# Amicus Brief — American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_1942%3A11

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1982
- **Citation:** 456 U.S. 63

## Text

THE AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY,
ToBACCO WORKERS’ INTERNATIONAL UNION, AND
LOCAL 182 oF TOBACCO WORKERS’
INTERNATIONAL UNION,

Petitioners,

V.

JOHN PATTERSON, MARION MOSHOE,
EDMUND PAGE, JAMES RANDOLPH
AND Percy TAYLOR,

Respondents.

AMERICAN BRANDS, INC.,
5 Petitioner,

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE FOR THE
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT ADVISORY COUNCIL
IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITIONERS

RoBerT E. WILLIAMS
Douac.as S. MCDOWELL
Davin H. LARRY
McGuINngEss & WILLIAMS
1015 15th Street, N.W.
Suite 1200
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 789-8600
Attorneys for the Amicus Curiae
Equal Employment
Advisory Council

Wasen Eres Printine Co.. Inc. + 789-0096 d WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE E
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S CONCLUSION THAT
SECTION 708 (h) APPLIES ONLY TO PRE-ACT
SENIORITY SYSTEMS IS DIRECTLY CON-
TRARY TO THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE,

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND THIS
COURT’S HOLDINGS

A. The Language of Section 703 (h) Is Unambigu-
ously Applicable To All Bona Fide Seniority
Systems, And This Court Has Emphasized
That Prospective Application Of That Section
Is Required By The Nation’s Labor Policy ......

B. There Is No Support In This Court’s Decisions
Or In The Legislative History For Applying
a Different Legal Standard To Post-Act Than
To Pre-Act Seniority Systems

K S&S WwW

15

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
Cases: Page
Aeronautical Lodge v. Campbell, 387 U.S. 521
(1949) 8, 11
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974).. 6, 15
California Brewers Association v. Bryant, 444 U.S.
e, renne 3, 5, 11, 12, 18, 16, 20
Ford Motor Co., 28 LA 296 (1954) .. 10
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 880 (1953). 11
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., Inc., 424

U.S. 747 (1976) 5, 8, 9, 16, 17, 18, 19
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 488 U.S.
567 (1978) 18
Greyhound Corp. v. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 487 U.S.
(1978) 8
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S, 424 (1971)... 4,5,
18, 17, 18, 20
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States, 481 U.S, 824 (1977) passim
Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 634 F.2d 744
(4th Cir. 1980) (en banc) 8,4
H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 897 U.S. 99 (1970) 11
Pullman - Standard v. Swint, U.S. Nos. 80-1190 and
80-1198 3

Swint v. Pullman- Standard, 624 F.2d 525 (5th
Cir. 1980), pet. for cert. granted, Nos. 80-1190

and 80-1198 8
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 101

S. Ct. 1089 (1981) 18
Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 486 U.S. 631

(1978) 8
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 482 U.S.

68 (1977) 8, 8, 12, 16, 17
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 481 U.S. 533

(1977) 8, 9, 16, 17

United States of America and Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission v. Trucking Manage-
ment, Inc., No. 79-2102 (D.C. Cir., August 14,
1981), Slip Opinion 8
United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 198 (1979) 6, 11, 18, 19

iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED—Continued
Statutes: Page
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended (42 U.S.C, 656 20000, et se. passim
Section 708 (h) passim
Miscellaneous :
Elkouri & Elkouri, How Arbitration Works, 3d
Edition (19738) 10

Slichter, Healy & Livernash, The Impact of Col-
lective Bargaining on Management (1960)........ 10, 14

7

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
OcTOBER TERM, 1980

No. 80-1199

THE AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY,
TOBACCO WORKERS’ INTERNATIONAL UNION, AND
LOCAL 182 oF TOBACCO WORKERS’
INTERNATIONAL UNION,

1 Petitioners,

JOHN PATTERSON, MARION MOSHOBR,
EDMUND PAGE, JAMES RANDOLPH
AND PERcY TAYLOR,

Respondents.
" AMERICAN BRANDS, INC.,
„ Petitioner,

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE FOR THE
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT ADVISORY COUNCIL
IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITIONERS

The Equal Employment Advisory Council (EEAC),
with the written consent of all parties,’ respectfully
submits this brief as Amicus Curiae in support of
the Petitioners.

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE

EEAC is a voluntary nonprofit association or-
ganized to promote the common interest of employ-
ers and the general public in sound government poli-
cies, procedures and requirements pertaining to non-
discriminatory employment practices. Its member-
ship comprises a broad segment of the employer
community in the United States, including both in-
dividual employers and trade and industry associa-
tions. Its governing body is a Board of Directors
composed primarily of experts and specialists in the
field of equal employment opportunity whose com-
bined experience gives the Council a unique depth of
understanding of the practical and legal considera-
tions relevant to the proper interpretation and appli-
cation of EEO policies and requirements.

Substantially all of EEAC’s members or their con-
stituents are subject to the provisions of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seg.). As such, EEAC’s members
have a direct interest in the issue presented for the
Court’s consideration; that is, whether the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has erred in conclud-
ing that Congress intended that the immunity from
Title VII liability afforded bona fide seniority sys-
tems by Section 703 (h) of Title VII should extend

1 Their consents have been filed with the Clerk of the
Court.

only to seniority practices instituted before the Act’s
effective date.’

At issue in this case, as in Pullman-Standard v.
Swint, U.S. Nos. 80-1190 and 80-1198, is the continued
viability of the protection Congress extended to bona
fide seniority systems in g 708(h). The Fourth Cir-
cuit in Patterson and the Fifth Circuit in Pullman-
Standard have advanced interpretations of that sec-
tion which are at odds with this Court’s holding in
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States, 481 U.S. 324 (1977), and which would im-
properly restrict the protections of 5 703 (h). Ac-
cordingly, because of the potentially enormous impact
upon seniority systems and the rights and benefits
accrued thereunder, this Court’s disposition of those
cases is of vital concern to the nation’s employers,
employees, and unions.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiffs in this employment discrimination case
allege that the operation of a lines of progression

* Because of its interest in issues involving interpretation
of Section 708(h) of Title VII, EEAC has filed briefs as
Amicus Curiae with this Court in Pullman-Standard v. Swint,
Nos, 80-1190 and 80-1198; California Brewers Association v.
Bryant, 444 U.S. 598 (1980); International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States, 481 U.S. 824 (1977); United
Airlines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977); and Trans World
Airlines v. Hardison, 482 U.S, 63 (1977).

* Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 684 F.2d 744 (an
Cir. 1980) (en banc).

* Swint v. Pullman Standard, 624 F.2d 525 (6th Cir. 1980).

4

promotional policy instituted in 1968 violates Title
VII.“

In the en banc opinion before this Court, the circuit
court held that Congress intended the protections of
§ 703(h) to apply only to those systems in existence
on the effective date of Title VII and to routine post-
Act applications of such systems. Because the lines
of progression policy was adopted after the effective
date of Title VII, § 703 (h) was found to have no
application, whether or not the policy was considered
a seniority system. As a result, the Fourth Circuit
held that the discriminatory effect of that policy was
properly evaluated by the district court under the
disparate impact test of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971).

In other words, the Fourth Circuit has concluded
that it was the intent of Congress te immunize from
Title VII liability only those seniority systems in ex-
istence prior to the Act’s effective date and to re-
quire that the legality of pre-Act and post-Act sys-
tems be evaluated pursuant to widely, and often
crucially, differing legal standards. |

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Fourth Circuit’s holding would implicitly re-
peal § 703 (h) for all post-Act seniority systems and
make the validity of such systems depend upon

There is a dispute regarding whether the lines of progres-
sion policy was implemented in 1968 or at an earlier time,
prior to the effective date of Title VII. Compare Patterson,
684 F.2d 744, 757-766, dissent of Judge Widener, with the

whether or not they perpetuated the effects of past
employment practices. Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971). Moreover, the court’s opinion
would effectively discourage employers and unions
from changing seniority systems. That standard and
result are directly contrary to this Court’s holdings
and the intent of Congress.

As this Court has acknowledged, “[s]eniority sys-
tems and the entitlements conferred by credits earned
thereunder are of vast and increasing importance in
the economic employment system of this Nation.”
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., Inc., 424 US.
747, 766 (1976). In § 703 (h) of Title VII, Congress

the importance of seniority systems, as
well as the process of independent collective bargain-
ing in which they are negotiated, by providing that
unless intentional discrimination is involved, the oper-
ation of such systems “shall not be an unlawful em-
ployment practice.” it is apparent from this Court’s
decision in California Brewers Association v. Bryant,
444 U.S. 598 (1980), that the immunity from Title
VII liability extended by § 703(h) is prospective, and
protects any neutral, bona fide seniority system,
whenever adopted.

Congress recognized that neutral bona fide senior-
ity policies could have a “disparate impact” upon
more recently hired minority group members, but
determined that the protection of bona fide seniority
systems was of overriding importance. As its resolu-
tion of competing interests, Congress determined that
“[p]ost-Act discriminatees . . . may obtain full ‘make
whole’ relief, including retroactive seniority under
Franks v. Bowman [424 U.S. 747 (1976) )

without attacking the legality of the seniority system
as applied to them” (emphasis added). Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. at 347.

The circuit court’s reading of § 703 (h) contradicts
the unambiguous language of the section, which un-
qualifiedly applies to all bona fide systems. More-
over, the legislative history of § 703 (h) indicates
that Congress intended that Title VII would not re-
sult in setting aside, or making illegal in the future,
neutral, bona fide seniority systems. Statements of
the sponsors of the bill were inserted into the record
to respond to objections of the opponents to Title VII
that bona fide seniority systems would be set aside.
It is unthinkable that legislative statements intended
to protect seniority systems could be construed as
evidence of a Congressional intent to prohibit upon
enactment precisely the types of pre-Act systems the
bill’s opponents vigorously sought to protect. Indeed,
because Title VII would not have passed without sup-
port of legislators who resisted federal encroachment
upon traditional management prerogatives and union
freedoms (United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193, 206 (1979)), the only logical conclusion is that
post-Act systems were intended to be given the same
protections at pre-Act systems.

Moreover, under the Fourth Circuit’s interpreta-
tion, § 703 (h) would no longer protect seniority sys-
tems modified by collective bargaining, conciliation
agreements or consent decrees, even if the changes
were intended to soften the effects of past employment
practices. Although voluntary change in employment
practices is the preferred means for carrying out the
purposes of Title VII, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver,
415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974), the circuit court’s approach

7

would penalize and, therefore, discourage such volun-
tary attempts to ameliorate the application of past
systems. Thus, the opinion of the court. below flies
in the face of the statutory language, is at odds with
this Court’s decisions and poses a significant threat
to the proper administration of the Federal labor and
antidiscrimination laws.

ARGUMENT

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S CONCLUSION THAT
SECTION 703(h) APPLIES ONLY TO PRE-ACT
SENIORITY SYSTEMS IS DIRECTLY CONTRARY
TO THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE, THE LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY AND THIS COURT’S HOLDINGS

A. The Language Of Section 703(h) Is Unambiguously
Applicable To All Bona Fide Seniority Systems, And
This Court Has Emphasized That Prospective Appli-
cation Of That Section Is Required By The Nation’s
Labor Policy

The Court has long recognized that differing indus-
trial circumstances and bargaining goals have given
rise to a wide variety of seniority systems and com-
ponents of those systems. Indeed:

It is the essence of collective bargaining that it
is a continuous process. Neither the conditions
to which it addresses itself nor the benefits to be
secured by it remain static.

* * * *

There are great variations in the use of the sen-
iority principle through collective bargaining
bearing on the time when seniority begins, de-
termination of the units subject to the same
seniority, and the consequences which flow from
seniority. All these variations disclose limita-
tions upon the dogmatic use of the principle

of seniority in the interest of the ultimate aims
of collective bargaining. Aeronautical Lodge v.
Campbell, 387 U.S. 621, 525-26 (1949).
Title VII, of course, was modeled in large part on this
pre-existing national labor policy. Franks v. Bowman
Transportation Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 769 (1976).
The Fourth Circuit’s construction of § 703 (h) as ap-
plying only to those particular seniority systems in
place as of the effective date of Title VII, however,
is antithetical to this labor policy and at odds with
the intent of Congress when it passed Title VII.

As this Court has observed, “seniority systems are
afforded special treatment under Title VII.” Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 81
(1977). In unambiguous language, applicable to all
bona fide seniority systems,“ § 708 (h) of Title VII
provides, in pertinent part:

Notwithstanding any other provision of this sub-
chapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment

*The “starting point” in statutory construction is, of
course, the language of the statute itself. Greyhound Corp.
v. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 487 U.S. 322, 330 (1978). Further-
more, the “literal or usual meaning” of a statute's words
should be accepted as controlling unless to do so would “lead
to absurd results” or “thwart the obvious purpose of the
statute.” In re Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U.S.
631, 643 (1978).

As noted recently by the District of Columbia Circuit, the
language of §708(h) “suggests Congress’ simple, but un-
equivocal, intent to preserve the lawfulness of bona fide
seniority systems even after the passage of Title VII.” United
States of America and Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission v. Trucking Management, Inc., No. 79-2102 (D.C.
Cir., August 14, 1981), slip op. at 16 (emphasis in original).

practice for an employer to apply different stand-
ards of compensation, or different terms, condi-
tions or privileges of employment pursuant to a
bona fide seniority . . . system, . . provided that
such differences are not the result of an inten-
tion to discriminate because of race. (Emphasis
added. )

It is well settled that § 703(h) is a “definitional pro-
vision” delineating which employment practices are
illegal and thereby prohibited and which are not.“
Nothing in the statutory language suggests that the
immunity extended thereby is to be conditioned upon
the date a seniority system is implemented. On the
contrary, the only prerequisite to the statute’s pro-
tection is the absence of discriminatory intent in the
negotiation or application of the seniority rule.“

Not only does the language of § 703(h) embrace all
bona fide seniority systems, it is also clear from this
Court’s decisions that the section is to be applied to
systems negotiated or changed after the effective date
of the Act. In Franks, this Court discussed the im-

™Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., Inc., 424 U.S.
747, 768 (1976). Accord, Intl Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 481 U.S. at 346-47 United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans,
431 U.S. 558, 559 (1977).

* As the dissent below pointed out, the majority opinion
has transformed the unqualified language of § 703 (h) into a
“grandfather” clause, 684 F.2d at 757 n.1. We concur with
the dissent and the arguments of the appellants that Con-
gress undoubtedly knows how to write a “grandfather” clause
if it wishes. For example, Congress could have drafted
§708(h) by adding either the word “existing” or “estab-
lished” to modify the term seniority system, It is inappropri-
ate to read such qualifying language into an unambiguous
statutory provision.

10

portance of seniority systems as being a part of an
evolutionary process that looks to future changes and
developments as a necessary condition for its contin-
ued viability. As the Court stated: “Seniority sys-
tems and the entitlements conferred by credits earned
thereunder are of vast and increasing importance in
the economic employment system of this nation.
S. Slichter, J. Healy, & E. Livernash, The Impact of
Collective Bargaining on Management 104-05 (1960).
Seniority principles are increasingly used to allocate
scarce benefits among competing employees. . and
to compute noncompetitive benefits earned under the
contract of employment.” 424 U.S. at 766, emphasis
added.

In this same regard, the Court in Teamsters
stressed that “Section 703(h) on its face immunizes
all bona fide seniority systems” (431 U.S. at 348
n. 30, emphasis added), and later added that:

there is no reason to suppose that Congress in-
tended in 1964 to extend less protection to legiti-
mate departmental seniority systems than to
plant wide seniority systems. Then, as now
[1977], seniority was measured in a number of
ways, including length of time with the employer,
in a particular plant, in a department, in a job,

* See Elkouri & Elkouri, How Arbitration Works, 3d Edition
555 (1973) (“Modification of prior seniority provisions in
subsequent Agreements is a fairly common feature of collec-
tive bargaining,” quoting Ford Motor Co., 23 LA 296, 297
(1954)). Indeed, “consideration of seniority looms so im-
portantly that it has been said that ‘one of the principle
purposes for entering into a collective bargaining agreement
is usually to secure for the employees the prized right of
seniority in case of layoff and promotion.’” Elkouri and
Elkouri at 555 (citation omitted).

11

or in a line of progression. 431 U.S. at 354 n. 41
(emphasis added).

In no sense did this Court suggest that the statute is
limited in the manner adopted by the Fourth Circuit;
rather, in a very real sense, the Court indicated the
ongoing and developing nature of seniority systems
that Congress sought to preserve.

Similarly, this Court’s opinion in California Brew-
ers“ repeatedly reflects Congressional appreciation
of the evolutionary nature of collective bargaining
and of the inevitable diversity of seniority systems
that have been and will be developed by parties to
collective bargaining in diverse circumstances:

Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964
against the backdrop of this Nation’s long-
standing labor policy of leaving to the chosen
representatives of employers and employees the
freedom through collective bargaining to estab-
lish conditions of employment applicable to a par-
ticular business or industrial environment. See
generally United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193, 99 S. Ct. 2721, 61 L.Ed.2d 480. It does not
behoove a court to second-guess either that proc-
ess or its products. H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB,
897 U.S. 99, 90 S. Ct. 821, 25 L.Ed.2d 146. Sen-
iority systems, reflecting as they do, not only the
give and take of free collective bargaining, but
also the specific characteristics of a particular
business or industry, inevitably come in all sizes
and shapes. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345
U.S. 330, 73 8. Ct. 681, 97 L.Ed. 1048; Aero-
nautical Lodge v. Campbell, 387 U.S. 521, 69

10 California Brewers Association v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598
(1980).

12

S. Ct. 1287, 98 L.Ed. 1518. As we made clear in
the Teamsters case, seniority may be “measured
in a number of ways” and the legislative history
of § 703 (h) does not suggest that it was enacted
to prefer any particular variety of seniority sys-
tem over any other. 431 U.S., at 355, n.41, 97
S. Ct., at 1865. 444 U.S. at 608."

While cautioning that 5 703 (h) would not im-
munize rules that depart fundamentally from com-
monly accepted notions concerning the acceptable con-
tours of a seniority system,” * this Court emphasized
in California Brewers that Is J ignificant freedom
must be afforded employers and unions to create dif-
fering seniority systems.“ This language, written

u Congressional deference to the rights secured by seniority
systems has been recognized by the Court in a variety of
Title VII contexts. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,
482 U.S. 68 (1977) (requirement of § 701 () of Title VII
that employers and unions reasonably accommodate employ-
ees’ religious practices, absent undue hardship, does not re-
quire abrogation of other employees’ collectively-bargained
seniority rights); International Brotherhood of Teamsters
v. United States, 481 U.S. 824 (1977) (a bona fide seniority
system that perpetuates the effects the employer’s past dis-
crimination is nonetheless protected by §708(h) ol Title
VII) ; California Brewers Association v. Bryant, 444 U.S.
598 (a seniority system’s “ancillary rules” do not fall out-
side the protections of § 708 (h) simply because they do not
“operate on the basis of some factor involving the passage
of time.“)

1 444 U.S. at 608.

48 Id., emphasis supplied. As has been stressed repeatedly,
Congress did not want the courts to “second guess” the
parties to a collective agreement, but insisted instead that
seniority rights vested under any bona fide seniority system
be respected, even if the system perpetuated the effects of

18

almost 15 years after the effective date of Title VII,
demonstrates that the Court considers § 703(h) to be
applicable, now and in the future, to the “differing
seniortiy systems” that parties to collective bargain-
ing can be expected to create." |

The predictable consequences of the Fourth Cir-
cuit’s holding are at odds with the intent of Congress
to encourage the continued resolution of seniority is-
sues by the bargaining process. Section 703 (h) effec-
tively would be written out of the statute for parties
who negotiate new seniority systems. All new or
modified seniority systems would be judged by the
Griggs standard—a result manifestly at odds with
Teamsters. See below, pp. 15-18. Consequently, to
avoid losing the protections of § 703(h), employers
and unions would have a strong incentive to keep the
pre-Act systems intact without making necessary or
desirable adjustments. Collective bargaining would
be stultified in a manner contrary to the teachings of
the California Brewers decision.

The disruptive potential of the decision below is
better understood when one considers a few of the

prior discrimination. See, California Brewers Ass’n v. Bryant,
444 US. at 608; Teamsters, 481 U.S. at 350-51. And see
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 488 U.S. 567, 578 (1978)
(“Courts are generally less competent than employers to
restructure business practices, and unless mandated to do so
by Congress they should not attempt it.“); Steelworkers v.
Weber, 448 U.S. 198, 205-206 (1979); and Texas Dept. of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 101 8. Ct. 1089, 1096 (1981)
(Title VII “was not intended to ‘diminish traditional manage-
ment prerogatives.’ ”’).

% Inexplicably, the Fourth Circuit failed even to mention
the California Brewers decision, even though it was decided
almost one year before the Fourth Circuit’s decision.

14

seniority issues that must be resolved by the bargain-
ing process, each of which can be extremely im-
portant for the relations between the employer and
employees and between the employees themselves. As
pointed out in Slichter, Healy & Livernash, The Im-
pact of Collective Bargaining on Management 118
(1960), initial contract language dealing with senior-
ity may give vise to administrative or interpretive
problems that must be clarified, modified or changed
over time. Questions which arise include: (1)
whether periods of absence from work count toward
total service (Id. at 118-19); (2) what methods
should be used to determine the priority among em-
ployees with the same seniority date (Id., at 119);
(3) what time credit shouid be given a probationary
employee for satisfying his probationary period (Jd.
at 123); (4) on what bases may seniority be lost (Id.
at 125); (5) whether and to what extent to protect
recall and other rights after long or indefinite periods
of unemployment (Id. at 127); (6) how to adjust
seniority for workforces merged during the consolida-
tion of two or more plants of the same or separate
companies (Id. at 130-31); (7) how to deal with
the employment rights of employees who have never
worked in the bargaining unit as they relate to unit
employees (Id. at 182); (8) how to determine the
rights of an employee who moves from a bargaining
to nonbargaining unit (Id. at 132); (9) how to pre-
serve the seniority rights of supervisory personnel
who come back to or initially enter the bargaining or
seniority unit (Id. at 132-33); or (10) how to estab-
lish the rights of an employee who moves from one
seniority unit to another within the same plant (Jd.
at 184). The peaceful resolution of such basic em-
ployment relations questions is the cornerstone of the

15

country’s labor relations policy. The decision below,
however, would undercut this policy and create a
disincentive to the creative ordering of the relative

rights of employees.

In addition, it would be more difficult for parties
to Title VII or other employment discrimination liti-
gation to settle cases, because any seniority modifica-
tion made as part of the settlement would pose a
definite risk that the employer’s entire seniority sys-
tem would lose its statutory protection. See footnote
22, below. The Fourth Circuit’s opinion thus would
undermine one of the most important policies under-
lying Title VII. In enacting Title VII, Congress ex-
pressed a strong preference for encouraging volun-
tary settlement of employment discrimination claims.
Indeed, “[c]ooperation and voluntary compliance were
selected as the preferred means for achieving this
goal.” Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S.
36, 44 (1974). Yet, if 5 703 (h) protection does not
extend to new agreements, collective bargaining par-
ticipants and litigants will have less incentive to nego-
tiate arrangements which, in many cases, could
greatly ameliorate the disparate effects of past em-

ployment practices, legal or othe 1

B. There Is No Support In This Court's Decisions Or
In The Legislative History For Applying A Different
Legal Standard To Post-Act Than To Pre-Act Senior-

ity Systems
Aside from its predictable “chilling effect” on the
negotiation and modification of seniority agreements,
the circuit court’s bifurcated approach to seniority

% The negative effect of the decision below on affirmative
action is fully set out in the petitioners’ brief.

16

under § 7038 (h) would lead to non-uniform adminis-
trative and judicial application of that section. Thus,
as the Fourth Circuit interprets § 703(h), the same
bona fide seniority system, neutral on its face and
as applied, would be lawful in spite of its perpetua-
tion of prior discrimination if it were implemented
before July 2, 1965, but it would be held unlawful
because of such perpetuation if implemented after the
effective date of the Act. Indeed, if the Fourth Cir-
cuit’s view were correct, the neutral seniority sys-
tems in Franks, Teamsters, Evans and California
Brewers would have been unlawful had they been
adopted after 1965 if they perpetuated the effects
of pre-Act discrimination. Also, the same employer
could have similar pre- and post-Act systems in
the same plant for different bargaining units which
would be judged under different legal standards. This
inconsistent result would hinge upon the time of im-
plementation of the system and not upon any charac-
teristics of the neutral system itself. Not only would
this anomaly be unprecedented labor policy, as we now
show it would render ineffective this Court’s prior
decisions and nullify the intent of the Congress that
enacted Title VII.

Although this Court has analyzed the applicability
of § 708(h) in cases involving seniority systems’ per-
petuation of both pre-Act and post-Act discrimina-
tion,“ the Court never has suggested, as the Fourth
Circuit would have it, that post-Act systems should be

1 Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., Inc., 424 U.S.
747; International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,
481 U.S. 824; and United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 558;
Trans World Airlines; Inc. v. Hardison, 482 U.S. 68.

N

judged under the Griggs disparate impact test, or
that the Court’s holding depended upon the pre-Act
implementation of the seniority systems at issue.

Rather, from Franks, Teamsters, Evans and Hardi-
son, it is evident that the Court views Congress’s
mandate as requiring that analysis of the legal effect
of a seniority system proceed differently than in tra-
ditional “disparate impact“ cases. For as stated in
Teamsters, “[w]ere it not for § 703 (h) the seniority
system in this case would seem to fall under the
Griggs rationale.“ While the Griggs (disparate
impact) approach would require that an employment
practice fair in form but discriminatory in operation
must be justified by business necessity to avoid Title
VII liability [Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401
U.S. at 429-82], „ 703 (h) unequivocally mandates
that there is no statutory violation in the absence of
a showing of discriminatory purpose.” Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 482 U.S. at 82, n.13.
“{A]bsent a discriminatory purpose, the operation of
a seniority system cannot be an unlawful employ-
ment practice even if the system has some discrimi-
natory consequences.” Id. at 82.

Moreover, the remedial purposes of Title VII can
be served fully without changing or setting aside
bona fide, neutral seniority systems. As the Court
emphasized in Teamsters, “Post-Act discriminatees
... may obtain full ‘make whole’ relief, including
retroactive seniority under Franks v. Bowman... .

M Teamsters, 481 U.S. at 349.

18

without attacking the legality of the seniority sys-
tem as applied to them.” 431 U.S. at 347. The fact
that the relief available to discriminatees would not
be enlarged by holding unlawful a seniority system
that perpetuated the effects of the employer’s post-
Act discrimination is, as the Court has stated, “sim-
ply an additional reason not to hold the seniority
system unlawful.” Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 348, n.30.
For the numerous reasons stated above, there is no
basis for the Fourth Circuit’s holding that effectively
reads out of § 703 (h) the intentional discrimination
language and substitutes the Griggs standard.

Because the language of the § 703(h) is clear and
unqualified in defining the protections that it affords
all seniority systems, it is unnecessary to look to the
legislative history which, as this Court has stated, is
unusual in light of the absence of the usual legisla-
tive materials” surrounding its adoption. See Franks
v. Bowman, 424 U.S. at 761. There is nothing in
the history, however, that would prevent the applica-
tion of § 703 (h) to post-Act seniority systems. As
noted in this Court’s discussions in Teamsters and
Franks, the main thrust of the legislative materials
was to assure critics of the legislation that it would
not disrupt the various types of existing seniority sys-
tems, or the rights of employees vested under those
systems, which had accrued prior to the enactment of
Title VII.

Specifically, the legislative record contains a Justice
Department statement and a series of Dirksen-Clark
questions and answers to the effect that the statute
would not affect bona fide neutral seniority systems

19

and would not require an employer to change exist-
ing seniority lists even though the negative impact
of such systems on minority employees was clearly
recognized by Congress. Franks, 424 U.S. at 759-60
& nn.15 and 16. As set forth fully in the petitioners’
brief, the legislative history demonstrates that these
statements designed to protect existing seniority sys-
tems were not in any way intended to be construed as
limitations that somehow imply that post-Act systems
were to be judged by a different legal standard.

To the contrary, because the legislative statements
were designed to satisfy objections by opponents of
Title VII that bona fide seniority systems could be
attacked if the proposed legislation were enacted,
there is neither logic nor common sense in the Fourth
Circuit’s reading of such statements as evidence of
Congressional intent to invalidate post-Act seniority
systems. It is unthinkable that the opponents of
Title VII would have supported a bill that would pro-
hibit upon enactment precisely the types of pre-Act
seniority systems they so assiduously sought to pro-
tect. Rather, the contrary Congressional intent has
been recognized by this Court:

Title VII could not have been enacted into law
without substantial support from legislators in
both Houses who traditionally resisted federal
regulation of private business. Those legislators
demanded as a price for their support that “man-
agement prerogatives, and union freedoms. . .
be left undisturbed to the greatest extent possi-
pol United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. at
2

Thus, the history of § 703(h) specifically limits the
reach of the statute as it pertains to neutral, bona

fide seniority systems. There is not one word evi-
dencing an intent to invalidate otherwise neutral
post-Act systems, or to restrict severely managerial
prerogatives in the manning suggested by the Fourth
Circuit."

In sum, consigning post-Act seniority systems to
the Griggs analysis would, with regard to such sys-
tems, revive the discredited pre-Teamsters principles
that discriminatory intent may be inferred, and a
Title VII violation found, from a seniority system’s
perpetuation of the effects of prior discrimination.
Because there is no expression of Congressional in-
tent to apply widely disparate legal analyses to post-
Act and pre-Act seniority systems, there is no rea-
son to interpret § 703 (h) in a manner that causes
the section to “self-destruct,” and which is, moreover,
inharmonious with Title \II’s basic goals. It is ap-
parent from the inconsistent and anomalous results
that would flow from application of the Fourth Cir-
cuit’s holding, that Congress did not intend that
§ 703 (h) should apply only to pre-Act systems.

10 The Circuit Court’s opinion is open-ended and could be
construed to invalidate an entire seniority system if a com-
ponent of that system were modified after the effective date
of the Act. Take, for example, an employer whose “existing”
system was modified on July 3, 1965, to include a probation
component of the type approved by the Court in California
Brewers. If the remaining basic components of the seniority
system were then to be judged by the Griggs standard because
of the post-Act modification, the legislative history approving
existing systems would be rendered meaningless. Moreover,
as the Brewers decision makes clear, our construction of
§ 703 (h) would still permit the proper application of the
Griggs standard to “practices, procedures and tests” without
“swallowing up” Title VII's otherwise broad protections. 444
US. at 608-09.

21

CONCLUSION

Congress intended §703(h) to immunize from
Title VII liability the operation of bona fide seniority
systems, even when those systems tend to perpetuate
the effects of prior discrimination. Nonetheless, Title
VII's remedial provisions permit, and § 703 (h) does
not bar, an award of retroactive seniority to remedy
timely-charged post-Act discrimination. Victims of
such discrimination may thus be “made whole” with-
out judicial invalidation or modification of neutral
seniority systems which, in their application, have
perpetuated the discriminatory effects. Within this
context, it is clear that the Fourth Circuit’s attempt
to limit § 703(h)’s applicability to pre-Act systems
not only is unsupported by legislative history and this
Court’s holdings, it would undermine important tenets
of the national labor policy reflected in Title VII as a
whole. This Court should, therefore, reject the Fourth
Cireuit's reading of § 703 (h) and make it clear that
any seniority system, whenever negotiated, is pro-
tected by that section unless it is demonstrated that
intent to discriminate entered into the system’s nego-
tiation or maintenance.

Respectfully submitted,

Ropert E. WILLIAMS
Dovuatas S. MCDOWELL
Davip H. LARRY
McGuIness & WILLIAMS
1015 15th Street, N.W.
Suite 1200
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 789-8600
Attorneys for the Amicus Curiae
Equal Employment
Advisory Council
August 20, 1981

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_1942%3A11. Public record. Not legal advice.
