# Record and brief — McClure v. Reagan

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Record and brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1981
- **Citation:** 454 U.S. 1025

## Text

JUDLUD}LIS
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Office Suptema Court. U.S

UL 30 1981

—

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81186 FILED
No.
*
In THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1981

JAMES A. MCCLURE, United States Senator,
Appellant,
; v.
ROWALD RE AGA
daMES- EARL CARTER, President of the United States
and ABNER J. MIKVA,
Appellee.

On Appeal from the District Court for the District of Idaho

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Davip H. MARTIN
SANTARELLI & GIMER
2033 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 466-6800

Counsel for Appellant

WILSON - Eres Print NG Co. INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON. D.C. 20001

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the three judge panel in the United States
District Court for the District of Idaho correctly held
that the plaintiff James A. McClure lacked standing to
challenge the appointment of Judge Abner J. Mikva to
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit on the grounds that said appointment
violated Article I, Section 6, Clause 2 of the United States
Constitution.

2. Whether the three judge panel correctly held that
the ;.aintiff’s claim should be dismissed as nonjusticiable
based on the separation of powers doctrine.

PARTIES TO THE CASE

Plaintiff—Senator James A. McClure of Idaho.

Defendants—The President of the United States, Ron-
ald Reagan substituted for former President, James Ear!
Carter; Abner J. Mikva.

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

r ¼ ¼//—ü.. —
Grounds for Jurisdiction of This Court 8
Constitutional Provisions and Statutes Involved
,,

Substantial Questions Are Presented Which Require
e a ia emceiceaih

Appendix A Opinion of the Three-judge panel of the
United States District Court for the District of
ETRE LA TEI OLN» ART OEE

Appendix B Order of Dismissal by the Three-judge
Panel of the United District Court for the District
e ̃ũ A —— aro ee

Appendix C Notice of Appeal

Appendix D Riegel v. Federal Open Market Commit-
mittee, No. 80-1061, slip op. (D.C. Cir., filed June
EMS ical ae eee

(iii)

la

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: Page
Ass’n of Data Proce .g Service Organization,
Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) 10
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) 8, 14, 16, 17,
18, 19
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) 14
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (19688) 10, 13, 14
Gladstone Realtors v. Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91
„ f 13
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 2 12. 19. 20
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 303 U.S.
. re eh enn 14
Harrington v. Bush, 180 U.S. App. D.C. 45, 553
r 12
Kennedy v. Sampson, 167 U.S. App. D.C., 511 F.2d
T 8 12
Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972777 10
Linda R.S. „. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (19733 15
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803 16
McClure v. Carter, 513 F. Supp. 265 (198177 8,15
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 240 (1961) - 14
Miles v. Graham, 268 U.S. 501 (1925) 7
National T;easury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492
Lern 7
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486 (1969) sees 16, 17, 18,
19
Public Citizen v. Sampson, 379 F. Supp. 622
r tsesdahieettiihineandiinisinindiiatabanietaleete 12
Reuss v. Balles, 73 F. R. D. 90 (D. D.C. 1976) 12

Riegle v. Federal Open Market Committee, No. 80-
1016 (D.C. Cir., filed June 24, 1981) ........ 10, 11, 12, 20

Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)........... 15
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Or-
ganization, 426 U.S. 26 (197) 10
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)........ 16
United States v. Scrap, 412 U.S. 669 (1973 14

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975557 10

*

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS: Page
United States Constitution :
r sone ere eee 17
Article I, Section 6, Clause 2 1 1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 16, 18
Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 3, 9, 11, 16
Article III, Sections 1 and 2 7, 10, 13, 14, 15
e clsmessie teeaecdepiciiaelastaccbesie 4
SEE 2,3
I .... 2,4
Federal Salary Act of 1967
44 — 4
Executive Salary Cost-Of-Living Adjustment Act
28 U.S.C. § 461 3 .
Federal Pay Comparability ‘Act of 1970
re 5
Public Law 96-86, 93 Stat. 656 (1979) § 101 (e) .. 2, 3, 6,
13, 15, 16 18
MISCELLANEOUS:
fT SS ree 9

McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New Plain-
tiffs, 15 Georgia L. Rev. 24114 12

In THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1981

No.

JAMES A. MCCLURE, United States Senator,
* Appellant,

JAMES EARL CARTER, President of the United States
and ABNER J. MIKVA,
Appellee.

On Appeal from the District Court for the District of Idaho

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Appellant submits herewith his jurisdictional statemen“
as required by Rule 15 of the Rules of the Supreme Court
of the United States.

OPINION BELOW

The three judge panel ef the United States District
Court for the District of Id. ho issued its order and deci-
sion on May 5, 1981. The decision is reported at 513 F.
Supp. 265.

GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT

(i) This is an appeal from a dismissal of an amended
complaint for declaratory relief arising out of Article I,
Section 6, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution. In

2

his original complaint, appellant invoked federal jurisdic-
tion pursuant to Title 28 United States Code Sections
1331 and 2201. In his amended complaint, plaintiff also
invoked federal jurisdiction pursuant to Section 101(c)
(2) of Public Law 96-86, 93 Stat. 656, which provides
in pertinent part that:

(1) Any Member of Congress, whether he voted to
confirm or not to confirm the appointment of any
judge appointed during the Ninety-Sixth Congress to
the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, or whether he abstained from, or was
not present for such vote, may bring a civil action
in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia or in any United States District Court
in the State he represents to contest the constitution-
ality o° the appointment and continuance in office of
said circuit judge on the grounds that such appoint-
ment and continuance in office is in violation of Ar-
ticle I, Section 6, Clause 2 of the Constitution;

(2) The designated United States district courts
shall have exclusive jurisdiction, without regard to
the sum or value of the matter in controversy, to
determine the validity of such appointment and con-
tinuance in office;

(3) Any action brought under this section shall be
heard and determined by a panel of three judges in
accordance with the provisions of Section 2284 of
Title 28, United States Code. Any appeal from the
action of a court convened pursuant to such section
shall lie to the Supreme Court; and

(4) Any judge designated to hear any action
brought under this section shall cause such action to
be in every way expedited.

(ii) The order and decision to be reviewed was en-
tered on May 5, 1981, by a three judge panel of the
United States District Court for the District of Idaho.

The Notice of Appeal was filed on June 9, 1981 in the
United States District Court for the District of Idaho.

(iii) The statutory provision conferring jurisdiction
on this Court is set forth in full above.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND
STATUTES INVOLVED

(i) Article I, Section 6, Clause 2 United States Con-
stitution:

No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time
for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil
Office under the Authority of the United States,
which shall have been created, or the Emoluments
whereof shall have been encreased during such time;
and no Person holding any Office under the United
States, shall be a Member of either House during his
Continuance in Office.

Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution:

He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided
two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Con-
sent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme
Court, and all other Officers of the United States,
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise pro-
vided for, and which shall be established by Law:
but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment
of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the
Heads of Departments.

(ii) Section 101(c) (2), Public Law 96-86, is set forth
above.

(iii) Title 28 United States Code Section 1331:

4

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution,
laws or treaties of the United States.

(iv) 28 United States Code Section 2201:

In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdic-
tion, except with respect to Federal taxes, any court
of the United States, upon the filing of an appro-
priate pleading, may declare the rights and other
legal relations of any interested party seeking such
declaration, whether or not further relief is or could
be sought. Any such declaration shail have the force
and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be
reviewable as such.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case arises out of the appointment of then Con-
gressman Abner J. Mikva to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

On November 7, 1978, defendant Mikva was elected to
the United States House of Representatives for the term
commencing on January 3, 1979 and ending on January
3, 1981. On May 29, 1979, former President James E.
Carter nominated defendant Mikva to be a circuit judge
of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. On September 25, 1979 the United States Sen-
ate, by majority vote, contrmed the nomination of Abner
J. Mikva, and on September 27, 1979 he took the oath of
office as a circuit judge.

Under the provisions of Title 28, Section 44(d) of the
United States Code, each circuit judge of the United
States receives a salary at an annual rate determined
under Section 225 of the Federal Salary Act of 1967, 2
U.S.C. §§ 351-361, as adjusted by Section 205(a) (10 of
the Executive Salary Cost-of-Living Adjustment Act. 28
U.S.C. § 461. Section 205(a)(1) provides that when an

adjustment in rates of pay in the General Schedule takes
effect under the Federal Pay Comparability Act of 1970
5 U.S.C. 88 5305 et seg., each salary rate subject to ad-
justment under Section 205(a)(1) shall be adjusted by
an amount equal to the percentage of such salary rate
which corresponds to the overall average percentage of
the adjustments in the rates of pay under such General
Schedule.

The Federal Pay Comparability Act requires that the
President, after considering the report of his agent and
the findings and recommendations of the Advisory Com-
mittee on Federal Pay, annually adjust the rates of pay
of each statutory pay system in accordance with the prin-
ciple of paying the same rate of pay for the same level
of work in private enterprise. The President is further
required annually to transmit to Congress a report of the
pay adjustment which shall specify the overall percentage
of the adjustment in the rates of pay in the General
Schedule and of the adjustment of the rates of pay under
the other statutory pay systems.

The President may, however, because of economic con-
ditions, adjust rates of pay at a lower percentage than
that recommended by the Advisory Committee and submit
that alternative plan to Congress. Such an adjustment
must be made prior to September Ist. The lower per-
centage increase becomes payable on the first day of the
first applicable pay period commencing on or after Oc-
tober 1 unless before the end of the first period of thirty
calendar days of continuous session of Congress after the
date on which the alternative plan is submitted, either
House adopts a resolution disapproving the alternative
plan. If such a resolution is adopted, the President is
required to readjust the rates of pay of the statutory
pay systems in accordance with the recommendations of
the Advisory Committee on Federal Pay, effective as of
the beginning of the first pay period commencing on or

after the date the resolution is adopted or on or after
October 1, whichever is later.

The President submitted, on August 31, 1979, an alter-
native pay adjustment plan and increased rates of pay of
the general schedule by an overall percentage of seven
(7) percent.

Neither House of Congress acted to disapprove the al-
ternative plan proposed by the President before October
1. 1979.

On September 25, 1979 the plaintiff filed a complaint
for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief claiming
that by virtue of the foregoing laws relating to federal
salary increases for circuit judges that the appointment
of Abner J. Mikva vioiated Article I, Section 6, Clause 2
of the Constitution. Plaintiff also filed on September 25,
1979 an application for an order requiring defendants,
the President of the United States and J. Stanley Kim-
mit, Secretary of the United States Senate, to show cause
why their actions in effecting the appointment of Abner
J. Mikva as circuit judge should not be enjoined. Al-
though the United States District Court for the District
of Idaho issued a show cause order, Abner J. Mikva was
sworn in as circuit judge before the order was timely
served.

Thereafter, on October 12, 1979, Congress passed and
the President signed into law Public Law 96-86, 93 Stat.
656 (1979), which contained Section 101(c) (2) authoriz-
ing members of Congress to challenge the constitutionality
of appointments made to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit during the 96th
Congress, Piaintiff then filed an amended complaint for
declaratory relief on November 6, 1979, naming the Pres-
ident and Abner J. Mikva as defendants and seeking a
three judge court to hear his complaint that the appoint-

7

ment of Abner J. Mikva violated Article I, Section 6,
Clause 2 of the United States Constitution.

Plaintiff claimed that the actions required of the Presi-
dent by the federal salary laws are mandatory. In Na-
tional Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d
587 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the court held that under the fed-
eral salary scheme the President’s actions, are mandatory
and non-discretionary, i.e., he must, prior to September
Ist of each year, adjust the pay scales in accordance with
the increase proposed by his pay agent, or pursuant to
an alternative plan.

The compensation of a federal judge which “Shall not
be diminished during their Continuance in Office ( Article
III, Seccion 1, U.S. Constitution) is fixed when Congress
declares “what sum shall be received by each judge out
of the public funds and the times for payment.” Miles v.
Graham, 268 U.S. 501, 508-509 (1925). Thus, even
though the office to which defendant Mikva was appointed
did not commence receiving the increased compensation
until October 1, 1979, the compensation of the office of
circuit judge had been increased as of September 1, 1979,
during the term for which defendant Mikva had been
elected, thus barring him from that office.

Cross motions for summary judgment were filed by the
parties, in which the defendants argued that plaintiff
lacked standing, and that even if he did not, that the
appointment of Abner J. Mikva did not violate Article I,
Section 6, Clause 2 of the Constitution. The plaintiffs
argued conversely as described above.

On May 5, 1981 the three judge panel issued its order
and decision dismissing the case, holding that plaintiff
lacked standing to bring the lawsuit and that the claim

was nonjusticiable based on the separation of powers
doctrine.

SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS ARE PRESENTED
WHICH REQUIRE PLENARY CONSIDERATION

The decision of the three judge court in the United
States District Court for the District ot idaho presents
this Court with substantial federal questions regarding
standing and the separation of powers doctrine as they
relate to suits by legislators.

The three judge court held that the plaintiff lacked
standing either as a private ‘dividual or as a member
of the United States Senate to bring this action with or
without the jurisdictional statute, Section 101(c)(2) of
Public Law 96-86, because he did not present to the court
a distinct and palpable injury to himself. Therefore, un-
der this Court’s holding in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962), the three judge court decided that Senator Mc-
Clure did not have “such a persone! stake in the outcome
of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult con-
stitutional questions.” Id. at 204.

The three judge court, moreover, concluded that Sec-
tion 101 (e) (2) of Public Law 96-86 was of no assistance
to the piaintiff because it implicated “special concerns
regarding the separation of powers.” McClure v. Carter,
513 F. Supp. 265, 268 (D. Idaho 1981). Therevyore, the
legislative branch, in seeking to grant authority to the
judicial branch to decide the constitutional issue, acted
improperly because of the separation of powers doctrine.
The three judge court reached this conclusion because it
decided that “[u]nder the Constitution, it was the duty
of Congress itself, in the first instance, to determine
Judge Mikva’s qualifications both on the merits and on
the issue of whether he was constitutionally eligible to
serve as a judge.” Id. at 271.

Plaintiff believes that the three judge court failed to
consider the unique injuries he, as a legislator, alleged.

Plaintiff also believes that the three judge court failed
to correctly interpret the decisions of this Court regard-
ing the separation of powers doctrine and the duty of
the judicial branch to decide constitutional issues.

(i) Standing

Senator McClure alleged the following injuries: (1)
To the Senate, and to himseif derivatively, because the
President, in nominating vudge Mikva, a person not
constitutionally eligible fur che office of circuit judge,
denied the Senate the opportunity to exercise its con-
stitutional duty under the Appointments Clause, Article
II, Section 2, Clause 2, to advise and consent to the
appointment of a constitutionally qualified nominee. This
injury is continuing.

Sine the appointment process “contemplates that only
such persons as are qualified to hold office shall be
nominated. . .”, 17 Ops. A.G. 522 (1883), it is implicit
in that process that the President must make the thresh-
old determination of a nominee’s constitutional eligibility
and that the Senate’s role is to approve or reject whom-
ever the President forwards for confirmation based solely
upon the Senate’s view of the nominee’s qualifications
to be a judge. Thus, when the President nominates a
person who is not constitutionally eligible for a judge-
ship, the Senate is unable to exercise its constitutional
duty to advise ard consent to the appointment of a con-
stitutionally eligible nominee, and its role is thereby
diminished. (2) To the Senate, and to himself deriva-
tively, since the Senate’s rights and duties under the
Constitution have, and will continue to be, diminished
because its acts are being, and will continue to be, inter-
preted and possibly held unconstitutional by an unquali-
fied person; (3) To the Senate, and himself derivatively,
since an appointment prohibited by Article I, Section 6,
Clause 2 suggests the presence of the very collusion the

10

constitutional provision was designed to prevent; and
(4) To himself, as an individual United States Senator,
since he was forced to cast his vote against defendant
Mikva to prevent an unconstitutional appointment, thus
nullifying his constitutional right to advise and consent
to the appointment of a nominee based solely on the
nominee’s qualifications to perform judicial functions.

This Court’s past decisions on standing demonstrate
clearly that [iln terms of Article III limitations on
court jurisdiction, the question of standing is related
only to whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will
be presented in an adversary context and in a form
historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution.”
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,101 (1968). A plaintiff must
allege injury in fact to an interest “arguably within
the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
statute or constitutional guarantee in question.” Ass'n
of Data Processing Service Organization, Inc. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 152-153 (1970). The injuries may be a
“specific present objective harm or a threat of future
specific harm.” Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 14 (1972).
A third requirement for standing is that the plaintiff
prove the injury was caused by the defendant’s actions
or in the alternative that prospective relief would re-
move the harm. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975);
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organiza-
tion, 426 U.S. 26 (1976).

The unique issue of standing for congressional plain-
tiffs has been treated most frequently by the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. That circuit’s most recent decision in Riegle v.
Federal Open Market Committee, et al., No. 80-1061
(D.C. Cir., filed June 24, 1981) App. at 17a and its
past decisions involving congressional plaintiffs leave this
crucial issue unsettled and makes its resolution particu-
larly appropriate for this Court. In the Riegle case, Sen-
ator Riegle challenged the constitutionality of the proce-

11

dures established by the Federal Reserve Act for the
appointment of the five Reserve Bank members of the
Federal Open Market Committee who were appointed but
not, pursuant to those procedures, subject to the advice
and consent of the Senate. Rather, the five members
whose appointments were challenged by Senator Riegle
were appointed subject to the approval of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The district
court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing. The
Court of Appeals, however, decided that Senator Riegle
had standing to make the challenge, but dismissed the
case on the grounds of the equitable discretion of the
court to avoid decisions which involve separation of pow-
ers considerations.

In finding standing for Senator Riegle the court stated
that “. . . assuming that the five Reserve Bank members
of the FOMC are officers who must be appointed with
the advice and consent of the Senate, Riegle’s inability
to exercise his right under the Appointments Clause of
the Constitution is an injury sufficiently personal to
constitute an injury in fact.” App. at 27a. Senator Rie-
gle, however, had inappropriately named the five members
of the Open Market Committee as defendants since their
actions had not caused the injuries alleged; rather, it
was the directors of the Federal Reserve Banks who had
appointed the five defendants who were the cause of the
injury. Even so, the court held that the causation re-
quirement of standing was satisfied because the prospec-
tive judicial relief would remove the harm. Finally, the
court held that the interest claimed by Senator Riegle to
be injured, that is, his right to advise and consent to
the appointment of officers of the executive branch, was
within the zone of interests protected by Article II, See-
tion 2, Clause 2, the Appointments Clause.

Earlier decisions of the District of Columbia Circuit
reflect the unsettled nature of the standing issue regard-

12

ing congressional plaintiffs. Two principles appear to
dominate the congressional plaintiff standing cases pre-
ceding the Riegle decision; first, that the requirements
of standing apply equally to congressional plaintiffs and
private plaintiffs, and second, that a congressional plain-
tiff must suffer an injury that his legislative colleagues
cannot redress.' These two principles have led the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit to make inconsistent applica-
tion of the standing principles. In the Riegle case, the
court recognized this by stating:

For example, in Public Citizen v. Sampson, 379 F.
Supp. 662 (D. D.C. 1974), aff'd mem., 169 U.S. App.
D.C. 301, 515 F.2d 1018 (1975), Harrington v.
Bush, supra at 212-214, and Reuss v. Balles, supra
at 468, standing was withheld from congressional
plaintiffs in part because their power to vote, i.e., to
enact legislation to cure the alleged injury, remained
unimpaired. Yet in Kennedy v. Sampson, supra, the
cou t conferred standing on Senator Kennedy to chal-
lenge the legality of an attempted pocket veto of a
bill for which he had voted. We reasoned that ex-
ecutive impairment of the Senator’s past vote had
nullified Kennedy’s legislative power. Id. at 436. The
Senator had, however, collegial remedies comparable
to those which negated standing in the Public Citi-
zen, Harrington, and Reuss cases; Senator Kennedy’s
power to reintroduce the relevant legislation in the
next session of Congress and to vote thereon re-
mained unimpaired. In Goldwater v. Carter, supra,
this court’s most recent opinion regarding congres-
sional standing, legislator plaintiffs were again
granted standing despite the presence of adequate
collegial remedies. App. at 29a.

Former Chief Judge Carl McGowan, United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit fully described the
case histories of Congressional-plaintiffs in Congressmen in Court:
The New Plaintiffs, 15 Georgia Law Review 241.

13

Using the traditional standing tests provided by this
Court plaintiff submits that he has satisfied those tests
and has standing to challenge the appointment of de-
fendant Mikva. Plaintiff has alleged injuries to interests
protected by the Constitution which are most certainly
capable of redress by the judiciary.

In addition, the language of Section 101(c) (2) of
Public Law 96-86 is a recognition by both the executive
and legislative branches of their apprehension that the
appointment of Mr. Mikva is constitutionally infirm and
that it is the responsibility of the judicial branch to
make the final determination of that matter. In partic-
ular, the language of subparagraph 1, Section 101(c),
recognizes under the particular facts of defendant Mikva’s
appointment that both the Senate and, derivatively, its
individual members, have suffered an injury.

Congress may eliminate all impediments to standing
save the minimal Article III requirements, and expand
“standing to the full extent permitted by Article III,”
Gladstone Realtors v. Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979).
The plaintiffs in Gladstone relied on the Fair Housing
Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. § 3612) as the statutory basis
to bring their action. The Court said that the Fair
Housing Act was intended by Congress to allow certain
agerieved citizens to bring such actions so long as they
could allege sorae minimal injury. Similarly, in P.L. 96-
86 Congress has recognized a small class of persons who
are aggrieved and provided a vehicle for resolving that
grievance. Cong ss intended that an action be brought
should one of its members so desire. Plaintiff need only
show the Article III requirement of minimum injury.

Even absent a specific statute authorizing legal action,
this Court has found that even a minimal or trifling
allegation of injury by a plaintiff will suffice to sustain
standing for Article III purposes. In Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 82 (1968), the Court, in deciding whether tax-

14

payers had standing to challenge the expenditure of
public monies in violation of the Establishment Clause,
held that. . . in terms of Article III limitations on
federal court jurisdiction, the question of standing is re-
lated only to whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated
will be presented in an adversary context and in a form
historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution.”
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 101. The Court found, conse-
quently, that although there was a minimum injury to
constitutional rights (each taxpayer’s miniscule portion
of taxes apportioned by HEW to New York parochial
schools), since the constitutional principle (establish-
ment of religion) was paramount, the plaintiffs had
standing. Similarly, the Court found standing where the
allegations of injury were minimal and even trifling in
the following cases involving constitutional principles:
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 240 (1961) (five dollar
fine and costs); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,
303 U.S. 663 (1966) (one dollar and fifty cent poll
tax); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (choice of
presence or absence during school prayer); and Baker v.
Carr, 396 U.S. 196 (1962) (fraction of a vote).

Even an indirect general allegation of injury in the
absence of an authorizing statute was satisfactory to
sustain standing in United States v. Scrap, 412 U.S. 669
(1973), where plaintiffs alleged that failure to suspend
a freight surcharge would cause them economic, recrea-
tional and aesthetic harm. The complaint also alieged
that plaintiffs would generally have to pay more for
finished products and that the plaintiffs’ use of the rivers,
streams and recreation areas was adversely affected and
that air pollution in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan
area would increase. These alleged injuries, though spec-
ulative and attenuated, were adequate.

This Court has acknowledged a distinction between
those plaintiffs who invoke the judicial process under

15

statutory authorization and those plaintiffs who do not.
In Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) at 732,
the Court said “Where the party does not rely on any
specific statute authorizing invocation of the judicial
process, the question of standing depends upon whether
the party has alleged such a ‘personal stake in the out-
come of the controversy’... .” Similiarly, in Linda
R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973) at 617, the
Court said “Although the law of standing has greatly
changed in the last ten years, we have steadfastly ad-
hered to the requirements that, at least in the absence
of a statute expressly conferring standing, federal plain-
tiffs must allege some threatened or actual injury result-
ing from the pvtatively illegal action before a federal
court may assume jurisdiction.”

From the Court’s recognition of this distinction, it
can be concluded that where a statute authorizes the
invocation of a lawsuit, the Article III requirement of
injury is even less than the minimal injury necessary to
sustain standing when a plaintiff brings suit without
statutory authorization. Thus, the injury which plaintiff
here must allege to sustain standing must truly be only
the most minimal.

In sum, then, it is highly appropriate for this Court
to review this case because of the unsettled status of
standing for congressional litigants.

(ii) Separation Of Powers

The three judge court raised a substantial federal
question regarding the separation of powers doctrine
in interpreting Section 101(c)(2) of Public Law 96-86.
It concluded that the “vice of the statute .. is its
muddling of the reles, its blurring of the lines between
the branches of government.” McClure v. Carter, 513

F. Supp. 265, 271. It further concluded that the Congress
(the court here meant the Senate) determines not only

16

the judicial fitness of nominees to the federal bench,
but also makes a final and unreviewable determination
of their constitutional eligibility. Plaintiff argued to the
contrary that only the judiciary may, in the final in-
stance, decide what the law is and interpret the Con-
stitution, and that the Senate could, pursuant to Article
II, Section 2, Clause 2, only pass on the judicial fitness
of a nominee. The legislative and executive branches
agreed with the plaintiff by passing and signing into
law Section 101 (e) (2) of Public Law 96-86. Based on
this Court’s decisions in United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683 (1974), Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486
(1969), and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) the
plaintiff believes the three judge court erred in its
interpretation of the separation of powers doctrine and
that the case should have been decided on its merits.

The merits of this case involve a pure interpretation
of a constitutional provision, Article I, Section 6, Clause
2. Senator McClure contends that only the courts, in
the last instance, may decide the issue on the merits,
that is, the constitutionality of defendant Mikva’s ap-
pointment to the office of circuit judge; and that the
Senate, in consenting to the appointment, is constitu-
tionally competent to pass only upon the political and
judicial fitness of the President’s nominee.

The foregoing contention is not violative of but con-
sistent with, the separation of powers doctrine because
ilt is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madi-
son, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803).

This Court’s decision in Baker v. Carr, requires res-
olution of the following considerations to determine
whether there is a political question involving separation
of powers which makes a case nonjusticiable:

a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of the issue to a coordinate political department; or

17

a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the im-
possibility of a court’s undertaking independent res-
olution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political deci-
sion already made; or the potentiality of embarrass-
ment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question. 369 U.S. at 217.

The most important one of those questions requiring reso-
lution here is whether there is a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
branch of government.

In Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) the
Court was faced with a similar issue in deciding an
elected Congressman’s right to his seat after having been
duly elected and then expelled from the House of Repre-
sentatives. Pursuant to Article I, Section 5, providing
that the House shall be the judge of the qualification of
its own members, the House had acted to expel Congress-
man Powell claiming that it was solely its constitutional
duty and power to make such a determination. The Court
disagreed and, citing Baker v. Carr, stated that d ſeeid-
ing whether a matter has in any measure been committed
by the Constitution to another branch of government, or
whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever au-
thority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise
in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of
this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.”
395 U.S. at 521. The Court then examined the constitu-
tional provision in question to determine the textual com-
mitment issue, and held that it must adjudicate Powell’s
claim.

18

The respondents in the Powell case also argued that
the other political question considerations made their case
nonjusticiable, particularly, that resolution of the claim
would produce a potentially embarassing confrontation
between coordinate branches of government. The Court,
however, responded that a determination of the merits of
petitioner’s claim:

. would require no more than an interpretation
of the Constitution. Such a determination falls with-
in the traditional role accorded courts to interpret
the law and does not involve a ‘lack of the respect
due [a] coordinate [branch] of government’ nor does
it involve an ‘initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for non-judicial discretion’ Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 at 217, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 at 686. Our system
of government requires that federal courts on occa-
sion interpret the Constitution in a manner at vari-
ance with the construction given the document by
another branch. The alleged conflict that such an
adjudication may cause cannot justify the courts’
avoiding their constitutional responsibility. (citations
omitted). 395 U.S. at 548-549.

Similar to Powell v. McCormack, this case is one of
constitutional interpretation; i.e., did the office to which
defendant Mikva was appointed receive an increase in
emoluments thereby causing his appointment to be in
violation of Article I, Section 6, Clause 2. Moreover, the
tests established by Powell would not bar the considera-
tion of this case by this Court. First, the matter is not
textually committed to any branch of government and,
thus, is appropriate for judicial resclution. Second, reso-
lution of the questions presented would not require the
Court to move beyond areas of judicial expertise. And,
finally, there certainly is no potential for embarrassment
if this Court interprets this case on its merits, for Con-
gress and the executive branch, in passing section 10(c)
(2) of P.L. 96-86, recognized the constitutional interpre-

19

tation could be made only by the judicial branch. Thus,
this Court need not consider this prudential limitation.

In Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979), this
Court did not address the standing of congressional plain-
tiffs even though that issue had been raised below and on
appeal. The Court, without a majorit; opinion, reversed
and remanded for dismissal] Senator Goldwater’s claim
of a right to vote on the termination of the United States
treaty with the Republic of China. Justice Rehnquist,
with Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and
Stevens, concluded that the case was political and, there-
fore, nonjusticiable because it involved the authority of
the President in the conduct of our nation’s foreign rela-
tions. Justice Powell, however, concluded that the case
should be dismissed because it was not ripe for considera-
tion, as the Senate had not passed a resolution stating its
position that their approval was necessary for termina-
tion. In his opinion, Justice Powell took issue with Jus-
tice Rehnquist’s opinion that the case was nonjusticiable
and concluded that if the case were ripe the Court should
consider the merits based on the precedents of Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) and Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486 (1969). Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 997.

Justice Powell examined the political question consid-
erations as set forth in Baker v. Carr, and determined
that the answer to each consideration would require the
Court to decide the case if it were ripe for consideration.
He reasoned that, though the issue touched on foreign
relations, it presented a constitutional question regarding
the authority to terminate treaties. Not a simple issue
to decide, but one requiring application of “. . . normal
principles of interpretation to the Constitutional provi-
sions at issue.” 444 U.S. at 997. Similarly, none of the
inquiries required to be determined with regard to the
political question issue bar this Court from deciding this
case on its merits.

In Riegle v. Federal Open Market Committee, No. 80-
1061 (D.C. Cir. filed June 24, 1981) App. at 17a, in reac-
tion to this Courts holding in the Goldwater case, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit developed a new theory for
deciding congressional plaintiff cases. The Riegel court
concluded that “[w]here a congressional plaintiff could
obtain substantial relief from his fellow legislators
through the enactment, repeal or amendment of a statute,
this court should exercise its equitable discretion to dis-
miss the legislator’s action.” No. 81-1061, App. at 32a.
The court explained its theory that congressional plaintiff
cases should be dismissed only when “(i) the plaintiff
lacks standing under the traditional tests, or (ii) the
plaintiff has standing but could get legislative redress
and a similar action could be brought by a private plain-
tiff.” App. at 34a. Even under this theory, plaintiff be-
lieves this Court should hear his case inasmuch as he
certainly has no legislative redress at this point. And
even though a private plaintiff might be able to bring
the merits of the case to this Court, that proposition is
now speculative at best.

CONCLUSION

This case presents the Court with substantial federal
questions regarding standing and the separation of pow-
ers doctrine as they relate to suits by legislators which
need to be settled by this Court, not only because they
themselves are significant, but because unless this Court
decides that Senator McClure has standing to bring this
action, an alleged serious violation of the Constitution
may go unreviewed.

Based on the foregoing. therefore, plaintiff respect-
fully requests this Court to remand the case back to the
U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho for consid-
eration of the merits, or, in the alternative, to set the
case down for plenary review of the issue of standing and
the separation of powers doctrine, or plenary review of

21

the issue of standing, the separation of powers doctrine,
and for consideration on the merits.

Respectfully submitted,

Davip H. MARTIN
SANTARELLI & GIMER
2033 M Street, N.W.
Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20036
Counsel for Appellant
On the Brief:

JAMES J. FEATHERSTONE

1600 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

RICHARD E. GARDINER
1600 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

APPENDICES

la
APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF IDAHO

Civil No. 79-1340

JAMES A. MCCLURE, United States Senator, Idaho,

= Plaintiff,

JAMES EARL CARTER, PRESIDENT of the United States;
and ABNER J. MIKVA,
Defendants.

Filed May 5, 1981
DECISION

Before: FLETCHER, Circuit Judge, and MCNICHOLS and
TAYLOR, District Judges, sitting as a Special
Three-Judge District Court.

This case comes before this three-judge court on cross-
motions for summary judgment. The amended com-
plaint to which the motions are addressed challenges the
appointment of former Congressman Abner J. Mikva to
a position as a circuit judge for the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The
relevant portions of the statute under which the chal-
lenge is brought, Act of October 12, 1979, Pub. L. No.
96-86, § 101(c), 93 Stat. 656 (not codified), are set out
in the margin.' The plaintiff, Senator McClure, asserting

Section 101(c) provides in relevant part:

Any additional payment [to federal officials} under existing
law is not to be construed as an increase ip salary or emolu-

2a

that the salaries of federal judges were increased during
defendant Mikva’s term in Congress, claims that Judge
Mikva’s* nomination, confirmation, and appointment as
a circuit judge were in violation of article I, section 6,
clause 2 of the United States Constitution (the Ineligi-
bility Clause).* Senator McClure asks that we direct the

ments within the meaning of Article I, section 6, clause 2
of the Constitution, except that:

(1) Any Member of Congress, whether he voted to
confirm or not to confirm the appointment of any judge
appointed during the 96th Congress to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, or whether
he abstained from, or was not present for such vote, may
bring a civil action in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia or in any United States Dis-
trict Court in the State he represents to contest the con-
stitutionality of the appointment and continuance in
office of said Circuit Judge on the ground that such ap-
pointment and continvance in office is in violation of
Article I, section 6, clause 2 of the Constitution;

(2) The designated United States District Court shall
have exclusive jurisdiction, without regard to the sum
or value of the matter in controversy, to determine the
validity of such appointment and continuance in office;

(3) Any action brought under this section shall be
heard and determined by a panel of three judges in ac-
cordance with the provisions of section 2284 of title 28,
United States Code. Any appeal from the action of a
court convened pursuant to such section shall lie to the
Supreme Court; and

(4) Any judge designated to hear any action brought
under this section shall cause such action to be in every
way expedited.

2 While plaintiff insists on referring to defendant Mikva as
“Mr.” his proper title is “Judge” until determined otherwise.

3 Article I, section 6, clause 2 of the United States Constitu-
tion provides in relevant part:

No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for
which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under

3a

President to notify defendant Mikva that his appointment
was in violation of the Constitution, and that we notify
defendant Mikva that his appointment was void ab
initio and that he must vacate his office. The threshold
question before us is whether we have jurisdiction to
hear the case. We cannot reach the merits of Senator
McClure’s challenge unless we answer that question
affirmatively.
BACKGROUND

The procedural posture of this case and the events
in its background provide a context that is helpful in
analyzing and attaching appropriate legal significance
to the contentions made by the parties. The procedural
steps taken and a summary of pertinent portions of the
pleadings are set forth in the margin.“

the Authority of the United States, which shall have been
created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased
during such time

* The original complaint was filed in the United States District
Court for the District of Idaho on September 25, 1979, by plaintiff
McClure, a United States Senator from the State of Idaho. Juris-
diction was alleged under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question)
and 2201 (declaratory judgment). The original defendants were
James Earl Carter, President of the United States, and J. Stanley
Kimmitt, Secretary of the United States Senate. The complaint
sought a declaration that then-Congressman Abner J. Mikva was
constitutionally ineligible for appointment to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The suit
also sought an injunction against defendant Kimmitt to prevent
him from communicating the results of the United States Senate’s
vote of confirmation of Abner Mikva to the President.

On September 26, 1979, defendant Carter signed the commission
appointing Abner J. Mikva a United States Circuit Judge for the
District of Columbia Circuit. On October 16, 1979, the plaintiff
moved to dismiss defendant Kimmitt. The motion was granted.

The amended complaint was filed on November 6, 1979, once
more naming President Carter as a defendant and adding Abner
J. Mikva as a defendant. Jurisdiction was again premised on
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 2201 but was additionally alleged under

4a

Congressman Abner J. Mikva was nominated by Presi-
dent Carter as eireuit judge for the Distriet of Columbia
Circuit. A number of senators, including Senator Me-
Clure, opposed the appointment. Indeed. a number of
these senators, again including Senator McClure, voiced
their opposition on the Senater floor, relying in their

section 101(c) of the Act of October 12, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-86,
93 Stat. 657 (not codified). Plaintiff requested a three-judge court
pursuant to the terms of section 101(c). The amended complaint
requested the relief described in the text of the opinion.

The defendant President answered the amended complaint and
requested that the action be dismissed. Defendant Mikva moved
to be dismissed as defendant based on his allegation that the court
lacked personal jurisdiction over him.

On December 13, 1979, the district judge originally assigned to
the case sent to the Honorable James R. Browning, Chief Judge
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, a
Notification and Certificate that a three-judge district court should
be convened. On December 21, 1979, the President moved for
withdrawal of the Notification and Certificate. The motion was
denied and on February 4, 1980, Chief Judge Browning designated
a three-judge district court.

On February 25, 1980, the two defendants moved for summary
judgment, with defendant Mikva expressly reserving his defense
that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The plaintiff
responded on March 28, 1980, by opposing the defendants’ motions
and himself moving for summary judgment. Oral argument was
heard on June 26, 1980. The court ruled from the bench that it
was properly convened as a three-judge court.

5 The constitutional question and the more general question of
Judge Mikva’s qualifications and fitness for judicial office were
extensively debated on the floor of the Senate, 125 Cong. Rec.
$13342-S13362 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1979). During the debate,
Senator Edward Kennedy introduced two detailed legal memoranda
prepared by the Justice Department on the constitutional ques-
tion, so that the senators would be fully informed. /d. at
$13360-S13362. Senator McClure made a speech attacking Con-
gressman Mikva’s political and social views and advised his col-
leagues that he would oppose the nomination specifically on that
basis, urging them to do the same. Id. at 813351-813353.

5a

arguments on their belief that then-Congressman Mikva
was philosophically unsuited to the job, as well as on
their view that he was constitutionally ineligible for
appointment because of the proscriptions of the Ineligi-
bility Clause. These arguments failed to persuade a
sufficient number of their fellow senators, and a majority
of the Senate voted to confirm defendant Mikva as judge
on September 25, 1979. 125 Cong. Rec. $1930% (daily ed.
Sept. 25, 1979).

After the Senate voted to confirm Judge Mikva, Sena-
tor McClure and others proposed to the Senate the juris-
dictional statute under which Senator McClure now sues.
The Senate attached the proposed statute as a rider to
an appropriation bill on October 10, 1979, 125 Cong. Rec.
814320, 814325 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1979), and the House
of Representatives agreed to it two days later. Jd. H9081
(daily ed. Oct. 12, 1979).

The jurisdictional statute is unusual in several re-
spects. First, it sets out a single substantive ground for
challenging a new judicial appointment—violation of the
Ineligibility Clause. A challenge to a judicial appoint-
ment on any other ground must be brought under some
other statute. Second, it limits both in time and by
institution the judicial appointments that may be chal-
lenged under the statute. It authorizes challenges to only
those judicial appointments made during the 96th Con-
gress and only those made to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. A chal-
lenge to a judge appointed during any other Congress or
to any other court must be brought under some other
statute. Perhaps not coincidentally, the only judicial
appointment that fits within the statute’s limitations and
might be subject to challenge on Ineligibility Clause
grounds is that of defendant Mikva. Third, the statute
authorizes suits by United States senators and members
of the House of Representatives, irrespective of whether
the senators voted for or against the appointment or,

6a

in the case of members of the House, voted at all. Fourth,
the stu.tute provides that suit may be brought either in
the United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia or in any federal district court in the state
which the senator or member of the House represents,
irrespective of the distance between that state and the
District of Columbia and irrespective of any connection
between that state and the judicial appointment sought
to be challenged.

In short, what the statute appears to authorize is a
mechanism whereby a senator or member of the House
of Representatives may challenge in a federal court in
his or her home state the validity of the judicial appoint-
ment of a single person, Judge Mikva. Such a statute
has, at one level, an entirely salutory purpose, for it
would be antithetical to the rule of law that all govern-
ment officials, and judges in particular, are pledged to
uphold if a federal judge were permitted to take office
in violation of the express terms of the United States
Constitution. The statute is, however, problematic at
quite another level, for under article III of the Con-
stitution federal courts may decide only cases and con-
troversies properly brought before them, by parties with
sufficient stake in the dispute to ensure that a decision
by the courts is not inconsistent with the limited role
the courts must play within our tripartite federal system
of government. The fact that the statute makes senators
and members of the House, and no others, “enforcers”
of the Constitution in the judicial forum implicates
special concerns regarding the separation of powers.

JUSTICIABILITY

The federal courts have consistently exercised care to
limit their jurisdiction to the case and controversy re-
quirement of article III. This governing principle is
more easily stated than applied, however, since compre-

7

hended within the limitations imposed by the terms
“cases” and “controversies” are concerns about the proper
functioning of courts in dispute resolution and the alloca-
tion of power among the three branches of government.

Our initial analysis of the unusual statute before us
embraced a full range of inquiry into the various aspects
of justiciability.“ We conclude, however, that one of
its aspects—the requirement of standing—is dispositive.
Article III requires that the parties to a lawsuit have
“such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional ques-
tions.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, (1962). The

*The Supreme Court described the concept of justiciability in
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 44-95 (1968) :

Embodied in the words “cases” and “controversies” are two
complementary but somewhat different limitations. In part
those words limit the business of federal courts to questions
presented in an adversary context and in a form historically
viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process.
And in part those words define the role assigned to the
judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power to assure that the
federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to the
other branches of government. Justiciability is the term of
art employed to give expression to this dual limitation placed
upon federal courts by the case-and-controversy doctrine.

One aspect of justiciability not raised by the parties, but which
gave this court some pause, is the possibility that this court has
been asked for an advisory opinion, an idea that is inconsistent
with the “case” or “controversy” requirement of the Constitution.
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).

Although the statute the Senator relies on is facially similar
to the statute found ineffective in Muskrat, the differences are
signficant enough to remove the case from the proscriptions of
whatever remains of the Muskrat rationale. See, e. g., Northern
Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649 (1976); South Caro-
lina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). Thus, we are not asked

for an advisory opinion.

8a

issue confronting us is whether Senator McClure has such
a personal stake.

The interpretations of the doctrine of standing are
manifold. The Supreme Court has considered the issue
in numerous contexts and has expressed the standing
requirements in several formulations. Some of the for-
mulations leave one with the sense that standing can
never be determined until the case has been tried on
the merits; only at that point can one say with certainty
that the plaintiff did or did not have a protected legal
right or that he or she suffered a wrong for which the
law provides a remedy. The distinction between injury
“in fact” and injury “in law” and whether either or both
remain requirements for standing is not always clear.
The Court has at times required that a plaintiff show
a distinct “legal interest” before he or she may have
standing in federal court. E.g., Jenkins v. McKeithen,
395 U.S. 411, 423 (1969). More recently, the Court has
said that a plaintiff must merely be within the “zone of
interests” sought to be protected by the constitutional
or statutory guarantee in question. Association of Data
Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970). In other cases, the Court has suggested that
a plaintiff need only show “injury in fact” to satisfy
the personal stake requirement of article III. E.g., Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.,
438 UU 59 (1978); United States v. Students Challeng-
ing Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S.
669 (1973). A person may thus have standing, despite
the lack of a demonstrable legal right, if he can show an
injury in fact and, we would surmise, some colorable
legal claim. The law is less ciear that a person without
an injury in fact may have standing, although it appears
that at least in some limited circumstances a statute may
give such a person a cause of action based on a rationale
of enforcing the public interest through private persons
concerned about public questions. See, e.g., Sierra Club

9a

v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 n.3 (1972); Metropolitan
Washington Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Colum-
bia, 511 F.2d 809, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. § 7604 (Supp. II 1978) (authorizing civil
suits by “any person”). But in Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 501 (1975), the Court, in acknowledging that
Congress may grant an express right of action that
otherwise would be barred on prudential grounds, af-
firmed that “the plaintiff still must allege a distinct and
palpable injury to himself, even if it is an injury shared
by a large class of other possible litigants.”

In light of the foregoing, we now inquire whether
Senator McClure has standing to bring this suit con-
sistent with the requirements of article III. The analysis
must be two-fold. First, without reference to any partic-
ular statute, does Senator McClure, either as a private
individual or as a senator, have a sufficient personal
stake in the challenge to Judge Mikva’s appointment to
give him standing? Second, if Senator McClure does not
have a sufficient personal stake under that criterion, has
Congress, by the statute under which Senator McClure
seeks to sue, properly conferred a sufficient “right” upon
him to give him standing and to satisfy the case or
controversy requirement of article III?

Without reference to the statute under which Senator
McClure seeks to sue, we conclude that a United States
Senator, suing in either his individual capacity or his
official capacity as a senator, lacks standing to challenge
the validity of the appointment of a federal judge. In
Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937) (per curiam),
the Supreme Court denied a motion brought by a mem-
ber of the Supreme Court bar for an order to show cause
why Justice Black, then recently appointed to the Su-
preme Court, should be permitted to serve as a Justice.
The challenge was based on the Ineligibility Clause, the
same constitutional provision relied upon by Senator

10a

McClure in this suit. In denying the motion for lack
of standing, the court said that “[i]t is an established
principle that to entitle a private individual to invoke
the judicial power to determine the validity of executive
or legislative action he must show that he has sustained
or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury
as the result of that action and it is not sufficient that
he has merely a general interest common to all members
of the public.” 302 U.S. at 634. As a private individual,
then, it seems that Senator McClure does not have suffi-
cient personal interest in the validity of Judge Mikva’s
appointment to have standing in federal court.

Senator McClure contends, however, that his special
duties and repsonsibilities as senator gave him standing
to challenge the appointment. The precise nature of a
legislator’s standing to sue in federal court is a matter
of no small importance, for a readier access to courts
by legislators, as legislators, is likely to give the courts
increased opportunity and obligation to decide matters
of public importance that might previously have been
left to the legislative and executive branches. It is
nevertheless the case that, in at least some circum-
stances, a legislator does have standing to sue as a
legislator when he or she would not have standing as an
individual. The touchstone is whether the legislator’s
interest in “maintaining the effectiveness of [his] votes”
is sufficient to confer standing to challenge an action
imparing that effectiveness. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S.
433, 438 (1939). In Coleman, the Supreme Court held
that a group of Kansas legislators had standing to
challenge both the right of the state’s lieutenant governor
to break a tie vote in the state senate, and the efficacy
of the state’s attempted ratification of an amendment to
the United States Constitution which the state legislature
had previously rejected. This principle has re-emerged
in a recent case in the District of Columbia Circuit, in
which Senator Kennedy was held to have standing to

lla

challenge President Nixon’s pocket veto of a health care
bill during a congressional recess. Kennedy v. Sampson,
511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Senator Kennedy argued
that the bill could not validly have been pocket vetoed
during a recess, and that President Nixon’s action not
only deprived the Senator’s earlier vote in favor of the
bill of its effectiveness, but also deprived him of the op-
portunity to vote to override a normal veto.’

It is difficult to see how Senator McClure can argue
that the effectiveness of his vote is impaired by the
appointment of former-Congressman Mikva to the federal
bench. Senator McClure had the opportunity to persuade
his colleagues to vote against the confirmation and, in
the conscientious performance of his duties, Senator
McClure did just that.* That he and like-minded senators
did not prevail in the Senate does not mean that the
effectiveness of Senator McClure’s vote was impaired
within the meaning of Coleman v. Miller. It means
merely that he was on the losing side. Certainly no one
would contend, and we do not understand Senator Mc-
Clure to contend, that the losing senators in any vote
should automatically have the right to appeal to a federal
court for a determination of the correctness of the result
approved by the majority of their colleagues. If this
were the case, federal courts would on such occasions be
little more than legal advisors to the Congress, whose
counsel could be obtainted at the instance of any single

See also Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (DC. Cir. 1973)
(member of House of Representatives lacks standing to seek de-
claratory judgment prohibiting certain illegal activities by Central
Intelligence Agency) ; Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455, 459
(4th Cir. 1975) (members of House of Representatives lack
standing to challenge expenditure of funds for military action in
Southeast Asia); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1315
(2nd Cir. 1973) (member of House of Representatives lacks
standing to seek declaratory judgment prohibiting military action
in Cambodia).

See note 4, supra.

12a

member of that body. This would, of course, amount to
the giving of advisory opinions that, whatever their de-
sirability in a particular case, we are forbidden to pro-
vide. Thus, at least without a statute authorizing such
suits, Senator McClure lacks standing to challenge, either
as an individual or as a Senator, the appointment of
former Congressman Mikva to the Court of Appeals.

We must therefore consider the effect, if any, of the
jurisdictional statute under which Senator McClure seeks
to sue. It is difficult to see how this statute may, con-
sistent with article II’, confer upon a senator or member
of the House of Representatives a “right” to seek a deci-
sion from a federal court that such a senator or member
of the House would otherwise be powerless to procure.
The statute is not premised on protecting the effective-
ness of a legislator’s vote under the rationale of Coleman
v. Miller, for it purports to grant standing to senators
who voted for Judge Mikva as well as to those who
voted against him. Furthermore, the statute purports
to grant standing to members of the House of Repre-
sentatives, who had no vote on the appointment at all.
And we see no relevance, at least insofar as standing
for members of the House is concerned, in the fact that
Judge Mikva was, before his appointment to the bench,
himself a member of the House.

Thus, we hold that Senator McClure, even with aid
of the special jurisdictional statute on which he seeks
to rely, does not have standing to bring this suit. The
jurisprudential considerations go beyond simply setting
proper limits on judicial power and containing its exer-
cise within its rightful sphere. They serve also to protect
against other branches of government, no matter how
well-intentioned, voluntarily ceding to the federal judi-
ciary powers and responsibilities that rightfully belong
to the legislature or the executive. At bottom, the vice
of the statute before us is its muddling of the roles,
its blurring of the lines between the branches of govern-
ment.

13a

Members of Congress are the democratically-elected
representatives of the people, chosen by them to enact
the laws of the United States, to advise and consent to
the appointment of policy-makers in the executive branch
and judges in the judicial branch, and to perform cer-
tain other functions prescribed by the Constitution. The
statute under which & nator McClure brings this suit
casts members of Congress in the role of special attorneys
general, to plead before this court for a second opinion
as to whether their judgments were right in voting for
or against the confirmation of Judge Mikva. Under the
Constitution, it was the duty of Congress itself, in the
first instance, to determine Judge Mikva’s qualifications
both on the merits and on the issue of whether he was
constitutionally eligible to serve as a judge. To allow
members of Congress to change hats, as it were, to plead
the unconstitutionality of their own acts before this
court on the basis of an argument already debated in the
Senate but lost there by vote, would, we suggest, set a
dangerous precedent. We find that this court does not
have jurisdiction, and we according!y dismiss.“

/s/ Betty B. Fletcher
BErry B. FLETCHER
United States Cireuit Judge

/s/ Ray MeNichols
Ray McNICHOLS
United States District Judge

/s/ Fred M. Taylor
FRED M. TAYLOR
United States District Judge

* Since we have determined that plaintiff McClure does not have
standing to bring this suit, we do not reach the question of per-
sonal jurisdiction over Judge Mikva nor any of the other issues

raised by the parties.

14a
APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF IDAHO

Civil No. 79-1340

James A. McCLurRE, United States Senator, Idaho,
. Plaintiff,
JAMES EARL CARTER, PRESIDENT of the United States;
and ABNER J. MIKVA,
Defendants.

Filed May 5, 1981

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Before: FLETCHER, Circuit Judge, and MCNICHOLS and
TAYLOR, District Judges, sitting as a Special
Three-Judge District Court.

The court having previously entered its decision that
the plaintiff lacks standing to bring this suit and that
the court therefore lacks jurisdiction over the subject
matter,

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

That the above entitled case be, and hereby is,
DISMISSED.
s Betty B. Fletcher
BETTY B. FLETCHER
United States Circuit Judge

s, Ray MeNichols
Ray McNICHOLS
United States District Judge

/s/ Fred M. Taylor
FRED M. TAYLOR
United States District Judge

15a
APPENDIX C

JOHN F. ADLARD, Esq.
RUNPFT, STECHER & COFFIN
Pest Office Box 953

420 West Bannock Street
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 345-6521

Davip H. MARTIN, Ese.
2033 M Street, N.W.
Suite 700

Washington, D.C. 20036

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

Case No. 79-1340

JAMES A. MCCLURE, United States Senator, Idaho,
— Plaintiff,

JAMES EARL CARTER, PRESIDENT of the United States;
and ABNER J. MIKVA,
Defendants.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Notice is hereby given that JAMES A. McCLURE,
plaintiff above named, hereby appeals to the United
States Supreme Court as provided for in P.L. 96-86 and
28 United States Code Sections 2284 and 2101, from
the final judgment dismissing this case entered in this
action on the 5th day of May, 1981.

DATED: June 9, 1981.
RUNFT, STECHER & COFFIN, CTD.

By
Davw H. MarTIN, Esq. JOHN F. ADLARD, of the Firm

l6a

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that service of the within and
foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL was made this 9th day
of June, 1981, by mailing copies thereof, by United
States Mail, postage prepaid, to the following persons:

Ronald Reagan, President
United States of America
c/o Solicitor General
Washington, D.C. 20530

Hon. Abner Mikva

United States Court of Claims
c/o Solicitor General
Washington, D.C. 20530

Fred Fielding, Esq.
Counsel to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20000

The Hon. Abner Mikva
United States Court of Claims
Washington, D.C. 20000

JOHN F. ADLARD

17a
APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 80-1061
DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR., MEMBER,
U.S. SENATE,

V.

FEDERAL OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE, et al.
Appellees

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia

(D.C. Civil Action No. 79-1703)

Argued January 15, 1981
Decided June 24, 1981
Grasty Crews, III, for appellant.

Lewis K. Wise, Attorney, Department of Justice with
whom Alice Daniel, Assistant Attorney General, Charles
F. C. Ruff, United States Attorney and Anthony Stein-
meyer, Attorney, Department of Justice were on the
brief for appellees.

Before: Ropp and EDWARDS, Circuit Judges and
PENN *, United States District Judge for the
District of Columbia

* Sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 292(a).

18a

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Ross.

Ross, Circuit Judge: This case presents the question
whether a United States Senator has standing to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of the procedures established
by the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 221 et seg.
(1976) for the appointment of the five Reserve Bank
members of the Federal Open Market Committee. A
corollary question is whether, assuming the Senator has
standing, this court should afford him relief. The com-
plaint of the appellant, Senator Donald W. Riegle, Jr.,
of Michigan, was dismissed by the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia on the ground that
the Senator lacked standing to seek injunctive relief
from the allegedly unconstitutional procedures authorized
by the Act. Riegle v. Federal Open Market Committee,
et al., 84 F.R.D. 114, 116 (D.D.C. 1979) (Gesell, J.).
We affirm on a ground different from that relied upon
below.

I.

The Federal Reserve System, which was created by
Congress in 1913 as this nation’s central bank, is com-
prised of public and private entities organized on a re-
gional basis with federal supervisory authority.“ The
System includes a seven-member Board of Governors,
the twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks, the FOMC,
the Federal Advisory Council, and approximately 5,500
privately-owned member commercial banks. (Br. of
FOMC at 4) The primary role of the System in the con-
duct of monetary policy is to facilitate the achievement
of national economic goals through influence on the avail-

1See Reuss v. Balles, 189 U.S.App.D.C. 303, 584 F.2d 461,
462-65, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978) for a description of the
Federal Reserve Sye 1, open market operations, and the evolu-
tion and functions of the FOMC. See also T. Mayer, J. DUESEN-
BERRY, & R. ALIBER, MONEY, BANKING, AND THE ECONOMY (1981) ;
“A look Inside Paul Volcker’s Fed,” N.Y. Times (May 3, 1981),
sec. 3, at 1, 8-9.

19a

ability and cost of bank reserves, bank credit, and money.
Three basic mechanisms employed by the System to im-
plement monetary policy are open market operations,
regulation of member bank borrowing from the Federal
Reserve Banks, and establishment of member bank re-
serve requirements. The most flexible and potentially
significant of these tools is open market transactions.
(Br. at FOMC at 6)

Open market trading, which consists of the purchase
and sale of government and other securities in the fi-
nancial markets by the Reserve Banks, is exclusively
directed and regulated by the FOMC. 12 U.S.C. § 263
(b) (1976). The FOMC, like the System as a whole, is
constituted to reflect both public and private interests.
Since 1935 the FOMC has been composed of the seven
members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System, 12 U.S.C. §241 (1976), who are ap-
pointed by the President with the advice and consent of
the Senate, and five representatives of the Federal Re-
serve Banks, who are elected annually by the boards of
directors of the Banks. 12 U.S.C. § 263(a) (1976). Since
1942 Congress has required that the five Reserve Bank
members of the FOMC be either presidents or first vice
presidents of the Reserve Banks. 12 U.S.C. § 263(a).
The Reserve Banks are private corporations whose stock
is owned by the member commercial banks within their
districts. 12 U.S.C. § 321 (1976). These member com-
mercial banks elect six of the nine members of the board
of directors of each Reserve Bank, and the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System selects the re-
maining three. 12 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304 (1976). The presi-
dents and first vice presidents of the Reserve Banks,
although selected by the respective boards of directors, are
subject to the approval, suspension, and removal au-
thority of the Board of Governors. 12 U.S.C. §§ 341,
248 (1976). In short, the FOMC consists of seven mem-
bers who hold their offices by virtue of presidential ap-

pointments confirmed by the Senate, and five members
who are elected by the boards of directors of the Banks
and who hold their offices subject to the approval of
the Board of Governors. 12 U.S.C. § 263(a).

The securities transactions directed by the FOMC have
a significant effect on the financial markets. In 1974,
for example, the FOMC alone was responsible for ap-
proximately $19.4 billion in outright transactions in
U.S. Government Securities. (Br. of Riegle at 5) These
transactions potentially affect the value of the dollar,
foreign exchange rates, interest rates, investment, and
employment. Id. Approximately every 45 days, the
FOMC formulates its monetary policy objectives for the
immediate future by setting targets for growth rates in
the money supply and the range of variance in the Fed-
eral Funds rate (the member banks’ rate for overnight
loans of excess reserves to other banks). The FOMC
then issues a domestic policy directive to the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York for the management of the
System Open Market Account, which is a central entity
representing the open market transaction interests of the
twelve Reserve Banks. The manager of the Account, who
maintains daily contact with Federal Reserve staff mem-
bers in Washington, engages in financial transactions de-
signed to achieve the monetary conditions sought by the
FOMC. Reserve Banks are prohibited under the Act
from engaging in any open market transactions except
those directed by the FOMC through the Account. 12
U.S.C. § 263 (b).

Considering the substantial ecor mie power wielded
by the FOMC, it is not surprising that controversy over
the balance between public and private control of the
Committee has existed since its creation. As originally
constituted, the FOMC was privately dominated, consist-
ing solely of representatives of the twelve Reserve Banks.
Banking Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 162. This arrangement

2la

was unsatisfactory to those who favored greater govern-
mental control over disposition of Reserve Bank funds.
During debates on the Senate floor preceding passage of
the Banking Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 704, Chairman Carter
Glass of the Senate Banking Committee (a supporter of
Reserve Bank control of the FOMC) explained the legis-
lative compromise between public (Board of Governors)
and private (Reserve Bank) interests which produced
the present procedure for constituting the FOMC:

[We are] amazed to have it proposed that the Fed-
eral Reserve Board alone should constitute the open-
market committee of the system. The Govern-
ment of the United States has never contributed a
dollar to one of the Reserve Banks; yet it is pro-
posed to have the Federal Reserve Board, having not
a dollar of pecuniary interest in the Reserve funds
or the deposits of the Federal Reserve banks or of
the member banks . . . to make such disposition of
the reserve funds of the country, and in large meas-
ure the deposits of the member banks of the country,
as they may please .... [I]n order to reconcile
bitter differences there was yielding, and we have
now proposed an open-market committee composed
of all 7 members of the Federal Reserve Board and
5 representatives of the regional reserve banks.

79 Cong. Rec. 11778 (1935).

Despite the passage of the compromise represented by
the Banking Act of 1935, the debate over public and
private control of the FOMC has continued during the
past 48 years. The late Congressman Wright Patman,
Chairman of the House Banking Committee, asserted in
1938 that the Reserve Bank members of the FOMC did
not represent the “people’s interest.”* Mr. Patman’s

2 Hearings before the House Banking and Currency Com-
mittee on H.R. 7230, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 56 (1938).

successor, Congressman Henry S. Reuss, has made several
unsuccessful attempts, both in Congress by amendment
of 12 U.S.C. § 263(a) and in the federal courts, to re-
quire that the five Reserve Bank members of the FOMC
be appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate
pursuant to the Appointments Clause. United States
Constitution, Art. II, sec. 2, cl. 2. Based on his belief
that the work of the FOMC “is essentially a govern-
mental function, and should not be exercised by private
people.” * Mr. Reuss in 1976 introduced the “Federal Re-
serve Reform Act,” H.R. 12934, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976), which in part would have required that the five
Reserve Bank seats on the FOMC be limited to Bank
presidents appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate. The House Banking Com-
mittee defeated this provision on April 30, 1976. (Br.
of FOMC at 21) Mr. Reuss then brought an action in
federal court seeking, in part, to have 12 U.S.C. § 263
(a) declared unconstitutional. The District Court dis-
missed the action on the ground that the Congressman
lacked standing to sue either in his capacity as a con-
gressman or as a private bondholder. Reuss v. Balles,
73 F.R.D. 90 (D. D.C. 1976) (Parker, J.), aff'd, 189
U.S. App. D.C. 303, 584 F.2d 461, cert. denied, 439 U.S.
997 (1978). On April 1, 1980 Congressman Reuss in-
troduced another bill, H.R. 7001, which would amend 12
U.S.C. § 263(a) in the manner sought by Senator Riegle
in this case: a prohibition on voting by the five Reserve
Bank members of the FOMC. This legislation was not
enacted.‘ (Br. of FOMC at 21-22)

* Hearings before the Subcommittee on Domestic Finance of the
House Committee on Banking and Currency “The Federal Reserve
System After Fifty Years,” 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1964).

H. R. 7001, after consideration by the Subcommittee on Domestic
Monetary Policy, was forwarded as a clean bill, H.R. 8223, to the
Committee on Banking on October 1, 1980. The bill died within
this Committee.

23a

Senator Riegle instituted the present suit on July 2,
1979 (prior to the introduction of H.R. 7001 by Con-
gressman Reuss) in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia, seeking injunctive relief in the
form of an absolute prohibition on voting by the Reserve
Bank members of the FOMC. (J.A. at 8) In an opinion
by District Judge Gesell, the court dismissed the action
for lack of standing. Riegle v. Federal Open Market
Committee, supra, at 116. The court reasoned that

Senator Riegle’s injury is of a political nature, de-
riving solely from the acts or omissions of his col-
leagues and not in any way from the actions of the
named defendants. Reuss v. Balles, supra 584 F.2d
at 468. What the Court must decide is whether
or not a Congressman from either chamber has
standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statu-
tory provision on which he has failed to persuade
his colleagues in the past and remains free to at-
tempt persuasion in the future. The Court concludes
that to confer standing upon such a Congressman
without more would improperly interfere with the
legislative process.

84 F.R.D. at 116 (citations omitted). The decision of
the District Court is now before us on appeal.

II.

Senator Riegle alleges that both the defendant indi-
viduals, [bly acting as officers of the United States
when their nominations have never been submitted to the
Senate,” and the defendant executive agency, “[b]y per-
mitting the defendant individuals to act as officers of
the United States when their nominations have never
been submitted to the Senate,” deprive him of his con-
stitutional right to vote in determining the advice and
consent of the Senate to the appointment of the five
Reserve Bank members of the FOMC. (Complaint, J.A.

24a

at 11) When ruling on a motion to dismiss for want of
standing, “both the trial and reviewing courts must ac-
cept as true all material allegations of the complaint,
and must construe the complaint in favor of the com-
plaining party.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501
(1975). We assume, therefore, that the procedure for
constituting the FOMC contained in 12 U.S.C. § 263 (a
of the Act results in a deprivation of Senator Riegle’s
constitutional right to advise and consent regarding the
appointment of the defendant officers of the executive
branch. Senator Riegle seeks not declaratory relief but
rather “an injunction against their [five Reserve Bank
members] voting as members of the FOMC, conduct
which deprives him of his right to vote in determining the
advice and consent of the Senate to the appointment of
officers at the highest level of government.” (Br. of Rie-
gle at 43) (Emphasis in original)

Two contradictory principles pervade the opinions of
this court concerning the standing of congressional plain-
tiffs. First, no distinctions are to be made between con-
g sional and private plaintiffs in the standing analysis.
As we stated in Harrington v. Bush, 180 U.S. App. D.C.
45, 553 F.2d 190, 204 (1977) (emphasis omitted),
“there are no special standards for determining Congres-
sional standing questions.” Second, this court will not
confer standing on a congressional plaintiff unless he is
suffering an injury that his colleagues cannot redress.
When congressional plaintiffs have sought to accomplish
in this court what they were unable to persuade their
colleagues to do, we have usually refused to confer stand-
ing because of our concern for non-interference in the
legislative process. See, e.g., Reuss v. Balles, supra; Har-
rington v. Bush, supra. Cf. Kennedy v. Sampson, 167
U.S. App. D.C. 192, 511 F.2d 430 (1974), holding that
nullification of a senator’s vote due to pocket veto of bill
by the President constitutes sufficient injury to confer

25a

standing; Goldwater v. Carter, 199 U.S. App. D.C. 115,
617 F.2d 430 (en banc), holding that disenfranchisement
of a senator because of the attempt by the President to
terminate the Taiwan Treaty without the advice and
consent of the Senate is injury sufficient to confer stand-
ing, judgment vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (mem.).
We believe that these two contradictory principles create
unnecessary confusion when applied to suits brought by
congressional plain*’ffs. As the former Chief Judge of
this court recently . oserved,

There can be no peaceful coexistence between, on
the one hand, the notion that legislators are treated
like any other plaintiff for standing purposes, and,
on the other, the idea that courts should rigorously
scrutinize whether the congressional plaintiff’s true
quarrel is with his colleagues, rather than the execu-
tive. There is no general requirement that a private
litigant employ self-help before seeking judicial re-
lief. Nor should there be, because an ordinary plain-
tiff, having suffered injury in fact within the con-
templation of the law he invokes, is entitled to his
day in court. If the plaintiff passes the standing
test and presents a justiciable dispute, it is assumed
that the political branches have decided to commit
such disputes to the judiciary and, barring extraor-
dinary circumstances, that is a judgment which
courts are bound to respect.

Hon. Carl McGowan, “Congressmen in Court: The New
Plaintiffs,” 15 Ga. L. Rev. 241, 254-255 (1981) (Me-
Gowan) (citations omitted). Accordingly we shall pro-
ceed by applying to this case the traditional standing
tests for non-congressional plaintiffs gleaned from opin-
ions of the Supreme Court. Thereafter, we shall exam-
ine what additional considerations, if any, must enter

26a

our analysis by virtue of the plaintiff's status as a
Member of the United States.“

The Supreme Court in Ass’n of Data Processing Serv-
ice Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970),
established a two-part test for standing: injury (i) in
fact and (ii) to an interest “arguably within the zone
of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute
or constitutional guarantee in question.” Id. at 152-53.
A causation requirement was added in Warth v. Seldin,
supra at 505: the plaintiff must prove that “the asserted
injury was the consequence of the defendants’ actions,
or that prospective relief will remove the harm.” This
causation requirement was elaborated upon in Simon v.
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426
U.S. 26, 41-42, 45 (1976), where the Court observed that
“the ‘case or controversy’ limitation of Art. III still re-
quires that a federal court act orly to redress injury that
fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the de-
fendant, and not injury that results from the independ-
ent action of some third party not before the court.”
Again, however, the Court stated the causation require-
ment in the alternative, quoting Warth v. Seldin, supra:
the causation requirement is satisfied if the plaintiff es-
tablishes that the injury was “the consequence of the
defendants’ actions” or that exercise of the court’s reme-
dial powers would redress the injury. 426 U.S. at 45.
See also Duke Power Co. v. North Carolina Environ-
mental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 74 (1978). Al-
though recent cases have suggested a slight relaxation of
the above tests, see, e.g., Duke Power, supra at 80-81, the

5 By postponing consideration of this court’s congressional stand-
ing opinions until the latter part of the discussion, we seek to
illustrate the conceptual imprecision which results from attempts
to achieve through standing analysis the resolution of those
separstion-of-powers problems peculiar to congressional plaintiff
cases. See generally, McGowan, supra; Note, “Congressional Ac-
cess to the Federal Courts,” 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1632 (1977).

27a

three requirements stated above present the maximum
burden which a plaintiff must bear to attain standing:
establishment of (i) injury-in-fact (ii) to an interest
protected by the relevant law (iii) where the injury is
caused by defendants’ actions or capable of judicial re-
dress.

We think it may be argued plausibly that Senator
Riegle has met the above burden. First, assuming that
the five Reserve Bank members of the FOMC are officers
who must be appointed with the advice and consent of
the Senate, Riegle’s inability to exercise his right under
the Appointments Clause of the Constitution is an injury
sufficiently personal to constitute an injury-in-fact. As
the Court observed in Warth v. Seldin, supra at 498-99,
the plaintiff must allege “‘such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy’ as to warrant his invocation
of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of
the court’s remedial powers on his behalf.” Second, with
regard to the causation requirement, we note that the
named defendants in this action (the five Reserve Bank
members of the FOMC) are not the causes of the injury
to Senator Riegle. The five Reserve Bank members were
elected by the directors of the Federal Reserve Banks. It
is these directors, rather than the five FOMC members
in question, who are exercising an appointment power
which deprives Senator Riegle of his right to vote on
determining the advice and consent of the Senate to the
appointments of officers. Thus, the requirement that “the
asserted injury was the consequence of the defendants’
actions,” Warth v. Seldin, supra, has not been met. How-
ever, as noted above at page 10, the causation require-
ment can also be met by showing that “prospective
[judicial] relief will remove the harm.” Warth v. Seldin,
supra. Because it is within the power of this court to
redress the alleged injury by holding that 12 U.S.C.
§ 263(a) is unconstitutional, the causation requirement

has been satisfied despite the naming of inappropriate
defendants.“ Third, the interest which Riegle claims was
injured by defendants’ action (his right to advise and
consent to the appointment of officers of the executive
branch) is within the zone of interests protected by the
Appointments Clause of the Constitution, supra. In short,
although there is room for argument as to whether Sen-
ator Riegle clearly satisfies all requirements of the most
stringent version of the Supreme Court’s standing test,
we think it reasonable to hold that he has standing.’

* Although it can be argued that the Senate rather than the
directors of the Federal Reserve Banks has, through the passage
of 12 U.S.C. § 263(a) of the Act, caused Riegle’s injury, to con-
clude therefrom that the Senator would not satisfy the first for-
mulation of the causation test even had he named the Bank
directors as defendants would violate the principle of equality
between private and congressional plaintiffs in the standing in-
quiry. When a plaintiff alleges injury by unconstitutional action
taken pursuant to a statute, his proper defendants are those acting
unconstitutionally under the law (i.e., the Bank directors), and
not the legislature which enacted the statute. See generally,
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 175-80 (1803).

7 This case differs from Reuss v. Balles, supra at note 1, where
standing was denied to a congressman who claimed, in part, that
improper delegation of responsibilities to the FOMC resulted in
usurpation of his powers under Article I, sec. 8 of the Constitution
to coin and regulate the value of monev, to regulate commerce,
and to borrow money on the credit of the United States. /d. at 467.
The court noted in the Reuss case that judicial relief could not
possibly cure the alleged injury, for even were the court to re-
quire that all FOMC members be presidential appointees, the
Committee would retain delegated powers and the congressman's
role in setting monetary policy would not be enhanced by the
judicial relief he sought. In this case, on the other hand, judicial
relief in the form of invalidation of 12 U.S.C. 5 263(a) would
prevent the directors of the Banks from exercising their allegedly
unconstitutional appointments of the five Reserve Bank members
of the FOMC.

III.

Appellant's status as a Member of the United States
Senate, however, raises separation-of-powers concerns
which are best addressed independently of the standing
issue. As we observed supra at pages 8-9, the prineiple
that a legislator must lack collegial or “in-house” reme-
dies before this court will confer standing has been a
theme of our congressional plaintiff opinions. This prin-
ciple is a departure from traditional standing analysis
because it violates the principle of equality between legis-
lator and private plaintiffs; non-legislator plaintiffs are
not routinely denied standing because of the presence of
an alternative remedy. Moreover, the inappropriateness
of the collegial remedy principle as an aspect of congres-
sional standing analysis has resulted in its inconsistent
application in the case law of this court. For example,
in Public Citizen v. Sampson, 379 F. Supp. 662 (D.D.C.
1974), aff'd mem., 169 U.S. App. D.C. 301, 515 F.2d
1018 (1975), Harrington v. Bush, supra at 212-214, and
Reuss v. Balles, supra at 468, standing was withheld
from congressional plaintiffs in part because their power
to vote, i.e., to enact legislation to cure the alleged in-
jury, remained unimpaired. Yet in Kennedy v. Sampson,
supra, the court conferred standing on Senator Kennedy,
to challenge the legality of an attempted pocket veto of
a bill for which he had voted. We reasoned that execu-
tive impairment of the Senator’s past vote had nullified
Kennedy’s legislative power. Id. at 436. The Senator
had, however, collegial remedies comparable to those
which negated standing in the Public Citizen, Harring-
ton, and Reuss cases; Senator Kennedy’s power to re-
introduce the relevant legislation in he next session of
Congress and to vote thereon remained unimpaired. In
Goldwater v. Carter, supra, this court’s most recent opin-
ion regarding congressional standing, legislator plaintiffs
were again granted standing despite the presence of ade-
quate collegial remedies. The plaintiffs in the Goldwater

30a

case were a small group of senators and representatives
who asserted that President Carter could not terminate
the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan without either
a two-thirds vote of the Senate or a majority of both
houses of Congress. A majority of this court reasoned
that the plaintiffs had been “disenfranchised” by the
President’s action because a requisite number of senators
could never force an unwilling Senate to vote on a decla-
ration of their right to block rescission of the Taiwan
Treaty, nor was there any assurance that the President
would heed any Senate action. 617 F.2d at 702-703. Yet
collegial remedies existed because Senate resolutions re-
garding the Treaty were pending at the time. McGowan,
at 247-48. On appeal the Supreme Court vacated our
judgment on the grounds that the plaintiffs did not pose
a justiciable question. 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (mem.) The
Court ignored the standing concept altogether and, in
separate opinions by Justices Powell and Rehnquist,
neither of which gained a majority of the Court, relied
upon the doctrines of ripeness and political question, re-
spectively. Jd. at 997, 1002.

If, as the ultimate disposition of Goldwater v. Carter
suggests, the Supreme Court does not believe that the
standing doctrine is capable of reflecting the prudential
concerns raised by congressional plaintiff suits, this court
ought not persist in the attempt to make it do so. The
doctrinal difficulties presented by an attempt to reconcile
our denial of congressional standing in the Public Citi-
zen, Harrington, and Reuss cases, on the one hand, with
our conferral of legislator standing in the Kennedy and
Goldwater cases, on the other, suggest that

[t]he use of the standing doctrine to address the
separation-of-powers concerns arising when federal
legislators sue the executive branch in federal court
is fraught with difficulties both in theory and in
application. Although it has been the most popular

31a

method of judicial self-restraint in these cases, the
recent Supreme Court decision in Goldwater, which
made no use of the term, suggests that its day may
have passed insofar as these lawsuits are concerned.

McGowan, at 256. Moreover, we are convinced that the
doctrines of ripeness and political question are no “more
elegant in their conception [n]or more satisfying in their
execution” than the standing concept as a means of artic-
ulating our prudential concerns in congressional plaintiff
cases. McGowan, at 256-261. The political question doc-
trine justifies a finding of nonjusticiability primarily
when there is an explicit textual commitment of the
controversy to a non-judicial branch of government for
resolution. Jd. at 258. In the case under review, the
Appointments Clause of the Constitution has no such
textual commitment of the advice and consent issue ex-
clusively to the legislature.* On the contrary, “[n]othing
in articles II or III [of the Constitution] suggests that,
assuming the court has jurisdiction, anyone but the ju-
dicial branch should decide this question.” McGowan, at
258. In short, a clear constitutional or statutory prohibi-
tion of judicial review will surely not be present in many
cases where prudential concerns nevertheless warrant a
court in finding it improper for a congressional plaintiff
to invoke the judicial power. As to ripeness, one can

The Appointments Clause of the Constitution, Art. II, sec. 2,
cl. 2, reads as follows:

[The President} shall have Power, by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two
thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shal! nominate,
and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall
appoint Ambassadors, and other public Ministers and Consuls,
Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the
United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by Law; but the
Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.

32a

conceive of instances when executive action has been
taken which may create a situation ripe for judicial
review (this case, for example), but separation-of-powers
concerns justify judicial restraint. Neither the ripeness
nor political question doctrine, in summary, is sufficiently
catholic in formulation or flexible in application to re-
solve the prudential issues arising in congressional plain-
tiff cases.

The most satisfactory means of translating our sepa-
ration-of-powers concerns into principled decisionmaking
is through a doctrine of circumscribed equitable discre-
tion. Where a congressional plaintiff could obtain sub-
stantial relief from his fellow legislators through the
enactment, repeal, or amendment of a statute, this court
should exercise its equitable discretion to dismiss the leg-
islator’s action. For the reasons set forth below, this
test avoids the problems engendered by the doctrines of
standing, political question, and ripeness. The standard
would counsel the courts to refrain from hearing cases
which represent the most obvious intrusion by the judi-
ciary into the legislative arena: challenges concerning
congressional action or inaction regarding legislation.
Yet this standard would assure that non-frivolous claims
of unconstitutional action which could only be brought by
members of Congress will be reviewed on the merits.

The above standard would counsel dismissal of a con-
gressional plaintiff’s claim in cases concerning legislative
action or inaction because it is in these cases that the
plaintiff’s dispute appears to be primarily with his fel-
low legislators. In these circumstances, separation-of-
powers concerns are most acute. Judges are presented
not with a chance to mediate between two political
branches but rather with the possibility of thwarting
Congress’s will by allowing a plaintiff to circumvent the
processes of democratic decisionmaking. “This meddling
with the internal decisionmaking processes of one of the

33a

political branches extends judicial power beyond the limits
inherent in the constitutional scheme for dividing federal
power.” McGowan, at 251. See, e. g, Harrington v.
Bush, supra at 215; Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d
1307 (2d Cir. 1973). Thus, where a congressional plain-
tiff has standing to challenge the actions of those acting
pursuant to a statute which could be repealed or amended
by his colleagues, or where he alleges an injury which
could be substantially cured by legislative action, our
standard would counsel judicial restraint. In all such
cases, it is unlikely that an unconstitutional action or
statute would go unreviewed. While we discourage con-
gressional plaintiffs in such circumstances, it is probable
that a private plaintiff could acquire standing to raise
the issue of unconstitutionality before a court. Because
such a private plaintiff’s suit would not raise separation-
of-powers concerns, the court would be obliged to reach
the merits of the claim. In this case, for example, al-
though prudential considerations warrant the dismissal of
Senator Riegle’s claim, one can easily conceive of a
private plaintiff who could acquire standing to bring a
similar claim. A person with significant economic inter-
ests in the open securities markets and prime lending
rates, ¢.g., a major corporation, pension fund, or other
major investor, might qualify for standing to challenge
the constitutionality of a procedure which allegedly per-
mits improperly appointed officials to so substantially
influence the monetary policy of the United States, open
market trading, and prime rates.

When a congressional plaintiff brings a suit involving
circumstances in which legislative redress is not available
or a private plaintiff would likely not qualify for stand-
ing, the court would be counseled under our standard to
hear the case. Thus, such actions as impeachment, expul-
sion proceedings, impoundment, and certain acts of the
executive not subject to direct legislative redress or pri-
vate party challenge (e.g., the pocket veto in Kennedy v.

34a

Sampson, supra) would be subject to judicial review in
a congressional plaintiff case. These circumstances
(which are not intended to exhaust the possibilities) rep-
resent situations where absent congresisonal plaintiff
actions, it is possible that non-frivolous claims of uncon-
stitutional action would go unreviewed by a court.

In short, our standard would counsel dismissal of con-
gressional plaintiff actions only in case. in which (i) the
plaintiff lacks standing under the traditional tests, or (ii)
the plaintiff has standing but could get legislative redress
and a similar action could be brought by a private plain-
tiff. Nondiscriminatory application of standing principles
warrants dismissal of the action in the former circum-
stance; non-interference in the legislative process coun-
sels dismissal in the latter situation. We would welcome
congressional plaintiff actions involving non-frivolous
claims of unconstitutional action which, because they
could not be brought by a private plaintiff and are not
subject to legislative redress, would go unreviewed unless
brought by a legislative plaintiff. In this last situation,
there are no prudential considerations or separation-of-
powers concerns which would outweigh the mandate of
the federal courts to “say what the law is”. Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).

In this case there can be no doubt that Senator Riegle’s
congressional colleagues are capable of affording him
substantial relief. Indeed, a bill which would accomplish
Senator Riegle’s objective was introduced in Congress as
recently as 1980. See note 4 supra. The Senator remains
free to attempt to persuade his fellow legislators of the
wisdom of his views. His colleagues, if so persuaded, are
empowered to redress the alleged inadequacies of 12
U.S.C. § 263 (a) of the Act through amending legislation.
Senator Riegle’s attempt to prohibit voting by the five
Reserve Bank members of the FOMC is yet another
skirmish in the war over public versus private control

35a

of the Committee which has been waged in the legislative
arena since 1933. It would be unwise to permit the fed-
eral courts to become a higher legislature where a con-
gressman who has failed to persuade his colleagues can
always renew the battle.

Assuming that the current procedure for constituting
the FOMC may be unconstitutional, we must nevertheless
weigh the danger of permitting such a statute to stand
against two countervailing concerns: (1) the potential
for misuse of the judicial system inherent in hearing a
case brought by this particular plaintiff, who, because of
his congressional status, has adequate collegial remedies;
and (2) the unwarranted interference in the legislative
process which judicial action would represent at this
time. We conclude that rendering a decision on the mer-
its in this case would pose a greater threat to the con-
stitutional system than would the principled exercise of
judicial restraint. As Judge Gesell perceptively recog-
nized, we should not “improperly interfere with the legis-
lative process.” 84 F.R.D., supra at 116.

We hold that Senator Riegle has standing to bring this
action but exercise our equitable discretion to dismiss the
case on the ground that judicial action would improperly
interfere with the legislative process.

The judgment dismissing the complaint is
Affirmed.

ul w 10
_ SSILUSIG
0} UOHOW

No. 81-186

OcTosper TERM. 1981

James A. McCLuRE, UNITED STATES SENATOR, APPELLANT
V.

RONALD REAGAN, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
AND ABNER J. MIKVA

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

MOTION OF THE APPELLEES TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM

Rex E. Lee
Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 633-2217

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
1253 and Section 101(c) of Pub. L. No. 96-86, 93 Stat. 657,
to consider an appeal from an order of a three-judge district
court dismissing an action on standing grounds.

2. Whether appellant, a United States Senator, has
standing to challenge the appointment of a federal judge as
violating the Ineligibility Clause of the Constitution, Article
I, Section 6, Clause 2.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:

California Medical Assn v. Federal Election
Commission, No. 79-1952 (June 26, 1981) .... I1

Coleman v. Miller. 307 U.S. 4h33: 4. 8
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,

r neee 10. 11
Gonzales v. Automatic Employees Credit Union,

eee e 5-6
Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F. 2d 40) 8
Levitti. E parte, 302 U. S. 6. 4. 7. 8. 9. 10
Miles v. Graham, 268 U.S. Sol 12
MTM. Inc. v. Baxley, 420 U.S. 7 9õůh999999999 5
rn ee
Riegle v. Federal Open Market Committee,

petition for cert. pending, No. 81-398 ......... 8
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the

eee eee 7. 10
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 10
United States v. Richardson,

e eee ee 7-8, 10

IV
Page
Cases—(Continued):
United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 ... 2, II. 12, 13

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 ............. 10, 11
Constitution and statutes:

United States Constitution, Article I,
Section 6, Clause 2 (Ineligibility

„ 2. 7. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13
Act of Oct. 12, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-86,
eee esse ese 2
Section 101(c). 93 Stat. 657 .. 2-3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 10
Section 101(c)(3), 93 Stat. 688. 5. 7. 12
Executive Salary Cost-of-Living Adjustment Act,
Pub. L. No. 94-82, 89 Stat. 419 ............. 11
re. 12

Federal Pay Comparability Act of 1970, 5 U.S.C.
5101 et seq.:

re „ 12
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Page
Miscellaneous:
125 Cong. Rec. $1 3342-S13362 (daily ed.
Sept. 25, 1 .nccccccsccccccccescccvccees 2

42 Op. Att'y Gen. 381 (09) 13

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OctToser Term, 1981

No. 81-186
James A. McCune, UNiTeD STATES SENATOR, APPELLANT
Vv.

RONALD REAGAN, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
AND ABNER J. MIKVA

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

MOTION OF THE APPELLEES TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM

Pursuant to Rule 16.1 of the Rules of this Court, the
Solicitor General, on behalf of the appellees, moves that
this appeal be dismissed or, in the alternative, that the
judgment of the three-judge district court be affirmed.

OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the district court (J. S. App. la-13a) is not
yet reported.

JURISDICTION
The judgment of the district court was entered on May 5.
1981(J.S. App. 14a). A notice of appeal was filed on June 9.
1981 (J.S. App. 15a). The jurisdictional statement was filed
on July 30, 1981. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
under 28 U.S.C. 1253 and Section 101(c) of Pub. L. No.
96-86, 93 Stat. 657.

2

STATEMENT

Appellant, a United States Senator from Idaho, asserts
that the district court erred in denying him standing to claim
that the appointment of appellee Mikva to be a judge of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit violated the Ineligibility Clause of the Constitu-
tion, Article I, Section 6, Clause 2.

Appellee Mikva was a member of the House of Represen-
tatives in May 1979, when President Carter nominated him
to be a judge of the District of Columbia Circuit. During the
Senate debate on the nomination, which took place on
September 25, 1979 (125 Cong. Rec. $13342-13362 (daily
ed.)), appellant and several other senators attacked Repre-
sentative Mikva's qualifications and political, social, and
philosophical views, and also argued that his appointment
violated the Ineligibility Clause (J. S. App. 4a-Sa & n.5). The
basis of this argument was that on August 31, 1979, Presi-
dent Carter had determined the amount subject to con-
gressional revision or disapproval—of a judicial salary
increase that was, under the terms of statutes passed during
previous Congresses, to go into effect automatically on
October |, 1979. See J.S. 4-6; United States v. Will, 449
U.S. 200, 203-205 (1980). Despite these arguments and the
dissenting votes of appellant and others, the Senate con-
sented to the appointment, and on September 26, 1979,
Judge Mikva took office (J.S. App. 3a n.4, Sa).

On October 12, 1979, Congress enacted Pub. L. No.
96-86, 93 Stat. 656, an appropriations act, which included a
rider (Section 101(c)) providing in part:

'The Ineligibility Clause provides in part:

No Senator of Representative shall during the Time for which
he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Author-
ity of the United States, which shall have been created, or the

Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time,
see

3

(1) Any member of Congress, whether he voted to
confirm or not to confirm the appointment of any
judge appointed during the 96th Congress to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia [Circuit], or whether he abstained from, or
was not present for such vote, may bring a civil action
in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia or in any United States District Court in the
State he represents to contest the constitutionality of
the appointment and continuance in office of said Cir-
cuit Judge on the ground that such appointment and
continuance in office is in violation of Article l. section
6, clause 2 of the Constitution,

(2) The designated United States District Courts
shall have exclusive jurisdiction, without regard to the
sum or value of the matter in controversy, to determine
the validity of such appointment and continuance in
office;

(3) Any action brought under this section shall be
heard and determined by a panel of three judges in
accordance with the provisions of section 2284 of title
28, United States Code. Any appeal from the action of
a court convened pursuant to such section shall lie to
the Supreme Court; and

(4) Any judge designated to hear any action brought
under this section shall cause such action to be inevery
way expedited.

As the district court noted, “[pJerhaps not coincidentally,
the only judicial appointment that fits within the statute's
limitations and might be subject to challenge on Ineligibility
Clause grounds is that of [Judge] Mikva. * * * In short,
what the statute appears to authorize is a mechanism where-
by a senator or member of the House of Representatives
may challenge ina federal court in his or her home state the

4

validity of the judicial appointment of a single person,
Judge Mikva“ (J. S. App. Sa-6a).

In November 1979, appellant sued President Carter and
Judge Mikva in the United States District Court for the
District of Idaho, alleging jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331
and 2201, and additionally under Section 101(c) of Pub. L.
No. 96-86, 93 Stat. 657 (J.S. App. 3a-4a n.4).? He sought
orders directing the President to notify Judge Mikva that
his appointment violated the Constitution and “notify{ing]
[Judge] Mikva that his appointment was void ab initio and
that he must vacate his office” (J. S. Ap. 2a-3a).

A three-judge district court dismissed the complaint for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (J. S. 13a),? holding that
appellant did not have standing to suc. The court reasoned
that, leaving aside Section 101(c), Ex parte Le’vitt, 302 U.S.
633 (1937), barred appellant from suing as a citizen, and
that appellant's position as a senator did not entitle him to
sue because ‘the effectiveness of [his] vote[]’ ” was not
impaired (J.S. App. 9a-10a, quoting Coleman . Miller,
307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939)). The court explained (J.S. Ila;
footnote omitted):

It is difficult to see how [appellant] can argue that
the effectiveness of his vote is impaired by the appoint-
ment of former-Congressman Mikva to the federal
bench. [Appellant] had the opportunity to persuade his
colleagues to vote against the confirmation and, * * *
did just that. That he and like-minded senators did not

2Appellant first brought suit against the President and the Secretary
of the Senate in the District of Idaho on September 25, 1979. In
November 1979 appellant dismissed the Secretary of the Senate as a
defendant and amended his complaint to name Judge Mikva and assert
jurisdiction under Section 101(c) (J.S. App. 3a n.4).

‘Judge Mikva reserved, and the court did not reach, the defense of
lack of personal jurisdiction (J.S. App. 4a n.4, 13a n.9).

5

prevail in the Senate does not mean that the effective-
ness of [appellant's] vote was impaired * * *. It means
merely that he was on the losing side. Certainly no one
would contend * * * that the losing senators in any
vote should automatically have the right to appeal toa
federal court for a determination of the correctness of
the result approved by the majority of their colleagues.

The court then considered Section 101(c) and ruled that it
did not overcome these barriers to appellant's standing (J.S.
App. 12a), noting that Section !01(c) “is not premised on
protecting the effectiveness of a legislator’s vote“ * * for it
purports to grant standing to senators who voted for Judge
Mikva as well as those who voted against him. Further-
more, the statute purports to grant standing to members of
the House of Representatives, who had no vote on the
appointment at all“ (J. S. App. Ha).

ARGUMENT

1. There is a substantial question whether the Court has
jurisdiction of this appeal. Section 101(c) of Pub. I. No.
96-86, 93 Stat. 658, specifies that this action was to be
decided by a three-judge court “in accordance with the
provisions of [28 U.S.C.] 2284,” and adds that “[a]ny appeal
from the action of a court convened pursuant to such sec-
tion shall be to the Supreme Court.” Direct appeals to the
Supreme Court from three-judge district courts convened
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2284 are authorized by 28 U.S.C.
1253. It is clear that “a direct appeal will lie to this Court
under §1253 from the order of a three-judge federal court
denying * * * relief only where such an order rests upon
resolution of the merits of the constitutional claim pre-
sented below.” TM. Inc. v. Baxley, 420 U.S. 799. 804
(1975). In particular, under 28 U.S.C. 1253, an order dis-
missing a claim for lack of standing is appealable only to a
court of appeals, not to this Court. Gonzales v. Automatic
Employees Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90 (1974).

6

Strong arguments can be made in favor of applying the
same rule to appeals of orders entered under Section 101(c).
Such a rule would further “the overriding policy, histori-
cally encouraged by Congress, of minimizing the manda-
tory docket of this Court in the interests of sound judicial
administration.” Gonzales v. Automatic Employees Credit
Union, supra, 419 U.S. at 98. While the language of Section
101(c), on its face, permits appeal to this Court “from the
action of” a three-judge court, the language of Section 1253
also appears to be unequivocal; it authorizes appeal “from
an order granting or denying * * * an interlocutory or per-
manent injunction,” without distinguishing denials not
based on the merits.

The Court’s principal reason for not entertaining an
appeal from a decision by a three-judge court dismissing a
complaint for lack of standing is that under 28 U.S.C. 2284,
such an order may be entered by a single judge (Gonzales v.
Automatic Employees Credit Union, supra, 419 U.S. at
100-101; footnote omitted):

A three-judge court is not required where the district
court itself lacks jurisdiction of the complaint or the
complaint is not justiciable in the federal courts. See
Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 31 [1933]. It is now well
settled that“ * * dissolution of a three-judge court,
and dismissal of a complaint by a single judge are
orders reviewable in the court of appeals, not here. If
the three-judge court in the present case had dissolved
itself on grounds that “standing” was absent, and had
left subsequent dismissal of the complaint to a single
judge, this Court would thus clearly have lacked appel-
late jurisdiction over both orders. The same would
have been true if the dissolution and dismissal deci-
sions had been made simultaneously, with the single
judge merely adopting the action of a three-judge
court. The locus of appellate review should not turn on
such technical distinctions.

—

Since three-judge courts convened pursuant to Section
101(c) operate “in accordance with the provisions of” 28
U.S.C. 2284, the same reasoning applies here.“ Conse-
quently, it would appear that the Court should dismiss this
appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

2. If the Court disagrees with our jurisdictional submis-
sion, then the judgment of the district court should be
affirmed because, as we demonstrate below, appellant
plainly lacks standing to challenge Judge Mikva's
appointment.

In Ex parte Le vitt. 302 U.S. 633 (1937), a member of the
Bar of this Court moved to prevent Justice Black from
serving as Associate Judge, alleging that Justice Black's
appointment violated the Ineligibility Clause. The Court
denied the motion on the basis of the “established principle
that * * * to invoke the judicial power to determine the
validity of executive or legislative action [a private individ-
ual] must show that he has sustained or is immediately in
danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that
action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general
interest common to all members of the public“ (id. at 634).
The correctness of the result in Le’vitt, and the constitu-
tional basis for the Court's holding, were expressly reaf-
firmed in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the
War, 418 U.S. 208, 219-220 (1974), and United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166. 176-179 (1974). Appellant's
claim is substantively identical to that rejected in Le’vitt.

Nothing in the legislative history of Section 101(c) contradicts this
conclusion. Moreover, Section 101(c)(3) (93 Stat. 658). provides that an
“appeal from the action of a court convened pursuant to such section™
(emphasis added) meaning 28 U.S.C. 2284 all lie to the Supreme
Court.” This suggests that Congress meant only to reenact the pre-
viously existing authority to appeal from the decisions of three-judge
courts, presumably with the implied limitations on that authority rec-
ognized by this Court.

Appellant's status as a United States Senator does not
sufficiently distinguish him from the movant in Le’vitt. In
some

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385008_0037%3A0. Public record. Not legal advice.
