# Amicus Brief — Diedrich v. Commissioner

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_2370%3A7

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1982
- **Citation:** 457 U.S. 191

## Text

Office Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED

No. 80-2204 NOV 19 1961

In the Supreme Court of the

October Term, 1981

VICTOR P. DIEDRICH and FRANCES T. DIEDRICH,
Petitioners,
vs

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent,
and
UNITED MISSOURI BANK OF KANSAS CITY, N.A.,
EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF FRANCES D. GRANT,
DECEASED,
Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent.

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF
On Behalf of Ralph Owen and Lulu H. Owen; John T.
Benson, Jr. and Jimmie L. Benson; J. C. Bradford,
Sr. and Eleanor Bradford; Joe C. Davis; and Estate of
Frances Hampton Currey

WILLIAM WALLER
(Counsel of Record)

WALLER LANSpEN Dortcu & Davis
2100 One Commerce Place
Nashville, Tennessee 37239
(615) 244-6380

Attorney for Amici Curiae

E. L. Menpennatt, Ixc., 926 Cherry Street, Kansas City, Mo. 64106, (816) 421-3030

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Interest of the Amici Curiae 2
Summary of Argument 8
Argument:
Structure of a Net Gift 10
The Commissioner’s Theory of Tax Liability ........ 12
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 14
The Crane Case 16
The Constitutional Concept of Income .................... 19
The Weight to Be Given the Tax Court Decisions 21
Conclusion 25

Table of Authorities

CAsxs

Arrousmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6, 12 (1952) 24
John T. Benson, Jr., et ux. v. Commissioner, T. C. Memo

1978-231 6
Eleanor A. Bradford v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 935
(6th Cir. 1956) 20
J. C. Bradford, et ux. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 584
(1978) 6
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406
(1932) 24
Cannon v. Apperson, 14 LEA (82 Tenn.) p. 553 ............ 12

Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 105-109 (1971) 25
Commissioner v. Rail Joint Co., 61 F.2d 751 (C. A. 2,

1932) 20, 21
Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947) 5, 8, 16,
17, 18, 19

Joe C. Davis v. Commissioner, 74 T. C. 881 (1980) .......... 6

II

Diedrich v. Commissioner, 643 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1981)

2 7,11

Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943) ...........-... 24

Edwards v. Cuba Railroad, 268 U.S. 628 (1924 21
Est. of Frances H. Currey v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo

1981-40 6

Est. of Davis v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1971-318,
(30 T.C.M. 1363), affd. 469 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1972)
4, 19, 22
Est. of Henry v. Commissioner, 69 T. C. 665 (1978) — 7
Est. of King v. Commissioner, 37 T. C. 973 (1962) 22
Evangelista v. Commissioner, 629 F. 2d 1218 (7th Cir.
1980) 12,17
Hanover Bank, Executor v. Commissioner, 369 U.S. 672
(1962) ae 25
Sarah Helen Harrison v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1350
eee 2, 11, 14
Hirsch v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1940) 20
Hirst v. Commissioner, 572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1978),
rene. 4, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 25
Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1974),
59 T. C. 791 (1973) 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 16, 18, 19
Krause v. Commissioner, 56 T. C. 1242 (1971) — 4, 6, 10,
14, 21
Magnolia Development Co. v. Commissioner, T. C. Memo
1960-177 (19 T. C. M. 934) 5, 12, 19

Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212 (3rd Cir. 1978),
cert. denied 439 U.S. 1046 (1978) 18

National Bank v. Whitney, 103 U.S. (13 Otto) 99 (1880)

Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716
(1929) 5, 8, 13, 16

Owen, et ux. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1978-51, 652
F.2d 1271 (6th Cir. 1981) 6, 7, 10, 12, 18, 24

Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company, 278 U.S. 339
(1929)

Simon v. Commissioner, 285 F.2d 422 (3rd Cir. 1960),
affg. 32 PC. 935 5, 12, 19

Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir, 1981) .... 18
Turner v. Commissioner, 49 T. C. 356 (1968), affd. 410

F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1969) ..... 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 21, 24
United States v. Dyrum, 408 U.S. 126 (1972) ................ 22
STATUTES
Internal Revenue Code of 19 3ůꝶ999r2v2zi¶ĩ 8

Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (U.S. C.):
ere 19, 20
e ,,, ] ceeessalinpiaclisiavesl 9, 15
e .... 3, 4, 11, 21
e . 3, 4, 11, 21
D . 8, 16, 17
Section 1015 (d) (6) 16
e ..... 22

MISCELLANEOUS

Rev. Rul. 57-564, 1957-2, Cum. Bull. 328 3

Rev. Kul. 75-72, 1957-1, Cum. Bull. 310 3

Sixteenth Amendment 9, 19, 20, 21

Tax Reform Act of 1976:

e ,,... es
e naatccaptcensabenengipoasuctatinbio’ 16

Judicial Code Act of June 25, 1948, 36, 62 Stat. 991-992 24
Virginia Bill of Rights, 1776 Paragraph 15 ........................ 19

Iv

Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Trusts, Boris
J. Bittker (1981) para, 43.1 17

Ways and Means Committee Report: i
H. Rpt. No. 94-658, 94th Congress, Ist Sess., Nov.
. 14
H. Rpt. No. 94-1380, 94th Congress, 2d Sess., Au-
gust 2, 1976, p. 44 eee 16

Conference Report

H. Rpt. No. 94-1515, 94th Congress, 2d Sess., Sept.
een eee 15

No. 80-2204
In the Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1981

VICTOR P. DIEDRICH and FRANCES T. DIEDRICH,
Petitioners,

VS.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent,
and
UNITED MISSOURI BANK OF KANSAS CITY, N.A.,
EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF FRANCES D. GRANT,
DECEASED,
Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent.

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF

On Behalf of Ralph Owen and Lulu H. Owen; John T.

Benson, Jr. and Jimmie L. Benson; J. C. Bradford,

Sr. and Eleanor Bradford; Joe C. Davis; and Estate of
Frances Hampton Currey

MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT:

This amicus curiae brief is filed in support of the posi-
tion of Petitioners in this case on behalf of the following

2

appellees in cases pending in the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals:

Ralph Owen and Lulu H. Owen

John T. Benson, Jr. and Jimmie L. Benson

J.C. Bradford, Sr. and Eleanor Bradford

Joe C. Davis

Estate of Frances Hampton Currey

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE

The interest of the amici curiae can best be seen from
the following historical survey.

The first reference to net gifts we find in court de-
cisions was in Sarah Helen Harrison v. Commissioner, 17
T. C. 1350 (1952), involving the amount of the gift tax.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue contended that the
gift tax should be applied to the gross gift. In ruling for
the taxpayer the Tax Court said (p. 1357):

Respondent asserts that gift tax “is measured by
the value of the property passing from the donor.”
Regulations 108, section 86.3. This is true if the prop-
erty passes from the donor with all the elements of a
gift. Cf. Commissioner v. Hogle, 165 F.2d 352, 353, af-
firming 7 T.C. 986. One of the essential elements of
a gift is the donor’s intention to make the gift. Peti-
tioner did not intend that the amount of the value of
the property necessary for the gift tax liability would
be a gift to the trust. Therefore, in the absence of an
intent to give, this amount was not effective as prop-
erty passing from the donor, and not taxable as a gift.

As used in the brief and in the cited cases, a net gift
is a gift on condition that the donee pay the gift taxes or
that the donee agree to pay the gift taxes.“

In Rev. Rul. 57-564, 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 328, the Com-
missioner responded to a request.. . with respect to the
Federal income tax consequences to a donor, pursuant to
a trust instrument, requiring the donee trust to pay the
Federal gift tax ori the gift of such stock... .” The Com-
missioner ruled that. . income of the trust which is
applied by the trustee in satisfying the obligation incurred
to pay gift tax of the donor, is taxable to the dunor under
the provisions of Section 677 of the Code.” There was no
suggestion of any other “income tax consequences” and the
implication of this omission was that there were none.
Certainly there was no administrative construction of any
Federal tax law that there were such consequences prior
to the cases now to be referred to.

The first decided case in which the I.R.S. made the
contention that a capital gain was realized by a donor who
made a net gift where the gift tax exceeded the donor’s
basis in the donated property was Turner v. Commissioner,
49 T.C. 356 (1968). The Tax Court rejected the conten-

1. Assuming a gross gift of $1,000, and a Federal gift tax
25%, the formula to arrive at the amount of the net gift
would be: X + 25/100 X = 1,000; 125 X; = 100,000; X = 800.
The computation becomes more complicated when different gift
tax br are involved and when the gift is considered as
made one-half by the donor and one-half by his spouse. See Rev.
Rul. 75-72, 1957-1, Cum. Bull. 310. In this brief, for the sake
of simplicity, state gift taxes will be ignored.

2. The Commissioner argued for a capital gain tax only in the
case of a gift to an individual, conceding that there was none in
the case of a gift to a trust. The reason for the concession is un-
clear, but was possibly on the theory that the only income tax con-
sequences of a net to a trust were those based on Sections
671 and 677 of the . In later cases the Commissioner made
e e e ee ee ee tee oe een

4

tion; the Commissioner appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals, and that Court affirmed the Tax Court, 410
F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1969). The same contention was then
made and rejected by the Tax Court in Estate of Davis v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1971-318 (30 T.C.M. 1363); the
Commissioner appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, and that Court affirmed the Tax Court, 469 F.2d 694
(5th Cir. 1972). Then again in Krause v. Commissioner,
56 T. C. 1242 (1971), the Commissioner advanced the same
contention as an alternative to his contention that the use
of proceeds of sale of donated property for payment of the
gift taxes resulted in income to the donor. The Tax Court,
in an opinion reviewed by the Court, held with one judge
dissenting, that the taxpayers realized income under Sec-
tions 671 and 677 of the Code in the amount of the income
received by the trusts prior to the payment of the gift tax
liabilities, but unanimously held that they did not realize
any other income as a result of the payment of such taxes.
Both parties appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, but both parties then dismissed their appeals on
June 27, 1972.

There was no other case pending in any other circuit
in which the Commissioner was making the contention
now made, except Hirst v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 307
(1974). In view of the state of the law, it is likely that
the Commissioner would not have pursued the Hirst case
had it not been for a decision of the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079, de-
cided April 9, 1974. This is the case on which the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals mainly relied in the instant cases.
The facts in Johnson were that the taxpayers, who owned
corporate stock of high value but a low tax basis, borrowed
money on non-recourse notes from a bank and then made
gifts of the stock to trusts, subject to the encumbrances of

the bank loans. The donors paid the gift taxes on the gross

gifts, using part of the proceeds of the bank loans to do so,
but were free to use these proceeds any way they chose.

Prior to the Johnson transactions, there had been at
least two decisions with facts almost identical in which the
Commissioner had prevailed. These were Simon v. Com-
missioner, 285 F.2d 422 (3rd Cir. 1960), affirming 32 T.C.
935, and Magnolia Development Company v. Commis-
sioner, T. C. Memo 1960-177 (19 T. C. M. 934). The factual
differences were that in Simon the gift was to a controlled
corporation and in Magnolia Development Co. the gift was
to a charity, so that in neither case were gift taxes in-
volved. In each case it was held that the fact that the
donor had borrowed the money and then transferred the
property was a matter of form rather than substance and
that the donee in each case was really buying the property
for the amount of the loan. These cases were presumably
known to the Johnson brothers or their tax counsel when
they engaged in the transactions in controversy, but by the
time deficiency notices were issued, Turner had been de-
cided, and they decided to contest the deficiencies on the
ground that they also had “in ubstance“ made net gifts.
The Tax Court disagreed, and they appealed to the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals, where they found a sympathetic
ear. The panel of that Court which heard the case, in an
opinion by Judge Celebrezze, affirmed the Tax Court, but
in doing so took occasion, in dicta, to disapprove Turner.
Reliance for this view was placed on Old Colony Trust Co.
v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929) and Crane v. Com-
missioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947). Neither of these cases had
been relied upon in Simon or in Magnolia Development
Co., although Judge Bruce, for the Tax Court in Johnson v.
Commissioner, 59 T.C. 791 (1973), had partially relied upon
Crane, saying that its “rationale” had been applied “in

situations analogous in many respects to the present case.”
(p. 810). As to Turner, Judge Bruce said that it was “dis-
tinguishable both on the facts and the issues presented.”
(p. 812). There was no one to urge the correctness of
Turner before the Johnson Court. The Commissioner
argued that its was incorrectly decided, and the taxpayers’
main thrust was that they should have the benefit of the
decision although they had not made net gifts.

It was in 1972 and 1973, after the dismissal of the ap-
peals in Krause, and prior to the decision in Johnson,
that the gifts of the taxpayers, who are the amici curiae
in these cases, were made. Solely as a result of the dicta
in Johnson, the Internal Revenue Service reactivated its
position that such gifts generated taxable income. Statu-
tory notices were duly issued, and petitions duly filed with
the Tax Court for redetermination of the deficiencies. The
opinions in the Tax Court, all in favor of the taxpayers on
this issue, were as follows:

Ralph Owen, et ux. No. 8960-75, T.C. Memo 1978-51
filed Feb. 6, 1978

John T. Benson, Jr., No. 5885-76, T. C. Memo 1978-231
et ux. filed June 21, 1978

J.C. Bradford, et ux. No. 5701-76, 70 T.C. 584 r-
filed July 31, 1978

Joe C. Davis No. 5831-76, 74 T. C. 881 vad
filed July 31, 1980
Estate of Frances F No. 2219-78, T.C. Memo 1981-40
Currey Feb. 2, 1981

The Tax Court did not hear the Hirst case until after
the decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in John-
son. It then reaffirmed its prior decisions in spite of
the dicta in Johnson upon which the Commissioner had

7

relied. The Commissioner appealed to the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals, which, after an en banc hearing, by a
vote of five to three, affirmed the Tax Court in an opinion
by Chief Judge Haynesworth, Hirst v. Commissioner, 572
F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1978). Subsequently, the Tax Court
decided the cases pending before it and the Commissioner
promptly appealed all of them. Oral argument was heard
in the Sixth Circuit in only one of these cases, Owen v.
Commissioner, No. 78-1341. This case was decided by the
Tax Court February 6, 1978, T.C. Memo 1978-51, and was
orally argued on appeal June 6, 1980, and finaliy decided
June 23, 1981 on the basis of stare decisis. Owen v. Com-
missioner, 652 F.2d 1271 (6th Cir. 1981). Meanwhile, in
the Eighti Circuit, the two cases now before the Court,
decided by the Tax Court on November 4, 1979, T.C.
Memo 1979-441, and February 27, 1980, T.C. Memo 1980-50,
respectively, were argued on January 15, 1981, with a de-
cision in favor of the Commissioner on March 4, 1981,
Diedrich v. Commissioner, 643 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1981).
In all the Sixth Circuit cases the Commissioner’s argument
both in the Tax Court and in the Court of Appeals has
been that the cases were “controlled by Johnson,” and in
the Eighth Circuit Johnson was strongly relied upon.

In addition to the cases of the amici curiae, there is also
pending in the Sixth Circuit the Commissioner’s appeal
from the Tax Court’s decision in Estate of Henry v. Com-
missioner, 69 T.C. 665, filed February 6, 1978. All of these
cases are being held in abeyance pending the decision of
this Court in the present cases. In the Owen case the court
has granted the Commissioner’s Petition to Rehear En Banc
and the case has been restored to the docket as a pending

appeal.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Where a donor makes a gift of appreciated property
to a donee in a lower tax bracket, e.g., a trust which dis-
tributes all its income except capital gains, and the donee
sells the property, or a part of it, his capital gain tax is
naturally less than the donor's tax would have been if the
donor had sold the same property. Hence, when a donor
makes a gift of appreciated property on condition that the
donee pay the gift taxes, or that he agree to pay them, and
the donee sells some of the property to raise the necessary
funds, the Internal Revenue Service collects a smaller
amount of capital gain taxes than if the donor had sold
the same property to pay the same gift taxes. This is
the tax advantage of making so-called net gifts.

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue contends in
these cases and in the cases involving the amici curiae that
where the gift taxes exceed the basis of the donated prop-
erty, the excess is a capital gain to the donor, relying
largely upon Old Colony Trust Company and Crane, which
were also relied upon by the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in the Johnson dicta disapproving Turner. Neither
of these cases support the Commissioner’s contention. Old
Colony involved the indirect payment of additional com-
pensation to an employee in the form of the payment of
his income taxes and the decision is applicable only in
such an income-generating context. It is not applicable
in non-commercial transactions between family members.
Crane involved a taxable “disposition” of property and de-
termined the “amount realized” under the provision of
the 1939 Code which corresponded with Section 1001(a)
of the 1954 Code. In the cases at bar, the “disposition”
of the property was not a taxable disposition, and Crane
is inapplicable. Moreover, Crane involved a sale of de-

preciable real estate on which the taxpayer had taken
sizable depreciation deductions over a period of years,
and this was said by the Court to be the “crux” of the
case. The Court was careful to point out what it was not
deciding. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was in-
correct, in the cases at bar, in treating the Johnson type of
transaction the same as a pure net gift.

This Court should give great weight to the numerous
decisions of the Tax Court holding that net gifts do not
generate taxable income and to the fact that when these
gifts were made, all prior to the Johnson decision, the law
was well settled in favor of the taxpayers, both in the Tax
Court and in the Sixth Circuit where the amici curiae all
resided. Moreover, the concept of taxable income en-
visioned by the Johnson Court and the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals in these cases is contrary to the concept of in-
come under the Sixteenth Amendment.

At any rate, the remedy, if one was needed, was for
Congress to apply, and Congress, in the Tax Reform Act
of 1976, enacted such reforms as it considered necessary,
including the incorporation of Section 644 into the Internal
Revenue Code, imposing on donee trusts which sell prop-
erty within two years of the transfer of the property a spe-
cial (but non-retroactive) tax equivalent to any tax bracket
savings otherwise realized by the donee trust as compared
with the tax which would be imposed on the donor if the
donor had sold the same property. The Commissioner in
these cases seeks to have a special tax imposed by judicial
fiat, not on the donee, but on the donor, creating in the
case of net gifts to trusts an incongruous situation.

10

Finally, should the Court agree with the Commissioner
and affirm the reversals of the Tax Court by the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals, the reversals of the Tax Court
should be non-retroactive.

ARGUMENT
Structure of a Net Gift

The simplest form of a net gift is a gift of money. As-
suming a gift tax rate of 25%, the donor who makes a net
gift of $800 will make a gross gift of $1,000, and the addi-
tional $200 does not “vanish into thin air“, to use the lan-
guage of Judge Raum in Hirst (63 T.C. at p. 315); it goes
into the United States Treasury. Obviously, the tax conse-
quences are exactly the same whether the donor makes a
gift of $800 and pays the gift tax of $200, or makes a gift of
$1,000 conditioned on payment of the gift tax by the donee.

The next simplest form would be a gift of property,
plus enough money to pay the gift tax; eg. shares of stock
worth $800, plus $200 in money. Here, as pointed out by
Judge Featherston in Krause, the transfer of money in the
amount of the gift tax, and the use of the money for pay-
ment of the gift tax, would not generate taxable income.
The donee simply pays the money into the Treasury as
before. Again, the tax consequences are exactly the same
as if the donor had made a gift of the property only, and
paid the gift tax himself.

The usual form of net gift, however, would be (using
the same figures) a gross gift of shares of stock of a value
of $1,000, in which case the donee could sell $200 worth and
pay the gift tax. This was the form of net gift involved in
Owen, where the exact language of each of the trust agree-
ments was as follows:

11

(d) This gift is on the express condition that the
Trustee report and pay out of the trust estate all gift
taxes, both state and federal, which may be imposed
upon donor by virtue of this gift. The Trustee is
authorized to borrow the money with which to pay
said taxes, or any part thereof, and to repay said loan
or loans by selling, from time to time, property com-
prising a part of the trust estate. The interest on said
loan or loans may be paid out of the income of the
trust or by selling property in the trust estate, in the
sole discretion of the Trustee.

To avoid any impact of Sections 671 and 677 of the
Code, the trusts borrow the money for the gift taxes and
after payment sell enough of the property to repay the
loans. The only tax disadvantage to the Treasury is that
it receives less capital gain taxes than if the donor, in a
higher tax bracket, had made the sale to raise the necessary
funds for the gift taxes.

A variation of this form of net gift would be one in
which the donee pays the gift tax with his own funds,
which would probably be the residue of taxable income
after payment of income taxes. Such was the form of net
gift described in Sarah Helen Harrison, and also the form
of net gift in Hirst, where real e ate was donated.

In Diedrich, the Court said in Footnote 7, that the
characterization of a transaction for gift tax purposes is
irrelevant in a case involving income taxes. Obviously
the income tax consequences of a transaction are different
from the gift tax consequences, but the transaction itself is
the same. If the transaction is a non-commercial transac-
tion for gift tax purposes, it is also a non-commercial trans-
action for income tax purposes, and if the donee is merely
the conduit for the payment of the gift taxes in the gift

12

tax context, he remains merely a conduit in the income
tax context.

Another variation in the form of net gifts is that the
gift may be conditioned either on the payment of the gift
tax by the donee, or on the agreement of the donee to pay
the tax. Here we run into the distinction between a con-
dition and a covenant, and if the gift is conditional, the
distinction between a condition precedent and a condition
subsequent. It is submitted that the gift in Owen was on a
condition precedent. In other words, the gift was not a
completed gift until the payment of the gift tax. See Can-
non v. Apperson, 14 LEA (82 Tenn.) p. 553, opinion by
Judge William F. Cooper, one of Tennessee’s most dis-
tinguished jurists, holding that when a condition upon
which a legacy depends is precedent, the legatee has no
vested interest until the condition is performed.

The Commissioner’s Theory of Tax Liability

Prior to the decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Johnson, the Commissioner consistently con-
tended in the net gift tax cases that the taxpayer made a
sale of the donated property for the amount of the gift
tax, and a gift to the extent that the market value of the
donated property exceeded the amount of the gift tax. One
difficulty with this approach, as indicated in the opinion of
Judge Raum in Hirst (63 T.C. at p. 315), was that if the
basis of the donated property exceeded the amount of the
gift tax, the taxpayer would have a recognizable loss.
This was also pointed out in Evangelista v. Commissioner,
629 F.2d 1218 (7th Cir. 1980).

Johnson was in all significant respects similar to Simon
v. Commissioner, supra, and Magnolia Development Com-
pany, supra, where the courts regarded the transactions as
part gifts, part sales. When Johnson reached the Sixth

13

Circuit Court of Appeals, however, that Court rejected the
part gift, part sale theory, and advanced a new theory,
which was apparently thought to satisfy both the Johnson
type of transaction and the net gift type of transaction;
viz. the theory of economic benefit, bottomed largely on
Old Colony Trust Company, where a corporate officer was
held to have derived additional compensation from the
payment of his income taxes by his employer. The Court
theorized that the donor is “primarily liable” for the gift
tax, and that if the donee pays the gift tax, this constitutes
income to the donor.

On this theory, however, the income would be the
amount of the gift tax without regard to the basis of the
donated property, and it would be ordinary income and
not capital gain. Nevertheless, the Commissioner contends
in such a case that the donor realizes taxable income to the
extent only that the amount of the gift tax exceeds the
adjusted basis in the donated property and that it is a
capital gain rather than ordinary income.

There are several other troubles with this theory.
In the first place, the payment of another’s tax liability
does not necessarily generate income. As pointed out by
Judge Haynesworth in Hirst (572 F.2d at p. 431) payment
of a tax for someone else may be a gift, depending on the
circumstances. For example, a parent may pay a daugh-
ter’s note at a bank as a gift to the daughter. The net gift
tax transaction could be characterized as reciprocal gifts,
which are netted out for gift tax purposes.

In the second place, it is incorrect to say that the donee
is paying the donor’s obligation. It is true that the donor
is liable for the gift tax if the donee fails to pay, but as
between donor and donee, the obligation to pay is that of
the donee, if there is any obligation at all. An accommoda-

14

tion maker of a note to a bank is primarily liable to the
bank, but the obligation is really that of the accommodated
party and if the latter pays the note, it would be incorrect
to say that he is paying the obligation of the accommoda-
tion maker. Moreover, in the case of the gift on the con-
dition precedent that the donee pay the gift tax, the gift
is not complete until the gift tax is paid and it would
therefore be incorrect to say that either the donor or the
donee has a prior obligation to pay the tax. The obligation,
the payment, and the completion of the gift are all simul-
taneous,

In the third place, the economic benefit to the donor
in a net gift transaction is simply that the donor has
made a smaller gift rather than a larger one. He is ob-
viously worse off economically than if he had made no
gift, but it would be farfetched to say that although one
is better off making a gift of $100 rather than a gift of
$200, he realizes taxable income and incurs an income
tax in so doing.

Finally, adopting the rationale of Sarah Helen Harrison
and Krause, the donee in a net gift transaction is merely
a conduit, The donor furnishes either the funds for pay-
ment of the gift taxes or the equivalent in property, which
the donee is free to sell to raise the funds.

The Tax Reform Act of 1976

In the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Public Law 94-455, one
of the concerns of Congress was “the possible tax abuse
where the grantor places in trust property which has un-
realized appreciation in order to shift the payment of any
capital gains tax to the trust at its lower progressive rate
structure.” Ways and Means Committee Report [H. Rpt.
No, 94-658, 94th Cong. Ist Sess. (November 12, 1975)] p.
183. The final result was Section 701(e) of the Act, incor-

15

porating a new Section 644 into the Code, whereby “the
trust is taxed at the grantor’s rate brackets on ‘built in’
gain occurring within 2 years of transfer to the trust.”
Conference Report [H. Rpt. No. 94-1515, 94th Cong. 2d
Sess. (September 13, 1976) ] p. 441.

It is significant that the Commissioner does not con-
tend in the cases under consideration, and has not con-
tended in any of the net gift cases, that the donor is the
real taxpayer where the donee sells a part of the donated
property to raise the funds for payment of the gift taxes.
There is no contention that the capital gain taxes incurred
by the donee should be mewsured by the donor’s tax
bracket rather than the @une< If such contention were
made, one conclusive answer * ould be, at least where the
donee is a trust, that Section 644 of the Code applies only
to transfers to trusts after May 21, 1976. As previously
shown, the difference in tax brackets of donor and donee
is the source of the Commissioner’s dissatisfaction with net
gifts and the correlative advantage to taxpayers. This is
not to say that in some cases there may not be a practical
reason for a net gift, as where the donor does not have the
funds to pay the gift taxes and does not want to sell any
part of the property, whereas the donee does have the
funds; e.g. in Hirst, where an 80 year old widow with lim-
ited liquid assets gave undeveloped land to her grown son
and his family on condition that he pay the gift taxes.
But the Commissioner has no just cause for dissatisfaction
in such a case because the funds used by the donee are
probably the residue of taxable income on which he has
previously paid (or will pay) the required income tax, at
perhaps a relatively high rate.

Congress was evidently concerned in the Tax Reform

Act of 1976 with reforms in this whole area of taxation.
Not only did it add Section 644 to the Code, but also by

16

Section 2005(c) of the Act added to Section 1015(d) of
the Code a new paragraph 6, providing a special rule for
gifts made after December 31, 1976, as to increased basis
for gift tax paid. Instead of increasing the donee’s basis
by the ‘ull amount of the gift tax paid there is added only
a proportionate amount bearing the same ratio to the
amount of tax paid as the net appreciation in value of the
gift bears to the amount of the gift.* This has the effect,
of course, of lowering the donee’s basis and increasing the
amount of his capital gain tax when he sells. But Congress
did not incorporate into this complex body of tax law the
incongruous concept advocated by the Commissioner in
these cases.

The Crane Case

In Johnson the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals relied
not only on Old Colony Trust Company, but on Crane.
Crane was cited for the proposition that a non-recourse
encumbrance must be included in the “amount realized on
the sale or other disposition of property under Section 1001
(a) of the Code.” This Court did make that holding as
applied to the facts of the particular case where there was

3. The reason for the change was given as follows by the
House Ways and Means Committee:

4. The basis of property acquired by gift generally is the
basis of the in the hands of the donor plus any gift
taxes 42 The purpose of the increase in basis

17

a sale of property which the taxpayer had inherited sub-
ject to a mortgage indebtedness. She had taken sizable
depreciation deductions prior to the sale, and then made
a sale subject to the mortgage indebtedness which had in-
creased because of accrued and unpaid interest. It does not
follow, however, that every “disposition” of property sub-
ject to an encumbrance is a taxable event. As pointed out
iu Evangelista, Section 1001 (a) simply provides for the
computation of the gain after it has been determined under
some other section of the Code that the disposition in ques-
tion was a taxable disposition.‘

The Court in Crane said that the “crux” of the case
was “whether the law permits her [the taxpayer] to ex-
clude allowable [depreciation] deductions from considera-
tion in computing gain.” (331 U.S. at p. 15). The deprecia-
tion deductions actually taken, according to the Tax Court
opinion aggregated $28,500, while the allowable deprecia-
tion was $28,045.10, which added to the $2,500 cash realiza-
tion would produce a taxable gain of $30,545.10. On the
theory that a non-recourse encumbrance is to be included
in the amount realized, the gain should have been the net
proceeds of sale plus the total amount of the encumbrance,
minus the adjusted basis: $2,500 + $270,857.71 — $233,-
197.40 = $40,160.31. The amount of the gain actually de-
termined was the net proceeds of sale plus the principal
(only) of the encumbrance, minus the adjusted basis:
$2,500 + $255,000 — $233,197.40 = $24,302.60. The Court
did not concern itself with the minutiae of the computation,
but contented itself with accepting the agent’s determina-
tion.

4. “This provision [61001 (a) ] be purely computational; it
leaves to other provisions the task of determining whether the
amount so computed is 3 * or N deductible recognized or not
recognized, capital or ordinary.“ Boris J. Bittker, Federal
Taxation of Income, Estates and Trusts (1981) 143.1.

18

The Court, in Crane, evidently realizing the potential
confusion likely to be engendered by the decision, was
careful to point out in Footnote 37 of the opinion what it
was not deciding. Nevertheless, some subordinate courts,
as well as commentators, have attempted to stretch the de-
cision beyond the limits imposed by the Court.“ Certainly
the Crane decision is completely inapposite in a case in-
volving a gift of non-depreciable property. Whether or not
such cases as Johnson were correctly decided is not here
at issue; however, if they were correctly decided, it would
not be on the authority of Crane, but on the principle that
one who borrows money on appreciated property, and then
makes a gift of it subject to the debt which is in excess of
the basis of the property, has realized income to the extent
of this excess. It is unnecessary to rely on Crane to reach
this decision.

The Commissioner is inconsistent in relying upon
Crane upon the merits and then asserting that the alleged
income is realized in the year that the donee pays the gift
taxes, rather than in the year of the transfer. Although the
Commissioner has made a labored attempt to escape this
dilemma, it is submitted that he cannot do so and that by
contending that the supposed income was realized in the
year of payment rather than in the year of transfer, he has
in effect abandoned his reliance on Crane. It is interesting
to note that the Commissioner at one time recognized the
complete inapplicability of Crane in the present situation.
In Johnson, the Solicitor General filed a Memorandum in

5. The first sentence in Footnote 7 in the Owen opinion (652
F.2d at p. 1275) is an example. The confusion engendered by
Crane is illustrated in two recent cases in which the courts reached

te conclusions: Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212 (3rd

ir. 1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 1046 (1978) and Tufts v. Com-

missioner, 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981), where the Court “de-

cline[d] to extend it [the Crane decision] beyond the facts of that
case.

19

opposition to the taxpayers’ petition for certiorari which
had been based, in part, upon an alleged conflict between
the Sixth Circuit decision in Johnson and the Fifth Circuit
decision in Estate of Davis. In arguing that there was no
conflict, the respondent said:

Moreover, unlike this case, Davis did not involve the
transfer of property subject to a pre-existing lien which
rendered the amount of the lien an “amount realized”
under this Court’s Crane decision.

Davis is, of course, on all fours with the cases at bar;
and if Davis was unlike Johnson, it follows that the cases at
bar are also unlike Johnson. In fact, as we see Johnson,
it bears little resemblance to the net gift type of transaction
here involved, but closely resembles such cases as Simon
and Magnolia Development Company.

The Constitutional Concept of Income

A “frequent recurrence to fundamental principles“ is
equally as essential in jurisprudence as in political and gov-
ernmental affairs. In Federal income tax cases, Congres-
sional authority stems from the Sixteenth Amendment,
and the Internal Revenue Code must be applied so as not
to violate the constitutional concept of income.’ It is a
fundamental principle, we submit, that a gift does not

6. Paragraph 15 of the Virginia Bill of Rights, 1776, reads
as follows:

That no free government, or the blessings of liberty, can be
preserved to any people, but by a firm adherence to justice,
moderation, temperance, frugality and virtue, and by frequent
recurrence to fundamental principles.

7. Cf., footnote 42 of Crane, 331 U.S. 1 at p. 15, supra, where
in referring to a hypothetical case, the Court said that it would
raise a question as to whether “either statutory or constitutional
income” would be realized by the hypothetical taxpayer. This
boa gear tag that constitutional concepts in income taxation are
not obsolete.

20

give rise to income, in the constitutional sense, either
to donor or donee. Nor has Congress undertaken to im-
pose such an income tax, thereby forcing the Commissioner
in this case to rely upon the general language of Section 61
that “gross income means all income from whatever source
derived.”

We respectfully submit that the derivation of income
from a transaction which leaves taxpayers “in fact poorer
by virtue of the entire transaction” (Commissioner v. Rail
Joint Co., 61 F.2d 751 (C.A. 2, 1932) ) is completely foreign
to the constitutional concept of income under either the
Sixteenth Amendment or Section 61 of the Code. The
Sixteenth Amendment authorizes the taxation of “income”
but it does not authorize the taxation of an integrated
transaction which merely leaves the taxpayer better off
than he might have been, although worse off than before
the transaction was entered into. Cf., Eleanor A. Bradford
v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 935 (6th Cir. 1956) opinion by
Judge Stewart, later Mr. Justice Stewart. There have
been many definitions of “income”. Among the cases cited
in Bradford on that subject was Hirsch v. Commissioner,
115 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1940), from which we quote as
follows:

‘Income’ within the purview of the Revenue Acts,
has been defined to bo ‘gain derived from capital,
from labor, or from both combined,’ and includes ‘profit
gained through sale or conversion of capital.’ Bowers
v. Kerbaugh Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170, 46 S. Ct. 449,
451, 70 L.Ed. 886. ‘In determining the definition of
the word “income” thus arrived at, this Court has con-
sistently refused to enter into the refinements of lexi-
cographers or economists, and has approved, in the
definitions quoted, what it believed to be the commonly
understood meaning of the term which must have been

\

21

in the minds of the people when they adopted the Six-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution.’ Merchants’
L. & T. Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 519, 41 S. Ct.
386, 389, 65 L.Ed. 751, 15 A.L.R. 1305.

It cannot be plausibly argued that the word “income”
had, when the Sixteenth Amendment was adopted, the
meaning attributed to it by the Commissioner in the in-
stant cases. A donor has the right to determine for him-
self the extent of his generosity, and if he wishes only to
give the value of stock less the amount of the gift taxes
payable by reason of the gift, it is difficult to understand
how he can be said to have realized income merely because
the amount of the gift taxes exceeds the cost of the stock.

On the constitutional concept of income, we refer the
Court to Edwards v. Cuba Railroad, 268 U.S. 628 (1924),
where the Court said: “The Sixteenth Amendment, like
other laws authorizing or imposing ta:.es, is to be taken
as written and is not to be extended beyond the meaning
clearly indicated by the language used.” (p. 631). The
Court held that subsidy payments to the railroad company
“not made for services rendered or to be rendered” were
not “profits or gains from the use of the railroad, and do
not constitute income within the meaning of the Sixteenth
Amendment.” (p. 633).

The Weight to Be Given the Tax Court Decisions

1 At the time the transfers of the amici curiae were

;

made, the Commissioner had apparently abandoned, at
least in the Sixth Circuit, the contention that a net gift
results in the realization of income to the donor in any case
except one controlled by Code Sections 671 and 677. Hav-
ing appealed the decision of the Tax Court in Krause, he
permitted his appeal to be dismissed on June 27, 1972 for
want of prosecution. This left the decision in Turner as

the unchallenged authority on the issue in the Sixth Circuit.
Moreover, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had affirmed
Estate of Davis.

The rule of stare decisis is peculiarly applicable with
respect to judicial decisions affecting the business interests
of the country, estate planning, income taxation and the
like. The reason was aptly stated in United States v.
Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972), where the Commissioner, in a
case involving Section 2036(a)(2) of the Code, sought to
impose an estate tax on trust property on the ground that
the settlor retained voting control of corporations whose
stock was transferred, and was in position to select the
corporate directors who, in turn, passed on dividend policy.
Citing Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company, 278 U.S. 339
(1929) and Estate of King v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 973
(1962), the Court said (p. 134):

Essentially the power retained by Byrum is the
same managerial power retained by the settlors in
Northern Trust and in King. Although neither case
controls this one—Northern Trust, because it was not
decided under § 2036(a) (2) or a predecessor; and King,
because it is a lower court opinion—the existence of
such precedents carries weight. The holding of North-
ern Trust, that the settlor of a trust may retain broad
powers of management without adverse estate-tax
consequences, may have been relied upon in the draft-
ing of hundreds of inter vivos trusts. The modifica-
tion of this principle now sought by the Government
could have a seriously adverse impact, especially. upon
settlors (and their estates) who happen to have been
“controlling” stockholders of a closely held corporation.
Courts properly have been reluctant to depart from an
interpretation of tax law which has been generally
accepted when the departure could have potentially
far-reaching consequences. When a principle of taxa-

23

tion requires reexamination, Congress is better
equipped than a court to define precisely the type of
conduct which results in tax consequences. When
courts readily undertake such tasks, taxpayers may
not rely with assurance on what appear to be es-
tablished rules lest they be subsequently overturned.
Legislative enactments, on the other hand, although
not always free from ambiguity, at least afford the
taxpayers advance warning.

This was not a new application of stare decisis. In
National Bank v. Whitney, 103 U.S. (13 Otto) 99 (1880),
the Court was confronted with a contention that real estate
mortgages taken by national banks to secure future ad-
vances on loans were ultra vires and unenforceable. There
had been a decision two years previously to the effect
that the prohibitory clause of the banking law with respect
to loans on real estate did not vitiate real estate securities
taken for loans, but “only laid the association open to
proceedings by the government.” In the case before it,
the Court said:

The construction of the act of Congress thus given
has been acted upon by the national banks throughout
the country ever since it was published. It is not
unreasonable to suppose that they have conducted their
business and made loans to a large amount in reliance
upon it, and that in many cases great injury would
follow a departure from it. Judicial decisions affect-
ing the business interests of the country should not be
disturbed except for the most cogent reasons, certainly
not because of subsequent doubts as to their soundness.
The prosperity of a commercial community depends
in a great degree, upon the stability of the rules by
which its transactions are governed. If there should
be a change, the legislature can make it with infinitely

24

less derangement of those interests than would follow
a new ruling of the court, for statutory regulations
would operate only in the future.

The statement most often quoted on stare decisis is
that of Justice Brandeis in his dissenting opinion in Burnet
v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932).
“Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most
matters it is more important that the applicable rule of
law be settled than that it be settled right. This is com-
monly true even where the error is a matter of serious
concern, provided correction can be had by legislation.”

It is recognized, of course, that this Court has not
previously spoken on the issue presented, so that stare
decisis in the usual setting is not applicable. Nevertheless,
the principles of Federal tax law relied upon by the tax-
payers were firmly embedded in the court with special
expertise in tax matters,“ with the concurrence of two
Circuit Courts of Appeal, including that of the Circuit
where the amici curiae resided. Judge Edwards, of the
Sixth Circuit, in his dissenting opinion in Owen, apparently
recognized the inequity of a retroactive reversal of Turner,
and we urge upon the Court that should the decision be
to affirm the present cases from the Eighth Circuit, re-
versing the Tax Court, the reversal of the Tax Court should

8. Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting, in Arrowsmith v. Com-
missioner, 344 U.S. 6, * (1952): “Where the statute is so indecisive
and the importance of a particular holding lies in its rational and
— relation to the general — of the tax law, I think

is due the twice-expressed ju ent of the Tax

Kiels of the gelding of Dobson v. Commissioner, 320

U.S. 489 (1 by the recent revision of the Judicial Code, Act of

June 25, 1043 Ne 62 Stat. 5 I still think the Tax Court is a

more competent t and steady influence toward a tic — 1
of tax law than our sporadic omnipotence in a field beset wi

invisible boomerangs. I should reverse, in reliance upon the Tax

Court’s judgment more, 1 own.“ The Tax Court

has expressed its judgment e net gift issue in not less than

cases.

be non-retroactive. The criteria outlined in Chevron Oil
Company v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 105-109 (1971) are clearly
met.

This, however, is a case where the remedy, if one is
needed, should be with Congress—not with this Court.
Hanover Bank, Executor v. Commissioner, 369 U.S. 672
(1962). Actually, as previously shown, Congress has al-
ready, in the Tax Reform Act of 1976, adopted the reforms
it considered necessary, but the one proposed by the Com-
missioner was not one of them.

In 1974, Judge Raum commented in Hirst (63 T.C. at
p. 315) that it was “now too late to wipe the slate clean and
start all over again.” In view of the Tax Reform Act
of 1976, it is now impossible to wipe it clean and start
all over again. The petitioners in this case, and the
amici curiae, all followed both the statute law and the
judge-made law as it existed at the time they made their
gifts, and that is the law which should now be applied.

CONCLUSION

The decisions of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals,
reversing the Tax Court, should be reversed, but if af-
firmed, the reversals of the Tax Court should be non-
retroactive.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM WALLER
(Counsel of Record)

WALLER LANspEN Dortcu & Davis
2100 One Commerce Place
Nashville, Tennessee 37239
(615) 244-6380

Attorney for Amici Curiae

Dated: November 18, 1981

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_2370%3A7. Public record. Not legal advice.
