# Jurisdictional Statement — Schlenz v. Castle > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_2331%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Jurisdictional Statement - **Published:** January 1, 1981 - **Citation:** 454 U.S. 804 ## Text 80°2164_. Oitice Supreme Court, U.S. No. | ti, LED JUN 22 1981 In THE Supreme Court of the Gui Ocroser Term, 1981 ~ RUSSELL G. SCHLENZ and NANCY A. SCHLENZ, Lake County, Illinois Appellants, and GERTRUDE ANDERSON and 1300 CONSOLIDATED CASES, Shelby County, Illinois Appellants, v. JOHN W. CASTLE, ROBERT JASPER, THE LAKE COUNTY, ILLINOIS, BOARD OF REVIEW, SHELBY COUNTY, ILLI- NOIS and the ILLINOIS PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD, Appellees. On Appeal From The Supreme Court Of Illinois JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT PAUL E. HAMER Attorney of Record 1356 Shermer Road Northbrook, Illinois 6(062 (312) 272-1800 JACK L. URETSKY 135 S. LaSalle Street Chicago, Illinois 60603 (312) 372-7842 Attorneys for Appellants Midwest Law Printing Co., Chicago 60611, (312) 321-0220 QUESTIONS PRESENTED Whether an Illinois statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by purporting to ob- literate retrospectively appellants’ rights to abatement and refund of property taxes levied upon assessment increases which had been invalidated »y the State’s highest court for want of timely notice? Whether an Illinois statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause by purporting to obliterate retrospectively the rights of only those tax- payers who had not obtained final judgment prior to an arbitrary prospective date to abatement and refund of property taxes levied upon assessment increases which had been invalidated by the State’s highest court for want of timely notice? ii PARTIES IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS Russel G. Schlenz and Nancy A. Schlenz, were appel- lees in the court below in proceedings originating in Lake County, Illinois. Robert Jasper end The Lake County Board of Review and Shelby County were appellants in the proceedings originating in Lake County. John W. Castle, named in the trial court in Lake County, was not a party on appeal. The Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board, acting on behalf of taxpayers! in 1300 consolidated tax appeals, were appellees in the court below in proceedings originating in Shelby County, Illinois, Gertrude Anderson was the first named taxpayer. Shelby County was the appellant in the proceedings originating in Shelby County. The Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board did not appeal to this court from the decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois. The court below consolidated the Lake County and Shelby County appeals. ' List of Shelby County taxpayers: Gertrude Anderson, Max Anderson, Charles Baker, James & Barbara Bridges, Charles Baker, Hedric Baker, Robert J. Behl, Carl L. Bayless, Mrs. Joseph Behl, John W. Bushue, Jean & Verl Bridges, Robert Behl, Charles Baker, Mrs. Joseph Behl, Robert H. Behl, Robert J. Behl, Oliver E. Baugher, Oliver E. & Merle Baugher, Vernie Boldt, Bobby L. Bridges, Roy Burrell, W. E. & Carol Anderson, William E. & Carol Anderson, W. E. Anderson, L. Ervin Storm, Ervin (Footnote continued on following page) iii 1 continued Storm, Leverett Brown, Carl & Lela Kircher, Garnet Page, David A. Shrake, Dale Bauer, Berniece Chamberlain, Ruth Lockart, Kenneth Robertson, Homer Culver, Henry Doll, Fairy E. Elson, John Elson, Delmar Elzy, Jerry Fearday, Everett Fearday, Irvin Figgins, Garold Gentry, Michael Greuel, Oscar Gentry, Leonard Greuel, Michael Greuel, Nor- bert Hille, Cecil L. Hardesty, Mary M. Henneberry, Elsie Nippe, Earl Noffke, Frieda C. Noll, Paul Parker, Bige Pat- terson, William C. Pieper, James Probst, Paul Rennels, Harold Russell, Albert Schumacher, Bernard Schumacher, Glen R. Bieber, Kenneth Carroll, Floyd Christy, David Compton, Donald Compton, Frank Compton, Ken Considine, Donald Cross, Bill Dunaway, Frank H. Dunaway, Daisy F. & Richard R. Heiserman, Daisy & Richard Heiserman, Jesse Heierman, Doris Kirk, Archie Hicks, ag’! M. Henneberry, James Jansen, Vincent Keck, Don M. Keller, Charles Latch, Joe Latch, Phyllis J. and Marian Lindley Krueger, Ervin F. Latch, John Landers, Ruth Luedke, Roy Lear, Walter Leving- ston, Amom Lindley, Winifred Lindley, Donald Mehl, Gary A. Mercer, Paul E. Montgomery, Faraba & Roy Shirley, Ervin Storm, Paul T. Sheenan, John A. Smith, John Smith, Mark O. Storm, Harold a. Mrs. Clarence Sudkamp, Mark O. Storm, Robert J. Strohl, Larry Strohl, Larry E. Strohl, Lee Roy Storm, Austin Spear, Reverdia Storm, Mrs. Clara Schutte, Norbert Schumacher, Jacqueline J. Schutte, Mark O. Storm, Eileen Schutte, Robert F. & Sandra Swengel, Elmer Tabbert, Ed Tucker, Mrs. M. Wood, A. A. Wilson, John F. Wilson, Harry F. Wells, Charles R. Weber, Sr., Theresa Walk, Victor Walk, Joseph Walden, Paul L. Williams, Charles R. Weber, Sr., Charles Walk, Theresa Walk, James Williams, Larry D. Montgomery, Paul Montgomery, Arble Moffitt, Jr., Jennie McAllister, Dean McAllister, Hannah McAndrew, Agnes Mc- Clory, R. H. Montgomery, Ervin Moran, Kenneth L. Moran, Jesse S. Morris, Jesse W. Morris, Robert W. Morrison, James E. Meek, Donald Mehl, Oliver E. & Merle Baugher, Roy Bur- rell, Carl D. Burrell, 6 oe een Verl & Jean Bridges, L. Joe Elson, Wayne & Bernice Dewar, Helen E. Curtis, August Doeding, L. Joe Elson, Thelma Elson, Harry Estelle, Irene Ferrell, Wayne & Lawrence Gordon Dewar, Helen & Arnold Huntington, Harold Huntington, Helen Hun- tington, Merwin Jervis, Kalph Kasey, Charles Latch, Paul Montgomery, Paul E. Mon me Laurence E. Mont- Romery, Laurence & Phyllis Montgomery, Russell & able Montgomery, Carl E. Miller, Dean & Jeanette McAllister, McAllister, Jennie McAllister, James (Footnote continued on following page) 1 continued Harold Price, James Probst, Harold Russell, Robert J. Strohl, Bernard Schumacher, Lee Roy Storm, Mary E. Storm, Ed Tucker, Raymond Watkins, Scott Worley, (Est.), Dale D. Wirth, Robert H. Behl, Joe Latch, George & Mildred Probst, Norbert Schumacher, Lee Roy Storm, Charles R. Weber, Sr., Henry Widdersheim, Paul L. Williams, Robert Willenborg, Donald Willenborg, Norbert & Rose Will, William & Paul Walk, Walk Farms, Inc., Virgil M. Walk, Theresa Walk, Wil- liam Young, Doris Kirk, Jim Kirk, Mrs. L. M. Kirk, Ralph Kirk, Irma J. Koons, Otha L. Mills, Forrest W. Miller, Theo & Evelyn Nohren, Annabel Roadarmel, Keith Snyder, Ervin Storm, Corwin & Gary Tucker, H. A. Van Horn, c/o Corwin & Gary Tucker, Ed Agney, Robert Allen, Carl Allen, James L. Antrim, Max Anderson, Jude Bixler, Florence Elbert, Robert D. Elbert, Forrest G. Elbert, Danny L. Forcum, Fred Gallagher, Thomas Grove, Jewell Isley, Clarence Elbert Isley, Elbert Isley, Harold R. Kennell, Jr., L. C. Lieb, William W. Lewis, Carl Rittgers, Franklin & Pauline Reid, David Compton, Jerry Corley, Ralph Chamberlain, Frank Compton, Everett Denton, Roger Foster, Huber O. Foster, Marie Fos- ter, Ross S. Glick, Harold & Leila Glick, Neva Hinton, Floyd B. Hinton, Mason Horsman, Eugene Hunter, Orville M. Jones, Ralph Kirk, Mrs. Leon Niehaus, John M. Swander, Ervin L. Storm, Sylvia Frost Snyder, L. R. Sommer, C. L. Voudrie, Max Anderson, Eda Bullerman, Emma Beals, Anna Bose, Russell & Evelyn Fall, pe Grunert, Calvin P. Giesler, Thomas Grove, Elmer Heil, Fred Heil, Edna Jones, Edwin Keller, Everett Kessler, Kenneth Kessler, Oscar Kess- ler, Dwight E. Kessler, Glen Kessler, Don & Irvin Kessler, Walter Keller, Elnora & Wilbur Meers, Merle Mechling, Ear] Noffke, Melvin Ohnesorge, Glenn H. Pieper, William E. Pieper, Edna Probst, Paul Probst, Leatha Rueff, Charles W. Reid, Charles Reid, Jr., Vernon Rincker, Clarence Rosine, Ira Rawdin, Stan & Louis Schutte, Louis Schutte, Jacquline J. Schutte, Shelby Thompson, G. B. Ulmer, Albert Vonderheide, Donald Vogel, Henry Widdersheim, Donald Wendt, Wayne Walden, Paul Whittenberg, Cecil G. Miller, Robert L. Mentzer, LaVonne R. entzer, Carl Kircher, Donald Matlock, Garnet Page, Lola B. Bottrell, Louise Bottrell, Bot- trell Brothers, Ora E. & Harold Curry, Virgil Collins, Elsie Nippe, Charles J. Rosine, Henry Widdersheim, Lorene Storm, n C. Westenhaver, Gary Wheeler, Elmer Wheeler, Don C Westenhaver, T. M. Bennett, Thomas Bennett, Myron Ben- nett, Freda Dunaway, Frank Dunaway, Frank H. Dunaway, Martha Denier, Bill Dunaway, Burl Evans, Earl Endsley, (Footnote continued on following page) 1 continued Curtis Endsley, Russell Fisher, Everett Gordon, Dale L. Gordon, Marion W. Griffin, Zelma & Richard Gordon, Charles & Richard Gordon, Marita Ann Moore, Vivian Roadarmel, Annabel Roadarmel, P. D. Simmons, Corwin Tucker, Luther Taylor, John Yarnell, Wayne Arnold, Frank Arnold, Robert Allen, Carl Allen, Jude Bixler, Wayne Bushue, J. D. Casstevens, J. D. & Amelia Casstevens, Max Clark, Floyd Erlenbusch, Floyd D. Erlenvusch, Curtis Endsley, c/o Endsley Bros., F. H. Forcum, Rolland D. Giles, Emery Gru- nert, John Giles, Richard Gordon, Richard C. Gordon, Fred ag jared Charley Giles, Everett Gordon, Rolland D. Giles, Jim Hutchison, Frank Compton, Don Cross, Bill K. Dunaway, Kimble Foor, Archie Hicks, Gary G. Hicks, Warren Nohren, Lola & Raymond Pfeiffer, Lyle & Audrey West, Jim J. Hut- chison, Jim Hutchison, George Hundertpfund, Cecil Hutton, Paul Jones, Florence B. Jones, Florence Jones, Ralph Jones, Harold R. Kennell, Jr., Hazel Kessler, Donald Kessler, Glen L. Kessler, Emory Knox, L. C. Lieb, sooees E. Miller, George Miller, Irene Patrick, Earl V. Reeder, Earl Reeder, Charles Reid, Verl Steele, James Vonderheide, Titus Vogel, Gene A. Wiley, Joe & Richard Waldhoff Virgil, Wayne Walden, Carol Young, Horace Doty, Edna Ferrell, Glenn I. Ferrell, Glenn Ferrell, T. D. iy Jr., McClovia Hilligoss, Harry Leeds, J. E. Neal, Jackie Owens, LaVerne Storm, Frank Warren, James L. Fribley, Kenneth Carroll, Bill Dunaway, * KJ Endsley, Aloysius Seitz, Dean Woods, Mrs. Ned Adams, J. T. Allen, Wayne & Frances Allen, Frances M. Allen, Harley T. Beyers, Wilfred C. Beyers, Jr., Wilfred J. Beyers, Wilhemina Beyers, Raymond Bond, Carolyn Chamberlain, Joyce Cham- berlain, Marion R. Chamberlain, Ralph Chamberlain, Ken- neth Dickey, Cletus J. Eck, James Eck, William J. Elliott, Frank Epley, Mary Epley, Myrna Flesch, Kenneth J. Flesch, Kenneth Flesch, Andrew Flesch, Roger R. a R. Edman Greenfield, R. E. Greenfield, Milton & Roselle Hahnenkamp, Herman Hanneken, John Holliday, John T. Holliday, Anna J. Kinney, Raymond C. Marley, Virgil J. Nold, Leona & Vergil J. Nold, John Pollman, Robert M. Pollman, Agnes Rakers, Elizabeth Raker, William Suey, Fredrick E. Suey, David Suey, Clarence J. Schmitz, James and Betty Smith, Vincent Sommer, Charles H. Temmen, Frank Temmen, James C. Tem- men, James Temmen, Richard B. Temmen, Paul F. Temmen, Paul Temmen, Claude Temmen, Claude B. Temmen, Claude B. & Martha Temmen, John Van Uytven, Charles Vits, Joe Wolf, Juanita Kuhn Wolf, Juanita K. Wolf, John S. Wood, John Wood, Ina Adkins, Henry Bales, Emma Heals, John H. Bigler, Mrs. (Footnote continued on following page) vi 1 continued Ross Boldt, Clarence Bushur, Donald Bushur, Gerald & Marla Bushur, Louis Greuel, Leonard Greuel, Dorothy Gentry, A. W. Hanfland, Hanfland Lumber Co., Albert Hoene, Anna Hoene, Clarence Hoene, Clarence & Frances Hoene, Della Hoene, James Hoene, John & Ruth Hoene, John Hoene, Ruth Hoene, Richard Hoene, Joseph A. Hoene, Paul Kaufman, Christine Koelsch foorge Konrad, Richard mony oh Christine pisprugge, Tony Pike, mbrose Probst, seetee robst, James Probst, Pa orbert Schum- acher, Francis Sudkamp, Sudkamp Brothers, Louis J. Schutte, John H. Schutte, Eileen Schutte, Bertha Schutte, Clara Schutte, Dolores Steinwandtner, Albert Schumacher, B. J. Schum- acher, John Schumacher, Sudkamp Brothers, Max Van Sant, Charles Walk, Maurice Walk, Robert Walk, Edwin Warner, Donald Wendt, Gertrude Wendt, Allie Wesselman, Robert Benborg, Richard Zerrusen, Garold Brunken, William Brunken, Grace Fribley, E. E. Killam, Ora M. Kerr, Leola M. Potter, Bugenia Smith, Evelyn J. Weber, Evelyn J. & J. Arthur Weber, Estate, Marion Waddington, Oscar Eades, mond F. Foor, Raymond & Marjorie Foor, Rudolph Alda Foor, Rudolph Foor, Jeffery L. & Mary K. Foor, Gre- ry A. & Barbara 8. Foor, Kimble Foor, 0. R. Glick, ugene Hunter, Harold Hunter, Noel Hunter, Louis Hal- brook, Lloyd W. Koons, Farry A. Jones, Harold Hunter, Jun- ior H. L. Lilly, Lemuel & Wreatha Lilly, Wreatha Goldie Lilly, Mamie & Edmund Marxman, Edwin F. Mathias, Jr., . W. Miller, Mrs. Linnett Mize, Harold L. Prosser, George L. Rueff, Eugene W. Schmitz, Lester J. Schmitz, Oliver Shal- lenberger, Herman Smart, L. R. Sommer, James E. Vits, Hattie Wakefield, Lyle and Audrey West, Dean Whitlatch, Charles Blaase, Roscoe spacer by, id Buchanan, Ross Bu- chanan, Marion R. Chamberlain, Ralph L. Chamberlain, Wes- ley Chamberlain, Mabel Chamberlain, Ross Chamberlain, Helen Elberson, Roy Fagg, Halden gs Leland Green, Naomi Harrison, Chester D. Horn, Earl Horsman, Mason Horsman, William & Goldie M. Horsman, george H. Romine, L. R. Sommer, Carl A. Turner, Fred E. Turner, Harry Turner, Harry G. Turner, C. L. Voudrie, V. M. Winter, Anne Hoene, Clarence Hoene, Merlyn Richards, Robert Walk. ul Probst, Harold Schumacher, vii TABLE OF CONTENTS QUESTIONS PRESENTED .,......scscsssessssssereeeneees LIST OF PARTIES | ccceccsvocsessscscsescscssscsscosevescscsseseves OPINIONS BELOW .uwcsccssssscsssscscssssesssesesesssesssescees STATEMENT OF JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS: Nature Of The Proceeding ..........cccccsecseseeeees Date Of Judgment And Appeal ..........s08 Statute Conferring Jurisdiction .............00008 CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY FPO VY BESLUINGS | cvocccrenscensceconcnedecestenecnsosensoresebibevneneesoees STATEMENT OF THE CASE ......ssssssssssesseeeeess REASONS FOR EXERCISING PLENARY JURISDICTION: Illinois Violated Ap olan Taxpayers’ Four- ights To Due Process By Obliterating Their Vested Rights To Tax Abatements And Refunds As Established By State Courts Following This Court’s Forbes Boat Line And Ettor Decisions ...........000000 teenth Amendment II. Illinois Violated Appellant ae Four- ual Pro- tection By Barring Them From Abatement Or Refund Of Taxes Levied Upon sry, ey teenth Amendment Rights To Increased Assessments Solely Because Had Not Obtained Final Judgment Prior 10 viii To An Arbitrary Statutory Date Although a Situated Taxpayers Obtained Re- MIND sna conicdloocansbeisomnubeseduataaneseanemsesioeaesdeduaioian APPENDICES: A—Opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois ... B—Order of the Supreme Court of Illinois Demy iene TORO RTIAG iscccsccscocsccicesssccsseccsvceeeses C— Opinion of the Appellate Court of IIlinvis, SORE SHER: icicksasciscrnctaiscteocietecamanion D—Opinion of the Appellate Court of Illinois, Fak BOMMNOOE. crerensibincssobitdicvcigericiaescinteatinnice E—Order of the Circuit Court of Lake CO BIUIEE / crctstirncisceniinsctaininnassid onesies F—Statutes Governing Illinois Assessment PROORNTOD: cxsiicsesshicrtneldicestsdilesiiisasidtuirevetoniies G—Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court OF CO United BURGeS sccsccccsscccescescsesccctecceseee TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Andrews v. Foxworthy, 72 Ill. 2d 13, 373 N.E. 2d RITES LD TOU | ndsscossessdbsutabsliasiineadinahédenssdaviontiitimsaaealiice Andrews v. Foxworthy, 43 Ill. App. 3d 438, 357 Pe edey OO OTB (Bt Dit; 1OFB) « ccccccccessecovescsscsesesses Cipriano v. Personnel Appeal Board, 330 A.2d 71 CUPiid STOR, dncsobpniadecgntibibasianbakalebioies alae aise tieattende Ettor v. City of Tacoma, 228 U.S. 148 (1913) ....... 10 10, 14 ix Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Board of Com- missioners, 258 U.S. 338 (1922) 9, Gibson v. Commonwealth, 415 A.2d 80 (Pa. a ow spagnccncnonscsoocones s Hall v. Northwest Outward Bound Schools, 572 I I INIT ss scncsnssccncetesccccsccccccsecsecnccece Hartford Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S. 459 (1987) oes 15, Neubert v. Foxworthy, 71 Ill. App. 3d 438, 389 IEE BORE, REPT) | scccccccscccccccsccscecsccsscce 5, People ex rel. Eitel v. Lindheimer, 371 Ill. 367, 21 N.E.2d 318 appeal d’m’d sub nom. Illinois ex rel. Eitel v. Toman, 308 U.S. 505 (1939) ....... 10, Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230 (1926) ...... Stone v. McKay Plumbing, 30 So.2d 91 (Miss. ric clicacnestinccsocsccccndtecne 10, 12, 18, Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) ......00000. 15, Washington National Arena Limited Partnership v. Treasurer, Prince George’s County, 419 A.2d SUN ET REEL. ‘sscocccocéscsscasctsecsovscccooosesece 9, 10, 12, Weissinger v. Boswell, 330 F. Supp. 615 (M.D. ria al ssccndenestestocesevsconssconscosconee Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134 (19388) ..............00 Constitutional Provisions Constitution of the United States, Fourteenth a ss cassbesconcooccodbocces 28 U.S.C. §1257(1) . + Senditieeneeeesentnene 28 U.S.C. $1ZB2(d) .......r.ccrcccocscersererercrecececercessscersees X Illinois Revised Statutes, Ch. 120 (1977): pars. 524, 527 . 4, 5 Us a Goiienuasddsnh chasm sthacninscdibvcamuviebetahetieaeviaeses 4,5 I IEE: sccocchinctsnaavinosisiseabetumulciniaiebdkensin 5, 8 Si MIRA ctccstcciuchnlesicvsbaisbniiaiapsaceinbbabeinsincsecsoeuss 8, 11 Illinois Revised Statutes, Ch. 120 (1978): para. 799.1 (P.A. 80-1471) ........... 2, 4, 5, 8, 16, 17 Court Rules Iilinois Supreme Court Rule 308 ............ccccseesees 6 In THe Supreme Court of the Anited States Ocroser Term, 1981 RUSSELL G. SCHLENZ and NANCY A. SCHLENZ, Lake County, Illinois Appellants, and GERTRUDE ANDERSON and 1300 CONSOLIDATED CASES, Shulby County, Illinois Appellants, v. JOHN W. CASTLE, ROBERT JASPER, THE LAKE COUNTY, ILLINOIS, BOARD OF REVIEW, SHELBY COUNTY, ILLI- NOIS and the ILLINOIS PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD, Appellees. On Appeal From The Supreme Court Of Illinois JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT OPINIONS BELOW The opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois (App. A, infra, pp. A-1 to A-14) is reported at 84 Ill. 2d 196, 417 N.E. 2d 1336 (1981). The court denied rehearing without opinion. (App. B, infra, p. A-14). The court reversed, in relevant part, the decisions of two Illinois Appellate Courts. The Appellate Court opinions are reported at 80 Ill. App. 3d 1131, 400 N.E. 2d 753 (2d as Dist. 1980) (App. C, infra, pp. A-15 to A-19) and 81 IIl. App. 3d 327, 401 N.E. 2d 290 (5th Dist. 1980) (App. D, infra, pp. A-20 to A-28). The Second District opinion reversed in part an order of the Circuit Court of Lake County denying plaintiffs’ motion for Summary Judgment (App. E, infra, at pp. A- 29 to A-30). STATEMENT OF JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS (i) Nature Of The Proceeding This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois upholding Illinois Revised Statutes, Ch. 120, par. 799.1 (1980) against challenges that the statute is invalid because it is repugnant to the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The Supreme Court, in upholding the statute, reversed the decisions of two Illinois Appellate Courts which had previously held the statute void, one court holding that the statute stripped the present appellants of vested rights. (ii) Date Of Judgment And Appeal The Supreme Court of Illinois filed its opinion on February 20, 1981, and denied a Petition for Rehearing slinn filed by the present appellants, Schlenz, on March 27, 1981. Appellants filed their notice of appeal in the Supreme Court of Illinois by mail on May 18, 1981. (App. E, infra at pp. A-39 to A-40). (iii) Statute Conferring Jurisdiction This court has jurisdiction of the present appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1257(1). CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AMENDMENT 14 Section 1. Citizens of the United States. All a born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. sel eas ILLINOIS REVISED STATUTES Statute Challenged Ch. 120, par. 799.1 (Revenue Act of 1939, § 318.1) (1978) 799.1. Validation Of Assessments Notwithstanding Un- timely Publication § 318.1. In all cases where real or personal property has been assessed for the purpose of taxation during the year 1978 and all years prior thereto as provided in the “Revenue Act of 1939”, filed May 17, 1939, as amended,! except no timely publication of the assessment of real or rsonal property, or both, was made as provided b ection 108 of said “Revenue Act of 1939”, suc assessments of real or ewe “igs gio de or both, are hereby validated for all purposes of taxation notwith- standing that the publication of the assessments of real or personal property, or both, was not made within the time provided by statute. The extension of taxes on such real or personal property assessments, or both, are made legal and valid for the pur of collection of taxes notwithstanding that the publication of the assessments of real or personal property, or both, was made within the time provided by statute. Added by P.A. 80-1471, § 1, eff. Nov. 30, 1978. 1 Paragraph 482 et seq. of this chapter. 2 Paragraph 584 of this chapter. Publication Of Assessment Lists Ch. 120, par. 584 (Revenue Act § 103) (Appendix F, pp. A-31 to A-32). Assessments Ch. 120, paras. 524, 527 (Revenue Act §§ 43, 46) (Appendix F, pp. A-32 to A-35). a an Property Tax Appeal Board Ch. 120, paras. 592.1 to 592.5 (Revenue Act §§ 111.1 to 111.5) (Appendix F, pp. A-35 to A-38). STATEMENT Of THE CASE On January 27, 1978, the Supreme Court of Illinois filed its opinion in the unrelated case of Andrews v. Foxworthy, 72 Ill. 2d 18, 373 N.E. 2d 1382, holding that late publication of a non-quadrennial real property tax assessment? voids an increase in that year’s assessments. The court was affirming a prior Appellate Court decision in 438 Ill. App. 3d 488, 357 N.E. 2d 678 (5th Dist. 1976). The taxpayers in Andrews subsequently received refunds. Neubert v. Foxworthy, 71 Ill. App. 3d 438, 389 N.E. 2d 898 (5th Dist. 1979). The Illinois legislature responded to Foxworthy by enacting Public Act 80-1471 which added III. Rev. Stat., Ch. 120, par. 799.1 to the Illinois Revenue Act of 1989, effective November 30, 1978. The paragraph purported to validate retrospectively assessments made in 1978 and years prior thereto despite late publication of the assessment. ® Real property in Illinois is assessed quadrennially but assessments are sometimes increased in non-quadrennial iott) See Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 120, paras. 524, 527, 584 nities: The constitutionality of Ch. 120, par. 799.1 is the subject matter of the present litigation. A. Lake County Taxpayers Russel and Nancy Schlenz filed this action in the Circuit Court of Lake County in March, 1978, naming among the defendants Rebert Jasper, Supervisor of Lake County Assessments and The Lake County Board of Review. Plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that Lake County assessing officials had failed to publish the 1977 tax year assessment lists (except in one township) until after December 15, 1977, the final publication date mandated by Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 120, par. 584 (1977). Plaintiffs subsequently filed a Motion for partial sum- mary judgment to abate the 1977 real property assess- ment increases on the grounds that the increases were void under the authority of Andrews v. Foxworthy. On December 19, 1978, the trial court judge denied Schlenz’s motion for summary judgment. He also certified to the Appellate Court pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 the following question,’ inter alia: “Whether or not Senate Bill 1790, 80 General Assembly, constitutionally validates all 1977 Lake County assessments tardily published in a new — ah 799.1 Ch. 120, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1977, as amen (See App. E, at A-30). The Appellate Court for the Second District reversed in part and remanded, saying: 8 The Rule provides for interlocutory anes of certified questions. It is analogous to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292(b). = = “In Andrews v. Foxworthy (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 13, 373 N.E.2d 1332, the supreme court analyzed and interpreted the notice provisions of section 103 and held that improper publication renders a non- uadrennial reassessment void; the court therein early held that the statutory notice prescribed was mandatory. Consequently, in this case, the applica- tion of Andrews renders the reassessments here void because of noncompliance with the publication (notice) provision. In response to this contention, defendant points out that subsequent to the Andrews decision, the legislature enacted Public Act 80-1471, (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1978 Supp., ch. 120, par. 799.1) which became effective on November 30, 1978, purporting to specifically validate reassessments of real property made without proper notice in all nonquadrennial years prior to and including 1978. Plaintiffs and amici curiae (Commonwealth Edison and certain parties litigating a similar issue in DuPage County) attack the validity of Public Act 80-1471 on the following basis: (1) it attempts to cure a void proceeding; (2) it violates the unformity of taxation provision in the Illinois Constitution; (3) it violates equal protection; (4) it violates due process; (5) it violates the “one subject” provision of the Illinois Constitution; and (6) it offends the concept of separation of powers. Only consideration of basis (1) and (6) above is necessary for our decision as we find Public Act 80-1471 unconstitutional.” 80 Ill. App. 3d 1131, 1134. Amicus Commonwealth Edison had raised State and Federal Equal Protection questions and the DuPage County Amici had raised State and Federal Due Process and Equal Protection clauses before the Appellate Court. The Supreme Court of Illinois granted the Lake County defendants’ Petition for Leave to Appeal. — oe B. Shelby County Taxpayers On August 17, 1978, the Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board,‘ following Andrews, invalidated approximately 1300 assessment increases made in 1976 in a case which the protests had been consolidated before the Board for hearing. The Board found that the County Supervisor of Assessments had failed to make timely publication of the increases. The County sought Administrative Review® in the Circuit Court of Shelby County which reversed on the basis of the new statute, Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 120, par. 799.1, which had become effective subsequent to the Board’s order. The Property Tax Appeal Board, represented by the Attorney General of Illinois, appealed on behalf of itself and the taxpayers. The Appellate Court for the Fifth District reversed, one Justice dissenting, holding that the legislative act “violates the principle of separation of powers embodied in . . . the Illinois Constitution.” The majority then furtner held: In Andrews the court made it clear that the fail- ure to comply with a mandatory requirement of publication is not merely the neglect of some legal formality. Thus, we conclude that Andrews’ con- struction of the publication requirement as designed for the benefit and protection of the taxpayer— giving him an opportunity to ascertain the correct- ness of his assessment as compared with that of other taxpayers—gives the taxpayer in the case at bar a legal exemption from the invalid assessment increases in a nonquadrennial year. Such is more 4 An Administrative Appellate Board established pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 120, paras. 592.1 et seg. (1977). 5 Pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 120, para. 592.4 (1977). allies than a mere expectation based upon an anticipated continuance of the existing law, as contended by appellee, but amounts to a vested right arising from a final decision of the Illinois Supreme Court. We further hold that the Attorney General has standing to raise the vested rights theory in this appeal. People ex rel. Scott v. Illinois Racing Board (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 569, 301 N.E.2d 285; Environ- mental Protection Agency v. Pollution Control Board (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 394, 372 N.E.2d 50. 81 Ill. App. 3d 327, 331. The Supreme Court of Illinois granted Shelby Coun- ty’s Petition for Leave to Appeal, and consolidated the Lake County and Shelby County appeals. In the proceedings in the Supreme Court of Illinois, the appellees and amici raised federal Due Process and Equal Protection questions in defending the Appellate Court decisions. The Supreme Court rejected the claims that Public Act 80-1471 violated Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment by divesting the appellee tax- payers of vested rights. The court declined to consider the Equal Protection issues. The Schlenz’s sought a rehearing on the basis of Washington National Arena Limited Partnership v. Treasurer, Prince George’s County, 410 A. 2d 1060 (Md. 1980). They contended that Washington National which relied upon this court’s decision in Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Board of Commissioners, 258 U.S. 338 (1922), showed that the Illinois court should have held that Public Act 80-1471 was offensive to federal Due Process under the vested rights theory. The Supreme Court of Illinois summarily denied a re- hearing. po THE FEDERAL QUESTIONS PRESENTED ARE SO SUBSTANTIAL AS TO REQUIRE PLENARY CONSIDERATION FOR THEIR RESOLUTION I. ILLINOIS VIOLATED APPELLANT TAXPAYERS’ FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO DUE PRO- CESS BY OBLITERATING THEIR VESTED RIGHTS TO TAX ABATEMENTS AND REFUNDS AS ESTAB- LISHED BY STATE COURTS FOLLOWING THIS ae FORBES BOAT LINE AND ETTOR DECI- This court should grant plenary review because the decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois is counter to a substantial line of decisions by this court and several state courts holding that the Due Process Clause pro- tects the right to obtain a refund of a wrongfully levied tax from abrogation by a legislature. That right and similar rights have been deemed vested and protected from legislative abrogation in Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Board of Commissioners, 258 U.S. 338, 339-340 (1922), Ettor v. City of Tacoma, 228 U.S. 148, 155-156 (1913), Washington National Arena Limited Partnership v. Treasurer, Prince George’s County, 410 A. 2d 1060, 1064-1070 (Md. 1980) cert. denied __ U.S. __, 66 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1980), and Stone v. McKay Plumbing, 30 So. 2d 91, 94-95 (Miss. 1974); see also Gibson v. Commonwealth, 415 A. 2d 80 (Pa. 1980) and Cipriano v. Personnel Appeal Board, 330 A. 2d 71 (R.I. 1975); and see also Justice Linde’s historical summary relating to retro- spective legislation in Hall v. Northwest Outward Bound Schools, 572 P.2d 1007, 1009-1011 (Ore. 1977); but see Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 146-149 (1938), and People ex rel. Eitei v. Lindheimer, 371 Ill. 367, 21 N.E. 2d 318, onl Reais appeal d’m’d sub nom. Illinois ex rel. Eitel v. Toman, 308 U.S. 505 (1939). In January 1978, the Supreme Court of Illinois had affirmed in Andrews on state grounds that the late publication of a nonquadrennial year assessment voids any assessment increases made in that year. State and federal due process were neither raised nor considered. In August, 1978, the Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board voided the 1976 assessment increases in Shelby County, relying upon Andrews. The Shelby County taxpayers were entitled to immediate refunds under Illinois Re- vised Statutes, Ch. 120, para. 592.4 (1978). The Appel- late Court held at 81 Ill. App. 3d 327, 331 that the taxpayers’ rights to refunds had vested, both before and after the Tax Appeal Board’s decision. The Schlenz’s filed their action in Lake County in March, 1978 and sought abatement of taxes based upon assessment increases made in 1977. It was uncontested in the courts below that the Lake County assessment officials, except in one subordinate jurisdiction, had failed to make timely publication of the 1977 assess- ments. The challenged statute, Public Act 80-1471, became effective on November 30, 1978. It purported to validate retrospectively, but not prospectively, non-quadrennial assessments for which timely notice had not been given. The Appellate Courts struck the statute on state constitutional grounds, holding that the legislative over- ruling of Andrews was an improper assumption of judi- cial power. The Supreme Court of Illinois, reversing, disposed of the Schlenz’s and the Appellate Court’s reliance upon the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process protection of vested rights, saying: —12— “A taxpayer has no vested right in the continued existence of a taxing statute”. Forbes, Ettor, Washington National Arena, and McKay Plumbing, as applied to the present appellants, are unmistakably contrary to the Illinois Court’s opinion. These cases hold that a legislature cannot consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process retro- spectively cure a tax official’s action that, at the time it was made, was clearly violative of the legislative intent. As Judge Eldridge of the Court of Appeals of Maryland wrote: “In Forbes, the defect in authority was in no sense ‘technical’ but related to the legislative policy deter- mination of what, if anything, should be charged by the government. The fact that the Legislature later expressed a different intent, and by ‘curative act’ language attempted to indicate that its new position had been the policy all along, did not convert the ror mea in policy to a ratification of a ‘technical’ efect. Washington National Arena at 1067. Washington National Arena, specifically brought to the Supreme Court of Illinois’ attention in Schlenz’s Petition For Rehearing, is factually close to the pres- ent case. Certain Maryland taxpayers obtained a court ordered refund when the Maryland Tax Court deter- mined that Prince George’s County was levying recorda- tion taxes in excess of the rate permitted by the legisla- ture. The legislature, in 1976, purportedly “ratified, confirmed and validated” the prior overcharges as stated in the Opinion at 1072. The Maryland appellants were refused refunds for overcharges prior to 1976 by the Tax Court because of the curative act. The Court of Appeals held the statute violative of Fourteenth Amend- ment Due Process, relying upon this court’s opinion in Forbes. Lei e McKay Plumbing is also closely in point. Appellee had received a lower court judgment entitling it to a refund of sales taxes illegally levied upon services. See the prior opinion of the same court at 26 So. 2d 349 (Miss. 1946). While the case was on appeal the legisla- ture reduced the limitation time from six years to three and imposed additional conditions for a refund. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the lower court judgment, holding that the lower court judgment was a vested right that could not, under the Due Process Clause, be obliterated by the legislature. The Mississippi court relied upon this court’s holding in Ettor, where the legislature had “attempted to take away from Ettor the right to recover damage he had previously sustained.” 30 So. 2d 91, 94. The prevailing opinion in McKay Plumbing went on to say: “The Court, in reversing both the trial court and the Supreme Court of the State of Wasi:ington, speaking through Mr. Justice Lurton, used this lan- guage: “The necessary effect of the repealing act, as construed and applied by the court below, was to deprive the plaintiffs in error of any remedy to enforce the fixed liability of the city to make com- pensation. This was to deprive the plaintiffs in error of a right which had vested before the repeal- ing act,—a right which was in every sense a prop- erty right. Nothing remained to be done to com- plete the plaintiffs’ right to compensation except the ascertainment of the amount of damage to their property. The right of the plaintiffs in error was fixed by the law in force when their property was damaged for public purposes, and the right so vested cannot be defeated by subsequent legisla- tion.” That case goes beyond the facts of the case at bar. There, the act was passed before the judgment was obtained. Here, the judgment was obtained ant jen before the act was passed. We limit our holding to the facts of this case.” Id. The Shelby County taxpayers fit snugly into the McKay Plumbing fact pattern. They, like the Mississippi taxpayer, had received a judgment from a lower tribu- nal, the Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board. That judg- ment was correct at the time it was made and “can not be defeated by subsequent legislation.” Ettor at 156, cited in McKay Plumbing at 30 So. 2d 91, 94. All of the taxpayers before this court also fit within the fact pattern of Washington National Arena where the court said, at 1069: “Turning to the case at bar, we do not believe it can be meaningfully distinguished from Forbes ..... Y The Illinois legislature had limited non-quadrennial assessment increases to years in which timely notice by publication is made; the Maryland legislature had limited the recordation tax rate in certain counties to $1.10. Each limitation had been held to be mandatory by the respective state’s highest court. Taxpayers in each state were then entitled to refunds. Each legislature then sought to “ratify” by “curative” legislation, the unlawful acts of the county officials. “Consequently, the retro- active application of [the curative legislation] . . . would impair property rights in violation of the United States Constitution ....” Washington National Arena at 1070. This court should therefore exercise its plenary juris- diction holding that Forbes, Ettor, Washington National Arena, and McKay Plumbing correctly construe the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to the present fact pattern, and reverse. a ILLINOIS VIOLATED APPELLANT TAXPAYERS’ FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO EQUAL PROTECTION BY BARRING THEM FROM ABATE- MENT OR REFUND OF TAXES LEVIED UPON ILLE- GALLY INCREASED ASSESSMENTS SOLELY BE- CAUSE THEY HAD NOT OBTAINED FINAL JUDG- MENT PRIOR TO AN ARBITRARY STATUTORY DATE ALTHOUGH SIMILARLY SITUATED TAX- PAYERS OBTAINED FUNDS. This court should also grant plenary review because as DuPage County amici pointed out in the Appellate Court, 2d District, and in the Supreme Court of Illinois, the curative act as applied was repugnant to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Appellate Court reversed on state grounds without reaching the federal issues. The Supreme Court of IIli- nois reversed the Appellate Court, and declined to con- sider the Equal Protection issue. That court should have found the statute impermissibly arbitrary in its ap- plication because it set up a classification devoid of any reasonable basis and therefore violative of the Equal Protection Clause as construed in Hartford Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S. 459, 462 (1987), Schlesinger v. Wis- consin, 270 U.S. 230, 240 (1926), and Weissinger v. Bos- well, 330 F. Supp. 615, 621-622 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (three judge court); and see Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 766-767 (1977). Lake County, Shelby County, Vermilion County (the county involved in Andrews), and possibly other tax- payers all became eligible for tax refunds when Andrews became final in early 1978. In each case the county tax assessing officials had made non-quadrennial assess- ment increases without giving timely notice by publica- tion. any The Vermilion County taxpayers received their refunds “in full”, as stated in the court’s opinion in Neubert v. Foxworthy, 71 Ill. App. 3d 438, 438, (decided after the present case was on appeal). The Lake and Shelby County taxpayers sought their relief, respectively, in the Circuit Court of Lake County and before the Property Tax Appeal Board. The Shelby County taxpayers obtained judgment from the Board. Then, on November 30, 1978, Public Act 80-1471 be- came law and purportedly deprived taxpayers of any remedy for the refusal of taxing authorities to follow the mandates of the Revenue Act. The Lake and Shelby County taxpayers were barred from any remedy by the new act. Four hundred and eight Vermilion County taxpayers, indistinguishably sit- uated, had received their relief and were unaffected. See 71 Ill. 2d 13, 16. Public Act 80-1471 drew an arbitrary boundary line creating two groups of taxpayers among those who had suffered assessment increases without timely publica- tion prior to 1978. The boundary line separated those who had received final judgments for abatements or refunds prior to November 30, 1978 and those who had not. The Shelby County taxpayers lost their refunds solely because the county chose to appeal the Property Tax Appeal Board’s decision. Shelby County was thereby able to defer finality of judgment until legislative rescue arrived. Public Act 80-1471 is repugnant to appellants’ Equal Protection right to be free of arbitrary legislative classi- fications and arbitrary differences in taxation. “This Court requires, at a minimum, that a statutory classifi- a cation bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.” T’rimble at 766. It is now settled law that a “‘wholly arbitrary’. . . . classification would be in plain conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment.” Schlesinger at 240 (gifts made within six years of death conclusively presumed made in contemplation of death). An attempt- ed classification must rest upon a “difference which bears a reasonable and just relation to the act to which the classification is proposed”. Hartford Co. at 462 (resi- dent agent license unavailable to salaried non-mutual insurance company employee). “[{D]ifferences in taxation resulting from the failure of state officers to properly administer the state’s tax laws will offend the Due Pro- cess and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Weissinger at 622. The Lake, Shelby and Vermilion County taxpayers were all entitled to tax refunds by the Supreme Court of Illinois’ Andrews decision. Public Act 80-1471 effec- tively classified the Vermilion County taxpayers differ- ently from the Lake and Shelby County taxpayers. The purpose of the classification was simply to overrule an unpleasant court decision protecting taxpayers from unlawful acts of their assessment officials. The classi- fication was therefore wholly arbitrary as that term is understood in Equal Protection analysis. The legislative classification imposed by Public Act 80-1471 arbitrarily deprived appellants of property rights by depriving them of a remedy to which they were entitled under Illinois tax statutes. This court should therefore exercise its plenary juris- diction, hold that the Public Act 80-1471 offends the Equal Protection clause, and reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois. itn CONCLUSION This court should find that the present appeal pre- sents substantial federal questions because the Supreme Court of Illinois decision is counter to the weight of sub- stantial existing constitutional authority. The opinion of the court below in fact rested upon no prior opinion of this court in adjudicating appellants federal constitu- tional claims. This court should therefore exercise its plenary jurisdiction and reverse in order to reaffirm the Federal Constitutional limitations upon a State’s power to administer its tax laws. Respectfully submitted, PAUL E. HAMER Attorney of Record 1356 Shermer Road Northbrook, Illinois 60062 (312) 272-1800 JACK L. URETSKY 135 S. LaSalle Street Chicago, Illinois 60603 (312) 372-7842 Attorneys for Appellants A-1l APPENDIX A Opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois (Filed February 20, 1981) Docket Nos. 53189, 53286 cons.—Agertua 44— September 1980. RUSSELL G. SCHLENZ et al, Appellees, v. JOHN W. CASTLE, Director of Local Government Affairs, et al (Robert Jasper, Supervisor of Assessments, et al, Appellants)—THE COUNTY OF SHELBY, Appellant, v. THE PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD, Appellee. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH delivered the opinion of the court: These consolidated cases present the question of the validity of section 318.1 of the Revenue Act of 1939 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 120, par. 799.1). In cause No. 53189 plaintiffs filed an application for leave to appeal from the order of the circuit court of Lake County entered pursuant to Rule 308(a) (73 Ill. 2d R. 308(a)). The appel- late court allowed leave to appeal, reversed the order in part, affirmed it in part (80 Ill. App. 3d 1131), and we allowed plaintiffs’ petition for leave to appeal. In cause No. 53286 the defendant Property Tax Appeal Board appealed from the judgment of the circuit court of Shelby County entered in the action brought by the County of Shelby for administrative review of the Property Tax Appeal Board’s decision holding certain assessments invalid. The appellate court reversed (81 Ill. App. 3d 327), and we allowed the County’s petition for leave to appeal. The causes were ordered consolidated for argument and opinion. A-2 Cause No. 53189 is another in a series of actions involving the alleged failure of the appropriate officials to equalize real property assessments in this State. See, e.g., Hamer v. Kirk (1978), 57 Ill. App. 3d 335; Hamer v. Kirk (1976), 63 Il. 2d 211; Hamer v. Kirk (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 434; Hamer v. Lehnhausen (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 400; Hamer v. Mahin (1973), 13 Ill. App. 3d 51; Hamer v. Mahin (1970), 47 Ill. 2d 252; People ex rel Hamer v. Jones (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 360. In their two-count first amended complaint filed in the circuit court of Lake County, plaintiffs Russell G. Schlenz and Nancy A. Schlenz named as defendants the Director of the Department of Local Government Affairs, the supervisor of assessments of Lake County, the Lake County board of review and certain Lake County township assessors. In count I plaintiffs, purporting to act as repre- sentatives of a class, sought, inter alia, an order declaring that a specified procedure utilizing “sales ratio studies” for assessment and equalization of realty be made applicable statewide for 1977 and subsequent tax years. Plaintiffs also sought an order declaring that the defendants must comply with applicable provisions of the Revenue Act of 1939 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 120, par. 482 et seq.) for 1977 and subsequent tax years. In count LI plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to enforce the declarations prayed in count I of the complaint. A “Supplemental Complaint’’ was filed “‘attacking the method of distributing state grants-in-aid” (see Hamer v. Dixon (1978), 61 Ill. App. 3d 30), and the first amended complaint was further amended seeking to challenge the tax-exempt status of certain prorerty in Lake County. Citing Andrews v. Foxworthy (1978), 71 lll. 2d 13, plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment alleging that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact relative to the failure of the defendants *** to publish A-3 the real estate assessment lists for the 1977 tax year in Lake County until after December 15, 1977, except in Shields Township.” Plaintiffs also moved for a determina- tion of their class as consisting of “‘all persons or entities owning improved real property used for single family resi- dential purposes subject to taxation in the State of Illinois for the 1977 tax year and subsequent tax years.”” Defend- ants filed a motion to deny, and an “objection to the motion” for determination of the class. The circuit court denied plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and allowed defendants’ motion and objection opposing the class certification. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule $08(a) (73 Ill. 2d R. 308(a)) the circuit court certified the issues of the propriety of a class action and the consti- tutionality of the statute. The appellate court affirmed that portion of the order which denied class certification, held that section 318.1 was unconstitutional as an attempt to validate a void tax and as violative of the principle of the separation of powers (see Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, sec. 1), and remanded the cause for a determination of the existence of a sub- class. 80 Ill. App. 3d 1131, 1133-35; see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110, par. 57.3(b). In cause No. 53286, the record shows that appropriate officials in Shelby County began a complete reassessment of real estate for tax purposes for the 1976 nonquadren- nial tax year. Although the statute provided that it must be published by July 10, 1976, the supervisor of assess- ments did not publish the list of changes of assessment until December 7, 1976. In addition to the publication, individual notices of assessment changes were mailed. Thereafter, over 3,500 complaints were filed by taxpayers with the Shelby County board of review challenging the increased assessments. After the board of review entered its decisions in the cases, many of the taxpayers appealed A-4 to the Property Tax Appeal Board (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 120, par. 592.1), which, after hearing, entered its order holding the assessments invalid. On administrative review the circuit court reversed the findings of the Board, noting in part that section 318.1 was “‘a validating act making legal and effective all assessments *** irrespective of a failure to make a timely publication.” On appeal, the appellate court reversed, finding “that the purporting validating statute at issue here likewise seeks to overrule retroactively the decision of the Supreme Court in Andrews” and that “Once the court had explicated the mandaxory nature of timely publication in Andrews, the explication became, in 2ffect, a part of the statute until the General Assembly changed it.’’ County of Shelby v. Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board (1980), 81 Ill. App. 3d $27, 329-30; see: Roth v. Yackley (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 423. We consider first the question whether in cause No. 53189 the appellate court erred in affirming the circuit court’s denial of certification of a class. The plaintiffs con- tend that because of the failure to equalize property according to law “the [Director of Local Government Affairs] had to place a higher equalization factor on [Lake County] in order to bring the aggregate assessments up to a statutory level.” As a result, they argue, the allegations concerming inter-county equalization were sufficient to “maintain the action as a class action on a state-wide basis.” Furthermore, plaintiffs contend that this case is not a “friendly or collusive suit,” that they do not “‘have interests which are antagonistic to the remainder oi the class,” and that even assuming so, “the problem can be resolved by the creation of sub-classes with respect to a particular issue.’’ In response, it is contended by the defendants supervisor of assessments and board of review that, since this case involves a “total inability” to proceed as a class action, the appellate court’s order of remand- ment “appears to serve no purpose.” A-5 Section 57,2 of the Civil Practice Act provides, in part, that a class action may be maintained if the court finds that there are questions of law or fact common to the class which predominate over those affecting only individual members, that the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class, and that the class action is an appropriate method for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110, par. 57.2.) This court has held that the question whether to certify a purported class is a matter within the sound discretion of the circuit court, and will be reversed only upon a showing of a clear abuse of dis- cretion or the application of impermissible legal criteria. McCabe v. Burgess (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 457, 464; see also Califano v. Yamasaki (1979), 442 U.S. 682, 702-03, 61 L. Ed. 2d 176, 193, 99 S. Ct. 2545, 2558. In denying class certification, the circuit court found that except for the fact that the alleged class was numerous the requirements of section 57.2 were lacking. The court noted in ruling on the question whether the plaintiffs were adequate class representatives that plaintiff Nancy Schlenz had at one time been Mr. Hamer’s (plain- tiffs’ counsel) secretary; ‘‘that she has not read the plead- ings filed in this case’’; “that also she has very little know- ledge about the tax assessment and collection procedures in the State of Illinois”; and that “‘it’s apparent that the real party in interest, the real instigator of the lawsuit, is Mr. Hamer, and that the naming of Mr. and Mrs. Schlenz as class representatives is just a mode of convenience and a bit of subterfuge.” See Hamer v. Board of Education (1977), 52 Il. App. 3d 531, 537. While Hamer is not a named plaintiff in this case, the record shows the type of relationship between the class representatives and the attorney which calls into question the adequacy of plaintiffs’ representation of the purported A-6 class. Class certification has frequently been denied because of the personal or business relationships between named class representatives and nonplaintiff class attorneys. (Barliant v. Follett Corp. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 226; Frank v. Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association of America (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 583; Susman v. Lincoln American Corp. (7th Cir. 1977), 561 F.2d 86; Charal v. Andes (E.D. Pa. 1979), 81 F.R.D. 99; compare Sweet v. Bermingham (S.D.N.Y. 1975), 65 F.R.D. 551.) We con- clude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the plaintiffs were inadequate class representatives in this case and in refusing to certify the purported class. We find no error in the decision of the appellate court to remand the cause for a determination of whether a sub- class may be found to exist. The record shows that only incidental reference was made and consideration given by the parties and the circuit court to the question of the existence of a subclass. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110, par. 57.3(b); Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 320, 342.) We have also considered the other contentions of the parties with respect to the issue of class certification and find them to be without merit. We consider next the question of the validity of section 318.1 of the Revenue Act of 1939. (IIL Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 120, par. 799.1.) Cause No. 53286 involves the validity of 1976 assessments in Shelby County and cause No. 53189 involves the validity of assessments in Lake County for the 1977 tax year. Section 103 of the Revenue Act of 1939, as amended and effective for the tax years 1976 and 1977, provided that the supervisor of assessments “shall publish *** a list of real estate for which assessments have been added or changed since the last preceding assessment, together with the amounts of the assessments on such real estate.” A-7 (ll. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 120, par. 584.) The publication in cause No. 53286 was required on or before July 10, 1976, while publication in cause No. 53189 was required on or before December 15, 1977. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 120, par. 58+.) It is undisputed that in both instances the publication was later than the statutory dates. In Andrews v. Foxworthy (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 13, we held that the publication dates in section 103 of the Revenue Act were mandatory and that failure of timely publication is not an “informality or clerical error’’ within the savings provisions of section 235 of the Revenue Act of 1939, as amended. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 120, par. 716; 71 Il. 2d 13, 23-24.) Thereafter, and before either circuit court judgment was entered in these cases, the General Assembly enacted section 318.1, providing: “In all cases where real or personal property has been assessed for the purpose of taxation during the year 1978 and all years prior thereto as provided in the ‘Revenue Act of 1939’, filed May 17, 1939, as amended, except no timely publication of the assessment of real or personal property, or both, was made as provided by Section 103 of said ‘Revenue Act of 1939’, such assessments of real or per- sonal property, or both, are hereby validated for all pur- poses of taxation notwithstanding that the publication of the assessments of real or personal property, or both, was not made within the time provided by statute. The ex- tension of taxes on such real or personal property assess- ments, or both, are made legal and valid for the purposes of collection of taxes notwithstanding that the publication of the assessments of real or personal property, or both, was not made within the time provided by statute.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 120, par. 799.1. Relying principally upon People v. Holmstrom (1956), 8 Ill. 2d 401, the appellants contend that the appellate court erred in holding the statute unconstitutional. The appellees contend that the statute violates the principle of separation of powers. -Almici curiae contend that the A-8 statute is void because it deprives the objectors of equal protection of the laws, deprives them of property without due process of law, and that the Act in which section $18.1 was contained (Public Act 80—1471) is void because “it is not confined to one subject.” The holdings of the appellate court that section 318.1 violates the principle of separation of powers are based on that court’s interpretation of our opinion in Roth v. Yackley (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 423. Roth involved an amend- ment to section 10 of the Cannabis Control Act (IIl. Rev. Stat., 1978 Supp., ch. 56%, par. 710) and section 410 of the Illinois Controlied Substances Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1978 Supp., ch. 56%, par. 1410, effective June 30, 1978.) This court had held in People v. DuMontelle (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 157, that fines and costs were not reasonable terms and conditions of probation as that term was used in section 10 of the Cannabis Control Act, and that the imposition of fines and costs was therefore not authorized by statute. The amendments authorized the imposition of fines and costs as conditions of probation and further provided: “The General Assembly declares that the changes made by this amendatory Act *** are declaratory of existing law and are therefore applicable in relation to events which occurred before the effective date of this amendatory Act. The ‘terms and conditions’ of probation as specified in this amendatory Act are declared to be reasonable terms and conditions for probation under the affected Sections as those Sections were in effect before the effective date of this armendatory Act.”” Pub. Act 80-1202, sec. 3, eff. June 30, 1978. The statute involved in Roth is clearly distinguishable from that here involved. The General Assembly did not amend section 103 of the Revenue Act, and section 318.1 does not attempt to attribute to section 103 at the time of our opinion in Andrews, a meaning different from that declared in that opinion. A-9 This court has previously considered the question of separation of powers in circumstances similar to those here. In Worley v. Idleman (1918), 285 Ill. 214, an election was held to authorize a tax levy and the issuance of bonds for road construction in Douglas County. The election was ruled invalid because of defects in the ballot. (People ex rel Duncan v. Worley (1913), 260 Ill. 536.) Subsequently, legislation was enacted providing a method for ratification of the bonds. The ratification was com- pleted and certain taxpayers who had been defendants in the prior case sought to enjoin a planned exchange of bonds. In affirming the validity of the curative statute the court noted: “The objection most frequently urged in cases similar to the one at bar, and one which appellants in effect here make, is, that by the curative act the legislature has invaded the constitutional province of the judiciary and has attempted to set aside the force and effect of the judgments and decrees of the courts ***, The judgment of this court and the decrees of the circuit court upon which appellants rely were not final adjudications that the bonds *** did not constitute a legal indebtedness *** for the reason that the bondholders were not parties to any of the suits in which the question of the validity of those bonds arose. Until an adjudication had been made in a suit between the town and the bondholders declaring that the bonds were not valid, the legislature had the right and power, as between the town and the bondholders, to validate those bonds ***.” 285 II. 214, 220-21. A similar conclusion was reached in Steger v. Traveling Men’s Building & Loan Association (1904), 208 IlL 236, where this court rejected a separation of powers challenge to a validating statute authorizing acknowledgments of A-10 trust deeds which were invalid when executed. The court said: “That is not an exercise of judicial power, since it does not purport to settle suits or controversies, but only gives effect to acknowledgments in a matter under the legislative control.” 208 Ill. 236, 2+2. The rationale of these cases is applicable here, and we hold that the General Assembly has not usurped judicial authority by directing a construction to be placed on section 103 contrary to our decision in Andrews. We find no merit in appellees’ contentions that by the decision in Andrews they acquired a vested right of which section 318.1 deprives them without due process. A tax- payer has no vested right in the continued existence of a taxing statute. Jn re Application of Skidmore (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 33; People cx rel. Harding v. Chicago & North- western Ry. Co. (1930), 340 Ill. 102; People ex rel. Campe v. Board of Review (1919), 290 Ill. 467. In People v. Holmstrom (1956), 8 Ill. 2d 401, this court considered a curative statute almost identical to the act at issue. In that case, in an action in debt to recover delinquent personal property taxes for several years in which publication of assessment lists was tardy under section 103, the defendant contended that he had been denied due process. The validating act provided that all the assessments ani levies “tare validated for all purposes of taxation notwithstanding that the publication of the assessments was not made as provided by statute.” (8 III. 2d 401, 404.) The taxpayer argued that the validating act itself was void and “‘that the General Assembly has power to validate by curative act only in the case of irregular or defective exercise of authority and that it cannot, in such manner, make a void proceeding valid.” This court upheld the constitutionality of the validating act, noting that “the legislature has the power to pass an act curing a defect in a tax levy when the defect consists of the A-11 failure to observe some requirement of the law without which the legislature might have authorized the levy to be made.” 8 Ill. 2d 401, 404-05. In view of our conclusion that the statute did not vio- late the principle of separation of powers it is not neces- sary to further consider the argument of the appellees and amici that the court in Holmstrom had no occasion to con- sider the question of separation of powers and that it is therefore distinguishable. Citing People ex rel. Ward v. Chicago & Eastern Illinois Ry. Co. (1936), 365 Ill. 202, People ex rel Lord v. Wabash Ry. Co. (1924), 311 Ill. 579, and People ex rel. Stevenson v. Illinois Central R.R. Co. (1923), 310 Ill. 212, amicus argues that although the General Assembly “may, by statute, validate the irregular or defective exercise of power where the proceeding sought to be cured was not one of the fundamentals of the powers exercised,” it may not “‘validate acts which are wholly void.”’ Those cases are clearly distinguishable in that in each of them the curative statute purported to validate actions taken without the statutory power to do so. The distinction is best illustrated by the language in North Pier Terminal Co. v. Tully (1976), 62 Ill. 2d 540, 548, “The defects of which the plaintiffs complain are essentially procedural irregulanities in the assessment process which *** do not establish the lack of authority of the assessor to act,”’ (See, e.g., Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. Swartz (1918), 284 Ill. 108.) Here there was no lack of power to make the assessments, and the rationale of Holmstrom is clearly applicable. Although the issue was raised for the first time in the amicus briefs, we consider it appropriate to review the question whether Public Act 80—1471 violates article IV, section 8, of the Illinois Constitution in that it is not con- fined to one subject. (People ex rel. Peoria Civic Center Authority v. Vonachen (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 179.) Amicus A-12 argues that because Public Act 80—1+471, in addition to amending section 103 of the Revenue Act of 1939, added sections 19.23—l(a) and amended the exemption pro- visions of paragraph 500.23.1, the Act deals with more than one subject. We do not agree. The Act amended is the “Revenue Act of 1939,” and we find apposite the language in People ex rel Carey v. Board of Education (1973), 55 Il. 2d 533, when in considering a similar argument directed toward amendments to the School Code this court said: “This argument overlooks the nature of the act which was being amended. The School Code of 1961, like its predecessor, was designed to gather into one statute the provisions relating to the establishment, operation and maintenance of schools. The complete title of the 1961 Act is: ‘An Act in relation to the establishment, operation and maintenance of public schools, providing for the transportation of and scholarships in institutions of higher learning for students of all schools, and to repeal certain acts hercin named’. Like its prede- cessor, its short title is ‘The School Code’. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, 1971, ch. 122, par. 1—1. Amendments to statutes of this kind, including the School Code, have frequently been before the court. (See, People v. Deatherage (1948), +01 Ill. 25, 43; Co-ordinated Transport, Inc. of Illinois v. Barrett (1952), 412 Ill. 321; City of Evanston v. Wazau (1936), 364 Ill. 198.) As we stated in Sangamon County Fair and Agricultural Ass’n v. Stanard (1956), 9 Ill. 2d 267, 272-3: ‘When the title of the act amended is set forth in the title of the amendatory act, as was here done, any pro- vision which might have been inserted in the original act may be incorporated in the amenda- A-13 tory act.’ Provisions concerning ‘parental schools’ were included in the School Code before its amendment (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 122, par. $4—117) and they did not become ‘discordant’ or ‘incongruous’ because they were included in this amendatory act. Cf People ex rel. Gutknecht v. City of Chicago (1953), 414 Ill. 600.” 55 Ill. 2d 533, 536-37. In their brief plaintiffs Schlenz argue several issues which are not presented in their interlocutory appeal, and the briefs of amici attempt to raise several issues which are not appropriately considered on this record. We do not therefore further consider them. For the reasons stated, the judgment in cause No. 53189 is reversed insofar as it holds invalid the real estate assessments because of failure to give timely notice and is affirmed insofar as it remands the cause to the circuit court of Lake County to determine whether an appropriate subclass of plaintiffs can be shown to exist. The judgment of the appellate court in cause No. 53286 is reversed, and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. 53189 — Affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded. 53286 — Appellate court reversed; circuit court affirmed. MR. JUSTICE SIMON took no part in the considera- tion or decision of this case. A-14 APPENDIX B Order of the Supreme Court of Illinois Denying Rehearing (Dated March 27, 1981) Mr. Jack L. Uretsky Attorney at Law 135 S. le St., S#900 Chicago, IL 60603 Nos. 53189, 53286 Cons.—Russell G. Schlenz, et al., etc., appellees, vs. John W. Castle, as Director of the Depart- ment of Local Government Affairs of the State of II- linois, et al., etc., (Robert Jasper, as Supervisor of Assessments of Lake County, et al., etc., appellants). Appeal, Appellate Court, Second District. The Supreme Court today denied the petition for rehearing in the above entitled cause. Mr. Justice Simon took no part. Very truly yours, /s/ Clell L. Woods Clerk of the Supreme Court A-15 APPENDIX C Opinion of the Appellate Court of Iilinois (Filed February 7, 1980) RUSSELL G. SCHLENZ et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JOHN W. CASTLE et al., Defendants-Appellees. Second District No. 78-586 Affirmed in part, and reversed in part and remanded. Mr. JUSTICE WOODWARD delivered the opinion of the court: On October 2, 1979, we filed our original opinion in this cause; on October 4, 1979, the supreme court an- nounced its decision in Roth v. Yackley (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 423, 396 N.E.2d 520, which we discuss later; on October 19, 1979, plaintiffs filed a petition for rehearing; on November 19, 1979, we granted rehearing, but the defendants thereafter did not file an answer to the — tion as allowed by Supreme Court Rule 367(d) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110A, par. 367(d)). Having considered the arguments raised by plaintiffs on rehearing, we have withdrawn our original opinion and replaced it with this modified opinion. This is an interlocutory appeal from an order denying cen motion for a class determination and motion or partial summary judgment. The issues raised are: (1) whether class certification was properly denied; (2) whether the trial court erred by denying plaintiffs leave to substitute new counsel or new class nominees; (3) whether Public Act 80-1471 is valid; and (4) whether the trial court erred by refusing to stay the proceedings. As to the first issue, plaintiffs seek certification of a class comprised of themselves and all other owners of single-family residential property in Illinois. They allege that the various defendants have, in a variety of ways, been in noncompliance with statutes regarding the assessment and equalization of real estate taxes with the A-16 result that there is a disparity in assessment between plaintiffs and owners of other types of real estate. On December 19, 1978, the trial court made a number of oral findings regarding the requirements of class cer- tification set forth in section 57.2 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110, par. 57.2). The re- quirements are: “Prerequisites for the maintenance of a class action. (a) An action may be maintained as a class ac- tion in any court of this State and a party may sue or be sued as a representative party of the class only if the court finds: (1) The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. (2) There are questions of fact or law common to the class, which common questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. (3) The representative parties will fairly and equately protect the interest of the class. (4) The class action is an appropriate method of the fair and efficient adjudication of the con- troversy.” First, the trial court found that because there were probably “millions” of potential plaintiffs, the numerosi- ty requirement was met, and we agree. Second, the court found that questions requiring individual proof predominated over any common questions of fact or law, noting that even if the named plaintiffs proved improper assessment as to their property, that would not establish in other pro class members a right to recover (see Goetz v. Vi of Hoffman Estates (1978), 62 Ill. App. 3d 233, 378 N.E.2d 1276), because each other plaintiff would have to prove that the township assessor im- properly assessed the property in his township. The court therefore properly concluded that the second re- quirement was not met. Third, the court found that the pone Te os en ra knew essentially nothing about the suit and had simply told the attorney to do whatever he thought A-17 necessary. The turning over of complete control to the attorney in a class action has been cited as unacceptable because the attorney then becomes the de facto represen- tative of the class, and this should be viewed as a con- flict of interest. (In re Goldchip Funding Co. (M.D. Pa. 1974), 61 F. R. D. 592.) That the attorney for a class may not also be the class representative is now a per se rule in Illinois. (Barliant v. Follett Corp. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 226, 384 N.E.2d 316.) The third requirement was ac- cordingly not met. Fourth, the trial court noted that because of the multiplicity of disparate and unrelated factual and legal questions involved, the fourth require- ment was not met. The prerequisites of section 57.2 of the Civil Practice Act must be established by the proponents of the class action. (McCabe v. Burgess (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 457, 389 N.E.2d 565.) McCabe also established that the standard of review in Illinois regarding the trial court’s deter- mination of whether the requirements for a class action have been met is a determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion. Based on the record before us, we determine that the trial court’s findings that, as to the proposed class, the last three of the prerequisites were not met and did not constitute an abuse of discre- tion. It is ible that paatit wy P- able to show that a subclass exists (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110, par. 57.3(b); Steinherg v. Chicago Medical School (1977, 69 Ill. 2d B26, 871 N.E.2d 634) and on remand ths trial court should, within its discretion, determine whether or not such a subclass can be shown. The second issue involved the trial court’s refusal to allow a substitution of class representatives or a sub- stitution of attorneys for the class. Based in our holding above, that the trial court correctly ruled that the pro class should not be certified, that a class action could not be maintained as alleged, and based on the reasoning of Goldchip and Barliant, we determine that if, on remand, the trial court should find that there is a subclass to certify, there should be either a substitution of attorneys or of class representatives. Barliant. A-18 The third issue raised by plaintiffs is noncompliance with the notice requirements of section 103 of the Revenue Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 120, par. 584), which provided that the assessor shall publish notice of assessment changes on or before December 15 of the tax year; timely notice as required by section 103 was not given in the present case which involved increases in assessments for the general real estate taxes levied for 1977 (a nonquadrennial year). In Andrews v. Foxworthy (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 18, 373 N.E.2d 1332, the supreme court analyzed and interpreted the notice provisions of section 103 and held that improper publication renders a non- quadrennial reassessment void; the court therein clearly held that the statutory notice prescribed was manda- tory. Consequently, in this case, the application of An- drews renders the reassessments here void because of noncompliance with the publication (notice) provision. In response to this contention, defendant points out that su uent to the Andrews decision, the legislature enacted Public Act 80-1471, (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1978 Supp. ch. 120, par. 799.1) which became effective on No- vember 30, 1978, purporting to specifically validate reassessments of real property made without ot aod notice in all nonquadrennial years prior to and including 1978. Plaintiffs and amici curiae (Commonwealth Edison and certain parties litigating a similar issue in Du Page County) attack the validity of Public Act 80- 1471 on the following basis: (1) it attempts to cure a void proceeding; (2) it violates the uniformity of taxation provision in the Illinois Constitution; (3) it violates equal protection; (4) it violates due process; (5) it violates the “one subject” provision of the Illinois Constitution; and (6) it offends the concept of separation of powers. Only consideration of basis (1) and (6) above is necessary for our decision as we find Public Act 80-1471 uncon- stitutional. Curative acts are within the power of the legislature (People ex rel. Toman v. Mercil & Sons Co. (1941), 378 Ill. 142, 837 N.E.2d 839); further, the legislature may amend an act after a construction by the courts and the amendment constitutes a more recent expression of A-19 legislative intent and establishes a new rule. (Jn re Es- tate of Zimmerman (1978), 63 Ill. App. 3d 560, 380 N.E.2d 434.) However, the recent case of Roth v. Yackley (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 423, 396 N.E.2d 520, carefully dis- tinguishes between amendatory statutes which operate prospectively and are therefore acceptable and amen- datory statutes which attempt to operate retroactively in contravention of an interpretation announced by a court of a prior statute and which is therefore improper. As the supreme court stated in Roth: “The General Assembly’s declaration that the amendatory act applies to events which occurred before the effective date of the amendatory statute represents a legislative attempt to retroactively apply new statutory language and to thereby annul a prior decision of this court. This is an assumption by the General Assembly of the role of a court of last resort in contravention of the principle of separation of powers embodied in article II, section 1, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, which peso ‘The legislative, executive and judicial ranches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another.’” (77 Ill. 2d 423, 428-29.) We accordingly conclude that Public Act 80-1471 violates the principle of separation of powers insofar as it attempts to validate real estate assessments made without proper notice for all nonquadrennial years prior to and including 1978 and because it seeks to nullify a prior decision of our supreme court which clearly inter- preted the law as it existed prior to November 30, 1978. Finally, plaintiffs contend that it was error to not stay the proceedings pending appeal. The staying of proceedings is within the discretion of the trial court, and, considering the ability of the named plaintiffs to continue the presentation of their cause as individuals, and the fact that any other possible plaintiffs also could have filed separate actions or separate tax objections, thereby avoiding prejudice, we hold that there was no abuse of discretion in denying the stay. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. NASH, J., concurs. A-20 APPENDIX D [Filed February 25, 1980] No. 79-135 IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIFTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF SHELBY, STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, Vv. STATE OF ILLINOIS PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD, Defendant-Appellant, and GERTRUDE ANDERSON, Taxpayer-Defendant. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Shelby County. Honorable Daniel H. Dailey, Judge Presiding. Mrs. JUSTICE SPOMER delivered the opinion of the court: On August 17, 1978, relying on the recent opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court in Andrews v. Foxworthy (1978), 71 Ill.2d 18, 873 N.E.2d 1832, the Property Tax Appeal Board! ruled in numerous ‘consolidated cases 1 An administrative md within el Illinois Department of Local Government airs. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 120, par. 502.1 et seq. A-21 arising out of Shelby County, including the instant case, that increases in real estate assessments for 1976 were invalid because of the failure of the county supervisor of assessments to make timely publication of the intended changes as required by statute. On administrative review, the Circuit Court of Shelby County found that a statute passed by the General Assembly subsequent to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Andrews had validated the increased assessments, and therefore reversed the decision of the Board. This appeal followed. At appellant’s request we take judicial notice in the cases on appeal of the pleadings and papers filed with the circuit court but assigned only to case number 78- MR-13, all involving common questions of fact and law. The Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Davis (1976), 65 Ill.2d 157, 161, 357 N.E.2d 792, 794, stated that “taking judicial notice of matters of record in other cases in the same court is simply an application of the increasingly recognized principle that matters susceptible of judicial notice include facts capable of immediate and accurate demonstration by resort to easily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy,” and we find this principle applicable to the present case. The determinative issue before us is whether the pur- ported validating statute violates the principle of separa- tion of powers embodied in Section 1 of Article II of the Illinois Constitution. We find that it does, and is therefore void. It is undisputed that the supervisor of assessments failed to publish increases in assessments made in a non- quadrennial year by “ig 10, 1976, as required by Sec- tion 103 of the Revenue Act of 1939. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 120, . 584). In the Andrews case, the Supreme Court held that the requirements of Section 103 are mandatory, and that a tax resulting from an increase in assessment was invalid because timely publication in compliance with the statute had not been made. What complicates the instant case is the passage by the General Assembly of P.A. 80-1471, effective No- A-22 vember 30, 1978—after the decision of the Property Tax Appeal Board, but prior to the decision of the trial court, which was handed down on January 23, 1979. The statute provides in pertinent part as follows: “In all cases where real or personal property has been assessed for the purpose of taxation during the year 1978 and all years prior thereto as provided in the ‘Revenue Act of 1939’, filed May 17, 1939, as amended, except no timely publication of the assess- ment of real or personal property, or both, was made as provided by Section 103 of said ‘Revenue Act of 1939’, such assessments of real or personal property, or both, are hereby validated for all pur- poses of taxation notwithstanding that the publica- tion of the assessments of real or personal property, or both, was not made within the time provided by statute. The extension of taxes on such real or per- sonal property assessments, or both, are made legal and valid for the eee: of collection of taxes notwithstanding that the publication of the assessments of real or personal property, or both, was not made within the time provided by statute.” wor” ch. 120, par. 799.1 (Smith-Hurd The appellee contends here that this retroactive, validating, or curative act “is merely the legislature act- ing to ratify or conform an act which it might lawfully have authorized in the first instance where the defect arises out of the neglect of some legal formality.” Rely- ing. on People v. Holmstrom (1956), 8 IIl.2d 401, 134 N.E.2d 246, the appellee argues that because the legislature might have lawfully and constitutionally authorized a change in assessed values without any publication at all, it may waive timely publication without contravening the doctrine of separation of powers. We think, however, that the result here is dictated by the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Roth v. Yackley (1979), 77 Ill.2d 423, 396 N.E.2d 520, 38 II. Dec. 131. In Roth, the court was confronted with a situa- A-23 tion where the 80th General Assembly passed an amen- datory act in response to a prior decision of the Supreme Court which had construed the meaning of the language used in section 10 of the Illinois Cannabis Control Act Ill.Rev.Stat., ch, 56%, par. 710) (People v. DuMontelle 1978), 71 Ill.2d 157, 374 N.E.2d 205). The amendatory act amended section 10 and section 410 of the Controlled Substances Act (Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 56%, par. 1410), and purported to be declaratory of the existing law prior to its passage and to be applicable to events before its effective date. In rejecting the contention that the amendatory act nullified the effect of its previous decision, the Supreme Court stated: “The General Assembly’s declaration that the amen- datory act applies to events which occurred before the effective date of the amendatory statute represents a legislative attempt to retroactively apply new statutory language and to thereby annul a prior decision of this court. This is an assumption by the General Assembly of the role of a court of last resort in contravention of the yp owe of separation of powers embodied in article II, section 1 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, which ‘ease em ‘The legislative, executive and judicial ranches are separate. No branch shall exercise —_— properly belonging to another.’ (See Federal xpress Corp. v. Skelton (1979), 265 Ark. 187, 199, 578 S.W.2d 1, 7-8; Johnson v. Morris (1976), 87 Wash.2d 922, 926, 557 P.2d 1299, 1303; 1A Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction sec. 27.04 (4th ed. 1972).) While the General Assembly has the power to draft legislation and to amend statutes prospectively if it believes that a judicial interpretation was at odds with its intent (see Bruni v. Department of Registration and Education (1974), 59 Ill.2d 6, 12, 319 N.E.2d 37; Mitchell v. Mahin (1972), 51 Ill.2d 452, 456, 283 N.E.2d 465), it is the function of the judiciary to determine what the law is and to apply statutes to cases. (See People v. Nicholls (1978), 71 Ill.2d 166, A-24 179, 15 Ill.Dec. 759, 374 N.E.2d 194; Belfield v. Coop (1956), 8 Ill.2d 293, 307, 184 N.E.2d 249.) The cases cited by the State do not recognize that the General Assembly may retroactively overrule a decision of a reviewing court. Instead they recognize only the power of the legislature to es- tablish laws prospectively and to alter for future cases interpretations of statutes by reviewing courts. See Modern Dairy Co. v. Department of Revenue (1952), 413 Ill. 55, 66, 108 N.E.2d 8; State v. Bowman (1962), 116 Ohio App. 285, 286-87, 187 N.E.2d 627, 629; cf. People ex rel. Spitzer v. County of La Salle (1960), 20 I11.2d 18, 28, 169 N.E.2d 521.” i. wa at 425, 396 N.E.2d at 522, 33 Ill.Dec. at The court also noted on page 133 that “[iJt is logically difficult to perceive how the declaration and the amendments by the 80th General Assembly can be simply a clarification of the intent of the 77th General Assembly, which originally enacted the statute seven years earlier, since only a fraction of the individuals who comprised the General Assembly were the same at both times.” Prior to the decision in Roth, the same issue was rais- ed, and the same amendatory act was involved in the case of People v. Harris (3d Dist. 1979), 69 Ill.App.3d 118, 387 N.E.2d 33. The court there held that the legislative amendments enacted after the DuMontelle decision were violative of the constitutional provision for the separation of powers in attempting retroactively to direct construction of the previously enacted sections and to reverse the construction placed upon them by the Illinois Supreme Court. We think it clear that the purported validating statute at issue here likewise seeks to overrule retroactively the decision of the Supreme Court in Andrews. Once the court had explicated the mandatory nature of timely publication in Andrews, that Boye became, in effect, a part of the statute until the General Assembly changed it. (Roth v. Yackley, 77 I11.2d at 425, 396 N.E.2d A-25 at 522, 33 Ill.Dec. at 133, and cases cited therein.) No subsequent action of the legislature could constitutional- ly alter the effect mandated by the court’s interpretation as to past failures to make timely publication. Although in our opinion the decision in Andrews was not man- dated by the case of People v. Jennings (1954), 3 IIl.2d 125, 119 N.E.2d 781 because a distinction can well be made between late publication with no prejudice to the taxpayer as contrasted with a total failure to publish. Andrews is nonetheless the law in Illinois, and binds this court in the case at bar. To the extent that the Holstrom case and other cases cited by the appellee are inconsis- tent with the result we reach here, we conclude that they have been effectively overruled by Roth and An- drews. In Andrews the court made it clear that the failure to comply with a mandatory requirement of publication is not merely the neglect of some legal for- mality. Thus, we conclude that Andrews’ construction of the publication requirement as designed for the benefit and protection of the taxpayer—giving him an oppor- tunity to ascertain the correctness of his assessment as compared with that of other taxpayers—gives the tax- payer in the case at bar a legal exemption from the in- valid assessment increases in a nonquadrennial year. Such is more than a mere expectation based upon an an- ticipated continuance of the existing law, as contended by appellee, but amounts to a vested right arising from a final decision of the Illinois Supreme Court. We further hold that the Attorney General has standing to raise the vested rights theory in this appeal. (People ex rel. Scott v. Illinois Racing Board (1973), 54 Il1.2d 569, 301 N.E.2d 285; E.P.A. v. Pollution Control Board (1977), 69 Ill.2d 394, 372 N.E.2d 50.) We therefore conclude that the Property Tax Appeal Board was correct in holding that the 1976 assessment increases in Shelby County were void because of the failure of the supervisor of assessments to make timely publication. The order of the Circuit Court of Shelby County is reversed, and the decision of the Property Tax Appeal Board is affirmed. REVERSED. JONES, P. J., concurs. A-26 KARNS, J., dissenting. These numerous cases arise from a general, non- prea tagmec reassessment of all real property in Shelby ounty, approximately 21,000 parcels, mandated by the Department of Local Government Affairs in order to equalize property assessments in Shelby County at the statutorily required percentages of fair market value. The reappraisal work was performed in 1975 and 1976. The Department of Local Government Affairs had issued an opinion to the Shelby County authorities that the July 10 publication date was directory, not man- datory. Andrews v. Foxworthy, (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 18, 373 N.E.2d 1332, was pending in the trial court in Ver- milion County when changes in assessment were published in Shelby County on December 7, 1976. The reassessments had not been completed by the July 10 statutory date. Property owners were also mailed notice of any change in assessment. The Board of Review of Shelby County remained in session as its term was ex- tended by the Department of Local Government Affairs, and approximately 3,500 complaints were filed and hearings were had before the Board. After decisions by the Board of Review, some 1,600 appeals were perfected to the Property Tax Appeal Board where 1,400 cases were consolidated and approximately 1,283 decided pean the Supreme Court’s decision in Andrews v. Fozx- worthy. I do not believe that the result reached by the majori- ty follows from the Supreme Court’s decision in Roth v. Yackley (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 428, 396 N.E.2d 520. Roth dealt with an attempt by the General Assembly to alter, retroactively, the construction the Supreme Court had theretofore placed on section 10 of the Illinois Cannabis Control Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 56%, par. 710) in People v. DuMontelle (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 157, 374 N.E.2d 205. Roth v. Yackley, however, in reality dealt with an attempt by the General Assembly to increase the penalty for a crime after its commission. The punishment for a criminal offense cannot be in- cre by an amendatory statutory enactment taking A-27 effect after the offense has been committed. (People v. Peach, (3d Dist. 1976), 39 Ill. App. 3d 757, 350 N.E.2d 583; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 131, par. 4). The Supreme Court had placed a construction on the Cannabis Control Act in DuMontelle. Roth was entitled to the benefit of this construction of the Act. Otherwise, the General Assembly could effectively increase the punishment for a violation of the Act by presuming to direct the court as to the peepee construction and interpretation of the Act as it would have accomplished by amending the Act to take effect retroactively. Ex post facto laws are mganiy tg by the Constitution of the United States and y article 1, section 16 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. A law increasing the penalty for a crime retroac- tively is an ex post facto law. (People v. Bowling (3d Dist. 1976), 43 Ill. App. 3d 932, 357 N.E.2d 724; People v. Johnson (4th Dist. 1970), 133 Ill. App. 2d 818, 263 N.E.2d 901; People v. Wyckoff (2d Dist. 1969), 106 III. App. 2d 360, 245 N.E.2d 216). While the Supreme Court did not discuss ex post facto application of criminal laws in Roth v. Yackley, no dis- cussion was warranted as the amendment to the Can- nabis Control Act did not purport to be a validating or curative act but a clarification of prior legislative intent. In the area of civil legislation, however, specifically those statutes dealing with property taxation, it has been uniformly held that no one has a vested right in the continuation of a particular statutory enactment so long as the effect of the legislative action does not impair the obligation of a contract. (People v. Lindheimer (1939), 371 Ill. 367, 21 N.E.2d 318; People v. Mercil & Sons Co. (1941), 378 Ill. 142, 162-163, 37 N.E.2d 839, 850). In Andrews v. Foxworthy (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 18, 378 N.E.2d 1332, the Supreme Court emphasized that the publication of assessment roles or changes in sol gr geal owner’s individual assessment was not requi by any constitutional mandate. The passage of Public Act 80- 1471, effective November 30, 1978, prior to the decision of the Circuit Court in the instant cases, simply changed the law applicable to these cases by no longer requiring A-28 ublication by July 10. Validating or curative acts have ong been upheld in the area of property taxation. (See People v. Anderson (1961), 21 Ill. 2d 396, 172 N.E.2d 760; People ex rel. Bauer v. Water Com. (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 139, 169 N.E.2d 350; People v. Holmstrom (1956), 8 IIl. 2d 401, 184 N.E.2d 246). The effect of the amendment to the statute was not to overrule retroactively the decision of the —, Court in Andrews v. Foxworthy; that case had n finally decided. It did change the law as it applied to similar cases between different parties that were not yet before the court. I see nothing in Andrews that suggests an in- tention to overrule People v. Holmstrom (1956), 8 Ill. 2d 401, 184 N.E.2d 246. In Holmstrom, the Supreme Court es a validating act that cured the failure to publish assessments for 1954 and all prior years by the date required by the Revenue Act. This is precisely what the General Assembly has done here. The fact that the Supreme Court had ruled in another case between different parties when the Revenue Act required publication by July 10 seems to me of no consequence to the proper decision of these cases. A-29 APPENDIX E [Dated December 19, 1978] IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, LAKE COUNTY, ILLINOIS RUSSELL G. SCHLENZ, et al., etc., et al., Plaintiffs-Petitioners, GENERAL No. 78 CH 74 v. JOHN W. CASTLE, etc., et al., Defendants-Respondents. ORDER This cause comes on to be heard on Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment and on the motions of all Defendants to deny certification of the Plaintiff class, the Court having heard all arguments and having made findings of fact and law on the record in this cause, orders as follows: 1. The Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judg- ment is denied; 2. The motion of the Defendant Township Assessors for summary judgment on the question of class certifica- tion is granted; 3. Regarding Plaintiff's motion for class certification, the Court holds that the instant action does not present a roper ha action, and certification of the alleged class is denied; A-30 4. Plaintiff's oral motion, made this date in open court for leave to substitute within 35 days of this date, either new class representatives or new counsel is denied; 5. The Court hereby finds, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 that the questions of: a. Whether or not this case can be maintained as a proper class action, and b. Whether or not Senate Bill 1790, 80th General Assembly, constitutionally validated all 1977 Lake County assessments tardily published in a new Paragraph 799.1, Chapter 120, Ill. Rev. Stats. 1977, as amended, are presented in interlocutory orders one, two and three of this order which are not otherwise appealable, and the Court finds that these orders involve questions of law as to which there are substantial unds for differences of opinion, and that an immediate appeal from these orders will materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation; 6. On the Court’s own motion pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308(e), further proceedings before this Court are not stayed by this order. Enter: /s/ Charles F. Scott Judge DATED this 19th day of December, 1978, at Waukegan, Illinois. A-31 APPENDIX F STATUTES GOVERNING ILLINOIS ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES Illinois Revised Statutes, Ch. 120 (1977, prior to October 1). PUBLICATION OF ASSESSMENT LISTS 584. Publication in counties of less than 2,000,000—Fees.] § 103. In counties containing less than 2,000,000 inhabitants, as soon as the county assessor, supervisor of assessments or board of assessors, as the case may be, had completed the assessment in the county or in the assessment district he or it shall, in each year of a quadrennial assessment of real property, publish for such county or assessment district a full and complete list of the assessment of real and personal property, by townships if the county is so organized. In years other than years of a quadrennial assessment of real ie rty, the assessor, supervisor of assessments or board of assessors, as the case may be, shall publish the assessment of personal property in full and a list of real estate for which assessments have been added or changed since the last preceding assessment, together with the amounts of the assessments on such real estate. Such publication shall be made on or before July 10 of that year in counties with less than 150,000 inhabitants and on or before December 15, of that year in counties with 150,000 or more but less than 2,000,000 inhabitants, and shall be printed in some public newspaper or newspapers published in the county; or shall be mailed to every person in that township, or in counties not un- der township organization, in that county paying taxes upon personal property. In every county containing less than 2,000,000 inhabitants, in addition to the publication of the list of assessments of real property in each year of a quadrennial assessment of real property and of the list A-32 of real estate for which assessments have been added or changed, as provided above, a notice shall be mailed by the township assessor, county assessor, supervisor of assessments or board of assessors, as the case may be, to each taxpayer at his address as it appears on the assessor’s records as to whose real property the assess- ment has been changed since the last preceding assess- ment, except in the case of changes caused by a change in the county equalization factor by the Department, during any year such change is made. Such notice must also state the name and price per copy of the newspaper in which the list of assessments will be published. In every township or assessment district in which there is published one or more ay ge 98) of general circula- tion, the list of such township shall be published in one of the newspapers. The gpa r shall be entitled to a fee of $.20 per line for publishing the assessment list and shall furnish to the local assessment officers as many copies of the paper containing the assessment list as he or they may require. Amended by P.A. 77-1721, § 1, eff. July 1, 1972; P.A. 78- 449, § 1, eff. Oct. 1, 1973. 524. Assessments in quadrennial years.] § 43. In counties having the township form of government and a population of less than 1,000,000 inhabitants, the quadrennial assessment years shall be 1963 and every fourth year thereafter, unless and until changed as provided in this Section for counties having the township form of government and a ulation of 100,- 000 or more but less than 1,000,000 inhabitants. In coun- ties having the commission form of government and a population of less than 1,000,000 inhabitants, the quadrennial assessment years shall be 1962 and every fourth year thereafter. The county board of each county having a population of 1,000,000 inhabitants or more shall, by resolution adopted before January 1, 1960, divide the county into 4 assessment districts. If the county is organized in townships the assessment districts shall follow township A-33 lines. The assessment district shall divide, as near as may be, the work of assessing the real estate in the county into 4 equal parts. Neither the area nor the number of parcels of real estate need be equal in the 4 assessment districts. The resolution shall number the assessment districts 1 to 4 inclusive. The quadrennial assessment years for assessment district number 1 shall be 1961, 1964 and every fourth year thereafter; for assessment district number 2 the quadrennial assess- ment years shall be in 1962, 1965 and every fourth year thereafter; for assessment district number 3 the quadrennial assessment years shall be 1963, 1966 and every fourth year thereafter, and for assessment district number 4 the quadrennial assessment years shall be 1963 and every fourth year thereafter. The county board of any county divided into assessment districts under this paragraph may provide by resolution of the county board for the assessment of the entire county in any year. The county board of any township form of government with a populston of 100,000 or more but less than 1,000,000 inhabitants may, by resolution adopted before January 1, 1966, divide the county into 4 assessment dis- tricts. The assessment districts shall follow township lines, and shall divide, as near as may be, the work of assessing the real estate in the county into 4 equal parts. Neither the area nor the number of parcels of real estate need be equal in the 4 assessment districts. The resolu- tion shall number the assessment districts 1 to 4 in- clusive. The quadrennial assessment years for assess- ment district number 1 shall be 1967, 1970 and every fourth year thereafter; for assessment district number 2 the quadrennial assessment years shall be 1968, 1971 and every fourth year thereafter; for assessment district number 3 the quadrennial assessment years shall be 1969, 1972 and every fourth year thereafter; and for assessment district number 4 the quadrennial assess- ment years shall be 1969 and every fourth year thereafter. The county board of any county divided into assessment districts under this paragraph may provide A-34 by resolution for the assessment of the entire county in the quadrennial assessment year provided by law for that county and for the dissolution of the assessment dis- tricts after the first such assessment. On or before June 1 in each quadrennial assessment year in all counties having a population less than 1,000,- 000 inhabitants, and as soon as he reasonably can in each quadrennial assessment year in counties having a population of 1,000,000 or more inhabitants, or if any such county is divided into assessment districts as provided above, as soon as he reasonably can in each quadrennial assessment year in such assessment dis- tricts, the assessor in person or by his deputy shall ac- tually view and determine as near as practicable the value of each tract or lot of land listed for taxation as of January 1, or as provided in Section 27a of this Act,' of such year and assess the same as 334% of its fair cash value, or in accordance with a county ordinance adopted ursuant to Section 4 of Article IX of the Constitution of llinois, setting down the sum in the proper column in the books furnished him. In making such assessments he shall set down his valuation of improved tracts and lots in one column, and his value of unimproved tracts and lots in another column. The value of lands and improvements shall be separately fixed and shall be set down in separate columns in such assessor’s books. Amended by P.A. 70-703, § 1, eff. Sept. 3, 1975. 1 Chapter 120, § 508a. 527. Assessment changes in counties of less than 150,000—Revision of assessments in counties of less than 1,000,000—Notice.] § 46. In counties containing less than 150,000 inhabitants, the assessors or super- visors of assessments shall not in any year, except the year of the quadrennial assessment, change the valua- tion of any real estate or improvements or the division thereof, except as provided in this Section and in Sec- tions 37 and 44 of this Act.' The supervisor of A-35 assessments, the county assessor or the board of assessors of any county having fewer than 1,000,000 in- habitants, or the township assessor of any township in any such county, may in any year revise an assessment and correct such assessments as shall appear to him or them to be just. A notice of any such revision shall be given in the manner provided in Section 103? to the tax- payer as to whose property the assessment has been changed. Amended by P.A. 77-556, § 1, eff. July 31, 1971. PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD 592.1 Creation—Membership—Chairman— Vacancies—Appeal of decision of board of review.] §111.1. There shall be created in the Department, the Property Tax Appeal Board, consisting of 3 members appointed by the Governor, with the ad- vice and consent of the Senate. The Governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall designate one of the members as Chairman. A vacancy in_ the membership of the Board shall be filled in the same manner as original appointments are made. In any county other than a county of over 1,000,000 population, any taxpayer dissatisfied with the decision of a board of review as such decision pertains to the assess- ment of his property for taxation purposes, or any tax- ing body that has an interest in the decision of the board of review on an assessment made by any local assess- ment officer, may, within 30 days after the date of written notice of the decision of the board of review, appeal such decision to the Property Tax Appeal Board for review. Such taxpayer or taxing body, hereinafter called the appellant, shall file a petition with the clerk of the Prope Tax Appeal Board, setting forth specifically the facts upon which he bases his objection to the decision of the board of review, together with a statement of the contentions of law which he desires to raise, and the relief he requests. If a petition is filed by a taxpayer, the taxpayer is precluded from filing objec- A-36 tions based upon valuation, as may otherwise be per- mitted by Sections 194, 195 and 235 of this Act.! However, any taxpayer not satisfied with the decision of the board of review as such decision pertains to the assessment of his property for taxation purposes, need not appeal such decision to the Property Tax Appeal Board for review before seeking relief in the courts. Amended by P.A. 79-386, § 1, eff. Oct. 1, 1975 P.A. 79-1044, § 1, eff. Oct. 1, 1975. 592.2. Procedure—One-year assessment level § 111.2. The Property Tax Appeal Board shall es- tablish by rules an informal procedure for the deter- mination of the correct assessment of property which is the subject of an appeal. The Board may use a one-year assessment level to be based on relevant sales during the revious year. Such procedure, to the extent that the ard considers practicable, shall eliminate formal rules of pleading, practice and evidence, and except for any reasonable filing fee determined by the Board, may provide that costs shall be in the discretion of the Board. A copy of the appellant’s petition shall be mailed by the clerk of the Property Tax Appeal Board to the board of review whose decision is being appealed. The chairman of the Property Tax Appeal Board shall provide for the speedy hearing of all such appeals. All appeals shall be considered de novo. Amended by P.A. 81-894, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1980. 592.3 Conduct of hearings.] § 111.3. A hearing shall be granted if any party to the appeal so requests, and, upon motion of any party to the Ly jpn or by direc- tion of the Property Tax Appeal Board, any appeal may be set down for a hearing, with proper notice to the in- terested parties. Notice to all interested taxing bodies shall be deemed to have been given when served upon the State’s Attorney of the county from which the appeal has been taken. Hearings may be held before less than a majority of the members of the Board, and the chairman A-37 may assign members or hearing officers to hearings. Such hearings shall be open to the public and shall be conducted in accordance with such rules of practice and rocedure as the Board may make and promulgate. The ard, any member or hearing officer may require the production of any books, records, papers or documents that may be material or relevant as evidence in any matter pending before it and necessary for the making of a just decision. Amended by P.A. 76-689. § 1, eff. Aug. 7, 1969. 592.4 Record of proceedings and orders— Decision—Extension of taxes—Review under Ad- ministrative Review Act.] § 111.4. The Property Tax Appeal Board shall keep a record of its proceedings and orders and such record shall be a public record. The Board shall make a decision in each appeal or case heard by it, and such decision shall be based upon equi- ty and the weight of evidence and not upon constructive fraud, and shall be binding upon appellant and officials of government. The extension of taxes on any such assessment so appealed shall not be delayed by any proceeding before the Board, and, in case the assessment is altered by the Board, any taxes extended upon such unauthorized assessment or part thereof shall be abated, or, if already paid, shall be refunded. The decision or order of the Property Tax Appeal Board in any such appeal, shall, within 10 days thereafter, be certified to the appellant and to the proper authorities, including the board of review whose decision was appealed, the county clerk who extends taxes upon the assessment in question, and the county — who collects property taxes upon such assess- ment. Final administrative decisions of the Property Tax Appeal Board are subject to review under the provisions of the Administrative Review Act.! Added by act approved May 1, 1967. L.1967, p. 372. 1 Chapter 110, § 264 et seq. A-38 592.5 Hearing officers and personnel—Clerk— Compensation.] § 111.5. The Property Tax Appeal Board may appoint necessary hearing officers, ap- praisers, technicians and necessary clerical help to aid it in performing its duties, and may use employees of the Property Tax Division of the Department of Revenue, when available, in performing its duties. The Property Tax Appeal Board shall choose some person to serve as clerk of the Board, and in its discre- tion, may with the consent of the Director choose the Superintendent of the Property Tax Division of the Department to serve as such clerk. If the Superinten- dent of the Property Tax Division is chosen to serve as the clerk, he shall not receive additional compensation for such duties but may receive necessary traveling ex- penses. Amended by P.A. 76-2254, § 1, eff. July 1, 1970. A-39 APPENDIX G [Filed May 20, 1981] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS Nos. 53189, 53286 (Consolidated) RUSSEL G. SCHLENZ, et al., Appellees, v. ROBERT JASPER, Supervisor of Assessments, et al., Appellants, and CounTY OF SHELBY, Appellant, Vv. THE PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD, et al., Appellees. NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Notice is hereby given that RUSSEL G. SCHLENZ and NANCY SCHLENZ, Appellees in No. 53189, and GERTRUDE ANDERSON. et al., Appellee in No. 53286, hereby appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States from the final order of March 27, 1981, denying Schlenz’s Peti- tion for Rehearing filed March 13, 1981. and from that part of the prior Order of February 20, 1981, reversing in part the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, in No. 53189 and reversing the Appellate Court of IIli- A-40 nois, Fifth District, in No. 53286. This Appeal is taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1257(2). /s/ og E. Hamer - AP 1356 Shermer Rd. Northbrook, IL 60062 (312) 272-1800 /s/ Jack L. Uretsky 135 South LaSalle Street Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 372-7842 Attorneys for Appellants to the Supreme Court of the United States Attorneys for Appellants to the Supreme Court of the United States --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_2331%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.