# Amicus Brief — Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc.

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_1953%3A8

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1982
- **Citation:** 458 U.S. 670

## Text

Office Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED

AUG1 1981

EVAS,

NO. 80-1348

IN THE —
Supreme Court of the Muited States
October Term 1980
STATE OF FLORIDA,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Petitioner,
v.
TREASURE SALVORS, INC.,
ARMADA RESEARCH CORPORATION,

Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF THE STATES OF ALABAMA, ALASKA, CALIFORNIA
BY ITS STATE LANDS COMMISSION AND ITS STATE HISTORIC
PRESERVATION OFFICE, HAWAII, ILLINOIS, LOUISIANA,
MARYLAND, MASSACHUSETTS, MISSISSIPPI,
NORTH CAROLINA, SOUTH CAROLINA AND TEXAS,
THE VIRGIN ISLANDS, AMERICAN SAMOA AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF GUAM

In Support of the Petitioner, Amici Curiae

RUFUS L. EDMISTEN
Attorney General
of North Carolina

W.A. Raney, Jr.

Special Deputy Attorney General
Daniel C. Oakley
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Amici
justice Building
Post Office Box 629

Raleigh, N.C. 27602
Telephone: 919/733-5725

ANT a rN ee ETE.
DI CESARE - Printing — 3314101 — Washington, D.C, 20006

ie ee
Petatae 7

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Brief Page
RS OF AMID | ii.k co dices vc cc ckdauauaceiame ii
Interest of Amici Curiae ..........cececccesceces 1
Summary of Argument ..........ccccscecccceees 3
PGE Giba-e Ga iohoinetss ccccedccccseséee beep te 4
EERE SEEDS OILS PETA EONS 9 26

Appendix: List of Amici Curiae

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Cited
Page

Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc.

UE AI MATEO hoc daiie dk'cc's 6 cb kwe o0'c cape 8,9
Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) nf

BAF COUNTS eR i0ds aba ew ed voc uiees taeceesocs 23
Bruton v. Flying ““W” Enterprises, 273

N.C. 399, 160 S.E. 2d 482 (1968) .............045. 9
Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609

PUUER Co CUS ica Can dddsboecccdadsccedecesccede 20

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1973) .... 11, 24, 25

Employees of Dept. of Public Health &
Welfare v. Dept. of Public Health &

Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973) ........ceeeceeeee 24
Ervin v. Massachusetts Co., Fla., 95 So.2d

i i os Remi vebccens 9
Ex Parte Madrazzo, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 627

rio Ge ieee sy Vda vackes 11, 12, 15
Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) .............. 20
Ford Motor Company v. Department of —

Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945) .........eee00- 23, 24
Gardner v. State of New York, 329 U.S.

SEE IEE AE ES 23
Goldberg v. Daniels, 231 U.S. 218 (1913) ......... 22

Great Northern Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. —
I iii ckn os occas eabeeve 19, 24

ae
Vs es

iii

Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1889) .............. 11
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit,

BE LD IO: cbc de cccccidccssctocvcseeus 8
In Re Muir, 254 U.S. 522 (1921)... cece ee eeenees 18
In Re State of New York, No.1, 256 U.S.

MI UNE eis soc vide ceed cewkavedetan 12
In Re State of New York, No. 2, 256

EA POURED cikpin c's vegvivovcve 12, 13, 16, 17, 18
Intracoastal Transportation, Inc. v. Decatur

County, Georgia, 462 F.2d 361 .............45. 25
Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937) ............ 8
Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Corp., 337 U.S.

DEE A Uicasran vere svecccccandsed ade cece 21, 22
Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556

CCC haa eece me ei bids 0 d0ces ses. ipeecocbne sas 14
Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 (1962) ......... 22
Murray v. Wilson Distilling Company, 213

Ci ERP: De clie ad's oc caseed cbdbherericds 24, 25
Nestor v. Hershey, 425 F.2d 504 (1969) ........... 17
Parden v. Terminal R. of Alabama, 377 U.S.

TAU UO Lae ass ob ps ocehesoeer tiers 24, 25
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,

SREP ED cc Gee c's vccecccvupeceseus’s 2,7
Pennoyer v. seen 140 U.S. 1

(1980) ....... RUMI, 5 Gu scons oe Kenboane 20, 21

iv

Platoro Ltd., Inc., v. Unidentified Remains of a
Vessel, 508 F.2d 1113 (1975) ............ceees 9, 15

Roe v. Kansas ex rel. Smith, 278 U.S. 297 (1929) .... 7
Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941) ............. 8

State of Florida, Department of State v. Treasure
Salvors, 621 F.2d 1340 (1980) (Treasure
SSE Ry i aR te 13, 17

Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Abandoned Sailing Vessel,
408 F. Supp. 907 (S.D. Fla. 1976) .............0.. 5

Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and
Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 569 F.2d 330 (1978)
(Treasure Salvors 1) ........ceeeeeeees 4, 9, 14, 15

Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked
and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 459 F. Supp.

SOF CBs FR VOTED Whe b ade oe ccccccvecsecete 23, 25
United States v. Gettsyburg Electric R. Co.,

SUR CONTIN Foi c sou csis bacactee cane oe 7
United States v. United Mine Workers of

America, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) .......ccceeceeees 17

Williamson Towing Company, Inc. v. State
of Illinois, 534 F.2d 758 (1976) .........6. e000. 25

Constitutional Provisions
Page

FLORIDA CONSTITUTION, Art. 10, §13 .......... 24
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION,

Eleventh Amendment .............++e00+: Passim

Statutes

ALASKA STAT. §41.35.020 (1977) ..........eeeeeees 6
COLO. REV. STAT. §24-80-401 (1978) ............. 6
FLA. STAT. §267.011-§267-14 (1979) ........ 5,6, 7,8
GA. CODE §40.813(a) (1978) ............cceeeeees 6
HAWAII REV. STAT §6E-2 and §6E-7 (1976) ........ 6
IND. CODE §14-3-3-3-1(m) (Cum. Supp. 1980) ..... 6
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 41 §1601 and §1605

i he aS ass ckesceebiewe ¥cuhe ce 6
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27 §371 and §373

SN Oh ee aha cu te uas cou sewed a cs keen ccd és 6
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 6 §§179-180

ae A Calis. wcdadeicardnccs ce’ 6
MINN. STAT. §138.31 and §138.37 (1980) .......... 6
MISS. CODE ANN. §39-7-9 (1972) ...........0000: 6

N.C. GEN. STAT. §§121-22 thru 121-28
FIRB EE hiss ove dnsdacccdonicccsdoccecsocccevenes 6

vi
OR. REV. STAT. §§273.705(a), 273.722, 273.728, 274.
005(7) and 274.025 (1979) .....ccccseceseeceeees

R.1. GEN. LAWS §§42-45.1 thru 45.3, §$42-45.1 thru
SEMI SUEY sha. s vo wun abanee baciaoates

S.C. CODE §§54-7-210 thru 54-7-280 (Cum. Supp.
(TOGO) eSdie veviecseccescccdccccevsccdeececssscs 6

TEX. CIV. CODE ANN. tit. 9 §§191.001 thru
191.174 (SUPP. 1979)... cccccescscvesevcocsses

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 §§701, 781-762 (1978) .......
USL, GOO. (IGEG) viviccicccccuccbcstaseseteaes
VA. CODE § 10-145.9 (Cum. Supp. 1980) ..........
WASH REV. CODE §27.53.040 (1979) ........---0+.
WIS. STAT. §27.012(1) thru 27.012(9) (1975) ........

vii

Miscellaneous

Page
Arnold, Some Thoughts on Salvage Law and
Historic Preservation, The International
Journal of Nautical and Underwater
Exploration 7.3:173-176 (1978) .........esseeee. 10

Bass, Marine Archaeology: A Misunderstood
Science, Ocean Yearbook 2 (1980) ............. 7

Gilbert, Introduction, Precedents for
the Future, 36 LAW AND CONTEMPT. PROB.
OIE oo ook ccc ccbiiveccvodiveceascec 2

Lawrence, State Antiquities Laws and
_ Admiralty Salvage: Protecting Our Cultural
Resources, 32 MIAMI L. REV. 291 (1977) ........ 9

Lyon, The Trouble With Treasure, 149 National
Geographic 787 (June, 1976) ..........seeee-ees 4

Note, Cultural Resources Preservation and
Underwater Archaeology: Some Notes on
the Current Legal Framework and a
Model Underwater Antiquities Statue,
15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 623, 654-660 (1978) ...... 6

Thornton, The Eleventh Amendment: An
Endangered Species, 55 IND. L.J. 293

CIMFTP SadbwnvcbonsbevAbeacctnerecceesecctcess 19

NO. 80-1348

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Mnited States

October Term 1980 .

STATE OF FLORIDA,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Petitioner,
v.

TREASURE SALVORS, INC.,
ARMADA RESEARCH CORPORATION,
Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF THE STATES OF ALABAMA, ALASKA, CALIFORNIA
BY ITS STATE LANDS COMMISSION AND ITS STATE HISTORIC
PRESERVATION OFFICE, HAWAII, ILLINOIS, LOUISIANA,
MARYLAND, MASSACHUSETTS, MISSISSIPPI,

NORTH CAROLINA, SOUTH CAROLINA AND TEXAS,

THE VIRGIN ISLANDS, AMERICAN SAMOA AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF GUAM
In Support of the Petitioner, Amici Curiae

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

The amici are all states or territories with significant
interest in the continued ability of the states to protect
and conserve their historic resources, particularly those
underwater archaeological artifacts which can form
such a special and invaluable link with our past. The
opinion below, State of Florida, Department of State v.
Treasure Salvors, 621 F.2d 1340 (1980), [hereinafter cited
as Treasure Salvors 1] has placed in jeopardy the role of
the states in the preservation of our archaeological

2

heritage. As this Court has noted, speaking through Mi.
justice Brennan in Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 108 (1979), quoting Robert
Stipe:

‘[H]istoric conservation is but one aspect of

the much larger problem, basically an

environmental one, of enhancing - or perhaps

developing for the first time - the quality of life

for people’.'

While the substantive aspects of this case are of grave
interest to these amici, perhaps even more important to
the individual states is the direct attack which has been
made on the princizie of sovereign immunity from suit
embodied in the Eleventh Amendment of the United
States Constitution. It is this aspect of the case that has
led these amici to participate in this matter. These amici
are in full support of the position of the petitioner State
of Florida, as set out in its brief, but feel that the special
role the Eleventh Amendment protection has served in
the formulation and development of this country
requires that it be given additional consideration.

The vitality of the Eleventh Amendment has perhaps
been lessened in recent years, primarily due to the
increased instances in which the sovereign has
consented to suit (or waived its immunity); but the
instant case presents no instance of established consent,
or waiver, by the State of Florida, and involves instead
the very basic, purely local, question of contract
obligations between a state and one of its own citizens.
It is believed that the Court of Appeals for the Fifth

‘Gilbert, Introduction, Precedents for the Future, 36 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 311, 312 (1971), quoting address by Robert
Stripe, 1971 Conference on Preservation Law, Washington, D.C.,

May 1, 1971 {unpublished text, pp. 6-7).

Circuit has glossed over the fundamental jurisdictional
question of suability in order to reach certain implied
admiralty questions, which it obviously felt only could
be addressed by the federal courts.

This case presents clearly the opportunity for the
reaffirmation of the Eleventh Amendment immunity in
situations in which consent, or waiver, is not present.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

It is the position of the amici that the decision of the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has placed in
jeopardy the fundamental protection the Eleventh
Amendment provides to the states. The facts of this case,
when boiled down to their basics, reveal nothing more
than the intrusion of the federal court into a purely local
contractual matter. This is particularly disturbing since
the subject matter of the contracts at issue involve an
important governmental function - that of locating and
protecting our underwater historic and archaeological
resources.

The courts below have refused to heed the Eleventh
Amendment bar to their jurisdiction in order to reach
certain implied admiralty questions. he ruling of the
Court of Appeals, that the action is not one against the
state, made in connection with determining its
jurisdiction, concerns these amici states because itleads
directly to the principle that an allegation of some illegal
action on the part of an officer of the sovereign insures
that a claimant may sue the state in federal court. This
notion has been rejected numerous times and, in the
absence of any allegations of unconstitutional action by
the sovereign, the suit should have been dismissed. The
state has been called into the federal court, without its
consent, in order to retain possession of materials and
artifacts obtained through a contractual agreement with
one of its own citizens. Such a result is obviously

incompatible with the continued viability of the
Eleventh Amendment.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE DECISION BELOW SUBJECTS THE STATE
OF FLORIDA TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE
FEDERAL COURT IN A PURELY LOCAL
CONTRACTUAL MATTER CONCERNING THE
PRESERVATION OF ITS HISTORIC AND
ARCHAEOLOGICAL RESOURCES, WHICH IS
A PROPER GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION.

» This matter has followed a very long and involved
procedural path since the discovery of the Spanish ship,
Nuestra Senora De Atocha, in 1971 by the respondents
herein. The history of the search is well documented in
Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and
Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 569 F. 2d 330 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Treasure Salvors |] and ina National
Geographic article, Lyon, The Trouble With Treasure,
149 National Geographic 787 (june 1976). While the
resiliency of the respondents may be perceived by some
to add an element of daring and adventure to this case,
at issue is not the discovery of the Atocha, however
exciting; but rather this case concerns the ability to
contest in federal court the title to certain goods and
artifacts presented to the State of Florida by the
respondents, citizens of the State of Florida, pursuant to
a series of contracts executed by the parties between
1971 arid 1975. Each contract was for a period of
approximately one (1) year. Under the contract, Armada
Research was to conduct underwater salvage from and
upon certain submerged sovereignty lands of, and
belonging to, the State of Florida; and the State, inter
alia, was to provide certain recordation, authentication
and evaluation services. Pursuant to the contracts, the

State of Florida received the artifacts and materials
which were the subject of the District Court’s Warrant
for Arrest In Rem. These artifacts and materials were in
the lawful possession of the State before Treasure
Salvors filed Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Abandoned Sailing
Vessel, 408 F. Supp. 907 (S.D. Fla. 1976) in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of FLorida.

The State entered the contracts in furtherance of the
very great public interest in the location and
preservation of the historic artifacts. Perceived in this
light, the case strikes at the very heart of the Eleventh
Amendment protection previously afforded to the
states and calls into question the ability of the states to
legislate, and contract, within the area of archaeological
preservation, particularly with regard to underwater
historic resources. It cannot be disputed that
archaeological preservation is indeed important to the
states. In 1965, Florida became the first state to
specifically include underwater archaeological
resources in its antiquities legislation, following the
discovery of substantial amounts of treasure in its
territorial waters.? Florida’s Department of State, Bureau
of Historic Sites and Properties is charged with the
responsibility to:

Locate, acquire, protect, preserve and
promote the location, acquisition and
eo otagyt of historic sites and properties,

uildings, artifacts, treasure trove, and objects
of antiquity which have scientific or historical
value or are of interest to the public, including,
but not limited to, monuments, memorials,
fossil deposits, Indian habitations, ceremonial

*FLA, STAT. §§267.01-267.08 (1965), 1965 Florida Laws ch. 66-300,

$§1-8, later replaced by FLA. STAT. §§267.011-267.14 (1979), 1967 Fla.
Laws ch. 67-50, §§1-11.

sites, abandoned settlements, caves, sunken or
abandoned ships, or any part thereof. FLA.
STAT. §267.061(a)(a).

Since that time, eleven other states have expressly
included sunken shipwrecks within the protection of
their antiquities legislation.’

Preserving cultural and historical resources has
become a national policy in the United States. Indeed,
the United States Supreme Court has long recognized

IGA. CODE §40.813(a)(1978); IND. CODE §14-3-3-3-1(m) (Cum.
Supp. 1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 41 §§1601 and 1605 (1974);
MASS. GEN, LAWS ANN. ch. 6 §§179-180 (1977); MISS. CODE ANN.
§39-7-9 (1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§121-22-121-28 (1961); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§42-45.1-3--42-45.1-4 (1977); S.C. CODE §§54-7-210--54-7-
280 (Cum. Supp. 1980); TEX. CIV. CODE ANN. tit. 9 §§191.001--
191.174 (Supp. 1979); VT. STAT. ANN, tit. 22 §§701, 781-782 (1978);
VA. CODE §10-145.9 (Cum. Supp. 1980).

Other states, while not referring to sunken or abandoned ships,
include submerged or underwater sites in their protection of
archaeological resources. See ALASKA SiAT.§$41.35.020 (1977);
COLO. REV. STAT. §24-80-401 (1973); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§6E-2
and 6E-7 (1976); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27 §§371 and 373 (1969);
MINN. STAT. §§138.31 and 138.37 (1980); OR. REV. STAT.
§§273.705(a), 273.722, 273.728, 274.005(7}, 274.025 (1979); WASH.
REV. CODE §27.53.040 (1979); WIS. STAT. §§27.012(1)--27.012(9)
(1975).

‘Note, Cultural Resources Preservation and Underwater
Archaeology: Some Notes on the Current Legal Framework and a
Model Underwater Antiquities Statute, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 623,
654-660 (1978). See also National Historic Preservation Act of 1966,
16 U.S.C. §470 (1970), which declares: “The Spirit and direction of
the nation is founded upon and reflected in its historic past;...the
historical and cultural foundations of the nation be
preserved...in order to give a sense of orientation to the American
people; [and] it is...necessary and appropriate for the Federal
government to accelerate its historic preservation programs and
activities, (and) to give maximum encouragement to agencies and
individuals undertaking preservation (as well as) State and local
governments.”

that protection and preservation of historic landmarks is
a proper governmental objective for the exercise of the
power of eminent domain. United States v. Gettysberg
Electric R. Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896); Roe v. Kansas ex rel.
Smith, 278 U.S. 297 (1929). Most recently, the Supreme
Court re-articulated this premise in a case involving a
city’s use of the police power in order to effectuate
landmark preservation, stating that “New York City’s
objective of preserving structures and areas with special
historic, architectural, or cultural significance is an
entirely permissible governmental goal.” Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 129
(1978).

These amici submit that under the auspices of
Chapter 267 of the Florida statutes, a marine res with
historical and cultural significance should not be
granted any less protection than a historic building or
landmark. While recognition of the value and
importance in securing our underwater cultural
heritage has perhaps been slow in coming, it certainly
can be ignorea no longer.

Once on the seabed, or even covered by beach
sands, countless wrecks are reasonably well
preserved - protected against man, the most
destructive agent of all. Sculpture, pottery,
weights, tools, glass and weapons are found in
wrecks in large numbers in a better state of
preservation and usually more precisely dated
than on land sites. As early as the first half of the
nineteenth century, geologist Charles Lyell
could write that “it is probabie that a greater
number of monuments of the skill and industry
of man will in the course of ages be collected
together in the bed of the ocean, than will exist
at any one time on the surface of the
Continents.” (citation omitted). Bass, Marine

Archaeology: A Misunderstood Science,
OCEAN YEARBOOK 2 (1980).

It is ur. uestioned that a state’s police power has been
used to preserve and regulate the use of valuable
res. ‘rces necessary for the public welfare. Skiriotes v.
Florio... 313 U.S. 69 (1941). The Court has also permitted
states to regulate traditionally maritime activities so long
as these regulations were related to essential state
police power interests. Huron Portland Cement Co. v.
City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442-43 (1960); Kelly v.
Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1937). The states have
properly recognized that the heritage of this country
can be, and in many cases has been, lost without a
proper emphasis being placed on locating, acquiring
and preserving our historic underwater archaeological
sites and properties. The State of Florida, Division of
Archives, administers one such program pursuant to the
authority contained in the FLA. STAT. §267.011-
267.014. The program allows historical information to be
obtained, generally through a cooperative effort
between the state and private salvage companies, and to
be catalogued, preserved and displayed for all
generations to enjoy.

This interest of the states is not at odds with federal
maritime law, nor should it be considered an intrusion
therein. The states have broad interests in many areas
which may at times coincide with certain federal
interests, anc it is clear there need not be found any
irreconcilable conflict. The most recent case to address
this possible conflict is Askew v. American Waterways
Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1972). There the Court
found state regulation in the area of oil spill prevention
to be permissible absent a clear conflict with federal
law, and stated: |

To rule as the District Court has done is to allow
federal admiralty jurisdiction to swallow most
of the police power of the States over oil
spillage - an insiduous form of poliution of vast
concern to every coastal city or port and to all
the estuaries on which the life of the ocean and
the lives of the coastal people are greatly
dependent. /d. at 328-329.

The coastal states’ interest in the preservation of their
underwater archaeological resources is similarly great.5
In addition, it naturally follows, in the wake of the
United States’ failure to convince the Fifth Circuit of its
jurisdiction over the Atocha in Treasure Salvors |, that
the State of Florida’s dealings with Treasure Salvors was
a necessary and proper governmental function.®

This governmental function perhaps needs to be
placed in proper perspective, in light of the tenor of the
opinions below. While the states do not have the
pecuniary interest in the gain associated with “treasure-
hunting”, neither do they seek to stifle the competitive
free-enterprise urges of the salvors. The interest of the
states is in the preservation of these irreplaceable
cultural resources, and in the knowledge of our
ancestry to be gained from their location and
protection. Refusal to acknowledge the states’ very
great interest in these archaeological resources will
likely mean the loss of any meaningful opportunity to
learn of our past from them. This possibility is not one
which has failed to stir archaeologists from time to time.

SThe authority of states to legislate and contract in areas
concerning shipwrecks has previously been addressed in Ervin v.
Massachusetts Co., Fla., 95 So.2d 902(1957); Bruton v. Flying “W”
Enterprises, 273 N.C. 399, 160 S.E. 2d 482 (1968); and Platoro Ltd.,
inc. v. Unidentified Remains of a Vessel, 508 F.2d 1113 (1975).

*See Lawrence, State Antiquity Laws and Admiralty Salvage:
Protecting Our Cultural Resources, 32 MIAMI L.REV. 291 (1977).

10

Treasure hunters very rarely are willing to
spend the vast amounts of time and money
necessary for proper conservation procedures
in order to preserve artefacts recovered from
the sea. This would be counterproductive to
their goal which is the quick sale of the
artefacts in order to gain a monetary profit.

Another danger to the site posed by the
treasure hunter is the destruction of the
physical interrelationship of the artifacts
from which archaeologists and historians can
derive interpretations of otherwise unrecord-
ed facts relating to the structure and function
of the ship, cargo, passengers, and crew. This
information is worth more than the monetary
value of the artefacts themselves. Once again
the recording of provenience, like
conservation, is not something the treasure
hunter bothers with since it would slow down
and increase the cost of his operation. Arnold,
Some Thoughts on Salvage Law and Historic
Preservation, The International Journal of
Nautical Archaeology and Underwater
Exploration, 7.3:173-176 (1978).

It is submitted that to allow jurisdiction, in spite of the
Eleventh Amendment immunity, to challenge in
Federal court the local contractual arrangements made
in furtherance of this proper and important
governmental concern undermines the fundamental
tenets of the amendment.

THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT EXTENDS TO
SUITS IN ADMIRALTY; IN ANY EVENT,
ADMIRALTY IN REM NOTIONS SHOULD
NOT BE ALLOWED TO OBSCURE THE FACT

THAT AN ATTACK HAS BEEN MADE ON THE
STATE’S ABILITY TO RETAIN THESE
MATERIALS AND ARTIFACTS OBTAINED
PURSUANT TO CONTRACT.

The Eleventh Amendment states that:

The Judicial Power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.

While the language of the amendment does not
expressly concern the ability of a citizen to sue his own
state, it has been so construed and may now be
considered axiomatic. The early case of Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1889) stands for the proposition
that a suit by a citizen of a state against the state, without
its consent, is prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment.
Recently, the principle was reiterated in Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662 (1973), reh. den. 416 U.S. 1000
where the court stated:

While the amendment by its terms does not bar
suits against a state by its own citizens, this
Court has consistently held that an
unconsenting state is immune from suits
brought in federal court by her own citizens as
well as by citizens of another State.

In addition, while the language of the amendment
speaks merely to suits in law and equity, it has been
found to be specifically applicable to suits in admiralty.
The case of Ex Parte Madrazzo, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 627 (1883),
initially addressed this issue. There the State of Georgia
was libelled by one Juan Madrazzo, a subject of the King
of Spain. The case is interesting, not merely for its
holding, but also for the similarity between its

12

underlying factual situation and that of the instant case.
The libel in Madrazzo claimed that the state illegally

certain proceeds from the sale of slaves from
the: vessel Isabelita, and the court was requested to
award admiralty process against the state to show cause
why the proceeds should not be paid over to the
libelant. The Court stated definitively that:

The case is not a case where the property is in
custody of a court of admiralty, or brought
within its jurisdiction, and in the possession of
any private person. It is not, therefore, one for
the exercise of that jurisdiction. It is a mere
personal suit against a state to recover
proceeds ir; its possession, and in such a case
no private person has a right to commence an
original suit in this court against a state. Id. at
632.

This principle was reaffirmed in companion cases, In
Re State of New York, No. 1, 256 U.S. 490 (1921) and In Re
State of New York, No. 2, 256 U.S. 503 (1921), the latter
being known as the Queen City case. The first suit
involved libels against tugs for damages occurring while
the libelants’ boats were being navigated by the tugs on
the Erie Canal. The tugs were claimed to have been
under charter to the superintendent of public works for
the State of New York, and motions were served upon
him to appear and answer. The Attorney General
appeared specially and filed a suggestion that the court
was without jurisdiction, as the suit was against the State
of New York. The court found that the District Court
indeed had no jurisdiction, stating:

We repeat, the immunity of a state from suit in
personam in the admiralty brought by a private
person without its consent, is clear. In Re State
of New York, No. 1, 256 U.S. at 500.

13

The court further stated that it was not inconsistent to
afford states their sovereign immunity in admiralty
courts, since this immunity in other tribunals was well
established. The Queen City case next applied the
immunity to an in rem admiralty action involving a libel
against the tug, Queen City, which was the property of
the State of New York. The general principle, then, that
the immunity privilege applies in an in rem admiralty
action was established.

The principle so uniformly held to exempt the
property of municipal corporations employed
for public and governmental purposes from
seizure by admiralty ess in rem applies
with even greater force to exempt public
property of a state used and employed for
public and governmental purposes. In Re State
of New York No. 2, 256 U.S. at 511.

This principle is important as an initial proposition, due
to the blurring in the courts below of the essential
contract issue with issues of admiralty. The Court of
Appeals apparently felt its exclusive admiralty in rem
jurisdiction must be invoked in order to provide some
forum for Treasure Salvors.’ If, however, the action is in
actuality found to be based on in rem admiralty
principles, it is clear that the immunity of the State can
operate to bar the action.

It is submitted by these amici that the continued
reference to this matter as an in rem admiralty-type
action is misplaced, and has obscured the real focus
with which this jurisdictional question should be
viewed. The action, at least since the issuance of the

"See, e.g. Treasure Salvors II, 621 F.2d at 1346, n. 19, where the
court stated “[I}f the mere assertion of ownership by a state of a res
was sufficient to invoke the Eleventh Amendment, petitioners such
as Treasure Salvors would find themselves stranded without a
forum in which to litigate their claims.”

14

Warrant for Arrest In Rem, has never been a true in rem
- against all the world - cause. The Court of Appeals, in
Treasure Salvors |, 569 F.2d at 335, stated:

The United States intervened in plaintiffs’ in
rem action as a party defendant and filed a
counterclaim asserting a property right in the
res. The government, by intervening in this
action and by stipulating to the court’s
admiralty jurisdiction waived the usual
requirement that the res be present within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court and
consented to the court’s jurisdiction to
determine its interest in the extra-territorial
portion of the vessel.

Thus, the jurisdiction in the initial cause was established
only by the consent occasioned by the entry into the
action by the United States. The interest of the State of
Florida was never addressed, and certainly was not
foreclosed, by this action. The Court of Appeals
expressly noted:

...[W]e do not approve that portion of its [the
District Court] order which may be construed
as holding that plaintiffs have exclusive title to,
and the right to immediate possession of, the
vessel and cargo as to other claimants, if any
there be, who are not parties or privies to this
litigation. Treasure Salvors |, 569 U.S. at 336.

The true nature of the proceedings is an in personam-
type action, directed against the State of Florida. The
concern with the vessel Atocha need not be considered
directly. Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556 (1954),
concerned a petition by a minority owner of a vessel to
prohibit the Superior Court in and for the County of San
Diego from entertaining a complaint for partition and
sale of the vessel by the majority owners. The Court

15

looked at the real interests of the parties, and found the
cause not to be in rem in the admiralty sense. While
there were perhaps some questions of admiralty
impiied, the court held the quarrel was basically
between the co-owners, and that “[e]asily accessible
local courts are well equipped to handle these
essentially local disputes.” /d. at 563.*

While the matter may be so intimately intertwined
with admiralty notions that the Court may choose not to
make distinctions with regard to the exact nature of the
suit - in rem or in personam- the principles argued in
support of the State’s immunity are equally applicable
regardless of that characterization. The interest of the
amici in reiterating the limitations on the jurisdictional
holding of Treasure Salvors |, and in raising the in
personam/in rem distinction is to caution against
finding some justification for the issuance of the
Warrant for Arrest and Show Cause Order in vague in
rem admiralty principles.

This cautionary note is particularly appropriate in that
the materials and artifacts at issue were not present
within the territorial confines of the federal court for
the Southern District of Florida, but were housed in
Tallahassee, Florida, in the Northern District prior to,
and during, this litigation. “To establish in rem
jurisdiction in admiralty the res must be present in the
district when the suit is filed or during the pendency of
the action.” Platoro Ltd. Inc. v. Unidentified Remains of
A Vessel, 508 F.2d 1113, 1115 (1975).

*See also Ex parte Madrazzo, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 627, 632 (1833) in
which the Court considered the suit to recover proceeds in the
possession of the State as a “mere personal suit against a State...”

16

THE QUEEN CITY CASES SUPPORT A FINDING
OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT BAR TO
THIS ACTION; THE “SPECIAL CHALLENGE”
LANGUAGE THEREIN DOES NOT ALLOW THE
FEDERAL COURT TO DETERMINE THE
VALIDITY OF THE CONTRACTS UNDER
WHICH THE STATE CLAIMS.

Much has been argued below in an effort to
distinguish the clear holding of Queen City; in
particular much time has been devoted to construction
of the following language found therein:

We deem it clear, however, that the verified
suggestion presented by the Attorney General
of that State, in his official capacity as
representative of the State and the People
thereof, amounts to an official certificate
concerning a public matter presumably within
his official knowledge, and that it ought to be
accepted as sufficient evidence of the fact [of
ownership], at least in the absence of a special
challenge. In Re State of New York, No. 2, 256
U.S. at 509.

The lower court construed this language as a limitation
of the Queen City ruling, such that the Eleventh
Amendment would not bar the action when the claim of
state ownership was controverted by the opposing
party.
The Queen City tells us that when a state
submits uncontroverted evidence of
ownership in an admiralty in rem action, the
district court is bound to accept the assertion
and apply the Eleventh Amendment
accordingly. In the case at bar, however, we
have a controverted claim of ownership.

17

Treasure Salvors offered evidence and legal .
argument to show that it, and not Florida,
owned the artifacts from the Atocha. Such an
offer is the “special challenge” that the
Supreme Court envisioned in the Queen City.
Treasure Salvors 1, 621 F.2d at 1345.
These amici submit that this is a clearly unwarranted
construction of the “special challenge” language, and
that is needlessly and recklessly opens the door to the
virtually unassailable “jurisdiction to determine
jurisdiction” arguments upon which the hopes of the
respondents’ are pinned. See United States v. United
Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, (1947) and
Nestor v. Hershey, 425 F.2d 504 (1969). However, such
arguments are wholly outside the true issues in this -
cause, and if followed would lead inescapably to the
result envisioned by Judge Rubin in his dissent below:

In essence the suggestion by my brethren that
the court can determine whether it has
jurisdiction of a suit over state-claimed
property by looking to the merits is equivalent
to asserting that suits against a state are
permitted by the Eleventh Amendment if the
result is that the state loses.Treasure Salvors
I, 621 F.2d at 1351.

A careful reading of the factual context in which the
“special challenge” language of Queen City appeared
reveals that the court was not thereby setting up an
adjudication of that claim, as occurred below, but was
merely determining whether the State was the real party
in interest. The record of proceedings itself did not, in
Queen City, reveal anything about the ownership of the.
vessel or its employment by the State other than the
suggestion of the Attorney General. The issue arose
upon the verified suggestion, and the Court merely

concluded that, inasmuch as there had been no “special
challenge” to the suggestion, it should have been
accepted.

It would be an unwarranted aspersion upon
the honor of a great state to treat facts thus
solemnly certified by its chief law officer, and
accepted as true when passed upon by the
District Court, as now requiring verification. In
Re State of New York No. 2, 256 U.S. at 509.

It is thus submitted that the Court was speaking in terms
of what might be an accepted practice and procedure,
and not definitively carving out an Eleventh

Amendment exception for controverted state
ownership.®

Further, the court below, even following its
controverted claim line of reasoning, went far beyond
what was necessary to determine the threshhold
Eleventh Amendment issue. The question raised at
. every turn by the State of Florida’s Motion to Quash
Warrant for Arrest In Rem, its Reply to Rule to Show
Cause, and its Petition for Prohibition and for Stay is not
the validity of the contracts under which it received the
property in question, but rather the existence of its title
pursuant to the contracts prior to any lawsuits
pertaining to ownership of the vessel. The underlying
dispute over the construction of the contracts is purely
and simply a local question, quite separate from any
* admiralty considerations. Assuming arguendo that the
“special challenge” language has the connotation
placed upon it by the Court of Appeals, can it be

SThis notion is further supported by the care taken by Queen City

to distinguish In Re Muir, 254 U.S. 522 (1921), which had involved a

of British ownership of the vessel Gleneden which

“came not through official channels, but from private
counsel....” In Re State of New York No. 2, 256 U.S. at 510.

19

seriously contended that this enables the Court to reach
the very merits of the issue — the validity of the
contracts? These amici believe such a construction
would seriously undermine the basic premise of the
Eleventh Amendment. “A state’s freedom from
litigation was established as a constitutional right
through the Eleventh Amendment. The inherent nature
of sovereignty prevents actions against a state by its own
citizens without its consent.” Great Northern Ins. Co. v.
Read, 322 U.S. 47, 51 (1944). While the existence of
various consent, and waiver, theories may be
considered by some to have eroded the vitality of the
Eleventh Amendment’s immunity," these principles do
not constitute such a direct assault as this case on the
state’s freedom from interference of the federal
judiciary in matters of such purely local concern as
contracts with its own citizens.

IV.

THE SUIT IS ONE AGAINST THE STATE, AND

THE “JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE

JURISDICTION” ARGUMENT ADVANCED BY

THE RESPONDENTS DOES NOT ALLOW THE

COURT TO REACH THE MERITS OF THE CASE
ONCE THIS IS ESTABLISHED.

The amici contend the Court of Appeals’ ruling, that
this does not present a suit against the state, given in
such a cavalier, almost “off-hand” manner, also
portends an erosion of the Eleventh Amendment
immunity which is simply not warranted. It is clear that
the real party in interest here is the State of Florida.
There has been, throughout the proceedings below, no

"See Thornton, The Eleventh Amendment: An Engandered
Species, 55 IND. L.J. 293 (1977).

20

indication that the suit could be couched as anything
other than one against the State.

Almost from the very beginnings of the construction
of the Eleventh Amendment, various escapes from its
prohibition to suit have been considered. One such
route has been to name individual officers of the state
and prosecute the action against them. The court has
examined these devices in detail and has indicated that:

The general rule is that a suit is against the
sovereign if ‘the judgment sought would be to
restrain the government from acting, or to
compel it to act.’ (citations omitted) Dugan v.
Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963).

These amici support, in particular, the argument of the
State of Florida, that this is indeed a suit against the
sovereign. Not only has it involved throughout as the
party of record, the State of Florida, the Department of
State and its Division of Archives, it is clear that ihe
contract and property rights of the State, and not any
individual, are at issue. The line of cases, beginning with
Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1 (1890) and
expanded upon, and crystallized, by Ex Parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908), generally to the effect that immunity is
unavailable to officers of the state seeking to enforce an
unconstitutional act, are inapposite since there is no
suggestion of improper action taken pursuant to some
unconstitutional authority. It is not to be argued that, if
such were the case, the court would be powerless to
entertain the action.

The other class [of Eleventh Amendment
action] is where a suit is brought against
defendants who, claiming to act as officers of
the State and under the color of an
unconstitutional statute, commit acts of wrong
and injury to the rights and property of the

21

plaintiff .... Such suit ... is not ... an action
against the State. (all citations omitted)
Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. at 10.

It is submitted that the principles expressed in the
watershed case, Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Corp.,
337 U.S. 683 (1949) are controling, and that the
“jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction” argument
advanced below should be repelled. In Larson, the War
Assets Administrator had been sued io enjoin the sale of
surplus coal which allegedly had been previously sold to
the plaintiff. The Court carefully, and purposely,
avoided the underlying contract-construction issue,
and found the district court had no jurisdiction over the
unconsenting sovereign. The case is instructive in that
there were no claims of unconstitutional actions by the
officer involved, but merely a “‘cause of action” claim
of an illegal possession of the coal. Similarly, the
Division of Archives in the instant case has been claimed
by the respondents to be in illegal and improper
possession of the Atocha artifacts, even though its
interest therein has been at all times pursuant to
legislative authority and validly-executed contracts.
Larson disposes of the argument that the allegation of
“illegal” action is enough to overcome the Eleventh
Amendment by stating:

...the actions of an officer of the sovereign (be
it holding, taking or otherwise legally affecting
the plaintiff’s property) can be regarded as so
“illegal” as to permit a suit for specific relief
against the officer as an individual only if it is
not within the officer’s statutory powers or, if
within those powers, only if the powers, or
their exercise in the particular case, are
unconstitutionally void. id. at 701-702.

The Court of Appeals should not have looked to the
underlying contract in order to bootstrap the matter

22

into its jurisdiction. The obvious result of such a
maneuver was correctly pointed out by Judge Rubin,
and these amici urge that this approach be nullified. As
in the Larson line of cases", the ultimate question on the
merits may be assumed for purposes of decision to go
against the sovereign, but in the absence of some claim
of unconstitutional action, the suit must be dismissed as
one against the sovereign without its consent.

The real effect of this suit is not to adjudicate statutory
authority or even the alleged unconstitutional actions
of an officer of the state, but to compel the state to
appear in federal court in order to retain possession of
its own property, obtained through a contractual
arrangement with one of its own citizens. It is simply a
question-begging device to declare or imply that such
would not be a suit directed against the sovereign.

Vv.

THE STATE OF FLORIDA HAS NOT WAIVED
ITS IMMUNITY; IN PARTICULAR, ITS
INTEREST IN HISTORIC PRESERVATION AND
UNDERWATER ARCHAEOLOGICAL
ARTIFACTS IS NOT A PARDEN-LIKE ENTRY
INTO FEDERAL MARITIME ACTIVITY.

While the Court of Appeals’ decision ignored aspects
of the consent/waiver doctrines which are so important
to Eleventh Amendment considerations, the District
Court raised several interesting points with regard to
the state’s consent to the suit which should be
addressed.

The Eleventh Amendment privilege of immunity can
scarcely be mentioned without noting that it involves
notions that the sovereign state cannot be sued without

_ "§ee also Goldberg v. Daniels, 231 U.S. 218 (1913) and Malone v.
Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 (1962).

23

its consent, and that the privilege may be waived. See
Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1858). One
such method of waiver is by voluntary appearance in an
action to present a claim.

in Gardner v. State of New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 67 S.
Ct. 467 (1947), cited by the District Court, Treasure
Salvors, Inc. v. The Unidentified Wrecked and
Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 459 F. Supp. 507 (S.D. Fla.
1978), the Court noted that the state had waived its
immunity with respect to certain claims involving a
debtor railroad by becoming the actor and filing a claim
in bankruptcy. The fallacy of applying this principle in
the case sub judice is readily apparent, as the State of
Florida has never voluntarily become an “actor”
seeking to establish rights in the property at issue. It has
rather been subjected to the federal court-issued
warrant for arrest for property in its possession pursuant
to contract.

Neither can it be said that the state has waived its
Eleventh Amendment privilege by its appearance in this
suit, even to answer a claim on the merits. In Ford
‘Motor Company v. Dept. of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459
(1945), the Court addressed the situation in which the
Attorney Geneal appeared, represented the State, and
defended the action on its merits. The Eleventh
Amendment claim was not even raised until the action
reached the Supreme Court, but the Court nevertheless
undertook to determine whether any executive or
administrative officer of the State had been authorized
to waive the state’s immunity. The Court stated that such
authorization “...is not to be presumed in the absence
of clear language to the contrary...”, id. at 468, and
found no waiver. Similarly here, no waiver authority has
been found, and the appearance by the State below has
not operated to overcome the Eleventh Amendment

privilege.

24

A state may also waive its immunity, and consent to
suit by legislative or constitutional pronouncements.
However, the waiver must not only be express
and unequivocal, it will not generally be found to
authorize suits against the state in courts other than its
own. See Murray v. Wilson Distilling Company, 213 U.S.
151, 171 (1909); Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322
U.S. 47 (1944); Ford Motor Company v. Dept. of
Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945). These amici expressly
support the position of the State of Florida to the effect
that neither the Florida Constitution, FLA. CONST., Art,
10, §13, nor its statutes, can be construed to be an
express and unequivocal waiver of immunity in this type
of action.

The most recent applications of the waiver doctrine
have involved the entrance of the state into areas of
federally-regulated activities. The triumvirate of cases,
beginning with Parden v. Terminal R. of Alabama State
Docks Department, 377 U.S. 184 (1964), reh. den. 377
U.S. 1010, as further refined by Employees of Dept. of
Public Health & Welfare v. Dept. of Public Health &
Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973) and by Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651 (1973), have resulted in the unavailability of
bo Si when (1) as a threshhold matter, Congress

poo Kip y indicated that suits against the state are
under an applicable federal law, and (2) the

state a es participates in the activity governed by
the law. These principles are not involved in this matter,
except in the most peripheral sense. It is apparent that
this case does not present the opportunity for
application, or extension, of the waiver doctrine as
amplified by Parden, Employees and Edelman, but the
cases are instructive to remind one of the scope and
breadth of the Eleventh Amendment, and to reiterate

the underlying principle that waiver is not lightly to be
inferred, as was done so by the courts below. As the

25

Court stated in Edelman, citing Murray v. Wilson
Distilling Company, 213 U.S. 151 (1909):

In deciding whether a state has waived its
constitutional protection under the Eleventh
Amendment, we will find waiver only where
stated ‘by the most express language or by such
overwhelming implications from the text as
would leave no room for any other reasonable
construction.’ Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at
673.

The district court’s argument, in Treasure Salvors, Inc. v.
Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel,
459 F. Supp. at 529, that a Parden-like waiver is present
due to the engagement of the State of Florida in a
“salvage operation” constitutes a convoluted
interpretation of the waiver doctrine, and should not be
further advanced. The interest of the state in the area of
preservation of its historic artifacts need not be
considered as an entry into some vague field of federal
maritime activity. (See Argument I, supra.) Although the
Court of Appeals failed to address consent or waiver in
its decision, it is apparent that concluding the State of
Florida has made a Parden-like entry into a
federally regulated area is erroneous and thet such a
theory cannot operate to confer jurisdiction on the
Court.

There simply is no consent, or waiver, to be found in
the actions of the State of Florida in this matter. Absent
such a consent, the suit against the state must be
dismissed. To allow the respondents to call the state into

"In Intracoastal Transportation, Inc. v. Decatur County Georgia,
462 F.2d 361 (1973), a case in which entry into a federally regulated
sphere of activity was presented explicitly, and in which admiralty
jurisdiction was at issue, the Fifth Circuit did not find any implied
consent. Of similar import is Williamson Towing Co., Inc. v. State of
Ilinois, 534 F.2d 758 (1976).

26

federal court and have the legality of its possession of
these historical artifacts adjudged is simply and clearly
not in accordance with the traditional protection
afforded by the Eleventh Amendment. Stripped of its
implied in rem admiralty notions, the matter may be
viewed as a very direct intrusion on the basic principle
of immunity from suit in federal court.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, amici urge this Court to
find that the Eleventh Amendment bars this action
against the State of Florida, and to reverse the decision
of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Respectfully submitted this the 31st day of July, 1981.

RUFUS L. EDMISTEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL

By

W.A. Raney Jr.
Special Deputy Attorney General

Daniel C. Oakley
Assistant Attorney General

Counsel for Amici

Justice Building

Post Office Box 629

Raleigh, North Carolina 27602
(919) 733-5725

27

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

| hereby certify that on this the 1st day of August, 1981,
three (3) copies of BRIEF FOR THE STATES OF
ALABAMA, ... IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITIONER,
AMICI CURIAE, were mailed, by depositing same in the
United States Post Office, with first class postage
prepaid, to counsel of record at the following
addresses:

Jim Smith

Attorney General

Sydney H. McKenzie III
Chief Trial Counsel
(Counsel of Record)
Susan E. Gamble

Assistant Attorney General
The Capitol - Suite 1501
Tallahassee, Florida 32301

David Paul Horan
608 Whitehead Street
Key West, Florida 33040

Joshua M. Morse
504 Plantation Road
Tallahassee, Florida 32303

This the 1st day of August, 1981.

RUFUS L. EDMISTEN
Attorney General of
North Carolina

Daniel C. Oakley

Assistant Attorney General
P.O, Box 629

Raleigh, North Carolina 27602
919/733-5725

APPENDIX

APPENDIX: LIST OF AMICI

State of Alabama

Honorable Charles A. Graddick
Attorney General of Alabama
State Administrative Building
Montgomery, Alabama 36130

State of Alaska

Honorable Wilson L. Condon
Attorney General of Alaska
Pouch K, State Capitol
Juneau, Alaska 99881

State of California

State Lands Commission
State Historic Preservation Office
Robert C. Hight, Chief Counsel

Jack E. Rump, Assistant Chief Counsel
1807 13th Street
Sacramento, California 95814

State of Hawaii

Honorable Tany S. Hong
Attorney General of Hawaii
State Capitol

415 South Beretania Street
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813

State of Illinois

Honorable Tyrone C. Fahner
Attorney General of Illinois
500 South Second

Springfield, Illinois 62701

State of Louisiana

Honorable William J. Guste, Jr.
Attorney General of Louisiana

2-3-4 L Avenue

New rs, Louisiana 70112

State of Maryland

Honorable Steven H. Sachs
Attorney General of Maryland
One South Calvert Building
Baltimore, Maryland 21209

State of Massachusetts

Honorable Francis X. Bellotti
Attorney General of Massachusetts
1 Ashburn Place

Boston, Massachusetts 02108

State of Mississippi

Honorable William A. Allain
Attorney General of Mississippi
Carroll Gartin Justice Building
P.O Box 220

Jackson, Mississippi 39205

State of North Carolina

Honorable Rufus L. Edmisten
Attorney General of North Carolina
Justice Building

P.O. Box 629

Raleigh, North Carolina 27602

State of South Carolina

Honorable Daniel R. McLeod
Attorney General of South Carolina
Wade Hampton Office Building
Columbia, South Carolina 29211

State of Texas

Honorable Mark White
Attorney General of Texas
Capitol Station

P.O. Box 12548

Austin, Texas 78711

The Virgin Islands

Honorable Donald M. Bouton

Acting Attorney General of
The Virgin Islands

Department of Law

P.O. Box 280 —

St. Thomas, Virgin Islands 00801

American Samoa

Honorable Aviata F. Faalevao
Attorney General of American Samoa
P.O. Box 7

Pago Pago, American Samoa 96799

Government of Guam

Honorable Jack Avery

Attorney General of the
Government of Guam

7th Floor, Pacific News Building

238 O’Hara Street

Agana, Guam 96910

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_1953%3A8. Public record. Not legal advice.