# Petition — Calder v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1981
- **Citation:** 451 U.S. 912

## Text

RECEIVED
80-6291 MAR 4 14s
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
IN THE SUPREME COURT, U.S.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1980

.
»
ue

No.

JOSEPH CALDER,

Petitioner,
-VS-
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

KENNETH J. KAPLAN
Attorney for Petitioner
JOSEPH CALDER

233 Broadway

New York, New York 10007
(212) 964-9666

ie

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Authorities.
Opinion Below .
Jurisdiction
! Questions Presented for Review

Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and Rules
‘* Involved . eae j

Statement of the Case .
Reason for Granting the Writ

1. There was insufficient proof at
trial to establish the jurisdic-

tional element under the Hobbs Act.

Conclusion

TABLE OF CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES

CASES:
United States v. Addonizio, 451 F2d 49 at 77
(3d Cir. ee oa wae «ke. ee ee si

ited States v. Augello, 451 F2d 1167, 1169-70
Ua cis 197) . cere denied, 405 U.S. 1070 (1976).
United States v. Crowley, 504 2d 992, 997
COU, ROTORS 6 ue oe Se ee ee

ates v. Daley, 564 F2d 645, 649
Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 933 (1977)

United States v. Demet, 486 F2d 816 (7th Cir 1973)
cert denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974) . .. +++ +s:
yyiges States v. Merolla, 523 F2d 5l, 54 (2d Cir.

United States v. Staszcuk, 5170 2d 53, 60
t r en banc) cert. denied,
433 U.S 4 4

. 837 (1975).
ed States v. Tropiano, 418 F2d 1069, 1076
eri Cir. 19609), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1021 (1970)..

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1254 (1). The judgment of the Court of Appeals was filed on

January 31, 1979.

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether there was sufficient proof at trial to establish the

jurisdictional element under the Hobbs Act.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES
AND RUT i.” T(NVOLVED:

United States Constitution

This case involves the Commerce Clause of the United States

Constitution.

PEGS LL TE Re + ee He

re}e

Statutee:

This case involves the application of the commerce clause to

wage

the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. §1951.

RECEIVED :
MAR 4 1981

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT, U.S.

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1980

JOSEPH CALDER,
Petitioner,
-vs- :
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI Se
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Petitioner, JOSEPH CALDER prays that a writ of certiorari issue
to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit entered against him on February 10, 1981, which affirmed:
(1) a district court judgment convicting petitioner of extortion in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951.

Opinions Below
The Court of Appeals affirmed each of the judgments of convictior

in an opinion, United States v. Calder et al., F. 2d 2d Circuit Slip .
Sheet Ops., September Term, 1980, at p.1365.The Opinion of the Court

of Appeals is annexed hereto as Appendix "A".

—

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. THE GOVERNMENT'S CASE

The Government's case consisted of witnesses who were the owners
and employees of two "topless bar" establishments in Manhattan, known
as “Adam ak Eve" and "Guys and Dolls Au Go Go", who testified that
during the period from September, 1978 to October, 1979 appellant
Joseph Calder demanded and received three hundred dollars a week as
"protection money" from each business. In general, each of the wit-
nesses testified that Mr. Calder performed no services for the three
hundred dollars, a contention vigorously contested on cross-examination _
and during the defense case. No evidence was presented of physical
harm to any individual, or of any property damage in connection with
the alleged threats made to certain witnesses.

The Government's investigation of this case began after Robert
Fimbel, who used the name Robert Williams while working as night
Manager in the Adam and Eve bar, was being investigated for paying 2
a bribe to a building inspector in late 1978 (T.106-107, 261-263).
Fimbel, a police officer concerned with losing his job and his pension,
agreed to cooperate with the New York City Department of Investigation
and the FBI (T. 266-268).

He told the FBI, and testified at trial, that appellant Joseph
Calder had requested "protection money" so that “nothing happens" in _
the place (T.96-97). After Fimbel spoke to Sol Sizer, owner of the :
bar, Calder was paid three hundred dollars a week from the cash registe=
(T.98). This sum was paid to apvellant every Wednesday when he
visited the bar, usually accompanied by co-defendant George Monge,
who carried a gun (T. 102-104).

ae

¥Numbers preceded by "I" cefer to pages of trial transcript

Although Fimbel was "fearful" that he would be hurt, he himself
carried a gun strapped to his ankle and would himself serve as a
"bouncer" for rowdy patrons in the bar (T. 129, 227, 258-259) . Further-
more, Fimbel testified that he had a personal relationship with Mr.
Calder and entered into “serious discussions" with him regarding their
going into the bar business together (T. 245-247).

When Fimbel was cooperating with the FBI he taped a conversation
with avpellant, and testified that although it was important for him
to get some threats of extortion on the tape, such threats never
materialized (T. 273).

According to the Government, owners Sol Sitzer and Arnold Yourman
“independently” came to the FBI not knowing that Fimbel was cooperating.
Both Sitzer (who named Adam and Eve and had an interest in Guys and
Dolls) and Yourman, who testified that he owned Guys and Dolls,*
testified about payments to Calder based upon fear. They further
explained that Adam and Eve, a "juice bar" serving non-alcoholic
beverages and Guys and Dolls, which had a liquor license, charged
outrageous prices for drinks. For example, a bottle for which they
paid'$3.00, sometimes sold for $500.00. In most cases the bottles
were de-alcoholized wine (T. 496-497). Both owners testified to ex-
tensive "skimming" operations which allowed them to take hundreds of
thousands of dollars from their businesses and fail to report this as
income on their tax returns (T.482, 563, 574, 702, 777). Sitzer and
Yourman were granted immunity in connection with the instant case,
and, in addition neither have filed amended returns or paid back taxes
due and owing the Government (T. 617, 745).

During the course of Arnold Yourman's testimony, it was developed
that he had originally sought to borrow money from Calder to “buy out”
Sitzer, with whom he was having a dispute. This dispute concerned

whether Guys and Dolls dancers should go “bottomless” or stay “topless”.

_¥There was a serfous question whether Yourman was merely a “front” for
Sitzer at Guys and Dolls since Sitzer was barred by the State Liquor

Authority from having any interest in liquor-servi
480-486, 630). y q erving establishments (T

Accordingly, Yourman was introduced to Julius "Red" Calder, Joseph
Calder's brother. At no time did Calder agree to the requested loan
(T.671-674). According to Yourman, suddenly his employees were
threatened by Joseph Calder and he then began paying them money .

At the request of the FBI, he subsequently taped conversations with
Julius Calder, in which he made no threats, but merely offered to
help Yourman with any problems he had (T. 748-749).

When the FBI made its entry into the case, Sitzer and Yourman
were told to advise Joseph and Julius Calder that they were being
shaken down by a "John Corbo Gang" for "protection money." Payments
to Joseph Calder stopped during October of 1979 for three weeks.
During the course of these conversations no threats were made by
appellant Joseph Calder, who indicated that he didn't know what
they (the agents posing as extortionists) were talking about (T.910).
It is significant that during the period that the Calders were “fired”
by the topless bars, no damage was done and no threats appear on tape.
Furthermore, it was Yourman who was calling the Calders for help in
handling the "Corbo Gang" situation (T. 912, 804).

In October, 1979 all the defendants were arrested in a car outside
the Adam and Eve Bar after Joseph Calder was alleged to have received
a three hundred dollar payment. This money was marked by the FBI, who
were surveilling Calder from the time he left the bar to the time of
his arrest a few minutes thereafter. None of the marked money was
ever seized by the agents although they thoroughly searched the four
occupants of the vehicle, and the vehicle itself (T. 1268-1272).

B. THE DEFENSE CASE

None of the defendants testified on their own behalf. Joseph

Calder called three witnesses. The first two, Nora Petrella and

Joseph Ricevuto, were employees at Adam and Eve and Guys and Dolls,

a rR Ore

respectively. They both testified that Joseph Calder was at the
premises not only on Wednesdays, but some three to four days a week,
staying there four or five hours each day (T. 1188-1189, 1233). In
addition, they stated that he performed certain functions inside the
premises, such as calming down rowdy patrons and stopping fights (T.

1195, 1235). There was further testimony that Joseph Calder's function

in the bar might have been to protect against raids by the police or

liquor authorities (T. 1226-1230).

Appellant also called Father Sebastian Buccellato, who explained
that the nickname "Joe Priest" derived from appellant's days as a
ceudnarten and that he was known 2s such among the clergy 4s well as
others in the community (T. 1263-1265).

Co-defendant George Monge called Guy Maggiore as a witness.
Maggiore, a twenty-one year old friend of Monge, testified that Monge
was dating Calder's daughter and would often drive him around because
Calder was a diabetic and had once "blacked out” behind the wheel.
Maggiore testified that he had also driven appellant into the city
upon occasion (T. 1281-1286) .

REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT

THERF. WAS INSUFFICIENT PROOF AT
TRIAL TO ESTABLISH THE JURISDICTIONAL
ELEMENT UNDER THE HOBBS ACT.

“the Government's proof at trial was insufficient to satisf
the jurisdictional requirement of the Hobbs Act. The evidence
failed to provide a nexus between the three hundred dollars rec:
weekly by appellant and any impact, however minimal, on interst-
commerce. Furthermore, there was no evidence that the victims’
chases in interstate commerce were in any degree depleted by pa”
to appellant.

The pertinent language of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C., 1951,
vides in pertinent part:

Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays,

ox, affects commerce OF tis merce, by Topbery

or extortion . . . is in violation of the Act.
Although the courts has construed the above language to includ
affects on commerce that are de minimus, “potential” or “subtle”
United States v. Augello, 451 F2d 1167, 1169-70 (2d Cir. 1971),
denied, 405 U.S. 1070 (1972); United States v. Tropiano, 418 F2
1076 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1021 (1970); Unite:
v. Daley, 564 F2d 645, 649 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 435 U.S. 933

some effect has always been a necessary predicate. In the inst
case, however, there is simply no nexus between the acts allege
interstate commerce. In short, the interstate commerce allegat:
merely a sham to provide federal jurisdiction.

The testimony adduced at trial, offered to provide this es

element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, was given sho

shrift by the prosecution 4

1 TESTIMONY OF SOL SITZER:

Q Now, during the years 1978 and 1979, di
‘ used at Acam and Eve? , did you purchase £.
es.

The Government failed to produce any invoices or documents to
show that goods were actually from out of state, nor were there

any inquiries into how many purchases were made from out of state

Teontinued. F

Q And basically where was that purchase (sic) from?
. Flagstaff Food Corporation in New Jersey.

Q Did you also purchase juices which were sold at Adam
and Eve?
A. Wines, juices, champagnes, non-alcoholic beverages,
beers.
Q When you say wines, do you mean the de-alcoholized
wines?
A De-Alcoholized, non-alcoholic wines that came from Canada.
Q Where did you purchase juices from or wines?
A The wines, Martinelli Wine Company in Canada.

THE COURT: In Canada?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

Q_ And from which company did you purchase such items as
garbage bags, etc.?

A There is a Minisco in New Jersey. Minisco Plastic Bag
Company, I'm not sure. I know its Minisco. (T.456-457)

TESTIMONY OF ARNOLD YOURMAN

Q Now, during this period of time, 1978 through 1979, from
what corporation did Guys and Dolls purchase its food?

A Flagstab (sic) Corporation. They were a New Jersey
Company.

Q Did you have any other goods shipped from out of State?
A Yes. From outside the State we used to get our garbage

bags. It was called Municipal Company. They are in
Palisades Park, New Jersey. We got our ballons (sic), our
decorations from a compeny in -- I think it's in East
Rutherford. I'm not sure of the address-

2 = you purchase any juices at Guys and Dolls?

es

Q Did any of that come from out of State?

A No, not the juices.

Q But the food came from out of State?

A Correct.

Q Now, during the year from approximately September of '78
through September of -- or October, 1979, how much money
was paid out of the assets of Guys and Dolls to Joseph
Calder?

A Approximately $15,000.

Q Did that have any impact on your profits?

A Yes, it did.

Q To what extent?

A $15,000 that I didn't have to work with (T. 687-688).

pencaxte In addition, Sol Sitzer testified on cross-examination
that the bottles of cider for which he paid two dollars were sold
for three hundred and fifty to five hundred dollars each (T. 520).
It was painfully obvious that the customers who frequented the Adam
and Eve and the Guys and Dolls establishments were not paying this
money for the beverages, but because of the topless women who worked
in the bar, who provided sexual services (T. 637). To suggest that
somehow the’ resources of these bars were depleted by the payments to
Calder so as to diminish their purchasing power in interstate commerce
(See United States v. Merolla, 523 F2d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1975); United
States v. Addonizio, 451 F2d 49 at 77 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,

United States v. Demet, 486 F2d 816 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,

.

e
.
*
—

416 U.S. 969 (1974), is so highly conjectural as to be unrealistic.
The most persuasive factor which militates against a finding of

any interference with interstate commerce is the testimony of owners
Yourman and Sitzer regarding their extensive skimming of cash (hundreds
of thousands of dollars) from the businesses in question (T. 482, 563,
574, 702, 777). Ona daily basis large amounts of cash were taken
from the cash register by the owners and appropriated by them to

evade paying income tax. It is not disputed that Calder was paid

out of these cash receipts. Accordingly, the evidence shows that

the cash payments to appellant merely depleted the owners’ own cash

—=e +
e-

Government counsel expressed his own concern whether there was
sufficient evidence to sustain the jurisdictional element when,
near the conclusion of the Government's case, he asked the Court
whether the evidence was "sufficient from a legal standpoint.”

1 ee refused to give an “auvisory opinion on the issue (T.1091-

Appellant Calder move pursuant to Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure for a dismissal based upon the failure of the
Government to prove the affect on interstate commerce, which motion
was denied by the Trial Court (‘. 1598-1599).

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VAN SuUAAF?H Chalets’, § Boe eet

4

This case involves the ext_rtion of money from two
bars with the descriptive names of "Guys and Dolls" and
"Adam and Eve", located in midtown Manhattan. The proof,

which we must view in the light most favorable to the Govern-
ment, shows that, beginning in September 1978, Joseph Calder,
accompanied by George Monge, extorted $300 weekly from each
of these bars. There was evi lence that the extortion con-
tinued for over a year, the take from each bar totalling

approximately $15,000.

Eventually, the FBI was called upon for help, and
it devised a plan to halt the extortion and to apprehend
those responsible for it. The gist of this plan was that
FBI agents would pose as members of a rival gang attempting
to shake down the same bars. Through this ruse, the Govern-
ment secured ample, properly-admitted evidence tying Joseph
Calder's brother Julius and Thomas DiDonato to the extortion

scheme.

On the night of October 31, 1979, all four appel-
lants were arrested while in a car parked outside the Adam
and Eve. Joseph Calder had just collected the weekly $300
payment and had informed the manager that he and DiDonato
"would be around from now on" to pick up the money. Monge
was carrying a pistol, and a baseball bat was found in the
back, seat of the car.

Appellants were convicted under the Hobbs Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1951, which makes federal offenses of robbery,
extortion, and conspiracy to rob or extort, if they “in any
way or degree” affect interstate commerce. The Calder
brothers and Monge were convicted on two substantive counts
and one conspiracy count; DiDonato was convicted on only the
conspiracy count. Their principal argument on appeal is
that the evidence was insufficient to show the impact on
interstate commerce required by the statute and that
@3

offender on probation... ." It also provides that the
Act shall not be construed to repeal or amend the provisions
of the general probation chapter, section 3651 of which
permits a court to suspend the imposition or execution of

sentence and place the defendant on probation. See Durst v. +

United States, 434 U.S. 542, 543-44, 549-50 (1978); United
States v. Buechler, 557 F.2d 1002, 1006 (3d Cir. 1977).

Commitment under sections 5010(b) and 5010(c) is “in
lieu of the penalty of imprisonment otherwise provided by

law." Durst v. United States, supra, 434 U.S. at 552. When

a court imposes probation and suspends the imposition of — ~
sentence, he is not sentencing the defendant to prison.
In the strict sense of the word, he is not “sentencing”

the defendant at all. See Dunn v. United States, 561 F.2d

259, 261 (D.C. Cir. 1977); United States v. Chappell, 480

F. Supp. 321, 324 (W.D. Okla. 1978). Assuming, for the

argument, that sentences imposed on all counts in a youth

>

offender case must be consistent, it does not necessarily
follow that sentence must be imposed on all counts. The
imposition of probation may be a proper exercise of the
"flexibility [allowed a district judge] in choosing among
a variety of treatment settings and programs tailored to

individual needs." Durst v. United States, supra, 434 U.S.

at 545. Like the fines and orders of restitution approved
by the Court in Durst, suspension of sentence and probation

may, in a particular case, be consistent with the

-7-

rehabilitative intent of the Act.

The judgments are affirmed.

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OT eeneantnail nt ee yi eiratae,

FOOTNOTES :
2 ‘ * ‘ |
1. We find no merit in appeilant DiDonato's argument that ;
. the evidence was insufficient to establish that he was a
: conspirator in the extortion scheme. His awn statements |
) :
’ ° showed him to be a person of authority in the extortion
° group, and this evidence was buttressed by properly-admitted
Be”
if testimony of his fellow conspirators. | 3
8 i
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9
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11
7
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by law for the offense or offenses of which

he stands convicted or until discharged

11 by the Commission as Provided in section :
5017(d) of this chapter, * j

~-

2 Section 5017(d) Provides;

"(d) A youth offender committed

> ~~ EO OS OG DEE Terre,
>

15 under section 5010(c) of this chapter fr i
i Shall be released conditionally under

16 Supervision not later than two years '
before the Cxptration of the term imposed ! ‘

17 by the court. He may be discharged |
unconditionally at the expiration of not

18 less than one year from the date of his .
conditional release. tte Shall be discharged

19 unconditional ly On or before the expiration

of the ma x imum sentence imposed, computed

20 uninterrupted ly from the date ef conviction.,* |
|

21 ‘
22 ! 3/ = Section 5023(a) Provides; i
23 "(a) Nothing in this chapter
shall Limit or affect the Power of any :

4 court to Suspend the imposition or i

execution of any sentence and Place a
25 youth offender on Probation or be_

construed in anv wise to amend, repeal,

6 or affect the Provisions of ch pter 231

of this title or the Act of June 25
27 1910 (en, 433, 36 Stat. 864), as amended.

(ch. Ll, title 24, Of the po. of CC. Code),
2a both relative to probation, * '
29
39

i
31 '
32 ~i-
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71 et. 1M ~ tery ‘

Court, U.S.
FILED
MAR 4 1981
| Niexander L. Stevas, Clerk
IN THE
¢ SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1980
No. 80-6291
JOSEPH CALDER,
Petitioner,
-Vs-
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
RECEIVED
» MARY 1981

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FOPMA PAUPERIS

Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. §1915,
and Rule 53 of the Rules of this Court, petitioner JOSEPH CALDER,
asks leave to file the attached petition for a writ of certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit without

payment of costs and to proceed in forma pauperis.

The certifitate of counsel for the petitioner in support

of this motion is annexed hereto.

Counsel or Petitioner
JOSEPH CALDER

New York, New York
February 23, 1981

Court, 6S.
FILED
MAR 4 wel
| Kexander L Stesas, Cast
IN THE an
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1980
No. 80-6291 |
JOSEPH CALDER,
Petitioner,
-Vs-
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
RECEIVED
MAR 9 1981
OFFICE OF THE CLERA a
~— SUPREME CouRT, 2 —

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. §1915,
and Rule 53 of the Rules of this Court, petitioner JOSEPH CALDER,
asks leave to file the attached petition for a writ of certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit without

payment of costs and to proceed in forma pauperis.

The certificate of counsel for the petitioner in support

of this: motion is annexed hereto.

——

Counsel or Petitioner
JOSEPH CALDER

New York, New York
February 23, 1981

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT S jrexander L. Stevas, Clerk |
= epee
October Term, 1980

No. 80-6291

JOSEPH CALDER,
Petitioner,
-Vs-

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Respondent. RECEIVED

MAR 9 1981

OFFICE OF THE CLERK °
SUP

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

KENNETH J. KAPLAN, ESQ., being a member of the Bar of this
Court, and assigned by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act, to represent
petitioner, hereby certifies as follows in support of petitioner's
motion for leave to proceed without being required to prepay costs or
fees:

1. The United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York assigned me to represent the petitioner at his
trial in that court, due to the financial inability of petitioner to
pay the costs of his defense.

2. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,

assigned me, pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act, to represent

petitioner upon his appeal to that Court, due to petitioner's inability
to pay the costs of his appeal.

3. Petitioner is not presently gainfully employed and has
not been employed during the duration of my representation of him.
Petitioner has advised me that he is unable to pay the costs of this
petition, or to give security for the same, he further advised me
that he believes he is entitled to the redress he seeks by the petition.
He has requested me to file this petition on his behalf.

4. The nature of the petition for a writ of certiorari is
as follows:

Following a jury trial in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York, petitioner was found guilty of
extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. §195. On June 6, 198, appellant
was sentences to a six year term of imprisonment. He contends that
he was denied a fair trial in that there was insufficient evidence to
establish the jurisdictional requirement of an affect or interstate

commerce under the Hobbs Act.

Respectfully submitted

KENNET ° LA
Assigned Counsel for
Petitioner JOSEPH CALDER

New York, New York
February 23', 1981

---

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