# Opposition — Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition
- **Published:** January 1, 1982
- **Citation:** 456 U.S. 305

## Text

Office-Supreme Court, U.S
| 2 Se
No. 80-1990 JUL 1. 1981
ALEXAT
IN THE

Supreme Court of the United Staten

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

CASPAR WEINBERGER ET AL.,

¥ Petitioners,

CARLOS ROMERO-BARCELO ET AL.,
Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

HECTOR REICHARD DE CARDONA
Secretary of Justice

THOMAS R. LINCOLN
Department of Justice

GERAKDO A. CARLO
Special Counsel to the Governor

JOHN A. HODGES
(Counsel of Record)

TimoTHy L. HARKER
LAWRENCE WHITE
JEFFREY N. MARTIN

PEABODY, RIVLIN, LAMBERT &
MEYERS
A Professional Corporation
1150 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 457-1000
Counsel for Respondents
Of Counsel
Lewis A. RIVLIN
1150 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

July 1, 1981

WILSON - EPES PRINTING Co., INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

_——_—_—
ome oe eee

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering an
injunction, limited as to scope and duration, for a con-
tinuous violation of the permit requirements of the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act, which violation was
in “utter disregard of the statutory mandate.”

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED ..............scscsssssssscscssssssceseseess

TABLE OF AUTHORITIBS ...........scscscsssssscsssssssssssssessees

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...........cccsssssssssssescsessneneees

I,
II.
Ill.

I cmv
I tr nc assulnateonuubroubea ‘
Decisions of the Courts Below ...............00000000...

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION ............

I,

Il.

Ill.

IV.

The Petition Raises a Question that in All Like-
lihood Will Be Mooted by the Completion of the
Administrative Process Concerning the Permit..

The Ruling of the Court Below Does Not Con-
flict with Fourth Circuit Decisions Cited by the
I a a cannes

The First Circuit Applied Settled Principles of
Federal Law in Enjoining the Navy’s Violations
OF Fe I PM MIO scttcccennsntcevsccsacsessecctscciecases

The Decision of the Court of Appeals is a Nar-
row, Fact-Specific Decision that Raises No
Significant Question of Federal Law ......... maceabiods

Denial of the Navy’s Petition Will Preserve the
Fair and Equitable Relief Secured by Puerto
Rico in the Court of Appeals ........0...0..00..00000000

ap IIIY -ichcucodstentenciencnentensvnsonineissaisebessasicaiesécsunadioninesn

(iii)

10

15

16
17

lv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: Page
Aluli v. Rumsfeld, Civ. Action No, 76-0880 (D.
BAIT) concomseviecsiidanetnvctneusticvecsavuahiiemiocsaaaaeenenae 5

American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. V.
Donovan, —— U.S. ——, 49 U.S.L.W. 4720

CHWMO BF, ROBT) cercovericersncssercnsveascantanamiminaae 18
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Train, 544 F.2d 657 (3d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 975 (1977)... 12

Buscaglia v. District Court of San Juan, 145 F.2d

274 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 8323 U.S. 798 (1944).. 12
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,

G02 GB. GOB CIDTE) sccscscerssriaitviensiiadaniaeseane 12
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Costle, 604 F.2d 239 (4th

Cir. 1979), rev’d sub nom., EPA v. National

Crushed Stone Ass'n, —— U.S. ——, 66 L.Ed.

BB BUD CRIB vereccccceestssssntsictecuae eee 8,9
Cooper Vv. Wisdom, 440 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D. Fla.

BOE D .: eveiccevecssnsveoesvesessuibinuainieaantaninataamannane 10, 12
Cousins Vv. Wigoda, 409 U.S, 1201 (Rehnquist, Cir-

GUNS TUTTO, DOE veccncssevescchesnsinthnnetnicaedieaee 7
FTC v. National Lead Co., 852 U.S, 419 (1957)... 9
Jones V. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885 (1st Cir. 1978) ......... 11
Lathan Vv. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir, 1971)... 18
Milwaukee v. Illinois, ——- U.S, ——, 49 U.S.L.W.

og OS OD ) ne 12

NLRB vy. Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 540
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
RODD COBTED serniccccdticccccrsicoseteitansienuadeceaee 9
National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, 529 F.2d
859 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Boteler v.
National Wildlife Federation, 429 U.S. 979

CRIB) ccceccescvssesvssscnsendsttcshceleuusececcicecmananesnaninanae 18
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle,

668 F.2d 1869 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ...........cccsssrsssssnees 12
Save Our Sound Fisheries Ass'n v. Callaway, 887

aA. | Bt ls | | ew 10, 12

Standard Oil Co. of California v. FTC, 577 F.2d
GER COU Cie, REDD: nccessncsscclescedssisenesmnsentannianns 9

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

State Water Control Board v. Train, 559 F.2d 921

(Atha Cle. 1DTE) ccccccnsensincencstinsessncnseretaeamansiabaiaiana 8-9
Taggart Vv. Weinacker’s Inc., 397 U.S. 223 (1970)

CDEP CUFIRM) .ncccerceesveccscerscccssocssovsessscseseconessnonessceaens 7,8
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153

CRITE) cecenecesececasenssnsenssensssisiniaasnnnsananenmniaeaianadais 11,12
United States v. City and County of San Francisco,

SIO UWB. 20 CRD eccrcsotcccscttsecmionionmamnan 12, 13
United States v. City of Painesville, Ohio, 644

if 8) 8 Ye 6} eee 13-14
United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d

DOB (10a Cle. TOFD) .ccecicncccssiscsscessenrssnenccvtsmnisanenss 1l
United States v. Gonzalez Vargas, 558 F.2d 631

(lat Cle, 2009) ccsccesicinicesstecsstcomttncemmencnnnaniien 9
United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D.

Be. 2OGE) sececetincsesemscreiscscsinstiininina 11
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340

UB, FS (EBDOD ccnccccnsnscsncccssessessscasmenansanndanage 9

STATUTES:

Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251 et seq. (1976 & Supp. III 1980)

eee § UBL D .....cccsccesceacsesssnsssosecesesssscessnncsnvssnd 4,10, 11, 12
exe § 2812.01) (1) ...cccrccsccsecessoecsesnnsvensonensonsieins 9
came § IBRD (B) .2cccccscccccoroscoccscnsssoscnsens nlatiaete 2,7
cme § UDG qn. ccesececcseosceonsonssenssensescosensnanenssanenreniais 4
come BD BED onnccccccoccsssncsescccrseccncsvosssusensssvessesneranns 4
comme § 19GB (6) -....0c0cceecccsnscscscescsscessononcssssanasseenins 4,5
eee § 19687). 222220-00ecccersecsesscsscnsseosscsscssesssssosnens 4
—— § 1362(8) ...........-..-.---0000- scveccanssibennipieneesianes 4
exes § 19GB (18) .......02...cc0ccecresscoccccsscesessonoseseunesee 4
ee § 1963 (14) ..0c0ccesscsccssorscecessoncssssonessassnssseesnens 4,5
eee § 29GB (16) ...00000<0cscosscrnescsrenseresssssnscsnessinnsias 4

OTHER AUTHORITIES:

2 A Legislative History of the Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972, 92d Cong., 1st
Bad. (LOTB) nccccenccssecsesessssscstersinsninianiovenmisapmaaan 11,12

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

No. 80-1990

CASPAR WEINBERGER ET AL.,

¥ Petitioners,
CARLOS ROMERO-BARCELO ET AL.,
Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

STATEMENT OF THE CASE?

I, Introduction

Carlos Romero-Barcelé, the Governor of Puerto Rico,
on behalf of Puerto Rico, the island municipality
of Vieques, and the other respondents (referred to col-
lectively as “Puerto Rico”), hereby opposes the petition
for a writ of certiorari filed on behalf of the Secretary

10n May 28, 1981, Puerto Rico filed its own petition for a
writ of certiorari to obtain review of other portions of the same
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit. Romero-Barcel6 v. Weinberger, No. 80-2033. Puerto
Rico’s petition contained a brief statement describing the factual
and procedural background of the case, and the Court is respect-
fully referred to that statement for details not repeated herein.

2

of Defense and officials of the Department of the Navy
(referred to collectively as “the Navy”). Puerto Rico
respectfully submits that the Navy’s petition raises no
significant questions of federal law that merit this
Court’s attention.

This case concerns the propriety of an injunction of
limited scope and duration restraining the Navy from
further violation of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act? in connection with intentional and accidental dis-
charges of ordnance into the coastal waters of the in-
habited island of Vieques. Both the trial court and the
First Circuit Court of Appeals found that the Navy, by
discharging bombs and shells into Puerto Rican coastal
waters without first obtaining a National Pollution Dis-
charge Elimination System (NPDES) permit from the
Environmental Protection Agency, engaged in a continu-
ing violation of the Clean Water Act.

The Navy does not dispute that conclusion. Instead,
characterizing its conduct as a “technical” violation of
the Clean Water Act*—a characterization specifically
rejected by the Court of Appeals—the Navy asks this
Court to review the remedy imposed by the Court of
Appeals: an injunction prohibiting further bombing and
shelling of coastal waters until the Navy either obtains
the required permit under the Clean Water Act or, pur-
suant to Section 313(a) of the Act,’ obtains a Presi-
dential exemption from the permit requirement.

233 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1976 & Supp. III 1980) (referred to
hereinafter as the “Clean Water Act”).

8 Cf. Navy’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Appendix C, p. 162a.
As used herein, the abbreviation “Navy Pet.” refers to the Navy's
petition for a writ of certiorari; the abbreviation “App.” refers
to the Appendices filed with that petition; and the abbreviation
“C.A.J.A.” refers to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in the
Court of Appeals.

*33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (Supp. ITI 1980).

3

II. Summary of Facts

This case arises out of the Navy’s air-to-ground bomb-
ing and ship-to-shore shelling of the inhabited island of
Vieques. Vieques is a small island approximately 20
miles long and an average of 4.5 miles wide. More than
8,000 people live on the island.

The Navy possesses title to approximately 76 percent
of the island’s land. Prior to 1970, the Navy conducted
air-to-ground bombing and ship-to-shore shelling on the
sparsely populated, nearby Puerto Rican island of
Culebra. Naval land on Vieques was used principally for
small-scale artillery training and amphibious exercises.

Between 1971 and 1975, the Navy methodically and
clandestinely transferred Culebra bombing and shelling
activities to Vieques.° As a result, the Navy tremen-
dously intensified the level of weapons firing on Vieques.
Between 1974 and 1977, the Navy increased by over 900
percent the number of 500 (MK82), 1,000 (MK83) and
2,000 (MK84) pound bombs dropped on and around

5 The clandestine nature of the Navy’s decision to transfer train-
ing operations from Culebra to Vieques is apparent from documents
produced by the Navy before trial. One confidential document re-
vealed the Navy’s awareness that the tempo of training operations
on Vieques was a sensitive issue:

It would seem advantageous to spread out the usage [on
Vieques] somewhat so as to give more ships a chance to fire
without increasing the apparent weekly tempo.

C.A.J.A. 1506 (emphasis added). The document also stated:

With regard to Vieques, [Rear Admiral] Ward indicated that
we should be very careful not to appear increase our tempo
of operations above that of previous yea,

C.A.J.A. 1504 (emphasis added). An internal Naval communication
in April, 1972, stressed that, due to the “extreme sensitivity” of any
plan for relocating Culebra operations to Vieques, all Navy message
traffic on the subject was to be “flagged limited distribution special
handiing.” C.A.J.A. 1413.

4

Vieques.* Bombing, shelling, and other military activities
have resulted in the discharge of millions of pounds of
munitions and other pollutants into the coastal waters of
Vieques, with damage to fragile coral reefs, seagrasses,
and other marine organisms and habitats. By the Navy’s
own admission, the beaches and waters surrounding
Vieques are now saturated with ordnance.’

The Navy was aware of the damage that would be in-
flicted on the marine environment of Vieques by the shift
of Culebra training activities to that island. A report pre-
pared for the Navy in 1972 warned that expanded range
use on Vieques “would cause a subtle and adverse impact
[on] the total marine environment of these waters.” The
report warned that coral reefs in Vieques coastal waters
would be irreparably damaged. “Although much of the
resulting ecological damage may be repaired by nature
in time, some damage to coastal zones, and reef systems
in particular, is irreparable.” *

The Clean Water Act expressly prohibits the “dis-
charge” of any “pollutant” from a “point source” into
the “navigable waters” of the United States without a
permit issued by the EPA or a state with an EPA-
approved permit program.’ The Act defines the term

®C.A.J.A. 1796-1824.

7C.A.J.A. 703-4, 757-60, 810-12, 1518-52, 1603-19. The extra-
ordinary intensification of bombing and shelling activities on
Vieques as Culebra sites were abandoned is graphically illustrated
in the record. See C.A.J.A. 1782-1952. Items discovered in the
waters of Vieques near the reefs include expioded and unexploded
bombs and shells, practice ordnance, parachutes, parachute cables,
flares, flaring casings, barges and other military vessels, machine
gun rounds, bazooka rockets and many unidentifiable ordnance
fragments.

8 C.A.J.A. 284-85. At trial, the Navy’s own witness testified that
“(t]he fringing reefs on both sides of the north central cove...
have been extensively bombed.” C.A.J.A. 311.

® $§ 301, 402, 403, 502(6), (7), (8), (12), (14), (16), 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1311, 1342, 1348, 1862(6), (7), (8), (12), (14), (16).

5

“pollutant” to include “munitions” and wrecked or dis-
carded equipment. The term “point source” is defined to
include vessels and other conveyances from which pol-
lutants may be discharged.’® Under the statutory scheme,
shells, bombs and other ordnance discharged into the
waters around Vieques are subject to the strictures of
the Act.

The Navy is chargeable with knowledge of these re-
quirements of the Act. In the words of the trial court,
the language of the Act is “unambiguous.” Further-
more, in 1976, a lawsuit was commenced challenging
Navy bombing and shelling activities on the island of
Kahoolawe in Hawaii.’ The complaint in that case as-
serted, among other things, that the Navy could not
conduct ship-to-shore shelling and air-to-ground bombing
without first obtaining an NPDES permit under the
Clean Water Act.’* Notwithstanding these facts and in
utter disregard of the explicit command of the statute,
the Navy neither sought nor obtained a permit from the
EPA for bombing and shelling of the coastal waters of
Vieques.

III. Decisions of the Courts Below

On March 1, 1978, Puerto Rico commenced this action

against the Navy in the United States District Court for
the District of Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico sought injunc-

10 § 502(6), (14), 33 U.S.C. § 1862(6), (14).
11 App. 80a.
12 Aluli v. Rumsfeld, Civ. Action No. 76-0380 (D.Haw.).

13 Tn its petition, the Navy untruthfully asserts that prior to the
filing of Puerto Rico’s complaint in 1978 nobody had ever con-
tended that the Clean Water Act applied to the incidental release
of ordnance into coastal waters. Navy Pet. 13. The Navy knows
full well that it was sued in 1976 over the failure to obtain an
NPDES permit for such activities. The Navy is being disingenuous,
therefore, when it asserts to this Court that “the first inkling” it
had “that anyone thought that a NPDES permit was required was
the complaint which was filed in this suit [concerning Vieques]... .”
Id.

6

tive relief until such time as the Navy complied fully
with the Clean Water Act.'*

On September 17, 1979, the trial court found that the
Navy had violated and was continuing to violate the
“unambiguous language” of the Act by discharging ord-
nance into the navigable waters of Vieques without an
NPDES permit. The trial court refused, however, to en-
join Naval bombing and shelling during the time period
required to obtain an NPDES permit."

The Navy did not even bother to appeal from the
ruling of the trial court that its conduct violated the
Act. Indeed, its petition to this Court admits what has
long been obvious: that “the literal language of the
Clean Water Act covers inadvertent release of shells and
bombs into the coastal waters of Vieques.” '*

On January 26, 1981, the Court of Appeals vacated the
judgment of the trial court on the Clean Water Act and
remanded with instructions to enter an order directing
the Navy “to take all steps necessary to insure that no
ordnance is discharged into the coastal waters of Vieques
until such time as it obtains a NPDES permit.” '’ The
Court of Appeals ruled that the Navy’s violation of the
Act was not “technical” and that the Navy had “utterly
disregarded the statutory mandate” by conducting bomb-
ing and shelling operations without first having obtained

14 Puerto Rico sought relief for violation of other laws as well.
See App. 55a-56a.

15 App. 78a-86a, 165a.

16 Navy Pet. 4, n.4. Nor did the Navy appeal with respect to
the matter it mentions in passing (Navy Pet. 13), that Puerto
Rico did not comply with a 60-day notice requirement. Nor could
the Navy have so appealed. Puerto Rico long ago filed a motion
in the district court to cure that alleged defect. The Navy did
not oppose the motion and the district court granted it. (C.A.J.A.
164-171.) The Navy’s mention of the 60-day notice matter in this
Court is a red herring.

17 App. 49a.

7

a permit.’* The Court of Appeals also stated that the
Navy could apply for a Presidential exemption from the
permit requirement pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1828(a) if
the injunction significantly interfered with Navy pre-
paredness.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

I. The Petition Raises a Question that in All Likelihood
Will Be Mooted by the Completion of the Administra-
tive Process Concerning the Permit.

After the Navy filed its petition with this Court, the
EPA gave public notice of a draft NPDES permit and
announced its tentative decision to issue that permit.'
Were the Court to grant the Navy’s petition, adminis-
trative processing of the Navy’s application for an
NPDES permit in all likelihood would be completed be-
fore the Court could reach a decision on the merits, In
addition, the Navy can resort to another administrative
remedy—the application for Presidential exemption—in
the event that it is dissatisfied with the administrative
processing of its permit application at EPA. In either
case, this Court is being asked to consider a question
that is thus more academic than real at this juncture.

This Court on many occasions has expressed its dis-
inclination to consider petitions raising questions that are
likely to become moot.” Even if a case may not be com-
pletely mooted during the pendency of an appeal, this
Court has observed that certiorari should not be granted

18 Jd,

19 Public Notice No. NPDES 81-161, Application No, PROO23582,
EPA Region II, May 29, 1981.

20 F.g., Cousins v. Wigoda, 409 U.S. 1201, 1204 (Rehnquist, Cir-
cuit Justice, 1972) ; Taggart v. Weinacker’s, Inc., 397 U.S, 2238, 226
(1970) (per curiam).

to resolve the “small embers of controversy” that might
remain,”

Furthermore, since the Navy can apply for a Presi-
dential exemption from the permit requirement, it can
extinguish whatever controversy remains without resort
to this Court. If the Navy is sincere in asserting that
an injunction would affect its national security obliga-
tions,” then the Navy will presumably apply for Presi-
dential exemption in the event that the permit procedure
fails to produce a result satisfactory to it. In either case—
whether the Navy resolves the matter through EPA or
the Executive Office of the President—this Court’s inter-
vention is hardly merited.

II. The Ruling of the Court Below Does Not Conflict with
Fourth Circuit Decisions Cited by the Navy.

The Navy asserts that the decision of the court below
conflicts with the decisions of the Fourth Circuit in State
Water Control Board v. Train, 559 F.2d 921 (4th Cir.
1977), and Consolidation Coal Co. v. Costle, 604 F.2d 289
(4th Cir. 1979), rev’d sub nom. EPA v. National Crushed
Stone Ass’n, ——— U.S. ——, 66 L.Ed. 2d 268 (1980).”
Each of these cases is consistent analytically and philo-
sophically with the decision of the First Circuit in this
case.

State Water Control Board dealt with the narrow prob-
lem of whether the receipt of grant money under the
Clean Water Act by publicly owned treatment works for
construction of treatment plants was a condition prece-
dent to compliance with a requirement to achieve by July

21 Taggart v. Weinacker’s, Inc., 397 U.S. 223, 225 (1970) (per
curiam).

22 Navy Pet, 13-14,

23 Navy Pet. 5-6. The Navy’s petition does not cite the decision
of this Court in National Crushed Stone,

9

1, 1977, the degree of effluent reduction attainable
through secondary treatment under Section 801(b) (1) of
the Act, 33 U.S.C. §1811(b) (1). The court’s opinion
said merely that courts have equitable discretion to de-
termine whether and to what extent injunctive sanctions
should be imposed “for violations brought about by good
faith inability to comply with the deadline.” 559 F.2d at
927 (emphasis added). Similarly, the issue before the
Fourth Circuit in Consolidation Coal was whether and to
what extent sanctions could be imposed on coal compa-
nies that exercised “good faith efforts” to comply with
the best practicable control standards but were unable to
do so by the July 1, 1977, deadline. 604 F.2d at 245.

Neither decision involved a situation where, as here,
the polluter “utterly disregarded the statutory mandate”
to obtain an NPDES discharge permit. The First Circuit
could hardly have chosen stronger words than those to
characterize the Navy’s conduct." Violations of the per-
mit requirements of the Clean Water Act in utter dis-
regard of the statutory mandate are different from the
“good faith” efforts to comply with the July 1, 1977,
compliance deadlines involved in State Water Control
Board and Consolidation Coal. Nothing in the Fourth
Circuit decisions suggests, even by implication, that a
more stringent remedial policy should not be applied by

% Courts reserve the phrase “utter disregard” to express strong
disapproval of a party who willfully ignores a legal obligation. See,
e.g., FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 429 (1957):

Those in utter disregard of law, as here, “call for repression
by sterner measures than where the steps could reasonably
have been thought permissible.”

(Quoting from United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S.
76, 89-90 (1950).) Accord, NLRB v. Union Nacional de Trabaja-
dores, 540 F.2d 1 (1st Cir, 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1089 (1977) ;
United States v. Gonzales Vargas, 558 F.2d 631 (1st Cir. 1977);
Standard Oil Co. of California v. FTC, 577 F.2d 653, 662 (9th Cir.
1978).

10

the federal courts in the circumstances presented by this
case.

III. The First Circuit Applied Settled Principles of Federal
Law in Enjoining the Navy’s Violations of the Clean
Water Act.

The decision of the court below is fully consistent with
other decisions under the Clean Water Act and related
environmental statutes. The court below, in fact, prop-
erly relied on two longstanding decisions involving the
propriety of injunctive relief for violations of the Act’s
permit requirements.

In Save Our Sound Fisheries Ass’n v. Callaway, 387
F. Supp. 292 (D.R.I. 1974), the court enjoined the Army
from disposing of dredged materials in violation of sev-
eral laws, including the Clean Water Act. The court
stated:

The statutory procedures for obtaining a permit...
before potentially harmful substances are introduced
into the water are designed to insure that such deci-
sions are based on specific and informed findings
regarding the effect of such dumping on the marine
environment.”*

And in Cooper v. Wisdom, 440 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D. Fla.
1977), the court restrained the Army from dredging ma-
rine areas under the authority of an invalid NPDES per-
mit. The court stated that because the operation was
being carried on without a valid permit, it “has therefore
not been evaluated according to established criteria.”
The court concluded that “the plaintiff’s right to protec-
tive relief from the effects of an invalid permit is clear.”
440 F. Supp. at 10380.

The permit requirement in Section 301(a) is the “en-
forcement hub” of the Act, at the center of a “web of

25 387 F.Supp. at 299-300.

11

complex interrelated regulatory programs.” ** The permit
is the mechanism by which individual point sources are
directly brought into compliance with the Act.*’ If the
courts in their discretion could allow certain point sources
to circumvent the prohibition of Section 301 (a), polluters
would be free to discharge their effluents without under-
going the detailed administrative review and compliance
procedures mandated by the Act. This result clearly con-
travenes Congress’ intent in designing the permit system
“to regulate to the fullest extent possible those sources
emitting pollution. .. .** The Court of Appeals recognized
this when it ordered the Navy to take all steps necessary
to insure that no ordnance is discharged into the coastal
waters of Vieques until it obtains an NPDES permit.

The courts have a responsibility to “protect the integ-
rity of the . . . process mandated by Congress, .. .” ”
Congress has decided the order of priorities in the area
of federal water pollution control efforts, and structured
the NPDES permit process accordingly. Now “it is for
the Executive to administer the laws and for the courts
to enforce them... .”™ If the Navy wishes to modify
the Congressional scheme for the issuance of discharge
permits, it should request such a change from Congress—
not by judicial fiat."

26 United States v. Holland, 373 F, Supp. 665, 668 (M.D, Fla.
1974). See also United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368
(10th Cir. 1979).

*7 See S. Rep. No, 92-414, 92d Cong., Ist Sess, 72 (1971), re-
printed in 2 A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972, 98d Cong., lst Sess, 1490 (1973).

28 United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc,, 599 F.2d 368, 873 (10th
Cir, 1979).

2% Jones v, Lynn, 477 F.2d 885, 892 (1st Cir, 1973).
*” Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S, 158, 194 (1978).

%t The Navy, by reference to the legislative history of the Clean
Water Act, attempts to show that Congress did not mean to “limit

12

The decision of the Court of Appeals is also consistent
with the general rule that where a court is called upon
to enjoin the continuing violation of a federal statute,
general considerations of “equity” are tempered by the
obligation to carry out the statutory mandate.” The rule
does not change when courts are called upon to enjoin
massive or nearly-completed government projects, even
when many millions of dollars of public funds have al-
ready been spent.” As this Court stated recently in

the traditional role of the courts in the enforcement process.” Navy
Pet. 8. On this point, however, the legislative history of the Clean
Water Act is no different from that of any other major environ-
mental statute. Congress intended to prohibit “the discharge of
any pollutant,” 83 U.S.C. §1311(a), unless the discharger first
secures an NPDES permit pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 1342. The leg-
islative history emphasizes the specificity and precision with which
Congress wrote these mandatory standards for environmental pro-
tection into the Act. See, ¢.g., Senate Debate on 8, 2770, Nov. 2,
1971, in 2 A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972, 98d Cong., lst Seas, 1272 (19738).

Congress intended the permit to be the only means by which a
discharger could escape the total prohibition of Section 1842,
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1869,
1874 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Train, 544 F.2d
657, 659 (8d Cir, 1976), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 975 (1977). This
Court specifically recognized that the Clean Water Act “established
a new system of regulation under which it is illegal for anyone to
discharge pollutants into the Nation’s waters except pursuant to a
permit.” Milwaukee v. Illinois, ——- U.S, ——, 49 U.S.L.W. 4445,
4447 (Apr. 28, 1981) (emphasis added), Two lower courts have
reached the same conclusion, Cooper v. Wisdom, 440 F.Supp, 1027,
1080 (S.D. Fla. 1977) ; Save our Sound Fisheries Ass'n v. Callaway,
887 F.Supp. 292 (D.R.I. 1974).

82 See, ¢.g., Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S, 153, 194
(1978) ; United States v. City and County of San Francisco, 310
U.S. 16, 30-81 (1940) (rejecting “balancing of equities” with
respect to an injunction where violation of Raker Act was shown) ;
Buscaglia v. District Court of San Juan, 145 F.2d 274 (1st Cir.),
cert, denied, 328 U.S. 798 (1944),

“ Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc, v. Volpe, 401 U.S, 402
(1971) (injunction upheld against a federal highway project which

13

American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Dono-
van: *

For “(t]he judicial function does not extend to sub-
stantive revision of regulatory policy. That function
lies elsewhere—in Congressional and Executive over-
sight or amendatory legislation.” Industrial Union
Department v. American Petroleum Institute, supra,
slip op., at 2 (Burger, C.J., concurring); see T'en-
nessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 487 U.S. 158, 185,
187-188, 194-195 (1978).

Only two months before the Navy filed its petition
with this Court, the federal government successfully
defended the lower court’s issuance, without an eviden-
tiary hearing, of an injunction to enforce new source
performance standards under the Clean Air Act. United
States v. City of Painesville, Ohio, 644 F.2d 1186 (6th
Cir. 1981). In words that are relevant to this case as
well, the court said:

In Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 380 (1944),
the Supreme Court emphasized that when a court is
called upon to enforce a federal statutory injunction,
its reliance upon the traditional practices of equity

had been underway for more than ten years); National Wildlife
Federation v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Boteler v. National Wildlife Federation, 429 U.S. 979 (1976)
(court enjoined ongoing construction of interstate highway upon
finding a violation of the Endangered Species Act). In the leading
case of Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971), the govern-
ment violated NEPA and Federal Highway Administration regula-
tions by failing to prepare written environmental assessments of a
highway project in downtown Seattle. Citing United States v. City
and County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940), the Court of
Appeals stated that “this case does not call for a balancing of
equities .. .,"” 465 F.2d at 1116 (quoting from 310 U.S. at 30), and
enjoined all construction and ordered the government to submit a
detailed timetable of compliance with NEPA and other environmen-
tal statutes and regulations, /d. at 1122.

= U8, ——-, 49 U.S.L.W. 4720, 4733-34 (June 17, 1981).

14

must be “conditioned by the necessities of the public
interest which Congress has sought to protect.” In
enacting the Clean Air Act, Congress made a deter-
mination that the public interest required that sub-
stantial measures he taken to combat the deleterious
effects of air pollution. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401. The
district court’s discretionary injunctive powers were
therefore tempered by its obligation to carry out the
Congressional mandate contained in the Clean Air
Act.

In a recent case, 7'VA v. Hill, 487 U.S. 153 (1978)
(the “snaildarter” case), the Court held that the
Endangered Species Act required the District Court
to enjoin the completion of the Tellico Dam in East
Tennessee, despite the lower court’s doubts about the
“wisdom ... of a particular course consciously se-
lected by the Congress.” Jd. at 194. The Court em-
phasized that it is the exclusive province of the
Congress to formulate legislative policies and estab-
lish their relative priority ....

By enacting the Clean Air Act, Congress estab-
lished a high priority for control of air pollution.
The legislature recognized that compliance would be
expensive in some cases, but the choice was made
to require compliance with the standards promul-
gated by EPA. Having made that choice, Congress
did not contemplate that its decision would be
thwarted by judicial reluctance to require compli-
ance when enforcement proceedings are brought and
liability is proven. Accordingly, this Court holds
that the district court was required to order injunc-
tive relief upon its finding of liability, once negotia-
tions for a compliance plan broke down. A hearing
to determine the presence of irreparable injury and
inadequacy of legal remedy was therefore unneces-
sary.”

35 644 F.2d at 1193-94.

15

IV. The Decision of the Court of Appeais is a Narrow,
Fact-Specific Decision that Raises No Significant Ques-
tion of Federal Law.

In its petition, the Navy hypothesizes that the ruling
below will have the far-reaching consequence of mandat-
ing the issuance of injunctions to redress technical viola-
tions of any federal environmental law. This argument,
however, is not consistent with the limiting language of
the First Circuit’s decision. The Court of Appeals was
careful to emphasize that it was not dealing with a
“technical” violation of the Clean Water Act. Instead,
the court reacted to the Navy’s “utter disregard” of the
statutory mandate. The injunction directed by the court
below is an appropriate response to the Navy’s egregious
disregard of the permit requirements of the Clean Water
Act.

The petition of the Navy raises only the narrow issue
of the type of relief to be awarded for the utter
disregard of the specific Clean Water Act require-
ment that an NPDES permit be obtained for the dis-
charge of pollutants from point sources. The decision of
the court below does not have broad implications. It
does not establish precedent for the type of remedies
that are appropriate for violations of lesser severity, vio-
lations of other provisions of the Clean Water Act, or
violations of other environmental statutes. The decision
of the court below is narrowly circumscribed by the
unique and unusual facts of this case. Lower courts and
other litigants would profit little from this Court’s re-
view of the Navy’s petition.

16

V. Denial of the Navy’s Petition Will Preserve the Fair
and Equitable Relief Secured by Puerto Rico in the
Court of Appeals.

The intensification of bombing and shelling activities
on Vieques has adversely affected the marine environ-
ment in the coastal waters of Vieques. These activities
continue to pose a significant hazard to the health and
well-being of the island’s inhabitants.** The injunction
ordered by the court below, limited as to scope and dura-
tion, may enhance the quality of the marine environment
and promote the safety of the people of Vieques.”

Puerto Rico has sought diligently to compel the Navy
to observe the requirements of the Act. The relief that
properly has been ordered under the Act should not be
overturned.

86 The Navy asserts that the permit process is unlikely to yield
new information about the “more extensive environmental harm”
(Navy Pet. 14) resulting from its discharge of ordnance into the
waters of Vieques on the ground that the environmental impact
statement (EIS) it has now prepared allegedly discloses no signifi-
cant adverse impacts on the coastal waters from the discharge of
ordnance, But the EIS is a Navy document, not an EPA document.
Furthermore, an important part of what the Court of Appeals was
saying is that the permit process could reveal information that would
help prevent or control environmental impact, not just whether
there is greater environmental impact than is revealed by the EIS.
The Navy’s assertion totally disregards the role of the EPA in its
review of NPDES permit applications and exhibits a disturbing
indifference to the thrust of the permit requirements under the
Clean Water Act. In any event, the Court of Appeals’ determination
that the permit process might reveal relevant information is not
clearly erroneous, particularly in light of the report prepared for
the Navy in 1972 warning about the environmental consequences of
a shift from Culebra to Vieques.

37 Ordnance can miss the target by at least six miles. During
trial a shell missed the target by about six miles and nearly hit
a fishing boat. C.A.J.A. 2738.

17
CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Navy’s petition for a writ of
certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

HECTOR REICHARD DE CARDONA
Secretary of Justice

THOMAS R. }.INCOLN
Department of Justice

GERARDO A. CARLO
Special Counsel to the Governor

JOHN A. HODGES
(Counsel of Record)

TIMOTHY L. HARKER
LAWRENCE WHITE
JEFFREY N. MARTIN

PEABODY, RIVLIN, LAMBERT &
MEYERS
A Professional Corporation
1150 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 457-1000
Counsel for Respondents
Of Counsel

Lewis A. RIVLIN
1150 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

July 1, 1981

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_2169%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
