# Joint Appendix — Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Joint Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1982
- **Citation:** 457 U.S. 496

## Text

No. 80-1874

AS.
CLERK
IN THE
nia Court of the Hnited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1981
>
GEORGIA PATSY,
Petitioner,

—

BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, A BODY CORPORATE,
FoR AND ON BEHALF OF FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY,
Respondents.

* ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

— ————
: Wes JOINT APPENDIX
ee

__ CHARLEs §,. SIMs, JEFFREY H, KLINK,
-. Counsel of Record Counsel of Record
_ BRUCE J. ENNIS, Jr. ’ Mahoney, Hadlow & Adams
JOEL M. GORA 800 Barnett Bank Building
E. RICHARD LARSON’ 100 Laura Street
American Civil Liberties P.O. Box 4099
‘Union Foundation Jacksonville, Florida 32201
132 West 43rd Street (904) 354-1100
rvesthah York 10036 MITCHELL D. FRANKS
| Dept. of Legal Affairs
STEVEN R. SHAPIRO Office of the Attorney General
New York, New York Suite 1501
The Capitol
' AVIAM SOIFER
“p Tallahassee, Florida 32301
” Cambridge, Massachusetts (904) 488-1573
gs Sean Sar Rees Counsel Jor Respondents

Petition for Certiorari Filed May 7, 1981
Certiorari Granted October 5, 1981

JOINT APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Relevant Docket Entries ....++-e««-. i
Complaint (February 7, 1979) ...... 1

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss March 5,
1979) . ‘ . . . . . . 7 . . *. . . . os . <

Defendant's Memorandum in Support of
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (March
5, 1979) . . . . . . . . . . . 7 . - . 14
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (March
12, 1979) . . . . . . . . . 7 . . . . . 20
OrGer of April 9, 1979 ...-«-e-eee ee 49
Amended Complaint (April 19, 1979) ... 29

Defendant's Motions to Dismiss the Amended
Complaint Complaint (June 8, 1979) .. 58

Memorandum in Support of Defendant's
Motions to Dismiss the Amended
Complaint (June 8, 1979) ....e.-.

Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to
Denfendant's Motion to Dismiss .... 83

Gamer @e duay 8, 2978 . ce eo ss sss Se

The opinions and judgments below are set forth
as appendices to the Petition for Certiorari

l.
5.

ll.

12.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

GEORGIA PATSY
Ve

BOARD OF REGENTS

of the State of Florida,

No. 79-732-CIV-JAG

RELEVANT DOCKET ENTRIES
Complaint. ($500,000.00+).

Motion to dismiss complaint
(Deft).

Memo of law in support of
above motion. (Deft).

Memo in opposition to
deft's motion to dis-
miss. (Pltf).

ORDER: Deft's motion to
dismiss complaint
GRANTED. Plitf have 20
days from date of order
to file w/court amended
complaint

Amended Complaint.

Feb.

Mar.

Mar.

Mar.

Apr.
Apr.

12,

19,

1979

1979

1979

1979

1979
1979

14,

15.

17.

18.

19.

20.

ii-

RELEVANT DOCKET ENTRIES

Motions to dismiss
amended complaint &
alternative motion for
a more definite state-
ment. (Deft Fla. Board
of Regents)

Memo in support of
above motion. (Deft.
Fla. Board of Regents)

Memo in opposition to
deft's motion to dis-
miss. (Pltf).

ORDER: Deft's motion to
dismiss GRANTED for
pltf's failure to ex-
haust administrative
remedies. (7/9/79-

JAG) M-7/25/79.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

ed by pltf from
Order dismissing pltf's
complaint entered 7/9/79.

COST BOND ON APPEAL in
amount of $250.00 de-
posited w/registry of
Court by pltf/appellant.

June

June

June

July

July

July

14,

8,

ll,

9,

26,

26,

1979

1979

1979

1979

1979

1979

-iii-

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 79-2965

Brief for Appellant filed
Brief for Appellee filed

Reply Brief for Appellant
filed

Opinion, Reversed and
Remanded

Appellee's Petition for
Rehearing En Banc filed

Order for Rehearing
En Banc

Brief for Appellant filed
Brief for Appellee filed

Opinion, Vacated and
Remanded

1979
1979

1979

1980

1980

1980
1980
1980

1980

oje
[CAPTION]

Complaint

COMES NOW, GEORGIA PATSY, Plaintiff herein,
by and through her undersigned counsel, com-
plaining of the above Defendant and for cause
of action would respectfully show unto the
Court as follows:

I.

JURISDICTION

1. Jurisdiction is conferred on this
Court by 28 U.S.C., Section 1343(3) which pro-
vides for original jurisdiction of this Court
in all actions authorized by 42 U.S.C., Section
1983 to redress the deprivation under color of
law of any right, privilege or immunity secured
by the Constitution of the United States,
specifically the Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth

Amendments.

II.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

4 GEORGIA PATSY, a white female American
and an employee of the above captioned Univer-
sity, seeks redress for discrimination due to
her race, suffered by her in violation of the
Constitution and the laws of the United States.
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges she has been
denied employment opportunities for which she
is well qualified within the above captioned
University, while there has been an intentional
and concerted effort by the University to pro-
mote and hire minorities to available positions
for which Plaintiff has applied.

Itt.
PARTIES

3. GEORGIA PATSY, Plaintiff, is a citizen
of the United States and a resident of the
Southern District of Florida. Plaintiff is
employed by FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
and has attained permanent status within the

personnel system of the State of Florida.

e

4. The Defendant, FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL
UNIVERSITY, is a Division of the State Univer-
sity of Florida and it possesses and exercises
all powers necessary for the maintenance of an
upper level university.

Iv.

STATEMENT OF CLAIM

5. On June lst, 1972, Plaintiff began
employment as a Clerk Typist III, with Defen-
dant University, and is presently classified as
a Secretary III.

6. Plaintiff's education consists of a
Bachelor of Education Degree (cum laude) from
the University of Miami and a Master of Science
Degree in Administration and Supervision of
Adult Education from Florida International
University. Plaintiff has had continuing
teaching experience in the Dade County, Florida,

Adult Education Program.

Ve During the six (6) years while Plain-
tiff has been employed at the Defendant Univer-
sity, she has applied for numerous employment
openings within the Defendant University and
has been uniformly rejected with many Latins
and non-whites having been selected iz) place
of the Plaintiff.

8. The following is a partial list of
available positions advertised by the Defendant
for which Plaintiff applied for, but was rejected:

Position with Career Development
and Placement Department

Interim Counselor in School Education

Liason Officer and Student Affairs
Coordinator

Continuing Education Coordinator
Coordinator/Director Alumni Affairs
Vocational Counselor II

Personnel Aide

College Work-Study Coordinator
Conference Coordinator

University Public Functions Manager

Financial Aid Counselor
Student Affairs Coordinator
Admissions Counselor

9. The former President of FLORIDA
INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY, Charles Perry has
recognized that Plaintiff's background qualifies
her for a higher position than the Secretary III
position then and now held. See Exhibit "A"
attached hereto and made a part hereof.

10. The professional skill and management
abilities of the Plaintiff have been recognized
by the Head of the Department of Psychology at
FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY. See Exhibit
"B" attached hereto and made a part hereof.

ll. The Performance Appraisal. conducted
annually in accordance with the State of Florida
Personnel System shows the Plaintiff to be
outstanding, not only with respect to her assigned
tasks, but innovative, resourceful, efficient

and functioning more as a Staff Assistant than

as a Secretary. See Exhibit "C" (composite)
attached hereto and made a part hereof.

ll(a). The Defendant has engaged in em-
ployment practices which have discriminated
against Plaintiff on the basis of her race and/or
sex in the promotion of its employees.

12. The Defendant has maintained and
continues to maintain a policy of preference to
minority applicants for both available admin-
istrative and non-administrative positions which
results in discrimination against the Plaintiff,
a white-female, contrary to the Constitution
and laws of the United States.

13. FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY has
continually sought out individuals from minority
groups to fill positions resulting in discrimina-
tion against the Plaintiff, contrary to the
Constitution and laws of the United States.

See Exhibits "D" and "E" attached hereto and

made a part hereof.

14. FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
through its agents, deceived Plaintiff into
believing that she was being considered for a
position she applied for when in reality,
Plaintiff's name had not been submitted as one
of the final candidates for the position of
Interim Counselor. See Exhibit "F" (composite)
attached hereto and made a part hereof.

15. FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY not
only rejected Plaintiff for positions for which
she was qualified and had applied, but rejected
Plaintiff for a position for which she had not
applied. See Exhibit "G" attached hereto and
made a part hereof.

16. FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY as
further evidence of its discriminatory policies
maintains files on qualified applicants for
positions by segr@€gating them as follows:
White, Black, Male, and Female, contrary to

Federal law and Equal Employment guidelines.

16(a). The acts and practices by the
Defendant described in this complaint constitute
a pattern and practice of resistance to the full
enjoyment of the right to equal employment
opportunities without distinction based on
race and/or sex and such acts and practices
are intended to deny the full exercise of rights
secured by the Constitution and laws of the
United States.

17. An actual controversy exists between
the Plaintiff and Defendant in that Plaintiff
contends that the actions of FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL
UNIVERSITY are in violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Plaintiff is in doubt as
to her status and rights under the Constitution
of the United States and seeks a declaration of
the legal and constitutional rights of the
parties with respect to the subject matter of
this action.

18. Plaintiff will continue to suffer
immediate and irreparable injury, loss of damage
unless this Court grants the injunctive relief
sought. There is no plain, adequate or speedy
remedy at law to redress these deprivations.

V.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

19. There exists between the parties an
actual controversy as heretofore set out. The
Plaintiff is suffering and is threatened with
immediate and irreparable injury as a result
of the actions of the Defendant stated above.
The Plaintiff has no plain nor adequate remedy
at law to redress the wrongs and unlawful con-
duct complained of herein. FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL
UNIVERSITY has severly damaged Plaintiff by its
discriminatory practices and has painfully
stigmatized Plaintiff, and continues to do so.
By the actions of FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVER-
SITY, Plaintiff has been discriminated against

and denied due process of law in violation of

-10-

her rights under the Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.

The Defendant has acted in violation of Title

42, U.S.C., Section 1983, to inflict said depriva-
tions on the Plaintiff.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays this Honorable
Court to enter the following relief:

A. Assume jurisdiction of this cause;

B. Enter a final judgmert pursuant to
28 U.S.C., Section 2201, and Rule 57, of the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure declaring that
the Plaintiff has suffered from acts of dis-
crimination at the hands of the Defendant or
its agents, contrary to the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment;

Cc. Require Defendant to remedy the dis-
crimination practiced upon Plaintiff by promot-
ing her to the next available position consistent
with those previously applied for and for which
she is qualified or in the alternative, to

require the Defendant to pay to the Plaintiff

-ll-

the sum of $500,000 as actual and exemplary
damages;
D. Assess all costs against the Defendant
and award the same to the Plaintiff;
E. Award attorney's fees to the Plaintiff;
F. That the Court order further equitable
and injunctive relief as it deems appropriate
and necessary to correct the conditions of dis-
crimination complained of herein.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
LAW OFFICES OF EUGENE P.
SPELLMAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff,
GEORGIA PATSY
100 North Biscayne Boulevard

Penthouse Suite
Miami, Florida 33132

-12-

‘ [CAPTION]

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Pursuant to Rule 12(b), Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the defendant, Florida Interna-
tional University (hereafter "FIU"), respect-
fully moves this Honorable Court to dismiss
the complaint against it for the following
reasons:

1. The Court lacks subject matter juris-
diction because the defendant is not a "person"
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

2. The defendant lacks the legal capacity
to be sued.

WHEREFORE, FIU respectfully requests this
Honorable Court to dismiss plaintiff's complaint
against it with prejudice, and award FIU a

reasonable attorney's fees.

Respectfully submitted,

GUY O. FARMER II

JEFFREY H. KLINK

Mahoney Hadlow & Adams

Post Office Box 4099
Jacksonville, Florida 32201
(904) 354-1100

JOHN W. KOZYAK

Mahoney Hadlow & Adams

1401 First Federal Building
One Southeast 3rd Avenue
Miami, Florida 33131

(305) 358-5550

Jeffrey H. Klink

-14-

[CAPTION]

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, a white female clerical employee
at Florida International University ("FIU"),
has sued FIU under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging
“reverse discrimination" regarding alleged
promotion opportunities. (Complaint, #4 1, 11l(a),
19) Plaintiff has also filed a motion to transfer
this matter to the Honorable Judge Eaton on the
grounds that he already has another "reverse
discrimination" suit against FIU pending before
him.

For the reasons discussed below, it is
clear that the complaint against FIU should be
dismissed with prejudice. Accordingly, the
requested dismissal, if granted, would moot the

motion to transfer.

=1 Se

ARGUMENT
I. THIS COURT SHOULD DISMISS THE COMPLAINT
AGAINST FIU BECAUSE IT IS NOT A "PERSON"
WITHIN THE MEANING OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The courts have consistently held that
states and their agencies are not "persons"
within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Vick v.

Texas Employment Commission, 514 F.2d 734 (5th

Cir. 1975); Cheramie v. Tucker, 493 F.2d 586

(5th Cir. 1974). In addition, the courts have
also consistently held that state universities
and their governing Board of Regents are state
agencies, and thus not "persons" within the

meaning of Section 1983. Ingraham v. Wright,

525 F.2d 909, 912 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,

421 U.S. 952, aff'd on other grounds, 430 U.S.

651 (1977); Blanton v. State University of New

York, 489 F.2d 377, 382 (2d Cir. 1973).
The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision of

Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, U.S. ?

56 L.Ed. 2d 611 (1978) has not overruled these

decisions with respect to state agencies being

=16=

considered "persons" under § 1983. In Monell,
the United States Supreme Court held that local

governments, municipal corporations, and/or

local indeyendent school »Soards are "persons"
subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
56 L.Ed. 2d at 618. The Supreme Court also
overruled Monroe v. Pope, 365 U.S. 167 (1967),

but only insofar as it had completely immunized
municipalities from suit under § 1983. Id. at

619. The Supreme Court explicitly noted that

its holding was “limited to local government

units which are not considered part of the
State" for Eleventh Amendment purposes.
(Emphasis added) Id. at 635 n. 54.

Thus, a fair reading of the Monell decision
can only lead to the conclusion that it is limitec
to local government units that are not considered
part of the state. The Fifth Circuit in Bogard
v. Cook, 586 F.2d 399 (Sth Cir. 1978) has re-
cently noted that the holding in Monell is so
limited:

ai Fo

The plaintiff contends that the
recent Supreme Court de~ision in
[Monell] . . . has abrogated the
state’s eleventh amendment immu-
nity when it is sued pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Nothing in
Monell, however, goes that far.
The Supreme Court explicitly
noted that its Monell holding was
"limited to local government
units which are not considered
part of the state for eleventh
amendment purposes."

586 F.2d 399 at 410 (5th Cir. 1978).
In sum, the defendant FIU, as a state
agency, is not considered to be a "person"

within the meaning of § 1983. See Aldredge v.

Turlington, TCA 78-0830, Order dated January

25, 1979 (N.D. Fla.) (A copy of this Order is
attached). Therefore, the complaint against
FIU should be dismissed with prejudice for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

II. THIS COURT SHOULD DISMISS THE

COMPLAINT AGAINST FIU BECAUSE IT
LACKS THE CAPACITY TO BE SUED.

Pursuant to Rule 17(b), Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, defendant FIU's capacity to

be sued is determined by Florida law. Byron

#18-

v. University of Florida, 403 F. Supp. 49

(N.D. Fla. 1975). Under Florida law the indi-
vidual public universities which comprise the
State University System, including FIU, see
Fla. Stat. §§ 239.01, 239.02, lack separate
corporate existence and the capacity to be
sued. Accordingly, the Court should dismiss

FIU as a party defendant. Byron, supra, 403

F. Supp. at 54.

CONCLUSION

For the preceding reasons, defendant FIU
respectfully requests this Honorable Court to
dismiss the complaint against it with preju-
dice, and award FIU a reasonable attorney's
fee, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

Respectfully submitted,
GUY O. FARMER II
JEFFREY H. KLINK
Mahoney Hadlow & Adams
Post Office Box 4099

Jacksonville, Florida 3220:
(904) 354-1100

=19e

JOHN W. KOZYAK

Mahoney Hadlow & Adams

1401 First Federal Building
One Southeast 3rd Avenue
Miami, Florida 33131

(305) 358-5550

By__/s/
Jeffrey H. Klink

LAB12/G

-20-

[CAPTION]

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

In spite of the decision in Bogard v. Cook,

586 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1978), it is still an
unsettled question as to whether or not a

"State" and/or one of its agencies or depart-
ments is considered a "person" for jurisdictional
purposes under the Civil Rights Act, Title 42
U.S.C., Section 1983. There is no question but

that Bogard takes the position that Monell v.

Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. , 98

S.Ct. 2018 (1978) continues to preclude civil
rights suits against State or their departments
while at the same time permitting suits against
"local government units". A close reading of
Monell indicates no such limitation.

Mr. Justice Brennan, in footnote number

53 stated the following:

=

"Since there is nothing in the
‘context’ of §1 of the Civil
Rights Act calling for a res-
tricted interpretation of the
word 'person', the language of
that section should prima facie
be construed to include ‘bodies
politic' among the entities
that could be sued."

and finally, the Monell concludes with a dis-

cussion of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees

Award Act of 1976, allowing attorney's fees

to the prevailing party in a 1983 Civil Rights
action. The Court pointed out in quoting from
the Senate Report on the Bill that defendants
in those cases are often states or local
bodies and that it was intended that attorney's
fees could be collected, if necessary, from
the state or local government.
The Court in Monell concluded by stating

as follows:

", . ». there can be no doubt

that Section 1 of the Civil

Rights Act was intended to pro-

vide a remedy, to be broadly

construed against, all forms of

official violation of federally
protected rights."

-22-

It should be noted that the question pre-
sented by the Defendant's motion to dismiss
is, in effect, not whether or not FLORIDA
INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY can be sued as a
party defendant, but whether or not monetary
damages can be obtained against that entity,
since the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has
entertained all actions against political
subdivisions except those for money damages.

Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School Dist.,

427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970) cert. den. 400

U.S. 991, 91 S.Ct.451; Butts v. Dallas Inde-

pendent School Dist., 436 F.2d 728 (5th Cir.

1971).

The Plaintiff herein has asked for money
damages in the claim for relief only as an
alternative to injunctive and equitable relief
and clearly if this Court is of the opinion
that monetary damages could not be assessed
against the Defendant, this Court has the

authority to strike the claim for monetary

=230

damages and permit the case to proceed solely

on the injunctive and equitable relief sought.
The Defendant takes the position that

the Supreme Court decision in Monell overrules

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473

(1961) only insofar as Monroe had completely

immunized municipalities from suit under Sec-

tion 1983. Whether that analysis is correct
or not, it should be noted that in the seven-

teen years during the existence of Monroe v.

Pape and prior to the Monell decision, Monroe
v. Pape was interpreted only as outlawing

actions for monetary damages against states

and municipal corporations. Adams v. Park

Ridge, 293 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1961); United
States v. Clark, 249 F.Supp. 720 (DC Ala. 1965).

Counsel for the Defendant have cited no
cases to this Court and, in fact, none exist
prohibiting injunctive relief against a state
or one its agencies and to the contrary, in

addition to the above cited authorities it is

quite clear that states are subject to suit for
injunctive and declaratory relief. Gates v.
Collier, 559 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1977). There-
fore, this Court should deny Defendant's
motion to dismiss and permit this cause to
proceed to a determination of the merits.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
LAW OFFICES OF EUGENE P.
SPELLMAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff,
GEORGIA PATSY
100 North Biscayne Boulevard

Penthouse Suite
Miami, Florida 33132

PY Seats BORN SRC

THIS CAUSE came before the Court on
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint
on substantive and procedural grounds. After
due consideration, the Court finds the Com-
plaint must be dismissed for its failure to
join the proper Defendant to this action.

State law determines the capacity of an
individual, corporation or other entity to
sue and be sued. Rule 17(b), Fed. R. Civ. P.
Florida Interational University is an inst-
itution which is part of the state univer-
sity system. Fla. Stat. §239.01 (1977).

The Board of Regents of the Division of
Universities of the Department of Education
is a corporate body with the power and
capacity to sue and be sued. Fla. Stat.

§240.042 (1977). No state university, in
its individual capacity, is granted such
power. “Under Florida law the University

=-26-

is not endowed with the authority to be

sued in its own name. Rather, these char-
acteristics are bestowed upon the Board of
Regents, as head of the State's University

System." Byron v. University of Florida,

403 F, Supp. 49, 54 (N.D. Fla. 1975). Ac-
cordingly, the Court finds Florida Inter-
national University not to be the proper
party Defendant in this cause.

It is thereupon

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss be and the same is hereby
GRANTED and it is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff
shall have TWENTY (20) days from the date
of this Order in which to file with the
Court an Amended Complaint. |

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers at

-27-

F. Supp. 49, 54 (N.D. Fla. 1975). Accordingly,
the Court finds Florida International University
not to be the proper party Defendant in this
cause,

It is thereupon

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss be and the same is hereby
GRANTED and it is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff shall
have TWENTY (20) days from the date of this
Order in which to file with the Court an Amended
Complaint.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers at Miami,
Florida, this 9th day of April, 1979.

ONTTED-S °K CEE DISTRICT COURT JUNCE

copies: Eugene P. Spellman, Esq.

Guy O. Farmer, II, Esq.
Jeffrey H. Klink, Esq.

-28-

Miami, Florida, this 9th day of April,
1979.

Ss
UNITED STA

copies: Eugene P. Spellman, Esq.

Guy 0. Farmer, II, Esq.
Jeffrey H. Klink, Esq.

-29-

[CAPTION]

AMENDED COMPLAINT

COMES NOW, GEORGIA PATSY, Plaintiff herein,
by and through her undersigned counsel, com-
plaining of the above Defendants and for cause
of action would respectfully show unto the
Court as follows:

I.
JURISDICTION

1. Jurisdiction is conferred on this
Court by 28 U.S.C. §1343(3) which provides for
original jurisdiction of this Court in all
actions authorized by 42 U.S.C. §1983 to
redress the deprivation under color of law of
any right, privilege or immunited secured by
the Constitution of the United States, spe-
cifically the Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.

=30=

If.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

2. GEORGIA PATSY, a white female American
and an employee of the above captioned Univer-
sity, seeks redress for discrimination due to
her race, suffered by her in violation of the
Constitution and the laws of the United States.
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges she has been
denied employment opportunities for which she
is well qualified within the above captioned
University, while there has been an intentional
and concerted effort by the University to
promote and hire minorities to available posi-
tions for which Plaintiff has applied.

Itt.
PARTIES

3. GEORGIA PATSY, Plaintiff, is a citi-
zen of the United States and a resident of the
Southern District of Florida. Plaintiff is
employed by FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

=o

and has attained permanent status within the
personnel system of the State of Florida.

4. The Defendant, BOARD OF REGENTS, of
the State of Florida is a corporate body, head
of the State's University System, of which
FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY is an
institution part of that system.

IV.

STATEMENT OF CLAIM

S. On June lst, 1972, Plaintiff began
employment as a Clerk Typist III, with FLORIDA
INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY and is presently
Classified as a Secretary III.

6. Plaintiff's education consists of a
Bachelor of Education Degree (cum laude) from
the University of Miami and a Master of Science
Degree in Administration and Supervision of
Adult Education from FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL
UNIVERSITY. Plaintiff has had continuing
teaching experience in the Dade County, Florida,

Adult Education Program.

=326

7. During the six (6) years while Plain-
tiff has been employed at FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL
UNIVERSITY, she has applied for numerous
employment openings within FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL
UNIVERSITY and has been uniformly rejected with
many Latins and non-whites having been selected
in place of the Plaintiff.

8. The following is a partial list of
available positions advertised by FLORIDA
INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY for which Plaintiff
applied for, but was rejected:

Position with Career Development
and Placement Dept.

Interim Counselor in School Education

Liason Officer and Student Affairs
Coordinator

Continuing Education Coordinator
Coordinator/Director Alumni Affairs
Vocational Counselor II

Personnel Aide

College Work-Study Coordinator

Conference Coordinator

-33-

University Public Functions Manager
Financial Aid Counselor

Student Affairs Coordinator
Admissions Counselor

9. The former President of FLORIDA
INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY, Charles Perry, has
recognized that Plaintiff's background qualifies
her for a higher position than the Secretary
III position then and now held. See Exhibit
"A" attached hereto and made a part hereof.

10. The professional skill and management
abilities of the Plaintiff have been recognized
by the Head of the Department of Psychology at
FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY. See Exhibit
"B" attached hereto and made a part hereof.

ll. The Performance Appraisal conducted
annually in accordance with the State of Florida
Personnel System shows the Plaintiff to be out-
standing, not only with respect to her assigned
tasks, but innovative, resourceful, efficient

and functioning more as a Staff Assistant than

-34-

as a secretary. See Exhibit "C" (composite)
attached. hereto and made a part hereof.

ll(a). FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
has engaged in employment practices which have
discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis
of her race and/or sex in the promotion of its
employees.

12. FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY has .
maintained and continues to maintain a policy
of preference to minority applicants for both
available administrative and non-administrative
positions which results in discrimination against
the Plaintiff, a white-female, contrary to the
Constitution and laws of the United States.

13. FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY has
continually sought out individuals from minority
groups to fill positions resulting in discrimina-
tion against the Plaintiff, contrary to the
Constitution and laws of the United States.

See Exhibits "D" and "E" attached hereto and

made a part hereof.

-35-

14. FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
through its agents, deceived Plaintiff into
believing that she was being considered for
a position she applied for when in reality,
Plaintiff's name had not submitted as one
of the final candidates for the position
of Interim Counselor. See Exhibit "F"
(composite) attached hereto and made a part
hereof.

15. FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
not only rejected Plaintiff for positions
for which she was qualified and had applied,
but rejected Plaintiff for a position for
which she had not applied. See Exhibit
"G" attached hereto and made a part hereof.

16. FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
as further evidence of its discriminatory
policies maintains files on qualified ap-
plicants for positions by segregating them
as follows: White, Black, Male and Female,
contrary to Federal law and Equal Employ-
ment guidelines.

-36-

16(a). The acts and practices by
FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY described
in this complaint constitute a pattern and
practice of resistance to the full enjoy-
ment of the right to equal employment
opportunities without distinction based
on race and/or sex and such acts and prac-
tices are intended to deny the full exer-
cise of rights secured by the Constitution
and laws of the United States.

17. An actual controversy exists
between the Plaintiff and FLORIDA INTER-
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, in that Plaintiff
contends that the actions of FLORIDA
INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY are in violation
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Plaintiff is in doubt as to her status and
rights under the Constitution of the
United States and seeks a declaration of

the legal and constitutional rights of

-37-

the parties with respect to the subject
matter of this action.

18. Plaintiff will continue to suf-
fer immediate and irreparable injury, loss
or damage unless this Court grants the
injunctive relief sought. There is no
plain, adequate or speedy remedy at law
to redress these deprivations.

V.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

19. There exists between the parties
an actual controversy as heretofore set
out. The Plaintiff is suffering and is
threatened with immediate and irreparable
injury as a result of the actions of
FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY as stated
above. The Plaintiff has no plain nor
adequate remedy at law to redress the
wrongs and unlawful conduct complained
of herein. FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVER-
SITY has severely damaged Plaintiff by

-38~-

its discriminatory practices and has
painfully stigmatized Plaintiff, and
continues to do so. By the actions of
FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY, Plain-
tiff has been discriminated against and
denied due process of law in violation
‘of her rights under the Fifth, Ninth,
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution. FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL
UNIVERSITY has acted in violation of
Title 42, U.S.C. §1983, to inflict said
deprivations on the Plaintiff.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays this
Honorable Court to enter the following
relief:

A. Assume jurisdiction of this cause;

B. Enter a final judgment pursuant
to 28 U.S.C., §2201 and Rule 57, of the ©
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure declar-
_ing that the Plaintiff has suffered from
acts of discrimination at the hands of

-39-

the Defendants or its agents, contrary
to the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment;

C. Require Defendants to remedy the
discrimination practiced upon Plaintiff
by promoting her to the next available
position consistent with those previously
app’ ied for and for which she is quali-
fied or in the alternative, to require the
Defendants to pay to the Plaintiff the
sum of $500,000 as actual and exemplary
damages;

D. Assess all costs against the
Defendant and award the same to the
Plaintiff;

E. Award attorney's fees to the
Plaintiff;

F. That the Court order further
equitable and injunctive relief as it
deems appropriate and necessary to cor-

“rect the conditions of discrimination

-40-
complained of herein.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

LAW OFFICES OF

EUGENE P. SPELLMAN

Attorney for Plaintiff

100 North Biscayne Boulevard
Penthouse Suite

Miami, Florida 33132

BY: ef ;
BY: (8/ LnAN

-4l-
October 30, 1972

Me. D. Burke Kibler, III
Post Office Box 1772
Lakeland, Florida 33802

Dear Burkes ©, g,

“Thank you for your recent latter concerning the
employment status of Mrs. John Patsy at Florida’ International,
Our Personnel Department has advised me that Mrs. Patsy is
being considered for the position of Secretary III in the
Division of iimalth and Physical Education, Recreation and

_ Athletics in the School of Iducation,.

“* ty the past she has been interviewed by the Dean of the

“Division of Special Programs and the Director of Financial Aid.
‘Cader tnnaeesy, there are just not an y Seenesler positions
o

available. realize Mrs. Patsy's ba ekground ifies her
for a higher position than the c typies position she now
holds. wUowever, as che situation sta the Secretary III

position is the highest one we have to offer.

+ op je Thank you for your interest-and best wishes.
, ., Sincerely,

, ‘Charles gE. Perry
“* President

: FC/jm —

bee:* ‘Personnel Department with file

Cana 7 rat

-42-

FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

MEMORANDUM
ne. pe 7
TO: Mrs. Georgia Patsy 4 DATE: June 21, 1977

FROM: Dr. Ronald S. rioters

SUBJECT: CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY

It goes without saying, from my point of view that
your presence in the Department as ny Secretary and
Office Manager have created what [ believe to be an
outstanding professional attitude within the office
staff. I have worked with many secretaries over the
peers but never have I been so pleased and proud to

e able to recognize formally the contribution of some-
one like yourself. You have really taken charge and

set a tone and atmosphere that is absolutely outstanding.
Your professional competence, personal skills, and
management abilities have impressed me greatly. More
work is being done in the Department than has ever been
done before, it is being done better, and with more
professionalism than before. You have created an

esprit de corps among the other members of the secretarial
staff that is going a long ways to keeping our Department
ene efficient in the face of all sorts of pressures

and demands.

Your nde ade 4 to handle pressure situations, keeping
me and other members of the faculty in tow when necessary,
and dealing with administrative matters within the
University that relate to the Department,.in a cool and
proficient way with a sense of humor, has made a significant
contribution to the well being of the Department. It gives
me great pleasure to be able to take this opportunity to
recognize in a formal way your outstanding contributions

to the Department and in particular for your work directly
related to my activities. I wish there were some way that
I could more properly recognize the contributions you ahd
other members of the secretarial staff have made to all of
us in the Department.

cc: Dean Arthur Herriott, College of Arts § Sciences
Mrs. Patricia Caruso, Director of Personnel

( Inter—office Communicarion )

Fy» y 0 rt :

my

FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY 00046
. ERFORMANCE WPrHAISAL .
Nene PALSY. Georgia D. Social Security No. 222eSAel69S
Oepariment _ 2ayeholocy Clasticavon Title

Tyee ot Aoererat: C Prananenary Annwersary ” §9 Segeiat

OTR: 18 eee 4 10 Be Smee Wy RE ES ore meer ERT Ew errenE meh IMO
Ree MRE rER ANE (RN A he FEE ent [he Grane sent WF cemermng

CO smewe teareteevery Justification:

OC sassetoctery excentional ne rs oa a
OC cwnssereret r}
oa wmaesseiaewery 40
O Net seprcsoe .

3. QUANTITY ‘? sty, vol
B cvatmneng .
O seve sersstornery cme -Mrs_2atsy always dears
OC tecsetecvery
OC Comtserenes
o Qwest. ef cowry
CNet heormnre

4. DEPENDASILITY (Reliable, trustworthy, requias in attendance)

Jeseséientions Sompletely reliable...

if

(Consider delegation of sesiensents, directing «ere flew snd
fellewing up on resuits.
ica :

|

i

(Dene (6 wet sitean sed achnewe goes wens sich One! e.oeredee(y |

Justification: ~Somplete self-starter,

:

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responsibility voluntarily.
WETTE-Persenne. Serviess + CANART-Evelescer’s Copy - PINE-Capleyes Cop,

ee 1 aye te

-44-
4

a . * 00047

of others, inetudeng vertal anet eeriiten comemumeat-on.
t ecven) Vee only whes

7. SUPERVISORY ABILITY (Eite a .
é femie §«—- eVENCES and co™OIEN, ong
Satan, @ supervisor.

O amore seasetectory Justification:
OC sesssteceoey

CO comes cranes

( tnsessstenvery

O Net Anpicaste °

(D *mere seesetacrory £
S eastesweer y sotetttontt ind stir Hef¥tery—
o Comat tomes

more a3 By $ a nt

Use ectschrenca, |! neceesary.
Seqratere of Emoe Osce:
(Dees net imply conaurrence with espervenr's evewatien, enty thet evelueuen wes made End reviewed By employes.)
Sagnemse of sete SupErvrter Data:
Signacere of Seeend-Level Supervises or Dept. Reed Oates

The employee vase iaforned of his/her progess on the following dates:

Supervisor and employee should indicate agreenent ef dates by initisling.

-45-
00048

2.” Te FLO’ 2A INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSI’ ~
. PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL

Name —_—— a: i! Socia! Security No. 99% 610" **t

Tyee et Agoret: O Precstionsry OAnnwermry 0 Sensis

OTE: «The term @ 0 Be eEmeteeed By Ce enEE GEE ON (Oren Om OO
~ mee eee en oe eee wees Ns eee me
ome ree ee re om Bee rowerte mae ter

O ‘seve Gometerey Justification:

ated =m see Ye -

ton etoamery
comets thoes pela Ae
emoets sisceery

aa? AAS 2H ASESee @ feane. |
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3. (Productivity, volume)

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(Deowe te met ste ow gue seeks ettiuenst

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FPR e Fe a ee ah e m

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WEITE-Perscnnel Services - CAMARI-tvalseter’ ° vonmesmaale nd
. © Copy

p eg SPe oe?
SRE weed? *:.:
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-46-

O Ovescancing 4 supervisor.
© sasve sessetenseey Justification:
O seaseteoweey
CO comssesones
Seessstecwry
O Net Appiacsate
fj aoe toe
Aewwe tease fenrery
Ol teaseternery
O comttetenes
Q Mettiotamnerr
=
kK . Y ey if nemeary.
tensa win 4 ees fot OF
Generar aeee * Gnty Ct evahsaten wes made and revenwed By emolover |
Sagrsnse of |nrmemote Z , me 4. fae 2°42 7”
7 “rej! me nf
Signecere ef Secend-Level Supervises os Dept. feed we! ave Se ecnes 723!

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ee eel 1/71

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-48-

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PRAPURPANGL APPRAISAL IGAMLA SCAVICK LPLOTELS)

cnusdoninnen Pays test Education

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@ the reverse side of tars

00051

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uASSiF ication: Jaceotary Tit

AmmivERsaay = EVALUATION — PERIOD COVERED BY THIS EV ICW=n=Freml ) = 1O7Sle

Yon-suservisery employee - cote only [ec iera lod

thts revvew anti! sou read ane understane iw oo on the Performance Acpraital System for Career
48 reorceuced on

a, Ny

1. Sweervisory emplover + “pup. al! “s6sarn ich

vagton GAT ISP acTOsY COND LT | Crna, SaTisvactoay Sal iavactoay
1 7 3 o°O°@ Fé A ,
1) grewlecge of | Mes HOt gained ade | Insufficient tnewi~ | Adewete tae! [aero commie
sa — eoee of wens orate | rege of oi! presen jeege of o!! sneses
of 0. af ‘oe. Igentscs
ane wore
(2) Quality 6
tty
(2) Sepenaaet tity ees tate ona = | Freqwentiy tate one | Utuall, orerene ‘Serge tate oF ane
. ton spsent. 41th s00eRt. Aubt be ree-| at sen@tulew Limes. [arnt aares coil in
p+. tweervisien | ularly sreeses ‘0 lemgiras wily ders i" suyence
soldem fintenes as- | eccomplien ansrqned [eae comeran, | teRk Saorertion
een lS A... ws eal — =————
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(4) tnvetacive Shows «© \eterest Fremwantiy sperers | emt mterett 18 lire tatermiog io
‘a 308. beg ant atl liees Ce [yet mt trem qeoas
wetiling ce sccept | ac. cpt respensi~ Oe ie
revpensieility. tot ity. a...
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(8) Seservisery y pon md Gemne- §=— | Consistently trmm itgme rates os-
aptlity Stretes deficient eile? malities
(vee enty ton, sresntiatien, plane ro c
Seeciict) | Messrs sins. |erlitig. tre rr |tmo ttiie; obs” [nie sei. Soe
a tegery' ser) § tal of - 4

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-50-

Sas hh ae UUUSG
F* ~ GA INTERNATIONAL WITVERSITY ~~
PERFORMANCE APPPAISAL
Sageer Service tmployees
/

Vem _P. Classification. Gleck: Typist Uz
College/Division__preical stucaricn_____., Social Security Number Pe a ae
Bayleywent 060e:__ 621272 “— acnoccesososcsooy/Anniversary Date Evaluation
Period Covered by this Review: From Licld-71_. te Lslo-74

Sy bes cintinen tite seviey winks ses send cnt understand TIU policies on the
and Uniform Pay Plan for Career Service tnployees.

Rate each factor

- by eizeling the Above
| @
if

woeweeeene ew we
e Fre Fe ere Ke Ke ee
eeeeeseeee

Signature: _Date
"S JUSTIFICATION: (Required for any score less than 16 of acre than 23, with exacgies
an te why and hew this eaployee is performing either above or Selow the Satisfactory ern.)

lis past year. She does not need to be told wnat to do. she is organized.
let _vork is very good. and she puts « great des extra time into her
—iobs_.she_nes handled her Oivision responsibilities well and she gots siong

ibilities wel she gats along
ith everyone. She is always able to do the little extira things that nake

-5l-

Gareer Service Employees
Classification ae ras a
p Social Security ‘umber
: Purpose: =
ayleyeent once dL Dah — 6 mo. tvaluattonSgaiversary Date tvaluati>,
“exiled Covered by this Review: From &.40:-7 3 4:-10.773 _.

so not camflete this review until you reed and understand PIU policies on the
and Uniform Pay Plan for Career Service Exployees.

“ppearance noo ® 2 2 °
Actendance scot ey) 2 a 0
Mmoviedse of ob 6 @) 3 2 2 °
Quality of work 3 2 2 0
Quantity of work =f) 3 2 1 0
Initiative 0) 3 2 a 9
Dependability 1) 3 2 1 °
Acti tude 9 a 2 1 0
Relationship vith 4 ® a 1 °
Others

ceestanding , 32 and above Total Seore 2.2

MLA
pantin (deren)
WAAAY 2as

aie

Af 59

70: Dean Sowards . ° 00055
Gageer Service Exployces
wame___Patsy, Georgie 0. Classification Secretary 122
College/Pivision__ Physical Eduestion Social Security Mumba s_232-54-}695 ~
Bayloyeent Doce: 11/20/72. ‘ 6 to. teasieslenneNeNNpEEnetionen
Period Covered by this Review: from 11/10/72 gt} —«8/10/73

De not camlete this review until you read and understand TIU policies on the
and Uniform Pay Plan for Career Service Employees,

by circling the Above ‘
gumerical velue Outstanding setisfectory satisfactory _Conditionel __unsstislacsory
Appearance xxx (y 2 1 C)
Attendance Uo 3 2 1 ()
Knowledge of Job 1D) 3 2 1 Q
Quality of Work y 3 2 1 C)
Quantity of work Y 3 2 1 r)
Initiative y 3 2 1 C)
Dependability ¥ 3 1 °

3 1 C)

3 1 C)

47 60

-53-

INDIANA "NIVERSI1.
School of Heauh, Phyncal Kducauan, ana Reerauen

40re erusnne
BLOOMINGTON. INOIAmA stene
PUVOIGAs LOUGETION Fon wan April 17, 1973 sete Geen 41+ 337=LB4s
Te... +e.
fe
ar
Dr. Poul £. Mavtren
of Health, Physical
Eduestion and

Vlovide International Caiversity
Temieai Treil
“Niemi, Florida 33144
Dear Dr. Hartman:

s you have indicated Slacks end Latins, I have no other people to ic
Big at the present cine, but vill their names for consideration if I find

a pbladke 23-73 Yld0g-m.
TO THALST Coll 24°78
0 pth Neate L fame ap WS

TF. TH Alen, FB Cotte

Exner D

Bh 6)

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es 00087

TLS7DSA CTANATIONAL UiIVER icy

ait st OFA MS oF 88

rx | Cr. Giann A. Goerke DATE: fuly 9, 1973
FROMs Cuaries €. 7arcy
SUITECT: Wreatling Coach

Just @ remioder wt you end to Cr. Sartmman that sone of ‘te head coaches
are ta Se appointed without Seing interviewed and approved by =e. | assume
thas this will be dene in regard to the wrestling coach.

Dis sy undersandisg that thers is an cutstamding Black ‘wrestling ¢sach
<= Mlami-Cade Sout who is 4 graduate of Tlerida A&M and has &@ Masters
degree from semeplace. | further understand that be has had 3 great (aterest
<2 the wrestliag job here at Plerida Icternaticnal. = -vould seem to =e that
we should lcok very carefully et this young san, secause having & heed coach
whe news the local wrestiing siszaticn (and who (2 lack) would se a great
edvemtage ta the University.

Thank you.

esr Cr. Peul Hartman (~
Cr? /nen

-55-

" (0058

FLOniDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVER ITY

GATE: Cotober 22, 1976

ae

-

js wH IIT

Y 63

9

-56-

Paul Gallagher Oct. S$, 1976
Judy Blucker t “. :
Candidates for Counseling Position . 4
My ranking of the candidates after reviow of <heis
resumes are as follcws: .
1. Jobs &. Taylor in counseliag
_— ve and other calf-initiaced
eee. * bilities :
" Margaret ouiley” Some as above plus teaching
' ~ ; .
« Cazol Cooper ; Same as above plus eccial
* work experience
4. Joanna Albert Training in Counseling)
S. Barbara Bader Sxperéence in working with

teacher education students
6. Joseph W. Wesley Education training is
Counseling; little or no
P experience (actual experience) .
7. Temes McKinney Educational background:
; ; little experienco ;

4 * 64

-57-

FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

Tamiaw: TRAiL © WiaAMe FLOMIS& 33°98 © (308) S82-2181

ACMINISTRATIVE AFFAIRS
OPINCE OF PURBCPONEL SEPICES

Me. Georgia Patsy
6325 S$. W. 151 Street
Miami, Plorida 33158

Oear Ms. Patsy:

I would like to express our appreciation for your interest in
the Admissions Counselor position that was recently available
= the Registrar's Office. The selection process was difficult
tive. This is to notify you that the position was
filled by another applicant. Since you are a qualities applicant,
we would like to keep your application active consideration in

future openings.

of the - An source of informa on
exp ties is the State of Florida Cepartment of
Education's ition Vacancy Listing, which is also posted in
Personnel. This listing is on a weekly basis and
includes details on all ¢ ty, administrative/professional
and Career Service time card-exempt position v: t are

Wek cppureunition within the Gaiverss
versity.
will be glad to assist you in any way

possible should you have any Surther es.
Sincerely,
Susan Pyle,
ni deaviecs
SP:iftc

en G

#065

-58-

[CAPTION]

DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO
DISMISS THE AMENDED COMPLAINT

Pursuant to Rule 12(b), Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, the defendant, Florida
Board of Regents ("BOR"), respectfully
moves this Honorable Court to dismiss the
amended complaint against it for the
following reasons:

1. The Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction because the defendant is not
a "person" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
because the plaintiff has failed to
exhaust her administrative remedies.

2.* The amended complaint fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.

DEFENDANT'S ALTERNATIVE MOTION
FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT

Should this Court deny the BOR's
dismissal motions, then pursuant to Rule

12(e), F.R.Civ.P., the BOR respectfully

-59-

moves this Court to order Plaintiff to
render a more definite statement of her
claim.

WHEREFORE, the BOR respectfully
requests this Court to dismiss the amended
complaint with prejudice and award the BOR
a reasonable attorneys’ fee. Alternatively,
the BOR respectfully requests a more def-
inite statement of plaintiff's claims.

Respectfully submitted,

GUY O. FARMER II

JEFFREY H. KLINK

Mahoney, Hadlow & Adams

Post Office Box 4099
Jacksonville, Florida 32201
(904) 354-1100

JOHN W. KOZYAK

Mahoney, Hadlow & Adams
1401 First Federal Building
One Southeast 3rd Avenue
Miami, Florida 33131

(305) 358-5550

By /s/
Jeffrey H. Klink

-60-

[CAPTION]

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE
AMENDED COMPLAINT

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, a white female clerical
employee at Florida International Univer-
sity ("FIU"), has now refiled her com-
plaint against the Florida Board of
Regents ("BOR"). Plaintiff contends that
she has suffered "reverse (racial) discrim-
ination” in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
("§ 1983") apparently because she has
unsuccessfully applied for positions for
which FIU has engaged in "an intentional
and concerted effort" to fill with minor-
ity applicants (Latins and non-whites).
(Complaint 44 2, 7, 8, 1l(a), 12, 16(a))
Plaintiff also generally contends that
she has suffered sex discrimination.
(Complaint ¥{ 1ll(a), 16(a)) The balaice
of plaintiff's "Statement of Claim" con-

-6l-

cerns evidentiary matters dealing with
her alleged qualifications and FIU's
alleged record-keeping policies (Complaint
qa 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 16), FIU's efforts
to fill vacancies which were apparently
not sought by plaintiff (Complaint 44 13,
15), FIU's alleged “deceit” in failing
to advise plaintiff correctly as to her
status as a "finalist" in contention for
a particular position. (Complaint q 14).
Based on these allegations, plaintiff
makes several relief oriented statements
and requests. (Complaint { 17, 18, and
19).

For all the following reasons, this
Court should dismiss the Amended Complaint
because plaintiff's allegations fail to
state a claim upon which relief can be
granted and reveal the absence of subject

matter jurisdiction.

-62-

ARGUMENT

I. THIS COURT SHOULD DISMISS THE AMENDED
COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
BECAUSE:

A. The Board of Regents Is Not A
"Person" Within The Meaning of
42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The courts have consistently held
that states and their agencies are not
"persons" within the meaning of § 1983.
Vick v. Texas Employment Commission, 514

F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1975); Cheramie v.

Tucker, 493 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1974).
This exclusion also encompasses state
universities and their governing boards.

Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909, 912

(5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 421 U.S.

952, aff'd on other grounds, 430 U.S. 651

(1977); Blanton v. State University of

New York, 489 F.2d 377, 382 (2nd Cir. 1973).
Finally, the Fifth Circuit has made it
quite clear that a defendant's status as

a “person" under § 1983 does not vary

-63-

depending upon the relief sought.

Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio, 528

F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc),

vacated and rem. on other grounds, 57

L.Ed. 2d 1144 (1°78). The recent U.S.
Supreme Court decision of Monell v.

Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. ’

56 L.Ed. 2d 611 (1978) has not overruled
these decisions with respect to the
status of state agencies as "persons"
under § 1983.
In Monell, the Supreme Court held that.

local governments, municipal corporations,

and/or local independent school boards
are "persons" subject to liability under
§ 1983. Id. at 635. The holding however

only overruled Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167

(1967), insofar as it had completely

immunized municipalities from suit under

§ 1983. Id. at 619. The Supreme Court
explicitly noted that its decision did

-64-

not affect the status of governmental
units which are considered part of the
State for Eleventh Amendment purposes.
Id. at 635 n. 54. The Fifth Circuit
in Bogard v. Cook, 586 F.2d 399, 410

(5th Cir. 1978) recently affirmed
this reading of Monell.

In sum, the BOR as a state agency
lacks the status of a "person" within

the meaning of § 1983. See Aldredge v.

Turlington, TCA 78~0830, Order dated

January 25, 1979 (N.D. Fla.) (A copy of
this Order was attached to FIU's initial
motions to dismiss.) Accordingly, this
Court should dismiss the complaint against
the BOR for lack of subject matter juris-
diction.

-65-

B. Plaintiff Has Failed To
Exhaust Her Administrative
Remedies

Unless an administrative remedy is
inadequate or futile, federal courts
generally should not involve themselves
in civil rights disputes until such
remedies have been exhausted. See gen-

erally, Gibson v. Berry Hill, 411 U.S.

564, 36 L.Ed. 2d 488 (1973); McKart v.
United States, 395 U.S. 185, 23 L.Ed. 2d

194 (1969); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268,

83 L.Ed. 1281 (1939); Penn v. Schlesinger,

497 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1974); Whitner v.

Davis, 410 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1969); Cray-
croft v. Ferral, 408 F.2d 587 (9th Cir.

1969).

One can find language in Supreme
Court decisions which seems to imply that
plaintiffs are not required to exhaust
administrative remedies prior to filing
suit to vindicate their civil rights.

-66-

See Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d

Cir. 1969). However, a close analysis
of those cases, Id. at 567-569, and a
review of later Supreme Court authority,

see Gibson v. Berry Hill, supra, reveals

that the Supreme Court has only condemned
a “wooden application of the exhaustion
doctrine in cases under the Civil Rights

Act." Bisen v. Eastman, supra, 421 F.2d

at 569. As Judge Friedly stated:

Exhaustion of state admin-
istrative remedies is not
required where the admin-
istrative remedy is inade-
quate ... or where it is
certainly or probably fu-
tile .... A quite different
situation would be pre-
sented, for example, when
a complaint alleged that

a subordinate state offi-
cer had violated the plain-
tiff's Constitutional
rights by acting because
of bias ... and the state
has provided for a speedy
appeal to a higher admin-
istrative officer ....

We shall need much clearer
directions than the
[Supreme] Court has yet

a67~

given or, we believe,
will give, before we
hold that plaintiffs
in such cases may turn
their backs on state
administrative reme-
dies and rush into a
federal forum, whether
their actions fall
under the Civil Rights
Act or come under
general federal juris-
diction.

Id. The Fifth Circuit has also required
that administrative remedies be exhausted--

particularly in school personnel and

management problems where there is a
governing board as in this case--in order
to insure that the alleged grievances are
"ripe for adjudication." For example,

in Stevenson v. Board of Education of

Wheeler County, Georgia, 426 F.2d 1154

(5th Cir. 1970), Judge Bell noted the
Supreme Court cases which appear to
dispense with the requirement of "exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies" in civil

rights actions, but held that exhaustion

-§8-

was generally necessary to insure insti-
tutional finality:

We do not take these
{U.S. Supreme Court]
cases to hold, how-
ever, that federal
courts are to inter-
vene in school per-
sonnel and management
problems without re-
quiring such prior
reference to local in-
stitutional authority
as may be necessary to
assure that the action
complained of is final
within the institution
in the sense that it
is ripe for adjudica-
tion.

426 F.2d at 1157. In the instant case,
plaintiff's alleged grievances clearly
lack this "institutional finality."

As a Career Service employee, Ms.
Patsy has access to several administrative
grievance procedures in the State Univer-
sity System. The administrative rules of
the Department of Administration Career

Service System, Division of Personnel pro-

-69-

vide that each Career Service employee
or applicant shall be assured of an
equal opportunity in all agency employ-
ment practices without regard to that
person's "race, color, sex, religion,
creed, national origin, political
opinions or affiliations, or age" except
as provided by law. Fla. Admin. Code,
Chapter 22A-15.02(1). These rules also
provide for a comprehensive complaint,
review and appeal procedure for any
Career Service employee or applicant who
feels he or she has been aggrieved with
respect to equal employment opportunity.
Id., Chapter 22A-15.05. The Department
of Administration also requires each
agency to establish written procedures
for handling grievances of Career Service
employees. Id., Chapter 22A-10.04. As
a result of this requirement, the admin-

istrative rules of the Department of

-70-

Education, Florida International Univer-
sity provide a comprehensive method of
handling the grievances of its Career
Service employees. Id., Chapter 6C8-4.05.
Under these rules, Ms. Patsy could have
initiated an adequate and readily avail-
able grievance procedure after the denial
of any of her applications. Id., Chapter
6C8-4.05(2) (a).

Finally, the BOR has the responsibility
of managing and regulating the State Uni-
versity System, Fla. Stat. §§ 20.15,

239.01, 240.001 and 240.042, including

its inherent power (through the Chancellor)
to implement the University System's non-
discrimination and equal employment
oportunity. Moreover, the administrative
rules of the BOR provide that university
presidents and "any other personnel employed

in the State University System" shall have

-7l-

access to the BOR through its Chancellor
Florida Admin. Code, Chapter 6C-4.01(6).
Thus, plaintiff had this additional avenue
of administrative relief available to her.
In sum, if plaintiff was a victim
of discrimination, she had several full
and adequate administrative remedies in
the State University System which she
could have pursued. Instead, she has
apparently elected to bypass these pro-
cedures and prematurely burden this Court
with her claims. Plaintiff's failure to
present her grievances to the appropriate
administrative agencies undermines any
possible claim of “institutional finality."
Accordingly, for this reason, plaintiff's
alleged claims should be dismissed for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

-72-

II. THIS COURT SHOULD DISMISS THE AMENDED
COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE ANY
CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED.

A. Respondeat Superior Fails To Pro-
vide Any Adequate Basis For
Imposing § 1983 Liability Upon
The BOR.

Assuming, arguendo, that the BOR is
a “person” under § 1983, the complaint
fails to allege an adequate predicate
for imposing liability. The complaint
alleges the FIU has discriminated against
plaintiff and assumes BOR's responsibility
for this alleged § 1983 misconduct

based on an agency or respondeat superior

theory of liability. However, it is

clear that respondeat superior fails to

provide an adequate basis for imposing
§ 1983 liability. Monell, supra, 56 L.

Ed. 2d at 635-638. In sum, unless plain-
tiff in good faith can allege that the of-
ficial policies of the BOR caused the
alleged discrimination (See Ch. 6C-5.01
Fla. Admin. Code) or that the BOR

-73-

authorized or ratified the alleged mis-
conduct, the § 1983 claims should be
dismissed with prejudice. Jones v. City

of Memphis Tenn., 586 F.2d 622, 624-625

(6th Cir. 1978); Duchesne v. Sugarman,

566 F.2d 817, 830 (2d Cir. 1977); Kostka
v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 39 (lst Cir. 1977);
Sims v. Adams, 437 F.2d 829, 832 (5th

Cir. 1976) (Court noted with approval that
the complaint did not rest on any theory

of vicarious liability); Bracey v. Gren-

oble, 494 F.2d 566, 569-570 (3d Cir. 1974);
Jennings v. Davis, 476 F.2d 1271, 1274

(8th Cir. 1973); Adams v. Pate, 445 F.2d

105, 107 (7th Cir. 1971).

B. Plaintiff's "Discrimination"
Allegations Are Inadequate To
State A Justifiable Claim Upon
Which Relief Can Be Granted.

In essence, plaintiff has invited

this Court to declare "affirmative action”

=F4=

policies, which may have affected her,
unconstitutional. The Court should view
her invitation as defective for several
reasons.

The federal government (Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare) re-
quires the BOR to maintain an "affirmative
action" policy. 45 C.F.R. §§80.3, 80.4,
80.5 (1978). Pursuant to that obligation,
FIU administrators must indeed make an
"intentional and concerted effort" to
seek out and hire qualified members of
minority groups. Although in a different
context, the U.S. Supreme Court recently
sanctioned a university's consideration
of a person's minority status in its

admissions policies. University of Cali-

fornia v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 57 L.Ed.

2a 750 (1978). The constitutionality
of affirmative action programs in the

employment context is also presently be-

-75-

fore the Supreme Court. See Weber v.

Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 563

F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. granted,

58 L.Ed. 2d 704 (1978). Given the compro-
mise course which Bakke followed, it would
seem most unlikely that the Supreme Court
will declare employment-related affirma-
tive action programs unconstitutional.
In sum, the mere fact that the BOR or
FIU has made an affirmative action commit-
ment does not entitle plaintiff to any
relief.

Plaintiff complains that she failed
to secure various positions for which
she applied and was qualified while non-
whites and Latins generally fared better.
Absent any allegation that the minority
members selected for these positions
lacked the requisite qualifications, how-
ever, plaintiff's discrimination charges

lack constitutional significance. The

-76-

complaint totally fails to place plain-
tiff in the position of a "Bakke" or a
"Weber". Affirmative action programs are
a sanctioned fact of life. Only when race
mechanically (e.g., a quota system) serves
to favor the objectively unqualified at
the expense of the objectively qualified -
scores or grades (Bakke) or seniority
(Weber) - does discrimination in a con-
stitutional sense allegedly exist. Clearly
plaintiff's present complaint does not
place her in any category which would
entitle her to judicial relief.

In sum, absent any specific allega-
tions that, as to a particular hiring
decision, plaintiff was rejected in favor
of an unqualified (or even lesser qual-
ified) minority applicant because of race,
her complaint, like the recent Sears suit,

Sears, Roebuck Co. v. Attorney General of

the United States, F.Supp » 29

-17-

EPD 49164A (D. DC. 1979), should be

viewed merely as a “political essay."

While the complaint may provide philosophi-
cal grist for the executive or legislative
"mills," it does not presently warrant

grinding by the federal judiciary.

III. THIS COURT SHOULD REQUIRE PLAINTIFF

TO RENDER A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT

OF HER CLAIMS.

Should the Court deny the motions to
dismiss or dismiss the complaint with
further leave to amend, then the Court,
in fairness to the BOR, should require
plaintiff to render a more definite state-
ment of her claim. Granted, federal "no-
tice" pleading requirements under Rule 8,
Fed. R. Civ. P., are quite liberal. How-
ever, several of plaintiff's allegations
are so vague or ambiguous that the BOR

cannot reasonably frame a responsive

pleading.

-738-

Plaintiff contends she has worked
at FIU since 1972 and has applied for
numerous positions consistently without
success although many Latins and non-
whites were selected. (Complaint 4q 5,
7). In Paragraph 8, she partially lists
those positions for which she has unsuc-
cessfully applied. In Paragraphs ll(a),
12, 13 and 16(a), plaintiff makes conclu-
sory sex and/or race discrimination allega-
tions. A more definite statement of her
claims should remedy the following ambi-
guities and questions before the BOR must
respond:

Sex discrimination - Other than her

conclusory allegations in Paragraphs 11 (a)
and 16(a), the complaint fails to indicate
when or where plaintiff allegedly suffered
sex discrimination. Indeed, sex discrim-

ination charges appear to have no rela-

tionship to her grievances.

=FQu'

Racial Discrimination - The complaint

does not indicate which particular hiring
decisions were allegedly improper. Every
position for which plaintiff applied? Only
those positions in Paragraph 8? Every po-
sition for which plaintiff applied and a
minority member was selected? In sum,

what specific hiring decisions does plain-
tiff desire this Court to examine for al-
leged impermissible minority preferences,
and when did they occur?

As to each specific challenged hiring
decision, why is it allegedly discrimin-
atory? Did the minority member selected
allegedly lack the requisite qualifications?

* pid plaintiff allegedly possess superior
qualifications?

The elimination of these ambiguities
in the complaint would minimize expensive
and time-consuming discovery. In sum,
plaintiff has launched an across-the-board

attack on FUI's affirmative action pro-
grams which may have affected her. All
the BOR requests is for plaintiff to
identify which employment decisions it
must defend and why. Since this request
only slightly inconveniences plaintiff,
the BOR respectfully submits that the
potential savings in terms of discovery
time and expense attest to the reasonable-
ness and fairness of a more definite

statement.

CONCLUSION

The federal government and most
state governments have woven “affirmative
action" into the political and economic
fabric of this country. Plaintiff's am-
biguous "reverse discrimination" complaint
provides inadequate justifications for
this Court to examine whether FIU's re-

quired affirmative action efforts have

-8l-

violated her constitutional rights. She
has prematurely chosen to burden this
Court with legally defective allegations.
Adequate administrative remedies and,
suitable judicial vehicles for securing
any necessary equitable and legal relief
certainly exist. Pending her pursuit of
either administrative or appropriate legal
remedies, this Court should not accept
her defective invitation to scrutinize
personnel decisions for alleged consti-
tutional infirmities. For all the pre-
ceding reasons, defendant BOR respect-
fully requests this Honorable Court to
dismiss the amended complaint. Alter-
natively, the BOR respectfully requests
a more definite statement of plaintiff's
claims.

-§2-
Respectfully submitted,

GUY O. FARMER II

JEFFREY H. KLINK

Mahoney, Hadlow & Adams
Post Office Box 4099
Jacksonville, Florida 32201
(904) 354-1100

JOHN W. KOZYAK

Mahoney, Hadlow & Adams
1401 First Federal Building
One Southeast 3rd Avenue
Miami, Florida 33131

(305) 358-5550

B s
Y certvey (eo RITE

-83-

[CAPTION]

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

The Plaintiff herein files this mem-
orandum of law in opposition to the motion
to dismiss amended complaint and memorandum
of law in support thereof filed on behalf
of the Defendant, BOARD OF REGENTS, here-
inafter referred to as BOARD.

Initially, it should be noted that:

"On a motion to dismiss, material

allegations of the complaint are

taken as admitted, and the com-
plaint is to be liberally construed
in favor of the plaintiff. Jenkins

v. McKeithen, 395, U.S. 411, 421

n.89 S.Ct. 1843, 23 L.Ed. 2d 404

(1969)." Kennedy v. H & M Lading,

Inc., 529 F. Yr. ).
In addition:

"Ordinarily a motion to dismiss

should be disfavored and doubt

should be resolved in favor of

the pleader." Williams v. Gorton,

529 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1976).

It has also been held that a case
brought under Section 1983, Title 42 U.S.C.,

should be not dismissed at the pleading

-84-

stage unless it appears to a certainty
that the Plaintiff would be entitled
to no relief under any state of facts
which could be proven in support of his

Claim. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41

(1957); Barnes v. Merritt, 376 F.2d 8

(Sth Cir. 1967); and Holmes v. New York

City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262

(2nd Cir. 1968).

IS THE BOARD OF REGENTS A "PERSON" WITHIN
THE MEANING OF 42 U.S.C., SECTION 1983

Florida Statute, Section 240.042

creates the BOARD OF REGENTS as follows:

"(1) The Board of Regents is
hereby created as a body cor-
porate, and shall have a cor-
porate seal; shall elect a
corporate secretary; shall
have and employ a staff at-
torney and all other neces-
sary personnel; shall have
power to contract and be
contracted with; to sue and be
sued; to plead and be im-
pleaded in all courts of law

and Sees 5 eo ot (Emphasis
supplies’)

-85-

The Legislature of the State of
Florida, in their wisdom, has seen to
it that the BOARD OF REGENTS of the State
of Florida is an entity subject to the
jurisdiction of this Court and properly
named as a party defendant in this action.

It has been recognized in Byron v. Univer-

sity of Florida, 403 F.Supp. 49 (N.D. Fla.

1975) that:

" . . ». under Florida law the
University is not endowed

with separate corporate exis-
tence, nor with the authority
to be sued in its own name.
Rather those characteristics
are bestowed upon the Board of
Regents, as need of the State's
Ont

versity System." (Emphasis
Supplied).

Likewise in Wolfe v. O'Neill, 336

F.Supp. 1255 (D.Alaska 1972) and Craig
v. Alabama State University, 451 F.Supp.

1207 (M.D. Ala. 1978), it was held that
the Board of Regents and a Board of

Trustees were "persons" within the mean-

-~86-

ing of the 1871 Civil Rights Statute
(42 U.S.C., §1983).

Clearly, based upon the above and
foregoing authorities in the State of
Florida, the BOARD OF REGENTS is an
entity properly before this Court.

FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

Defendant has claimed that the com-
plaint herein be dismissed for the failure
of the Plaintiff to have availed herself
of and/or exhaust certain alleged admin-
istrative remedies to undue the grievous
wrong inflicted upon her.

It is the law from the Supreme Court
of the United States and from the Fifth
Circuit that exhaustion of neither State
administrative nor State judicial remedies
are required prior to bringing an action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C., §1983. Chief

Judge Brown in Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d

430 (5th Cir. 1970), Judge Wisdom in Moreno

-87-

v. Henckel, 431 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir. 1970)

and Judge Goldberg in Hobbs v. Thompson,

448 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1971), speaking

for their respective panels, all concluded
that one of the purposes underlying 42
U.S.C., §1983 is to provided a remedy

in Federal court which is supplementary

to any remedy in State proceedings. Ses
also, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,

93 S.Ct. 1827 (1973); Carter v. Stanton,

405 U.S. 669, 92 S.Ct. 1232 (1972) and

McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S.

668, 83 S.Ct. 1433 (1973).

Based upon the above and foregoing
authorities, neither exhaustion of
state nor judicial remedies were required
as a prerequisite to bringing the action

in this Court.

RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR

Defendant claims unequivocally

"that respondeat superior fails to pro-

vide an adequate basis for imposing Sec-
tion 1983 liability." The law is not

as clear, especially in the Fifth Circuit
as the Defendant suggests:

"Moreover, assertions of insula-
tion from liability because
§1983 does not permit deriva-
tive, respondeat superior,
liability are questionable,
and, at best, overbroad. It is
true that some cases hold

that absent overt acts, §1983
does not authorize recovery

of monetary damages through
respondeat superior, see, e.g.,
Johnson v. Glick, 2 Cir. 1973,

F. ; Adams v. Pate,
7 Cir. 1971, 445 F.2d 105, but

this circuit has carved out

some exceptions to this rule.

A sheriff may be held liable

for the actions of his appointed
deputies, over whom he has con-
trol, in certain circumstances.
See e.g., Madison v. Gerstein,

5 Cir. 1971, 440 F.2d 338. Even
more to the point this court

has established in several
fairly recent cases that 'prison
administrators may under cer-
tain circumstances be held vi-

-89-

cariously liable for the act
of their subordinates'. See
Carter v. Estelle, 5 Cir.
1975, 159 F.2d 1136; Holland
us Connors, 5 Cir. 19

; Parker v. McKeithen,
5 “Cir. 197 F.
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838,
95 S.Ct. 67, 42 L.Ed. 2d 65;
Tuley v. Heyd, 5 Cir. 1973,
462 F.2d 55. At this stage,
it 1s impossible to determine
whether or not Taylor's broad
allegations will support
derivative liability under a
respondeat superior theory."

Taylor v. Gibson, 529 F.2d
705; 716 (5th Cir. 1976).

See, in addition, Croy v. Skinner,

410 F.Supp. 117, 123 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
Some courts have rejected the limitation
upon liability urged by the defendants
altogether. See Santiago v. City of

Philadelphia, 435 F.Supp. 136, 148-49

(E.D. Pa. 1977). The Fifth Circuit has
also had this to say about the matter:
"On usual principles of agency persons
may be held accountable for the acts of
others under §1983." Gomez v. Florida

-90-

State Employment Service, 417, F,2d 569,

578 n.34 (Sth Cir. 1969).

Additionally, the Defendant in the
memorandum of law filed with this Court
claims that Plaintiff is asking this
Court to declare "affirmative action pol-
icies" unconstitutional. The Defendant
then goes on to try and justify the alleged
discriminatory conduct on the part of
the Plaintiff under the mandate of govern-
mental affirmative action programs. No-
where, in Plaintiff's complaint are Defend-
ant's "affirmative action programs" even
discussed, assuming they exist and in
any event, Defendant is arguing matters
before this Court which are outside of
the face of the complaint, that argument
being improper on a motion to dismiss.

WHEREFORE, counsel prays this Honor-
able Court to deny the motion ':to dismiss
filed herein, to find that the complaint

-91-

sufficiently sets forth allegations to
enable Defendant to plead and to allow

this action to proceed accordingly.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

LAW OFFICES OF

EUGENE P. SPELLMAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff

100 North Biscayne Boulevard
Penthouse Suite

Miami, Florida 33132
Telephone: (371-3477)

By: /s/
DENIS DEAN, SR.

-92-
[CAPTION]

ORDER

THIS CAUSE having come before the
Court on Defendant's motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction for plaintiff's
failure to allege exhaustion of admin-
istrative remedies under principles

enunciated by Penn v. Schlesinger 497

F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1974), and having
considered the motion and being otherwise

duly advised,

It is thereupon

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant's
motion to dismiss be granted for Plaintiff's
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

DONE AND ORDERED at Miami, Florida,
this 9th of July, 1979.

JOSE A. GONZALEZ
DISTR

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_2073%3A02. Public record. Not legal advice.
