# Appendix — New York Mercantile Exchange v. Leist

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1981
- **Citation:** 450 U.S. 910

## Text

Nos. 80-757, 80-895, 80-986 | spp 9 ga

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroser Term, 1980

New York Mercantite Excuance, Ricwarp B, Levine,

Howarp Gasier and AuLrrep Pennist,
Petitioners,

Vv.

New Letst, Pip Smiru and Incomco,
Respondents,

Crayton Brokerace Co, or Sr, Louis, Ine.,
Petitioner,

V.

New Leist, Pais Smiru and Incomco,
Respondents,

Heinotp Commopities, Inc. and THomson & McKinnon
AvcuincLoss Kouumeyer Inc.,
Petitioners,
v.

New Leist, Paiie Smitu and Ixcomco,
Respondents,

Hernotp Commopirixs, Inc. and Tuomson & McKinnon

Avcuinc Loss Kouumeyer Ine.,
Petitioners,

Vv.

Nationa Super Spups, Inc., et al.,
Respondents.

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

JOINT APPENDIX

(List of counsel on inside cover)

PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI FILED NOVEMBER 11,
DECEMBER 4 AND DECEMBER 5, 1980

CERTIORARI GRANTED FEBRUARY 23, 1981

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Relevant Docket Entries

Bn Se I ooh csavechsequmconmnntnnene
Re
Be I TIS, asics teciccacacsonsaccicncrtenacunsosee

Complaint in Incomco v. New York Mercantile Ex-
change, et al., 76 Civ. 2648 (LF'M), filed June 16,
MIDE cicscuic-scnsinsnsaduisn cessnenonssaa tnaichaesesasieuganbiancenah eines

Complaint in Neil Leist, et al. v. Simplot, et al., 76
Civ. 4350 (LF'M), filed September 30, 1976 ..........

First Amended Consolidated Class Action Com-
plaint in National Super Spuds, et al. v. New
York Mercantile Exchange, et al., 76 Civ. 2357
(LFM), 76 Civ. 2554 (LFM), 76 Civ. 2571
(LFM), 76 Civ. 2596 (LFM), filed October 4,
RARE x SARSR ACES PORNO RN IMC ee aie Seo ROR ATR

Opinion of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, dated May 29,
Be Re I da redississcsinicnstsvmnemsnmenienagsiianinios

Judgment of the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, dated July 3,
1979 seaterssaasasdatpveicasatacs cuctuiaiscineh cuits

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, dated July 8, 1980 (Majority
Opinion and Dissent) (Slip Opinion) ....................

PAGE

il
PAGE

Judgment of the Court of Appeals, dated July 8,
ITED insccunscstadilesdshcuihaaslhaaitaiilenimnesantaaonsaeeceeaacaamalaae JA 250

Order of the Court of Appeals dated September 9,
1980 denying Petition for Rehearing filed by ap-
pellees New York Mercantile Exchange, Richard
B. Levine, Howard Gabler and Alfred Pennisi .... JA 252

Order of the Court of Appeals dated September 9,
1980 denying Petition for Rehearing filed by
appellee Heinold Commodities, Ine. ...................... JA 255

Order of the Court of Appeals dated September 9,
1980 denying Petition for Rehearing filed by ap-
pellee Clayton Brokerage Co. of St. Louis, Ine. .. JA 257

Order of the Court of Appeals dated September 9,
1980 denying Petition for Rehearing with a sug-
gestion for rehearing in bane filed by appellees
New York Mercantile Exchange, Richard B.
Levine, Howard Gabler and Alfred Pennisi ........ JA 259

Order of the Court of Appeals dated September 9,
1980 denying Petition for Rehearing with a sug-
gestion for rehearing en banc filed by appellee
Heinold Commodities, Ime. ............0...ccccccccceseeeeeeeeee JA 262

Order of the Court of Appeals dated September 9,
1980 denying Petition for Rehearing with a sug-
gestion for rehearing en bane filed by appellee
Clayton Brokerage Co. of St. Louis, Ine, ............ JA 264

JAl

List of Relevant Docket Entries

In toe Unirep Srates Distrricr Court ror
THE SouTHERN District or New York:

Leist, et al. v. Simplot, et al., 76 Civ. 4350 (LFM)

Sept. 30, 1976 Complaint filed and summons issued.

Nov. 16, 1976* Answer of defendant Heinold Commod-
ities, Ine. (“Heinold”) filed.

Dec. 1, 1976 Answer of defendant Thomson & MeKin-
non Auchincloss Kohlmeyer Inc. (“Thom-
son”)t

Dec. 2, 1976 Answer of defendants New York Mercan-
tile Exchange, Richard B. Levine (“e-
vine”), Howard Gabler (“Gabler”) and
Alfred Pennisi (“Pennisi’”)+

Dec. 3, 1976 Answer of defendant Clayton Brokerage
Co. of St. Louis, Inc. (“Clayton”) filed.

* During the period from November 1, 1976 to April 14, 1977,
the answers to the following defendants, who are not parties to
the pending appeal, were served: John Richard Simplot; J. R.
Simplot & Co,; Simplot Industries, Inc.; Simtag Farms, Ine.;
Peter J. Taggares; P. J. Taggares & Co.; Henry A. Pollak; Harvey
B. Pollak; Harvey B. Pollak Company; Pressner Trading Corp.;
Benjamin Pressner; Stephen Sundheimer; Jules Nordlicht; Edel-
stein & Co., Ine.; Charles Edelstein; Robert Edelstein: Muriel
Edelstein; S. Meierfeld, Inc.; Gilbert Meierfeld; David Meierfeld;
Robert Reardon; F. J. Reardon, Inc.; Alex Sinclair; Manning
Stoller; Hornblower, Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes; MFX Commodities,
Ine.; Donald Silver; Duane South; Kenneth Ramm; A&B Farm-
ing, Inc.; Gearheart Farms, Inc.; Edward MeKay; and Frank
Fullmer.

t The items designated by this symbol were filed on August 8,
1979 as part of the Supplemental Record on Appeal. The dates
shown above are those appearing on the documents themselves,

Sept. 29, 1978

Oct.

Dec.

Dec.

Dec.

Dec.

Dec.

Jan.

Feb.

24, 1978

4, 1978

4, 1978

4, 1978

7, 1978

26, 1978

16, 1979

2, 1979

May 7, 1979

JA 2

Defendants New York Mercantile Ex-
change, Levine, Gabler, and Pennisi move
for judgment on the pleadings or for sum-
mary judgment.

Defendant Clayton moves for judgment
on the pleadings or for summary judg-
ment.t

Defendant Heinold moves for summary
judgment.

Piaintiffs’ papers in opposition to motion
of defendants New York Mercantile Ex-
change, Levine, Gabler and Pennisi filed.

Defendant Thomson’s affidavit in support
of motions of defendants Clayton and
Heinoldt

Plaintiffs’ papers in opposition to motion
for defendant Clayton filed.

Plaintiffs’ papers in opposition to mo-
tions of defendants Heinold and Thomson
filed.

Objections of defendants New York Mer-
eantile Exchange, Levine, Gabler, Pen-
nisi, and Heinold to plaintiffs’ input for
pre-trial order filed.

Objections of defendant Clayton to plain-
tiffs’ input for pre-trial order filed.

Objections of defendants Clayton and
Heinold to plaintiffs’ additional and re-
vised input for pre-trial order filed.

May 30, 1979

July

9,

1979

July 20, 1979

Apr.

3,

June 16,

Nov.

Sept.

Dec.

May :

July

July

3,

29,

4,

1981

1976
1976

1978

1978

1979

1979
1979

JA 3

Opinion and Order of the District Court
for the Southern District of New York
filed.

Judgment of the District Court entered.

Plaintiffs’ amended notice of appeal to
the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
euit filed.

Plaintiffs’ input for pre-trial order and
plaintiffs’ additional and revised input
for pre-trial order filed.

Incomco v. New York Mercantile Exchange, et al.,

76 Civ. 2648 (LFM)

Complaint filed and summons issued.

Answer and cross-claims of defendant
New York Mercantile Exchange filed.

Defendant New York Mercantile Ex-
change moves for judgment of the plead-
ings or for summary judgment.

Plaintiff’s papers in opposition to motion
of defendant New York Mercantile Ex-
change filed.

Opinion and Order of the District Court
for the Southern District of New York
filed.

Judgment of the District Court entered.

Plaintiffs amended notice of appeal to
the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit filed.

JA 4

National Super Spuds, Inc., et al. v. New York Mercantile
Exchange, et al., 76 Civ. 2375 (LFM), 76 Civ. 2554 (LFM),

May
Oct.

Nov.
Nov.
Nov.
Oct.
Dee.

Dee.

Dee.

Jan.

May

July

Aug.

76 Civ

26, 1976
4, 1976

29, 1979

30, 1979

6, 1979
20, 1979

. 2571 (LFM), 76 Civ. 2594 (LFM)

Complaint filed and summons issued,

First amended consolidated class action
complaint filed.

Answer of defendant Clayton filed.
Answer of defendant Heinold filed.
Answer of defendant Thomson filed.

Defendant Clayton moves for judgment
on the pleadings or for summary judg-
ment,

Plaintiffs’ papers in opposition to motion
of defendant Clayton filed.

Defendant Heinold moves for summary
judgment

Defendant Thomson’s affidavit in support
of motions of defendants Clayton and
Heinold filed.

Plaintiffs’ papers in opposition to motion
of defendant Heinold filed.

Opinion and Order of the District Court
for the Southern District of New York
filed.

Judgment of the District Court entered.

Plaintiffs’ amended notice of appeal to
the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit filed.

JA 5

In tHe Unrrep Srates Court or APPEALS

FOR THE Seconp Circuit:

Leist, et al. v. Simplot, et al., 79-7402, 79-7464, 79-7482

July

Aug.

Jan.

July

July

July

July

Sept.

Sept.

27, 1979

22, 1980

22, 1980

22, 1980

9, 1980

Appellants New York Mercantile Ex-
change, Levine, Gabier and Pennisi move
for leave to consolidate the appeals from
the three actions identified above,

Order granting leave to consolidate en-
dorsed.

Case argued before Friendly, Mansfield
and Kearse, C.JJ.

Opinion and Dissent of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Cireuit filed and
judgment entered,

Petition for Rehearing with a suggestion
for rehearing in bane of appellees New
York Mercantile Exchange, Levine, Gab-
ler and Pennisi filed.

Petition for Rehearing with a suggestion
for rehearing en banc of appellee Heinold

filed.

Petition for Rehearing with a suegestion
for rehearing en bane of appellee Clayton

filed.

Orders of the Court of Appeals denying
Petition for Rehearing with a suggestion
for rehearing in banc of appellees New
York Mercantile Exchange, Levine, Gab-
ler and Pennisi entered.

Orders of the Court of Appeals denying
Petition for Rehearing with a suggestion
for rehearing en bane of appellee Heinold
entered.

Sept.

Nov.

Dee.

Dee.

Feb.

9, 1980

JA 6

Orders of the Court of Appeals denying
Petition for Rehearing with a suggestion
for rehearing en banc of appellee Clayton
entered.

In tar Supreme Court or tHe Unirep Srates:

11, 1980

4, 1980

5, 1980

23, 1980

Petition for certiorari of New York Mer-
eantile Exchange, Levine, Gabler and
Pennisi filed (No, 80-757).

Petition for certiorari of Clayton filed
(No. 80-895).

Petition for certiorari of Heinold and
Thomson filed (No, 80-936),

Petitions for certiorari in 80-757, 80-895
and 80-936 granted and eases consol-
idated.

JA 7

Complaint in
Incomco v. New York Mercantile Exchange, et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Soutuern District or New York

Incomco, a partnership,
Plaintiff,
—against—

Tue New York Mercantite Excuance, Wayne County
Propuce Co., and Haroip CoL.ins,
Defendants.

CoMPLAINT

Plaintiff, by its attorney, complaining of defendants al-
leges as follows:

Tue Parties

1. The plaintiff Incomco is a partnership engaged in busi-
ness as a licensed futures commission merchant earning its
commissions in the trading of contracts for commodities
and commodity futures for customers. It also trades con-
tracts for commodities and commodity futures in ifs own
account. It has its office and only place of business in the
Southern District of New York.

2. The defendant The New York Mercantile Exchange
(“NYME”) is an exchange constituted and licensed pur-
suant to United States Law (Commodity Exchange Act,
7 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) as an approved contract market for the
purposes of conducting and regulating trading in various
approved contract markets one of which is potato futures.

JA 8

3. In addition to the regulation of trading the NYME
also promulgates rules on the methods of shipping and
delivery (by railroad in the potato market) attendant there-
to, and also promulgates measures to be taken by it in the
event of a default in delivery.

4. The New York Mercantile Exchange is composed of
an individual who is its President and other individuals
designated as “Members”, a number of whom are further
designated as a “Board of Governors”; the actions of The
New York Mercantile Exchange are formulated and imple-
mented through either its President or its Board of Gov-
ernors or a committee constituted by them.

5. The defendant Wayne County Produce Company
(“Wayne”) is engaged in the potato business as a grower,
exporter, shipper and merchandiser thereof in various geo-
graphic localities, and upon information and belief dealt
with potatoes which were or became subject to trading in
the markets regulated by the NYME.

6. The defendant Harold Coilins (“Collins”) is an indi-
vidual who is the principal of Wayne. Any and all of the
acts complained of against Wayne were the results of Col-
lins’ conduct.

JURISDICTION

7. The NYME on the one hand and Wayne and Collins on
the other, acting separately and also in concert with each
other have violated the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C.
1 et seq., thereby raising a federal question.

8. The NYME on the one hand and Wayne and Collins
on the other, acting separately and also in concert with each

JA 9

other have violated the U.S. Anti-Trust Laws, 15 U.S.C.
13 et seq., thereby raising a federal question.

As AND For A First Cause or
Action Acatinst ALL DEFENDANTS

9. Plaintiff was trading certain potato contracts in and
around February and March of 1976 which were due to
expire on March 5, 1976; these potato contracts (the “March
contracts”) of which there were 30 in number, representing
30 railroad cars of potatoes of 50,000 pounds each, are here-
after referred to as “The 30 Lots” or “The 30 Cars”.

10. The 30 March contracts herein had been purchased
by plaintiff as futures and delivery was taken at a price of
$7 per hundredweight. In the terminology used by traders
and the parties hereto, plaintiff then became “long cash
potatoes”. Said potatoes on which delivery was taken were
stored in the warehouse of plaintiff’s agent, in Ft. Fairfield,
Maine.

11. Subsequent thereto and in early May 1976, there were
traders and merchants and brokers and speculators who
were “short” May potato futures and were actively seeking
to purchase potatoes. Again, the terminology of the trade
regarding “shorts” are those who have sold contracts for
potatoes that they did not then own against the expectation
and necessity of buying back those contracts, hopefully at
a lower price than at which they sold their short or by
making actual delivery of the cash article to close out their
short potato contracts.

12. Plaintiff with the expectation of realizing profits on
its 30 lots by selling them those described in paragraph

JA 10

“11” supra, instructed its agent to prepare for delivery of
the 30 lots, which would have premium value because of a
shortage of deliverable grade potatoes.

13. Plaintiff through its agent had in fact agreed to sell
its potatoes to others who needed them to make delivery
against their short positions.

14. In accordance with plaintiff’s instructions its agent
ordered railroad cars on May 3, 1976 from the Bangor and
Aroostook Railroad (“B & A”) to be placed at his ware-
house in Maine for intended May delivery; the B & A is
the only railroad servicing the potato deliveries which are
the subject of this lawsuit.

15. The railroad cars were not forthcoming from B & A
for the reason that they were already loaded with potatoes
for overseas export by Wayne and Collins, who, along with
others, had physically tied up the actual railroad cars by
willfully failing to unload same or only partially unloading
same for the express purpose of blocking the availability
of railroad cars, thereby creating an artificial and manipu-
lative railroad car shortage.

16. Upon information and belief these subject railroad
ears full of potatoes for export were awaiting sea trans-
portation at Sears-Port, Maine; however, at least one ship
which appeared at Sears-Port for the purpose of loading
the said export potatoes was sent away empty and, upon
information and belief few, if any, of the alleged (export)
orders were ever actually loaded aboard ship.

17. Pursuant to its rules and regulations, the NYME has
the right to proclaim an emergency and extend the period

JA 11

for delivery of the contracts that are approved on its mar-
kets, and it has the further right to proclaim an emergency
and allow a delivery by truck rather than by railroad.

18. When plaintiff’s agent learned that the railroad cars
he had ordered from B & A were not forthcoming, he made
immediate and repeated oral demands on the NYME, on
May 10, 11, and 12, 1976, for an extension of time within
which to deliver plaintiff's 30 cars and/or for permission
to deliver the said potatoes by truck.

19. The NYME first orally indicated that it would grant
the oral demands of plaintiff’s agent, but never actually did
so; accordingly plaintiff’s agent immediately made similar
demands in writing on May 12, 13, and 14, 1976, but these
written demands were simply disregarded by the NYME.

20. In addition, to the foregoing, upon information and
belief, defendant Collins was also trading potato contracts
and was actually long potatoes during the relevant period.
At the same time Collins and others further contracted to
buy potatoes from plaintiff and from various growers and
shippers in Maine which he thereafter refused to honor and
has never honored to date.

21. Also, in addition to the foregoing, defendant Wayne
and others had signed contracts for purchase of potatoes
destined for alleged export orders but said export orders
upon information and belief never existed and said con-
tracts were dishonored. Again all in the furtherance of a
deliberate plan and conspiracy to manipulate the potato
market.

JA 12

22. Upon information and belief, several of the members
and governors of the NYME as well as their firms and
customers, were also individually long potato futures.

23. Therefore, it was in the financial interest of all de-
fendants to prevent other longs, such as plaintiff, from
delivering their potatoes and in actually acting to prevent
such delivery, both separately and/or in concert with one
another.

24. By preventing delivery of potatoes by others defen-
dants created a situation in which an improper default was
created in the delivery of potatoes against the May con-
tracts.

25. The conduct of the defendants, as aforesaid, consti-
tuted violations of the Commodity Exchange Act to the
detriment of the plaintiff.

26. As a result of the foregoing, the plaintiff has been
damaged by the defendants in an amount that cannot pres-
ently be calculated, but which is far in excess in the juris-
dictional limitation of this Court.

As AND For A Seconp Cause or
Action Acatnst Ati DerenDANTS

27. Plaintiff repeats all of the allegations of paragraphs
1.24” hereinabove as if fully set forth herein.

28. The conduct of defendants in manipulating and in
conspiring to manipulate prices of the cash potato market
constituted violations of the United States Anti-Trust Laws
to the detriment of the plaintiff.

JA 13

29. As a result of the foregoing, the plaintiff has been
damaged by the defendants in an amount that cannot be
presently calculated, but which is far in excess of the juris-
dictional limits of this Court, and said amount of damages
should be trebled in accordance with the law.

As anD For A Tuirp Cause or
Action Acatnst ALL DEFENDANTS

30. Plaintiff repeats all of the allegations of paragraphs
“97” and “28” hereof as if fully set forth herein.

31. As a result of the foregoing plaintiff should be award-
ed attorney’s fees in accordance with the law and which
may hereafter be set by the Court.

As AND For A Fourtnu Cause or
Action Acainst Derenpant NYME

32. Plaintiff repeats all of the allegations of paragraphs
“1.24” hereinabove as if fully set forth herein.

33, Pursuant to its rules and regulations, when there is
a default in delivery, the President of the NYME or a
broker appointed by him shall be required to buy in the eash
market for the account of the delinquent sellers so that the
outstanding obligations shall he fulfilled.

34, However, in addition to its obstruction of delivery as
aforesaid, defendant NYME also failed to comply with its
own regulations regarding the consequent default in de-
livery.

35. Plaintiff, in reliance ujon said regulations of the
NYME, did not sell its eash } ositions.

JA 14

36. As a result of the foregoing, the plaintiff has been
damaged by defendant NYME in an amount which cannot
be presently calculated but which is far in exeess of the
jurisdictional limit of this Court.

Wuererore, Plaintiff demands judgment as follows:

A. On the first cause of action: Money damages in an
amount to be caleulated by the Court.

B. On the second cause of action: Money damages in an
amount to be calculated by the Court and thereafter trebled.

C. On the third cause of action: The attorney’s fees of
this action that may hereafter be set by this Court.

D. On the fourth cause of action: Money damages in an
amount to be calculated by the Court.

E. The costs and disbursements of this action.
F. Such other and further relief as this Court may deem
to be proper.

Yours, ete.,

Leonarp Tosororr
Attorney for Plaintiff

17 E. 63rd Street

New York, N.Y.

(212) 838-2323

[ Affidavit of service omitted]

JA 15

Complaint in
Neil Leist, et al. v. Simplot, et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SovrHern District or New York

New, Leist, Pamie Smiru and Incomco,

Plaintiffs,
—against—

Joun Ricnarp Smmprot, J. R. Smmpror & Co., Smmp.or
Propucts Co., Inc., Smuptot Inpustries, Inc., Sura
Farms, Inc., Peter J. Taccares, P. J. Taccares & Co.,
Henry A. Poriax, Harvey B. Pottax, Harvey B. PotiaK
Company, Geratp Rarrerty, Pressner Trapine Corp., Ben-
JAMIN PressNeR, STEPHEN SuNDHEIMER, JULES NoRDLICHT,
Eperstein & Co., Inc., Cuartes Epetsters, Rosert Epev-
stein, Mure. Epersteix, Mererrecp & Company, Ivc., Gr-
pert MererFELD, Davin Meterretp, Rosert Rearvon, F. J.
Rearvon, Inc., Harotp Cotiins, Caspar Mayerson, LYNNE-
woop Exporting Company, Avex Srnciarr, MAnnine
Srotzer, Hornstower, Weeks-Hempuiti, Noyes, CLayton
BroxeraceE Co., Inc., Heryotp Com Mopities, INc., THomMson
& McKinnon Avcuincioss Koutmeyer Inc., MEX Com-
mopities, Inc., Donatp Sitver, Duane Sours, Kenneta
Ramm, A & B Farmiye, Inc., HucH Gienn, GEARHEART
Farmine, Inc., Epwaro McKay, New York Mercantice
Excnance, Ricuarp B, Levine, Howarp Gasier, ALFRED
Pennist, “Jonn” Humpureys, Frank FuLLMer,

Defendants,

JA 16

CoMPLAINT

Puatntirrs DeMANpD A Jury Tria.

Plaintiffs, by their attorneys, Batton, Srotu & Irzier,
for their complaint allege:

1. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked by virtue of the
provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C.
§¢ 1-13, the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1 and 2,
the Clayton Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §15, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331, 1337 and the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.

Parties
A. Plaintiffs:

2. Plaintiif Neil Leist is a duly licensed member of the
New York Mercantile Exchange (the “Exchange”) engaged
in the business of trading commodities and futures con-
tracts for his own account.

3. Plaintiff Incomco, a partnership, is a duly licensed
futures commissions merchant.

4, Plaintiff Philip Smith is a principal and the managing
partner of Incomco.

B. Defendants:

5. Defendant John Richard Simplot is a resident of the
State of Idaho and is a principal shareholder, officer and
controlling person of defendants J.R. Simplot and Co.,
Simplot Products Co., Inc., Simplot Industries, Inc., and
Simtag Farms, Ine.

JA 17

6. J.R. Simplot and Co., is a Nevada Corporation with
its principal place of business in Boise, Idaho. Simplot
Products Co., Ine. is a corporation with its principal place
of business in Caldwell, Idaho. Simplot Industries, Ine. is a
corporation with its principal place of business in Cald-
well, Idaho. Simtag Farm, Inc. is a corporation with its
principal place of business in the State of Washington. All
of the foregoing corporations are hereinafter referred to as
the “Simplot Corporations”. The Simplot Corporations are
engaged in the business of processing potatoes and potato
products throughout the United States.

7. Peter J. Taggares is a resident of the State of Wash-
ington and is principal controlling person of defendant P.J.
Taggares Co,

8. P.J. Taggares Co. is a sole proprietorship with its
principal place of business in Othello, Washington and is
engaged in the business of processing potatoes and potato
products throughout the United States.

9. Henry A. Pollak is a resident of the State of New
York and is a partner in Harvey B. Pollak Company.

10. Harvey B. Pollak is a resident of the State of New
York and is a partner of Harvey B. Pollak Company. Har-
vey B. Pollak at all times relevant hereto was engaged as a
Commission Agent for defendant Clayton Brokerage Co.,
Ine.

11. Harvey B. Pollak Company is engaged in the busi-
ness of acting as a broker in the sale of commodities and
commodity futures. Its business is operated by Henry A.
Pollak and Harvey B. Pollak.

JA 18

12. Gerald Rafferty is a resident of the State of New
York and is engaged in the business of trading commodity
futures.

13. Pressner Trading Corp. is a New York corporation
with its principal place of business in New York, New York
and is engaged in the business of acting as a broker in the
sale of commodities and commodity futures. It is a clearing
member of the Exchange and is registered with the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission (the “Commission”).

14. Benjamin Pressner is a resident of the State of New
York and is the principal stockholder, officer and control-
ling person of Pressner Trading Corp.

15. Stephen Sundheimer is a resident of the State of
New York and is engaged in the business of trading com-
modity futures and is an officer of Pressner Trading Corp.

16. Jules Nordlicht is a resident of the State of New
York and is engaged in the business of trading commodity
futures and is an officer of Pressner Trading Corp.

17. Edelstein & Co., Inc. is a New York corporation with
its principal offices at 6 Harrison Street, New York, New
York and is engaged in the business as a broker in the sale
of commodities and commodity futures. It is a clearing
member of the Exchange and is registered with the Com-
mission.

18. Charles Edelstein is a resident of the State of New
York and is a principal officer, stockholder and controlling
person of Edelstein & Co., Ine.

JA 19

19. Robert Edelstein is a resident of the State of New
York and is a principal officer, stockholder and controlling
person of Edelstein & Co., Inc.

20. Muriel Edelstein is a resident of the State of New
York and is a principal officer, stockholder and controlling
person of Edelstein & Co., Inc.

21. Meierfeld & Company, Inc. is a New York corpora-
tion with its principal place of business in New York, New
York and is engaged in business as a broker for the sale of
commodities and commodity futures. It is a clearing mem-
ber of the Exchange and is registered with the Commission.

22. Gilbert Meierfeld is a resident of the State of New
York and is a principal officer, stockholder and controlling
person of Meierfeld & Company, Inc.

23. David Meierfeld is a resident of the State of New
York and is a principal officer, stockholder and controlling
person of Meierfeld & Company, Inc.

24. F. J. Reardon, Ine, is a New York corporation with
its principal place of business in New York, New York and
is engaged in business as a broker in the sale of commod-
ities and commodity futures. It is a clearing member of the
Exchange and is registered with the Commission.

25. Robert Reardon is a resident of the State of Massa-
chusetts and is a principal officer, stockholder and con-
trolling person of F. J. Reardon, Ince.

26. Harold Collins is a resident of the State of Maine and
is engaged in business &s a trader in potato futures, and as
a potato merchant.

JA 20

27. Caspar Mayerson is a resident of the State of Maine
and is engaged in business as a potato merchant and futures
trader.

28. Lynnewood Exporting Company is a partnership or
unincorporated association with its principal place of busi-
ness in the State of New York and was engaged in the busi-
ness of exporting potatoes and buying and selling potato
futures.

29. Alex Sinclair is a resident of the State of Idaho and
is engaged in business as a potato merchant and futures
trader.

30. Manning Stoller is a resident of the State of Massa-
chusetts and is engaged in business as sales representative.

31. Hornblower, Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes, is a Delaware
corporation with its principal offices at 8 Hanover Street,
New York, New York and is engaged in business among
other things, as a broker in connection with the sale of
commodities and commodity futures. It is a clearing mem-
ber of the Exchange and is registered with the Commission.

32. Clayton Brokerage Co., Inc. is a Missouri corporation
with its principal place of business at St. Louis, Missouri
and is engaged in business as a broker in connection with
the sale of commodities and commodity futures. It is a
clearing member of the Exchange and is registered with
the Commission.

33. Heinold Commodities, Inc. is a New York corporation
with its principal place of business at 74 Pearl Street, New
York, New York and is engaged in business as a broker in

JA 21

connection with the sale of commodities and commodity
futures, It is a clearing member of the Exchange and is
registered with the Commission.

34. Thomson & McKinnon Auchincloss Kohlmeyer Ine.
is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of busi-
ness at 1 New York Plaza, New York, New York, and is
engaged in business as a broker in connection with the sale
of commodities and commodity futures. It is a clearing
member of the Exchange and is registered with the Com-
mission.

35. MFX Commodities, Inc. is a foreign corporation with
its principal place of business in Maine and is engaged in
business as a commodity futures commission merchant.

36. Donald Silver is a resident of the State of Maine and
is engaged in business as a commodity futures trader and
salesman and officer of MF X Commodities, Inc.

37. Duane South is a resident of the State of Idaho and
is engaged in business as a commodity trader.

38. Kenneth Ramm is a resident of the State of Washing-
ton and is engaged in business as a potato merchant.

39. A & B Farming, Inc. is a foreign corporation with its
principal place of business in Washington State and is
engaged in business as a potato trader and merchant.

40. Hugh Glenn is a resident of the State of Washington
and is a principal officer, stockholder and controlling per-
son of A & B Farming, Inc.

JA 22

41. Gearheart Farming, Inc. is a Washington corpora-
tion with its principal place of business in the State of
Washington and is engaged in business as a potato grower
and merchant.

42. Edward McKay is a resident of the State of Wash-
ington and is a principal officer, stockholder and controlling
person of Gearheart Farming, Ine.

43. The Exchange is a New York corporation with its
principal place of business in New York City and is a desig-
nated contract market pursuant to Section 7 of the Com-
modity Exchange Act.

44, Richard B. Levine is a resident of the State of New
York and is President of the Exchange.

45. Howard Gabler is a resident of the State of New
York and is Vice-President of the Exchange.

46. Alfred Pennisi is a resident of the State of New York
and is Compliance Officer of the Exchange.

47. “John” Humphreys is a resident of the State of Idaho
and is engaged in the business as a salesman for Clayton
Brokerage Co.

48. Frank Fullmer is a resident of the State of Idaho and
is engaged in business as an officer and employee of J.R.
Simplot & Co.

C. Background:

49. Maine potatoes are a “commodity” as that term is
defined in the Commeuity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §1 et

JA 23

seq. (the “Act”) traded and shipped in interstate com-
merce as are contracts for the future delivery of Maine
potatoes, Such contracts are regularly bought and sold in
interstate commerce and on the Exchange subject to the
Act and the charter, by-laws and rules of the Exchange.

50. A purchaser or seller of potato futures in effect,
enters into a contract to either buy or sell potatoes on a
fixed delivery date at an agreed upon purchase price. The
future contracts are bought and sold at prices which vary
in accordance with many factors including the availability
of the commodity, weather conditions, ete. Generally the
full purchase price on a contract is not payable until the
conclusion of trading on the date of delivery but a margin
or cash deposit of approximately 10% is required at the
time of purchase.

51. Potato futures contracts are standardized, each con-
tract requiring delivery of 50,000 pounds of a specified
quality of Maine potatoes at a predetermined location. The
contract quantity is approximately that which is required
to fill a railear and is generally referred to as a carload.
Prices are quoted in dollars per C.W.T. or cents per pound,

52. Delivery under futures contracts for potatoes are
also standardized. The potatoes are deliverable in certain
months during the year. The potato futures involved in this
action required delivery in March, April and May, 1976 and
are referred to herein as the Maine Futures.

53. Trading in Maine Futures commenced on or about
Febrvary 18, 1975 with the March futures expiring March
5, 1976, the April futures on April 7, 1976 and the May
futures on May 7, 1976. Actual delivery or acceptance of

JA 24

delivery for May Maine Futures pursuant to such contracts
was required to take place between May 7, 1976 and May
25, 1976. In lieu of making delivery, short sales and long
sales could be offset against each other by buying or selling
futures on or before the last trading day.

54. Simplot and the Simplot Companies are responsible
for the processing of approximately 50% of all Idaho
potato products processed and sold in the United States.

55. Taggares and P. J. Taggares & Co. are responsible
for the processing of approximately 30% of all Washington
potato products processed and sold in the United States.

56. In connection with their activities, Simplot, the Sim-
plot Companies, Taggares and P. J. Taggares & Co., are
the largest purchasers of potatoes throughout Washington,
Idaho and Oregon. By virtue of their position in the potato
processing field and the quantity of potatoes purchased by
them, defendants Simplot, the Simplot Companies, Tag-
gares and P. J. Taggares & Co. would be in a position to
control] the prices paid for potatoes but for the existence
of the Exchange and the activity of merchants, farmers,
processors, brokers and traders in buying and selling potato
futures contracts. The existence of the Exchange provides
an auction market for potatoes and potato futures which
thereby determines fair prices.

57. During the period of January through May 1976
various of the defendants and particularly Simplot, the
Simplot Companies, Taggares and P. J. Taggares Co. made
short sales of substantial quantities of potato futures.

JA 25

As AND For A First Cram Acatnst DEFENDANTS JOHN
Ricuwarp Smptort, J. R. Siupior & Co., Peter J. Taa-
cares, P. J. Taccares Co., Henry A. Potiak, Harvey
B. Potiax, Harvey B. Potuak Company, Pressner
Trapinc Corp., BENJAMIN Pressner, STEPHEN Sunp-
HEIMER, JuLES Norpuicut, Epristerixn & Co., Inc.,
Cartes Epetstern, Mererretp & Company, Inc., Gtt-
BERT MEIERFELD, Davin Meterrety, F. J. Rearpon, Inc.,
Rosert Rearvon, Haroup Coins, Caspar Mayerson,
LynNewoop Exrortinc Company, ALEx Stxciam, Eman-
VEL Sto.tuerR, Hornstower, Weeks-Hempuiy, Noyes,
Cuayton Brokerace Co., Inc., Heryoitp Commopittes,
Inc., Toomson & McKinnon Avucurncioss Kon uMeEYer
Inc., MFX Commnoprttrs, Inc., Donatp Sriver, Duane
Soutn, Kennetu Ramm, A & B Farmriye, Inc., Huan
Guenn, GearHeart I .rminc, Inc., Epwarn McKay,
“JoHn” Humpureys, Frank FviuMer.

58. From on or about December 1, 1975 up to and includ-
ing June 30, 1976 in the Southern District of New York and
elsewhere, the defendants John Richard Simplot, J. R.
Simplot & Co., Peter J. Taggares, P. J. Taggares Co.,
Henry A. Pollak, Harvey B. Pollak, Harvey B. Pollak
Company, Pressner Trading Corp., Benjamin Pressner,
Stephen Sundheimer, Jules Nordlicht, Edelstein & Co., Inc.,
Charles Edelstein, Meierfeld & Company, Inc., Gilbert
Meierfeld, David Meierfeld, «. J. Reardon, Inc., Robert
Reardon, Harold Collins, Caspar Mayerson, Lynnewood
Exporting Company, Alex Sinclair, Emanuel Stoller, Horn-
blower, Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes, Clayton Brokerage Co.,
Ine., Heinold Commodities, Inc., Thomson & MeKinnon
Auchincloss Kohlmeyer Inc.. MFX Commodities, Inc.,
Donald Silver, Duane South, Kenneth Ramm, A & B Farm-
ing, Inc., Hugh Glenn, Gearheart Farming, Inc., Edward

JA 26

McKay, “John” Humphreys, Frank Fullmer and others to
the plaintiffs presently unknown did unlawfully, willfully,
knowingly and maliciously combine, conspire, confederate
and agree, together and with each other to commit viola-
tions of Federal law, to wit violations of Title 7 U.S.C.
§§ 1 through 13.

59. It was part of said conspiracy that the above named
defendants and their co-conspirators would unlawfully,
willfully, and knowingly and maliciously in connection with
the purchase and sale of Maine Futures by the use of means
and instruments of transportation and communication in
interstate commerce and by the use of the mails, directly
and indirectly, employed devices, schemes and artifices to
defraud and engaged in transactions, practices and courses
of business which would and did operate as a fraud and
deceit upon purchasers and sellers of Maine Futures.

60. It was further a part of said conspiracy that the de-
fendants and their co-conspirators unlawfully, willfully,
knowingly and maliciously, in connection with the purchase
and sale of Maine Futures, directly and indirectly, by the
use of means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce
and the mails, used and employed manipulative devices and
contrivances in violation of Title 7 U.S.C. §13 and Rules
promulgated by the Commission.

61. It was further a part of the conspiracy that in order
to reduce or eliminate any losses on their short sales, de-
fendants conspired to and did manipulate the market price
of Maine Futures for the purpose of creating an artificially
low price for such Maine Futures.

JA 27

62. Among the means by which defendants carried out
the conspiracy were the following:

(a) Defendants Simplot, Taggares and their co-con-
spirators sold short and caused to be sold short Maine
Futures despite their knowledge that there were in-
sufficient quantities of such potatoes available to sat-
isfy their contracts and despite their knowledge of the
fact that there were insufficient railroad cars available
to make delivery of the potatoes even if they were
successful in purchasing such potatoes.

(b) In order to protect their short positions in
Maine Futures by depressing the price of potatoes
defendants and their co-conspirators shipped unsold
Idaho potatoes to the market in large quantities for
immediate sale and transferred or caused to be trans-
ferred carloads of potatoes from market to market and
offered them for immediate sale at the going eash price,
at a time when there were no buyers available.

(c) Although they knew that there were insufficient
Maine potatoes available to fill their short sales and
that there were insufficient ears available to deliver the
potatoes which were required to satisfy their obliga-
tions under their short contracts, defendants failed and
refused to enter liquidating orders for approximately
1911 Maine Futures contracts,

(d) Defendants Simplot and Taggares and their co-
conspirators refused to offset any of their short sales
of Maine Futures against existing long contracts for
Maine Futures as a result of which, since they were
unable to make delivery of potatoes under their con-
tracts, they defaulted or caused defaults under con-

JA 28

tracts involving at least 1911 carloads of Maine
potatoes.

(e) Defendants Simplot and Taggares and their co-
conspirators failed to report or caused the brokers who
handled their short sales of Maine Futures to fail to
report to the Commission violations of the Act, the
Rules and Regulations of the Commission, and the By-
Laws, Rules and Regulations of the Exchange and con-
cealed or caused to be concealed such violations from
the Commission.

(f) Defendants Simplot, Taggares, Reardon and
their co-conspirators sold or caused to be sold Maine
Futures in concert with each other at times and for
prices which were prearranged to have the maximum
impact on the market.

(g) The defendant brokers failed and neglected to
enter liquidating orders for Maine Futures on or be-
fore May 7, 1976 with respect to accounts which main-
tained short positions even though they knew that such
short positions could not be covered and that there
would be a default if the accounts were not closed out.

(h) Defendant brokers permitted the short sales of
Maine Futures to be made and cooperated in making
such short sales although they knew or should have
known that the sellers did not intend to and would be
unable to cover such short positions.

63. As a result of the foregoing, the price of Maine
Futures was artificially lowered, resulting in damages to
the plaintiff Philip Smith in the amount of $400,000, to the
plaintiff Incomeo in the amount of $400,000, and to the
plaintiff Neil Leist in the amount of $500,000.

JA 29

As AND For A Seconp Ciaim Acatnst DereNDANTS JOHN
Ricuarp Simptot, J. R. Stmprot & Co., Peter J. Tac-
cares, P. J. Taccares Co., Henry A. Pouiak, Harvey
B. Potnax, Harvey B. Potnak Company, Pressner
Trapinc Corp., Benzamin Pressner, STEPHEN SunpD-
HEIMER, JuLES Norpuicut, Epersteixn & Co., Inc.,
Cuartes Epetstern, Mererretp & Company, Inc., Gr-
BERT MererFeLp, Davin Meterrecn, F’, J. Rearvon, Inc.,
Rosert Rearpon, Harotp Coiiins, Caspar Mayerson,
Avex Srvciar, Emanvet Sroiier, Hornsiower,
Weexks-Hempuitt, Noyes, Cuaytron Brokerace Co.,
Inc., Heryotp Commopitirs, INc., Toomson & McKry-
won Avcuincitoss Kontmeyer Inc., MFX Commop-
ites, Inc., DonaLtp Sitver, Duane Sourn, Kenneru
Ramo, A & B Farmine, Inc., HucH Guenn, Gearnearr
Farmine, Inc., Eowarp McKay, “Joun” Humpnreys,
Frank Fuutetmer.

64. From on or about December 1, 1975 up to and in-
cluding June 30, 1976, in the Southern District of New
York and elsewhere the defendants John Richard Simplot,
J. R. Simplot & Co., Peter J. Taggares, P. J. Taggares Co.,
Henry A. Pollak, Harvey B. Pollak, Harvey B. Pollak Com-
pany, Pressner Trading Corp., Benjamin Pressner, Stephen
Sundheimer, Jules Nordlicht, Edelstein & Co., Inc., Charles
Edelstein, Meierfeld & Company, Inc., Gilbert Meierfeld,
David Meierfeld, F. J. Reardon, Inc., Robert Reardon,
Harold Collins, Caspar Mayerson, Alex Sinclair, Emanuel
Stoller, Hornblower, Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes, Clayton
Brokerage Co., Ine., Heinold Commodities, Ine., Thomson
& McKinnon Auchincloss Kohlmeyer Ine., MFX Com-
modities, Inc., Donald Silver, Duane South, Kenneth Ramm,
A & B Farming, Inc., Hugh Glenn, Gearheart Farming,
Inc., Edward McKay, “John” Humphreys, Frank Fullmer

JA 30

and others to the plaintiffs presently unknown, did unlaw-
fully, willfully, knowingly and maliciously combine, con-
spire, confederate and agree together and with each other
to commit violations of Federal Law to wit violations of
Title 15 U.S.C. §§1 and 2.

65. It was part of said conspiracy that the above named
defendants and their co-conspirators would unlawfully,
willfully, knowingly and maliciously in connection with the
purchase and sale of May Futures and Maine potatoes
agree to and take steps to restrain trade and commerce
among the several states and with foreign nations.

66. It was further a part of said conspiracy that the
above named defendants and their co-conspirators would
unlawfully, willfully, knowingly and maliciously monopolize
and attempt to monopolize trade and commerce in May
Futures and Maine potatoes among the several states and
with foreign nations.

67. It was further a part of said conspiracy that the
defendants and their co-conspirators unlawfully, willfully,
knowingly and maliciously would seek to destroy the Ex-
change as a factor in the trading of future contracts for the
purchase of potatoes in the future and thereby to eliminate
all competition in the marketplace for the purchase and
sale of potatoes, thereby providing for the defendants and
their co-conspirators a monopoly position in connection
with the acquisition of potatoes,

68. Among the means by which defendants carried out
the conspiracy were the following:

(a) Defendants Simplot, Taggares and _ their , co-
conspirators sold short and caused to be sold short

JA 31

May Futures despite their knowledge that there were
insufficient quantities of such potatoes available to
satisfy their contracts and despite their knowledge of
the fact that there were insufficient railroad ears avail-
able to make delivery of the potatoes even if they were
successful in purchasing such potatoes.

(b) Defendants Simplot, Taggares and their co-
conspirators, in order to depress the cash market price
of potatoes in New York, shipped unsold Idaho pota-
toes to the market in large quantities for immediate
sale.

(c) Defendants Simplot, Taggares and their co-
conspirators transferred or caused to be transferred
from market to market and offered for immediate sale
at the going cash price, carloads of potatoes at a time
when there were no buyers available.

(d) Although they knew that there were insufficient
Maine potatoes available to fill their short sales and
that there were insufficient cars available to deliver the
potatoes which were required to satisfy their obliga-
tions under their short contracts, defendants Simplot,
Taggares and their co-conspirators failed and refused
to enter liquidating orders for a total of 1911 Maine
Futures contracts.

(e) Defendants refused to set their short sales of
May Futures against existing long contracts for May
Futures as a result of which, since they were unable
to make delivery of potatoes under their contracts,
they defaulted or caused defaults under contracts in-
volving at least 1911 carloads of Maine potatoes.

(f) Defendants failed to report or caused the
brokers who handled their short sales of Maine Futures

JA 32

to fail to report to the Commission violations of the
Act, the Rules and Regulations of the Commission, and
the By-Laws, Rules and Regulations of the Exchange
and concealed or caused to be concealed such violations
from the Commission,

(g) The defendant brokers failed and neglected to
enter liquidating orders for Maine Futures on or be-
fore May 7, 1976 with respect to accounts which main-
tained short positions even though they knew that such
short positions could not be covered and that there —
would be a default if the accounts were not closed out.

(h) Defendant brokers permitted the short sales of
Maine Futures to be made and cooperated in making
such short sales although they knew or should have
known that the sellers did not intend to and would be
unable to cover such short positions,

69, As a result of the foregoing acts of the defendants
and their co-conspirators plaintiffs have sustained substan-
tial damages and are entitled to recover three-fold the dam-
ages sustained by them together with the costs of this
action including a reasonable attorney’s fee,

As aANp ror A Tromp CLaim Acarnst Derenpants Ropert
Rearvon, F. J. Rearvon, Inc., Harotp Cours, Caspar
Mayerson, Lynnewoop Exprortina Company, ALEx
Srxcuair, Mannine Srotier and Hornstower, Weexs-
Hempniw, Noyes.

70. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allega-
tion contained in paragraphs 58 through 62, and 64 through
68.

JA 33

‘.

71. Defendants with knowledge of the existence of the
conspiracies alleged above for purposes of personally pro-
fiting from the existence of the conspiracy simultaneously
with their participation in the aforementioned conspiracy
entered into a conspiracy of their own to commit violations
of federal law, to wit violations of Title 7, United States
Code §§ 1 through 13. Such conspiracy occurred within the
Southern District of New York and elsewhere during the
period December 1, 1975 through June 30, 1976,

72. It was part of said conspiracy that simultaneously
with participating with and assisting the co-conspirators
named in the First and Second Causes of Action herein in
the short sale of Maine Futures, defendants would purchase
or cause to be purchased potatoes and Maine Future for
the purpose of creating an artificially high price in the
market. It was further a part of said conspiracy that de-
fendants would purchase or cause to be purchased, potatoes
and Maine Futures although they did not have sufficient
resources to meet their contract obligations.

73. It was further a part of such conspiracy that the
brokers for whom such purchases were made would permit
the purchases to be made on credit with full knowledge that
defendants who were making the purchases or their agents
did not have the resources to meet their obligations.

74. The acts of defendants were done willfully, knowingly
and maliciously.

75. As a result of the foregoing acts of the defendants,
plaintiffs have sustained damages in excess of $400,000,

JA 34

As AnD ror A Fourrn Cuaim Acainst Derenpants New
York Mercantize Excuance, Ricuarp B. Levine,
Howarp Gasver and Autrrep Pewnist.

76. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allega-
tion contained in paragraphs 58 through 62, 64 through 68.

77. Defendant Exchange was required by law to regulate
activities of brokers and traders in the trading of com-
modities on the New York Mercantile Exchange and specif-
ically, trading in Maine Futures.

78. The activities of the defendant Exchange were the
responsibility of the defendants Levine, Gabler and Pennisi
as the President, Vice President and Compliance Officer
respectively of the Exchange.

79. Defendants Exchange and Levine, Gabler and Pen-
nisi negligently failed to maintain an orderly market for
trading in Maine Futures in violation of the duties imposed
upon them under tke provisions of the Act.

80. Defendant Exchange and Levine, Gabler and Pennisi
failed and neglected to report violations of the Act and the
Rules and Regulations of the Commission and the By-Laws,
Rules and Regulations of the Exchange.

81. Defendant Exchange and Levine, Gabler and Pennisi
failed and neglected to direct the entry of liquidating
orders for the Maine Futures which had been sold short for
the accounts of members with net short positions, on or
before May 7, 1976 although they knew or should have
known that the sellers of Maine Futures would not and
could not make delivery under their agreement.

JA 35

82. The defendant Exchange and the defendants Levine,
Gabler and Pennisi failed and neglected to exercise due
care in policing activities of traders and brokers in con-
nection with the purchase and sale of Maine Futures and
thereby failed to prevent the manipulative practices by the
various other defendants named in this complaint and their
co-conspirators.

83. As a result of the foregoing, plaintiffs have each been
injured and have sustained damages in excess of $400,000.

Wuenrerore, it is respectfully requested that plaintiffs
have judgment as follows:

On the First Claim

To the plaintiff Leist in the amount of $500,000 together
with punitive damages, interest according to law and the
costs of the action.

To the plaintiff Smith in the amount of $400,000 together
with punitive damages, with interest according to law and
the costs of this action.

To the plaintiff Incomeo in the amount of $00,000 [sic]
together with punitive damages, with interest according to
law and the costs of this action.

On the Second Claim

To the plaintiff Leist in the amount of $1,500,000 together
with interest according to law, reasonable attorneys fees
and the costs of this action.

To the plaintiff Smith in the amount of $1,200,000 to-
gether with interest according to law, reasonable attorneys
fees and the costs of this action.

To the plaintiff Incomco in the amount of $1,200,000 to-
gether with interest according to law, reasonable attorneys
fees and the costs of this action.

JA 36

On the Third Claim

To the plaintiff Leist in the amount of $500,000 together
with interest according to law, punitive damages and the
costs of this action.

To the plaintiff Smith in the amount of $400,000 together
with interest according to law, punitive damages and the
costs of this action.

To the plaintiff Incomco in the amount of $400,000 to-
gether with interest according to law, punitive damages and
the costs of this action.

On the Fourth Claim

To the plaintiff Leist in the amount of $500,000 together
with interest according to law, punitive damages and the
costs of this action.

To the plaintiff Smith in the amount of $400,000 together
with interest according to law, punitive damages and the
costs of this action.

To the plaintiff Incomeo in the amount of $400,000 to-
gether with interest according to law, punitive damages and
the costs of this action.

Baton, Stout & Irzter

IF xsconeptapassecsasiciauminuniauiaaiecs
Morton S. Rosson

Office and P.O. Address

1180 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036
(212) 575-7900

[ Affidavit of service omitted]

JA 37

First Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint in
National Super Spuds, Inc., et al. v. New York Mercantile
Exchange, et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5 8)
SoutTHerN District or New York

Nationa, Super Spups, Inc., Wiiuiam R. Buster, Jr., WiL-
LARD C, Suiner, Evcene P. Weisman, Ricnarp We ts,
Raymond Rotuserc, Artuur S. Armstrone, THEODORE
Brrinek, Capcarn Howpinas, Inc., and Herz RomMincer,
individually and on behalf of all persons similarly situ-
ated,

Plaintiffs,
—against—

New York MercantILeE Excuance; Crayton BrokeracE Co.
or Sr. Louis, Inc.; Heryotp Commopitirs, Inc.; THom-
son & McKinnon Avcuinctoss Kontmeyer Ine.;
PressNerR Trapinc Corp.; Jack Ricnarp Srmpror; J. R.
Srmptor Co.; Simpnior Inpustries, Inc.; Peter J. Tac-
cares; P, J. Taccares Co.; C. L. Orrer; Srmtac Farms;
Kenneta Ramm; A & B Farms, Inc.; Hucn V. Gren:
GearHeart Farmine, Inc. and Ep McKay,

Defendants.

First AMENDED ConsouipatTep CLass Action CoMPLAINT

76 Civ, 2375 (LFM)
76 Civ. 2554 (LFM)
76 Civ. 2571 (LFM)
76 Civ. 2594 (LFM)

Plaintiffs, by their attorneys, for their first amended con-
solidated class action complaint, allege :

JA 38

I. JurRispicTION AND VENUE

First: This action arises under the Commodity Exchange
Act of 1922, as amended, 7 U.S.C. §1 et. seq. (“the Com-
modity Act”), the rules and regulations of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) 17 C.F.R. §1.1
et. seq., the Charter, By-Laws and Rules adopted by the
defendant New York Mercantile Exchange (“Exchange”)
and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, §1 ef. seq. (“the Sherman
Act”).

Second; Jurisdiction of this action to recover damages
is based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1337; and 44 of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 15.

Third: (a) The commodity transactions complained of
took place within the jurisdiction of the United States
Court for the Southern District of New York, and each of
the defendants is found in and/or participated in business
activities relevant to this action within said district.

(b) The acts complained of herein occurred in interstate
commerce and were accomplished through the use of the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce.

TI. Parties

Fourth: Each of the named plaintiffs purchased May
1976 Maine Potato Future Contracts (“Contract” or “Con-
tracts”) on the Exchange and was damaged in liquidating
said Contracts between April 13, 1976 and the close of
trading on the Exchange on May 7, 1976.

Fifth: Defendant Exchange is a corporation organized
and existing pursuant to the laws of the State of New York,

JA 39

having its principal place of business at 6 Harrison Street,
New York, New York, and is a “contract market” desig-
nated pursuant to § 5 of the Commodity Act (7 U.S.C. §7)
through which transactions for the future delivery of com-
modities may be consummated.

Sith: (a) Defendant Clayton Brokerage Co. of St.
Louis, Ine. (“Clayton”), Heinold Commodities, Inc. (“Hei-
nold”), and Thomson & McKinnon Auchincloss Kohl-
meyer Ine. (“Thomson & McKinnon”), corporations who
have places of business at, respectively, 1 World Trade
Center, New York, New York, 74 Pearl Street, New York,
New York, and One New York Plaza, New York, New York,
are members of the Exchange, members of the Exchange’s
Clearing House, and are also “members of a contract mar-
ket” and “futures commissions merchants” as these terms
are defined in the Commodity Act. At the close of trading
on the Exchange on May 7, 1976, Clayton, Heinold and
Thomson & McKinnon all had accounts that held a short
position in the Contract.

(b) Defendant Pressner Trading Corp. (“Pressner”), a
corporation, with a place of business at 6 Harrison Street,
New York, New York, is a member of the Exchange, a mem-
ber of the Exchange’s Clearing House, and is also a “mem-
ber of a contract market” and “futures commissions mer-
chants” as these terms are defined in the Commodity Act.
At the close of trading on the Exchange on May 7, 1976,
Pressner had accounts that held a short position in the
Contract.

(c) Defendants Clayton, Heinold, Thomson & McK
non and Pressner are hereinafter collectively referred to
as “the Members”.

JA 40

Seventh: (a) Defendant Jack Richard Simplot (“Sim-
plot”) is an individual residing in the State of Idaho. He
conducts business through defendant, J. R. Simplot Co., a
Nevada corporation which has its principal place of busi-
ness in Boise, Idaho, and through defendant, Simplot In-
dustries, Inc., a Utah corporation which has its principal
place of business in the State of Idaho.

(b) Defendant C. L. Otter (“Otter”) is an individual and
and citizen and resident of the State of Idaho. Otter is the
Vice-President of defendant Simplot Industries, Ine. and
is the son-in-law of defendant Simplot.

(ec) Defendant Peter J, Taggares (“Taggares”) is an
individual residing in the State of Washington. He con-
ducts business through a corporation known as P. J. Tag-
gares Co., which defendant has its principal place of busi-
ness in Othello, Washington.

(d) Defendant Simtag Farms is a partnership between
Simplot and Taggares, having its principal place of busi-
ness located in Boardam, Oregon.

(e) Defendants Kenneth Ramm (“Ramm”), Hugh V.
Glenn (“Glenn”) and Ed McKay (“McKay”) are all indi-
viduals residing in Othello, Washington. Defendant A & B
Farms, Ine. (“A & B”) and defendant Gearheart Farming,
Ine. (“Gearheart”) are both Washington corporations, with
their principal place of business located in Othello, Wash-
ington.

(f) Defendants Simplot, Otter. J. R. Simplot Co., Sim-
plot Industries, Inc., Peter .J. Taggares, P. J. Taggares Co.,
Simtag Farms, Ramm, Glenn, McKay, A & B and Gear-

JA 41

heart are hereinafter collectively referred to as the “Short
Sellers”.

III. Puarntirrs’ Ciass ALLEGATIONS

Eighth: Plaintiffs bring their action as a class action
pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure on behalf of themselves and all other persons
who held a net long position in Contracts and who liqui-
dated their long positions in said Contract between April
13, 1976 and the close of trading on the Exchange on May
7, 1976.

Ninth: Plaintiffs do not know the exact size of the class
but believe the numerosity of the members of the elass is
so great that, coupled with the fact that members are locat-
ed throughout the United States, it is impracticable to bring
them all before the Court.

Tenth: The questions of fact and law common to all
members of the class include:

(a) Whether the Short Sellers, individnally or in eon-
cert, engaged in manipulative practices which were de-
signed to artificially lower the trading price of the Contract
in violation of § 4b (7 U.S.C. (6) and/or 49 [7 U.S.C. 413
(b)] of the Commodity Act and 41 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. §1, ineluding, but not limited to:

(i) From at least as early as April 13, 1976, through
May 7, 1976, acting in unison to sell short additional
Contracts at any price in order to depress the market
price of said Contracts.

(ii) From at least as early as April 13, 1976, through
May 7, 1976, acting in unison by shipping large quanti-

JA 42

ties of unsold Idaho potatoes to the East by “roller
cars” or otherwise in order to reduce the “spot price”
for Maine potatoes and thereby artificially depress the
market price of said Contract.

(iii) From at least as early as April 13, 1976,
through May 7, 1976, acting in unison by failing and
refusing to liquidate their Contracts on or before May
7, 1976.

(b) Whether the Members engaged in manipulative prac-
tices which were designed to artificially lower the trading
price of the Contract in violation of ‘4b (7 U.S.C. §6)
and/or §9 [7 U.S.C. §3(b)] of the Commodity Act and 41
of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §1?

(ce) Whether the Exchange is liable for the manipulative
practices of Short Sellers and/or Members in artificially
lowering the trading price of the Contract by failing to
enforce its Charter, By-Laws and Rules in violation of
§5a(8) of the Commodity Act [7 U.S.C. §7a(8) and §1.53
of the rules and regulations of the CFTC (17 C.F.R. §1.53)]
and in failing to use due diligence as required by §1.51 of
the rules and regulations of the CFTC (17 C.F.R. $1.51)
to secure compliance with the Commodity Act and its own
Charter, By-Laws and Rules?

(d) Whether Short Sellers and/or Members entered
into short sales of the Contract in excess of the trading
limits imposed by §150.10 of the rules and regulations of
the CFTC (17 C.F.R. (150.10), thereby artificially lowering
the trading price of the Contract?

(e) Whether the Exchange and its Members are liable
for failing to enforce the trading limits imposed by $150.10

JA 43

of the rules and regulations of the CFTC (17 C.F.R.
§150.10), with respect to short sales of the Contract?

(f) Whether there was a violation of §44.02 of the Char-
ter, By-Laws and Rules of the Exchange by Members in
failing to place liquidating orders for customers with a
short position in the Contract?

(g) Whether Short Sellers who failed to liquidate their
short positions in the Contract on or before the final day
of trading when they were not in a position to fulfill their
contractual obligation to deliver, engaged in a manipulative
practice in violation of §4b of the Commodity Act (7 U.S.C.
§6b) and/or §9b of the Commodity Act [7 U.S.C. §13(b)]
thereby artificially lowering the trading price of the Con-
tract?

(h) Whether the Exchange is liable for the failure of
the Members to place liquidating orders for short positions
held in the Contract?

These common questions of law and fact predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members of
the class. The only uncommon question is the actual dollar
amount of damage to which each class member is entitled.

Eleventh: The claims of plaintiffs are typical of the
claims of all members of the class. All members of the
class have an identical interest in seeking damages for the
claims alleged herein. The damages suffered by plaintiffs
insure that they will be sufficiently motivated to adequately
and fairly represent the members of the class. Moreover,
plaintiffs’ counsel are experienced in the class action and
anti-trust fields lending to the fair and adequate repre-
sentation of the class,

JA 44

Twelfth: (a) This class action is superior to other avail-
able methods for fair and efficient adjudication of this con-
troversy in that the interest of the individual members of
the class (the amount of damages individually suffered)
are small in comparison with the expense involved in the
vindication of these interests so that the maintenance of
individual actions is impractical and a class action repre-
sents the only effective method.

(b) It is desirable to concentrate the litigation in the
forum in which many of the acts and practices relevant
to the claim of the class occurred and in which the Ex-
change is located. No difficulties of management are likely
to be encountered, particularly since individual transac-
tions of class members can be documented by records re-
quired to be maintained and filed pursuant to the Com-
modity Act.

IV. Facts

Thirteenth: Maine grown potatoes are a commodity reg-
ularly bought and sold for future delivery subject to the
Charter, By-Laws and Rules of the Exchange. Contracts
for future delivery of Maine potatoes (commonly known
as “potato futures”) have been and are regularly bought
and sold in interstate commerce. These potato futures are
standardized in that each Contract calls for delivery of a
fixed quantity of 50,000 pounds, sometimes referred to as a
carload, of a specified quality of Maine potatoes at a pre-
determined location. Prices are quoted in dollars per hun-
dred weight (“ewt”) or cents per pound. The times of
delivery are also standardized. Potato futures are deliver-

JA 45

able in certain months during the year. This action in-
volves potato futures that were deliverable in May, 1976,
also known as the May 1976 Maine Potatoes Future Con-
tract (“Contract”). When one buys or sells May potato
futures, one enters into a Contract to buy or sell potatoes
deliverable in May at a price agreed upon on the purchase
date. Prices quoted on the Exchange are supposed to repre-
sent, and usually represent, genuine transactions, and as
the quoted price rises or falls, the buyers and sellers have
unrealized profits or losses in their futures. The full pur-
chase price is not payable until the conclusion of trading
(i.e., May 7, 1976 in this ease), but buyers and sellers are
required to post a cash deposit, or margin (approximately
10% of the total price), when they make the trade.

Fourteenth: Trading on or through the Exchange for the
1975 crop of Maine grown potatoes was conducted for Con-
tracts providing for delivery in November, 1975, March,
1976, April, 1976 and May, 1976, with the last of the 1975
Maine potato crop being delivered pursuant to the May
Contract.

Fifteenth: Trading in the May 1976 Maine Potato Fu-
ture Contract (also referred to herein as the “Contract”),
commenced on or about February 18, 1975 and, pursuant
to § 51.01 of the Charter, By-Laws and Rules of the Ex-
change, trading closed on May 7, 1976.

Sixteenth: During the period of February 18, 1975
through May 7, 1976, plaintiffs and the members of the class
bought one or more Contracts (50,000 Ibs.) of May 1976
Maine Potato Futures, thereby holding net long positions.

JA 46

Seventeenth: Throughout its trading, the Contract had
a wide price fluctuation reflected by a low of $5.92 per ewt
($.0592 per pound) and a high of $19.15 per ewt ($.1915 per
pound), with a closing price on May 7, 1976 of $8.70 per ewt
($.087 per pound).

Eighteenth: April 7, 1976 was the last day of trading for
the April 1976 Maine Potato Future Contract. At the close
of business on the Exchange on April 7, 1976, there were
511 open April 1976 Maine Potato Future Contracts which
required the delivery of approximately 25.5 million pounds
of Maine potatoes on or before April 25, 1976. On that
same date, there were 7471 open May 1976 Maine Potato
Future Contracts which, if not liquidated on or before May
7, 1976, required the delivery of more than 373.5 million
pounds of Maine potatoes on or before May 25, 1976.

Nineteenth: (a) On or about April 13, 1976, the United
States Department of Agriculture issued a Report that
stocks of Maine potatoes in storage totalled 7.40 million
ewt on April 1, 1976. The Report was considered very bul-
lish, because the normal consumption of Maine potatoes in
April is 2.5 to 3.0 million ewt, seed usage for the next plant-
ing would require approximately 3.6 million ewt, and ex-
ports were expected to total approximately 1.0 million ewt.
Moreover, the Report stated that total stocks of all potatoes
in storage were only 67.3 million ewt on April 1, 1976, 11%
under the 75.9 million ewt stocked on April 1, 1975.

(b) Said Report, when coupled with other generally
available information with respect to the projected need for
Maine potatoes for export and other uses, provided the

JA 47

Members, Short Sellers and the general investing public,
with a sound basis for determining the quantities of Maine
potatoes that would be available to satisfy delivery obliga-
tions existing in connection with the May 1976 Maine
Potato Future Contract upon its expiration on May 7, 1976.

Twentieth: At the close of business on the Exchange on
May 7, 1976, the Members and Short Sellers (other than
Otter) were short 1911 Contracts which required delivery of
more than 95 million pounds of Maine potatoes no later
than May 25, 1976. The Members (other than Pressner)
and Short Sellers (other than Otter) have defaulted on 1000
of these Contracts requiring delivery of 50 million pounds
of Maine potatoes. Defendant Pressner covered all of its
short positiong between May 7, 1976 and May 25, 1976, by
paying a premium 'in excess of the Contracts’ closing price
of $8.70 per ewt ($.087 per pound), while Otter knowingly
participated in, and was partly responsible for, the decision
of Simplot and/or J. R. Simplot Co., and/or Simplot Indus-
tries, Inc. and/or Simtag to default on Contracts.

COUNT I

As anp For A Seconp Cia ror Retire Acarinst Jack
Ricwarp Simprotr; J. R. Sruptor Co.; Srmpror Inpvs-
tries, Inc.; C. L. Orrer; Perer J. Taccanes; P. J.
Tacaares Co.; Srtac Farms; Kenneta Ramm; A&B
Farms, Inc.; Hven V. Guenn; Gearneart Farina,
Inc. and Ep McKay.

Twenty-First; Plaintiffs repeat and reiterate all of the
allegations contained in paragraphs “First” through
“Twentieth” as if fully set forth herein.

JA 48

Twenty-Second; In August, 1975, the United States De-
partment of Agriculture issued a Report which contained
its first estimate of the number of acres that farmers would
have to harvest in their Fall potato crop. This estimate
stated that the national potato acreage would be down eight
percent (8%) from the previous year with an even larger
drop in Maine. As a result of said Report, and other infor-
mation which led the investing public to believe Maine po-
tatoes would be in short supply, the price of the Contract
rose from $9.75 per ewt ($.0975 per pound) to a record
price of $19.15 per ewt ($.1915 per pound) by October 3,
1975.

Twenty-Third; From August, 1975 through April 13,
1976, the Short Sellers executed a large volume of short
sales of the Contract at prices considerably in excess of
$8.70 per ewt ($.087 per pound).

Twenty-Fourth: On or about April 13, 1976, based on
publicly available information, it was known or should have
been known to Short Sellers that there was an insufficient
number of Maine grown potatoes available in the United
States or elsewhere to satisfy all open commitments for the
Contract through delivery of Maine potatoes.

Twenty-Fifth: On the final day of trading of the Con-
tract on the Exchange and prior thereto, Short Sellers
failed to have liquidating orders placed, despite knowledge
of their inability or unwillingness to fulfill their obligation
to deliver Maine potatoes as required by the Contract and
thereafter Short Sellers (other than Otter) defaulted on

JA 49

said Contracts. In addition, on the final day of trading,
sellers entered into sales of the Contract.

Twenty-Sizth: These activities by Short Sellers which
violated the applicable provisions of the Commodity Act
acted as a manipulative force which artificially lowered the
price of the Contract.

Twenty-Seventh: Had Short Sellers acted properly by
liquidating their short positions, the market price for the
Contract would have risen considerably above the price at
which plaintiffs and members of the class were forced to
liquidate their long position.

Twenty-Eighth: By virtue of the foregoing, plaintiffs and
members of the class have been damaged in an amount as
yet undetermined but believed to be many millions of
dollars.

COUNT II

As anp For A Seconp Ciam ror Retrer Acarnst Jack
Ricnarp Smp ot; J. R. Smpror Co.; Stwperor Ixpvs-
tries, Inc.; C. L. Orrer; Peter J. Taccares; P. J. Tac-
cares, Co.; Smwtac Farms; Kexneta Ramu; A & B
Farms, Inc.; Hven V. Guenn; Gearnearr Farmrne,
Inc. and Ep McKay.

Twenty-Ninth: Plaintiffs repeat and reiterate each and
every allegation contained in paragraphs “First” through
“Twentieth”, “Twenty-Third” and “Twenty-Fourth” as if
fully set forth herein.

JA 50

Thirtiefh;: On or about April 13, 1976, the United States
Department of Agriculture issued a Report that stocks of
Maine potatoes in storage totalled 7.40 million ewt on April
1, 1976. The Report was considered very bullish, because
the normal consumption of Maine potatoes in April is 2.5 to
3.0 million ewt, seed usage for the next planting would re-
quire approximately 3.6 million ewt, and exports were
expected to total approximately 1.0 million ewt. More-
over, the Report stated that total stocks of all potatoes in
storage were only 67.3 million ewt on April 1, 1976, 11%
under the 75.9 million ewt stocked on April 1, 1975. As of
April 1, 1976, there were approximately 8,000 open Con-
tracts of May 1976 Maine potatoes requiring delivery of
4.0 million ewt. The next trading day prices for May 1976
Maine Potato Futures rose significantly.

Thirty-First: In order to counteract the effect of the
Agriculture Department Reports and to depress the price
of May 1976 Maine Potato Futures, Short Sellers engaged
in the following manipulative acts in violation of the Com-
modity Act to reduce the price of May 1976 Potato Futures:

(a) From at least as early as April 13, 1976 through May
7, 1976, Short Sellers exceeded the position and trading
limits imposed by § 150.10 of the Rules and Regulations of
the CFTC (17 C.F.R. § 150.10).

(b) On or about April 13, 1976, Short Sellers sent one
or more roller cars of potatoes moving East, knowing that
they did not have any customer or buyer for those potatoes.
Roller cars are railroad carloads of potatoes that are
shipped from market to market and offered for immediate
sale at the going cash price (i.e., the price for immediate

JA 51

delivery). Normally, shippers dispatch carloads only when
they have buyers for them. The arrival of roller cars at a
market tends to depress prices, and shippers often send
them out for that very purpose.

(c) On or about April 13, 1976, Short Sellers and other
persons unknown to plaintiff entered into an understanding
and agreement to sell May 1976 Maine Potato Futures into
the market at any price, which they did immediately there-
after.

(d) As early as April 13, 1976, Short Sellers knew, or
should have known that there was an insufficient number
of Maine grown potatoes available in the United States or
elsewhere to permit them to make delivery on or before
May 25, 1976 of such potatoes to satisfy all of their open
short positions. Nonetheless prior to and on the final day
of trading, May 7, 1976, Short Sellers entered into an
understanding and agreement pursuant to which they failed
and refused to have liquidating orders filed.

(e) After the close of trading on May 7, 1976, there were
approximately 1,9 open short positions. Short Sellers
then acknowledged inat they could not make delivery pur-
suant to their open short positions, and as of May 25, 1976,
defaulted on 1,000 carloads of Maine potatoes.

(f) Short Sellers delivered for transmission through the
mails and in interstate commerce by telephone and other
means of communication false, misleading and knowingly
inaccurate market information concerning Maine potatoes.

Thirty-Second: The conduct of Short Sellers was in-
tended to and did artificially lower the price of May 1976

JA 52

Maine Potato Futures during the period of at least April
13, 1976 through May 7, 1976 in violation of the Commodity
Act.

Thirty-Third: In closing out or offsetting their open long
positions at the artificially low price manipulated by Short
Sellers, plaintiff and the members of the class have been
damaged in an amount as yet undetermined but believed to
be many millions of dollars.

COUNT ITI

As anp ror A Turrp Ciatm ror Retrer Acarnst Jack
Ricwarp Stmpiot; J. R. Stwpitor Co.; Smwprior Ixpvs-
rries, Inc.; C. L. Orren; Perer J. Taccares; P. J.
Taccares Co.; Surtac Farms; Kennetu Ramo; A & B
Farms, Inc.; Huen V. Guenn; Gearneart Farina,
Inc. and Ep McKay.

Thirty-Fourth: Plaintiffs repeat and reiterate each and
every allegation contained in paragraphs “First” through
“Twentieth”, “Twenty-Third”, “Twenty-Fourth”, and
“Thirtieth” through “Thirty-Second”, as if fully set forth
herein.

Thirty-Fifth: Short Sellers have combined and conspired
with each other and with others presently unknown to
plaintiffs in violation of 41 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1, to manipulate the supply and the market price of pota-
toes in the United States, to manipulate and to artificially
depress the price of the Contract, to refuse to close out their
open short positions in May 1976 Maine Potatoes Futures

JA 53

on or before May 7, 1976, and to do the various acts, inter
alia, as alleged in paragraph “Thirty-First” hereof.

Thirty-Sixth: Tae aforesaid combination and conspiracy
was intended to and did artificially lower the price of May
1976 Maine Potato Futures during the period of at least
April 13, 1976 through May 7, 1976.

Thirty-Seventh; As a result of the aforesaid combination
and conspiracy, plaintiffs and all members of the class have
been injured in that they were required to sell their May
1976 Maine Potato Futures during the period of at least
April 13, 1976 through May 7, 1976 at artificially low prices,
prices substantiaily lower than they would have been paid
in the absence of said combination and conspiracy.

Thirty-Eighth: Plaintiffs and all members of the class ac-
cordingly have been injured in their business and property
as a result of said combination and conspiracy, in amounts
as yet undetermined but believed to be in the many millions
of dollars.

COUNT TV

As AND For A F'trst Ciatm ror Retier Acatnst CLayTon
Brokerace Co, or St. Lovis, Inc.; Herroup Commop-
1T1e8, Inc.; THomson & McKinnon Avcnincioss Kont-
MEYER Inc.; and PressNer Trapinc Corp.

Thirty-Ninth: Plaintiffs repeat and reiterate each and
every allegation contained in paragraphs “First” through
“Twentieth”, “Twenty-Third”, “Twenty-Fourth”, “Twenty-
Fifth” and “Thirtieth”, as if fully set forth herein.

JA 54

Fortieth: (a) On or before the final day of trading of the
Contract on May 7, 1976, Members failed, as required by
§ 44.02 of the Charter, By-Laws, Rules and Regulations of
the Exchange to have liqnidating orders placed, despite the
fact that they knew or should have known that their account
or accounts could not fulfill their obligation to deliver Maine
potatoes.

(b) Members also permitted the Short Sellers to exceed
the position and trading limits imposed by the Commodity
Act and Regulations of the CFTC as aforesaid and failed
to report these violations.

(c) Members also failed and neglected to report and con-
cealed other violations of the Commodity Act, Rules and
Regulations of the Commission, and By-Laws, Rules and
Regulations of defendant Exchange by one or more of their
accounts with respect to the Contract, of which they knew
or should have known.

Forty-First: These acts by Members directly affected
the price of the Contract which was artificially depressed
as a result thereof.

Forty-Second: Had Members acted in accordance with
the Commodity Act, and the Charter, By-Laws, Rules and
Regulations of the Exchange. the market price of the Con-
tract would have risen considerably above the price at which
plaintiffs and members of the class were forced to liquidate
their long position.

Forty-Third: By reason of the foregoing, plaintiffs and
members of the class have been damaged in an amount as

JA 55

yet undetermined but believed to be in the many millions
of dollars.

COUNT V

As AND For A Seconp Cia ror Revier Acarnst Ciay-
TON Broxerace Co. or St. Louis, Inc.; Hernotp Com-
MopITIES, Inc.; THomson & McKinnon AvcHINCLoss
Konumeyer Inc, and Pressyer Trapine Corp.

Forty-Fourth: Plaintiffs repeat and reiterate each and
every allegation contained in paragraphs “First” through
“Twentieth”, “Twenty-Third”, “Twenty-Fourth”, “Twenty-
Fifth”, “Thirtieth” through “Thirty-Third” and “Fortieth”,
as if fully set forth herein.

Forty-Fifth: Members held accounts through which
Short Sellers executed one or more transactions in the
Contract.

Forty-Sixth: Members, with knowledge of intent of Short
Sellers to deflate the prices of the Contract acquiesced and/
or participated in the acts of Short Sellers,

Forty-Seventh: As a result of the manipulative acts and
omissions of the Members in violation of the Commodity
Act and § 1 of the Sherman Act, the plaintiffs and members
of the class have been damaged in an amount yet to be
determined but believed to be in the many millions of
dollars.

JA 56

COUNT VI

As AND For A First Ciam ror Reuier AGAINST
THE New York MercANTILE EXCHANGE

Forty-Eighth: Plaintiffs repeat and reiterate each and
every allegation contained in paragraphs “First” through
“Twentieth”, “Twenty-Third”, “Twenty-Fourth”, “Twenty-
Fifth” and “Thirtieth”, as if fully set forth herein.

Forty-Ninth: Between April 14, 1976 and May 7, 1976,
the CFTC had its personnel oa the floor of the Exchange
and brought to the attention of the Exchange’s officers, the
large short position of the Short Sellers and Members in
the Contract. Moreover, on or about May 5, 1976, the CFTC
sent mail-o-grams to the Exchange in which it noted that
traders had amassed sizeable obligations to deliver Maine
potatoes from the 1975 crop. The mail-o-grams also stated
that the Short Sellers were “required by law to avoid caus-
ing artificial prices in either cash or futures market”.

Fiftieth: Despite the aforesaid warnings by personnel of
the CFTC, officers of the Exchange assured the CFTC that
the short positions would be covered notwithstanding the
fact that the Exchange had taken no steps to resolve the
problem and had no basis for so advising the CFTC.

Fifty-First: Contrary to and in violation of the Com-
modity Act, the Rules and Regulations of the CFTC, and
its own By-Laws, Rules and Regulations, the Exchange:

(a) Failed and neglected to report and concealed viola-
tions of the Commodity Act, the Rules and Regulations of

JA 57

the CFTC and its own By-Laws, Rules and Regulations by
the Short Sellers and Members.

(b) Failed and neglected to direct that liquidating orders
of the Contract be entered on or before May 7, 1976 with
respect to accounts of Members which Exchange knew or
should have known would default if not liquidated.

(c) Failed and neglected to perform its duties as a con-
tract market with respect to the Contract.

(d) Failed and neglected to exercise due care to halt
manipulative practices with respect to the Contract.

Fifty-Second: As a result of the acts and omissions of
Exchange, the price of the Contract was artificially lowered
during the period of at least April 13, 1976 through May
7, 1976.

Fifty-Third: In closing out or offsetting their open long
positions at the artificially low price caused by the acts and
omissions of defendant Exchange, plaintiffs and the mem-
bers of the class have been damagid in an amount as yet
undetermined but believed to be in the many millions of
dollars.

Wuererorr, plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of the
class, demand judgment against the defendants as follows:

(a) On Counts I, IT, TV, and VI in an amount equal
to the damages which have been sustained by the class;
and

JA 58

(b) On Counts III and V in an amount equal to
treble the damages which have been sustained by the
class; and

(ec) All together with interest, costs and disburse-
ments of the action, and the reasonable attorneys’ fees
incurred in the prosecution of the action.

Dated:
Yours, ete.,

Pomerantz Levy Havpex & Brock

TIE sscsicasspnesmboseontoteenindsinibibaaketnaseechpeasiaibtiiciidein
A Member of the Firm

Lead Counsel for Plaintiffs
295 Madison Avenue

New York, New York 10017
(212) 532-4800

Worr, Biock, Scrorr and Sorts-Conen
Attorneys for Plaintiff William R.
Buster, Jr.

Seymour Kurland
Judah I. Labovitz
Ian A. Strogatz
Alan B. Rubenstein

Twelfth Floor Packard Building
Philadelphia, Pa. 19102

JA 59

Lieve, Ruskiw & Scwutsser, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
National Super Spuds, Inc.

Richard A. Lippe
Melvyn B. Ruskin
Michael L. Faltischek

114 Old Country Road
Mineola, New York 11501
(516) 248-9500

HoturnsHeaD and Menpetson

James A. Lewis, Esq.
T. Lawrence Palmer, Esq.

3010 Mellon Bank Building
Pittsburgh, Pa. 15219
(412) 281-2222

Keenan & Pepersen

Edward F. Keenan, Esq.
John M. Murray, Esq.

36 West 44th Street
New York, New York 10036
(212) 682-4474

Attorneys for Plaintiffs Willard C.
Shiner, Eugene P. Weisman, Richard
Welts, Raymond Rothberg, Arthur S.
Armstrong, Theodore Brinek, Capgain
Holdings, Inc. & Heitz Romminger

[Affidavit of service omitted]

JA 60

Opinion of the District Court
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Soutuern Districr or New York

76 Civ, 2375 (LFM), 76 Civ. 2554 (LFM),
76 Civ. 2571 (LFM), 76 Civ. 2594 (LFM)

NationaL Super Spvps, Inc. et al.,
Plaintiffs,
—against—
New York Mercantite Excuance et al.,

Defendants.

76 Civ. 2648 (LFM)

Incomco,

Plaintiff,
—against

New York Mercantite Excuance et al.,

Defendants.

76 Civ. 3210 (LFM)

Howard BErenson,

Plaintiff.
—against—

Joun Ricuarp Simptor et al.,

Defendants.

JA 61

76 Civ. 4350 (LFM)

New Leisr et al.,

Plaintiffs,
—against—
Joun Ricuarp Simptor et al.,
Defendants.
76 Civ. 5200 (LFM)
Dexter Ricuarps,
Plaintiff,

—against—

New York Mercantite Excuance et al.,
Defendants.

APPEARANCES:

Rein, Mound & Cotton

By: Maurice Mound, Esq.
130 John Street
New York, N.Y. 10038

—and—

Cahill Gordon & Reindel
By: William E. Hegarty, Charles Platto, Ruth D.
MeNaughton and Peter Leight, Esqs.
80 Pine Street
New York, N.Y. 10005

Attorneys for defendant New York
Mercantile Exchange.

JA 62

Thompson & Mitchell
By: W. Stanley Walch, Gerard K. Sandweg, Jr.
and Kenton E. Knickmeyer, Esqs.
One Mercantile Center
St. Louis, Mo. 63101

—and—.

Barrett, Smith, Schapiro, Simon
& Armstrong

26 Broadway

New York, N.Y. 10004
Attorneys for defendant Clayton
Brokerage Co. of St. Louis, Inc.

Dewey Ballantine Bushby Palmer
& Wood
By: Hugh N. Fryer and
Ira G. Greenberg, Esqs.
140 Broadway
New York, N.Y. 10006

—and—

Sidley & Austin
By: Stuart S. Ball, Lawrence H. Hunt, Jr.,
Thomas F, Ryan and Michael W. Davis, Fsqs.
One First National Plaza
Chicago, Tll. 60603
Attorneys for defendant Heinold
Commodities, Inc.

Hall, MeNicol, Hamilton & Clark
By: Donald G. McCabe, Esq.

330 Madison Avenue

New York, N.Y. 10017
Attorneys for defendant Thomson &
McKinnon Auchincloss Kohlmeyer, Inc.

JA 63

Pomerantz Levy Haudek & Block
By: William E. Haudek, Richard M. Meyer
and Roger W. Haudek, Esqs.
295 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10017
Lead Counsel for Class Plaintiffs

Howard Berenson, plaintiff pro se.

Robson & Toboroff |
By: Leonard Toboroff and
Kenneth N. Miller, Esqs.
950 Third Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022
Attorneys for plaintiffs Neil Leist,
Philip M. Smith and Incomco.

Jay W. Kaufmann, Esq.
111 Broadway
New York, N. Y. 10006
Attorney for plaintiff Dexter Richards.

MacManon, District Judge.

Defendants, the New York Mercantile Exchange (the
“Exchange”), Richard Levine (“Levine”), Howard Gabler
(“Gabler”), Alfred Pennisi (“Pennisi”), Clayton Broker-
age Co. of St. Louis, Ine. (“Clayton”), Heinold Commodi-
ties, Inc. (“Heinold”) and Thomson & McKinnon Auchin-
closs Kohlmeyer, Ine. (“Thomson”), move under Rule
12(c), Fed.R.Civ.P., for judgment on the pleadings, or,
in the alternative, under Rule 56(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., for
partial summary judgment dismissing all or part of the
complaints against them in these related actions.’ Since

*The Exchange moves in the following actions: National Super
Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exchange, 76 Civ. 2375, 76
Civ. 2554, 76 Civ. 2571, 76 Civ. 2594 (the “consolidated class ac-

JA 64

all parties have submitted factual material outside the
pleadings, we treat the motions as motions for partial
summary judgment.

These actions arise out of the much publicized default
in May 1976 of Maine potato futures contracts,’ when the
sellers of almost 1,000 contracts failed to deliver approx-
imately 50,000,000 pounds of potatoes, resulting in the
largest default in the history of commodities futures trad-
ing in this country. The primary claim in these actions is
that the default was caused by certain defendants’ price
manipulation.

In order to understand these motions, a basic under-
standing of the commodities futures industry is essential.
A commodity future is a contract for the future delivery
of a certain commodity. Except for price, all the terms of
the contracts for a given commodity traded on an exchange
are standardized and, thus, the contracts are fungible. The
actual trading of futures is done by futures commission
merchants and floor brokers, both of whom must be reg-
istered with the Commodities Futures Trading Commission

tions”) ; Incomco v. New York Mercantile Exchange, 76 Civ. 2648;
and Leist v. Simplot, 76 Civ. 4350.

Levine, Gabler and Pennisi move in Letst v. Simplot, 76 Civ.
4350.

Clayton moves in the consolidated class actions and in Leist v.
Simplot, 76 Civ. 4350.

Heinold and Thomson move in the consolidated class actions, in
— v. Simplot, 76 Civ. 3210, and in Leist v. Simplot, 76 Civ.

The motions of the Exchange, Levine, Clayton, Heinold and
Thomson in Richards v. New York Mercantile Exchange, 76 Civ.
5200, are denied as moot because this action was discontinued after
these motions were filed.

The motions of the Exchange and Clayton in Berenson v. Sim-
plot, 76 Civ. 3210, are also denied as moot because this action has
been discontinued as to the Exchange and Clayton.

2 See N.Y. Times, May 26, 1976, at 1, col. 1.

JA 65

(the “CFTC”).’ Additionally, trading may take place only
on exchanges which have complied with certain statutory
requirements and have been designed as “contract mar-
kets” by the CFTC.‘

A seller of a futures contract is, in the language of the
trade, in a “short” position, that is, he is obligated to de-
liver the commodity at a future date in return for the
right to receive the purchase price. Conversely, a buyer of
a futures contract is said to be in a “long” position, that
is, he is obligated to pay the purchase price in return for
the right to receive the commodity. As a practical matter,
however, physical delivery of the commodity is made on
only a small fraction of the futures contracts traded on
the nation’s exchanges. Most of the trades are made by
speculators who have no intention of delivering or receiv-
ing the actual commodity. As the last day of trading in a
particular contract approaches, a speculator in a short po-
sition (a seller) will cover his obligation to deliver by
buying a contract. Similarly, a speculator in a long posi-
tion (a buyer) will cover his obligation to pay by selling a
contract.®

Plaintiffs, traders and a dealer in potatoes, were buyers
holding long positions in May 1976 Maine potato futures
contracts. They allege that Clayton, Heinoid and Thomson,
futures commission merchants, conspired with certain of
their customers to manipulate and depress the price of the
May contract by selling an illegally large number of May
contracts, thereby causing plaintiffs to sell their contracts
and potatoes at an artificially depressed price.

°7 U.S.C. §§ 6d, 6e, 6f.
‘7 U.S.C. §§ 6, 7.

5 The commodities futures industry is described in more detail
in S. Angrist, Sensible Speculating in Commodities (1972) and
S. Kroll & I. Shishko, Commodity Futures Market Guide (1973).

JA 66

Plaintiffs contend that the actions of Clayton, Heinold
and Thomson violated the Commodities Exchange Act*
(the “Act”), various regulations promulgated thereunder,’
and Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.* Plaintiffs also
contend that the Exchange, a designated contract market,
and its officers, Levine, Gabler and Pennisi, are liable to
them for failure to take steps to prevent the downward
price manipulation by the other defendants, and that the
Exchange conspired with the other defendants to manipu-
late the price.

Specifically, plaintiffs allege that the Exchange and its
officers failed to report and concealed violations of the Act
and the regulations promulgated thereunder; that the Ex-
change and its officers violated the Act by failing to enforce
its own rules, the Act and the CFTC’s regulations; and
that the Exchange violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act.

Impurep Ricut or Action

All moving defendants contend that they are entitled to
partial summary judgment because there is no private
right of action against them under the Act. Concededly,
such a right of action existed prior to 1974,* but, in that

*7 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.

’ Plaintiffs also allege violations of the Exchange's rules. Be-
cause the obligation to obey these rules arises under the CFTC’s
regulations, we consider these claims as alleging violations of the
CFTC’s regulations.

*15 U.S.C. §§1, 2.
° E.9., Deaktor v. L.D. Schreiber & Co., 479 F.2d 529 (7th Cir.),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Chicago Mercantile Exchange v.

Deaktor, 414 U.S. 113 (1973) ; Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265
F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967).

JA 67

year, the Act was amended extensively,” and the ques-
tion before us is whether the private right of action has
survived the 1974 amendments to the Act.

Although a number of other district courts have con-
sidered this question, there is no clear consensus on the
answer."' This difference of opinion and the importance
of the question to the future course of these actions compel
us to resolve the question ourselves.

Under Cort v. Ash,’* four factors are relevant in deter-
mining whether a private right of action may be implied
under a federal statute which does not expressly provide
for one:

“First, is the plaintiff ‘one of the class for whose
especial benefit the statute was enacted,’ ... that is,

1°Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.). The
Act was further amended in 1978. Futures Trading Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-405, 92 Stat. 865 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §1 et seq.).

1! Nine cases have stated that a private right of action exists
under the Act: R.J. Hereley & Son v. Stotler & Co., Comm. Fut.
L. Rep. (CCH) 20,773 (N.D. Ill. 1979) ; Smith v. Grover. No. 77
C 2297 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 2, 1979); Gravois v. Fairchild, Arabatzis
¢& Smith, Inc., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) § 20,706 (E.D. La.
1978) ; Berenson v. Madda Trading Co., No. 78-544 (D.D.C. Oct.
30, 1978) ; Hoffmayer v. Dean Witter & Co., Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) $20,694 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Kelley v. Carr, 442 F. Supp.
346 (W.D. Mich. 1977) ; Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc. v. French, 425
F. Supp. 1231 (D.D.C. 1977); Shearson Hayden Stone, Ine. v.
Lumber Merchants, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 559 (S.D. Fla. 1976);
rh v. Conticommodity Serv., Inc., 462 F. Supp. 405 (N.D. Cal.
1 ;

Five cases have stated that no private right of action exists
under the Act: Alkan v. Rosenthal & Co., Comm, Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) { 20,797 (S.D. Ohio 1979) ; Berman v. Bache Halsey Stu-
art, Shields, Inc., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) { 20,796 (S.D. Ohio
1979) ; Bartels v. International Commodities Corp., 435 F. Supp.
865 (D. Conn. 1977) ; Consolo v. Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill,
Noyes, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 447 (D. Ohio 1976); Arkoosh v. Dean
Witter & Co, 415 F. Supp. 535 (D. Neb. 1976), aff'd on other
grounds, 571 F.2d 437 (8th Cir. 1978).

12 422 U.S. 66 (1975).

JA 68

does the statute create a federal right in favor of the
plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legisla-
tive intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such
a remedy or to deny one? ... Third, is it consistent
with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme
to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? ... And
finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated
to state law, in an area basically the concern of the
States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a
cause of action based solely on federal law? .. .”**

There can be no question that plaintiffs, investors in the
commodities market and a dealer in potatoes, are within
the class “for whose especial benefit the statute was en-
acted.” As Senator Dole stated, the primary purposes of
the 1974 amendments to the Act were “[to protect] against
manipulation of markets and to protect any individual who
desires to participate in futures market trading.” ‘* Addi-
tionally, the Act itself states that price manipulation and
unreasonable fluctuations in price “are detrimental to...
persons handling the commodities.” **

Thus, we find that the first element of the Cort test is
satisfied.

The second element of the Cort test, congressional intent,
is more troublesome. The 1974 amendments to the Act
established an administrative procedure under which
“fajny person complaining of any violation of any pro-
vision of this chapter or any rule, regulation, or order
thereunder by any person who is registered or required to

13 7d. at 78 (citations omitted).

14120 Cong. Rec.-Senate 30466 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Dole) ;
accord 120 Cong. Rec.-Senate 34998-99 (1974) (remarks of Sen.
Clark). See also Ames v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Ine., 567 F.2d 1174, 1179 (2d Cir. 1977).

67 USC. §5.

JA 69

be registered under . . . this title may” ’* commence an
administrative proceeding before the CFTC to recover
reparations. Judgments resulting from these reparation
proceedings are subject to judicial review by the courts
of appeal’ and may be enforced in the district courts.’*

The 1974 amendments also give the CFTC plenary power
over futures commission merchants and contract markets.
The CFTC may suspend or revoke the registration of a
futures commission merchant or the designation of a con-
tract market.’® The CFTC is also authorized to issue cease
and desist orders against contract markets*® and to assess
civil penalties of up to $100,000 against futures commission
merchants and contract markets.*! Finally, the CFTC or
the Attorney General, at the request of the CFTC, is au-
thorized to bring an action in the district courts against
futures commission merchants and contract markets for
a restraining order, an injunction or a writ of mandamus
to compel compliance with the Act and the regulations
thereunder.”*

We believe that under the maxim of “cxpressio unius
est exclusio alterius,” ** the establishment of administrative

67 U.S.C. § 18(a).
77 U.S.C. § 18(g).
87 U.S.C. §18(f).
197 U.S.C. §§ 7b, 9.
207 1J.8.C. § 13a.
27 U.S.C. §§9, 13a.

227 U.S.C. § 13a-1. The 1978 amendments to the Act added a
provision by which a state may bring an action under the Act on
behalf of its citizens. 7 U.S.C. § 13a-2.

*3 Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. See
Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 419
(1975) ; National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass’n of R.R.
Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974); Redington v. Touche Ross
& Co., 592 F.2d 617, 629-30 (2d Cir.) (Mulligan, J., dissenting),
cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3368 (U.S. Nov. 27, 1978) (No. 78-309).

JA 70

reparation proceedings and the plenary grant of discipli-
nary and regulatory power to the CFTC evidences a con-
gressional intent to deny a private right of action under
the Act. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that
Congress was informed of the need for a private right of
action under the Act** but rejected a bill which would
have expressly established such a right of action.”®

Thus, we conclude that Congress did not intend that
there be a private right of action under the Act.

The third element of the Cort test, whether the implica-
tion of a private right of action would be consistent with
the underlying purposes of the Act, also weighs against
the implication of such a right. As applied by the Supreme
Court, this element of the Cort test is satisfied when the
implication of a private right of action is necessary in
order to further the purposes of the statute in question.**

Contract markets, such as the Exchange, are not regis-
tered persons under the Act, and, thus, they are exempt
from the administrative reparation proceeding established
by the Act. The CFTC alone has the right to assess a
monetary civil penalty against a contract market, and the
Act imposes two limitations on the amount of the civil
penalty which may be assessed against a contract market.
First, there is an overall limitation of $100,000." Second,

*4 Hearings on S. 2485, S. 2578, S. 2837 and H.R. 13113 before
the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. pt. 3, 737, 746 (1974) (testimony of Prof. Roy A. Schotland).

28S. 2837, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. § 505(a) (1973). This bill pro-
vided for actual damages for non-wilful violations of the Act and
treble damages for wilful violations.

°6 Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 39-40 (1977);
Cort v. Ash, supra, 422 U.S. at 84; JJ. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426, 432 (1964) ; Comment, Implying Private Causes of Ac-
tion from Federal Statutes, 17 Boston Col. Indus. & Com. L. Rev.
53, 69 (1975).

777 U.S.C. § 13a.

JA 71

the CFTC is required to consider “whether the amount of
the penalty will materially impair the contract market’s
ability to carry on its operations and duties.” ** We be-
lieve that both of these limitations evidence a congressional
intent to limit the potential monetary exposure of contract
markets. Since neither of these limitations would be pres-
ent in private actions against contract markets, the im-
plication of a right of action against contract markets
would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of Congress
to limit the potential monetary liability of contract markets.

Additionally, the implication of a private right of action
against futures commission merchants would not be con-
sistent with the Act because it is not necessary to further
the purposes of the Act. Since there is no dispute that
futures commission merchants, such as Clayton, Heinold
and Thomson, are subject to the administrative reparation
proceedings mentioned above,” there is plainly no neces-
sity to imply a right of action to remedy injuries which
are fully compensable in administrative proceedings.

_ Thus, we conclude that implication of a private right
of action under the Act would not be consistent with the
underlying purposes of the Act.

The fourth element of the Cort test, whether the im-
plication of a private right would infringe on an area of
state concern, favors the implication of such a right since
it is well settled that the regulation of commodity futures
trading is essentially a matter of federal concern.”

Thus, our application of the Cort test leads us to con-
clude that there is no private right of action under the

28 Td.
29 See text accompanying notes 16-18, supra.

3°See e.g. Smith v. Grover, supra, slip op. at 18-19; Gravois vy.
Fairchild, Arabatzis & Smith, Inc., supra, Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) {| 20,706 at 22,873.

JA 72

Act because the two critical elements of the test,®' con-
gressional intent and consistency with the statutory scheme,
weigh strongly against the implication of such a right.
Plaintiffs contend that the implication of a private right
of action under the Act is compelled by those cases which
have implied private rights of action under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.** Although we agree with plain-
tiffs that there are some similarities between the com-
modity futures industry and the securities industry, we
find that the respective statutory schemes are significantly
different. First, the Securities Exchange Act does not pro-
vide any administrative remedy to defrauded investors as
does the Commodities Exchange Act. Second, the Secu-
rities Exchange Act does not grant the SEC the same
plenary powers that the Commodities Exchange Act gives
the CFTC." Finally, the Commodities Exchange Act con-
tains no counterpart to the Securities Exchange Act’s spe-
cific grant of jurisdiction to the district courts over viola-
tions of that Act,** which the Supreme Court found of

31 See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass’n of R.R.
Passengers, supra, 414 U.S. at 457-58.

3215 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.

33The SEC’s power over brokers, dealers and securities ex-
changes is limited to suspension or revocation of their registration.
15 U.S.C. §§ 780(b) (4), 78s(h). The SEC may also seek to en-
join brokers, dealers and securities exchanges from violating the
Security Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78u.

3415 U.S.C. § 78aa provides, in pertinent part, that:

“The district courts of the United States, and the United
States courts of any Territory or other place subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States shall have exclusive juris-
diction of violations of this chapter or the rules and regula-
tions thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law
brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this chap-
ter or the rules and regulations thereunder.”

Although 7 U.S.C. § 13a-2(2) closely resembles the language quoted
above, its reach is expressly limited to actions brought by state
attorneys general.

JA 73

critical importance when it implied private rights of ac-
tion under that Act.*®

Plaintiffs also argue that the CFTC interprets the Act
as allowing private rights of action** and that the CFTC’s
interpretation is entitled to “‘great deference.” * How-
ever, as the Supreme Court has recently stated, the ad-
ministrative deference rule is not applicable where the
“narrow legal issue is one particularly reserved for judicial
resolution, namely whether a cause of action should be im-
plied by judicial interpretation in favor of a particular
class of litigants.” *

Finally, we note that the Supreme Court’s recent deci-
sion in Cannon vy. University of Chicago® is readily dis-
tinguishable from this case. In Cannon, the Supreme
Court implied a private right of action for a victim of al-
leged sex discrimination under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972,*° despite the existence of an adminis-
trative procedure to enforce those amendments. However,
the only administrative remedy under Title IX is the
termination of federal grants to educational institutions
which discriminate on the basis of sex. Thus, the Supreme
Court found that Title IX provided no private administra-
tive remedy to victims of sex discrimination.“ In contrast,

%5 Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, supra, 421
U.S. at 424; J.J. Case Co. v. Borak, supra, 377 U.S. at 430-31.

3® Amicus Curiae Brief of the Commodities Futures Trading
Commission submitted in Smith v. Grover, supra.

7 United States v. Consumer Life Ins. Co., 430 U.S. 725, 752
(1977) (citations omitted).

38 Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., supra, 430 U.S. at 41 n.27.
°° 47 U.S.L.W. 4549 (U.S. May 14, 1979) (No. 77-926).

4920 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686.

*! See 47 U.S.L.W. at 4556.

JA 74

the reparations procedure available under the Commodities
Exchange Act provides a remedy directly for the benefit
of private parties injured by violations. Thus, unlike
Cannon, the implication of a right of action here is not
necessary to provide a plenary remedy to the intended
beneficiaries of the Act.

Cannon is also distinguishable for a second reason. In
Cannon, the Supreme Court noted that Title [IX was en-
acted in 1972 when the Court had been rather liberal in
finding implied rights of action. The Court found that
Congress expected Title LX to be interpreted in accordance
with that liberal view.** The Commodities Exchange Act,
on the other hand, was reconsidered by Congress as re-
cently as last year when the Supreme Court had retreated
from its liberal view toward implied rights of action.”
Yet, in enacting the 1978 amendments to the Act, Congress
again failed to add a section expressly providing for a
private right of action despite knowledge that a number
of district courts had held that the private right of action
previously implied did not survive the 1974 amendments.“
Cannon teaches that the failure of Congress to provide for
a private right of action must be viewed in light of the
judicial attitude toward such rights at the time of enact-
ment. In light of that teaching, the failure of Congress to
provide for a private right of action in the 1978 amend-
ments evidences an intent to deny such a right.

Thus, we conclude that there is no private right of action
against futures commission merchants and contract mar-
kets under the Act. Since there is no private right of action
under the Act, it necessarily follows that there is no private

“7d. at 4554.
37d.
** 124 Cong. Ree.-Senate 10537 (remarks of Sen. Huddleston).

JA 75

right of action under the regulations promulgated pur-
suant to the Act.‘

ANTITRUST CLAIMS

Clayton and Heinold also move for summary judgment
on the antitrust claims, asserting that there is no genuine
issue of fact that they did not intend to manipulate the
price of May 1976 Maine potato futures contracts.

A party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of
demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of fact,**
even when the motion is unopposed.** Clayton and Heinold
have submitted excerpts of deposition testimony given by
certain of their employees. Although this testimony does
tend to,show that Clayton and Heinold lacked the intent
required for a violation of the Sherman Act, it is neither
conclusive nor sufficiently clear to allow us to conclude that
there is no genuine issue of fact. Clayton’s employee, Del-
bridge, admitted that Clayton took no steps to investigate
its clients’ ability to deliver despite their large short posi-
tion, and Heinold’s vice-president, Klopfenstein, admitted
that Heinold did not take the steps that it normally would
have taken to ensure that its short customers could deliver.
Given the elusive nature of intent and its significance to an
antitrust violation,“* we cannot say that there is no issue
of fact regarding Clayton’s and Heinold’s knowledge and
intent.*®

8 Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc., No. 77-7517, slip op.
at 2019 n.11 (2d Cir. Apr. 4, 1979).

6 Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970).
‘7 Td. at 160.

8 See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 98 S. Ct. 2864
(1978).

**See SEC v. Research Automation Corp., 585 F.2d 31, 33 (2d
Cir. 1978) (“(S]ummary judgment is rd to be inappropriate
when the issues concern intent.’’).

JA 76

Accordingly :

1. There being no just reason for delay, the Clerk of the
court is directed, pursuant to Rule 54(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., to
enter final judgment:

A. In favor of the Exchange on its motions for
partial summary judgment on the sixth claim of the
first amended consolidated class action complaint in
National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile
Exchange, 76 Civ. 2375, 76 Civ. 2554, 76 Civ. 2571 and
76 Civ. 2594; the first and fourth claims of the com-
plaint in Incomco v. New York Mercantile Exchange, 76
Civ. 2648; and the fourth claim of the complaint in
Leist v. Simplot, 76 Civ. 4350;

B. In favor of Levine, Gabler and Pennisi on their
motion for summary judgment on the fourth claim of
the complaint in Leist v. Simplot, 76 Civ. 4350;

C. In favor of Clayton on its motions for partial
summary judgment on the fourth siaim of the first
amended consolidated class action complaint in Na-
tional Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Ex-
change, 76 Civ. 2375, 76 Civ. 2554, 76 Civ. 2571 and 76
Civ. 2594; and the first claim of the complaint in Leist
v. Simplot, 76 Civ. 4350;

D. In favor of Heinold and Thomson on their mo-
tions for partial summary judgment on the fourth
claim of the first amended consolidated class action
complaint in National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York
Mercantile Exchange, 76 Civ. 2375, 76 Civ. 2554, 76 Civ.
2571 and 76 Civ. 2594; the first claim of the complaint
in Leist v. Simplot, 76 Civ. 4350; and the second claim
of the complaint in Berenson v. Simplot, 76 Civ. 3210,
to the extent that it asserts a claim under the Act.

JA 77

2. Clayton’s and Heinold’s motions for summary judg-
ment in their favor on all other claims against them are
denied in all respects.

So ordered.

Dated: New York, N.Y.
May 29, 1979

/3/ Luoyp F, MacManon
Luioyp F. MacManon
United States District Judge

JA 78

Judgment of the District Court
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Soutuern District or New York

76 Civ. 2375 (LFM)
76 Civ. 2554 (LFM)
76 Civ. 2571 (LFM)
76 Civ. 2594 (LFM)

Nationa Super Spvups, Inc., Wirtt1am R. Buster, Jr.,
Wriutarp C. Suiner, Evcene P. Weisman, Ricuarp
Wetts, Raymonp Roruserc, Artuur S. ArMstrona,
Tueopore Brinek, Capcatn Hotprnos, Inc., and Heiz
Rommincer, individually and on behalf of all persons
similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,
—against—

New York MercantILte Excnance; Crayton Broxerace Co.
oF St. Louis, Inc.; Hernotp Commopities, Ixc.; THom-
son & McKinnon Avcuinctoss Konumeyer Inc.;
PressNer Trapinc Corp.; Jack Ricwarp Simpiot; J.R.
Srmptot; J.R. Srmptot Co.; Smprot INpustries, INc.;
Peter J. Taccares; P.J. Taccares Co.; C.L. Orrter;
Smtac Farms; Kexneto Ramo; A & B Farms, Inc.;
Hvcuw V. Gienn; Gearneart Farmine, Inc. and Ep
McKay,

Defendants.

JA 79

76 Civ. 2648 (LFM)

Incomco,
Plaintiff,
—vs.—

New York MercantiLe ExcHanee,
Wayne County Propuce Co., and Harotp Cottins,

Defendants.

76 Civ. 4350 (LFM)
Nem Leist, Pamre Smita and Incomco,

Plaintiffs,
—against—

Joun Ricuarpv Srmptot, J. R. Stmuprot & Co., Simpior
Propucts Co., Inc., Stupiot Inpvustries, Inc., Smmtac
Farms, Inc., Peter J. Taccares, P. J. Taccares &
Co., Henry A. Potrax, Harvey B. Porta, Harvey B.
Pottak Company, GERALD RaFFertTy, PrREssNER TRADING
Corp., BENJAMIN PressNER, STEPHEN SUNDHEIMER, JULES
Norpuicut, Eperstern & Co., Inc., Cuartes Epetstern,
Rosert Epersters, Murer Eperstern, MererFrecp & Com-
PANY, Inc., Grusert MererFeLp, Davip MErERFELD, Ropert
Rearpon, F. J. Rearvon, Inc., Harotp Coiurys, Caspar
Mayerson, Lyxnewoop Exportinc Company, ALEX Srn-
cLarrR, Manninc Stoitier, Hornsiower, Weexs-Hemp-
HILL, Noyes, Crayton Broxerace Co., Inc., HErnoip
Commopittrs, Ixc., THomson & McKixnon Avcuty-
cLoss Konimeyer Inc., MFX Commonitirs, Inc., Don-
ALD Srtver, Duane Sovtu, Kenneth Ramo, A & B

JA 80

Farmino Inc., Hucn Guienn, Gearneart Farmrne, Inc.,
Epwarp McKay, New York Mercantite EXxcHance,
Ricuarp B. Levine, Howarp Gasier, ALFRED PENNISsI,
“Joun” Humpureys, Frank Fvutimer,

Defendants.

76 Civ. 3210 (LFM)

Howarp Berenson,
Plaintiff,
—against—

Jack Ricnarp Simptot; J.R. Stupor Co.; Stmprot Inpvs-
tries, Inc.; Simtac Farms; Peter J. Taccares; P.J.
Taccares Company; THe New York Mercantite Ex-
CHANGE; THomson & McKinnon Avcuincioss Kout-
MEYER Inc.; Hetnotp CommMonities, Inc.; Crayton
Broxerace Co. or St. Louis, Inc.; Pressner Trapino
Conp.,

Defendants.

Defendants, the New York Mercantile Exchange (the
“Exchange”), Richard Levine (“Levine”), Howard Gabler
(“Gabler”), Alfred Pennisi (“Pennisi”), Clayton Broker-
age Co. of St. Louis, Inc. (“Clayton”), Heinold Commodi-
ties, Inc. (“Heinold”) and Thompson & McKinnon Auchin-
closs Kohlmeyer, Inc. (“Thompson”), having moved under
Rule 12(c), Fed.R.Civ.P., for judgment on the pleadings,
or, in the alternative, under Rule 56(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., for
partial summary judgment, and an Opinion and Decision
dated May 29, 1979 having been duly rendered, and the
Court having expressly determined that there is no just

JA 81

reason for delay and having expressly directed the Clerk
of the Court to enter final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b)
Fed.R.Civ.P., it is hereby

ApsvpceEp that the sixth claim of the first amended con-
solidated class action complaint in National Super Spuds,
Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exchange, 76 Civ. 2375, 76 Civ.
2554, 76 Civ. 2571, and 76 Civ. 2594 is dismissed as to the
Exchange; and it is further

Apsvupcep that the first and fourth claims of the com-
plaint in Incomco v. New York Mercantile Exchange, 76
Civ. 2648 are dismissed as to the Exchange; and it is
further

Apsvupcep that the fourth claim of the complaint in Leist
v. Simplot, 76 Civ. 4350 is dismissed as to the Exchange;
and it is further

Apsvupcep that the fourth claim of the complaint in Leist
v. Simplot, 76 Civ. 4350 is dismissed as to Levine, Gabler,
and Pennisi; and it is further

ApsvpceEp that the fourth claim of the first amended con-
solidated class action complaint in National Super Spuds,
Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exchange, 76 Civ. 2375, 76 Civ.
2554, 76 Civ. 2571 and 76 Civ. 2594; and the first claim of
the complaint in Leist v. Simplot, 76 Civ. 4350 are dismissed
as to Clayton; and it is further

Apsvupcep that the fourth claim of the first amended con-
solidated class action complaint in National Super Spuds,
Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exchange, 76 Civ. 2375, 76 Civ.
2554, 76 Civ. 2571 and 76 Civ. 2594; the first claim of the
complaint in Leist v. Simplot, 76 Civ. 4350; and the second
claim of the complaint in Berenson v. Simplot, 76 Civ. 3210,

JA 82
to the extent that it asserts a claim under the Commodity
Exchange Act, are dismissed as to Heinold and Thompson.

Dated: New York, New York
July 3, 1979

Lioyp F. MceManon
U.S.D.J.

JupoMEentT Entenrep: 7/6/79

Raymonp F. BurcHarpt
Clerk

JA 83
Opinion of the Court of Appeals

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

>
Nos. 402, 403, 404—September Term, 1979

(Argued January 16, 1980 Decided July 8, 1980)
Docket Nos. 79-7402, 79-7464, 79-7482

>

NEIL LEIST, PHILIP SMITI! and INCOMCO,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

_—! —

JOHN RICHARD SIMPLOT, J.R. SimpLotT & Co., SIMPLOT
Propucts Co., INc., SIMPLOT INDUSTRIES, INC., SIMTAG
FARMS, INC., PETER J. TAGGARES, P. J. TAGGARES &
Co., HENRY A. POoLLACK, HARVEY B. POLLACK,
HARVEY B. POLLACK COMPANY, GERALD RAFFERTY,
PRESSNER TRADING CoRP., BENJAMIN PRESSNER,
STEPHEN SUNDHEIMER, JULES NORDLIGHT, EDELSTEIN
& Co., INcC., CHARLES EDELSTEIN, ROBERT EDELSTEIN,
MURIAL EDELSTEIN, MEIERFELD & COMPANY, INC.,
GILBERT MEIERFELD, DAVID MEIERFEI.D, ROBERT REAR.
DON, F.J. REARDON, INC., HAROLD COLLINS, CASPAR
MAYERSON, LYNNEWOOD EXPORTING COMPANY, ALEX
SINCLAIR, MANNING STOLLER, HORNBLOWER & WEEKS-
HEMPHILL, Noyes Inc., MFX Commoopitigs, INC.,
DONALD SILVER, DUANE SOUTH, KENNETH RAMM, A &
B FARMING INC., HUGH GLENN, GEARHEART FARMING,
Inc., EDWARD McKay, “JOHN” HUMPHREYS, FRANK
FULLMER,

Defendants,

JA 84

CLAYTON BROKERAGE Co. OF St. Lovts, INcC., HEINOLD
COMMODITIES, INC., THOMPSON & MCKINNON, AUCHIN.
CLOSS, KOHLMEYER, INC., NEW YORK MERCANTILE
EXCHANGE, RICHARD B. LEVINE, HOWARD GABLER,
ALFRED PENNISI,

Defendants-Appellees.
>
INCOMCO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
—Vi.—

WaYNE COUNTY PRODUCE Co., and HAROLD COLLINS,
Defendants,

NEW YorRK MERCANTILE EXCHANGE,
De fendant-Appellee.

o>

NATIONAL SUPER Spups, INc., WILLIAM R. BUSTER, JR.,
WILLARD C. CHINER, EUGENE P. WEISMEN, RICHARD
WELTS, RAYMOND ROTHBERG, ARTHUR S. ARMSTRONG,
THEODORE BRINEK, CAPGAIN HOLDINGS, INC., and HEIZz
ROMMINGER, individually and on behalf of all persons
similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
—_—Vi—

NEW YORK MERCANTILE EXCHANGE, CLAYTON BROKERAGE
Co. oF St. Louis, INC., PRESSNER TRADING CORP.,

H018)

JA 85

JACK RICHARD SIMPLOT, J.R. SimpLot Co., SIMPLOT
INDUSTRIES, INC., PETER J. TAGGARES, P.J. TAGGARES
Co., C.L. OTTER, SIMTAG FARMS, KENNETH RAMM, A
& B Farms, INc., HUGH V. GLENN, GEARHEART
FARMING, INC. and Ep McKay,

Defendants,

HEINOLD COMMODITIES, INC., THOMPSON & MCKINNON,
AUCHINCLOSS, KOHLMEYER, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Before:

FRIENDILY, MANSFIELD and KEARSE,
Circuit Judges.

————_---~<> —----—-

Appeal from an order of the District Court for the
Southern District of New York, Llovd F. MacMahon.
Judge, 470 F.Supp. 1256 (1979), granting partial
summary judgment to the New York Mercantile
Exchange and three futures com

[Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.]

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_1905%3A04. Public record. Not legal advice.
