# Opposition — Lopez v. California

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition
- **Published:** January 1, 1981
- **Citation:** 454 U.S. 964

## Text

ice « Supreme Court, U.S,
FILED
IN THE
NDER L. STEVAS.

ALEXA!
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED iti CLERK

October Term, 1980
GILBERT FRANK LOPEZ,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

GEORGE DEUKMEJIAN, Attorney General
of the State of California
ROBERT H. PHILIBOSIAN, Chief

Assistant Attorney General
--Criminal Division

S. CLARK MOORE,
Assistant Attorney General

ROBERT F. KATZ,

FREDERICK GRAB,
Deputy Attorneys General

3580 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90010
Telephone: (213) 736-2100

Attorneys for Respondent

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

l. Whether inspections of
pervasively regulated businesses,
traditionally permitted in the absence
of either a search warrant or probable
cause, are rendered constitutionally
impermissible solely by virtue of the
fact that the official conducting the
search is specifically seeking evidence
of crime.

2. Whether statutorily
authorized warrantless inspections of
automobiles, for the purpose of locating
stolen vehicles under circumstances
presenting articulable and reasonable
grounds’ for believing that theft-related
activity is occurring are consti-

tutionally impermissible.

TOPICAL INDEX
Page
Questions Presented ..ccccseccccccseeee i
Brief of Respondent in Opposition ......l

Constitutional and Statutory
ProvisSions at ISSUC wceseccccccsecseeeseed

Statement of the CaS€..ccccceescceseeeesd
Summary Of Argument ..cccccesecscessese OD
I

Since the Warrantless Inspection was

Justified Under the Regulated

Industries Exception, Neither a Warrant

Nor Probable Cause were Required .......7
II

The Inspection was Reasonable .....+++-21

Conclusion 96666650 O60 66S SOS OSes OOOO EE

ii.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page

Camara v. Municipal Court (1967)
387 U.S. 523 eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 22,27

Chambers v. Maroney (1970)
399 U.S. 42 eeeeeeeeeeeneeeeeeeeee 24

Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States (1970) 397 U.S. 72 cecccece 8

Delaware v. Prouse (1979)
440 U.S. 648 eeeee 20-21,23,26,27,28

Donovan v. Dewey (1981) U.S.
69 L.Ed. 2d 262 eeereeeeeeeeee 9-10,16

Dunaway v. New York (1979)
442 U.S. 200 eocccccccccccccccesagal

G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States
(1977) 429 U.S. 338 eeeeeeeneeeeneee 10

Jackson v. Superior Court
74 Cal.App.3d 361 eeeeeeeeeeee 18,24

Marshall v. Barlow's Inc. (1978)
436 U.S. 307 eccccccccccceDgh5 920223

Michigan v. Tyler (1978)
436 U.S. 499 eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 20,27

People v. Grubb, 63 Cal.2d 614 ....... 18
People v. Woolsey, 90 Cal.App.3d 994.. 14

Scott v. United States (1978)
436 UsSe 128 eeeeoeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 19

See v. City of Seattle (1967)
387 U.S. 541 eoeeeoeeeeeveeeeeeeeeeee 20

iii.

Page

State v. Galio (1979)

587 P.2d

Terry v. Ohio
392 U.S.

United States
406 U.S.

United States
433 U.S.

California Ve
Section
Section
Section
Section

Section

Section
Section
Section
Section

Stats. 1973,

United States

Fourth Amendment ...ecees

44 eeeeeoeveeveeeeeeeeeeeeeee

(1968)

Leococesesesuses 22,23,27,

v. Biswell (1972)

311 eereeee 8,10,14-15,16,

v. Chadwick (1977)

| eeeeveeveeveeeeevneeeeeeene 24,

Statutes
hicle Code
220 eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee

221 eeeeeeeeeeveeeeeeeeeee

320 eeeeeeee 7-8,11,12,17,

1662 eeeeeveveveeveeeeeeeeeee

2805 eeeeeeeee 7,13,17,21,
24,25,26,28,

4462 eeeeeeevoeoee eee eeeaeeee

9264 eoeeeoevoeveoevoeoeeeeeeeeeee

10656 eeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 12-

12951 eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeneee
Ch. 996, § l eeeeneeeeeeeneee
Constitutions

Constitution

iv.

20-21,23,

15

28

19

26

ll
ll
21
12

23
29

26
12
13
26
14

31

NO. 81-44
IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1980

GILBERT FRANK LOPEZ,

Petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Respondent,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

Respondent, State of California,
respectfully requests that this Honorable
Court deny the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari in which petitioner’ seeks
review of the judgment of the Court of
Appeal of the State of California, Second
Appellate District, Division Two (2d Crim.
No. 37347), entered on March 6, 1981,

1.

affirming the judgment of con-
viction imposed by the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS AT ISSUE

Amendment IV of the Constitution of the

United States:
"The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants”~ shall
issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized."

California Vehicle Code section 320, which

at the time of the search at issue here

read, in salient part, as follows:

"“"Established place of business'

is a place actually occupied either

2.

continuously or at regular periods

by:

"(b) An automobile dismantler
where the books and records pertinent
to the type of business being
conducted are kept. ... The place
of business shall be open to
inspection of the premises, pertinent
records and vehicles by any peace
officer during business hours."

California Vehicle Code section 2805
which, at the time of the search at issue
here, read in salient part as follows:

"(a) For the purpose of

locating stolen vehicles, a mem-

ber of the California Highway

Patrol + « « May inspect any

vehicle of a type required to be

registered under this code on a

highway or in any public garage,

3.

repair shop, parking lot, new or used
car lot, automobile dismantlers lot,
vehicle shredding facility, vehicle
leasing or rental lot, vehicle
equipment rental yard, vehicle
salvage pool, or other similar
establishment, and may inspect the
title or registation of vehicles, in
order to establish the rightful
ownership or possession of the

vehicle.

"(c) Whenever possible, inspec-
tions conducted pursuant to sub-
division (a) or (b) shall be
conducted at a time and in a manner so as
to minimize any interference with, or

delay of, business operations."

zxkekk

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent accepts the rendition
of the facts and proceedings presented by
petitioner commencing at page 2 of the
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, with the
following addition: Investigator Ririe
had been informed by Mr. Brodigan, Manager
of Color Glow Paint Store, that the cars
he had been painting for Sol Mizrahi were
"questionable." (R.T. p. 52.)2/
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Petition for Writ of

Certiorari should be denied. Under
longstanding authority, warrantless
inspections of pervasively regulated

businesses, of which the auto dismantling

ke "RP. y” | =6(6WhS refer to the
Reporter's Transcript, while "C.T." will
refer to the Clerk's Transcript included

as part of the record on appeal below.

5.

industry in California is an example, are
permissible in the absence of any showing
with regard to probable cause whatsoever.
It has been held that a proprietor of such
a business in effect consents’ to such
searches by choosing to enter a field in
which pervasive regulation, including
inspection, is established by statute.
The state of mind of, or degree of
information possessed by, the searching
official in no way undermines this result.
Furthermore, it has long been recognized
that intrusions which are specifically
limited in scope frequently invoke less
stringent protections under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. On balance, the search at
issue here, limited in purpose and scope,
and conducted on the basis of articulable
and reasonable grounds to _ suspect theft
related activity, was reasonable and

therefore lawful.

ARGUMENT
I
Since the Warrantless Inspection
was Justified Under the Regulated
Industries Exception, Neither
a Warrant Nor Probable Cause were
Required
The warrantless inspection of
his business of which petitioner now
complains was held valid by the court
below under the provisions of sections 320
and 2805 of the California Vehicle
Code .2/ As the opinion of the California
Court of Appeal demonstrates, searches
under Vehicle Code section 2805, as
construed, must be made "‘under reasonable
circumstances, within constitutional
limitations.'" (Petn, for Writ of
Certiorari, Appen. A, p. 6.) Similarly,

searches effected under Vehicle Code

2. The salient portions of these
statutes are set forth above at pages 2 to

4.

7.

section 320, which must’ be made during
normal business hours, are permissible
without warrant because of the "'elaborate
provisions for registration and licensing
of businesses engaged. in dismantling
vehicles ....'‘" (Id., at p, 7.)
Petitioner appears to accept the validity
of warrantless inspections of heavily
regulated industries as enunciated in

United States v. Biswell (1972) 406 U.S.

31l, and Colonnade Catering Corp. v.

United States (1970) 397 U.S. 72, at least

with respect to "the inspection of a
business to determine compliance with
administrative regulations ...."

(Petn. p. 19.) It is respondent's posi-
tion that the search at issue here, when
considered in conjunction with Vehicle
Code section 320, does indeed fall within
the regulated industries exception, and
that this conclusion is dispositive of the

instant issue.
8.

It has long been recognized
that,

"Certain industries have such a
history of government oversight that
no reasonable expectation of privacy
» « « could exist for a proprietor
over the stock of such an
enterprise. ... [W]hen an entre-
preneur embarks upon such a business,
he has voluntarily chosen to subject
himself to a full arsenal of
government regulation. ... ‘The
businessman in a regulated industry
in effect consents’ to the
restrictions placed upon him.'"

(Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. (1978)

436 U.S. 307, 313.)
The concomitant reduction in reasonable
privacy expectation of the proprietor of a
regulated industry leads to the conclusion
that "legislative schemes authorizing

warrantless administrative searches of
9.

commercial property do not necessarily
violate the Fourth Amendment." (Donovan
v. Dewey (1981) __—s'Uw“S. _,:- 69 L.Ed. 2d
262, 268; United States v. Biswell, supra

(1972) 406 U.S. 311, 316.)

As noted in G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United

States (1977) 429 U.S. 338, 353, “a busi-
ness, by its special nature and voluntary
existence, may open itself to intrusions
that would not be permissible in a purely
private context."

There can be little doubt that
under the prevailing statutory scheme in
California, the auto dismantling industry
is "“pervasively regulated" within
the purview of this exception. (United
States v. Biswell, supra, 406 U.S. 3ll,

316.)2/ To begin with, an entire

3. While petitioner's business was
designated as an automobile body shop, the
Court of Appeal found, as a matter of

10. (cont. )

chapter of the Vehicle Code, comprising
twenty sections, is devoted to the subject
of automobile dismaatlers. (Div. 5, Ch.
3.) This chapter specifies the regula-
tions surrounding the granting, refusal,
and failure to obtain a license to operate
as an automobile dismantler. Other
pertinent reporting requirements are
included in this chapter.

The term “dismantler” itself is
defined and limited in sections 220 and
221 of the California Vehicle Code. Among
other miscellaneous provisions relating to

automobile dismantlers are sections

fact, that petitioner was engaged in the
business of auto dismantling, and that, by
virtue of this fact, California Vehicle
Code section 320 was applicable to him.

(Petn. Appen. A, p. 7.)

ll.

relating to renewal and alteration of
licenses (Cal. Veh. Code, § 9264),
defining the duties of the Department of
Motor Vehicles with respect to complaints
directed at automobile dismantlers (Cal.
Veh. Code, § 1662), and defining an
established place of business within the
meaning of the code. (Cal. Veh. Code, §
320). It is this same_ section, which
requires such place of business to “be
open to inspection of the premises,
pertinent records and vehicles by any
peace officer during business hours" which
was relied upon, in part, by the
California Court of Appeal below in
validating the search of petitioner's
place of business.
Similarly, section 10656 of the
Vehicle Code permits inspection of
“any vehicle of a type required to
be registered under this code in any

garage, repair shop, parking lot,
12.

used car lot, automobile dismantlers
lot, or other similar establishment
for the purpose of investigating the
title and registration of vehicles
and inspection of vehicles wrecked or
dismantled."
This provision is very similar in language
to Vehicle Code section 2805, which was
the other statutory basis upon which the
search in the instant case was sustained
below. Respondent will argue, in Argument
II below, that the provisions of section
2805 are reasonable in virtually every
conceivable circumstance in which it could
be applied under the construction given by
the courts of California. For the purpose
at hand, only searches and inspections
conducted at facilities, such as
petitioner's, actually engaged in auto-

mobile dismantling need be considered.

x*eekeet

13.

As noted in People Ve Woolsey
(1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 994, 1002, limited

inspections for the purpose of locating
stolen vehicles has been permitted under
California law since i935. Moreover, the
importance of the motor vehicle industry
to the welfare of California in general
cannot be seriously contested, In a
different context, the Legislature of
California found and declared that “the
distribution and sale of new motor
vehicles in the State of California
vitally affects the general economy of the
state and the public welfare ... ."
(Stats. 1973, Ch. 996, § l.)

It should be clear, then, that
petitioner, by choosing to engage in the
pervasively regulated business of
automobile dismantling, did so with a
reasonably reduced expectation of privacy

with respect to his business. (United

14.

States v. Biswell, supra, 406 U.S. at p.

416.) The fact that petitioner's entry
into the automobile dismantling business
was surreptitious and unlawful,
circumventing the mandatory licensing and
registration requirements, cannot change
this result in the slightest.
Petitioner's suggestion that this result
is undermined by the holding in State v.
Galio (1979) 587 P.2d 44, is unavailing.
(Petn. at p. 20.) In that case, it was
held that a New Mexico statute authorizing
warrantless inspections of what were
essentially automobile dismantlers was not
supported by an urgent governmental

interest, supposedly required under

Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., supra. While
respondent submits that Galio was

incorrectly decided, since it failed to
take into account the “single industry"

aspects of the Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.

decision (436 U.S, at p. 321), it is clear
15.

that the determination by a New Mexico
court with respect to the quantum of
governmental interest in the automobile
industry Of New Mexico is entirely ir-
relevant to the parallel determination in
California.

Similarly, it is entirely clear
from the decisions of this Court that the
requirement of a federal interest and

congressional regulation relates to

congressional competence to regulate in
the first instance, rather’ than to the
power of Congress to modify the scope of
Fourth Amendment protections. (Donovan v.

Dewey, supra, U.S. , 69 L.Ed.2d

at p. 269; United States v. Biswell,

supra, 406 U.S. at pp. 314-315.) It

should thus be apparent that the

"regulated industry" exception to the

warrant requirement cannot be the exclu-

sive domain of congressional enactments,

but that the states are likewise entitled
16.

to determine for themselves, within
reasonable limits, those industries which,
because of extreme importance or risk,
require pervasive regulation and, where
necessary, warrantless inspection.
Respondent submits that the in-
spection in the instant case was clearly
justified on the basis of the principles
set forth above. While petitioner was not
a licensed dismantler, reasonable grounds
existed to believe that he was engaged in
that activity at the time the inspection
was conducted. (R.T. p. 52.) The
existence of such reasonable grounds
rendered likewise reasonable the
application af California Vehicle Code
section 320 to petitioner, despite the fact
that his business was not licensed as an
automobile dismantler. Similarly, viewing
the search as authorized by Vehicle Code
section 2805, as construed by the courts
of California, requires the raising of

17.

"the probability” that activity relating
to automobile theft was taking place.
(People v. Grubb (1965) 63 Cal.2d 614,
618.) Furthermore, the search authorized
by that section is very limited in scope,
extending only to evidence of ownership of

the vehicle. (Jackson v. Superior Court

(1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 361, 367.) Thus, it

should be clear that ample statutory
authority, predicated upon ae requisite
degree of governmetal interest, justified
the inspection in the instant case.
Petitioner nevertheless main-
tains that where as here, the purpose of
an inspection or search is to secure evidence
of a crime, probable cause in the criminal
law sense, as well as a warrant, are
required (Petn. at p. 19). It should be
clear that the detection of crime, or at
least of statutorily prohibited conduct
subject to penalty, is always the likely
outcome of an administrative inspection.

18.

(See generally United States v. Biswell,

supra, 406 U.S. 311.) Indeed, the conduct
which resulted in the instant judgment is
precisely the type of activity which the
pervasive regulation scheme discussed
above was designed to prevent.

Finally, it has been held that
an officer's state of mind will not
invalidate a search "as long as_ the
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify

that action." (Scott v. United States

(1978) 436 U.S. 128, 138.) If, as
respondent has attempted to demonstrate,
the search of petitioner's place of
business was authorized by the valid
regulatory scheme, the propriety of that
search should not be undermined because of
the information possessed by the officers,
whether that information constitutes a
mere suspicion, probable cause to arrest,
or, as in the instant case, reasonable
grounds to believe criminal activity is

19.

taking place.

It should, perhaps, be noted in
this regard that the distinction which
grounds petitioner's assertions--namely
that between administrative searches and
searches conducted for the purpose of
criminal prosecution--does not in fact
exist under the decisions of this Court.
In other words, it has been "held that the
Fourth Amendment prohibition against un=
reasonable searches protects against war-
rantless intrusions during civil as well
as criminal investigations." (Marshall v.
Barlow's Inc., supra, 436 U.S. 312; see
also Michigan v. Tyler (1978) 436 U.S.
506; See v. City of Seattle (1967) 387

U.S. 541, 543.) Rather, the differing re-
sults achieved in various factual settings
must be seen as the product of the
appraisal which underlies all Fourth

Amendment adjudication, namely "balancing

20.

the public interest against the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests

+ « « «" (Delaware v. Prouse (1979) 440
U.S. 648, 657.)

II
The Inspection Was Reasonable

Respondent has attempted to
demonstrate above that the inspection,
without warrant, of petitioner's place of
business was justified under the regulated
industries exception to the warrant
requirement, especially when viewed from
the perspective of California Vehicle Code
section 320 relating to automobile
dismantlers. Alternately, respondent sub-
mits that limited searches for the purpose
of determining ownership of a motor
vehicle under reasonable and limited
circumstances, as authorized by Vehicle
Code section 2805 as construed by the
courts of California, represent "a sui

21.

generis ‘rubric of police conduct,'" which,
like the "'stop and frisk'" considered by
this court in Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392
U.S. 1, should be evaluated on the basis
of balancing of the limited intrusion
against the governmental interest support-
ing the search. (Dunaway v. New York
(1979) 442 U.S. 200, 209.)

| In Terry v. Ohio, this Court
identified "“the"central inquiry under the
Fourth Amendment--the reasonableness’ in
all the circumstances of the particular
governmental invasion... ." (392 U.S.

at p. 19.) In Camara v. Municipal Court

(1967) 387 U.S. 523, this Court noted the

absence of a "ready test for determining
reasonableness" other than a _ balance
between “the need to search" and “the
invasion which the search entails." (387
U.S. 537.) And in the specific context of

statutorily authorized warrantless

22.

searches, this Court has specifically held
that the reasonableness of such searches
depends "upon the specific enforcement
needs and privacy guarantees of each

statute." (Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,

supra, 436 U.S. 307, 321.)

It is readily apparent that the
instant search, when viewed as predicated
upon the provisions of Vehicle Code
section 2805, satisfies the requirements
of reasonableness as identified above. To
begin. with, this Court has_ repeatedly
noted that Fourth Amendment interests
in the balance identified above are, in
some rough way, proportional to the degree
of intrusion involved in the search.

(Delaware v. Prouse, supra, (1979) 440 U.S.

648, 656-657; Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392

U.S. 1, 25.) In addition, it has been
recognized that the longstanding rule
permitting warrantless searches of automo-~
biles where probable cause to believe

23.

contraband is present "has been based in
part on their inherent mobility," but
rests primarily on "the diminished expecta-
tion of privacy which surrounds’ the

automobile." (United States v. Chadwick

(1977) 433 U.S. 1, 12; Chambers v. Maroney
(1970) 399 U.S. 42, 50-51.)

As noted in Jackson v. Superior
Court, supra, 74 Cal.App.3d 361, 367,

judicial interpretation of Vehicle Code
section 2805 requires reasonable circum-
stances before the limited intrusion for
the purpose of investigating title or
registration will be sanctioned. Indeed,
in Jackson itself, it was held that police
entry to obtain registration information
must be preceded by an inquiry if the
vehicle is occupied. Clearly, the courts
of California have construed Vehicle Code
section 2805 within narrow and reasonable

limits in order to render the limited

24.

intrusion authorized thereunder compatible
with constitutional requirements.

In the instant case, it is clear
froh the r-cord that Officer Ririe
informed petitioner of his identity, the
purpose of his inspection, and the
statutory authority for it under Vehicle
Code section 2805. (C.T. pp. 199, 202.)
A “complete search of the premises" was
not conducted in the instant case, but
inspection was limited to paperwork and
vehicles or parts thereof. (C.T. p. 204.)
Petitioner does not assert, nor does the
instant record support the inference, that
the police inspection at any time exceeded
this limited scope.

It is well settled that, follow-
ing a relatively minor traffic infraction,
a motorist may be lawfully required to
furnish evidence of his right to operate a
motor vehicle and of the registration and
ownership of the vehicle he is driving.

25.

(Delaware v. Prouse, supra, 440 U.S. 648,

659.) Similarly, in the same case this
Court noted that prominent display of
license plates is required in many, if not
most states. (440 U.S. at p. 660; see

also United States v. Chadwick, supra, 433

U.S. at pp. 12-13.) These requirements
are implemented by statute in California.
(Cal. Veh. Code, §§ 4462; 12951.)

Respondent submits that the current
construction of Vehicle Code section 2805
is, if at all, but slightly more intrusive
than the statutes permitting inspection of
a driver's license or registration certif-
icate, The physical intrusion in the
instant case was clearly minimal: no
property was destroyed; no closed

containers were opened. And to the degree
to which incriminatory information was
obtained as a result of the inspection,

such is clearly and equally possible with

26.

respect to the request for a driver's
license or registration certificate.

This Court has’ recognized for
some time that the degree of protection to
be afforded an individual from government
intrusions--such as the necessity for a
judicial warrant or the requisite level of
knowledge or information possessed by the
officer or official--is a function of the
degree of intrusiveness implicit in the
search or inspection itself. (Dunaway v.
New York, supra, 442 U.S. 200, 210;
Michigan v. Tyler, supra, 436 U.S. 499,

506; Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, 387

U.S. 523, 538-539.) Thus, in at least two
situations, this Court has held that
warrantless intrusions of a limited nature
may be effecuated on less than traditional
probable cause. (Delaware v. Prouse,
supra, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (production of
license and registration); Terry v. Ohio,

supra, 392 U.S. 1, 21. (Weapons "pat-

27.

down"). In each of these cases, the court

has required only “specific and articulable
facts" which give rise to a reasonable sus-
picion warranting the particular
intrusion. (392 U.S. at p. 21, 440 U.S.

at p. 663.)

It is clear that in the instant
case, and in all cases likely to arise
under the current construction of
California Vehicle Code section 2805, the
requirement of “articulable and reasonable
suspicion" was, and will be, met. (Ibid.)
Specifically, in the instant case, Officer
Ririe had been informed by Sergeant Biller
of the Hollywood Division of the
Los Angeles Police Department that nu-
merous cars in apparently undamaged
condition were entering Daytona Auto Body
never to be seen again. (C.T. pp. 197-
198.) In addition, during an inves-
tigation concerning a confessed car thief

named Stradman, a refurbisher of cars of

28.

questionable origin named Sol Mizrahi was
linked to Daytona Auto Body. (C.T. p.
198; R.T. p. 46.) Finally, on the day
prior to the search at issue, investigator
Ririe was contacted by an investigator
Johnson in Alhambra, California who
indicated that he was’ investigating
insurance frauds involving Daytona Auto
Body. (C.T. p. 198.)

While respondent concedes’ that
this information did not meet the
requisite standards of specificity and
personal knowledge to amount to probable
cause for the issuance of a _ search
warrant, it is apparent that this
information provided the articulable and
reasonable suspicion required for the
limited inspection authorized under
Vehicle Code section 2805 and actually
conducted in the instant case. Indeed,

respondent submits that the nature of

29.

petitioner's enterprise--an unlicensed and
unlawful dismantler of, and dealer in,
stolen vehicles--further justifies the
utilization of limited warrantless inspec-
tions on less’ than traditional probable
cause.

Clearly, petitioner's enterprise
was sophisticated, including the leasing
of a three-story building, two floors of
which he subleased to a tenant, the
maintenance of elaborate facilities for
dismantling, reassembling, and painting
automobiles, and direct contact with
perspective buyers. Petitioner also
apparently employed several workers in his
enterprise. (R.T. pp. 53-58.) Moreover,
the speed with which petitioner was able
to conduct his activities is evidenced by
the fact that, in attempting to execute an
arrest warrant for petitioner, Officer
Ford impounded two additional vehicles in
various stages of reconstruction eight

30.

days after investigator Ririe conducted
the initial inspection. (C.T. pp. 224-
2253 229.) Clearly, the degree of speed
and sophistication demonstrated by
petitioner's enterprise renders both rea-
sonable and necessary the type of limited
warranted intrusion contested by
petitioner.

Since the inspection conducted
in the instant case was clearly reasonable
under longstanding principles of Fourth
Amendment adjudication, respondent submits
that this Court should therefore deny the
requested writ of certiorari to review the
denial of petitioner's motion to suppress

evidence.

xe ® &

31.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
respondent urges that the Petition for
Writ of Certiorari be denied.
Respectfully submitted,

GEORGE DEUKMEJIAN, Attorney General
of the State of California
ROBERT H. PHILIBOSIAN, Chief
Assistant Attorney General
--Criminal Division
S. CLARK MOORE,
Assistant Attorney General
ROBERT F. KATZ,
Deputy Attorney General
FREDERICK GRAB,
Deputy Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondent

32.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_2486%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.