# Jurisdictional Statement — Williams v. Ohio

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Jurisdictional Statement
- **Published:** January 1, 1981
- **Citation:** 454 U.S. 801

## Text

Office-Supreme Court, U.S.
riLz2 wy
80-1867 . MAY 5. 198!
No. reaver STEYAS,
IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

EDWARD JOHN WILLIAMS,
Appellant,

V.

STATE OF OHIO
Appellee.

On Appeal From the Supreme Court of Ohio

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

PATRICK H. YOUNG

Attorney of Record

of PATRICK H. YOUNG CO., L.P.A.
Attorney for the Appellant

106 East Jackson Street

Paulding, Ohio 45879

Telephone: 419/399/5991

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Cetee PUG ov aoc kets ckees eee ee i
Footie cf AMOUUIS 6 6 6dc ions tees veencsndhieesoeees iv
The Copltiows Belew «6 occ enc edvcauneesaes cee eee l
Statement of the Grounds on Which the

Jurisdiction of This Court is Invoked.............. 2

Statement of the Facts of the Case ......cceccescsces 3
The Federal Question Presented is Substantial ........ 4

i. The Court’s earlier decision in Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 625, 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979), clearly indicates
that any evidence of an alleged criminal offense
obtained by an illegal search and seizure must be

SUTCNE a6 ccadeensecvensens shee geeueapneean 5
ii. The issue in this case is of public and great general

WORE ik cn edansciveuund cress ene een 9
COMCMINION ov ccd vcdvnvicndvisanvenbureene een 19

Appendix A Copy of Notice of Appeal to the Supreme
Coed OF GINO. «ssa ce scanda cocne cases eee 1A

Appendix B Copy of the State of Ohio’s Assignment of
Error filed in Court of Appeals ... 2.2.50 csces0 2A

Appendix C Copy of Memorandum Opinion of the Court
ff, .. PPeEVere rT ere Te eer eee 3A

QUESTION PRESENTED BY THE APPEAL

The following question is presented by this appeal:

Under the holding of Delaware vs. Prouse, 440 U.S. 625,
99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979), must evidence of an alleged criminal
offense be suppressed as a constitutionally impermissable
search and seizure where such evidence was seized during a
random motor vehicle stop made by an Ohio State Highway
Patrolman when there was no articulable or reasonable
suspicion that a violation of law had been committed or that
the vehicle or the appellant was otherwise subject to seizure?

Appendix D Copy of Journal Entry (Judgment) of the

RUE Oe PRED 6 ov cae ewteceesy coker deecennes 12A
Appendix E Copy of Journal Entry of the Court of
Common Pleas, Paulding County, Ohio ......... 13A
Appendix F Statutes ....cccccscceccccsesccesccces 14A
7.3.0, Tie GI, BO CEI ee o cescesccvedensars 14A
DR, BO Fee Ce cece vectinecccuvnnnes ISA
ph Rot rt PP eTrererrerrr cri re ISA
O.R.C. Section $503.02(B), para. 3.....cccccceces 16A
Appendix G Constitutional Provisions.............. 16A
POU FO oc cass cesvcseeeessceccesoes 16A
POULT ATORIIIOE cc cccecccvccccseccsacess 17A
Ohio Constitution
AOE PIE Dic cc necoctccccekoevsevecaucen 17A

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page
CASES
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 226, 93 S. Ct.
SE bb dc eae ye cks hha ene hebuwneeneaes 15
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S. Ct. 223 (1964) ...... 13
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S. Ct.
EE 6 can We de Un Hin ee a hacd a awe ONS ROE o 15
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S. Ct.
og Ge errr ee ere 14, 15

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 625, 99 S. Ct.
1931 (1979) .. 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19

Delaware v. Prouse, 383 A. 2d 1359 (Del. 1978)....... 5
Dunway v. New York, 99 S. Ct. 2248 (1979).......... 17
Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 25 L. Ed.

PEE Shc ivateerensaeve Ube deeronayasasnees 12

Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 79 S. Ct. 804 (1959) .11
Kretchmar v. Nebraska, 99 S. Ct. 1783 (1979) .. 2, 18, 19
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961) 12, 14
Marbury v. Madison, | Granch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803)i1
Marshall v. Barlow’s Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 98 S. Ct.

SUED hia k cad dobesuenSavenciensceeen ne 13, 15
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 4 L. Ed.

PP. s46ukbaeb eer CeSACSEKSD CERES Ee ORO wes 11
Payton v. New York, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980).......... 17

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES, Continued

State v. Kretchmar, 201 Neb. 308, 267 N.W. 2d

SR 18
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct.

UG ag be 13, 14, 15
Tinetti v. Wittke, 479 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Wis 1979),

aff'd 620 F. 2d 160 (7th Cir. 1980) ............... 17
United States v. Beck, 602 F. 2d 726

ccc acewiceecosscorccescecoone 18
United States v. Brignoni- Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,

APE EMIOD cicccvecccccccccccccccscene 13
United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 F. 2d 29

SE EN cp wcccacevcesesesccovecccecccess 17
United States v. Dunbar, 470 F. Supp. 704 (D. Conn.

1979) aff'd. 610 F. 2d 807 (2d Cir. 1979) .......... 18
United States v. Martinez- Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,

96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976) 2... cc ee ees 13
United States v. Palmer, 603 F. 2d 1286

we weed warasdecrncnccacsesecvess 17

United States v. Price, 599 F. 2d 494 (2d Cir. 1979) ..17
United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 97 S. Ct.

Se 13
United States v. Soto-Soto, 598 F. 2d 545

EN i wincdcecncesccccsvecseccccceses 18
United States v. Taylor, 488 F. Supp. 475

Es ona eee scccsartsersasncceesecs 17

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES, Continued

United States v. United States District Court,

ee a re ee es GR, BERS CEDIA) ss ccc vccccrvcces 14
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)......... 11
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 S. Ct.

i eevee eps eessesesce ce veees 17

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS:

United States Constitution
Fourth Amendment ........... 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13,
15, 16, 17, 18, 19

Fourteenth Amendment .......... 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 19
Ohio Constitution

ov eeceevccscseccecocce 12

STATUTES:

United States Code

ee ee, OUUNOD BEST CZ) oc cc ccccsccccccs 2
Ohio Revised Code

Cicer ete sccccccerecessere 6, 7

Ne Ll nab orks varetescee 13

ee i wisec ee ks sess eseecee 7

vi

l
IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

NO.

EDWARD JOHN WILILIAMS,
Appellant,

Vv.

STATE OF OHIO
Appellee.

On Appeal From the Supreme Court of Ohio.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

THE OPINIONS BELOW

The Memorandum Opinion of the Court of Appeals for
Paulding County, Ohio is unreported and appears herein as
Appendix C.

2

STATEMENT OF THE GROUNDS ON WHICH THE
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT IS INVOKED

(i) This is a criminal prosecution against the appellant,
Edward John Williams. The indictment against appellant
charged that the appellant received stolen property in
violation of Ohio Revised Code, Section 2913.51. Receiving
stolen property is defined as receiving, retaining, or
disposing of property of another, knowing or having
reasonable cause to believe that the property has been
obtained through commission of a theft offense. The
appellant moved the trial court for an order suppressing all
evidence obtained from appellant as the result of an
unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States. The trial court sustained appellant’s motion.

(ii) The judgment or decree sought to be reviewed is the
ruling of the Supreme Court of Ohio which dismissed
appellant’s appeal for lack of a substantial question.
Appellant had appealed the decision of the Ohio Court of
Appeals for Paulding County, Ohio which had reversed the
judgment of the trial court and remanded the case with
instructions to overrule appellant’s motion to suppress
evidence. The Ohio Court of Appeals ruling was issued on
October 24, 1980 and entered on that day. A Notice of
Appeal was filed in the Court of Appeals of the Third
Appellate Judicial District of Ohio, Paulding County, Ohio
on November 28, 1980. The Supreme Court of Ohio
dismissed the appeal on February 10, 1981. The Notice of
Appeal was filed in the Supreme Court of Ohio on April 28,
1981.

(iii) Jurisdiction of the appeal is conferred on this Court by
Title 28 of the United States Code, Section 1257 (2).

(iv) Cases sustaining the jurisdiction of this Court are:

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 625, 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979).

Kretchmar v. Nebraska, 99 S. Ct. 1783 (1979).

3
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS OF THE CASE

Edward John Williams, appellant herein, is a citizen of the,
United States and a resident of the State of Ohio. On March
8, 1979, appellant was charged with receiving stolen property
in a complaint filed by Trooper Jerry P. Brown of the Ohio
State Highway Patrol.

On March 13, 1979, a hearing was held in the County
Court of Paulding County, Ohio, for the purpose of setting
bond. At that time, bond was set at $ 25,000.00 and the
appellant was ordered released upon execution of an
appearance bond in the amount of $2,500.00. The appellant
had a preliminary hearing on April 23, 1979, at which time he
was bound over to the Court of Common Pleas of Paulding
County, Ohio. Subsequently, on June 7, 1979, a Paulding
County, Ohio grand jury returned an indictment against the
appellant for receiving stolen property, a violation of Ohio
Revised Code Section 2913.51. At his arraignment on June
21, 1979, the appellant entered a plea of not guilty. A jury
trial was scheduled to begin in the Court of Common Pleas of
Paulding County, Ohio on September 17, 1979, but was
continued until October 23, 1979. Thereafter, on September
19, 1979, appellant, through his counsel, filed a motion to
suppress all evidence obtained from the appellant as a result
of the stopping and detention of appellant’s vehicle.

The charge against appellant was based on an incident
which occurred on March 7, 1979. On that date the appellant
was operating a motor vehicle on U.S. Route 127 in Paulding
County, Ohio. As the appellant proceeded northbound on
Route 127, he and two other motorists were motioned to pull
over by Trooper Jerry P. Brown of the Ohio State Highway
Patrol. The appellant duly pulled off the highway and was
informed by the officer that a motor vehicle inspection would
be conducted on appellant’s vehicle. The officer then asked
appellant for his driver’s license and automobile registration,
which appellant produced. A lengthy delay ensued during

%

4

which Officer Brown made several trips to his cruiser.
Finally, Troo»er Brown informed appellant that he
suspected the vehicle was a stolen one, read him the Miranda
rights, and asked him for a statement. At this time appellant
declined to make any further comments and Trooper Brown
then transported him to the Paulding County Jail in
Paulding, Ohio.

At a hearing held in regard to appellant’s motion to
suppress, testimony was elicited which showed that Trooper
Brown had stopped appellant’s vehicle entirely at random
(transcript at pages 9 and 13) and that he observed nothing
suspicious about appellant or his automobile at the time he
motioned him to stop. (Transcript at page 10 and 11). On
October 9, 1979, the Court of Common Pleas of Paulding
County, Ohio made a finding sustaining appellant’s motion
to suppress. The Paulding County Prosecuting Attorney
appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals for the Third
Judicial District of Ohio. On October 24, 1980, the Court of
Appeals rendered a decision reversing the trial court and
instructing that the motion to suppress be overruled. The
appellant then appealed this decision to the Ohio Supreme
Court on the basis of Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 625, 99S.
Ct. 1391 (1979), but on February 10, 1981 that court dis-
missed applellant’s appeal on the grounds that no substantial
constitutional question existed. Appellant therefore appeals
to the Supreme Court of the United States.

THE FEDERAL QUESTION PRESENTED
IS SUBSTANTIAL

This appeal squarely raises the issue as to whether a
random motor vehicle stop, where there is no articulable or
reasonable suspicion that a violation of law has been
committed or that the vehicle or an occupant thereof is
subject to seizure, is a constitutionally impermissable search

5
and seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments

to the Constitution of the United States.
(i) THE COURT’S EARLIER DECISION IN DELA-

WARE v. PROUSE, 440 U.S. 625, 99 S. CT. 1391 (1979),
CLEARLY INDICATES THAT ANY EVIDENCE OF
AN ALLEGED CRIMINAL OFFENSE OBTAINED
BY AN ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE MUST BE
SUPPRESSED.

The case presently before the Court is directly on point
with the Court’s recent decision in Delaware v. Prouse,
supra, and several past cases which logically lead to the
Prouse finding that persons in automobiles on public
highways may not for that reason alone have their travel and
privacy interfered with at the unbridled discretion of police
officers and therefore evidence obtained from such stops and
detentions must be suppressed in conformity with the
constitutional rights of privacy and freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution. In Delaware v. Prouse, supra, this Court
affirmed the finding of the Delaware Supreme Court that a
motion to suppress must be granted where evidence was
obtained from a random stop of a motorist in the absence of
specific articulable facts which justify the stop by indicating a
reasonable suspicion that a violation of the law has occurred.
Delaware v. Prouse, 383 A. 2d 1359, 1364 (Del. 1978). The
facts of the instant case fall squarely within this Court’s
prohibition. Trooper Brown on direct examination in the
trial court testified that he chose the vehicles he wished to
inspect at random. “They don’t expect us to inspect vehicles
today at a certain location. Normally we do it at random
where we choose.” Transcript at page 13, lines 11 through 13.
“We just do it at more or less our own choice, you might say.”
Transcrsipt at page 13, lines 16 and 17 “We just select them at
random. When I get out of my car, I stop the next couple of
cars coming at me...” Transcript at page 13, lines 24 and 25.
Thus it is clear that the Defendant was stopped at random by
the officer. The only remaining question to be answered is

6

whether the officer had probable cause to stop the
Defendant. The majority opinion in Prouse concluded with
the holding that “except in those situations in which there is
at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist
is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that
either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to
seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile and
detaining the driver...are unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.” Delaware v. Prouse, supra, at 99 S. Ct. 1401.
Trooper Brown testified that there was nothing suspicious
about the Defendant or his vehicle at the time he was ordered
to stop.

Q. Now was there anything suspicious about his
(Defendant’s) car at that time?

A. I just held up my hand and motioned for him to go over.

Q. There was nothing suspicious about the manner in
which he drove the car or its appearance or anything like
that? You just saw a car coming down and you motioned for
that car to go over because he was more or less the next one in
line to be pulled off to be inspected?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. At the time that you pulled him over, there was no
suspicion of anything; is that correct?

A. Not at the time that I held my hand up and motioned for
him to go over.

Transcript at page 10 and II.

The case before the court is clearly one in which the
articulable and reasonable suspicion which an officer must
have in order to lawfully stop and detain a motorist was
lacking. Indeed, th. se was no suspicion at all and therefore
the stop was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment
and any evidence obtained thereby must be suppressed under
the exclusionary rule.

The first paragraph of Ohio Revised Code Section 4513.02
(B) provides:

7

When directed by any state highway patrolman, the
operator of any motor vehicle shall stop and submit
such motor vehicle to an inspection and such tests
as are necessary to determine by law, or that its
equipment is not in proper adjustment or repair, or
in violation of the equipment provisions of
Chapter 4513. of the Revised Code.

This statute is certainly not unconstitutional per se,
although state highway patrolmen, like any other law
enforcement officers, are required to meet minimum
constitutional standards in the exercise of their duties. Thus,
whenever a state highway patrolman stops a motor vehicle
for an inspection under O.R.C. Section 4513.02 (B) under
circumstances in which the officer has probable cause to
believe the vehicle is unsafe or that some other violation of
the law has been committed, the subsequent search and
seizure would undoubtedly be constitutional. However,
where the officer uses “unbridled discretion” to stop a vehicle
under O.R.C. Section 4513.02 (B) without “at least
articulable and reasonable suspicion” that a violation of law
has occurred, then such a stop is unconstitutional under the
Delaware v. Prouse decision.

The Court of Appeals of Paulding County, Ohio erred in
stating that: “We conclude that in spite of the officer’s
statement that he stopped vehicles ‘at random’...the
intrusion, if any, of defendant’s privacy was warranted in the
interests of vehicular safety, and the stop was not violative of
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.” Court of Appeals
Memorandum Opinion, page 7. The Ohio Supreme Court
also erred in failing to modify this decision. Their holdings
fly in the face of the finding of this Court in Delaware v.
Prouse and are therefore directly at odds with the law of the
land. Mr. Justice White stated, in the Prouse majority
opinion: “The State’s interest in discretionary spot checks as
a means of ensuring the safety of its roadways does not

8

outweigh the resulting intrusion on the privacy and security
of the persons detained. Given the physical and
psychological intrusion visited upon the occupants of a
vehicle by a random stop..., the marginal contribution to
roadway safety possibly resulting from a system of spot
checks cannot justify subjecting every occupant of every
vehicle on the roads to a seizure at the unbridled discretion of
law enforcement officials.” Delaware v. Prouse, supra at 99
S. Ct. 1393. The search and seizure of Appellant’s vehicle was
void ab initio and all evidence of alleged criminal offenses
was properly suppressed by the trial court judge in the
Common Pleas Court of Paulding County, Ohio. The Court
of Appeals of Paulding County erred in reversing the
decision and instructing the trial court to overrule appellant's
motion to suppress.

The Delaware v. Prouse holding extends to all individuals
operating or traveling in automobiles: “An individual
operating or traveling in an automobile does not lose all
reasonable expectation of privacy simply because the
automobile and its use are subject to government
regulation.” Prouse at 99 S. Ct. 1400-1401. “The marginal
contribution to roadway safety possibly resulting from a
system of spot checks cannot justify subjecting every
occupant of every vehicle on the roads to a seizure.”...,
Prouse at 99 S. Ct. 1400.

It is helpful, in this case, to examine footnote 18 of the
Delaware v. Prouse opinion:

It has been urged that additional state interests are
the apprehension of stolen motor vehicles and of
drivers under the influence of alcohol or narcotics.
The latter interest is subsumed by the interest in
roadway safety, as may be the former interest to
some extent. The remaining governmental interest
in controlling automobile thefts is not
distinguishable from the general interest in crime
control. Prouse at 99 S. Ct. 1399.

9

After considering these important state interests, this
court nevertheless found that random spot checks were not
constitutionally permissible methods of enforcing them.

Given the alternative mechanisms available, both
those in use and those that might be adopted, we
are unconvinced that the incremental contribution
to highway safety of the random spot check justifies
the practice under the Fourth Amendment. Prouse
at 99 S. Ct. 1399.

This court ended by holding that “except in \ ose
situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable
suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed, or that an automobile
is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is
otherwise subject to seizure for violation of the law, stopping
an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his
driver’s license and the registration of the automobile are
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendments.” Prouse,
supra at 99 S. Ct. 1401. The record below shows clearly that
the stop was a totally random one made without any
suspicion that a violation of law had occurred and was
therefore an unreasonable seizure. Because the stop was
constitutionally impermissible under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments, any evidence of alleged criminal
offenses must be suppressed under the Delaware v. Prouse
decision. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision dismissing
Appellant’s appeal of the Ohio Court of Appeals’ decision
overruling the trial court must be reversed. The trial court
correctly sustained appellant’s motion to suppress.

(ii) THE ISSUE IN THIS CASE IS OF PUBLIC AND
GREAT GENERAL INTEREST.

The resolution of the issue in this case will obviously affect
all users of public highways. In this appeal, the court is
confronted with a case directly on point to the Delaware v.
Prouse decision. The trial court judge in the Paulding

10

County Common Pleas Court found that the facts of the case
at bar fit the Delaware v. Prouse situation. On appeal by the
State of Ohio, the Court of Appeals for the Third Appellate
Judicial District of Ohio reversed the trial court’s judgment
sustaining a motion to suppress, finding first, that the
random motor vehicle stop was warranted in the interests of
vehicular safety and second, that Appellant had no standing
to enforce his Fourth Amendment rights due to a lack of
possessory interest in the subject motor vehicle.

Appellant submits that the findings of the Ohio Court of
Appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court directly conflict with
the finding of this court in Delaware v. Prouse, supra, and
that it will be necessary for this court to address the issues
herein in order to resolve the resulting conflict.

The search and seizure issue involved herein is clearly a
substantial constitutional question. The starting point in
search and scizure cases is, of course, the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. “The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the piace to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.” Fourth Amendment, United States
Constitution. “No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall deprive any person of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1, United States
Constitution. In interpreting the unreasonableness of
searches and seizures, this court has found that “two
protections emerge from the broad constitutional
proscription of official invasion. The first of these is the right
to be secure from intrusion into personal privacy. The
second, and intimately related protection, is self-protection:
the right to resist unauthorized entry which has as its design

the securing of information to fortify the coercive power of
the state against the individual, information which may be
used to effect a further deprivation of life or liberty or
property. Thus, evidence of criminal action may not, save in
very limited and closely confined situations, be seized
without a judicially issued search warrant.” Frank vs.
Maryland, 359 U.S. 300, 79 S. Ct. 804 (1959).

This court made a finding at an early stage of American
history that it was vested with sufficient power to “without
question, revise the proceedings of the executive and
legislative authorities of the states, and if they are found to be
contrary to the constitution, may declare them to be of no
legal validity.” Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, | Wheat. 304, 4 L.
Ed 97 (1816). This holding conformed to the basic principal
already established “that a law repugnant to the constitution
is void.” Marbury v. Madison, | Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60
(1803). This court specifically applied the Fourth
Amendment protections to evidence secured by illegal
searches and seizures in federal prosecutions. “If letters and
private documents can thus be seized and held and used in
evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the
protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to
be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value,
and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well
be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts
and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praise-
worthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of
those great principles established by years of endeavor and
suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the
fundamental law of the land.” Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914).

This court next made the logical extension that the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments were to be applied with equal
force to unreasonable searches and seizures by state officials.
“Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied
in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States,

12

and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of
privacy by state officers is, therefore, constitutional in origin,
we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty
promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to
like effect as other basic rights secured by the Due Process
Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the
whim of any police officer who, in the name of law
enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our
decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual
no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him, to
the police officer no less than that to which honest law
enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial
integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice.”
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961).

On appeal below, the State of Ohio cited various Ohio
statutes at length in support of the authority of the Ohio
State Highway Patrol. It must be recognized, however, that
pronouncements of this court override any non-conforming
use of state law. It is axiomatic that no agency of the state,
legislative, executive, or judicial; nor instrumentality of the
state, and no person, officer, or agent exerting the power of
the state shall violate individual rights guaranteed by the
United States Constitution. Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339,
25 L. Ed. 676 (1880). Moreover, the Ohio Constitution
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by verbatim
incorporation of Section One of the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution:

The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and possessions,
against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the
place to be searched and the person and things
to be seized. Ohio Constitution, Article 1,
Section 14.

13

In addition, the Ohio statute which sets forth the duties and
powers of Ohio State Highway Patrolmen contains the fol-
lowing:

Patrolmen shall have no other right or power of
search and seizure except to take from any person,
under arrest or about to be arrested, deadly or
dangerous weapons in the possession of such
person. O.R.C. Section 5503.02 (B).

Thus it is clear that Ohio law contains provisions very similar
to the principles stated by this Court in Delaware v. Prouse,
supra.

It is well established that stopping an automobile and
detaining its occupants constitutes a “seizure” within the
meaning of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, even
though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting
detention brief. United States v. Martinez- Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543, 556-558, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 3082-3083 (1976); United States
v. Brignoni- Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S. Ct. 2578 (1975):
cf. Terry vs. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88S. Ct. 1868, 1877 (1968).
The basic reason for imposing Fourth Amendment
limitations on law enforcement officials is to maintain a
standard of reasonableness upon their exercise of discretion
in order to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals
against arbitrary invasions. Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436
U.S. 307, 312, 98 S. Ct. 1816, 1820 (1978): see also Beck v.
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97, 85 S. Ct. 223, 228 (1964). The
permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is
judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate
governmental interest. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S.
606, 616-619, 97 S. Ct. 1972, 1979-1980 (1977). This court is
the ultimate interpreter of the United States Constitution
and its decisions form the basis of the exclusionary rule
whereby any evidence obtained in an illegal search and

14

seizure is inadmissible in either federal or state courts. Mapp
v. Ohio, supra. The facts in the instant case must now be
applied to this court’s finding that “the State’s interest in
discretionary spot checks as a means of ensuring the safety of
its roadways does not outweigh the resulting intrusion on the
privacy and security of the persons detained. Given the
physical and psychological intrusion visited upon the
occupants of a vehicle by a random stop..., the marginal
contribution to roadway safety possibly resulting from a
system of spot checks cannot justify subjecting every
occupant of every vehicle on the roads to a seizure at the
unbridled discretion of law enforcement officials.” Delaware
v. Prouse, supra at 99 S. Ct. 1393.

This court has been especially concerned with
guaranteeing that the individual's reasonable expectations of
privacy are not subject to the discretion of the official in the
field. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532, 87 S.
Ct. 1727, 1733, (1967); United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 322-323, 92S. Ct. 2125, 2139 (1972). In
theProuse decision, this Court found that the marginal
contribution to roadway safety possibly resulting from spot
checks cannot justify subjecting every occupant of every
vehicle on the roads to a seizure - limited in magnitude
compared to other intrusions but nonetheless
constitutionally cognizable - at the unbridled discretion of
law enforcement officials. Delaware v. Prouse, supra at 99 S.
Ct. 1400. The court further pointed out that to insist upon
neither an appropriate factual basis for suspicion directed at a
particular automobile nor upon some other substantial and
objective standard or rule to govern the exercise of discretion
“would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed
rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate
hunches...” Terry v. Ohio, supra 392 U.S. at 22, 88S. Ct. at
1880. This kind of standardless and unconstrained discretion
is the evil which this court has discerned in previous cases and
the court has insisted that the discretion of the official in the

15

field be circumscribed, at least to some extent. Camara vs.
Municipal Court, supra, 387, U.S. at 532-533, 87 S. Ct. at
1733; Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 270,
93 S. Ct. 2535, 2538 (1973).

The court has further found that the grave danger of abuse
of discretion does not disappear simply because the
automobile is subject to state regulation resulting in
numerous instances of police - citizen contact. Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 2538 (1973).
Whenever the government intrudes upon individual rights,
the privacy interest suffers regardless of whether the
government’s motivation is to investigate violations of
criminal laws or breaches of other statutory or regulatory
standards. Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., supra. Justice White's
majority opinion is eloquent in expressing the concern that
must be given to the individual's rights in search and seizure
cases involving motorists:

An individual operating or traveling in an
automobile does not lose all reasonable
expectation of privacy simply because the
automobile and its use are subject to government
regulation. Automobile travel is a basic, pervasive,
and often necessary mode of transportation to and
from one’s home, workplace, and lesiure activities.
Many people spend more hours each day traveling
in cars than walking on the streets. Undoubtedly,
many find a greater sense of security and privacy in
traveling in an automobile than they do in
exposing themselves by pedestrian or other modes
of travel. Were the individual subject to unfettered
governmental intrusion every time he entered an
automobile, the security guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment would be seriously circumscribed. As
Terry v. Ohio, supra, recognized, people are not
shorn of all Fourth Amendment protection when
they step from their homes onto the public

i6

sidewalks. Nor are they shorn of those interests
when they step from the sidewalks into their
automobiles. Delaware v. Prouse, supra, at 1400-
1401.

The rationale for extending probable cause protections to
those traveling in automobiles is therefore indisputably
clear.

The case at bar cannot be distinguished from Delaware v.
Prouse. Both cases deal with the power of state police under
state statutes to stop and detain motorists without probable
cause for the purpose of maintaining highway safety. The
State of Delaware urged that “these stops are reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment because the State’s interest in
the practice as a means of promoting highway safety upon its
roads more than outweighs the intrusion entailed.” De/aware
v. Prouse, supra at 99 S. Ct. 1398. The State of Ohio argues
the identical point herein. This court has already considered
this argument and agreed with the State of Delaware (and
now the State of Ohio) “that the States have a vital interest in
ensuring that only those qualified to do so are permitted to
operate motor vehicles, that these vehicles are fit for safe
operation, and hence that licensing, registration, and vehicle
inspection requirements are being observed...Unquestion-
ably, those provisions, properly administered, are essential
elements in a highway safety program...The question
remains, however, whether in the service of these important
ends the discretionary spot check is a sufficiently productive
mechanism to justify the intrusion upon Fourth Amendment
interests which such stops entail...Given the alternative
mechanisms available, both in use and those that might be
adopted, we are unconvinced that the incremental
contribution to highway safety of the random spot check
justifies the practice under the Fourth Amendment.”
Delaware v. Prouse, supra at 99 S. Ct. 1398 and 1399.
Among the alternatives available to states, Mr. Justice White

17

noted that some states require all vehicles to pass an annual
safety inspection before they can be registered for the next
year. Delaware v. Prouse, supra at 99 S, Ct. 1401. It is
important to note in this respect that the State of Ohio does
not rely solely on its highway patrolment to make safety
inspections. Motor vehicle safety inspections are conducted
extensively throughout Ohio by civilian employees of the
Ohio State Highway Patrol who set up less threatening
checkpoint stops similar to the suggestion in Mr. Justice
White’s majority opinion of Delaware v. Prouse. “We hold
only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not
for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered
with at the unbridled discretion of police officers.” Delaware
v. Prouse, supra at 99 S. Ct. 1401.

Although the Delaware v. Prouse decision is only a few
years old, anumber of reported cases have cited and followed
the case in subsequent search and seizure decisions. Payton
v. New York, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1379 (1980); Ybarra v. Illinois,
100 S. Ct. 338, 345 (1979); Dunway v. New York, 99 S. Ct.
2248, 2255 (1979); United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 615
F. 2d 29, 32 (2nd Cir. 1980); United States v. Palmer, 603 F.
2d 1286, 1291 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Price, 599 F.
2d 494, 499, (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Taylor, 488 F.
Supp. 475, 478 (D. Ore. 1980); Tinetti v. Wittke, 479 F. Supp.
486, 490 (E.D. Wis. 1979), aff'd 620 F. 2d 160(7th Cir. 1980).

In addition several courts have been confronted with fact
situations similar to the one in the present case and have
found themselves bound to follow Delaware v. Prouse.
Where an FBI agent, claiming to be conducting vehicle
inspections in conjunction with the California State
Highway Patrol under a California state statute and, at the
same time, looking for stolen motor vehicles, stopped a
motorist for the sole reason that the motorist was driving a
late model pick-up truck, the stop and search was illegal
under the Fourth Amendment as an overly discretionary
spot check and all evidence obtained therefrom was properly

18

suppressed. United States v. Soto-Soto, 598 F, 2d 545 (9th
Cir. 1979). In another case, the state police officer's stop of a
motorist based on a good faith belief that the motorist was
lost was not a sufficient basis for Fourth Amendment
purposes to outweigh the Defendant-motorist’s right to
personal security free from arbitrary interference by law
officers. The exclusionary rule was used to exclude all
evidence obtained as a direct result of the Fourth
Amendment violation. United States v. Dunbar, 470 F.
Supp. 704 (D. Conn. 1979), affd. 610 F. 2d 807 (2d Cir.
1979). The initial stop of a vehicle by police officers based
only on the facts that the neighborhood was a high crime area
and that neither occupant of the vehicle was known to the
officers was illegal under Prouse and evidence discarded by
the occupants as the result of the illegal stop was tainted fruit
of the initial illegal stop, could not be used to validate the
unlawful search and seizure, and was suppressed on appeal.
United States v. Beck, 602 F. 2d 726 (Sth Cir. 1979),
Finally, in the only reported state case thus far which deals
with a Prouse fact situation, this court granted a petition for
a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Nebraska and
vacated that court’s judgment, remanding the case back to
the Supreme Court of Nebraska for further consideration in
light of Delaware v. Prouse. Kretchmar v. Nebraska, 99 S.
Ct. 1783 (1979). The Supreme Court of Nebraska had erred
in upholding the conviction of a motorist based on evidence
seized from the motorist by an officer who made a random
spot check of the motorist based only on the fact that the
motorist was driving a late model car. The Supreme Court of
Nebraska held that the officer’s poorly founded suspicion
was not sufficient to vitiate the lawfulness of the arrest and,
moreover, that the officer had probable cause to arrest the
motorist anyway when he discovered the evidence on the
basis of which the motorist was convicted. State v.
Kretchmar, 201 Neb. 308, 267 N.W. 2d 740 (1978).
Nevertheless, this court found the Kretchmar case fell

19

squarely within its holding in Delaware v. Prouse, supra.
Appellant submits that the instant case must also be required
to fall into line with the Delaware v. Prouse decision.

CONCLUSION

This appeal raises an issue of fundamental importance in
regard to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States. In light of this court's
recent decisions in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 625, 99 S.
Ct. 1391 (1979) and Kretchmar v. Nebraska, --U.S.--, 99 S.
Ct. 1783 (1979) it seems clear that the search of the
appellant's vehicle was illegal, and that the evidence
discovered in that search should be suppressed.

Respectfully submitted,

PATRICK H. YOUNG

of PATRICK H. YOUNG CO., L.P.A.
Attorney for the Appellant

106 East Jackson Street

Paudling, Ohio 45879

Telephone: 419/ 399/599]

1A
APPENDIX A

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OHIO

EDWARD JOHN WILLIAMS,
Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF OHIO,

Appellee.

NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES

Notice is hereby given that Edward John Williams, the
appellant above named, hereby appeals to the Supreme
Court of the United States from the final order of the
Supreme Court of Ohio dismissing the appellant's appeal, for
the reason that no substantial constitutional question existed,
in a case in which the court of Appeals for Paulding County,
Ohio revised the trial court’s judgment in regard to the appel-
lant’s motion to supress evidence entered in this action on
February 10, 1981.

This appeal is taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1257 (2).

/s/ Patrick H. Young

PATRICK H. YOUNG

of PATRICK H. YOUNG CO., L.P.A.
Attorney for the Appellant

106 East Jackson Street

Paulding, Ohio 45879

Telephone: 419/399/5991

2A
PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Patrick H. Young, Attorney for Edward John Williams,
appellant herein, and a member of the Bar of the Supreme
Court of the United States, hereby certify that, on the 28th
day of April, 1981, I served copies of the foregoing Notice of
Appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States on the
several parties thereto, as follows: on the State of Ohio, by
mailing a copy in a duly addressed envelope by certified mail
and to J. David Webb, Prosecuting Attorney, 705 West
Wayne Street, Paulding, Ohio 45879.

It is further certified that all parties required to be served have
been served.

/s/ Patrick H. Young

PATRICK H. YOUNG

of PATRICK H. YOUNG CO., L.P.A.
Attorney for the Appellant

106 East Jackson Street

Paulding, Ohio 45879

Telephone: 419/399/5991

APPENDIX B
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

The Court of Common Pleas of Paulding County erred in
finding that a motor vehicle safety inspection made pursuant
to Section 4513.02 of the Ohio Revised Code which revealed
that the inspected vehicle was stolen violated the Fourth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and suppressing all
evidence arising from that inspection.

3A
APPENDIX C
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE THIRD APPELLATE
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF OHIO

STATE OF OHIO,
Plaintiff-Appellant

V.

EDWARD JOHN WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
(CASE #11-79-12 - Decided October 24, 1980)
APPEAL: Court of Appeals for Paulding County.

MR. J. DAVID WEBB, Prosecuting Attorney, counsel for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

MR. PATRICK H. YOUNG, counsel for Defendant-
Appellee.

MILLER, J. This is an appeal by the prosecuting attor-
ney of Paulding county from a judgment of the Court of
Common Pleas of that county granting a motion to suppress
evidence.

Defendant’s vehicle was stopped by a state highway
trooper in a traffic safety check. The officer observed that the
vehicle identification number located inside the windshield of
the car, and which was readily visible to him from outside the

4A

car, was not in accord with those generally appearing on Ford
Motor Company products. Upon further check it was disco-
vered that the vehicle was in fact stolen.

The indictment against defendant provided that he “did,
receive, retain or dispose of certain property, being a 1978
Lincoln Continental Mark V automobile, the property of
another * * * knowingly or having reasonable cause to
believe said property had been obtained through the commis-
sion of a theft offense * * * in violation of the Ohio
Revised Code, Title 29,, Section 2913.51 * * * .”

Defendant moved the trial court for an order suppressing
all evidence obtained from defendant as a result of an illegal
stop and detention. The trial court sustained defendant's
motion.

The prosecutor sets forth one assignment of error in this
appeal:

“The Court of Common Pleas of Paulding
County erred in finding that a motor vehicle
safety inspection made pursuant to Section
4513.02 of the Ohio Revised Code which
revealed that the inspected vehicle was stolen
violated the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution and suppressing all evidence aris-
ing from that inspection.”

The Supreme Court in Delaware v. Prouse, U.S. .
99 S. Ct. 1391, the case principally relied upon by defendant,
concluded that stopping an automobile and detaining its
occupants constitutes a “seizure” within the meaning of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court held that
(page 1401):

SA

“ * * * except in those situations in which
there is at least articulable and reasonable sus-
picion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an
automobile is not registered, or that either the
vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to
seizure for violation of law, stopping an auto-
mobile and detaining the driver in order to
check his driver's license and the registration of
the automobile are unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.”

The Court stated, however (p1401):

“This holding does not preclude the State of
Delaware or other states from developing
methods for spot checks that involve less intru-
sion or that do not involve the unconstrained
exercise of discretion. Questioning all oncom-
ing traffic at roadblock-type stops is one pos-
sible alternative. We hold only that persons in
automobiles on public roadways may not for
that reason alone have their travel and privacy
interfered with at the unbridled discretion of
police officers * * * .”

In U.S. v. Martinez- Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S. Ct. 3074,
the Supreme Court held a permanent checkpoint inspection
of automobiles for illegal aliens constitutional where the
automobiles were slowed at the checkpoint and certain
automobiles selectively referred to an area for secondary
inspection for a more thorough inquiry, although having
previously held roving patrol stops without warrant or prob-
able cause for the same purpose to be unconstitutional in
Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S., 413 U.S. 263, 93 S. Ct. 2535.

6A

In Delaware v. Prouse, supra, the court stated that (p1398)
“[w]e cannot assume that the physical and psychological
intrusion visited upon the occupants of a vehicle by arandom
stop to check documents is of any less moment than that
occasioned by a stop by border agents on roving patrol.”

R.C. 5503.02(A) entitled “Duties and powers of state
highway patrol” provides as pertinent:

“(A) The state highway patrol shall enforce the
laws of the state relating to the titling, registra-
tion, and licensing of motor vehicles; enforce,
on all roads and highways, notwithstanding
section 4513.39 of the Revised Code, the laws
relating to the operation and use of vehicles on
the highways; enforce and prevent the viola-
tion of the laws relating to the size, weight, and
speed of commercial motor vehicles and all
laws designed for the protection of the high-
way pavements and structures on such high-
ways; investigate and report to the public utili-
ties commission violations of its rules and the
laws governing the transportation of persons
and property by motor transportation com-
panies and all other motor carriers for hire;
investigate and report violations of all laws
relating to the collection of excise taxes on
motor vehicle fuels; and regulate the move-
ment of traffic on the roads and highways of
the state, notwithstanding section 4513.39 of
the Revised Code.”

R.C. 4513.02(B) states in part:

“(B) When directed by any state highway
patrolman, the operator of any motor vehicle

7A

shall stop and submit such motor vehicle to an
inspection and such tests as are necessary to
determine whether it is unsafe or not equipped
as required by law, or that its equipment is not
in proper adjustment or repair, or in violation
of the equipment provisions of Chapter 4513.
of the Revised Code.”

The state trooper testified in part as follows: (p8ff. of
transcript of hearing on motion to Suppress):

“Q. Would you please tell the Court what you were
doing at the particular time immediately before
Mr. Williams [defendant] was stopped?

“A. I was holding a motor vehicle inspection.

* kee.”

“Q. From time to time I have observed inspection
stations where they have a station or a van set
up, and the patrolman - they stop vehicles
going in both directions and sometimes just
one direction.

Was this such a vehicle inspection?

“A. It was similar, except that people that you are
referring to - we just do it at random.

“Q. You do it at random?
“A. Yes, sir.

ms x*ee .”

8A

“Q. Would you explain to the Court how you went
about selecting the cars that you stopped?

“A. Well, when I originally stopped there, I just
stopped two or three vehicles that would come
down the road. It makes no difference which
ones, I just stop the next two or three vehicles
down the road.

“Q. Allright. Now, is there any particular method
of selection outside of just the fact that you just
happened to stop the first two or three that
came along?

“A. No, there is not. Obviously, if you see a defect,
such as no muffler or something like this, then
I would, you know, stop that because I can see
that that is a violation. And then I continue to
inspect the whole vehicle.

ma xe.”

We conclude that in spite of the officer’s statement that he
stopped vehicles “at random”, that he in fact only stopped at
one time the number of vehicles he could reasonably check
without interfering with the flow of traffic, that the officer
was exercising a reasonable discretion, that the intrusions, if
any, of defendant’s privacy was warranted in the interests of
vehicular safety, and that the stop was not violative of
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.

Having determined the stopping of the vehicle not to be
violative of defendant’s Fourth Amendment Rights, we then
consider defendant’s standing to seek suppression of the evi-
dence under the particular circumstances of the case.

9A

Here the unrefuted evidence was that the automobile was
in fact a stolen vehicle and was being driven by defendant,
defendant claiming that he was driving the car after having
borrowed it from one Young whose name appeared on the
vehicle registration. Such a registration, however, indicates
only that the vehicle is licensed and is not sufficient to prove
ownership, a certificate of title being required therefor. See
R.C. 4505.04.

Thus defendant had no title to the vehicle nor did the
person from whom he allegedly had borrowed the car have
title.

Although it is the current view that a person driving a car
with the owner’s consent has standing to object to a search of
the vehicle, most courts agree that an occupant of a vehicle
cannot be said to have standing by virtue of his presence if he
is in possession of a stolen or otherwise illegally possessed or
controlled vehicle. See La Fave, Search & Seizure, Section
11.3(e). In U.S. v. Pitts. 588 F 2d 102(CAS, 1979) cert. denied

U.S. , 99S. Ct. 2171, the court held that a mere
possessor-driver of a stolen automobile in operation on a
highway has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the VIN
number observable through the windshield.

The following appears from the testimony of the trooper at
p. 18 of the transcript of the hearing on defendant’s motion to
suppress:

“Q. How did you come to get the information from
the people in the vehicle?

“A. Well, I asked whose vehicle it was. He stated
that it was registered to a Mr. Young. And I
asked him how to get a hold of Mr. Young. His
wife just spoke up and said that he had an

10A

unlisted phone number, and they had just bor-
rowed the car from him.

“They were from Florida. I said, ‘Well, | would
like to hold you and verify that you have per-
mission to have the vehicle. We don’t know his
number, and it’s unlisted. We will check him
and verify that you have permission to have the
car.”

“And I got this information about an address
on Beach Street.

“Q. William B. Young, 1147 Front Street, is that
it?

“MR. WEBB: I think it is Front Street in Lebanon.
“THE WITNESS: That was on the warranty card.

“BY THE COURT: Was that on the owner’s
card?

“A. That was the driver’s registration, 125 Beach
Street, Barberton, Ohio. That’s what he gave
me originally.

“Q. That’s when you got his license?

“A. Yes, right. Later he produced that little war-
ranty card and said something about it was his
brother’s or something like that. I don’t recol-
lect exactly what he said on that.”

Thus any possessory interest that defendant could claim in
the vehicle was that acquired through Mr. Young who

11A

obviously did not and could not own the vehicle, the same
having been stolen, and thus could not invest defendant with
any legal possessory interest.

Since defendant had nor claimed no ownership in the
vehicle and his only possessory interest as claimed was that
claimed through Mr. Young who could not confer on
defendant a valid possessory interest in a sto)2n vehicle,
defendant could have no legitimate expectation’ privacy in
the vehicle and thus no standing to seek suppr ssion of evi-
dence obtained as a result of the stopping of the vehicle.

We conclude that it was erroneous for the trial court to
sustain defendant’s motion and its judgment must be reversed.

We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand with
instructions to overruled defendant’s motion to suppress
evidence.

Judgment accordingly.

GUERNSEY, P.G. and COLE, J, concur.

12A
APPENDIX D

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE THIRD APPELLATE JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF OHIO PAULDING COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

V.

EDWARD JOHN WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellee.

CASE NO 11-79-12

JOURNAL ENTRY

This matter came on to be heard on appeal on the record,
briefs and oral arguments of counsel.

Upon consideration the court finds error of the Court of
Common Pleas of Paulding County in sustaining defendant-
appellee’s motion to suppress evidence.

It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED
that the judgment of the trial court be reversed at defendant-
appellee’s costs and that this cause be, and the same hereby is,
remanded to the Court of Common Pleas of Paulding
County with instructions to overrule defendant-appellee’s
motion and for further proceedings according to law.

It is further ORDERED that the Clerk of this Court certify
a copy of this journal entry of judgment as the mandate
required by Appellate Rule 27 or as required by any other
provision of law.

13A

It is further ORDERED that the Clerk of this Court fur-
nish a copy of any opinion filed concurrently with this journal
entry directly to the trial judge.

Exceptions saved.

/s/ JUDGES

APPENDIX E

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
* _, OF PAULDING COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
EDWARD JOHN WILLIAMS,
Defendant.
CASE NO. CR-79-523
JOURNAL ENTRY

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard upon the Defendant's
Motion to suppress all evidence obtained from the Defendant
as a result of a safety check stop and detention of the Defend-
ant’s automobile on March 7, 1979 in Paulding County, Ohio
as an unreasonable search and seizure under Amendment IV,
U.S. Constitution in producing evidence indicating a viola-
tion of the law but unrelated to automobile safety, viz, the
following: Defendant's operators license, the Ohio Registra-
tion for the 1978 Lincoln Continental Mark V automobile, a

14A

Warranty identification card for said automobile and any
other evidence obiained from the confiscation and inspection
of the aforesaid motor vehicle on the date mentioned. The
court finds the motion well taken. Consequently;

Defendant's motion to suppress is sustained.

DATED: October 12, 1979
/s/ J. Gareth Hitchcock
J. GARETH HITCHCOCK
JUDGE

APPROVED:

/s/ John David Webb
JOHN DAVID WEBB, Prosecuting Attorney

/s/ Patrick H. Young
PATRICK H. YOUNG, Attorney for Defendant

APPENDIX F
§ 1257. STATE COURTS; APPEAL; CERTIORARI

Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of
a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by
the Supreme Court as follows:

(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the
validity of a statute of any state on the ground
of its being repugnant to the Constitution,
treaties or laws of the United States, and the
decision is in favor of its validity.

ISA
§ 2913.51 RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY.

(A) No person shall receive, retain, or dis-
pose of property of another, knowing or hav-
ing reasonable cause to believe that the prop-
erty has been obtained through commission of
a theft offense.

§ 4513.02(B)

(B) When directed by any state highway patrol-
man, the operator of any motor vehicle shall
stop and submit such motor vehicle to an
inspection and such tests as are necessary to
determine whether it is unsafe or not equipped
as required by law, or that its equipment is not
in proper adjustment or repair, or in violation
of the equipment provisions of Chapter 4513.
of the Revised Code.

Such inspection shall be made with respect
to the brakes, lights, turn signals, steering,
horns and warning devices, glass, mirrors,
exhaust system, windshield wipers, tires, and
such other items of equipment as designated by
the superintendent of the state highway patrol
by rule or regulation adopted pursuant to sec-
tions 119.01 to 119.13 of the Revised Code.

Upon determining that a motor vehicle is in
safe operating condition and its equipment in
conformity with Chapter 4513. of the Revised
Code, the inspecting officer shall issue to the
operator an official inspection sticker, which
shall be in such form as the superintendent
prescribes except that its color shall vary from
year to year.

16A
§ 5503.02(B), PARA. 3

...Patrolmen shall have no other right or
power of search or of seizure except to take
from any person, under arrest or about to be
arrested, deadly or dangerous weapons in the
possession of such person...

APPENDIX G

CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMENDMENT IV
Security from Unwarrantable Search and Seizure

The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.

17A

CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMENDMENT XIV

SECTION I
Citizenship Rights Not to Be Abridged by States

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws.

§14 SEARCH WARRANTS AND
GENERAL WARRANTS.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and possessions, against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched
and the person and things to be seized. (See Const 1802, Art
VIII, § 5.)

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_2068%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.