# Appellants Reply Brief — Common Cause v. Schmitt

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_1909%3A08

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appellants Reply Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1982
- **Citation:** 455 U.S. 129

## Text

Nos. 80-847 and 80-1067

Office-Supreme Court, U.S.
> RILED

ol

IN THE ALEXANDER IL. SicwAS,
Supreme Court of the United ree

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

COMMON CAUSE, et al.,

Appellants,
v.

HARRISON SCHMITT, et al.,

Appellees.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,

Appellant,
Vv.

AMERICANS FOR CHANGE, et al.,

Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia

OPPOSITION TO MOTIONS TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM

Of Counsel:

KENNETH J. Gumo, JR.

ELLEN G. BLOCK

DONALD J. SIMON
CoMMON CAUSE
2080 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20086
(202) 888-1200

February 6, 1981

MICHAEL L. BURACK
Counsel of Record

ROGER M. WITTEN

CLIFFORD B. HENDLER

WILMER, OuTLER &
PICKERING

1666 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 872-6000

Attorneys for Appellants
Common Cause, David Cohen
and Winifred Long

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

I. APPELLEES HAVE GIVEN NO COGENT
REASON WHY THIS COURT SHOULD DE-
PART FROM ITS LONG-STANDING PRAC-
TICE OF REQUIRING THE DEVELOPMENT
OF AN ADEQUATE FACTUAL RECORD AS
A PREDICATE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AD-
JUDICATION 2

II. THERE IS NO MERIT TO APPELLEES’ CON-
TENTION THAT THESE CASES DO NOT
WARRANT PLENARY REVIEW ..................... 6

Ill. THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT THE ER-
RONEOUS JURISDICTIONAL AND STAND-
ING ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY AFC, OR
IN THE ALTERNATIVE SHOULD ALLOW
THE DISTRICT COURT TO PASS UPON
THEM IN THE FIRST INSTANCE ON RE-
MAND 9

A. This Court Should Reject AFC’s Jurisdic-
tional Argument 9

B. This Court Should Reject AFC’s Standing
Argument 13

C. In the Alternative, This Court Should With-
hold Its Decision on the Jurisdictional and
Standing Issues Until After the District
Court Has First Passed Upon Them on
Remand 14

CONCLUSION 15

ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES: Page

Animal Welfare Institute v. Kreps, 561 F.2d 1002
(D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1013

(1978) 18
Beal v. Doe, 482 U.S. 488 (1977) .......2...2..--2-..--0000--- 5
Board of Governors Vv. Agnew, 829 U.S. 441

(1947) me 8
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) .......... 4,5, 6, 7,9, 10
Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers, 418

U.S. 548 (1978) 8-9
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 485 U.S.

765 (1978) 7-8
Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556

(1974) 8-4
Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1978)... 18
Mandel v. Bradley, 482 U.S. 178 (1977) (per

curiam) 8

Metropolitan Washington Coalition for Clean Air
v. District of Columbia, 511 F.2d 809 (D.C.

Cir. 1975) 13
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 585 (1974) ................. 10
Posadas Vv. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497

(1936) ae. 10
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S.

SE RED. ioasern cicn caveats wosissedicistiecthatainbsonucee 8-9

Republican National Committee v. Federal Elec-
tion Commission, 487 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y.)
(three-judge court), aff'd mem., 445 U.S. 955

(1980) ‘ 5-6
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) .......... 18
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) .....00........00--- 3
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 409

U.S. 205 (1972) 18
United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U.S.

567 (1957) a
United States v. Mississippi Tax Commission, 412

U.S. 868 (19738) 14

Youakim Vv. Miller, 425 U.S. 281 (1976) ................ 14

iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

FEDERAL STATUTORY PROVISIONS: Page
2 U.S.C. § 481 et seq. 10
2 U.S.C. § 481(4) (A) 8
2 U.S.C. § 481(19) 11
2 U.S.C. § 487c(b) (1) 10, 11
2 U.S.C. § 487d (e) 11
2 U.S.C. § 487¢ 12
2 U.S.C. § 487g¢(a) (1) 12
2 U.S.C. § 487g¢(a) (2) 12
Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, 26

U.S.C. ch. 95 2

§ 9002 (9) 8

§ 9011 (b) 9, 10, 11, 12, 18
§9012(f) . passim

§ 9082 (8) 8
Pub. L. No. 94-288, Title III, 90 Stat. 497 ............ 11

CONGRESSIONAL MATERIALS:

H.R. Rep. No. 94-917, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1976) 11

117 Cong. Rec. 42897 (1971) 8

117 Cong. Rec. 42626 (1971) 8

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980
No. 80-847
COMMON CAUSE, et al.,
©: Appellants,
HARRISON SCHMITT, et al., ;
Appellees.
No. 80-1067

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,
“< Appellant,

AMERICANS FOR CHANGE, e¢ al.,
Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia

OPPOSITION TO MOTIONS TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM '

According to appellees, it is perfectly appropriate—
indeed, desirable—for this Court to invalidate an Act
of Congress without a factual record to illuminate either
the actual working of the statute or the important gov-

1Common Cause, David Cohen and Winifred Long, appellants
in No. 80-847, are filing this Opposition in both of the above-
captioned cases because both cases involve the same constitu-
tional issue, arise out of the same proceeding, and have been
briefed together by appellees. ;

Citations to our Jurisdictional Statement are given by “J.S.
—.” Citations to the Appendices to our Jurisdictional State-

ernmental interests it serves, and without full briefing
and argument to explore the constitutional issues at
stake. Appellees are wrong.

The invalidation of 26 U.S.C. § 9012(f) would have
serious consequences, for—as the Federal Election Com-
mission (“the Commission”) has emphasized—it would
substantially undermine the public-financing scheme en-
acted by Congress in the Fund Act.? See FEC J.8. 13-15;
see also J.S. 16-19. These cases therefore require careful,
fully informed consideration. Consistently with its long-
standing practice, the Court should reverse (or vacate)
the decision below and remand the cases to the district
court so that an adequate record can be developed. In
any event, the Court should not decide the constitutional
issues in the absence of full briefing and argument. As
for AFC’s jurisdictional and standing arguments—on
which the court below did not rule—the Court should
either reject them now or let the district court consider
them first on remand.

I, APPELLEES HAVE GIVEN NO COGENT REASON
WHY THIS COURT SHOULD DEPART FROM ITS
LONG-STANDING PRACTICE OF REQUIRING THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AN ADEQUATE FACTUAL
RECORD AS A PREDICATE FOR CONSTITU-
TIONAL ADJUDICATION.

A fully developed factual record is a basic prerequi-
site for the delicate task of constitutional adjudication.
This Court has consistently reversed district court de-
cisions and remanded for factual development when the
record did not provide “the concrete factual setting . . .

ment are given by “App. ——.” Finally, citations to the Juris-
dictional Statement filed by the Federal Election Commission are
given by “FEC J.S. ——.”

2 Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, 26 U.S.C. ch. 95.

especially demanded for constitutional decision.” United
States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 591 (1957).°

Appellees do not deny the importance of this principle;
they do not deny that the record in this case is extraor-
dinarily sparse; and they do not claim that the relatively
limited discovery needed to compile a factual record would
in any way prove burdensome. Instead, appellees con-
tend that a factual record is simply unnecessary in this
case: They pretend that this Court would need a factual
record only in order to determine whether they are cov-
ered by Section 9012(f), concede that the statute applies
to them, and then insist that the Court has all the in-
formation it needs to strike down the statute.

Appellees’ argument is fundamentally flawed. The
issue before this Court is not whether Section 9012(f)
applies to them—it clearly does—but whether, in light
of all of the circumstances surrounding its application to
committees such as appellees, Section 9012(f) is con-
stitutional. When the constitutionality of an Act of
Congress is challenged, the context in which the statute
operates, the effects it has and the interests it serves
must be explored and fully understood—even if it is
undisputed that the challengers come within the statute.
See note 3 supra. These matters must be explored in this
case; they are factual in nature, and they cannot (and
should not) be decided on the basis of blind hunches or
argumentative assertions.

8In addition to the cases cited at J.S. 18, 15 & n.18, see, ¢.g.,
Mandel v. Bradley, 482 U.S. 173, 177-79 (1977) (per curiam)
(decision vacated and remanded where a three-judge district court
had held a statute unconstitutional on the basis of a previous
Supreme Court decision instead of “sift{ing] through the con-
flicting evidence and making findings of fact” concerning the
operation of the statute); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 738-40
(1974) (this Court stated it was “quite sure” that the decision
of a three-judge district court should be vacated and remanded
because in order “to assess realistically whether the law imposes
excessively [and thus unconstitutionally] burdensome require-
ments ... it is necessary to know other critical facts which do not
appear from the evidentiary record”); Gilmore v. City of Mont-

4

There is another, equally fundamental reason why
appellees are wrong in requesting this Court to decide
the case on a virtually non-existent record. The dis-
trict court’s decision—which appellees say was correct
and urge this Court to affirm—depended upon crucial fac-
tual findings that the record does not support, that appel-
lants (including the Commission) contend are erroneous,
and that even appellees have not seriously attempted to
defend.

The district court correctly stated that “[a] ‘contribu-
tion’ case . . . is entitled to less-exacting judicial scrutiny
{than an ‘expenditure’ case] because the ‘transformation
of contributions into political debate involves speech by
someone other than the contributor.’” App. 15a (quoting
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976)) (footnote omit-
ted). The court found, however, that no such “transforma-
tion” occurs in the case of committees such as appellees,
because (in the court’s view) the contributors control the
committees’ expenditures. On that basis—and that basis
alone—the district court held that Section 9012(f) operates
as an “expenditure” limitation and struck it down. App.
15a-18a. Thus, the district court’s decision hinged on its
finding that the contributors control how the committees
spend their contributions.

To the extent the record sheds light on the relationship
between committees and their contributors, it indicates—
as we have already noted, and as the Commission agrees—
that the district court’s finding was incorrect. See J.S.
7n.9; FEC J.S. 24-25. But the point here is not whether
the district court’s finding was or was not correct on the
basis of the record before it. The point is, rather, that
the record is woefully inadequate to enable any court
(including this Court) to decide with any degree of

gomery, 417 U.S. 556, 570-74 (1974) (decision reversed in part
and remanded where the record before this Court did “not contain
sufficient facts upon which to predicate [the requisite] legal judg-
ments”).

assurance a central issue in this case—whether the con-
tributors in fact exercise control.*

Appellees do not contend that the record is adequate to
serve as the basis for deciding this issue. AFC and FCM
are simply mute on the subject, while AEP makes the
extraordinary suggestion that the district court’s findings
are gratuitous and should simply be ignored. See AEP
Br. 9-10 n.9. But findings as to control were essential to
the district court’s analysis, and such findings require a
factual record. Cf. Beal v. Doe, 482 U.S. 488, 448 (1977)
(case remanded to three judge court where the record
was inadequate to permit this Court to determine who
really controlled the medical decision at issue).

This Court should decline appellees’ invitation to decide
a delicate and important constitutional issue in the dark.
A fully developed record is essential here just as it was
in the previous cases in which this Court has ruled on
the constitutionality of election-law provisions. The Court

4 It is equally impossible to decide, on the present record, whether
another finding crucial to the district court’s constitutional anal-
ysis is in fact correct—its finding that a political committee's for-
mal independence eliminates any danger that the candidate, if
elected, will be (or appear to’ be) beholden to the committee. App.
19a; see J.S. 11, 27. This conclusion is essentially factual in nature.
Evidence can and should be developed bearing on the question
whether the activities of entities like appellees pose the kinds of
dangers of actual or apparent quid pro quo’s that this Court recog-
nized in Buckley. See 424 U.S. at 26-27.

Appellee FCM has erroneously suggested that this question was
answered in Buckley. See FCM Br. 8. But FCM has ignored
this Court’s express statement that its discussion of independ-
ent expenditures in Buckley was limited to election practices
as they “presently appear[ed].” 424 U.S. at 46. The kinds of
entities and activities at issue in this case were unknown and un-
foreseen when Buckley was decided, and they were not before this
Court for consideration in Buckley. See J.S. 20-21.

a Buckley v. Valeo, supra, 424 U.S. at 9-10; Republican National
Committee v. Federal Election Commission, 487 F. Supp. 280,

should, therefore, reverse (or vacate) the decision below
and remand these cases for the development of an ade-
quate factual record. ,

IL. THERE IS NO MERIT TO APPELLEES’ CONTEN-
TION THAT THESE CASES DO NOT WARRANT
PLENARY REVIEW.

Appellees’ contention that the district court’s invalida-
tion of 26 U.S.C. § 9012(f) does not present a substantial
federal question is—and we use this term advisedly—
frivolous. As the Commission has correctly stated, Sec-
tion 9012(f) was “rooted in Congress’ wise, indeed ex-
pert, assessment of the potential danger in allowing politi-
cal professionals to amass, control and spend vast sums to
secure the election of presidential candidates.” FEC J.S.
18. Accord, J.S. 16-19. In concluding that Section 9012 (f)
does not serve important governmental interests, the
district court simply disagreed with Congress’ consid-
ered determination. Under these circumstances, sum-
mary disposition of these cases would be inconsistent with
the respect owed to considered determinations of the Legis-
lative Branch in matters so peculiarly within its expertise.

Nothing in Buckley v. Valeo diminishes the need for
plenary consideration in these cases. Neither Section
9012(f) nor the kinds of activities in which appellees
have engaged were before this Court in Buckley, see
J.S. 20-21, and appellees do not contend otherwise. More-
over, the across-the-board prohibitions against independ-
ent expenditures that the Court overturned in Buckley
differed in every material respect from the carefully
tailored limitation contained in Section 9012(f). See

290-807 (S.D.N.Y.) (three-judge court), af’d mem., 445 U.S. 955
(1980).

There is no merit to AEP’s suggestion that this Court ignored
, the record in Buckley. See AEP Br. 10 n.9. This Court relied
extensively upon that record. See, e.g. 424 U.S. at 20 nn.20-21,
21-22 n.28, 26 n.27, 82 nn.84-87, 33 n.39, 34 0.40, 37 n.42.

7

J.S. 24-26.° Thus, in arguing that Buckley mandates
affirmance of the decision below, appellees are in reality
asking this Court significantly to extend Buckley. See
J.S. 25 & n.26. Such a step would require plenary
consideration."

Full briefing and argument will materially assist the
Court in resolving important questions of statutory con-
struction that bear directly on the constitutionality of
Section 9012(f). Section 9012(f) only applies to “politi-
cal committees” as that term is defined in the Fund Act.
Appellants contend that the term, properly construed,
excludes groups of individuals who pool and spend their
own money, without relinquishing control over it, and
that such groups therefore do not come within Section
9012(f). See J.S. 24 & n.28. See also FEC J.S. 19. In
response, AEP asserts that this construction is “not based

on statutory language, legislative history, ... or on any
other criterion utilized by lawyers.” AEP Br. 20. But

In particular: (1) As appellees concede, Section 9012(f) leaves
individuals free to make unlimited independent expenditures,
whereas the statute overturned in Buckley prohibited essentially
all such expenditures. (2) Section 9012(f) only applies to a narrow
and specific type of group (“political committees” within the
meaning of the Fund Act), whereas the statute overturned in
Buckley applied to all groups. (3) Section 9012(f) does not (and
was not intended to) place a limit on the total amount of money
that can be spent to support candidates, whereas the statute over-
turned in Buckley drastically restricted the overall quantity of
political speech. (4) Section 9012(f) protects the integrity of the
Fund Act’s public-financing scheme and therefore applies only
when a candidate has accepted public funding, whereas the statute
overturned in Buckley choked off all independent expenditures re-
gardiess of whether a candidate had received public financing.

T Appellees also err in contending that First National Bank
of Boston v. Bellotti, 486 U.S. 765 (1978), supports affirmance.
To be sure, Bellotti explained that the capacity of speech for
informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its
source. Jd, at 777. But that capacity is not at issue here. Rather,
these cases call into question Congress’ power to protect against
actual (or apparent) quid pro quo’s resulting from the creation

8

as AEP must be aware,* appellants’ construction finds
support in both the language of the Fund Act® and its
legislative history.” It is also supported by the well-
established principle—which runs directly counter to ap-
pellees’ approach—that this Court’s “task is not to destroy
the Act if we can, but to construe it, if consistent with the

of political debts in candidate elections. Bellotti did not deny
Congress that power; to the contrary, it acknowledged it. Jd. at
788 n.26.

8 Appellants provided detailed support for their position on this
point in their district court briefs filed on August 4 and 18, 1980.

®The statutory language shows that only a relatively narrow
class of entities are “political committees” within the meaning of
the Fund Act. The Fund Act defines a “political committee” to
include only a “committee, association, or organization (whether
or not incorporated)... .” 26 U.S.C. §9002(9). By contrast, the
Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”) defines a “political com-
mittee” as including “any committee, club, association, or other
group of persons... .” 2 U.S.C. §481(4)(A) (emphasis added).
Similarly, the Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account Act
defines a “political committee” as including “any individual, com-
mittee, association, or organization (whether or not incorpo-
rated). . . .” 26 U.S.C. §9082(8) (emphasis added). The Fund
Act thus defines “political committee” more narrowly than do
these other statutes. The differences are significant, and “(t]he
inference seems reasonable . . . that Congress by the words it chose
marked a distinction which we should not obliterate... .” Board
of Governors Vv. Agnew, 829 U.S. 441, 448 (1947).

These differences in statutory definitions undercut FCM’s reli-
ance on two Commission advisory opinions. See FCM Br. 19-20.
Since both involved the FECA, rather than the Fund Act, they
applied a broader definition of “political committee.” Those opin-
ions are therefore immaterial to a determination of what con-
stitutes a “political committee” within the meaning of the Fund
Act.

10 See, ¢.g., the remarks of Senator Pastore, the sponsor of the
Fund Act, at 117 Cong. Rec. 42897-98 (1971) (speaking against
amendment that, if adopted, would have extended Section 9012(f)
to all types of committees). See also id. at 42626 (Fund Act would
ee reo ee
a .

will of Congress, so as to comport with constitutional limi-
tations.” Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419
U.S. 102, 184 (1974), quoting Civil Service Commission
v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 571 (1973). This task
can be successfully performed here. Indeed, Section
9012(f), properly construed, comports exactly with the
constitutional distinction between contributions and ex-
penditures that this Court drew in Buckley. See JS.
24-25.

Appellees are therefore wrong in alleging that appellants
seek to relitigate Buckley. We seek, rather, to construe
Section 9012(f) “so as to comport with the constitutional
limitations” announced in Buckley. To be sure, that task
may involve difficult questions of constitutional and statu-
tory analysis. But that is precisely why these cases should
be decided only after plenary briefing and argument.

III. THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT THE ERRONEOUS
JURISDICTIONAL AND STANDING ARGUMENTS
ADVANCED BY AFC, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE
SHOULD ALLOW THE DISTRICT COURT TO PASS
UPON THEM IN THE FIRST INSTANCE ON
REMAND.

AEP and FCM apparently agree that appellants’ appeal
(No. 80-847) is within the jurisdiction conferred by the
judicial review provision of the Fund Act, 26 U.S.C.
§ 9011 (b), and is properly before this Court." AFC, how-
ever, has moved this Court to dismiss the appeal on juris-
dictional and standing grounds. AFC Br. 11-17. The
Court should deny AFC’s motion.

A. This Court Should Reject AFC’s Jurisdictional
Argument..

There is no merit to AFC’s argument that 26 U.S.C.

§ 9011(b) does not authorize Count I of appellants’ ac-

tion—the only part of that action involved in this appeal.

11 Neither AEP nor FCM contends that appellants’ may not prop-
erly prosecute this appeal. Nor has the Commission moved to dis-
miss the appeal.

10

See J.S. 10 n.15. Count I alleges that Section 9012(f)
of the Fund Act applies to appellees’ activities and re-
quests appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief. Thus,
Count I is authorized by the plain language of 26 U.S.C.
§ 9011(b), which states that “individuals eligible to vote
for President are authorized to institute such actions, in-
cluding actions for declaratory judgment or injunctive
relief, as may be appropriate to implement or construe
any prov sions of” the Fund Act.’* Congress has never ex-
pressly repealed this provision, and AFC does not contend
otherwise.

AFC’s argument is, at bottom, that Congress worked
an implied repeal of Section 9011(b)’s express authori-
zation to institute actions to “implement or construe” the
Fund Act when, in 1976, Congress amended the Federal
Election Campaign Act (“FECA”), 2 U.S.C. §§ 431
et seq., to give the Commission exclusive “enforcement”
jurisdiction. See 2 U.S.C. §487c(b) (1). But it is a
“cardinal rule” of statutory construction that such im-
plied repeals are disfavored. Morton v. Mancari, 417
U.S. 585, 549 (1974), quoting Posadas v. National City
Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936). An implied repeal may
be found only when there is an “affirmative showing of
an intention to repeal” or when “the earlier and later
statutes are irreconcilable’—that is, when they are not
“capable of co-existence.” Morton v. Mancari, 417 US.
at 550, 551. AFC’s argument fails under this test,
because (1) there is no “affirmative showing of an in-
tention” to repeal Section 9011(b) either in whole or in

12[t is undisputed that appellants David Cohen and Winitced
Long are “individuals eligible to vote for President” within the
meaning of 26 U.S.C. §9011(b). App. 78a-74a. It is also undis-
puted that appellant Common Cause has members who are “eligible
to vote for President” and whose interests it represents in election-
law matters, including litigation. App. 72a-73a. Cf. Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. at 9 n.5.

Il

part,” and (2) the private right of action expressly au-
thorized by Section 9011(b) of the Fund Act is entirely
“capable of co-existence” with Section 437c(b) (1) of the
FECA."*

AFC’s argument rests, moreover, on an erroneous
premise. According to AFC, Count I of appellants’ action
is an “enforcement” matter within the meaning of Section
487c(b) (1) of the FECA, rather than an action to “im-
plement or construe” the Fund Act within the meaning
of Section 9011(b) of that Act. See AFC Br. 12. But

18 The legislative history relating to 2 U.S.C. § 487c(b) (1) con-
tains no evidence whatsoever—let alone an “affirmative showing”—
of any intention by Congress to repeal the authorization expressly
granted by Section 9011(b). Indeed, the legislative history does
not even mention Section 9011(b). This fact is dispositive on the
question of an “intention to repeal,” because the 1976 legislation
did, expressly and specifically, amend other Fund Act provisions.
See Pub. L. No. 94-283, Tit. III, 90 Stat. 497-502. With Congress
explicitly specifying how it wished to change those provisions,
it makes no sense to assume that Congress would have decided to
repeal all or part of Section 9011(b) sub silentio.

14 Section 9011(b) is entirely compatible with the provision of
the FECA that deals with the exclusivity of remedies. 2 U.S.C.
§ 437d(e). That provision, which AFC has chosen to ignore, makes
actions by the Commission “the exclusive civil remedy for the en-
forcement of the provisions of this Act”—i.e., of the FECA. See
2 U.S.C. § 481(19). Because Section 9011(b) provides a remedy
for resolving issues that arise under the Fund Act only, and not
under the FECA, it is clearly “capable of co-existence” with Section
487d(e).

Section 487c(b)(1), in turn, is “capable of co-existence” with
both Section 9011(b) and Section 487d(e). Section 487c(b)(1)
does not deal with the exclusivity of any remedy; it deals, rather,
with the scope of the Commission’s enforcement jurisdiction. The
purpose of Section 487c(b) (1) was to “simplify and rationalize”
the civil enforcement powers that had previously been divided be-
tween the Commission and the Department of Justice. H.R. Rep.
No. 94-917, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1976). Thus, Section 4387c
(b) (1) and Section 9011(b) are fully reconcilable.

12

Count I of appellants’ action is virtually identical to the
Commission’s action. See J.S. 8-9. The Commission, how-
ever, does not regard its action as an “enforcement” mat-
ter; for instead of proceeding administratively, see 2
U.S.C. § 487g(a) (2),* the Commission brought an action
under Section 9011(b) to “implement or construe” the
Fund Act. See FEC J.S. 1. Since the Commission’s ac-
tion is an action to “implement or construe” authorized
by Section 9011 (b)—and no party contends otherwise—
appellants’ Count I, which involves the identical claim, is
also an action to “implement or construe” authorized by
that Section.

Equally unmeritorious is AFC’s suggestion that the
only actions which voters may bring under 26 U.S.C.
§9011(b) are actions against the Commission to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of provisions of the Fund Act.
See AFC Br. 15. To limit actions under Section 9011 (b)
to suits seeking to overturn Fund Act provisions as un-
constitutional would read the word “implement” out of
the statute. Indeed, such a limitation would be contrary
to the obvious intent of Congress, for it would allow
only suits whose purpose was to prevent the implementa-
tion of the statute as enacted. Such a limitation would
also be inconsistent with the Commission’s prosecution
of its own action under Section 9011(b)—an action, to
which AFC has raised no jurisdictional objection, that
seeks to give effect to, rather than to overturn, Section
9012(f) of the Fund Act.

16 As AFC acknowledges, “enforcement” matters are governed
by 2 U.S.C. § 487g, which prescribes administrative procedures
to be used in such cases. See AFC Br. at 12 n.17. Those proce-
dures apply not only to “enforcement” matters initiated by pri-
vate parties, 2 U.S.C. §487g(a)(1), but also to “enforcement”
matters initiated by the Commission, id. § 487g (a) (2).

13
B. This Court Should Reject AFC’s Standing Argument.

AFC’s argument that appellants lack standing also fails
to withstand scrutiny. That argument ignores the cru-
cial fact that Congress, in enacting 26 U.S.C. § 9011(b),
determined that “individuals eligible to vote for Presi-
dent” have a sufficient stake in the statutory scheme
for the public financing of Presidential elections to jus-
tify authorizing such persons to institute actions designed
to ensure the proper functioning of that scheme.”*

The cases that AFC cites do not advance its standing
argument. See AFC Br. 16-17. Those cases, without
exception, involved questions of standing that arose in
the absence of an express statutory grant of authoriza-
tion such as that contained in Section 9011(b). Here,
Congress has created a statutory scheme, has determined
that certain groups of persons have interests that are
affected by it, and has expressly authorized those persons
to institute actions to protect their interests. In such
situations, Congress’ determination is decisive on the
question of standing.” As this Court stated in Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 782 n.38 (1972), “where
a dispute is otherwise justiciable, the question whether
the litigant is a ‘proper party to request an adjudication
of a particular issue’ . . . is one within the power of Con-
gress to determine” (citation omitted).

16 Congress’ determination was eminently reasonable; it is, after
all, the voters whose interests the Fund Act is ultimately designed
to safeguard.

17 See, e.g., Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n3
(1973) ; Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 409 U.S.
205, 212 (1972) (concurring opinion of Justices White, Blackmun
and Powell); Animal Welfare Institute v. Kreps, 661 F.2d 1002,
1005-06 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1013 (1978);
Metropolitan Washington Coalition. for Clean Air v. District of
Columbia, 511 F.2d 809, 814 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

14

C. In the Alternative, This Court Should Withhold Its
Decision on the Jurisdictional and Standing Issues
Until After the District Court Has First Passed
Upon Them on Remand.

The district court has not yet passed upon the jurisdic-
tional and standing issues raised by AFC."* Accordingly,
if this Court does not now deny AFC’s motion to dismiss,
it should withhold decision on the jurisdictional and stand-
ing issues until after the district court, on remand, has
ruled on them in the first instance.” This course is par-
ticularly appropriate, since these cases should in any
event be remanded to the district court for factual devel-
opment. See J.S. 13-16 and pp. 1-6 supra. This pro-
cedure would promote judicial economy, and would also
ensure that these issues, when they finally come before
this Court, will be framed in the manner best suited for
disposition by it.

18 The district court considered jurisdiction only with regard
to Count II of appellants’ action, and—as AFC correctly acknowl-
edges—only Count I is before this Court. AFC Br. 4 n.6. AFC
thus also concedes, as it must, that the district court did not re-
solve either the issue whether 26 U.S.C. §9011(b) authorizes ap-
pellants to prosecute the claim stated in Count I, see AFC Br.
11 n.15, or the issue whether appellants have standing to prosecute
that claim, see id. at 16 n.23.

19 See, e.g., Youakim v. Miller, 425 U.S. 281, 236 (1976) (“claim
should be aired first in the [three-judge] District Court”) ; United
States v. Mississippi Tax Commission, 412 U.S. 363, 379, 381
(1973) (same).

15

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth in appellants’ Jurisdictional
Statement and in this Opposition, the Court should deny
appellees’ motions to dismiss or affirm and should reverse
(or vacate) the decision below and remand these cases to
the district court. In the alternative, the Court should
note probable jurisdiction of these appeals and set them
down for a full hearing.

Respectfully submitted,

MICHAEL L. BURACK
Counsel of Record

ROGER M. WITTEN

CLIFFORD B. HENDLER

Of Counsel: WILMER, CUTLER &

PICKERING
KENNETH J. GUIDO, JR. 1666 K S NW.
ELLEN G. BLOCK treet,
Washington, D.C. 20006

DONALD J. SIMON (202) 872-6000

CoMMON CAUSE

2030 M Street, N.W. Attorneys for Appellants

Washington, D.C. 20036 Common Cause, David Cohen

(202) 833-1200 and Winifred Long

February 6, 1981

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_1909%3A08. Public record. Not legal advice.
