# Opposition — Ehrlich v. United States

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_2549%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition
- **Published:** January 1, 1981
- **Citation:** 454 U.S. 940

## Text

; . ? as . ph
. 1% y . es ; 7 , ; , aw

% oa | ' oa ep > ~ | Offices Supreme Court, 0.5. |
| / ; Fe FILED

4 Te NO} ny is SEP 88- 1m)

au the ‘Gipiens Court of the Unite

| $y pi ; ~ . « OcToser TERM, 1980

| RICHARD K. EuRLICH AND LURLINE GARDENS LIMITED
ae om DIVIDEND HOUSING PARTNERSHIP, PETITIONERS

Vv,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

; ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
A sae THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
e THE:NINTH CIRCUIT »

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

"ad

'» Rex E. Lee.
“Solicitor General
STUART E. SCHIFFER
Acting Assistant Attorney General
WILLIAM KANTER _
' JuDITH RABINOWITZ .
|. Attorneys,
. ty ».. ~ Department of Justice.
? -¥ |... » Washington, D.C, 20530
(202) 633-22] 7 ;

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether vouchers submitted monthly in order to
receive interest subsidies from the government constitute
“claims” within the meaning of the False Claims Act.

2. Whether the False Claims Act imposes liability on
petitioners of one statutory forfeiture for each false claim
submitted to the United States on petitieners’ behalf, when
petitioners had actual knowledge and control over each
such submission.

3. Whether, in a suit under the False Claims Act, the
government may recover damages that accrued after dis-
covery of the fraud.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
OCpemions REIOW occ ciccctvcccveccccdeccsastesenctes l
FUIMGIION sickened vccivvesverccernecteveseceunee l
SOG Sc cccdccdieccnvrcsscnccucesbaderevesss 1
PIMA cc circrccvdscccvessvcswesdaseeacécebes 4
CORCIMMIOR oosicccdcccesecedcsessepepasesediceseye 8
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303 .... 3, 5-6
United States v. Cohn, 270 U.S. 339 ......0006: 5
United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595 ........ 5
United States v. Neifert-White Co.,
PAs EOD bs heeds cediceess cidnvessaens 4,5

Statutes and regulation:

False Claims Act:
Rev. Stat. (1874 ed.):

SOCHON FOG: siccccccvccsccccercsesesse 3
SOCHOR SOPS: oe ccccccccvcccccesescseces 3
SOCOM SETS cc ccccccccvavcdecccseses 3,4
FEU S.C. ZU OME: svccvadsctsccsccns ate Ma
National Housing Act, Section 236, 12 U.S.C.
SPRL. dhnbwekascéencadsdosbepiebuneeebin I
PE Cg WEE Rekcveccecinepcctunecenesanees 3
POE Re SAOOte kcccnenvesedeviaiiessbennst 4

In the Supreme Court of the Rnited States
} OcTOBER TERM, 1980

No. 81-106

RICHARD K. EHRLICH AND LURLINE GENERAL LIMITED
DIVIDEND HOUSING PARTNERSHIP, PETITIONERS

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
.THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. Al-A17) is
reported at 643 F. 2d 634. The opinion of the district court
(Pet. App. B1I-B8) is not reported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
April 23, 1981. The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed
on July 14, 1981. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATEMENT
Petitioners Lurline Gardens, a limited partnership, and
Richard Ehrlich, Lurline’s sole general partner, obtained a
commercial mortgage to finance a low income housing
project. The mortgage was insured and partially subsidized
by the United States under Section 236 of the National
Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. 1715z-1, a program administered

2

by the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD). Under the statute, the insured amount of the mort-
gage may not exceed 90% of the replacement costs of the
project, including construction costs. The subsidy provided
under the statute reduces the project sponsor’s interest
payments to 1% of the amount of the mortgage; hence, the
larger the mortgage, the larger the subsidy (Pet. App.
Al-A2).

In accordance with routine program procedure, HUD
estimated the maximum mortgage for which it would insure
petitioners’ proposed housing project. Petitioners obtained
a mortgage at the estimated amount and, in August 1971,
HUD, petitioners, and a mortgagee entered into an “Agree-
ment and Certification” under which HUD was to pay the
interest reduction subsidy directly to the mortgagee (Pet.
App. A3). Both the Act and the agreement provide for a
reduction of the insurable mortgage principal, to be paid
by the mortgagor (petitioners) to the mortgagee, in the
event that actual costs of construction are smaller than
estimated project costs (ibid.). Such a reduction of the
principal has the effect of reducing the interest subsidy
HUD is obligated to pay the mortgagee.

Upon completion of the project in August 1972, petition-
ers submitted two Certificates of Actual Cost to HUD, one
as the mortgagor and cne as the general contractor. Both
certificates were prepared by petitioner Ehrlich. The certifi-
cates overstated construction costs to avoid repaying part
of the principal as required by the Act and the agreement.
Thus, the false certifications caused HUD to insure a larger
mortgage and pay larger interest subsidies than those auth-
orized by the Act or required under the agreement. Ehrlich
also certified falsely that there was no identity of interest
with any subcontractor on the project although he was the
sole owner of one subcontractor (Pet. App. A4).

3°

Pursuant to the agreement, HUD paid monthly interest
reduction subsidies to the mortgagee upon the receipt each
month of a “voucher” or “statement” prepared by the mort-
gagee.' Each voucher stated whether the mortgagor (the
partnership) was in default and the amount of the interest
reduction payment due. Seventy-six such vouchers were
submitted by the mortgagee to HUD, causing HUD to
make 76 subsidy payments totalling $995,264.22. Had peti-
tioners not inflated their actual costs, HUD would have
paid the mortgagee $70,068.72 less in interest reduction
payments (Pet. App. B5).

In 1975, based on these events, petitioner Ehrlich pleaded
guilty to two counts of an indictment charging him with
submitting false claims to an agency of the United States, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001. Ehrlich admitted knowingly
and intentionally inflating construction costs. In April
1978, HUD demanded that the partnership pay the excess
principal due the mortgagee under the agreement, but the
partnership refused to do so (Pet. App. A4).

In May 1978, the United States brought this suit in the
United States District Court for the Central District of
California to obtain specific performance of the agreement,
i.e., reduction of the mortgage principal, and to obtain
damages under the False Claims Act, Rev. Stat. 3490, 3494,
and 5438 (1873'€d).2 The district court granted the United
States full relief upon motion for summary judgment,
including forfeitures of $2,000 for each of the 76 vouchers
submitted to HUD by the mortgagee (Pet. App. A4-A5).

'The monthly “vouchers” referred to here have been so labeled
throughout this litigation. In the petition, however, petitioners have
changed this nomenclature to “statements” (Pet. 14 n.*).

2The False Claims Act is codified at 31 U.S.C. 231 et seq., but that
version has not been enacted into positive law. See United States v.
Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 305-307 n.1 (1976).

4

The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s judg-
ment in all respects (Pet. App. Al-A14). Judge Canby
dissented only with respect to the number of forfeitures that
could be assessed (id. at Al4-A17).

ARGUMENT

The decision of the court of appeals is correct and does
not conflict with any decision of this Court or another court
of appeals. Further review is therefore unwarranted.

1. Petitioners contend (Pet. 14-16) that the vouchers
submitted by the mortgagee to HUD are not “claims”
within the meaning of the Act. This contention is without
merit. This Court has recognized that “the [False Claims]
Act is broadly phrased to reach any person who makes or
causes to be made ‘any claim upon or against’ the United
States.” United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228,
232 (1968). Indeed, the Act “reaches beyond ‘claims’
* * * toall fraudulent attempts to cause the Government to
pay out sums of money.” /d. at 233. Thus, the statute
specifies that the submission of “any false bill, receipt,
voucher, roll, account, claim, certificate, affidavit, or depo-
sition” may be grounds for liability. Rev. Stat. 5438 (1874
ed.). The requirement is simply that the false statement has
“the purpose and effect of inducing the Government imme-
diately to part with money.” 390 U.S. at 232.

This requirement clearly was met in this case. The
vouchers here were a necessary prerequisite to payment.
HUD regulations provide that “(t]he interest reduction
payments * * * shall be paid upon the receipt of a billing
* * * from the mortgagee.” 24 C.F.R. 236.515. The mort-
gagee submitted this billing or voucher monthly on behalf
of petitioners and thereby obtained the interest reduction

5

payments from HUD. Thus, the courts below correctly
concluded (Pet. App. A8, B7) that the vouchers were false
claims within the meaning of the Act.’

2. Petitioners contend (Pet. 16-19), relying on United
States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303 (1976), that they cannot
be held liable for 76 forfeitures based on the 76 claims
submitted to HUD by the mortgagee. Instead they assert
that they can be subjected only to one forfeiture because
they submitted false information only once, on the Certifi-
cates of Actual Cost. As the court of appeals explained in
detail (Pet. App. A8-Al1), however, its decision is fully
consistent with Bornstein.

In Bornstein,. this Court considered a subcontractor’s
liability for forfeitures in a case in which the subcontractor
supplied mislabeled parts to the prime contractor, who
incorporated them into a finished product that was fur-
nished to the government. The subcontractor submitted
three shipments of parts to the prime contractor, each of
which was accompanied by a separate invoice, and the
prime contractor forwarded 35 separately invoiced ship-
ments to the government. Recognizing that “the statute
imposes liability only for the commission of acts which
cause false claims to be presented” (423 U.S. at 312), the
Court held that the number of forfeitures is not necessarily
determined by the number of claims ultimately presented by
the innocent prime contractor; rather, it requires examina-
tion of “the specific conduct of the person from whom the

Petitioners mistakenly claim (Pet. 15) that the decision below is
inconsistent with United States v. Cohn, 270 U.S. 339 (1926), and
United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595 (1958). As this Court
explained in United States v. Neifert-White Co., supra, 390 U.S. at
230-232, those decisions simply held that no “claim on or against the
Government” was presented on the particular facts before the Court.
Unlike those cases, however, here the vouchers induced the United
States “immediately to part with money”(390 U.S. at 232) in the form of
interest reduction payments and thus constitute claims within the mean-
ing of the False Claims Act.

6

Government seeks to collect the statutory forfeitures.” 423
U.S. at 313. On the facts of that case, the Court held the
subcontractor liable for three forfeitures, noting (423 U.S.
at 312; emphasis added):

The fact that [the prime contractor] chose to submit 35
false claims instead of some other number was, so far
as [the subcontractor] was concerned, wholly irrele-
vant—completely fortuitous and beyond [the subcon-
tractor’s] knowledge or control.

The situation here is quite different. Petitioners knew
that, because of petitioners’ false certifications, the mortga-
gee submitted monthly claims to HUD for interest reduc-
tion payments that exceeded the amount permitted by sta-
tute. Indeed, because the vouchers reported each month
that the mortgagor was not in default, they depended on
petitioners’ payment each month of their obligations under
the agreement. Moreover, it was completely within peti-
tioners’ control to prevent the submission of each of the 76
claims. At any time, they could have honored the covenant
in the agreement to reduce the excess mortgage amount,
thereby reducing each interest reduction payment to the
correct figure. By refraining each month from performing
their contractual obligations under the agreement, petition-
ers knowingly caused the submission of a false claim to the
United States by the mortgagee. Furthermore, unlike the
Bornstein defendants, petitioners continued to derive a
benefit from the submission of additional vouchers. While
the subcontractor in Bornstein had no stake in the number
of claims presented by the prime contractor, petitioners
here benefitted from an inflated interest subsidy paid each
month as a result of the presentation of each monthly
voucher, the payment of which also prevented their mort-
gage from going into default.

In these circumstances, it is fully consistent with Born-
stein, and in accordance with the purposes of the False

£5

Claims Act, to penalize petitioners, not for the mortgagee’s
actions in submitting the vouchers, but for petitioners’ own
actions in engineering and continuing to assure the presen-
tation of the false vouchers. Moreover, petitioners point to
no decision of another court that is even arguably inconsis-
tent with the decision below. Accordingly, the decision of
both courts below that petitioners are liable for 76 civil
forfeitures does not warrant review by this Court.

3. Petitioners also contend (Pet. 19-22) that the United
States was dilatory in bringing this suit and that damages
suffered after the false claim has been exposed may not be
recovered under the False Claims Act. This contention is
insubstantial. The Act contains a specific, six-year statute
of limitations, which petitioners do not claim was violated.
- Apart from this restriction enacted by Congress, petitioner
points to no authority imposing a time bar to the recovery
of damages under the False Claims Act.

Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the United
States has an affirmative obligation to mitigate damages in
suits brought under the Act, it could not have done so in the
circumstances of this case. Although petitioner Ehrlich’s
guilty plea in 1975 indicated that the amount of the insured
mortgage was too large, the United States was not relieved
of its obligations under the agreement. Had the United
States withheld the interest reduction payments it con-
tracted to pay the mortgagee, it would have risked contrac-
tual liability to the mortgagee for the interest payments and
government liability as insurer of a mortgage in default.
Therefore, the United States had no choice but to continue
making payments and incurring damages, which clearly
were sustained “by reason of” petitioners’ conduct.‘

‘Petitioners also contend (Pet. 22-25) that summary judgment was
inappropriate here because certain factual questions remained in dis-
pute, This factual contention was correctly rejected by both courts

8
CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

Rex E. Lee
Solicitor General

STUART E. SCHIFFER
Acting Assistant Attorney General

WILLIAM KANTER
JUDITH RABINOWITZ
Altorneys

SEPTEMBER 1981

below, and it does not warrant review by this Court. As the court of
appeals explained (Pet. App. A5-A6, Al4), the alleged unresolved
factual questions identified by petitioners cast no doubt on the judg-
ment below and provide no reason for the district court to have refused
to grant summary judgment.

DOJ.1981.09

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_2549%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
