# Amicus Brief — Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1982
- **Citation:** 454 U.S. 235

## Text

Nos. 86-848; 80-883

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OctToser TERM, 1980

HARTZELL PROPELLER, INC.,
and
Piper AIRCRAFT COMPANY,
Petitioners,

Vv.

GAYNELL REYNO,
Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF
OF AMICI CURIAE

BRIEF FOR THE BOEING COMPANY, °
LOCKHEED CORPORATION,
McDONNELL DOUGLAS CORPORATION,
AS AMICI CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

May 9, 1981

KeiTH GERRARD

JouN D. DiLtow*

RICHARD C. CoyLe

PERKINS, Cok, STONE,
OLSEN & WILLIAMS
1900 Washington Building
Seattle, Washington 98101
(206) 682-8770

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
The Boeing Company

JOHN E. CAVANAGH

SAMUEL F. Pearce*

JOSEPH TWOMEY
P.O. Box 551
Burbank, California 91520
(203) 847-6601

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
Lockheed Corporation

Tuomas C. WaLsH*
JOHN J. HENNELLY, Jr.*
BRYAN, CAVE, MCPHEETERS
& McRoserts
500 North Broadway
St. Louis, Missouri 63102
(314) 231-8600
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
McDonnell Douglas Corporation

* Counsel of Record

Nos. 80-848; 80-883

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroper Term, 1980

HARTZELL PROPELLER, INC.,

and
Piper AIRCRAFT COMPANY,
Petitioners,
v.
GAYNELL REYNO,
Respondent.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF
OF AMICI CURIAE

The Boeing Company, Lockheed Corporation, and
McDonnell Douglas Corporation hereby respectfully move for
leave to file the attached brief as amici curiae in this case. The
consent of the attorney for the respondent and of the attorneys
for the petitioners was requested but refused.

The interest of The Boeing Company, Lockheed Corpo-
ration, and McDonnell Douglas Corporation in this case arises
from their business as manufacturers of commercial jet aircraft
which are used worldwide. From time to time, these aircraft
are involved in accidents in countries other than the United
States. In the past decade, Boeing, Lockheed, and McDonnell
Douglas have been subject to an increasing number of lawsuits

2

brought in the United States arising out of foreign aircraft
accidents. Because much of the evidence is located abroad, the
operator and other key actors are not partics to the American
suit, and the attendance at trial of key foreign witnesses cannot
ve compelled, these cases are extremely difficult for the manu-
facturer to defend.

The doctrine of forum non conveniens has provided manu-
facturers with an important procedural safeguard against litiga-
tion which can more fairly be tried in foreign courts. However,
in the instant case, the Court of Appeals concluded that a
federal court could not dismiss any action on the basis of forum
non conveniens where the dismissal would result in a change in
the applicable law. Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149,
164 (3d Cir. 1980). This decision, if affirmed, will emasculate
the doctrine of forum non conveniens since plaintiffs rarely
choose to bring suits in a forum which will apply a less
favorable law than another, more convenient forum.

The brief which amici curiae are requesting permission to
file addresses important issues not heretofore considered by this
Court concerning the relationship between the principles set
forth in Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964), and the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. If the argument of amici
curiae is accepted, it would be dispositive of this case.

Respectfully submitted,

Kerrh GERRARD
Joun D. Ditow*
Ricuarp C. CoyYLe
Perkins, Co1z, STONE,
Ovsen & WILLIAMS
1900 Washington Building
Seattle, Washington 98101
(206) 682-8770

Attorneys for The Boeing Company

May 9, 1981

JouN E. CAVANAGH
SAMUEL F. Pearce*
JosepH TWOMEY

P.O. Box 551

Burbank, California 91520
(203) 847-6601

Attorneys for Lockheed Corporation

JOHN J. HENNELLY, Jr.*

Tuomas C. WaLsH*

Bryan, Cave, MCPHEETERS
& McRoserts

500 North Broadway

St. Louis, Missouri 63102

(314) 231-8600

Attorneys for McDonnell Douglas
Corporation
*Counsel of Record

Nos, 80-848; 80-883

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Octoser Term, 1980

HarTzeit Propeicer, INC.,
and
Piper AIRCRAFT COMPANY,
Petitioners,

Vv.
GAYNELL REYNO,

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE BOEING COMPANY,
LOCKHEED CORPORATION,
McDONNELL DOUGLAS CORPORATION,
AS AMICI CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT. l
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4
I. Commencement of the Action and Transfer..................... 4
Il. The District Court’s Dismissal 5
Ill. The Court of Appeals’ Reversal 6
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 7
ARGUMENT 9

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING
DECISIVE WEIGHT TO ITS ASSUMPTION THAT A
SCOTTISH COURT WOULD APPLY A LAW LESS
FAVORABLE TO PLAINTIFF THAN THE LAW
pale WOULD BE APPLIED BY AN AMERICAN .

CONCLUSION 20

ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES PAGE
In re Air Crash Disaster at Boston, Mass., 399 F. Supp. 1106 (D.
Mass. 1975) 13

In re Air Crash Disaster Near Illinois, on May 25, 1979,
500 F. 1044 (N.D. Ill. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 16
Av. Cas. 17,122 (7th Cir. January 5, 1981)

Aanseoy Co., Inc. v. M/V Nordic Regent, 636 F.2d 860 (2d Cir.

15

Anglo-American Grain Co. v. The A/T Mina D’Amico, 169 F.
908 (E.D. Va. 1959) 18

Archibald vy. Cinerama Hotels, 15 Cal. 3d 811, 544 P.2d 947, 126
Cal. Rptr. 853 (1976) 12

Bouvy- v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 15 Av. Cas.
17,153 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 3,7

Canada Malting Co., Lid. v. Paterson Steamships, Lid., 285 U.S.
413 (1932) 8,17 ,18

One. Motors Corp., 80 Wis.2d 91, 258 N.W.2d 680. ‘

Ciprari v. Servicos Aereos Cruzeiro do Sul, S.A., 232 F. Supp. 433
(S.D.N.Y. 1964) 14

Clayton v. Warlick, 232 F.2d 699 ( 4th Cir. 1956) 20
Dahl v. United Technologies Corp., 632 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1980). 3

DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F.2d 895 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978)

Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377 (1929)......... 14

Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938 )..........-.-..-.10,11,13,19 ,20
Fitzgerald v. Texaco, Inc., 521 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.

denied, 423 US. 1052 (1976)
Forsyth v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 520 F.2d 608 ( 9th Cir. 1975) ......... 15

Fosen v. United Technologies Corp., 633 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1980).. 3

George v. Aircraft Co., 332 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.),
denied, 397 S. 904 (1964) Sopa

oon) Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. %

Gould, Inc. v. Health Science, Inc., 54 Cal. App. 34 687, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 726 (1976) Tt

Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 105, 90
Cal. Rptr. 46111970). See ll

Griffith v. United Air Lines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).......... 7

CASES PAGE

Wee ‘ "cma Industries, Inc., Civ. No. M-80-722 (D.Md. 8

eb. 3,

Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947) ......cceccsceeserees 7,14,15 ,18

H. L. Green Co. v. MacMahon, 312 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 928 (1963) ; 18

Harrison v. Wyeth Laboratories, No. 79-2788 (E.D. Pa. July 1, "

1980) l
H v. Boeing Co., 106 Cal. App. 3d 576, 165 Cal. Rptr.
190 (1980) 11,12
Junco vy. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 666 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), aff'd, 538 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1976) 7
Koster v. Lu mbermens Mi Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947). 14
Lapides v. Doner, 248 F. Supp. 883 (E.D.Mich. 1965) ..............00++ 14
Macedo v. Boeing Co., . Nos. 79-C-2488, 4771, and 4772
N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 1980), appeal docketed, No. 80-1559 (7th
ir. April 25, 1980) 3
or General Motors Corp., 439 F. Supp. 24 (N.D. Ohio Ms
Norwood v. k, 349 U.S. 29 (1955) 10
Orr v. Boeing Co., CV-79-526 (C.D. Cal. — 23, 1979), appeal
docketed, No. 79-3404 ( 9th wg ALD, 9) 3
Pain v. United ico wp 9-4 Corp, 637 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 3
Parsons v. Chesapeake & O.R. Co., 375 U.S. 71 (1963) ........ccesse000 14
In ory Aety R. Co. Securities and Antitrust Litigation,
543 F.2d 1058 (3d Cir. 1976) 20
bhi’ AOA sad ana Cement Mfg. Co., 376 F. Supp. 1054 (D.Md. re
Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Division of Package Machinery Co., 49
N.Y.2d 471, 403 N.E.2d 440, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717 ( 1980)............. 17
Scheinbart v. Certain-Teed Products Corp., 367 F. Supp. 707
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) 19
Shields v. Mi Construction Co., Civ. No. 79-628 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 21, 1981) 15
gay ng FSasaad v. Avco Lycoming Corp., 411 F.Supp. 598 (D.
Szantay v. Beech Ai t Corp., 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965)......... 14
Bi v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267
(1977) 17

Thomson v. Palmieri, 355 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1966) 14
Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964)........00+++ 2,8,9,11,13,18 ,19

STATUTES
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) ... 4,8,10,13 ,18

OTHER

Restatement (Second ) of Conflict Laws § 8, Comment k................ 16

Nos. 80-848; 80-883

In THE

7

Supreme Court of the United States

OctTosper Term, 1980

HARTZELL PROPELLER, INC.,
and
Piper AIRCRAFT COMPANY,
Petitioners,

Vv.

GAYNELL REYNO,
Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE BOEING COMPANY,
LOCKHEED CORPORATION,
McDONNELL DOUGLAS CORPORATION,
AS AMICI CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

This matter presents important issues not previously ad-
dressed by this Court concerning the relationship between the

2

principles set forth in Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 US. 612
(1964), and the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Respond-
ent is the personal representative of five Scottish citizens killed
in an aircraft accident which occurred on a domestic Scottish
flight. Petitioners are the American manufacturer of the
aircraft and the American manufacturer of one of its com-
ponents. The principal issue presented is the following:

Does this Court’s decision in Van Dusen prevent a federal
court from dismissing an action on forum non conveniens
grounds whenever the American court would apply a law more
favorable to the plaintiff than the law which would be applied
in the jurisdiction where the matter could more conveniently be
heard?

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

Amici curiae are manufacturers of commercial jet aircraft
which are used world-wide. From time to time these aircraft are
involved in accidents in countries other than the United States.
In the past decade, amici curiae have been subjected to an
increasing number of lawsuits brought in the United States
arising out of foreign aircraft accidents. These actions have
been brought by claimants who have sought out or been sought
out by American lawyers and have come to the United States
seeking the more favorable law and more generous awards
available here.

In addition to the burden placed on the American court
system by having these large and complex cases tried here,
these cases are frequently extremely difficult for an American
manufacturer to defend. Much of the critical evidence as to
liability and all of the evidence as to damages is located in a
foreign country and is available to the American manufacturer
either not at all or only after a cumbersome international
discovery process which often requires diplomatic intervention.
Attendance at trial of key foreign witnesses cannot be com-
pelled. In contrast, the American manufacturers, when they
have had actions moved to the convenient foreign forums, have
generally agreed to make their witnesses and documents avail-
able in the foreign court.

3

Although these actions frequently are cast solely as product
liability suits against the manufacturer, such casting is mis-
leading. The airline or others involved in the maintenance,
operation and control of the aircraft are not parties to the
American suit may be due to any of several reasons: they may
not be subject to jurisdiction in the United States; they may
have limited liability by virtue of a treaty or internal statute or
regulation of the foreign country; or, as in this case, an action
against the operator may actually be pending in the foreign
courts. Moreover, American products liability law is such that
the plaintiff may prevail against the manufacturer without
showing that the conduct of the manufacturer was a major
contributing cause of the accident. Joint and several liability
and expanded concepts of product liability for design defects,
failure to warn, and failure to have warning or other safety
devices can create a major exposure for the manufacturer for
what is essentially an operational accident.' If these essentially
“foreign” cases remain in the United States, the manufacturer is
placed in the difficult position of having to defend its product in
a suit to which the other key actors are not parties and the focus
is unfairly placed upon the product. All of these problems can
be avoided by trial in the foreign forum where the participation
of all interested parties can easily be obtained. Thus, the courts
have properly responded to the recent spate of imported
litigation with a number of decisions dismissing these actions on
the basis of forum non conveniens.?

Amici curiae have requested permission to submit this brief
because they believe that the decision of the Court of Appeals,

1 See, e.g., Chart v. General Motors Corp., 80 Wis.2d 91, 258 N.W.2d 680
(1977) (automobile manufacturer only 12 percent at fault required to pay
entire judgment because operator of vehicle was insolvent); Sun Valley
Airlines v. Avco Lycoming Corp., 411 F Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976) (operator
90 per cent at fault; manufacturer 10 per cent at fault).

2 See, ¢.g., Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 oA erlang
1980); Fosen v. United Technologies Corp., 633 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1980);
Dahl vy. United Technologies Corp., 632 F.24 1027 nth ct 1980); Macedo v.
Boeing Co., Civ. Nos. 79-C-2488, 4771, and 4 hgh D. Il. Jan. 11, 1980),
appeal docketed, No. 80-1559 (7th Cir. April 25 ); Orr v. Boeing Co.,
CV-79-526 (C.D. Cal. April 23, 1979), ape docked No. 79-3404 (9th
Cir. July 19, 1979). See also Bouvy-Loggers v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc., 15 Av. Cas. 17,153 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).

4

if affirmed, will emasculate the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens and deprive manufacturers of an important procedural
protection. The Court of Appeals concluded that a federal
court could not dismiss any action on the basis of forum non
conveniens where the dismissal would result in a change in the
applicable law. 630 F.2d at 164. Since plaintiffs rarely choose
to bring suits in a forum which will apply a less favorable law
than another more convenient forum, the doctrine of forum non
conveniens could rarely be invoked. Amici curiae believe that
the rule enunciated by the Court of Appeals is not correct and
should not be followed.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Amici curiae will not attempt to set forth herein a detailed
statement of the facts and procedural history. These were
described in detail in the petitions and will, no doubt, be
adequately described in the briefs of the parties. The prior
proceedings and the decisions below will, therefore, be dis-
cussed summarily.

L

COMMENCEMENT OF THE ACTION AND TRANSFER

This action was originally commenced against defendants
Piper Aircraft Company (“Piper”) and Hartzell Propeller, Inc.
(“Hartzell”) in California state court by a person who was
appointed personal representative of the decedents in Califor-
nia but who had no preexisting relationship with the decedents.
The action was removed to the United States District Court for
the Central District of California and defendants then moved to
transfer the action to a federal court in Pennsylvania. The
bases for the motions were that jurisdiction over Hartzell was
lacking in California and that the convenience of parties and
- witnesses and the interests of justice favored trial in Pennsylva-
nia rather than California which had no relationship to the
transaction or the parties. The California federal court agreed
with defendants and ruled that the actions should be trans-
ferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to the Middle District
of Pennsylvania.

5
IL

THE DISTRICT COURT’S DISMISSAL

After transfer, defendants moved, inter alia, to dismiss the
action on the basis of forum non conveniens. The district court
granted the motions and dismissed the action on the condition
that defendants submit to jursidiction in Scotland and waive
any defense based on the statute of limitations. Reyno v. Piper
Aircraft Co., 479 F. Supp. 727 (M.D. Pa. 1979).

In so ruling, the court analyzed the action in terms of the
public and private interest factors set forth by this Court in Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), and found that they
“overwhelmingly point to dismissal.” 479 F. Supp. at 731.
Among those private interest factors that the court considered
most significant were that “nearly all witnesses needed for the
defense of this suit are located in the British Isles” (id. at 732),
that “all evidence as to damages, both witnesses and docu-
ments, is located in Scotland” (id.), that “the only connection
with [Pennsylvania] is the fact that the plane was manufac-
tured [t]here over seven years before the accident” (id.), that
“(t}he only contact with ... California is that Plaintiff's
attorney and expert reside there” (id.), “(t]he unavailability of
compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses
necessary for complete and fair trial” (id. at 733), “[the]
inability to implead parties located in” Scotland (id.), and that
“(familiarity with the topography around Tulla, Scotland and
inspection of the wreckage of the plane would be aided by trial
in the British Isles” (id. at 734).

The district court found that the public interest factors
“even more strongly point to dismissal.” Jd. As recited by the
district court, “[t]hese factors include court congestion, local
interest in the lawsuit, court familiarity with the law that will
govern the action, the avoidance of unnecessary problems and
conflicts of law foreign to the court and the unfairness of
burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty.” Jd.
With respect to choice of law, the court noted that a trial in
Pennsylvania “would be hopelessly somplex and confusing for
a jury as different laws will apply to different parties.” Jd. The

6

court found that under California conflict of laws applicable to
the claim against Piper, Scottish law applied as to who could
bring an action for wrongful death and Pennsylvania law
applied with respect to the availability of an action based on
strict liability in tort. Jd. at 736. With respect to the claim
against Hartzell, the court concluded that Scottish law applied
to all issues. Jd. at 737. Thus, having determined that Scottish
law would govern part of the action, the court concluded that
“it would be better for all parties for this case to proceed in a
court in Scotland that is at home with the law of that country.”
Id.

The district court also addressed, and rejected, plaintiff's
contention that the action should not be dismissed because the
law of Scotland was not as favorable to her:

That the law of Scotland is not as helpful to the real parties
in interest is not a weighty consideration. We must
determine which forum is proper because of convenience
and the interests of justice and the decision cannot be
correctly made if the amount of a plaintiff's likely award is
given undue weight. Generally, ihe cases that have been
dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens all
involve situations where a party enters a forum with the
hope of seeking more liberal rules of recovery. If the
foreign law that ought to govern a case does not protect its
citizens as fully as the law of the dismissing forum, that is a
matter to be dealt with in the foreign forum.

Id. at 738.
il.

THE COURT OF APPEALS’ REVERSAL

The Court of Appeals reversed. Reyno v. Piper Aircraft
Co., 630 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1980). While the Court of Appeals
disagreed with the district court on several points, the most
significant difference, and the principal reason for the reversal,
was with respect to the governing law. As noted, the district
court had concluded that because Scottish law would apply to

7

at least some issues were the action to remain in Pennsylvania,
and because there were difficulties associated with the appli-
cation of different laws to the claims against the different
defendants, the public interest favored dismissal of the action.
The Court of Appeals, while apparently not disagreeing with
the district court that Scottish law might apply to some issues,?
concluded, contrary to the district court’s analysis, that the strict
liability law of Ohio would apply to the claim against Hartzell.
630 F.2d at 169-171 and especially n. 95. The court further
concluded that because a Scottish court would not apply
American strict liability law, dismissal on the basis of forum
non conveniens wis inappropriate: “[A] dismissal for forum
non conveniens, like a statutory transfer, ‘should not, despite its
convenience, result in a change in the applicable law.””
Id. at 164.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), this
Court held that the decision to grant or deny a motion to
dismiss an action on the ground of forum non conveniens is
entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial judge, who must
consider a aumber of factors, no one of which is necessarily

3 The Court of Appeals’ opinion is difficult to follow on this point. While
the court states that “the negligence and damage limitations law of Scotland”
would not apply (630 F.2d at 171), and that “the district court erred in
concluding that foreign law would govern a substantial part of the case” (id. ),
it leaves open the issue of whether plaintiff had “representative capacity”
without expressly disputing the district court's conclusion that this issue should
be resolved by reference to Scottish law. Furthermore, while the Court of
Appeals speaks of “damage limitations,” there is no indication in the record
that Scotland has any damage limitations as such. While the elements of
recovery or the class of persons entitled to benefit from the award may be
more restricted in Scotland, a long line of decisions has found that the law of
the decedents’ and beneficiaries’ domicile has the greatest interest in these
matters. See, ¢.g., Junco v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 399 F.Supp. 666
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 538 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1976); Gordon v. Eastern Air
Lines, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Bouvy-Loggers v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc., 15 Av. Cas. 17,153 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Griffith
v. United Air Lines, 416 Pa.i, 203 A.2d 796 (1964). Cf. In re Air Crash
Disaster near Chicago, Illinois, on May 25, 1979, 500 F. Supp. 1044, 1047-
1048 (N.D. Ill. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 16 Av. Cas. 17,122 (7th Cir.
Jan. 5, 1981) (“[C]ompensatory damages probably are to be governed by
the law of the domicile of the plaintiffs or their decedents.”)

determinative. Previously, in Canada Malting Co., Lid. v.
Paterson Steamships, Lid., 285 U.S. 413 (1932), this Court had
held that a dismissal on the basis of forum non conveniens may
be entered even though the more convenient alternative forum
will apply a law less favorable to the plaintiff. In spite of these
precedents, the Court of Appeals in this case held that this
Court’s decision in Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964),
precludes a federal district court from dismissing an action on
the basis of forum non conveniens whenever the more con-
venient forum will apply a law less favorable to the plaintiff.
By so ruling, the Court of Appeals created an exception to the
forum non conveniens doctrine so large that the doctrine itself is
swallowed. Thus, at issue in this case is the continued existence
in the federal courts of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

That the Court of Appeals’ decision will encourage forum
shopping for a favorable law is apparent. Furthermore, the
decision is based on a misunderstanding of the principles
involved in Van Dusen. In Van Dusen, this Court held that in a
diversity action transferred from one federal district court to
another under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the substantive law of the
transferor state should continue to apply. This holding was
based on the Erie doctrine and was intended to assure that the
“accident of federal diversity jurisdiction” did not result in the
application of a different law than would have been applied by
the ‘state courts in the place where the action was filed. The
Court of Appeals in this case turned Van Dusen on its head and
established a rule that will not only leave litigation in inconven-
ient forums and promote rather than deter forum shopping, but
will cause a different result to be reached in federal court than
would have been reached in state court.

Because the decision of the Court of Appeals lacks any
sound precedential or policy basis, it is incorrect and should be
reversed.

9
ARGUMENT

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING DECISIVE
WEIGHT TO ITS ASSUMPTION THAT A SCOTTISH
COURT WOULD APPLY A LAW LESS FAVORABLE
TO PLAINTIFF THAN THE LAW WHICH WOULD BE
APPLIED BY AN AMERICAN COURT

The paramount reason for the Court of Appeals’ reversal
of the district court's dismissal of the action was that

the dismissal would work a change in the applicable law so
that plaintiff's strict liability claim would be eliminated
from the case. ...[A] dismissal for forum non con-
veniens, like a statutory transfer, “should not, despite its
convenience, result in a change in the applicable law.”
Only when American law is not applicable, or when the
foreign jurisdiction would, as a matter of its own choice of
law, give the plaintiff the benefit of the claim to which she
is entitled here, would dismissal be justified.

630 F.2d at 163-164 (footnote omitted). This conclusion was
based on the same court’s prior opinion in DeMateos v. Texaco,
Inc., 562 F.2d 895 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904
(1978), which, in turn, was purportedly based on this Court’s
decision in Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).

Amici curiae believe that both DeMateos and the decision
of the Court of Appeals in this case reflect a fundamental
misunderstanding of this Court’s holding in Van Dusen and the
policy reasons for that holding. Van Dusen, like the present
case, arose out of an aircraft accident. However, in Van Dusen,
unlike the present case, the action was originally brought in the
plaintiffs’ and decedents’ home state, which was also the
destination of the flight. There was no element of forum
shopping involved and no suggestion that the actions met the
test for a forum non conveniens dismissal. Rather, the actions
were transferred from one appropriate forum (Pennsylvania)
to another appropriate and more convenient forum ( Massachu-
setts). As this Court noted in Van Dusen, “the most convenient
forum is frequently the place where the cause of action arose.”

10

376 U.S. at 628. The transfers did not involve a forum non
conveniens dismissal but rather were made pursuant to a
federal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)) which had previously
been construed by this Court “to permit courts to grant transfers
upon a lesser showing of inconvenience.” Norwood v. Kirk-
patrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955).

In Van Dusen, this Court held that on the facts before it the
transferee court must apply the same law as the transferor court
would have applied, including its choice of law rules. 376 U.S.
at 639. This result was required by the doctrine of Erie R. Co.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). As this Court stated:

We believe, therefore, that both the history and purposes
of § 1404(a) indicate that it should be regarded as a
federal judicial housekeeping measure, dealing with the
placement of litigation in the federal courts and generally
intended, on the basis of convenience and fairness, simply
to authorize a change of courtrooms.

Although we deal here with a congressional statute
apportioning the business of the federal courts, our inter-
pretation of that statute fully accords with and is supported
by the policy underlying Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 US.
64.... As this Court said in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,
326 U.S. 99, 109:

“Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins was not an endeavor to
formulate scientific legal terminology. It expressed a
policy that touches vitally the proper distribution of
judicial power between State and federal courts... .
The nub of the policy that underlies Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins is that for the same transaction the accident
of a suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court
instead of a State court a block away should not lead
to a substantially different result.”

Applying this analysis to § 1404(a), we should ensure
that the “accident” of federal diversity jurisdiction does not
enable a party to utilize a transfer to achieve a result in
Sederal court which could not have been achieved in the
courts of the State where the action was filed. This purpose
would be defeated in cases such as the present if nonresi-

dent defendants, properly subjected to suit in the transferor
State (Pennsylvania), could invoke § 1404(a) to gain the
benefits of the laws of another jurisdiction (Massachu-
setts). What Erie and the cases following it have sought
was identity or uniformity between federal and state
courts; and the fact that in most instances this could be
achieved by directing federal courts to apply the laws of
the States “in which they sit” should not obscure that, in
applying the same reasoning to § 1404(a), the critical
identity to be maintained is between the federal district
court which decides the case and the courts of the State in
which the action was filed.

376 U.S. at 636-639 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added).

The Van Dusen actions would not have been dismissed on
forum non conveniens grounds by a Pennsylvania state court,
and the plaintiffs in those actions would have been entitled to
have their claims decided by a Pennsylvania state court under
Pennsylvania law, including its conflict of laws rules. Thus,
Erie and its progeny required that the federal courts also apply
Pennsylvania law, including its conflict of laws rules, to the
actions properly filed in Pennsylvania federal court but trans-
ferred pursuant to “a federal statute apportioning the business
of the federal courts.”

The present case is not the same as Van Dusen, however,
and to the extent that the Erie doctrine is relevant to this case, it
supports a result exactly opposite to that reached by the Court
of Appeals here. This suit was brought in California, a
jurisdiction whose only contact with any of the parties or the
transaction at issue was the fact that one of the defendants was
apparently subject to suit there. Thus, California was plaialy an
inconvenient forum and, had the action remained in the
California state courts, a dismissal on the grounds of forum non
conveniens would have been a certainty. See, e.g., Hemmelgarn
v. Boeing Co., 106 Cal. App. 3d 576, 165 Cal. Rptr. 190
(1980); Gould, Inc. v. Health Science, Inc., 54 Cal. App. 3d
687, 126 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1976); Great Northern Ry. Co. v.
Superior Court, 12 Cal. App. 3d 105, 90 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1970).
Moreover, the fact of critical significance to the Court of
Appeals—that the foreign court would not apply a law as

12

favorable to plaintiff as that which the California courts would
apply—would not have prevented the California courts from
dismissing this action on forum non conveniens grounds. In
Hemmelgarn, which like the present case involved an action on
behalf of foreign nationals arising out of a foreign aircraft
accident, the court assumed that a change in the applicable law
might result from the dismissal but dismissed the action
nonetheless:

The difficulty with the present case is that it is not
possible to satisfy all of California’s policy considerations
by retaining the case here and it is equally impossible to
satisfy all those policy considerations by requiring trial in
Canada. In either situation some policy trade-offs are
necessary which the court must consider in the exercise of
its discretion.

Here, accepting plaintiffs’ premise on damages as true,
... and although defendants Rohr and Boeing may not
feel the full sting of damages as computed in accordance
with California law, they nevertheless will feel some sting
from the damages imposed by the Canadian court.

165 Cal. Rptr. at 197.4

4 See also Archibald v. Cinerama Hotels, 15 Cal. 34 853, 544 P.2d 947,
126 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1976). Archibald was a class action against a number of
Hawaii hotels. The trial court dismissed the action on the ground of forum
non conveniens. On appeal plaintiff contended that forum non conveniens
was inapplicable because there was no suitable alternative forum. The basis
for this contention was that Hawaii class action procedures were less
favorable to plaintiff than those of California. The California Supreme Court
rejected this contention, stating:

We do, however, address one argument presented by piaintiff since
its determination would preclude the exercise of any discretion by the
trial court in the matter.

Plaintiff argues that defendants have failed to show the existence of
a suitable alternative forum (see Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, supra, 330 U.S.
501, 506-507, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055), and consequently that the
trial court lacks the discretion to stay proceedings in California.

Plaintiff's argument rests on a comparison of class action procedures
in California and Hawaii.

sees
Any attempt on our part to predict how Hawaiian courts will resolve
unsettled issues of class action procedure would be purely speculative.
But, contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the existence of unsettled questions
of Hawaiian procedure does not compel the trial court to conclude as a
matter of law that Hawaii is not a suitable alternative forum.

" 15 Cal. 3d at 861-862 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).

13

This review of California law demonstrates that the rule
adopted by the Third Circuit in this case frustrates rather than
furthers the Erie principles which underly Van Dusen. Unlike
Van Dusen, where the effect of continued application of the law
of the transferor forum was that the same law would be applied
by the state and federal forums, in the present case the effect of
a refusal to dismiss the action on the ground of forum non
conveniens is not oniy to leave the action in an inconvenient
forum but to achieve an entirely different result in the federal
court than would have been reached in the state court. This
action would have been dismissed by the California state courts
on the ground of forum non conveniens and plaintiff would
have lost any opportunity to have California choice of law rules
apply.5 Van Dusen does not require the federal courts to reach a
different result. Indeed, the tenor of Van Dusen is precisely the
opposite.

One point should be emphasized. Amici curiae do not
contend that forum non conveniens dismissals in diversity cases
must be resolved by reference to state law. This issue was left

5 This fact also casts doubt the conclusion of both lower courts that

as to the claim against Piper law would necessarily a after a
§ 1404(a) transfer. of te California bane courts would hawe dieaioed tis
action on forum non conveniens —thereby defeating plaintiff's

attempt to invoke California law—Van Dusen does not require a different
result in federal court. This point was expressly recognized by this Court in
Van Dusen:

..» [W]e do not and need not consider whether in all cases § 1404

(a) would require the application of the law of the transferor, as opposed

to the transferee, State. We do not attempt to determine whether, for

example, the same considerations would govern if . . . it was contended
that the transferor State would simply have dismissed the action on the
ground of forum non conveniens.

376 US. at 639-640 (footnotes omitted ).

The Court of Appeals cited one case, In re Air Crash Disaster at Boston,
Mass, 399 F. Supp. 1106, 1121-1122 (D. Mass. 1975), in support of its
position that California law still applied. In Boston, the court concluded that
it would be inappropriate to apply the law of the transferee forum because:

An assumption that a plaintiff, after dismissal, would choose to bring his

action in the transferree forum is plainly unjustified in any case in which

another more favorable forum is open to him.
Id. at 1121.

sislsciea ae Meeaile OF ee desde tees Seer ab ened og tor ond kate
forum less inconvenient than the original choice but with a choice of law rule
more favorable chan the rule followed in the convenient forum to which the
action was transferred.

14

open by this Court in Gulf Oil and Koster v. Lumbermens
Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947), and the lower
federal courts have tended to consider the propriety of such
dismissals a matter of federal law. See e.g., Thomson v.
Palmieri, 355 F.2d 64, 66 (2d Cir. 1966); Szantay v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60, 65 (4th Cir. 1965); Grodinsky v.
Fairchild Industries, Inc., Civ. No. M-80-722 (D.Md. Feb. 3,
1981); Poe v. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co., 376 F. Supp. 1054
(D.Md. 1974); Lapides v. Doner, 248 F. Supp. 883 (E.D.Mich.
1965); Ciprari v. Servicos Aereos Cruzeiro do Sul, S.A., 232 F.
Supp. 433, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). Thus, the absence of a state
law doctrine of forum non conveniens would not preclude a
federal court from dismissing a diversity action on this basis
since many of the factors involved in the decision whether to
grant a forum non conveniens dismissal are matters of federal
concern.® Similarly, it can at least be argued that a federal
court need not dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds a
diversity action which would have been dismissed in state court,
at least to the extent that factors such as court congestion, not
present in a particular federal court but present in state court,
would have been a major reason for the latter’s decision to
dismiss the action, had it been brought there. Cf. Parsons v.
Chesapeake & O.R. Co., 375 U.S. 71, 73 (1963) (federal court
need not transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404( a) an action based on
federal law even though state court had dismissed identical
action based on forum non conveniens; Court noted, “there is
nothing to show that the problem in the federal court in
Chicago [of “docket congestion”] is identical . . . to the
problem in the Cook County court system”).

In any event, complicated hypothetical conflicts between
state and federal law need not be resolved here. In the present
case all parties agreed, and the Court of Appeals found, that no
difference exists among California, Pennsylvania and federal
forum non conveniens principles, see 630 F.2d at 158. Thus the
question of what law controls if there is a conflict can be
resolved another day. Under the Gulf Oil factors used by all

® The converse situation, a state court dismissal of a federal claim by
application of the state’s standards for forum non conveniens dismissals, was
approved in Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377 (1929).

15

three jurisdictions, problems of foreign law and conflict of laws
have been held to be relevant in two ways to the trial court’s
discretionary decision whether to dismiss a case on forum non
conveniens grounds. First, there is a public interest “in having
the trial . . . in a forum that is at home with the . . . law that
must govern the case, rather than having a court in some other
forum untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign
to itself.” Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 509. Second, the lower federal
courts have not suggested that the new forum must afford
precisely the same protection to a plaintiff as the inconvenient
forum but have held only that the law and procedures which
would be applied by the new forum must not be so devoid of
due process that plaintiff would be deprived of “an adequate
alternative forum.” See, e.g., Shields vy. Mi Ryung Construction
Co., Civ. No. 79-628 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 1981); Alcoa S.S.
Co., Inc. v. M/V Nordic Regent, 636 F.2d 860, 871-872 (2d Cir.
1980) (en banc).

The public interest in avoiding problems associated with
conflict of laws and application of foreign law strongly supports
the dismissal of this action. The transaction giving rise to this
litigation is centered in Scotland and, as apparently conceded
by all parties and found by both courts, the Scottish courts
would probably apply Scottish law. In contrast, this case
presents to an American court “a classic example of the
wilderness in which courts sometimes find themselves when
searching for solutions to problems arising under the judicial
nightmare known as Conflict of Laws.” Forsyth v. Cessna
Aircraft Co., 520 F.2d 608, 609 (9th Cir. 1975).7 Furthermore,

7 It is difficult to imagine a case which better illustrates how “tangled”
some problems in conflict of laws can be. The district court concluded that
choice of law doctrine required application of Scottish law to
the issue of whether a cause of action in strict products liability existed. The
Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the Pennsylvania approach to
conflict of laws was similar to the California “interest analysis” approach and
that under “interest analysis” Ohio had an interest in applying strict liability
to its resident manufacturer whereas Scotland had no interest in making it
more difficult for its residents to recover by requiring that they prove
negligence. Thus, there was a threshold dispute among the Pennsylvania
eT
choice iw.

(footnotes continued on following page)

16

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17

trial in Pennsylvania and trial in Scotland is that while strict
liability would be available in Pennsylvania, plaintiff must
prove negligence in order to recover in Scotland. This is hardly
the kind of difference which would deprive the plaintiff of a fair
trial in Scotland. Much more fundamental objections to the
adequacy of the foreign forum were made in Shields and Alcoa
and rejected.

There is no federal rule automatically precluding a forum
non conveniens dismissal merely because the forum in which
the action must be refiled would apply a different law to the
plaintiff's claim. Indeed, this Court has expressly rejected such
a rule. In Canada Malting Co., Ltd. v. Paterson Steamships,
Lid., 285 U.S. 413 (1932), this Court affirmed a dismissal on
forum non conveniens grounds of a suit in admiralty notwith-
standing libellants’ assertion that a Canadian court would, by
application of a different choice of law rule, apply Canadian
law which would not have created joint and several liability in
favor of libellants. Libellants’ assertion as to the content of
Canadian choice of law doctrine was disputed, but this Court
stated:

® Significantly, the plaintiff's allegations here involve primarily defects in
design and inadequate warnings. See 630 F.2d at 154 n.2. In a design defect
or failure to warn case it is doubtful that there should be amp difference
between strict liability and negligence. Certainly there is no difference under
Ohio law which the Court of Appeals held applicable to Hartzell. See Temple
v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267, 272-273 (1977):
We have thus far discussed appellees’ liability in terms of strict tort
liability. It is, however, apparent that the rule imposing obligation on the
manufacturer or seller to give suitable warning of a dangerous propensity
of a product is a rule fixing a standard of care, and any tort resulting from

the failure to meet this duty is, in essence, a negligent act.

** &

To date, no Ohio case has specifically defined the duties of a
manufacturer relative to product design, but the general rule is that“. .
{i]t is the duty of a manufacturer to use reasonable care under the
circumstances to so design his product as to make it not accident or
foolproof, but safe for the use for which it is intended.” Gosset v. Chrysler
Corp. (C.A.6, 1966), 359 F.2d 84, 87.

The law in other jurisdictions is similar. See ¢.g., Robinson v. Reed-
Prentice Division of Package Machinery Co., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 479, 403 N.E.2d
440, 443, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717, 720 (1980). (“Since no product may be
completely accident proof, the ultimate question in determining whether an
article is defectively designed involves a balancing of the likelihood of harm
against the burden of taking precaution against that harm.”)

We have no occasion to enquire by what law the
rights of the parties are governed, as we are of the opinion
that, under any view of that question, it lay within the
discretion of the District Court to decline to assume
jurisdiction over the controversy.

285 U.S. at 419-420. Accord, Fitzgerald v. Texaco, Inc., 521
F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1052 (1976);
Anglo-American Grain Co. v. The S/T Mina D’Amico, 169 F.
Supp. 908 (E.D. Va. 1959). As the Second Circuit held in
Fitzgerald:

A district court has discretion to dismiss an action
under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, however, even
though the law applicable in the alternative forum may be
less favorable to the plaintiff's chance of recovery. A
contrary holding would emasculate the doctrine, for a
plaintiff rarely chooses to bring an action in a forum,
especially a foreign one, where he is !ess likely to recover.

521 F.2d at 453 (citation omitted).

It is thus apparent that the position taken by the Court of
Appeals in this case concerning the test for a forum non
conveniens dismissal is not supported by Gulf Oil, is contrary to
Canada Malting, and is at odds with, rather than compelled by,
the federalism principles involved in Van Dusen. Indeed, the
rule enunciated by the Third Circuit can only have the effect of
encouraging the sort of forum shopping which occurred here.
To encourage forum shopping by allowing plaintiff to pick his
law at will and hold on to it forever is most definitely not the
public policy this Court sought to promote in Van Dusen.
Indeed, even before Van Dusen was decided, the proper scope
of the Van Dusen principle was analyzed by the Second Circuit
in H.L. Green Co. v. MacMahon, 312 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928 (1963). That decision is instructive.

H.L. Green was an action commenced in the Southern
District of New York in which the plaintiff, a New York
corporation, alleged violations of § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act and common law fraud. The defendant moved
to have the action transferred to the Southern District of
Alabama under § 1404(a) and the motion was granted. In its

19

petition to the Second Circuit for a writ of mandamus prohibit-
ing the transfer, plaintiff asserted that the transfer would not be
in the interests of justice, in part because its effect would be that
Alabama law, which was less favorable than New York law,
would be applied to the common law claim. Anticipating Van
Dusen, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit refused to
grant the writ noting that, because of Erie, New York law
(including, as to the common law claim, its conflict of laws
rules) should continue to apply. 312 F.2d at 652-653. How-
ever, this Court went to some length to emphasize that when
federalism considerations were put aside a plaintiff does not
have an unfettered right to shop for the most favorable law:

A plaintiff may not resist the transfer of his action to
another district court on the ground that the transferee
court will or may interpret federal law in a manner less
favorable to him. We agree with the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit that if there is a conflict of views among
circuits, “this presents a matter for consideration by the
Supreme Court on application for certiorari, not for consid-
eration by a district judge on application for transfer * * *.
We have no sympathy with shopping around for forums.”
Clayton v. Warlick, 232 F.2d 699, 706 (4 Cir. 1956); see
Torres v. Walsh, 221 F.2d 319 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 836, 76 S.Ct. 72, 100 L.Ed. 746 (1955).

312 F.2d at 652 (emphasis added). Accord, Scheinbart v.
Certain-Teed Products Corp., 367 F. Supp. 707, 710-711
(S.D.N.Y. 1973):

Plaintiff argues that the interests of justice will be
served by trial in New York because the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, in Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d ‘1337
(2d Cir. 1971), has held that the Advisers Act prohibits an
investment advisor from profiting by the sale of its fidu-
ciary office. Plaintiff claims that since the law in the Third
Circuit is unclear on this issue, she “should not be required
to litigate her cause [there] and to shoulder the burden of
seeking to establish the standard applied in Rosenfeld in
another jurisdiction.”

20

Plaintiff's argument amounts to mere forum shopping.

The federal courts, and this court in particular, have little

sympathy for forum shopping. ... Plaintiff's obvious

forum shopping merely adds weight to the other consid-
erations favoring transfer.
( Footnotes omitted; emphasis added.) See also In re Pittsburgh
& L.E. R. Co. Securities and Antitrust Litigation, 543 F.2d
1058, 1065 n.19 (3d Cir. 1976); Clayton v. Warlick, 232 F.2d
699, 706 (4th Cir. 1956).

The lesson of these decisions is clear: There is a federal
policy against forum shopping such that when continued appli-
cation of the law of the transferor siate is not required to
effectuate Erie principles, the plaintiff will not be allowed to
hold on to a favorable law for which he has shopped in an
inconvenient forum. In the present case, plaintiff's effort to
avoid dismissal because a slightly less favorable law will be
applied in the more convenient forum is not only contrary to
this federal policy against forum shopping, but is inconsistent
with, rather than compelled by, Erie principles.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the order of the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit reversing the district court’s order dis-
missing this action, with conditions, on the ground of forum non
conveniens should be reversed and the matter remanded to the
Court of Appeals with directions to reinstate the district court’s
order of dismissal.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th day of May,
1981.

KerrH GERRARD

Joun D. DiLLow

RicHarD C. CoYLe
Perkins, Coie, Stone,

Olsen & Williams

1900 Washington Building
Seattle, Washington 98101
(206) 682-8770

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
The Boeing Company

21

JOHN E. CAVANAGH

SAMUEL F. PEARCE

JosepH TWOMEY
P.O. Box 551
Burbank, California 91520
(203) 847-6601

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

Lockheed Corporation
Tuomas C. WALSH '
JOHN J. HENNELLY, Jr.

Bryan, Cave, McPheeters

& McRoberts

500 North Broadway

St. Louis, Missouri 63102

(314) 231-8600

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
McDonnell Douglas Corporation

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_1910%3A08. Public record. Not legal advice.
