agreement to refuse to deal in violation of antitrust and
labor law, may defendants argue to a jury that increasing
salaries received by the management of plaintiff, a closely
held business, prove that plaintiff was not injured in its
business or property within the meaning of Clayton Act
§4, 15 U.S.C. §15, and Section 303 of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. $187?

Questions Presented
Table of Authorities .......
Citation to Opinion Below
Jurisdiction
Statutory Provisions Involved ....
Statement of the Case

Reasons for Granting the Writ _.......

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. The Decision Departs From Precedent in Hold-

Il.

ITI.

ing That Sherman Act §1 Was Not Violated by
the Clauses Included in the Multiemployer Con-
tract and Insulates Abuses of Multiemployer
Bargaining Associations of Competitors From
Judicial Scrutiny
The Decision Below Conflicts With the Decision
of Other Courts of Appeal Which Hold That
Under Section 8(b)(4)(A) of the NLRA an
Employer Has an Absolute Right to Refuse to
Become Party to a Multiemployer Contract ....

Union Pressure on Neutral Employers for the
Purpose of Achieving Changes in the Work
Practices of a Primary Employer Violates Sec-
tion 8(b)(4)(B) Without Regard to “Work
Preservation” or “Union Standards” Motives ..

13

16

22

PAGE

IV. Increasing Salaries Received by Management
of a Closely Held Business Are Irrelevant to
Whether or Not a Company Is Injured in Its
Business or Property Under Clayton Act §4
and Section 303 of the LMRA

ConcLusion

ApPrENDIxX—
Opinion of Court of Appeals
Order Denying Petition for Rehearing —............... 7
Bench Opinion of District Court ....

Opinion of District Court Denying Post-Trial
Motions ;

Judgment of District Court

PR Fey

Taste or AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Amaz Coal Co. v. NLRB, 614 F.2d 872 (3d Cir. 1980),
rev'd in part, —— U.S. ——, 49 U.S.L.W. 4869 (1981) 18n

Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S.
447 (1977) 15, 24

California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated
General Contractors of California, Inc., 648 F.2d 527
A a eo eT 19n

Carey v. Westinghouse, 375 U.S. 261 (1964) 19

Connell Construction Company, Inc. v. Plumbers and
Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975) 14

PAGE

Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.,
370 U.S. 690 (1962) 10n

Federal Maritime Commission v. Pacific Maritime As-
sociation, 435 U.S. 40 (1978) 14, 16
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S.
203 (1964) 22
Frito-Lay v. Teamsters Local Union 137, 623 F.2d 1354
(9th Cir. 1980) 14, 20

General Marine Transport Corp. v. NLRB, 619 F.2d
180 (2d Cir. 1980) 17n
General Warehouseman and Helpers vy. Standard
Brands, 579 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
— US. ——, 99 8S. Ct. 2420 (1979) 18
Glendale Manufacturing Co. v. Local 520, ILGWU,
283 F.2d 936 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 336 U.S.
950 (1961) 18

Local Union 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965) 18

Local 7-210, Oil, Chemical € Atomic Workers v. Union
Tanker Car Co., 475 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 875 (1973) ‘ 18

Lone Star Steel Co. v. NLRB, 639 F.2d 545 (10th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, —— U.S. ——, 101 S. Ct. 1349
(1981) 18n

NLRB v. Local 542, Operating Engineers, 532 F.2d 902
(3rd Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1072 (1977) ... 18

NLRB v. Local 825, Operating Engineers, 400 U.S. 297
EE a Me ee 15, 22

National Society of Professional Engineers v. United
States, 435 U.S. 696 (1978) ... 17

South Prairie Construction Co. v. Local 627, Operating
Engineers, 518 F.2d 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev’d.,

425 U.S. 800 (1976) 14, 18,19
Sperry Rand Corp. v. NLRB, 492 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1974)
cert, denied, 419 U.S. 831 (1976) 18
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Barry, 438
U.S. 531 (1978) 17
Union De Tronquistas De Puerto Rico v. Arlook, 586
F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1978) 14, 20
United Marine Division, Local 333, 226 N.L.R.B. 1214
(1976) 7, 8, 23n
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657
(1965) 13, 14, 16
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Co., 310 U.S. 150
(1940) 17
Statutes:
Clayton Act
Section 4, 15 U.S.C. §15 ii, 3, 5, 10, 15, 24
Section 16, 15 U.S.C. §26 3, 5, 10, 24, 24n

Labor Management Relations Act
Section 303, 29 U.S.C. §187 ..................-.....li, 5, 10, 15, 24

National Labor Relations Act
Section 8(b) (4) (A), 29 U.S.C. §158(b) (4) (A) ~..i, 8, 13,

14, 15, 20, 21
Section 8(b)(4)(B), 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(4)(B) ....i, ii, 3,
5, 7, 13, 14, 15, 20, 22, 23, 23n

Section 9, 29 U.S.C. $159 ..............--ccccersressenesessesees i, 4, 18

Sherman Act
Section 1, 15 U.S.C. §1
28 U.S.C. §1254(1)

PAGE

i, 2,5, 10, 11
2

Rules:
Federal Rules of Evidence
Rule 403

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroser Term, 1981

Berman Enrterrries Ixe., Stanparp Tank Cieanino Corp,.
and GengraL Marine Transport Corp.,

Petitioners,
—Vs.—

Locau 333, Untrep Marine Division, Internationa, Lone-
SHOREMEN’s Association, Marine Tow1nG anp TRANSPOR-
tration Empvoyers’ Association, McA.Lister Broruers,
Inc., Diesen Vesse. Operators, Inc., Spentonsusn
Transport Service, Inc., Moranta Or. Tanker Corpora-
Ton, Boucnarp Transportation Company, Inc., Moran
Towrne & Transportation Company, Ino., Potanc Trans-
PoRTATION Corporation, Extor Marine Corporation, Rep
Star Marine Services, Inc., Rernaver Transportation
Companies, Inc., and TurecamMo CoastaL & Harsor Tow-
1nG CORPORATION,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Berman Enterprises Inc., General Marine Transport
Corp. and Standard Tank Cleaning Corp. petition for a
writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit entered
February 25, 1981, and an order denying a petition for
rehearing of said judgment, containing a suggestion for

2

rehearing e.1 banc, entered May 13, 1981, that affirmed a
judgment entered October 26, 1979, and an order denying
a new trial, judgment n.o.v. and injunctive relief entered
March 4, 1980, by the United States District Court of the
Southern District of New York in favor of respondents. ~

Citation to Opinion Below

The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at 644
F.2d 930 and is set out in the Appendix. The order of the
Court of Appeals denying the petition for rehearing is
unreported and is set out in the Appendix. The bench
opinion of the District Court dismissing certain claims, and
the opinion of the District Court denying petitioner’s post-
trial motions, are unreported and are set out in the Ap-

pendix.
Jurisdiction

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on
February 25, 1981. Following this judgment, petitioner
filed a timely petition for rehearing containing a suggestion
for rehearing en banc. On May 13, 1981, the Court of Ap-
peals denied the petition. Jurisdiction of this Court is
invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

Statutory Provisions Involved

This case involves the following federal statutes :
a. 15 U.S.C. §1

Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-
aferce among the several States, or the foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal... .

b. 15 U.S.C. §15

Any person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the anti-
trust laws may sue therefor in any district court of
the United States in the district in which the defendant
resides or is found or has an agent, without respect
to the amount in controversy, and shall recover three-
fold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of
suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.

*

ce. 15 U.S.C. §26

Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be
entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief, in any
court of the United States having jurisdiction over the
parties, against threatened loss or damage by a viola-
tion of the antitrust laws ... when and under the same
conditions and principles as injunctive relief against
threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is
granted by courts of equity....

d. 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(4)

(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization or its agents—

(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any
individual employed by a person engaged in commerce
or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a
strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to
use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise
handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or
commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to
threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in
commerce or im an industry affecting commerce, where
in either case an object thereof is—

4

(A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-em-
ployed person to join any labor or employer organiza-
tion or to enter into any agreement which is prohibited
by subsection (e) of this section ;

(B) forcing or -equiring any person to cease using,
selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing
in the products of any other producer, processor, or
manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other
person, or forcing or requiring any other employer to
recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the
representative of his employees unless such labor or-
ganization has been certified as the representative of
such employees under the provisions of section 159 of
this title: Provided, That nothing contained in this
clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where
not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary
picketing ;

. 29 U.S.C. §159

(a) Representatives designated or selected for the
purpose of collective bargaining by the majority of
the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes,
shall be the exclusive representatives of all the em-
ployees in such unit for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment... .

(b) The Board shall decide in each case whether,
in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom
in exercising the rights guaranteed by this subchapter,
the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant
unit, or subdivision thereof... .

f. 29 U.S.C. §187

(a) It shall be unlawful, for the purpose of this
section only, in an industry or activity affecting com-
merce, for any labor organization to engage in any
activity or conduct defined ars an unfair labor practice
in section 158(b) (4) of this title.

(b) Whoever shal] be injured in his business or
property by reason of any violation of subsection (a)
of this section may sue therefor in any district court
of the United States subject to the limitations and
provisions of section 185 of thi: title without respect
to the amount in controversy, or in any other court
having jurisdiction of the parties, and shall recover
the damage by him sustained and the cost of the suit.

Statement of the Case’

1. Nature of the Case

This petition concerns the legality of labor practices ana
collective bargaining provisions in the marine transporta-
tion service industry under Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. §1,
and Section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act
(“NLRA”), 29 U.S.C. §8(b)(4). The jurisdiction of the
district court was invoked under Clayton Act §§ 4 and 16,
29 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26, and Section 303(b) of the Labor Mar-
agement Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 187(b).

Petitioners, the plaintiffs below, are three affiliated com-
panies, Berman Enterprises Inc. (“Berman”), General
Marine Transport Corp. (“General Marine”), and Stan-
dard Tank Cleaning Corp. (“Standard Tank”). They allege
antitrust violations by Marine Towing and Trensportation

' The statement of the case generally follows the opinion of the
court of appeals set out m the Appendix.

6

Employers’ Association (“Association”), a multiemployer
bargaining organization, certain of the Association’s mem-
bers, and Local 333, United Marine Division, International
Longshoremen’s Association (“Union”), a union repre-
senting vessel emp!oyees. Petitioners also allege labor law
violations by the Union.

At trial, the district court, after petitioner rested, dis-
missed all elements of the antitrust claim except that por-
tion alleging a conspiracy to refuse to deal with Berman.
The jury subsequently returned verdicts against Berman
and the companies affiliated with it on the remaining anti-
trust claim and on the labor claim. The court then denied
petitioners’ request for injunctive relief. On appeal the
three affiliated companies argued that the antitrust claims
should not have been dismissed, that the court should have
directed a verdict for the appellants on the labor claim,
and that evidence concerning salaries of Berman officers
should not have been the subject of argument to the jury
that Berman was not injured by the conspiracy alleged.
The court of appeals rejected these contentions and af-
firmed.

2. Facts

Berman, Geners! Marine, and Standard Tank are all
owned by Standard Marine Services, Inc., which in turn
is owned by Evelyn Berman Frank and her brothers. Ber-
man operates tugs, barges, and harbor tankers in New York
harbor; General Marine operates two ships which dispose
of sewage sludge produced by municipal customers; and
Standard Tank operates a vessel-cleaning facility and one
tank-cleaning vessel.

General Marine was a member of the Association at the
time the dispute in question arose, but Berman and Stan-
dard Tank were not and the Union did not represent their

7

employees. The Union and the Association have three
labor contracts covering employees on tugs, barges and
self-propelled tankers, respectively. Berman, or its pre-
decessor, and the Association member corporations have
for many years been customers as well as competitiors of
one another, hiring each other’s tugs or barges from time
to time, but also competing for business from third parties.
Berman operates with one man on a barge and four-man
tug crews, whereas members of the Association, pursuant
to acollective bargaining agreement with the Union, oper-
ate with two men on a barge and a six- or seven-man tug
crew.

Well before April 1, 1976, the date of the new collective
bargaining agreement with which we are concerned here,
the Union unsuccessfully sought to require Berman to
cease towing unmanned vegetable oil barges of MOTC
Acquisitions Corp. (MOTC).* The Union had decided that
all barges with less than a certain carrying capacity should
be manned by a crew of two. A federal district court,
however, enjoined the Union from so coercing Berman,
and the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) sub-
sequently found that the Union had engaged in a secondary
boycott unlawful under Section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA, 29
U.S.C. § 158(b) (4), as well as having violated other pro-
visions of the NLRA, United Marine Division Local 333,
226 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1976). Shortly thereafter the Union,
claiming that it had previously terminated its labor con-
tract, struck General Marine but again was unsuccessful;
a federal district court enjoined the strike and the court
of appeals upheld the injunction on appeal, General Marine
Transport Corp. v. Local 333, United Marine Division,
No. 75-7559 (2d Cir. Mar. 10, 1976). General Marine

? “Vegetable oil barges” included any barge under 55,000 bar-
rels used in the animal, vegetable or fish oil trades.

later obtained favorable holdings on this matter both
before the NLRB, which found violations of Sections 8(d),
8(b)(3) and 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA, United Marine
Division Local 333, 228 N.L.R.B. 1107 (1977), and before
an arbitrator.

In January 1976 the Union made certain demands upon
the Association for contract provisions to be incorporated
in the new collective bargaining agreement which was to
commence on April 1, 1976. The demands were designed
to achieve its goals for industry-wide barge manning stan-
dards and to prevent further resistance to such standards
by Berman. This was followed by a Union demand made
to General Marine that all the Berman companies’ crew
members, except those on the tank-cleaning vessel, join
the Union and that all hiring be done through the Union
hiring hall. Further negotiations, accompanied by the
litigation noted above, resulted in an impasse, with the
Union threatening to strike the Association unless it com-
plied with the demands. General Marine refused to resign
from the Association despite the Association bargaining
committee’s statement that unless it did so the Association
would enter into a contract that satisfied the Union.

Finally on March 26, 1976, the Union and the Association
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement containing what
we will call the “vegetable oil” and “affiliates” clauses. The
first clause in effect required two men to be aboard all
vegetable oil barges carrying less than 55,000 barrels, a
clause applicable to the Berman petroleum barges because
they could be cleaned to carry vegetable oil.? The second

* The “vegetable oil” clause read:

9. Section 29. Vegetable Oil Barges. No vessel operated
under this contract shall tow any barge under 55,000 barrels
used in the animal, vegetable, or fish oil trades unless there
are two men aboard the barge at all times.

9

clause required affiliates‘ of Association members to oper-
ate under the contract and provided for strikes against
noncomplying employers. In a column in a Union news-
paper, the Union president explained that the clauses had
been added to the Union-Association contract to prevent
companies that were not members of the Association from
undercutting the prices of companies abiding by the As-
sociation-Union contract and taking work away from
Association members.°

After the Union ratified the new contract, the Union
president wrote General Marine to demand compliance with
the affiliates clause and listed fourteen Berman-General
Marine vessels which he claimed were covered by the
Union-Association contract. At about the same time, in
early April 1976, the Union membership was informed
about and advised to enforce the vegetable oil clause, on
pain of discipline. Fou.lowing General Marine’s response
that the contract exceeded the scope of the Association’s
bargaining power and constituted a group boycott, the
Union again struck General Marine. The Union also ad-
vised Association members not to deal with Berman and
specifically not to tow Berman barges with less than two
men aboard. Some Association members issued orders to

*The affiliates clause read in part:

8. Section 1. Application of Agreement. This Agreement
applies only to all licensed and unlicensed Employees, em-
ployed on tugboats and self-propelled lighters owned or oper-
ated by the Employers, a subsidiary company, an affiliated
company or a company division in the Port of New York and
vicinity.

5 The Union president’s newspaper column stated:

For several years, we have been having problems with cer-
tain companies who have been trying every way possible to
duck our contracts and the wages, benefits and working con-
ditions our membership is entitled to under those contracts.
The actions of these companies, and some of the men employed
by them, have a ripple effect throughout the industry. The

10

their employees not to deal with Berman and Berman’s
business fell with respect to them.‘

Subsequently, in Jur~ 1976, Berman filed a petition with
the NLRB for an eleetion to determine whether its em-
ployees wanted to be represented by a labor union. The
Union opposed such an election, but the NLRB’s Regional
Director ordered an election and the Berman employees
chose as their union, and the NLRB certified, a rival union,
Marine Engineers Beneficia! Association (MEBA).

3. Proceedings Below

This suit by Berman, General Marine and Standard Tank
is in two counts. The first count charges all defendants
with a combination in restraint of trade under Sherman
Act §1, 15 U.S.C. §1, and seeks damages under Clayton
Act §4, 15 U.S.C. § 15, and an injunction under Clayton
Aet §16, 15 U.S.C. § 26. The second count charges the
Vuion alone with violation of Section 303 of the LMRA, 29
U.S.C. § 187, and seeks damages from the Union.

companies have been able to undercut the rates of companies
abiding by the contract, and thus expand and take work away
from others vesulting in a loss of jobs for our members. The
new clauses and clause revisions are designed to strengthen
the contract against this type of action, making the com-
panies competitively equal and thus providing greater job
security for our membership. I have said in the past that
knowing your contract is very important. It now becomes even
more important that every member know and abide by this
contract.

* The court of appeals explanation that the drop in the volume
of Berman’s business could be explained by other factors (App.
13) is irrelevant to this petition because judicial review of dis-
missal of claims for failure to state a cause of action requires all
factual inferences be made in petitioners’ favor. Continental Ore
Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962). The
distriet court itself found the evidence supported a conelusion that
the drop in the volume of Berman's business was caused by the
respondent corporations’ refusal to deal. (App. 21-22)

11

The district court held that the vegetable oil and affiliates
clauses, as well as the actions taken under them, did not
constitute antitrust violations because of labor’s nonstatu-
tory exemption to the antitrust laws, and, alternatively,
that the clauses did not have the anticompetitive purpose or
effect necessary to violate Sherman Act §1. (App. 21-22)
The district court dismissed Berman’s antitrust claims
based upon the clauses after petitioners rested and subse-
quently instructed the jury that the clauses were not illegal
and could be used only as evidence of a separate agree-
ment to refuse to deal, an agreement which the jury spe-
cially found did not exist. The jury also specially found
against Berman and its affiliated companies on three ques-
tions submitted under the labor law count.’ The district
court further allowed defendants to argue to the jury that
the increasing salaries paid to executives of Berman
showed that Berman had not been injured even if there
had been an agreement to refuse to deal. Following the
verdict, the trial judge denied motions for a new trial,
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict against the
Union on the labor law count, and for injunctive relief.

The court of appeals affirmed. The court held that the
vegetable oil clause—the agreement not to tow barges un-
less manned by two persons—was legitimate labor activity
and did not violate Sherman Action § 1 because it “was de-
signed to prevent erosion of manning standards by outside

7 The three questions, all answered negatively by the jury, were:
4. Did Local 333 induce or encourage its members to refuse
to work for their employers when asked to work on Berman
vessels or threaten, coerce or restrain the Association or the
corporate defendants in order to:
(a) Force Berman to become a member of the Association ?
(b) Foree Berman to recognize Local 333 as the repre-
sentative of its employees?
(e) Force the Association or the corporate defendants to
cease doing business with Berman?

12

economic pressure, to protect jobs and to promote safety
at sea.” (App. 10) The court also held that Union pres-
sure to prevent the barges from being towed did not violate
Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the NLRA because “the sometimes
competitive relationship between Berman barges and Asso-
ciation barges” meant that “Berman’s undermanned barges
may have taken jobs away from the bargaining unit”.
(App. 16)

The court of appeals found that the affiliates clause—the
agreement to force non-union Berman to abide by the As-
sociation-Union contract by virtue of its affiliation with
General Marine—was “more troublesome”. Berman was
not a member of the Association and the Union did not
represent its employees. Nonetheless, the court held that
although the agreement “may appear broader than neces-
sary to fulfill legitimate union objectives”, it was immune
from antitrust attack under the nonstatutory exemption
because Berman and General Marine constituted a single
employer as a result of employee interchange and “it was
a legitimate union objective to protect employees against
shifts of work days (and vessels) designed to avoid the
standards and wages established in the collective bargain-
ing agreement”. (App. 11-12) The court concluded that
existing Supreme Court decisions are “not applicable here
because they involved employer bargaining groups and
unions conspiring to injure truly separate concerns”.
(App. 12)

The court of appeals also held that the affiliates clause
did not have “either an anticompetitive purpose or an anti-
competitive effect” despite the Union president’s admission
that the purpose was to prevent non-members of the Asso-
ciation who did not operate in accordance with the Associa-
tion-Union labor contract from undercutting the prices of
Association members and taking work away from them.

13

The court held that the “true purposes” were “job preserva-
tion, maintenance of working conditions and safety, none
of which is anticompetitive in nature.” (App. 12-13) With
respect to the claim that the affiliates clause and efforts to
enforce it violated Section 8(b)(4)(A) of the NLRA be-
cause it required an employer, Berman, to become a mem-
ber of an employer’s organization, the Association, the
court held that the distinction between primary and sec-
ondary labor activity in Section 8(b)(4)(B) was applicable
to a violation of Section 8(b)(4)(A) and there was evi-
dence to support the view that the Union’s conduct was
primary. (App. 13-14) Finally, the court of appeals held
that the argument about salaries and antitrust injury was
one that a jury properly could consider.

Reasons for Granting the Writ

Association of competitors into multiemployer bargain-
ing organizations that negotiate labor contracts with unions
has become pervasive in American industry. Such organiza-
tions offer the opportunity for anticompetitive and other
abuses that this Court cautioned against in United Mine
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665 (1965) (“. . .
because they must bargain does not mean that the agree-
ment reached may disregard other laws”). This case, in
which a multiemployer association of competitors and a
union use self-help and economic coercion to impose labor
standards industry-wide, raises questions of exceptional
importance to competition and the appropriate limits of
multiemployer bargaining. The writ should be granted to
resolve these questions.

The judgment below authorizes a multiemployer associa-
tion and union to impose a labor contract on a non-union
company that the association does not represent and whose

14

employees the union does not represent. The rationale for
the result is that the imposition of uniform working con-
ditions eliminates labor cost competition from the non-unit
company and preserves the work available for association
members. The holding that the conduct does not violate
Sherman Act §1, and is within labor’s nonstatutory ex-
emption from the antitrust laws, conflicts with prior deci-
sions of this court including United Mine Workers v. Pen-
nington, supra, Connell Construction Company, Inc. v.
Plumbers and Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 US.
616 (1975), and Federal Maritime Commission v. Pacific
Maritime Association, 435 U.S. 40 (1978). The holding
would further permit a multiempoyer association and union
to determine unit questions and decide the bargaining
representative of the non-union employees thereby circum-
venting NLRB certification procedures. This conflicts with
the Court’s judgment in South Prairie Construction Co. v.
Local 627, Operating Engineers, 425 U.S. 800 (1976) (per
curiam).

Other courts of appeal and the NLRB hold that par-
ticipation in multiemployer contracts is voluntary. The
decision below conflicts with decisions that union threats
to strike with the object of forcing an employer to become
a party to a multiemployer labor contract violates Section
8(b)(4)(A) of the NLRA because an employer has an abso-
lute right to refuse to become so bound. See Frito Lay
v. Teamsters Local Union 137, 623 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir.
1980); Union De Tronquistas De Puerto Rico v. Arlook,
586 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1978). The decision holds instead
that the distinction between primary and secondary labor
activity in Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the NLRA applies to
violation of Section 8(b)(4)(A). The effect of the holding
is that an employer can be forced to participate in a multi-
employer labor contract against its will, a grant of excep-
tional authority to multiemployer associations of competi-

15

tors and unions. The writ should be granted to decide
whether the exercise of such authority can be lawful under
Section 8(b)(4)(A) and to resolve the conflict between
the circuits.

The decision also departs from this Court’s judgment in
NLRB v. Local 825, Operating Engineers, 400 U.S. 297
(1971), on the application of Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the
NLRA. The decision below holds that a union may pressure
members of a multiemployer association neutral to a dis-
pute to disrupt the business they do with a non-union com-
pany to force the non-union company to adopt union work
rules (barge manning standards). The court of appeals
holds that if a union’s purpose is “work preservation” and
the maintenance of “union standards”, it may try to in-
fluence the labor practices of the target company by pres-
suring neutral employers. The writ should be granted be-
cause the holding permits a union to impose its work rules
outside of the bargaining unit and thereby achieve in-
dustry-wide work rule goals without representing em-
ployees of the companies whose labor practices it wants

to change.

Finally, the judgment below allows defendants to use
financial information about management salaries unrelated
to the question of injury under Clayton Act §4 and Section
303 of the LMRA in violation of the decision in Brunswick
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 447 (1977).
Antitrust injury is a question of causation. Salaries re-
ceived by management of the injured company are irrel-
evant to the statutory question of whether or not the un-
lawful conspiracy is the cause of the business disruption.
Salaries, whether they increase or decrease, cannot help
answer the injury question. The writ should be granted
because antitrust and labor cases frequently involve finan-
cial evidence that cannot be fairly weighed unless the par-

16

ties are restricted to contesting the statutory elements of
a violation and prohibited from making arguments to a
jury that have no legal or economic basis.

L

The Decision Departs From Precedent in Holding
That Sherman Act §1 Was Not Violated by the Clauses
Included in the Multiemployer Contract and Insulates
Abuses of Maltiemployer Bargaining Associations of
Competitors From Judicial Scrutiny.

The decision below permits a multiemployer association
of competitors and a union to pursue their self-interest at
the expense of a non-member competitor. The “affiliates”
clause is an anticompetitive agreement to impose a labor
contract on non-unit employers condemned in United Mine
Workers v. Pennington, supra. The “vegetable oil” clause
is a group boycott—an agreement among competitors to
deal with third parties only on certain terms and condi-
tions—a per se violation of Sherman Act 61. The holding
that the clauses are not anticompetitive despite the ad-
mission of the Union president that their purpose is to
restrain price competition by establishing industry-wide
labor costs makes the elimination of competition over labor
costs legitimate labor activity even when the union does
not represent the non-union target. However, agreements
to impose labor terms and conditions industry-wide are
against the policy of both antitrust and labor laws. United
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 668. (“The anti-
competitive potential of such a combination is obvious.
...”); Federal Maritime Commission v. Pacific Maritime
Association, 435 U.S. at 62-3 (Union-Association imposi-
tion of labor terms on non-unit employers is anti:empeti-
tive). Excusing such industry-wide restraints because they

17

ensure “maintenance of working conditions” (App. 13)
and “prevent erosion of manning standards by outside
economic pressure” (App. 10), simply uses euphemisms to
state benefits that any cartel hopes to achieve from the
elimination of outside competition. Compare United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).

The decision that the “vegetable oil” clause is exempt
from Sherman Act §1 under the nonstatutory exemption
authorizes an agreement to boycott unless Berman does
what the Union wanted and manned its barges with two
men instead of one, a per se violation of Sherman Act §1.
See e.g. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Barry,
438 U.S. 531 (1978). The invocation of the nonstatutory
exemption on the grounds that bargaining unit jobs would
be preserved since “Berman’s undermanned barges may
have taken jobs away from the bargaining unit” (App. 16)
makes the elimination of competition a virtue whenever the
union and multiemployer allegedly perceive a threat to
bargaining unit standards. However, the preservation of
“standards” does not make it legitimate to engage in con-
duct which eliminates competition. See National Society of
Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 696
(1978).

The decision that the “affiliates” clause is exempt from
Sherman Act §1 under the nonstatutory labor exemption
on the grounds that Berman and General Marine are a
single employer is a failure to apply to antitrust cases
a long line of decisions under the NLRA about the appro-
priate scope of collective bargaining.* Even when there is
a “single employer”, union proposals to impose labor terms
on unrepresented employees are nonmandatory subjects of

* The decision also departs from an earlier decision of a differ-
ent panel of the same court which stated that Berman is distinct
from General Marine. See General Marine Transport Corp. v.
NLRB, 619 F.2d 180, 187-88 (2d Cir. 1980).

18

bargaining.’ This is so even though the union’s motive is
to protect the standards and wages established in a collec-
tive bargaining agreement from the competition of the un-
represented group. Sperry Rand Corp. v. NLRB, 492 F.2d
63 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 831 (1976); NLRB
v. Local 542, Operating Engineers, 532 F.2d 902, 907 (3d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1072 (1977); Glendale
Manufacturing Co. v. Local 520, ILGWU, 283 F.2d 936
(4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961) ; General
Warehousemen and Helpers v. Standard Brands, 579 F.2d
1282, 1291 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2420
(1979) ; Local 7-210, Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers v.
Union Tank Car Co., 475 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 US. 875 (1973). Nonmandatory subjects of
bargaining are not entitled to an exemption from the anti-
trust laws. Local Union 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676
(1965).

The decision below that the “affiliates” clause was legiti-
mate labor activity because some General Marine employ-
ees also worked on Berman vessels allows a union and
multiemployer association to absorb non-union employers
and employees without resort to NLRB certification pro-
cedures. This conflicts with this Court’s judgment in South
Prairie Construction Co. v. Local 627, Operating Engineers,
425 U.S. 800 (1976) (per curiam), that the scope of the
bargaining unit can only be deter:nined by the NLRB
under Section 9 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.\’. §159. Many com-
panies with subsidiaries or divisions are single employers,
yet it has never been suggested that this requires a single

* Courts hold that an “affiliates” clause is not a mandatory sub-
ject of bargaining even when the union represents the iate’s
employees. A union violates Section 8(b)(3) of the NLRA, 29
U.S.C. §158(b) (3), when it coerees an employer to agree to such a
clause. Lone Star Steel Co. v. NLRB, 639 F.2d 545 (10th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, US. . 101 8. Ct. 1349 (1981) ; Amaz
Coal Co. v. NLRB, 614 F.2d 872, 883-84 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd in
part on other grounds, —— U.S. ——, 49 U.S.L.W. 4869 (1981).

19

bargaining unit or that such a unit can be forced upon an
employer. The decision in South Prairie, 518 F.2d 1040
(D.C. Cir. 1975), rev’d, 425 U.S. 800 (1976) (per curiam),
is exactly on point because it was the “interchange” and
“fungibility” of employees on which the District of Colum-
bia circuit relied. This “ourt reversed. The decision’s
claim that Berman was not “truly” separate from General
Marine thus permits an association of competitors and a
union to impose an entire contract on Berman and its un-
represented employees allegedly to stop transfer of crew
members and vessels between affiliates (App. 11-12) when
a simple grievance filed under General Marine’s contract
with the Union would have sufficed without having an
adverse impact on Berman.

The decision below licenses the forceful imposition of
labor contracts on “single employers” even when their
unrepresented employees do not wish to be represented by
a union—a dangerous rule. Congress has designated the
NLRB to be the exclusive agency to setile questions con-
cerning the representation of employees. Carey v. Westing-
house, 375 U.S. 261 (1964). Petitioner submits that the
correct analysis is to leave questions of representation to
the NLRB and not to a multiemployer association of com-
petitors, and to apply traditional antitrust principles. Too
much is at stake in terms of industry competition and labor
relations to do »therwise.** These issues recur" because of

1° For example, the New York Times reports that in the 1979
negotiations between the Association and Union, the Union insisted

on expanding the scope of the “affiliates” clause so that it affected
the Association generally. The Union wanted the 1976 “affiliates”
clause expanded to include operations from Virginia to Maine and
not just the Port of New York. A three-month strike costing the
New York economy $1.5 billion resulted. N.Y. Times, June 12,
1979, §B at 4, col. 3; id., June 13, 1979, §B at 4, col. 3; id., June
14, 1979, $A at 1, col. 2.

~

" See e.g. California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated
Se ea 648 F.2d 527 (9th Cir.
1980).

the prevalence of multiemployer bargaining and the writ
should be granted to resolve them.

Il.

The Decision Below Conflicts With the Decision of
Other Courts of Appeal Which Hold That Under Sec-
tion 8(b)(4)(A) of the NLRA an Employer Has an
Absolute Right to Refuse to Become Party to a Multi-
employer Contract.

The words of Section 8(b)(4)(A) of the NLRA preclude
the judgment below. The decision holds that the distinction
between primary and secondary labor activity, which is
found in the proviso in Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the NLRA,
is also part of Section 8(b)(4)(A) which contains no such
proviso. In Frito-Lay v. Teamsters Local Union 137, supra,
the Ninth Cireuit concluded after thorough analysis that
an employer had an absolute right to refuse to become
party to a multiemployer contract. The First Circuit’s
conclusion was the same in Union De Tronquistas De
Puerto Rico v. Arlook, supra. The Ninth Cireuit’s analysis
of the legislative history of Section 8(b)(4)(A) in Frito-
Lay shows that “because of congressional concern over
industry-wide employer bargaining in general—and its per-
ceived evils, such as crippling industry-wide strikes, collu-
sion, stifling of competition and ‘shocking restraints of
trade’ ”’, Section 8(b)(4)(A) was enacted to guarantee that
no business would be forced to become a party to a multi-
employer contract against its will. 623 F.2d at 1358-59
(citation omitted). The “work preservation” motivation,
which frequently determines the primary or secondary
nature of conduct under Section 8(b)(4)(B), is irrelevant
under Section 8(b)(4)(A).

The decision below conflicts with these other decisions.
Berman was not a member of the Association and the Union

21

did not represent Berman’s employees. (App. 3) Nonethe-
less, the decision holds that the Union couid threaten the
Association with a strike to foree Berman to become party
to the multiemployer contract against its will because
“*,.. section 8(b)(4)(A) ... of the NLRA [is] intended to
prohibit not agreements or actions directed toward the
primary employer, but secondary objeciives. ...” (App.
13-14) The court is wrong because the statute is very clear:
pressure on Berman, the primary employer, to force it to
abide by the multiemployer contract violates Section 8(b)
(4)(A). A fortiori, pressure applied to neutral employers,
i.e., Association members, for the same purpose, violates
Section 8(b)(4)(A).

To grant multiemployer organizations and unions the
power to force unwilling employers to join in their
contracts raises questions of exceptional importance to
industry-wide collective bargaining. In addition, because
industry generally and the industry involved here, oper-
ates in the jurisdiction of several courts of appeal, the
conflict between the circuits will result in differing treat-
ment of the same parties depending on the forum. For
example, the parties here operate in the jurisdiction of at
least the First, Second, and Third circuits and there is
presently the conflict between the First and Second circuits.
The writ should be granted to resolve the question of statu-
tory interpretation and to eliminate the conflict in the cir-
cuits.

iil.

Union Pressure on Neutral Employers for the Pur-
pose of Achieving Changes in the Work Practices of a
Primary Employer Violates Section 8(b)(4)(B) With-
out Regard to “Work Preservation” or “Union Stan-
dards” Motives.

The decision holds that Union pressure to restrain mem-
bers of the Association from towing Berman’s barges unless
they were manned by two persons does not violate Section
8(b)(4)(B) as a matter of law because there was evidence
from which a jury could find that the Union’s motive was
“work preservation” and “maintaining union standards”.
(App. 15-16) However, this Court’s decision in NLRB v.
Local 825, Operating Engineers, 400 U.S. 297 (1971), holds
that once it is shown that the union’s object is to force the
primary employer to change its policy on work assignments,
union pressure upon neutral employers violates Section
8(b) (4) (B).

The decision below avoids the Local 825, Operating Engi-
neers rule by drawing an analogy to cases that authorize
restrictions on subcontracting of unit work negotiated by a
union and employer. (App. 15-16) The analogy to sub-
contracting is erroneous because restricting the way in
which an employer subcontracts unit work is fundamentally
different from restraining the way in which an employer
conducts its business.

In Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 US.
203, 215 (1964), this Court cautioned that the duty to bar-
gain over an employer’s subcontracting out of unit work
is not authority for restrictions on “other forms of ‘con-
tracting out’ or ‘subcontracting’ which arise daily in our
complex economy.” The invocation of cases involving the

23

subcontracting of unit work to authorize the Union’s pres-
sure on Association members not to tow Berman’s barges
unless they met Union manning standards is a dangerous
analogy because it authorizes union disruption of business
dealings between two companies in the absence of sub-
contracting. If the Union can act to advance its industry-
wide goals for uniform working conditions by preventing
the towing of non-union barges unless they are manned to
its liking, then any union can restrict the basis on which its
members will work when they come into contact with an-
other union.”

The writ should be granted to decide whether the law
announced in subcontracting cases under Section 8(b) (4)
(B) can properly be applied generally in this manner. The
question is of exceptional importance because union de-
mands on employers to restrict business practices for the
union’s benefit are an everyday part of labor relations and
the far-reaching restrictions authorized by the decision
below will cause substantial disruption unless prohibited.

12 See United Marine Division, Local 333, 226 NLRB 1214
(1976) in which the NLRB held that the identical conduct vio-
lated Section 8(b)(4)(B) and Section 8(b)(3) of the NLRA.
Although the court of appeals noted the MOTC decision, it did
not explain why its decision departed from it.

24

IV.

Increasing Salaries Received by Management of a
Closely Held Business Are Irrelevant to Whether or Not

a Company Is Injured in Its Business or Property Under
Clayton At §4 and Section 303 of the LMRA.

The decision below holds that the jury could properly
consider the claim that salaries received by Berman’s man-
agement showed Berman was not injured as an exercise of
trial court discretion under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. However, to treat such an argument as an
exercise in discretion allows juries to decide cases on a
ground irrelevant to whether or not a business is injured
within the meaning of Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 16 and
Section 303 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 187. Injury under
the antitrust and labor laws is a specific and logical chain
of causation between the violation and the injury alleged
and plaintiffs are prohibited from a claim of injury not so
causally connected to the violation. Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977). Here, the
injury is Berman’s loss of business from, and inability to
hire the services of, the defendant corporations. Defen-
dants should have been restricted to arguing whether or
not the injury claimed occurred and prevented from argu-
ing to a jury that increasing salaries to management show
no injury. The decision below means that a business in-
jured by an antitrust violation but, nevertheless, able to
pay substantial salaries in spite of the injury, has no
remedy" for the violations because a jury is in no position

13 Petitioners’ post-trial request for injunctive relief under
Clayton Act §16, 15 U.S.C. §26, relief that depends on threatened
injury, was also denied.

25

to determine the legal and economical falseness of such an
argument.'* The writ should be granted for this reason.

CONCLUSION

Wuenrerore, petitioners Berman Enterprises Inc., Stan-
dard Tank Cleaning Corp., and General Marine Transport
Corp., respectfully pray that a writ of certiorari be issued
to review the decision of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit in this case.

Respectfully submitted,

Jarep STAMELL

488 Madison Avenue

New York, New York 10022
(212) 794-8772

Attorney for Petitioners

Kevin J. McG
Currtoy, Bupp, Burke & DeMaria

Of Counsel

“The error of the a ent is emphasized by the evidence
to have made it relevant: the only way the salaries
could have been relevant is if they showed an alternative explana-
tion of why defendants refused to deal. For example, if there
were evidence that the defendants learned that Berman’s execu-
tives were receiving increasing salaries and refused to deal not as
a result of an agreement with the union, but because they were
offended by the size of the salaries, then there would be a causal
connection to the injury claimed for the jury to consider.

Decisions of the Courts Below

Opinion of Court of Appeals

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FoR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
>
No. 112—September Term, 1980
(Argued December 3, 1980 Decided February 25, 1981)

Docket No. 80-7260

—
BERMAN ENTERPRISES INC., STANDARD TANK CLEANING
Corer, and GENERAL MARINE TRANSPORT Corp,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

—_—V.—

Loca 333, UNITED MARINE DIVISION, INTERNATIONAL
LONGSHOREMEN’S ASSOCIATION, MARINE TOWING AND
TRANSPORTATION EMPLOYERS’ ASSOCIATION, MCALLIS-
TOR BrRoTHerRS, INc., DieSseL VESSEL OPERATORS, INC.,
SPENTONBUSH TRANSPORT SERVICE, INC., MORANIA
Oi. TANKER CORPORATION, BOUCHARD TRANSPORTA-
TION COMPANY, INC., MORAN TOWING & TRANSPORTA
TION COMPANY, INC., POLING TRANSPORTATION CORPO-
RATION, EKLOF MARINE CORPORATION, RED STAR
MARINE SERVICES, INC., REINAUER TRANSPORTATION
COMPANIES, INC., and TURECAMO COASTAL & HARBOR
TOWING CORPORATION,

Defendants-Appellees.

7

Before:

Oakes and MESKILL, Circuit Judges, and
WerkKeER, District Judge.*

~

° Of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, sitting by designation.

la

2a
Opinion of Court of Appeals

Oakes, Circuit Judge:

This appeal concerns labor practices and collective
bargaining provisions in the marine transportation service
industry. Appellants are three affiliated companies, Ber-
man Enterprises Inc. (Berman), General Marine Trans-
port Corp. (General Marine), and Standard Tank Clean-
ing Corp. (Standard Tank). They allege antitrust viola-
tions by Marine Towing and Transportation Employers’
Association (Association), a multiemployer bargaining
organization, certain of the Association’s members, and
Local 333, United Marine Division, International Long-
shoremen’s Association (Union), a union representing
vessel employees. Appellants also allege labor law viola-
tions by the Union. The United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, Robert W. Sweet,
Judge, at the conclusion of the evidence dismissed all
elements of the antitrust claim except that portion alleg-
ing conspiracy to refuse to deal with Berman. Thereafter
the jury returned verdicts against Berman and the compa-
nies affiliated with it on the remaining antitrust claim and
on the labor claim. The court then denied the appellants’
request for injunctive relief. On appeal the three affiliated
companies argue that the antitrust claim should not have
been dismissed, that the court should have directed a
verdict for the appellants on the labor claim, and tha
evidence concerning salaries of Berman’s officers should
neither have been admitted nor have been the subject of
an argument about Berman’s damages. We cannot accept
these contentions and, accordingly, affirm the judgment
below.

3a
Opinion of Court of Appeals

I. FACTS

Berman, General Marine, and Standard Tank are ali
owned by Standard Marine Services, Inc., which in turn is
owned by Evelyn Berman Frank and her brothers. Ber-
man operates tugs, barges, and harbor tankers in New
York harbor; General Marine operates two ships which
dispose of sewage sludge produced by municipal cus-
tomers; and Standard Tank operates a vessel-cleaning
facility and one tank-cleaning vessel.

General Marine was a member of the Association at the
time the dispute in question arose, but Berman and
Standard Tank were not and the Union did not represent
their employees.' The Union and the Association have
three labor contracts covering employees on tugs, barges,
and self-propelled tankers, respectively. Berman, or its
predecessor, and the appellee Association member corpo-
rations have for many years been customers as well as
competitors of one another, hiring each other’s tugs or
barges from time to time, but also competing for business
from third parties. Berman operates with one man on a
barge and four-man barge crews, whereas members of the
Association, pursuant to a collective bargaining agree-
ment with the Union, operate with two men on a barge
and a six- or seven-man barge crew.

Well before April 1, 1976, the date of the new collective
bargaining agreement with which we are concerned here,
the Union unsuccessfully sought to require Berman to

! When General Marine employees worked on Berman vessels,
General Marine made payments to the Union-Association pension
funds but the employees worked according to Berman wages and
working conditions. Since January 1977 Berman employees’ bargain-
ing representative has been Marine Engineers Beneficial Association
(MEBA).

4a
Opinion of Court of Appeals

cease towing unmanned vegetable oil barges? of MOTC
Acquisitions Corp. (MOTC). The Union had decided that
all barges with less than a certain carrying capacity should
be manned by a crew of two. A federal district court,
however, enjoined the Union from so coercing Berman,
and the National Labor Relations Board subsequently
found that the Union had engaged in a secondary boycott
unlawful under section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4), as well as
having violated other provisions of the NLRA, United
Marine Division Local 333, 226 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1976).
Shortly thereafter the Union, claiming that it had pre-
viously terminated its labor contract, struck General
Marine but again was unsuccessful; a federal district
court enjoined the strike and this court upheld the injunc-
tion on appeal, General Marine Transport Corp. v. Local
333, United Marine Division, No. 75-7559 (2d Cir. Mar.
10, 1976). General Marine later obtained favorable hold-
ings on this matter both before the Board, which found
violations of sections 8(d), 8(b)(3), and 8(b)(1)(A) of the
NLRA, United Marine Division Local 333, 228 N.L.R.B.
1107 (1977), and before an arbitrator.

In January 1976 the Union made certain demands upon
the Association for contract provisions to be incorporated
in the new collective bargaining agreement, which was to
commence on April 1, 1976. This was followed by a
Union demand made to General Marine that all the
Berman companies’ crew members, except those on the
tank-cleaning vessel, join the Union and that all hiring be
done through the Union hiring hall. Further negotiations,
accompanied by the litigation noted above, resulted in an

“Vegetable oil barges” included any barge under $5,000 barrels \.sed
in the animal, vegetable, or fish oil trades.

5a
Opinion of Court of Appeals

impasse, with General Marine refusing to resign from the
Association despite the Association bargaining commit-
tee’s statement that unless General Marine resigned, the
Association would enter into a contract that satisfied the
Union. Finally on March 26, 1976, the Union and the
Association entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
containing what we will call the “vegetable oil” and the
“affiliates” clauses, the first in effect requiring two men
on vegetable oil barges carrying less than 55,000 barrels’
and the second requiring affiliates of Association mem-
bers to operate under the contract.‘

After the Union ratified the new contract, the Union
president wrote General Marine to demand compliance
with the affiliates clause and to list fourteen Berman-
General Marine vessels which he claimed were covered by
the Union-Association contract. At about the same time,
in early April 1976, the Union membership was informed
about and advised to enforce the vegetable oil clause, on
pain of discipline. Following General Marine’s response
that the contract exceeded the scope of the Association’s

5 The “vegetable oil” clause read:

9. Section 29. Vegetable Oil Barges. No vessel operated under
this contract shall tow any barge under $5,000 barrels used in the
animal, vegetable, or fish oil trades unless there are two men
aboard the barge at all times.

This Clause was applicable to the Berman petroleum barges because
they could be cleaned to carry vegetable oil.

4 The “affiliates” clause read in part:
8. Section |. Application Agreement
This Agreement applies only to all licensed and unlicensed Em-
ployees, employed cn tugboats and self-propelled lighters owned or
operated by the Employers, a subsidiary company, an affiliated
company or a company division in the Port of New York and
vicinity.

It went on to provide for strikes against noncomplying employers.

6a
Opinion of Court of Appeals

bargaining power and constituted a group boycott, the
Union again struck General Marine. The Union also
advised Association members not to deal with Berman
and specifically not to tow Berman barges with less than
two men aboard.’ Subsequently, in June 1976, Berman
filed a petition with the Board for an election to deter-
mine whether its employees wanted to be represented by a
labor union. The Union opposed such an election, but the
Board’s Regional Director ordered an election and the
Berman employees chose Marine Engineers Beneficial
Association (MEBA) as their union.

This suit by Berman, General Marine, and Standard
Tank is in two counts—the first charges all defendants
with a combination in restraint of trade under section | of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and seeks damages
under section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, and
an injunction under section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 26. The second count charges the Union alone
with participation in a secondary boycott in violation of
section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act

$ In a column in a Union newspaper, the Union president further
explained the Union-Association contract:

For several years, we have been having problems with certain
companies who have been trying every way possible to duck our
contracts and the wages, benefits and working conditions our
membership is entitled to under those contracts. The actions of
these companies, and some of the men employed by them, have a
ripple effect throughout the industry. The companies have been able
to undercut the rates of companies abiding by the contract, and
thus expand and take work away from others resulting in a loss of
jobs for our members. The new clauses and clause revisions are
designed to strengthen the contract against this type of action,
making the companies competitively equal and thus providing
greater job security for our membership. | have said in the past that
knowing your contract is very important. It now becomes even
more important that every member know and abide by this con-
tract.

Ta
Opinion of Court of Appeals

(LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 187, and seeks damages from the
Union.

The court below held that the vegetable oil and the
affiliates clauses, as well as the actions taken under them,
were not themselves antitrust violations in light of the
so-called “labor exemption” to the antitrust laws,* and,
alternatively, that these clauses did not have the anticom-
petitive purpose or effect necessary to violate section | of
the Sherman Act, though they could be used as evidence
of an agreement to refuse to deal, an agreement which the
jury specially found did not exist. The jury also specially
found against Berman and its affiliated companies on
three questions submitted under the labor law count.’

6 As explicated in Adams, Rav & Rosenbere ». William Morris
Agency, 411 F. Supp. 403, 407-08 (C.D. Cal. 1976), where litigation
involves only union activities, the union may claim a statutory exemr-
tion under sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act, 1§ U.S.C. § 17 and 29
U.S.C. § $2, and under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-
115; where litigation involves the activities of a umion and employers,
the defendants may claim a “nonstatutory exemption,” Connell Con-
struction Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622-23 (1975). See
generally, R. Mann, B. Powers & B. Roberts, The Accommodatnon
Between Antitrust and Labor Law: The Antitrust Labor Exemption, 9
Seton Hall L. Rev. 744 (1978).

? The three questions, all answered negatively by the jury, were:

4. Did Local 333 induce or encourage its members to refuse to
work for their employers when asked to work on Berman vessels or
threaten, coerce or restrain the Association or the corporate defen-
dants in order to:

a. Force Berman to become a member of the Association?

b. Force Berman to recognize Local 333 as the representative of
its employees?
¢. Force the Association or the corporate defendants to cease
doing business with Berman?
Following the verdict, the trial judge denied motions for a new trial,
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict against the Umon on the
labor law count, and for injunctive relief.

8a
Opinion of Court of Appeals

Il. DISCUSSION
A. Antitrust Claim

Berman argues that the vegetable oil and the affiliates
clauses had the purpose of restraining Berman from
charging lower prices and from taking work away from
Union members, and that the clauses had the effect of
excluding Berman as a competitor of Association mem-
bers and restricting the conditions under which Berman
could hire an Association tug.

Berman begins with the assertion that the nonstatutory
labor exemption is not available to protect a combina-
tion, between a union and a nonlabor group, that has an
anticompetitive purpose or effect on the business of
another, Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S.
797, 809-10 (1945), particularly in light of the narrow
construction to be given exemptions from the antitrust
laws, Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Ruyu' Drug
Co., 440 U.S. 205, 231 (1979). This argument has two
prongs. The first is that the agreement here imposed
wages, hours, and working conditions on nonparty em-
ployers and, accordingly, was not exempt from the anti-
trust laws. Federal Maritime Commission v. Pacific
Maritime Association, 435 U.S. 40 (1978) (upheld Federai
Maritime Commission finding that multiemployer bar-
gaining unit-union contract requiring nonparties to com-
ply with fringe benefit programs and other work rules for
hiring-hall work force members is not protected by the
nonstatutory exemption and is subject to section 15 of the
Shipping Act, 46 U.S.C. § 814, which regulates anticom-
petitive agreements in certain maritime industries); United
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665-66 (1965)
(union forfeits its exemption from antitrust laws when it
agrees with one set of employers to impose a wage scale

9a
Opinion of Court of Appeals

on other bargaining units). The second prong relies on the
analysis in Local 189, Amaigamated Meat Cutters v.
Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689-90 (1965),* and Connell
Construction Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616,
622-23 (1975), which concludes that agreements reached
on nonmandatory subjects of bargaining—matters other
than wages, hours, and working conditions—are not
within the nonstatutory exemption if they constitute re-
straints on competition in a business market. See also
Commerce Tankers Corp. v. National Maritime Union,
553 F.2d 793, 801 (2d Cir.) (Jewel Tea-Connell analysis
followed), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923 (1977). Thus Ber-
man’s point is that the challenged agreement fell outside
the scope of the nonstatutory labor exemption to the
antitrust laws: it failed the Pennington test because it set
employment terms for nonparty employers and it failed
under the Jewel Tea-Connell analysis because it embraced
nonmandatory subjects of collective bargaining. We dis-
agree. x

Both of the disputed clauses represented legitimate
union objectives because they dealt either with working
conditions, Jewel Tea,’ or job preservation, /ntercon-
tinental Container Transport Corp. v. New York Shipping
Association, 426 F.2d 884, 886-88 (2d Cir. 1970) (contract

8 Although Justice White spoke for only a three-person plurality, his
statement in Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 689-90, is considered to be a classic
formulation of the standard for determining applicability of the labor
exemption. According to Justice White, the issue is whether the subject
matter of the restriction

is SO intimately related to wages, hours and working conditions that
the unions’ successful attempt to obtain that provision through
bona fide, arm’s-length bargaining in pursuit of their own labor
union policies, and not at the behest of or in combination with
nonlabor groups, falls within the protection of the national labor
policy and is therefore exempt from the Sherman Act.

9 See note 8 supra.

10a
Opinion of Court of Appeals

held exempt from the antitrust laws under the labor
exemption because the union had a right to preserve the
jobs of its members). Any indirect effect upon Berman
was permissible, especially because the contract did not
forbid the use of nonunion members. See California
Dump Truck Owners Association v. Associated General
Contractors, 562 F.2d 607, 613-14 (9th Cir. 1977) (clause
valid even though it might have some effect on the hiring
of nonunion members, because it did not preclude the
hiring of these members). The vegetable oil clause did not
impose any requirements on any nonparty to the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. Rather, it was directed at
union employers (as discussed further in section II. B. of
this opinion) and was designed to prevent erosion of
manning standards by outside economic pressure, to
protect jobs, and to promote safety at sea.'°

The affiliates clause is more troublesome. There is case
law holding that broad clauses such as this one deal with
nonmandatory subjects, at least when they go beyond the
language “necessary to accomplish the legitimate Union
goal of protecting employees against a shift of production
to another [place] to evade standards and wages at the
[present place of employment].” Lone Star Steel Co. v.
NLRB, No. 77-1667, slip op. at 33 (10th Cir. Jul. 28,
1980) (clause applying contract to all facilities presently
owned or hereafter acquired by the employer and facili-
ties owned by subsidiaries and affiliates, upon recognition
of the union, whether or not such operations compete
with the work of unit employees, was not a mandatory
subject), cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3456 (U.S. Dec. 10,
1980) (No. 80-940); see also Amax Coal Co. v. NLRB,

10 There was evidence that tug boat crews felt that unmanned barges
were unsafe to tow. This suggests that barges manned by a single
person might also be unsafe.

lla
Opinion of Court of Appeals

614 F.2d 872, 883-84 (3d Cir. 1980) (clause applying
contract to employees who work in other than the certi-
fied unit and who select the union held not to be a
mandatory subject), cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3353 (U.S.
Oct. 27, 1980) (No. 80-692). Appellees would distinguish
Lone Star Steel and Amax Coal from the instant case on
the basis that the former are bargaining cases under
section 8(b)(3) of the LMRA. But the Jewe/ Tea-Connell
analysis relates us back to the issue of mandatory versus
nonmandatory subjects of bargaining and, thus, these
cases are relevant.

Although the language in the affiliates clause here may
appear broader than necessary to fulfill legitimate union
objectives, as applied to Berman the clause served legiti-
mate goals of the Union. The reason for this is that
General Marine and Berman treated employees as fungi-
ble, that is to say, the two affiliate’? companies used
employees interchangeably.'' There was also some trans-
ferring back and forth of vessels between General Marine
and Berman. Berman was not an independent, unrelated

" Mrs. Frank, president of all three affiliated companies, testified as
follows:

Q. The directors of Berman and the directors of General Marine
are the same people, are they not?

A. That's right.

Q. You as the chief operating officer of Berman and of General
Marine use the employees of Berman and General Marine fungibly
[sic] and interchangeably, is that correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. You have Berman employees doing General Marine work and
General Marine employees doing Berman work, is that correct?

A. I would say mostly it was General Marine doing Berman
work.

Q. In any event, you did use them fungibly [sic] and interchange-
ably, is that correct?

A. That's right, with union consent.

12a
Opinion of Court of Appeals

employer. Under these circumstances, there was in reality
but a single employer, with interrelated operations, com-
mon management, and centralized control of labor rela-
tions, see South Prairie Construction Co. v. Local 627,
Operating Engineers, 425 U.S. 800, 802 n.3 (1976) (quot-
ing Radio Union v. Broadcast Service of Mobile, Inc.,
380 U.S. 255, 256 (1965)), and the affiliates clause vitally
affected working conditions and wages of the Union
members. At least for purposes of application of the
antitrust exemption, it was a legitimate union objective to
protect employees against shifts of work days (and ves-
sels) designed to avoid the standards and wages es-
tablished in the collective bargaining agreement Further-
more, cases such as Federal Maritime Commission and
Pennington are not applicable here because they involved
employer bargaining groups and unions conspiring to
injure truly separate concerns. Berman’s underlying fac-
tual premise that it was am unconnected nonparty is
simply not true.

We also agree with the court below, in the alternative,
that even if the vegetable oil and the affiliates clauses do
not fall within the labor exemption, there was no proof of
an antitrust violation under the rule of reason, which
would be applicable here. See, e.g., National Society of
Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
687-88 (1978); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 & n.16, 58-59 (1977). Despite the
Union newspaper column’s language quoted in the
margin,'? we fail to discern either an anticompetitive
purpose or an anticompetitive effect. The Supreme
Court, in National Society of Professional Engineers, 435
U.S. at 687-88, made it clear that the inquiry under the

2 See note 5 supra.

13a
Opinion of Court of Appeals

rule of reason is directed at the challenged restraint’s
overall impact on competitive conditions, rather than
whether a particular party has been restrained by the
conduct at issue. In the instant case, neither the vegetable
oil nor the affiliates clause constituted an unreasonable
restraint of trade. There was a good deal of testimony to
establish that the true purposes behind the clauses were
job preservation, maintenance of working conditions,
and safety, none of which is anticompetitive in nature. As
for the effect of the clauses, they were in effect for only a
short period of time, and to the extent that Berman
suffered any drop in the volume of its business, the
evidence clearly demonstrated that it was due to condi-
tions unrelated to this dispute. See generally VD. Leslie,
Principles of Labor Antitrust, 66 U. Va. L. Rev. 1183
(1980) (suggesting that an antitrust violation may be
found only if the union’s use of a restraint is part of a
scheme to regulate a product market by controlling
prices, Outputs, or market allocations).

B. Labor Law Claim

In light of the special jury verdicts set forth in the
margin,'? Berman’s labor law claim must be based essen-
ially on establishing that it was entitled to a directed
verdict on the secondary boycott issue and that the jury
charge confused lawful primary activity with unlawful
secondary activity. The alleged violation of section 303 of
the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 187, depends on whether the
Union violated section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(4).

Under National Woodwork Manufacturers Association
v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967), it is now well settled that

3 See note 7 supra.

l4a
Opinion of Court of Appeals

section 8(b)(4)(A) (which incorporates by reference sec-
tion 8(e)) and section 8(b)(4)(B) of the NLRA are in-
tended to prohibit not agreements or actions directed
toward the primary employer, but secondary objectives
such as the exertion of pressure on a neutral employer.
The key question, therefore, is whether the provisions
that the Union sought were aimed at preserving work and
maintaining working conditions or whether they were
tactically calculated by the Union to saiisfy its objectives
elsewhere. /d. at 644-45. In NLRB v. International Long-
shoremen’s Association, 48 U.S.L.W. 4765, 4769 (U.S.
June 20, 1980), the Supreme Court stated that

a lawful work preservation agreement must pass two
tests: First, it must have as its objective the preserva-
tion of work traditionally performed by employees
represented by the union. Second, the contracting
employer must have the power to give the employees
the work in question—the so-called “right of con-
trol” test... .

And the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia,
discussing contract clauses analogous to the “two men on
a barge” requirement in the instant case, noted that

[t]he test as to the “primary” nature of a subcontrac-
tor clause in an agreement with a general contractor
has been phrased by scholars as whether it “will
directly benefit employees covered thereby,” and
“seeks to protect the wages and job opportunities of
the employees covered by the contract.” We have
phrased the test as whether the clauses are “germane
to the economic integrity of the principal work unit,”
and seek “to protect and preserve the work and
standards [the union] has bargained for,” or instead

15a
Opinion of Court of Appeals

“extend beyond the [contracting] employer and are
aimed really at the union’s difference with another
employer.”

Painters District Council 48 v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 534, 538
(D.C. Cir. 1964) (footnotes omitted). Although Berman
claims that the Union’s conduct fails these tests, the
evidence does not sustain this argument.

Berman complains about Union pressure on the Asso-
ciation to force Association members not to tow Berman
barges or to hire its tugs. Berman asserts that the history
of the relationship between it and the Union shows that
pressure on Association members not to tow Berman
barges was exerted solely to impose manning and other
labor requirements on nonunit vessels and nonunion
employees. Indeed, Berman contends that any work pres-
ervation argument regarding this point is frivolous be-
cause when Berman hired an Association member’s tug to
tow a Berman barge, Berman gave work to, rather than
took work away from, Association members’ employees.
But this is all a one-sided interpretation of the facts.

The “idle tugs”'* and the “two men on a barge”
requirements were designed to preserve jobs for the bar-
gaining unit, protect Union tugmen from exposure to
serious safety risks, and prevent erosion of contractual
manning standards, see NLRB v. International Long-
shoremen’s Association, 48 U.S.L.W. at 4769; NLRB vy.
National Maritime Union, 486 F.2d 907, 912 (2d Cir.
1973) (“subcontracting clauses . . . which restrict sub-
contracting to those who observe certain pay scales and
conditions of employment, are valid”), cert. denied, 416

14 This refers to the Union effort to obtain a commitment from
employers not to hire outside tugs when their own tugs stood idle.

léa
Opinion of Court of Appeals

U.S. 970 (1974); Painters District Council 48, 328 F.2d at
538-39 (“ ‘to limit the work to employers maintaining
labor standards commensurate with those required by the
Union’ was within ‘the area of legitimate union claim’ ”).
And as for Berman’s claim that it was giving work to
Association employees, this ignores the sometimes com-
petitive relationship between Berman barges and Associa-
tion barges, and the fact that use of Berman’s under-
manned barges may have taken jobs away from the
bargaining unit. In short, as the Union points out, the
Union’s effort to secure the “idle tugs” rule was to
preserve work and its pressure for the “two men on a
barge” requirement was analogous to a legitimate “union
standards” objective rather than to a prohibited “union
signatory” purpose, see National Maritime Union, 486
F.2d at 912. The Union's conduct also is not vulnerable to
Berman’s “right to control” argument because the Union
did not coerce Association members to obtain work for
the Union that the members had no right or power to
assign, NLRB v. Enterprise Association of Pipefitters,
429 U.S. 507, 521-28 (1977).

Certainly there was ample evidence to support this view
that the Union’s objectives were primary rather than
secondary and thus, in our opinion, the trial judge prop-
erly sent the labor law issue to the jury. Furthermore, the
jury charge correctly stated that if the Union’s sole
purpose was work preservation then the activity was
primary and protected, but that if the Union’s purpose
was to force Berman to recognize the Union or to require
Berman to join the Association then the jury had to find
in favor of Berman. See National Woodwork, 386 U.S. at
644-45.

17a
Opinion of Court of Appeals

C. Evidence on Salaries

The final issue is an evidentiary one. Berman claims
that the court erroneously permitted the appellees to
present evidence about the salaries of Berman’s officers
to demonstrate that Berman had not been injured by the
alleged antitrust and labor law violations and that this
evidence unfairly prejudiced the jury. We cannot agree
with this contention. The evidence on salaries was rele-
vant to Berman’s operations because Berman was a close
corporation; it was also admissible to impeach the credi-
bility of Berman’s president, Mrs. Frank. It was within
the trial judge’s discretion to decide that the probative
value cy the evidence was not outweighed by unfair
prejudice, see Fed. R. Evid. 403. As for the cases cited by
Berman, see, ¢.g., United States v. Stahl, 616 F.2d 30,
31-33 (2d Cir. 1980); Koufakis v. Carvel, 425 F.2d 892,
900-05 (2d Cir. 1970), they are inapposite. In each of
those cases the plaintiff had gone to great lengths to
appeal to class prejudice in characterizing the defendant
as a very rich man. Here, the salary information was
simply one of many pieces of evidence and it was submit-
ted for limited purposes, without either undue emphasis
or unscrupulous references.

Judgment affirmed.

18a

Petition for Rehearing

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Szconp Crecurr
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
in and for the Second Circuit, held at the United States

Court House, in the City of New York, on the 13th day of
May 13, one thousand nine hundred and eighty-one.

No. 80-7260

Berman Enterprises Inc., Stanparp Tank
Creanine Corp., and Genera, Manine Transport Corp.,

Plaintiff s-Appellants,

vs.

Locat 333, Unrrep Marve Division, IvrerwationaL Lone-
SHOREMEN’s Association, Marine Towtnc anp TRanspor-
tation Emptoyvers’ Association, McAuuister BrotHers,
Inc., Dresetr Vessexr Operators, Inc., Spentonsusx
Transport Service, Inc., Morantua Or Tanker Corpora-
tion, Boucnarp Transportation Company, Inc., Moran
Tow1nc & Transportation Company, Inc., Potine Trans-
PoRTATION Corporation, ExLor Marine Corporation, Rep
Stan Marine Services, Inc., Retwaver Transportation
Companies, Inc., and Turecamo Coastat & Harsor Tow-
tno CoRPORATION,

Defendants-Appellees.

A petition for rehearing containing a suggestion that the
action be reheard in banc having been filed herein by coun-

19a
Petition for Rehearing

sel for the plaintiffs-appellants, Berman Enterprises, Inc.,
Standard Tank Cleaning Corp., and General Marine Trans-

port Corp.,
Upon consideration by the panel that heard the appeal,
it is
Orperep that said petition for rehearing is Dentep.
It is further noted that the suggestion for rehearing in
banc has been transmitted to the judges of the court in
regular active service and to any other judge on the panel

that heard the appeal and that no such judge has requested
that a vote be taken thereon.

/8/ A. Dante Fusaro
A. Daniel Fusaro, Clerk

20a

Bench Opinion of District Court
£1169]
Ocroser 11, 1979

By How. Rosert W. Sweer
on Derenpants’ Motion To Dismiss

The Court: Gentlemen, first of all, I want to thank you

all very much for the very helpful briefs that you have
given me and also for the argument which was again very
useful. And I want to hasten to say what I guess will be-
come obviou~ in the course of these remarks, and that is
that I don’t regard this as a pro forma motion to dismiss,
and it’s been apparent, I think, all along that that was the
case.
Also I should say, by way of preface, I’m sure all of you
are very familiar with the views of the Court of Appeals
on the subject o* motions to dismiss, and there is obviously
an important factor in a case, in any case, but in particular
in a case like this, particularly in an area as difficult as
this one, the risk of precluding the Court of Appeals from
having a full record on which they can make a determina-
tion is [1170] obviously a factor which has to be taken
into consideration, and I take that very seriously, and that
is one of the elements of this decision.

The Court of Appeals, so far as the circuit has indicated
to us in Commerce Tankers v. NMU, and the difficulty
which faces me now, that there Judge Feinberg stated,
“Both these assertions”—that is, the assertions under a
factual situation similar to this—“raise extremely complex
and significant questions on the interaction between the
federal labor and antitrust laws. The accommodation of
these conflicting policies reflected in these laws has aptly
been called a troublesome and unruly issue.”

2la
Bench Opinion of District Court

And I certainly find it so.

Now, with respect to the events relating to the MOTC
strike, the difficulty with the union, with respect to that
difficulty, with respect to the vegetable clause in the 76
contract, and with respect to the affiliation clause in the "76
contract, and those are all shorthands which you gentlemen
understand, I conclude that those are properly subject to
the labor exemption, and were I wrong in that assumption
I would still reach the conclusion that a cause is not set
forth as a result of those elements [1171] alone, for there
has been, in my view, an insufficient showing of any anti-
competitive purpose or effect under the rule of reason
which would apply, if I were wrong, and they could be
considered to be antitrust violations.

However, that in my view does not end the case, although
I recognize that there is argument to the contrary. It seems
to me that there remains a problem, and that is as to
whether or not there is enough to go to the jury on a charge
of a refusal to deal.

In that regard, let me say that I believe the case—I will
grant the motion with respect to Eklof, Diesel and Bou-
chard, for I feel that there has been no showing, even if it
be assumed for the sake of this motion, that a cause has
been set forth, that is, that there is a violation, there has
been on the numbers an insufficient showing of any proxi-
mate cause of injury resulting from that violation, if the
violation were to be found.

Mr. Pollack: Turecamo also, your Honor?

The Court: No. Turecamo is in a different situation
because there the numbers can be argued to create an in-
jury, in my view.

[1172] Now, that leaves you with where we are at the
moment. I also believe that an agreement, if you will, and

22a
Bench Opinion of District Court

using “agreement” to mean a contract, combination, re-
straint of trade, etc., etc., between the Association and the
union or between the union and individual companies to
establish the manning procedures on the barges, that is, to
refuse to tow unmanned barges, I believe that also is
covered by the labor exemption. However, that still, in my
mind, although I think it is difficult, does not necessarily
dispose of the case; and, incidentally, I would propose
that—I will try to frame instructions for the jury some-
what along the lines of what I am now telling you all when
it becomes necessary to do that, for I do think that there
is a case to go to the jury, and that is as to whether or not
there is an agreement or contract or combination in re-
straint of trade to refuse to deal with Berman.

The evidence which I see from which the jury might, it
seems to me, infer such a refusal to deal is the Cornette
conversation with Elzer, the O’Hare conversation with
Bushey, the clauses in the contract, though I believe that
they are part of the labor exemption, I also believe that
they could [1173] be evidence of an intent, and the arguable
loss of business and the fact of the refusal to deal.

Now, I have been troubled by the fact that there has uot
been a totality uf a refusal to deal. Obviously there have
been dealings, but I believe that there is enough from which
the jury might infer that there has been a diminution of
business constituting a refusal to deal.

In reaching that decision, I, of course, am compelled to
view the facts in the most favorable light possible for the
plaintiffs, and, indeed, I may have done so even in a more
favorabe light than the plaintiffs chemselves, but nonethe-
less, that is what I have decided, gentlemen, that there will
be a case of a refusal to deal that will go to the jury as I

23a
Bench Opinion of District Court

have indicated. But there will be instructions with respect
to labor exemptions when the time comes.

Now, how are we going to proceed this afternoon? Ob-
viously we have got these preliminary matters, and then
after that.

Mr. Bernstein: Well, I have these—

The Court: Yes, I say, preliminary matters, exhibits,
whatever you want to call them.

Oh, by the way, yes, my clerk points out to [1174] me
I didn’t say anything about the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act. Obviously from what I have said, I believe that
there is an issue that should go to the jury as to whether
or not the union sought to compel Berman either to join
the Association or to compel its empleyees to join the
union.

Yes. Mr. Waldman?

Mr. Waldman: Your Honor, I guess I am thinking out
loud now, I have to have some time to consider how I want
to proceed. I had prepared—I guess there is no point in
keeping it secret because it isn’t a secret—my intent was
to go forward this afternoon with witnesses who would
deal with the question of the safety implications of the
one-man-on-a-barge situation, bearing in mind that we have
argued thus far the manning requirement, the job preserva-
tion, there was a second arrow in that quiver, and that was
safety. It strikes me that the court’s ruling may make that
academic unless I want to be sure I have a stronger record
on appeal—

The Court: You do what you want, but despite my deter-
mination I would not consider it irrelevant.

Mr. Waldman: But your present inclination, [1175] or
your ruling is you will not allow that issue to go to the jury.

24a
Bench Opinion of District Court

The Court: No, I will instruct the jury that if they find
that the purpose of the union and the defendants was to
enforce the manning provision, the unmanned-barge pro-
vision, forgive me if the language isn’t proper, but if that
was the purpose of the refusal to deal, if they find a refusal
to deal, they must find for the defendants.

25a

Opinion of District Court
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Souruern Disrrict or New York
77 Civ. 272 (RWS)

Berman Er rerpnises, Inc., Stanparp Tank
Cuieanine Corp., and GeneraL Marine Transport Corp.,

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Locat 333, Unrrep Martve Division,
INTERNATIONAL LoNGSHOREMEN’S Assoc1aTIoN, et al.,

Defendants.

Sweet, D.J.

Plaintiffs Berman Enterprises, Inc. (“Berman”), Stan-
dard Tank Cleaning Corp. (“Standard Tank”), and General
Marine Transport Corp. (“General Marine”) have moved
for a new trial on all issues under Rule 59, Fed.R.Civ.P., for
a directed verdict against defendant Local 333, United
Marine Division, International Longshoremen’s Association
(“Local 333”) under Rule 50, Fed.R.Civ.P., and for entry
of findings of fact, conclusions of law and an injunction
against certain activities by the defendants. The motions
are denied.

The motions under Rules 50 and 59 for a new trial and
for a directed verdict present no facts or legal theories
which were not carefully reviewed and adjudicated at trial.
In the absence of new grounds for relief, the court declines
to alter its rulings on these admittedly complex legal is-

26a
Opinion of District Court

sues, or to disturb the findings reached by the jury after
careful deliberation. Accordingly, these motions are
denied.

Berman has also moved for entry of factual findings and
conclusions of law in accordance with Rule 52, Fed.R.Civ.P.
Berman claims that the court must consider separately a
legal theory which was not presented to the jury and which
calls for entry of injunctive relief independently of the
jury’s verdict. The defendants have submitted pro) osed
findings of fact, but continue to oppose the motion.

Although Berman’s suit is for injunctive relief as well as
damages, Berman is not entitled to separate factual conclu-
sions by the court in this case. It has been consistently held
that where legal claims are combined with equitable claims,
“the legal issues are to be tried first and the findings of the
jury are binding on the trier of the equitable claims.” GTE
Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 986
n. 7 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 433 U.S. 36 (1977). See also
Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959); Com-
mercial Iron & Metal Co. v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 581
F.2d 246 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1229
(1979) ; Southland Reship, Inc. v. Flegel 534 F.2d 639, reh.
denied, 539 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1976); Robime v. Ryan, 310
F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1962).

Berman demanded a jury trial on all issues. The jury
found that there was no agreement, combination or con-
spiracy among the defendants to refuse to deal with Ber-
man in violation of the antitrust laws. The jury also found
that Local 333 did not induce or encourage its members
to refuse to work on Berman vessels or threaten, coerce or
restrain either the Marine Towing and Transportation Em-
ployees’ Association (the “Association”) or the corporate
defendants in order to force Berman to become a member

27a
Opinion of District Court

of the Association, to recognize Local 333 as the represen-
tative of its employees or to force the Association or the
corporate defendants to cease doing business with Berman.
In short, the jury found against Berman on ali factual is-
sues which could provide a predicate for the issuance of
injunctive relief in this case. The jury’s conclusions are
amply supported by the evidence adduced during this three
week trial.

Under these circumstances, there is no basis for entry of
factual findings, conclusions of law or an injunction which
would necessarily contradict the explicit findings of fact
reached by the jury. Therefore the motion under Rule 52
is denied.

Ir Is So Onperep:
/8/ Roserr W. Sweet, U.S_D.J.

Dated: New York, New York
March 3, 1980

Judgment

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SoutHern District or New Yorx
77 Civil 272 (RWS)

Berman Enrerpnises, Iwc., et al,
Plaintiffs,

—against—
Locau 333 Unirep Martye Drvistox,
I~TerNaTIONAL LonosHOREMEN’s Association, et al.,

Defendants.

The issues in the above entitled action having been
brought on regularly for trial, before the Honorable Robert
W. Sweet, United States District Judge, and a jury, on
September 26, October 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 15, 17, 18 and 19,
1979, and defendants Diesel Vessel Operators, Bouchard
Transportation and Eklof Marine Corp., having moved to
dismiss, and said motion having been granted, and at the
conclusion of the evidence the jury having returned a ver-
dict in favor of the defendants, it is,

Orperep, Apsupcep and Decreep: That the complaint be
and it is hereby dismissed in its entirety.

Dated: New York, N.Y.
October 26, 1979

/s/ Samvet F. Burenarpr, Clerk

L
uol}ISOddG

, on Ollice -Supresas Court, |
No. 81-279 FILED

I SEP 28 1981
N THE
Supreme Court of the United States *- © NBER L STEM!

Octoser Term, 1981 a

BerMaN Enterprises, Inc., STANDARD TANK CLEANING CorP.,

and GENERAL Marine Transport Corp.,
Petitioners,
Vv.

LocaL 333, Unrrep Marine Division, INTERNATIONAL LONGSHORE-
MEN’s ASSsOciIATION, MARINE TOWING AND TRANSPORTATION EM.
PLOYERS AssociaTION, McA.uister Brotuers, INnc., Diesen
VessEL Operators, INc., SPENTONBUSH TRANSPORT SERVICE,
Inc., Moranta Om Tanker Corporation, Boucnarp TRraNns-
PORTATION CoMPANY, INc., Moran Tow1rne & TRANSPORTATION
Company, Inc., Potinc Transportation Corporation, EKLOF
Marine Corporation, Rep Star Marine Services, [nc., Reww-
AUER TRANSPORTATION CoMPANIES, INC., and TurEcAMO CoasTAL

& Harsor Towine Corporation,
Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR LOCAL 333,
UNITED MARINE DIVISION,
INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN’S ASSOCIATION
IN OPPOSITION

Seymour M. WaLpMAN
501 Fifth Avenue

New York, N. Y. 10017
(212) 661-1230

Attorney for Respondent Local 333,
United Marine Division,
International Longshoremen’s Association

Wartpman & WatpMay, P.C.
Of Counsel

Questions Presented

1. (a) Whether the courts below properly held that an
employer association and a Union did not violate the Sher-
man Act as a matter of law in voluntarily agreeing to
apply their collective bargaining agreement to subsidiaries
2ud affiliates of contracting employers, when the evidence
showed that the commonly owned and operated plaintiff
corporations—one of which was an Association member
and the other of which was not—interchanged vessels and
employees at will, made fringe benefit contributions for
some but not all employees on both sets of vessels, formed
new vessel-owning or operating companies without inform-
ing the Union and the Association, and in general frus-
trated the Union’s ability to know which vessels and per-
sonnel were covered by the contract and to enforce the
agreed-upon terms and conditions.

(b) Whether the courts below correctly held that this
challenged contract provision did not, in any event, have
the requisite anticompetitive purpose or effect, when it
was never applied to plaintiff Berman, never affected Ber-
man’s operations, caused Berman no damage, and was
shortly rendered ineffective as a matter of law through
an NLBB representation proceeding under which another
union was certified to represent Berman’s employees.

2. (a) Whether the courts below properly held that a
negotiated collective bargaining provision providing that
employers in the contracting Association would not tow
vegetable oil barges without two persons aboard did not
violate the Sherman Act as a matter of law, when the
evidence showed that the Association members operating
vegetable oil barges had two employees aboard, the Union
was concerned about maintenance of that standard man-

ii

ning scale, and the use of less than two persons created
safety hazards to employees in the Union’s bargaining unit.

(b) Whether the courts below correctly held that this
challenged contract provision did not, in any event, have
the requisite anticompetitive purpose and effect, when Ber-
man never operated vegetable oil barges and the challenged
provision was never applied to Berman, never affected its
operations, caused Berman no damage, and shortly after
its adoption was formally deleted from the collective bar-
gaining agreement,

3. Whether the trial court properly submitted to the
jury, under unchallenged instructions, the issue whether
the Union’s efforts to maintain its long-standing contrac-
tual manning standard of two employees aboard petroleum
barges, constituted work preservation which was not vio-
lative of Section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA or a secondary
boycott violative of that Section.

4. Whether the trial court properly permitted defendants
to show the large, increasing salaries paid to the several
family members employed as officers and executives of
Berman, after Berman’s officers had testified to the losses
allegedly incurred by it, its declining credit standing, its
cash flow problems, its recourse to borrowing from friends,
and the personal sacrifices of its principal owner and Pres-
ident in selling her own home.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Questions Presented i
Table of Authorities iii
Statement of the Case —................ 1
Nature of the Case ........................... 1
The “Subsidiaries and Affiliates” Clause .................... 3
See I RE IID ccc cetcccccecesctnrceneeeniccoinie 6
“Two Men on a Barge”’ .............. a Lae
The Trial Court’s Rulings and Instructions .............. 10
Reasons for Denying the Writ 2.2.2.0. oeeeccceeeeeeees 12

I. The “Subsidiaries and Affiliates” Clause Was Not
Unlawful as a Matter of Law and Had No Anti-
competitive Purpose or Effect 2.02.2... 13

II. The “Vegetable Oil” Clause, an Abortive Effort to
Protect Union Standards and Prevent Safety
Hazards, Did Not Violate the Sherman Act ........ 15

III. The Trial Judge Properly Submitted to the Jury,
Under the Section 303 Count, the Issue Whether
the Union’s Conduct, Including the Negotiation
of the 1976 Contract Provisions, Was Primary or
Fee 17

IV. The “Two Men on a Barge” Effort Was Directed
at Maintenance of Union Standards, the Preser-
vation of Unit Work, and the Prevention of Un-
safe Working Conditions, and, Therefore, Did
Not Violate Section 8(b)(4)(B) as a Matter of

iv
Taste or AUTHORITIES
Cases: PAGE

Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940) ........ 16

Artists & Associates, Inc. H.A. v. Actors’ Equity Asso-
ciation, —— U.S. ——, 45 USLW 4557 (decided May

8 RNR a ane oe ae ae er mo 13
Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421
U.S. 616 (1975) sali ciaicinnsaiancetipioniansldiaibdiaiaiiiell 15, 16
Douds v. ILA, 241 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1957), affirming
147 F.Supp. 108 ...................... 13
Federal Maritime Commission v. Pacific Maritime
Association, 435 U.S. 40 (1978) 14
ILA v. NLRB, 277 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1960) —.............. 13
NLRB v. ILA, 447 U.S. 490 (1980) _............. 16
NLRB v. Local 825 Operating Engineers, 400 U.S. 297
(1971) 18
NLRB v. NMU, 486 F.2d 907 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
den’d, 416 U.S. 970 15
NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46 (1974) -................... 18
National Woodwork Manufacturers Ass’n v. NLRB,
IID» istcteecnsniestosccstecestncenanssiuillinten 16, 17
Painters District Council v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 534 (D.C.
PS ie 15
Radio Union v. Broadcast Service of Mobile, Inc., 380
Tain nh cceteirhannieseeneetscilieniiattatanseiieinlgeiniiiida) 13
South Prairie Construction Co. v. Local 627, Operating
Engineers, 425 U.S. 800 (1976) 2. eeeeeeeneceeenneeee 13

Teamsters Local 179 (Alexander Warehouse & Sales
Co.), 128 NLRB 916 (1960) 0... " 17

PAGE
Teamsters Local 560 (Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc.),

248 NLRB No. 156 (1980) 17
UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) 14
Statutes:

Labor Management Relations Act

Section 303, 29 U.S.C. §187 _.... 2
National Labor Relations Act

Section 8(B)(4)(A), 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(4)(A) —..... 17

Section 8(B)(4)(B), 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(4)(B) ... 17

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocrosper Term, 1981
No. 81-279

Berman Ewnrerpnises, Ixc., Stanparp Tank CLEANING
Corp., and General Marine Transport Corr.,

Petitioners,
v.

Loca, 333, Unrrep Marine Division, LyrernationaL Lone-
SHOREMEN’s AssociaTiION, Marine Towine anv Trans-
PORTATION EMp Lovers’ Association, Mca.uister Broru-
ens, Inc., Diesen Vesser Orerators, Ixc., SpeNtonsusH
Transport Service, Inc., Morantra Ow. Tanker Cor-
poration, Bovcuarp Transportation Company, Iwnc.,
Moran Tow1rne & Transportation Company, Inc., Potine
Transportation Corporation, Extor Marine Corpora-
tion, Rep Stan Marine Services, Inc., Remnaver Trans-
PorTATION Companies, Inc., and Turecamo CoastaL &
Harsor Tow1rne Corporation,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR LOCAL 333,
UNITED MARINE DIVISION,
INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN’S ASSOCIATION
IN OPPOSITION

Statement of the Case

Nature of the Case.

In a two-count complaint, plaintiffs' charged all defen-
dants with a concerted refusal to deal in violation of the

‘Only Berman sought damages in this action. The other two
plaintiffs sought only injunctive relief against the contract clauses.
By the time of trial the injunction claim had long since been
mooted.

2

Sherman Act and charged defendant Local 333 with a
secondary boycott in violation of Section 302 of the Labor-
Management Relations Act of 1947, based on identical
allegations.

After a three-week trial, both claims were submitted to
the jury under a series of special verdict questions to
which plaintiffs took no exception. The jury decided
against plaintiffs on all issues (A 1584-1585).*

Plaintiffs raise no question as to the correctness of the
District Judge’s charge to the jury. Their petition centers
on two clauses included in the 1976 collective bargaining
agreement between Local 333 and the multi-employer Asso-
ciation with which the Union negotiates. The petition
creates the misleading impression that these clauses were
the subject of a separate antitrust claim which the trial
court refused to submit to the jury. That is not so. Plain-
tiffs alleged a single antitrust count, the thrust of which
w is that the defendant corporations, at the instigation of
the Union, refused to do business with Berman; and that
was the burden of their case throughout the lawsuit (A
19-20). The contract clauses were simply two items of
evidence adduced in support of that claim.

Neither contract provision, if applied to Berman, would
have caused Berman’s business with the other defendants
to have ceased or diminished or had any other effect al-
leged in the complaint. But neither clause was ever applied
to Berman or enforced against it. Plaintiff's own President
and principal stockholder testified flatly that neither clause
had any impact upon Berman. One of the two clauses was
deleted from the collective agreements less than three
months after its negotiation and the other was ineffective

* Numbers preceded by “A” refer to page numbers in the Joint
Appendix in the Court of Appeals. Numbers followed by “a” refer
to the Appendix to the petition.

from the outset and soon thereafter became inapplicable
as a matter of law. Accordingly, the trial Judge correctly
charged that these clauses in and of themselves, could not
constitute an actionable Sherman Act violation, although
he specifically instructed the jury that it could consider
them as evidence of an antitrust combination.

Both the District Court and Court of Appeals also held,
in full consonance with the decisions of this Court and
the Courts of Appeals, that neither clause, in the cireum-
stances of this case, violated the Sherman Act.

The only other contention pressed by plaintiff relates
to what was termed the “two men on a barge” issue. Al-
though their position is not made clear, they seem to urge
that this Union effort entitled Berman to a directed verdict
on the secondary boycott claim as a matter of law. Again,
they do not challenge the jury instructions which faithfully
mirrored the terms of the governing statute and the deci-
sions of this Court.

The “Subsidiaries and Affiliates” Clause.

In 1969, several vears before the incorporation of plain-
tiff Berman, General Marine, then the vessel-operating
company: of the Berman family, recognized Local 333 as
the collective bargaining representative for the crew mem-
bers aboard five named vessels (A 1564-1565, 1187). Gen-
eral Marine was a member of the Association and bound
by its collective agreements with the Union (A 1241, 1189-
1190). Several years later, the family formed Berman
Enterprises, Inc., but gave the Union no notice of this
fact and continued to deal with the Union—and other com-
panies as well—in the name of General Marine (.\ 417-418,
456, 603-604, 1498-1525).

The plaintiff companies were commonly owned, managed
and operated as an integrated enterprise; Evelyn Berman

4

Frank, President and principal stockholder, conducted the
labor relations of all three. Corporate officers were paid
salaries by one company to cover their work for all, and
funds were shared by all entities as needed (A 528, 552-
554, 669-671).

Mrs. Frank transferred both vessels and personnel back
and forth between her operating companies “fungibly and
interchangeably” (A 554, 556-558). When boats were shift-
ed from one company to another, the Union was not ad-
vised (A 456-457, 603). Contributions to the collectively
bargained pension and insurance funds were made in the
name of General Marine, with no consistency, not only for
crews aboard the sludge vessels—the nominal General
Marine boats—but for employees on Berman tugs, barges
and tankers as well (A 855, 861-862, 1498-1525).

The Union never knew which vessels and employees were
within the bargaining unit covered by its Association
agreement and which were not; and Union officials made
no secret of their frustration on this score. Because of
the confused status fostered by plaintiffs’ mode of opera-
tion, the Union experienced difficulty in enforcing the
agreement; and the employment conditions aboard plain-
tiffs’ vessels did not comply with those prescribed by the
collective agreement (A 290-291, 337).

Prompted at least in part by the elusive nature of the
Berman-General Marine enterprise, the Union included
among its contract demands in 1976 a proposal that “sub-
sidiaries and affiliates” of Association companies be cov-
ered by the new agreement. During the course of negotia-
tions, Mrs. Frank was offered the opportunity to withdraw
from the Association so that her companies would not be
bound by the contract; she was advised that, in light of
Union pressures, the Association would probably agree to
this demand (A 1280, 272-273, 279-282, 285-287). The Union

indicated that it would acquiesce in General Marine’s with-
drawal from the negotiations (A 299-294), although other-
wise untimely under NLRB doctrine (A 1189); but Mrs.
Frank declined to do so (A 319-320). After extensive nego-
tiations, the clause was included in the 1976 agreement.

In early April, 1976, shortly after the making of the
new contract, General Marine formally repudiated it, con-
tending that the “subsidiaries and affiliates” clause con-
stituted an improper attempt to enlarge the bargaining unit
without its consent. Berman took the position that as a
nonmember of the Association, it was not bound by the
Association agreement, and Berman never adhered to the
terms of that agreement (A 573-574, 1187-1189, 1530-1536).

In mid-April 1976, two weeks after the new agreement
became effective, Berman recognized a rival labor organ-
ization, the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association
(MEBA) as exclusive bargaining representative of all its
employees. There followed a flurry of Labor Board ac-
tivity: an unfair labor practice charge by Local 333; a
settlement agreement by which Berman rescinded the recog-
nition of MEBA and agreed not to recognize any union
unless certified by the Board; a simultaneous representation
petition filed by Berman; and a lengthy representation
proceeding during which Berman maintained that its
NLBB settlement precluded it from dealing with any union.
In December 1976, the Regional Director ordered an elec-
tion which was held in January 1977. MEBA won and has
thereafter been representing Berman’s employees (A 625-
630, 1484, 1531-1536, 1567-1568). Since the NLRB certifica-
tion of MEBA in January 1977—the very day this action
was commenced—the Association-Local 333 agreement, in-
cluding the “subsidiaries and affiliates” clause, could not
be applied to Berman as a matter of law. There is no evi-
dence that anyone sought to do so.

Thus, at no time since the effective date of the new Asso-
ciation-Local 333 agreement, April 1, 1976, has that con-
tract been applied to Berman, been observed by Berman,
or governed the terms and conditions of employment of
Berman’s employees. Understandably, Mrs. Frank testified
that this clause never affected Berman (A 573-575).

The “Vegetable Oil” Clause.

For many years Local 333 has had separate bargaining
relationships with a company called Manhattan Oil Trans-
port Co, (“MOTC”), which operated barges carrying
vegetable oil, not petroleum products, and one tug, the
Michael Tracy, which was covered by MOTC’s Local 333
agreement and supplied about 95% of its towing needs
(A 217-220). Unlike the great bulk of towing and tranis-
portation employees in New York Harbor, MOTC’s barge-
men were represented by a labor organization other than
Local 333 (A 175). That organization, while insisting that
two bargemen be aboard during transfer of cargo, per-
mitted the barges to travel unmanned, a condition which
Local 333 considered hazardous to its tugmen (A 182-183).
Securing unmanned barges to tugs required tug deckhands
to jump from tug to barge and back again, across open
water, from one slippery level to another, often in the
dark. When barges are manned, lines are tossed or handed
from the employee stationed aboard one vessel to the em-
ployee aboard the other (A 308-311, 340-341, 198-200).

Local 333 has one other company under contract which
operates vegetable oil barges; that company keeps two men
aboard its barges at all times, and the Union feared that
it would seek the same reduced manning as MOTC (A 175-
177, 302-304, 306). Accordingly, for safety reasons and
manning scale preservation, the Union sought, unsuccess-
fully as it turned out, to insure that tugs crewed by Local

7

333 members were not required to tow unmanned MOTC
barges.

As a result of a Union bargaining demand, the 1976 Asso-
ciation-Local 333 agreement included a new provision that
no tug covered by the agreement would tow any vegetable
oil barge of specified capacity without two bargemen
aboard (A 1212). That clause had no effect, was never
applied to Berman, and was soon deleted from the contract.

In early April, 1976 having concluded the Association
agreement, the Union began negotiations with MOTC,
pressing the same demand for the tug Michael Tracy.
MOTC resisted, tied up the Michael Tracy, locked out its
Local 333 tug crew, successfully operated its barges with
the aid of Berman tugs, and forced the Union to accept
an agreement which did not require two men aboard vege-
table oil barges towed by the Local 333 tug Michael Tracy.

Meanwhile the NLRB Regional Director was considering
an unfair labor practice charge filed by plaintiffs under
§ 8(e) of the NLRA against the “vegetable oil” clause in
the Association-Local 333 contract. Rather than litigate
the issue—particularly in light of its failure to obtain a
similar provision covering the tug performing 95% of
MOTC towing—the Union agreed to delete the clause in
the Association’s collective agreement. On June 15, 1976,
the Union wrote the Association confirming the parties’
understanding that this clause would no longer be imple-
mented or enforced against anyone (A 1496). Since then,
the clause has in fact been a dead letter; and Berman has
never contended otherwise. Mrs. Frank testified that the
“vegetable oil” clause, like the “subsidiaries and affiliates”
clause, did not affect or injure plaintiffs (A 570-575).

“Two Men on a Barge”.

The principal economic activity of the towing industry
is the transportation of petroleum products; and the “two
men on a barge” issue relates to the towing of oil barges.
The considerations underlying the Union’s position were
similar to those prompting the vegetable oil controversy,
but even more compelling.

Petroleum products, unlike vegetable oils, are highly
combustible, with the ever-present hazard of fire or explo-
sion (A 221). Moreover, although vegetable oil transfers
generally take place only during normal business hours
(A 221-222), petroleum barges operate around the clock,
seven days a week. They may make a number of trips
during each 24-hour day, with loading or discharge of oil
being accomplished several times during this span. When
a barge is being loaded or discharged, a bargeman must
be on duty, under Coast Guard regulations as well as basic
safety requirements (A 473-474, 597, 838-839).

The Association-Local 333 collective bargaining agree-
ment covering oil barges has long provided that they shall
have a four-man crew, two of whom shall be on duty at
all times, while the other two are at home on earned vaca-
tion time (A 1349). The two bargemen spell each other
during the round-the-clock operation, so that each is ade-
quately rested (A. 473-474). Furthermore, during heavy
seas, it is often necessary to have two bargemen on duty
to insure the safety of the tow and of the tugboat crew.
For at such times, to prevent vessel damage, the barge,
that is, it is towed at the end of a long rope or hawser.
that is, it is towed at the end of a long rope on hawser.
If a barge has but a single employee, the change in towing
configuration requires a tugboat employee to jump from
tug to barge, and back again, while both boats are in
transit, across rongh seas, with slippery decks at hoth ends

9

of the leap. With two men aboard the barge, this is un-
necessary (A 555, 829-832, 834, 840-844, 846-849).

Contrary to the universal practice aboard the Associa-
tion member barges, Berman sought to operate its barges
with only one aboard, or with no one aboard, Berman
barges had one employee assigned to them, usually for a
full week, around the clock; and he generally remained
aboard at all times during his assignment (A 555, 836-840,
902-907). This often resulted in round-the-clock assign-
ments with virtually no rest (A 834-840, 919-925, 927-930),
imperiling not only the bargeman’s own safety but that
of the tug crew dependent upon his alertness.

This practice of Berman’s also posed a serious threat
to the Union’s contract standards. With only half the
crew of an Association barge, Berman’s barge labor costs
were substantially lower; and on the basis cf labor costs,
Berman could take work away from Local 333 contract
barges. Moreover, Association members, faced with the
choice of using their own barges or Berman’s, would have
a strong economic incentive to contract out the work to
Berman. Thus Berman’s lower labor costs—or those of any
other company seeking to operate undermanned barges—
threatened to diminish the work opportunities and earn-
ings of Loca] 333 bargemen and generate pressure to lower
the manning scale for barges under the Local 333 collec-
tive agreement, thus impairing the Union’s most basic con-
tract standards. The Association members were fully
aware of these cost differentials resulting from under-
manning and did in fact hire Berman barges extensively.

The Union and its members took the position that in
order to prevent Local 333 employees from being exposed
to unnecessary safety hazards and to protect their contract
standards and preserve the work opportunities of the bar-
gaining unit, Local 333 contract tugs should not tow under-

10

manned barges. This position was not confined to Berman
nor was it initiated after the April 1, 1976 agreement (A
367-368, 434-435, 1306).

However, the evidence also established that this Union
effort was directed at maintaining manning scales within
its contract bargaining unit and not at achieving some
other objective vis-a-vis Berman. In asking its own con-
tract employers not to tow Berman barges without two
men aboard, the Union made no other demands. It did not
say that Berman should join the Association, that its
vessels should employ Local 333 members, or that Berman
should adhere to any other contract terms. And, most sig-
nificantly, when a second man was placed aboard, the opera-
tion proceeded without protest or hindrance (A 505, 519,
524-525).

The Trial Court’s Rulings and Instructions

After extensive argument on the motion to dismiss at
the end of plaintiffs’ case, the trial Court ruled that al-
though the question was close, both claims should be sub-
mitted to the jury. On the Sherman Act claim, the Court
stated that the “subsidiaries and affiliates” and “vegetable
oil” clauses were subject to the labor exemption and, alter-
natively, were not independently actionable because of “an
insufficient showing of anticompetitive purpose or effect”
(A 814-815). He stated, however, that the jury could con-
sider these contract clauses as “evidence of intent” (A
816-817).

With respect to the secondary boycott claim, the Court
stated only that “there is an issue that should go to the
jury as to whether the union sought to compel Berman
either to join the Association or to compel its employees
to join the union” (A 817-818).

ll

In his charge to the jury, the Court treated the two con-
tract clauses as follows (A 1128):

“The insertion in the collective bargaining agree-
ment between Local 333 and the Association of the
vegetable oil clause, about which you have heard testi-
mony, and the affiliates clause purporting to include
Berman in the collective bargaining agreement, the in-
sertion of those clauses in and of themselves is not
sufficient to show a violation of the antitrust laws.
However, you may consider those clauses and their
insertion in the collective bargaining agreement as
evidence of an illegal contract, combination or con-
spiracy as alleged by the plaintiff.”

In his charge on t

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385008_0128%3A0. Public record. Not legal advice.
