# Opposition — New Jersey v. Ryan

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition
- **Published:** January 1, 1981
- **Citation:** 454 U.S. 880

## Text

Suet cll

ORIGINAL seit

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
ase SUPREME COURT, U.S.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1981

NO. 80-2151

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

East Orange, New Jersey 07018

THE NATURE OF THE CASE

The New Jersey Attorney General's Office argues that the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not prevent the
imposition of an increased term of imprisonment subsequent to and
during the execution of the original sentence of imprisonment.

oF.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

As a result of the entry of retraxit pleas of guilty to two
Monmouth County Indictments (Nos. 1388-72 and 1389-72) and one Accusa-
tion (No. A-253-72) charging him in five counts with breaking and entering
with intent to steal and three counts of larceny, on January 4, 1974, Mr.
Ryan was sentenced by the Honorable Alton V. Evans, J.S.C., to the
New Jersey State Prison for concurrent terms, the longest being three
to five years. Six months later, on July 2, 1974, Mr. Ryan was granted
a motion for transfer to a drug treatment program pursuant to R.
3:21-10(b), which was to became effective a: August 1, 1974, after Mr.
Ryan had served same seven months in custody on the sentences imposed.
The Court order further provided that the originally imposed sentences
be suspended, and that defendant enter a narcotic treatment program and
remain on probation for a period of two years.

On February 25, 1977, having pled guilty to two of three charges
of violating probation and pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:168-4, the Honorable
Thomas L Yaccarino, J.S.C., sentenced Mr. Ryan to various concurrent
sentences of five to seven and two to three years, respectively, for
the crimes charged in the original indictments and accusation. Thus, at

this-resentencing Mr. Ryan received a sentence which, in aggregate is two

years greater than the sentence originally imposed.
On appeal to the Appellate Division Mr. Ryan

contended that the imposition of a greater sentence

after execution of his original sentence had

begun--contravened the double jeopardy clauses of the United States

Constitution! and the Constitution of New Jersey. In addition he

1. U.S. Const., Amend. V.
2. N.J. Const., Art. I, par. 11 (1947).

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contended that the history surrounding the pramgation of R. 3:21-10(b)
supported his contention that if an offender violates probation received
pursuant to the grant of a R. 3:21-10(b) motion, he can only be returned
to prison to serve the reaminder of his tern.

On December 4, 1979, in an wneninous opinion the Appellate Division
affirmed Mr, Ryan's convictions. Relying primarily upon State v. Cunning-
ham, 143 N.J. Super. 415 (App. Div. 1976), the Appellate Division con-
cluded that traditional principles of double jeopardy are inapplicable
when an offender is resentenced for violation of probation, even when
probation is imposed subsequent to execution of a prison term, State v.
Edward Ryan, unpub. opinion, App. Div., Docket No, A-2843-76 (1979),
appended hereto as Pa3 to Pal7, Pa6é to ll. In reaching this decision the
appellate court suggested that defendant's increased sentence was proper

because he had initiated the proceeding by which probation was granted, and
further than his violation per se justified upward revision of his sentence.
Id. at PaS and Paé.

A Notice of Petition for Certification was filed in this matter
on December 24, 1979.

On April 20, 1981, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the Appellate Division, vacated the increased term of five to
seven years and reinstated the original sentence of three to five
years. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that double jeopardy consider-
ati ns militate against increasing a defendant's prison sentence
after violation of probation when he has already served a portion of
that custodial term. The court distinguished United States v. DiFrancesco,

449 U.S. _, 66 L. Ed. 2d 328 (1980) as not addressing the issue of
partial execution of sentence. The New Jersey

Supreme Court further distinguished DiFrancesco by noting that, unlike
the defendant in DiFrancesco, respondent here had no reason to expect that
his sentence was not final at the time it was imposed and his imprison-
ment began.

In a dissenting opinion, Justice Sidney Schreiber found that
application of the facts and holding of DiFrancesco to the factual
pattern of the instant matter indicated the absence of a double jeopardy
cbstacle. Justice Schreiber argued that the pronouncement of sentence has
never carried the finality that attaches to a judgment of acquittal,
particularly where the State legislature has removed any expectation of
finality by providing for an increased term of imprisonment following a
violation of probation.

On May 4, 1981, petitioner moved in the New Jersey Supreme Court
for a stay of judgment pending the filing of a petition for certiorari
to this Court. On May 20, 1981, petitioner's motion for a stay pending
determination of its petition for certioari to this Court was granted.
(A40).

The State of New Jersey now petitions this Court for a writ of
certioari to review the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court.

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DN i a a hr pee

The State of New Jersey in its petition for certiorari invokes
this Court's jurisdiction by way of 28 U.S.C. Section 1257(3). ‘The
State of New Jersey argues that the New Jersey Supreme Court in its
opinion below improperly concluded that New Jersey probation statutes,
and their legislative history, did not apply to the procedure which
resulted in Mr. Ryan's increased sentence.3 This Court has held on
numerous occasions that it is “bound to accept the interpretations of
(state law) by the highest court of the State." Hortonville Dist. v.
Hortonville Ed. Assn., 426 U.S, 482 (1976); Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400
U.S. 505 (1971); Garner v. Louisianna, 368 U.S. 157 (1961), Kingsley

Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959). In order to show the

error of petitioner's argument it is necessary to give a brief review

lynchpin of the decision is the Court's examination first of state statutes
and second defendant's conduct. Having concluded that no applicable

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state statute existed and that defendant's conduct did not constitute
a form of voluntary waiver the New Jersey Supreme Court then addressed
the issue of double jeopardy. 4
The New Jersey Supreme Court in reversing the trial court's

increase of Mr. Ryan's original senterm : and the New Jersey Appellate
Division affirmance of that action held;

“...that jeopardy attached as soon as

defendant commenced serving his prison

term, hence principles of double

foreclose the imposition of

any increased term after violation of
probation." State v. Ryan, __ N.J.

Although there is no holding by this Court directly on point there can be
no question that this holding is in full accord with a long line of
double jeopardy cases beginning with Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.)
163 (1974) and ending with United States v. DiFrancesco, 499 U.S. __, 66
L. Ed. 2d 328 (1980) and Bullington v. Missouri, _U.S. __, 49 U.S.L.W.

4481 (1981). In Ex parte Lange, supra at 173 the Court observed

"If after judgment has been rendered an
the conviction, and the sentence of that
judgment executed on the criminal, he can
be again sentenced on that conviction to
another and different punishment... is the
constitutional restriction (against double
jeopardy) of any value? Is not its intent
and its spirit in such a case as much vio-
lated as if a new trial had been had, and
on a second conviction a second punishment
inflicted?”

Having posed the question this Court resolved it with the following comment

"...we do not doubt that the constitution
was designed as much to prevent the

4. Petitioner's brief seems to be under the mistaken belief that the
N.J.S.C. first decided the double jeopardy question and then the
statutory issues. Their confusion can be explained in part by the
structure of the opinion below in which, because of the thrust of
the dissenting opinion, the majority felt it necessary to addr
the double jeopardy issue at greater length.

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Ph dee ee eee

criminal fran being twice punished for the
same offense as fram being twice tried for it."

Ex parte Lange, supra, at 173.
This Court again addressed the issue of mltiple punishment in United States

v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 307-8 (1931) wherein it reaffirme’ the holding in Ex
parte Lange. ° Although the rule of both Ex parte Lange and Benz was held
to be limited to their specific facts in United States v. DeFrancisco, ___

U.S. at i, 66 L. Ed. 24 328 at 347 (1981) it is clear fram the following
comment by Justice Blackman that the prohibition against multiple punishment
still remains.

"This accounts for the established practice in
the federal courts that the sentencing judge
may recall the defendant and increase his sen-
tence, at least (and we venture no cament as
to this limitation) so long as he has not yet
begun to serve his sentence, (Cites anitted) ."
DeFrancisco, supra at 344,

The New Jersey Supreme Court relying on this Court's prior holdings
woncluded the following: once a sentence is imposed and execution is
begun, absent statutory authority for appealing or increasing it, or the
voluntary action of the defendant, the defendant has a reasonable expec-

6 7

tation’ that it is a final sentence.” It is the doctrine of finality

upon which prior dictum as well as the New Jersey Supreme Court's ruling

5. In Benton v. land. 395 U.S. 784, 796 (1969) this Court held that
the double ey restrictions in the Fifth Amendment were applica-
ble to the states.

6. Reasonable expectation is a factual question which is resolved by first

he has voluntarily placed himself in a
the waiver of any double jeopardy argument
appeal of convicticn).

7. Finality can be described as that point in time when statutes and/or

to a jury's verdict of acquittal.’ Id. at
, 66 L. Ed, 2d at 343 (emphasis added) .

fhe instant case is with whether

a criminal sentence is entitled to finality

State v. Ryan, ___ N-J+ _ (at Pal0a). In analyzing Mr. Ryan's ex~

pectation of finality the New Jersey Supreme Court noted,

prisonment began. When he subsequently
moved for sentence modification under R.
3:21-10(b), the defendant was seeking
special, more lenient treatment subject to

the finality of his original sentence,
he would expect, at the very worse (that)

Ryan, supra at (Palla). |

In concluding its opinion the court directly addressed the ques~
‘tion of whether Mr. Ryan's action, the filing of the motion for transfer
to a drug treatment program, had in some way waived® his double jeopardy
rights or his reasonable expectation in the finality of his sentence.

“Finally, we address the State's contention,
by the Appellate Division, that when
a defendant by his own motion has his original
sentence set aside, the constitutional guaran-
tee against double jeopardy does not restrict
the imposition of whatever sentence may be
legally authorized, even though it may be
greater than the original sentence imposed.
On the strength of North Carolina v. Pearce,
a, the court below attempted to apply to
tant matter the principle derived from
that case that a more severe sentence upon recon=
viction is permitted when justified by defen-
dant's subsequent conduct, absent any motive
of retaliation for the taking of an appeal. See
Pearce, ,395 U.S. at 723-26, 23 L. Ed. 2d
at 668-70. by way of analogy the
Appellate Division concluded that “a sentence
imposed after probation has been violated can
reflect the added basis for evaluating defen-~
dant's amenability to reform, namely, his re-
sponse to probation.” 171 N.J. Super. at 436.

“There can be no doubt that defendant's subse-

conduct is an appropriate concern at the
time of sentencing after reconviction. But the
linchpin of Pearce's analysis is the premise
thet

‘the original conviction has, at the defendant's
behest, been wholly nullified and the slate
wiped clean, ***(S)o far as the conviction
itself goes, and that part of the sentence that
has not yet been served, it is no more than a
simple statement of fact to say that the slate
has been wiped clean. The conviction has been
set aside, and the unexpired portion of the
original sentence will never be served. ”

8. There can be no question that the record below is totally silent as
to the potential consequences of defendant's motion. Therefore, it
is irrelevant whether one applies a waiver test as set forth in

rill dad

Sain” on oe a

es nem Avt+t
=. Saba s ak

(395 U.S. at 721, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 667
(emphasis in original) .)

“Here, Ryan has not attacked his original
conviction. His R. 3:21-10(b) motion sought
only a modification of sentence, not a new
trial. The granting of that motion resulted
only in a suspension of the execution of his
original sentence pending successful can-
pletion of the drug rehabilitation program
and probationary term, not in a vacation or
annullment of that sentence. In effect
the sentence became temporarily and condition-
ally inoperative. Under the circumstances

The slate was not “wiped clean” within the
meaning of Pearce.”

It is clear from the above that the New Jersey Supreme Court in resin-
stating Mr. Ryan's original sentence was making several conclusions as
to both fact and law.

1. The Court found as a matter of state law
that no state statute gave authority to the
trial court to increase defendant's sentence.

2. Mr. Ryan's motion for transfer to a
treatment program was not an act which
in itself would subject him to a potentially
sentence. The Court decided that be-
cause of the lack of record below it would
not presume a voluntary waiver by defendant.

3. The Court having concluded that no waiver
existed and that the court's actions were not
based upon specific statutory authority held
that the double jeopardy provisicm of the
United States Constitution prevents an in-
crease in defendant's sentence once execution

has begun.
The fatal flaw in the New Jersey Attorney General's writ is that
it is asking this Court to disregard and overrule the New Jersey Supreme
Court conclusion as to the current status of New Jersey statutory law
and find that a specific New Jersey statutes exists which would justify
the action taken by the trial court. As stated earlier, there can be no

question than when the highest court of a state speaks on questions of

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existing state law and its meaning this Court must yield to their
opinions.

The New Jersey Supreme Court having concluded, based upon its
analysis of this Court's holding in DiFrancesco, supra, that the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits the State

fran increasing a defendant's sentence, once he has begun serving it,
unless the State can show specific statutory authority or the voluntary
action of defendant.

In deciding the case below the New Jersey Supreme Court found

1. No statutory authority existed for increasing defendant's

2. Defendant's filing of a motion for transfer to a drug treatment
program was not a waiver of his double jeopardy arguments.
As a result of their factual findings, based solely on New Jersey law, this
Court is without jurisdiction to review the finding of New Jersey's highest
court.
Respectfully submitted,

STANLEY C. VAN
Public Defender
Attorney for Defendant-Petitioner

| Neweree”

ORIGINAL | JUL 1.7 1981

FFICE OF THE CLERK

IN THE 0
SUPREME COURT, U.S.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES |_ SUPREME ¢ MRT be

October Term, 1981

No. 80-2151

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Petitioner

__

EDWARD RYAN, Respondent

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

The Respondent, Edward Ryan, asks leave to file the attached
Brief in Opposition to a Write of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of
New Jersey, without prepayment of costs and to proceed in forma pauperis
pursuant to Rule 46. :

Counsel for Respondent's affidavit in support of this motion is
attached hereto.

STANLEY C. VAN NESS
Public Defender of New Jersey

| (ls TN

GERALD P. BOSWELL
Ass t Deputy Public Defender

Counsel for Petitioner

RECEIVED

ORIGINAL ren Panes

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT, U.S. _

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1981

No. 80-2151

I, GERALD P. BOSWELL, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, counsel
for respondent Edward Ryan, being first duly sworn, according to law,
Gepose and says, in support of my motion for leave to proceed without
being required to prepay costs or fees:

1. I am counsel for respondent Edward Ryan in the above-entitled

2. Respondent Fdward Ryan has been found to be an indigent by
the New Jersey Office of the Public Defender.

3. Mr. Ryan has been represented by the Office of the Public Defender
at all stages of this matter.

4. Mr. Ryan appears before this Court as respondent to a Petition
for Writ of Certiorari filed by the New Jersey Office of the Attorney
General.

5. As counsel for Mr. Ryan I believe that he is entitled to proceed
In Forma Pauperis so as to oppose the New Jersey Attorney General Petition

for a Writ of Certiorari.

/ GERALD P. BOSWELL
for Edward Ryan, Respondent

Sworn to and subscribed to
before me on this 15th
day of July, 1981.

Fansck Ata

attorney-at-Law of the
otate of New Jersey

ORIGINAL ~ | RECEIVED |
JUL 17 1981,
ia SUPREME COURT, US. |

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1981

No. 80-2151

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Petitioner

-_~

EDWARD RYAN, Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 15th day of July, 1981,
one copy each of the Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis,
Affidavit in Support thereof, and Brief in Opposition to a Writ of
Certiorari were mailed, postage prepaid, to James R. Zazzali, Esq.,
Attorney General of New Jersey, Counsel for the Petitioner. I further
certify that all parties required to be served have been served.

P. BOSWELL
istant Deputy Public Defender
fice of the Public Defender
20 Evergreen Place
East Orange, New Jersey 07018

Counsel for Petitioner

July 15, 1981

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_2318%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
